Quotes of the Day:
"I never learned from a man who agreed with me."
- Robert A. Heinlein
"There are plenty of good reasons for fighting...but no good reason to ever hate without reservation, to imagine that God Almighty hates with you, too. Where's evil? It's that large part of every man that wants to hate without limit, that wants to hate with God on its side. It's that part of every man that finds all kinds of ugliness so attractive....it's that part of an imbecile that punishes and vilifies and makes war gladly."
- Kurt Vonnegut
"Character cannot be developed in ease and quiet. Only through experience of trial and suffering can the soul be strengthened, ambition inspired, and success achieved."
- Helen Keller
1. Former President Chun Doo-hwan dies at 90
2. Chun Doo-hwan, Ex-Military Dictator of South Korea, Dies at 90
3. Chun Doo-hwan: Symbol of bloody, divided past
4. Defense minister asks for U.S. Congress' support for alliance, Korean peace
5. Discussions over Korean War’s formal end are ‘coming to a finish,’ official says
6. Cheong Wa Dae expresses regret as ex-President Chun dies without apology
7. Tumultuous inter-Korean relations under rule of late ex-President Chun
8. N. Korea holds nationwide computer programming competition
9. Family of assassinated N. Korean defector requests state panel probe
10. State Department clarifies expectations of Seoul regarding Beijing
11. Experts: US Boycott of Beijing Olympics Would Dash Seoul's Hopes for Diplomacy
12. Catching Korea off guard (trilateral meeting in Washington)
13. How to Deliver Relief to North Koreans Without Lifting Sanctions
14. N. Korean investigation finds over 110 cases of "unauthorized entry" into Pyongyang
15. S Korea groans under US, China supply chain pressure
16. North Korea Remains the Land of Bad Options: What to Do About Human Rights?
17. Seoul’s leftists now blame Washington for the Dokdo dispute
18. North Korean Hackers Caught Snooping on China’s Cyber Squad
1. Former President Chun Doo-hwan dies at 90
(4th LD) Former President Chun Doo-hwan dies at 90 | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with Cheong Wa Dae's statement, body's transferral, opposition presidential candidate's stance)
By Lee Haye-ah
SEOUL, Nov. 23 (Yonhap) -- Former President Chun Doo-hwan, a general-turned-strongman widely criticized for seizing power through a 1979 military coup and ruthlessly quelling a pro-democracy civil uprising in the southwestern city of Gwangju the following year, died Tuesday at the age of 90.
Chun died at his home in western Seoul around 8:40 a.m. after battling blood cancer and chronic ailments, aides said.
Chun's last wish was that his remains be buried "on a frontline high ground overlooking North Korean territory," Min Jeong-ki, a former presidential secretary and aide to Chun, told reporters outside the residence, adding his body will be cremated before being buried at a site to be determined later.
Chun's body was transferred to Seoul's Severance Hospital in the afternoon.
The former Army general rose to power after staging a coup in the wake of the assassination of then President Park Chung-hee in 1979 and ruled the country until 1988.
One of his biggest and darkest political legacies is his deadly crackdown on the Gwangju pro-democracy civil uprising in 1980, which left more than 200 dead and 1,800 others wounded, according to conservative official data.
The deceased never apologized for the blood on his hands.
Chun's death on Tuesday was met with condemnation from civic groups seeking to preserve the history of the country's democratic movement.
"It is deeply regrettable that (Chun) died without acknowledging his faults," read a joint statement by the May 18 Memorial Foundation, Korea Democracy Foundation and the BUMA Democratic Uprising Memorial Foundation.
"Chun Doo-hwan didn't even ask for forgiveness from the people, especially the citizens of Gwangju," they said.
Cheong Wa Dae expressed regret that Chun died without an apology but offered its prayers for the deceased and comfort to the bereaved family.
Chun "didn't reveal the truth of history until the end," presidential spokesperson Park Kyung-mee told reporters, adding Cheong Wa Dae has no plans to send flowers or pay a condolence visit.
The ruling Democratic Party said it will look into appropriate ways to mark Chun's death but noted the deceased is not eligible for a state funeral or burial at a national cemetery because of his past crimes.
The main opposition People Power Party (PPP) said it does not plan to issue a statement Tuesday on the former president's death and its presidential nominee, Yoon Seok-youl, will not be visiting a memorial altar for Chun to pay his respects.
Earlier, Yoon came under fire after claiming many people believed Chun "did well in politics," with the exception of the coup and the bloody crackdown.
Chun was born into a poor family in Hapcheon, South Gyeongsang Province, on Jan. 18, 1931 and entered the Korea Military Academy in 1951.
At the academy, he befriended Roh Tae-woo, who would later become his right-hand man and serve in various capacities during Chun's administration before being elected president himself and succeeding Chun.
Before becoming president, Chun enjoyed an illustrious career that included a stint at the state spy agency, the Army 1st Special Forces Group, which he headed, and as a member of Park's presidential security service.
At the time of Park's assassination in October 1979, Chun was chief of the Defense Security Command and led an investigation into the case.
In December, he took power in a coup staged with Roh's help.
Chun consolidated power after quelling the uprising in Gwangju in 1980 by launching a supra-constitutional emergency committee and laying out regulations on political activity, which led to the dissolution of parliament and strengthened his grip on power.
The same year he retired from the military after more than 25 years of service and began what would become the most notorious rule in modern Korean history.
He forced the resignation of then acting President Choi Kyu-hah in August 1980, paving the way for his election as president. He was inaugurated in September under the banner of eradicating corruption and political strife, with a particular emphasis on achieving a just society.
After leaving office in 1988, Chun was mired by a series of controversies over his rule, which led him to issue a public apology and pledge to donate his wealth to the nation.
He donated more than 16 billion won (US$13.4 million) in political funds and private wealth before effectively going into exile at a Buddhist temple with his wife, Lee Sun-ja.
During his time in exile, Chun was summoned to testify before the National Assembly and was subject to public humiliation as Roh Moo-hyun, a then lawmaker who later became president, threw a nameplate at him.
Even after returning home at the end of 1990, Chun was dogged by prosecutorial investigations over illegalities committed before and during his time in office, including in the course of the coup and Gwangju crackdown.
He was summoned by the prosecution on charges of treason in December 1995, but he defied the order by reading out a public statement outside his home saying he would not cooperate with the investigation.
A warrant was issued the next day for his arrest, and he was eventually incarcerated at a prison in his hometown of Hapcheon.
In 1996, Chun was convicted of treason, murder for the purpose of treason and bribe-taking, and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court later commuted his sentence to life in prison and a forfeiture of over 220 billion won.
Chun was released from prison in December 1997 after being pardoned by then President Kim Young-sam in the name of national unity.
Until his death, Chun failed to pay the penalty in full. At one point, he claimed his entire wealth consisted of 290,000 won, a remark that was widely criticized for years afterward, especially as he was seen visiting expensive golf clubs.
One of Chun's trials is still under way, and the last time he was seen in public was when he appeared at a district court in Gwangju in August.
His death comes less than a month after the passing of Roh Tae-woo on Oct. 26.
Despite Roh's own dark political legacy, the former president was given a five-day state funeral amid public recognition of his efforts to atone for his wrongdoings by expressing remorse through his family.
Chun has been credited by some supporters with bringing prices under control and helping win Seoul's bid to host the 1988 Summer Olympics, which raised the country's profile on the international stage.
He is survived by his wife, three sons and a daughter.
(END)
2.Chun Doo-hwan, Ex-Military Dictator of South Korea, Dies at 90
Chun Doo-hwan, Ex-Military Dictator of South Korea, Dies at 90
The country’s most vilified former military dictator, he seized power in a coup and ruled his country with an iron fist for most of the 1980s.
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Unapologetic to the end, Chun Doo-hwan was the last to die among South Korea’s three military general-turned presidents.Credit...Yun Jai-Hyoung/Associated Press
By
Nov. 22, 2021Updated 9:32 p.m. ET
Chun Doo-hwan, South Korea’s most vilified former military dictator, who seized power in a coup and ruled his country with an iron fist for most of the 1980s, dispatching paratroopers and armored vehicles to mow down hundreds of pro-democracy protesters, died on Tuesday at his home in Seoul. He was 90.
His death was confirmed by South Korea’s national police agency.
In 1996, eight years after he left office, Mr. Chun was sentenced to death on sedition and mutiny charges stemming from his role in the 1979 coup that brought him to power and the massacre of demonstrators at the southwestern city of Gwangju the following year. But he was pardoned in 1997 in a gesture of reconciliation, shortly after Kim Dae-jung, a former dissident whom Mr. Chun’s military junta had once condemned to death, was elected president.
Mr. Chun, who was president from 1979 until early 1988, was also convicted of collecting hundreds of millions of dollars in bribes from wealthy, politically connected families known as chaebol whose businesses expanded into conglomerates with the help of tax cuts and other government favors.
Unapologetic to the end, Mr. Chun was the last to die among South Korea’s three military general-turned presidents.
As an army captain, Mr. Chun took part in Maj. Gen. Park Chung-hee’s coup in 1961, a move that secured his place in Mr. Park’s military elite. When Mr. Park’s 18-year dictatorship abruptly ended with his assassination in 1979, Mr. Chun, by then a major general himself, staged his own coup to usurp control. He later handpicked his friend Roh Tae-woo, also a former general, as successor. Mr. Roh, president from 1988 to 1993, died in October.
During the three generals’ combined rule of 32 years, South Korea rose from the ruins of the 1950-53 Korean War to become one of Asia’s Tiger economies, overtaking rival North Korea in industrial output and national income. While Mr. Chun was in office, South Korea tamed its chronic inflation, and its economy was among the world’s fastest growing, expanding an average 10 percent a year.
His government also overcame huge odds against Japan, its historical enemy, to win the right to host to the 1988 Olympics, widely seen as a coming-out party for the once war-torn nation.
But Mr. Chun is mostly remembered as a dictator.
“Among South Koreans, his name is synonymous with a tyrannical military dictator,” said Choi Jin, director of the Institute for Presidential Leadership in Seoul. “His positive achievements are far outweighed by his negative legacies — the illegitimate way he came to power and the dictatorial streak that ran through his term.”
Mr. Chun was born on Jan. 18, 1931, to a farming family in Hapcheon in what is now southern South Korea. At the time, Korea was a colony of Japan’s.
While his father, Chun Sang-woo, ran from debt-collectors and Japanese police officers (after pushing one of them off a cliff), his mother, Kim Jeom-mun, had high expectations for Doo-hwan, one of their four sons. When a Buddhist fortuneteller predicted that her three protruding frontal teeth would block the boy’s path to future glory, she rushed into her kitchen and yanked them out with a pair of tongs, according to “Chun Doo-hwan: Man of Destiny,” an authorized biography published after his coup.
After finishing vocational high school, Doo-hwan gave up going to college because he could not pay tuition. Instead, he joined the Korea Military Academy, where he practiced boxing and captained its soccer team as a goalie. (As president, he used to call the head coach of South Korea’s national soccer team in the middle of a match to dictate game strategy.)
General Chun was serving as head of the military’s intelligence command in late 1979 when Mr. Park was assassinated by the director of KCIA, his spy agency, during a drinking party. Mr. Chun and his army friends — mostly officers like Mr. Roh who hailed from his home province in the southeast of South Korea — arrested their boss and martial-law commander, the army chief of staff, Gen. Jeong Seung-hwa, and moved their troops into Seoul to complete his largely bloodless coup.
“It was a dirty rebellion that served no other purpose than to satisfy Chun Doo-hwan’s personal greed,” Mr. Jeong said later. He said Mr. Chun’s cronies flogged and waterboarded him to extract a false confession that he had been complicit in Mr. Park’s assassination.
Mr. Chun placed the country under a martial law, closing Parliament and universities and detaining prominent dissidents, including the two main opposition leaders, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung. In May 1980, people in Gwangju, Kim Dae-jung’s political home base, rose up in protest, chanting, “Down with Chun Doo-hwan!”
Troops moved in, wielding batons and bayonets and opening fire. Some protesters armed themselves with weapons stolen from police stations. The crackdown cost at least 191 lives by official count, including 26 soldiers and police officers. Victims’ families said the death toll was much higher.
Mr. Chun’s military junta later sentenced Kim Dae-jung to death on a false charge of instigating the Gwangju uprising at the behest of North Korea.
“The incident was an outrage and a tragedy that was to profoundly shape the thinking of an entire generation of young people in Korea, making many of them extremely critical of the United States,” David Straub, a former American diplomat who served in South Korea at the time, wrote in his 2015 book “Anti-Americanism in Democratizing South Korea.”
To young Koreans, Washington’s perceived failure to stop the Gwangju massacre despite the fact that their country had placed its military under operational control of American generals was evidence of betrayal. Later, President Ronald Reagan’s “quiet diplomacy” on Mr. Chun’s human rights abuses hardened their belief that Washington had ignored Koreans’ suffering under Mr. Chun.
Anti-Americanism among young South Koreans raged on into later decades. Student activists raided U.S. diplomatic facilities, setting one on fire. American military bases were plagued by demonstrators shouting, “Yankee Go Home!”
Washington said that it had been caught off-guard by Mr. Chun’s coup and that none of the forces deployed at Gwangju were at the time under the control of any American authorities. It criticized Mr. Chun’s martial law and called for restraint in Gwangju, but the government-controlled South Korean news media reported that the United States had approved Mr. Chun’s dispatch of troops there.
Mr. Chun “manipulated not only the Korean public but also the United States,” Mr. Straub wrote.
In a rare interview published in the South Korean monthly magazine Shindonga in 2016, Mr. Chun denied giving a shoot-to-kill order in Gwangju. He called himself a victim of political “revenge.”
“I had nothing to do with the Gwangju incident,” he told the magazine. “As a soldier, I saw the country in a difficult situation, and I had to become president because there was no other way. It was not like I wanted to become president.”
After the Gwangju massacre, Mr. Chun had himself elected president by an electoral college filled with pro-government delegates. He forced the country’s news media to shut down or merge into a handful of newspapers and TV stations, which his government controlled with a daily “press guideline.” Prime-time TV news always began with reports on Mr. Chun’s daily routine. A comedian was banished from TV when people began comparing him to Mr. Chun; both were bald.
Dissidents, student activists and journalists were hauled into torture chambers. Under Mr. Chun’s “social purification” program, the government rounded up tens of thousands of gangsters, homeless people, political dissidents and others deemed to be unhealthy elements of the society and trucked them to military barracks for brutal re-education. Hundreds were reported to have died under the program.
North Korea tried to assassinate Mr. Chun while he was visiting Burma, now known as Myanmar, in 1983. Bombs planted by its agents destroyed the Martyrs’ Mausoleum in Yangon (formerly known as Rangoon), then the Burmese capital, and killed 21 people, including several South Korean cabinet ministers. Mr. Chun escaped the attack because his arrival there had been delayed.
Deeply unpopular, Mr. Chun wanted his handpicked successor, Mr. Roh, elected by the same rubber-stamp electoral college. But amid massive protests triggered by the death of a tortured student activist, he and Mr. Roh acceded to a popular election.
Mr. Roh became the country’s first directly elected president in 16 years, thanks largely to the split of opposition votes between the two dissident candidates, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, whose mutual mistrust was as deep as their common hatred of military rule.
Mr. Chun tried to appease the public calling for his punishment by going into domestic exile in a remote Buddhist monastery. But after Kim Young-sam took power in 1993, he went after Mr. Chun, Mr. Roh and other former generals once considered untouchables.
Mr. Chun was on his way to the bathroom on Tuesday, assisted by his wife, Lee Soon-ja, when he collapsed, said a senior police officer who was in charge of guarding Mr. Chun’s residence in Seoul. In addition to his wife, he is survived by their four children, Jae-yong, Hyo-sun, Jae-guk and Jae-man.
In a Supreme Court ruling in 1997, Mr. Chun was ordered to return 220 billion won, or $190 million, to the state that he had illegally accumulated through bribery. He said he didn’t have enough to pay the fine, though critics accused him of hiding assets in the care of relatives.
Prosecutors have so far collected only half the sum, even though they raided his home to confiscate what they could, including a refrigerator and two dogs.
3. Chun Doo-hwan: Symbol of bloody, divided past
There is a reason why Kim Jong-un fears unification with the ROK. If the ROK will put three former presidents in jail, imagine what a unified Korea might do to him for his crimes against humanity.
As noted Chun is vilified and not remembered for some of the good that he did:
While Chun is mostly remembered as a military dictator who orchestrated bloody crackdowns and perpetrated gross human rights violations, he also brought significant policy reforms and made notable diplomatic achievements, most of which are rarely mentioned due to his dark past.
He abolished a collective punishment system and established a new college entrance admission system that allowed people with few advantages in life to climb up the ladder. He also made initial investments toward the installation of a nationwide telecommunications system.
During his term, South Korea enjoyed high economic growth and low unemployment. The country’s economy grew an average of 12.1 percent between 1986 and 1988, and some have labeled the period as the most prosperous years South Korea has ever seen.
He also introduced a minimum wage system and implemented policies mandating that the rate be negotiated each year while introducing a Reserve Officers' Training Corps recruitment system and designing protective housing policies.
At the same time, Chun abolished the nationwide curfew that was in force for 37 years while eliminating regulations on school uniforms and hairstyles. He lifted regulations on the film industry, opening the gateway for South Korea’s entertainment sector.
Chun also launched professional soccer, baseball and Korean wrestling leagues. He was instrumental in having Seoul host the Summer Olympic Games in 1988.
Yet the Samcheong reeducation camp -- established on his orders in 1980 -- drew immense controversy, as many innocent citizens were subjected to brutal conditions and forced labor. The camp was initially aimed at "cleansing" social ills such as drug trafficking.
The years after Chun’s term were marred by the crimes he committed before and during his presidency.
He and his successor Roh were arrested in 1995 during the Kim Young-sam administration, which defined Chun's military action as a coup. Chun was sentenced to death, but his sentence was later commuted to life in prison. He and Roh were pardoned in December 1997.
Chun Doo-hwan: Symbol of bloody, divided past
By Ko Jun-tae koreaherald.com4 min
Former President Chun Doo-hwan, one of the most controversial figures in South Korea’s recent history, died Tuesday at the age of 90.
Chun, who died after suffering from multiple myeloma in his later years, leaves behind a bloody and troublesome legacy largely due to a 1979 military coup that led to a bloody crackdown on the 1980 Gwangju Democratic Uprising.
The Army general-turned-politician was born as the fourth son of 10 children in Hapcheon County, South Gyeongsang Province, in 1931, later on joining the military by attending the Korea Military Academy from 1951 to 1955.
He rose through the ranks by befriending powerful figures during his military career. He earned the trust of his predecessor, Park Chung-hee, who made him secretary to the commander of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction after showing support for Park's May 16 coup in 1961.
Chun consolidated his power by forming a secret military club named Hanahoe, composed of his classmates from the Korea Military Academy and other acquaintances. The club laid the foundation for the military coup he led in 1979 following the assassination of Park the same year.
Before serving as president of South Korea from 1980 to 1988, Chun was the nation’s de facto leader in 1979, with Choi Kyu-ha as the figurehead president.
He declared martial law in 1980, citing rumors of North Korean infiltration -- closing down universities, banning political actions and gagging the press. The move caused a nationwide uproar, with people protesting the military presence in their regions.
The opposition was especially fierce in Gwangju, with citizens mobilizing to launch protests and rallies that turned into the Gwangju Democratic Uprising. Under Chun’s direct orders, troops, tanks and choppers were deployed to suppress the protest, massacring activists over the course of two days.
In seeking to cement his dictatorship, Chun dissolved the National Assembly and effectively named himself as president by registering as the only candidate for the presidential electoral college in August 1980. He enacted a new constitution that concentrated power in the president’s hands.
Chun extended his presidential term by controlling the electoral college, continuing his dictatorship until he stepped down in 1988.
As leader of the Democratic Justice Party, he picked Roh Tae-woo as a presidential nominee in 1987. Roh announced the "Declaration of Democracy," accepting the public’s demand for a constitutional amendment to introduce the direct election system.
Despite the changes, Roh won the election and continued Chun’s legacy.
While Chun is mostly remembered as a military dictator who orchestrated bloody crackdowns and perpetrated gross human rights violations, he also brought significant policy reforms and made notable diplomatic achievements, most of which are rarely mentioned due to his dark past.
He abolished a collective punishment system and established a new college entrance admission system that allowed people with few advantages in life to climb up the ladder. He also made initial investments toward the installation of a nationwide telecommunications system.
During his term, South Korea enjoyed high economic growth and low unemployment. The country’s economy grew an average of 12.1 percent between 1986 and 1988, and some have labeled the period as the most prosperous years South Korea has ever seen.
He also introduced a minimum wage system and implemented policies mandating that the rate be negotiated each year while introducing a Reserve Officers' Training Corps recruitment system and designing protective housing policies.
At the same time, Chun abolished the nationwide curfew that was in force for 37 years while eliminating regulations on school uniforms and hairstyles. He lifted regulations on the film industry, opening the gateway for South Korea’s entertainment sector.
Chun also launched professional soccer, baseball and Korean wrestling leagues. He was instrumental in having Seoul host the Summer Olympic Games in 1988.
Yet the Samcheong reeducation camp -- established on his orders in 1980 -- drew immense controversy, as many innocent citizens were subjected to brutal conditions and forced labor. The camp was initially aimed at "cleansing" social ills such as drug trafficking.
The years after Chun’s term were marred by the crimes he committed before and during his presidency.
He and his successor Roh were arrested in 1995 during the Kim Young-sam administration, which defined Chun's military action as a coup. Chun was sentenced to death, but his sentence was later commuted to life in prison. He and Roh were pardoned in December 1997.
Chun faced criticism even later as he effectively ignored a court order to repay more than 220 billion won ($185 million) that the Supreme Court said he had misappropriated. He refused to pay the bulk of his forfeit and lost the privileges given to former presidents due to his convictions for treason and bribery.
He continued to face time in court until just months before his death, appearing in Gwangju courts on libel charges. Chun published a memoir in 2017 defending his authoritarian presidency, and some of the comments contained in the book led to a criminal defamation complaint with the prosecution.
The former leader still faces criticism today, as he never apologized to the victims of the Gwangju massacre.
In his later years Chun saw his health deteriorate rapidly, and he suffered from Alzheimer's disease and blood cancer. Chun is survived by his wife, Lee Soon-ja, three sons and a daughter.
4. Defense minister asks for U.S. Congress' support for alliance, Korean peace
We have been fortunate that we have had strong bipartisan support for the ROK/US alliance. I fear HR 3466 could change that ("Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act," https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3446/text) because it is being enacted and supported by members of Congress who do not have sufficient understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime and they are being influence by certain NGOs who do not understand north Korea ether.
Defense minister asks for U.S. Congress' support for alliance, Korean peace | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Nov. 23 (Yonhap) -- Defense Minister Suh Wook met U.S. lawmakers Tuesday and asked for their support for the bilateral alliance and peace on the Korean Peninsula, his office said.
During his meeting with Reps. Mark Takano (D-CA), Colin Allred (D-TX), Elissa Slokin (D-MI), Sara Jacobs (D-CA), and Nancy Mace (R-SC) in Seoul, Suh said the alliance is becoming more comprehensive and mutually beneficial.
Suh added the military is making efforts to support the diplomatic endeavors of Seoul and Washington for the denuclearization and perpetual peace on the Korean Peninsula.
The U.S. delegation also vowed to make bipartisan efforts for the future-oriented advancement of the alliance, according to the ministry.
The congressmen expressed gratitude for the South Korean government's support for the United States Force Korea (USFK) as well.
The representatives were visiting South Korea to encourage USFK troops in time for Thanksgiving Day.
.
colin@yna.co.kr
(END)
5. Discussions over Korean War’s formal end are ‘coming to a finish,’ official says
We should pay attention to the former General and Admiral/Ambassador:
Former officials who oversaw the U.S.’s role in South Korea have viewed the possibility of an end-of-war declaration with caution. Defense experts have widely called into question whether Pyongyang would change the course of its weapons program and open up to the international community following such a declaration.
Former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Harry Harris, during a discussion panel in New York on Wednesday, reiterated that the U.S. “must not relax sanctions or reduce joint military exercises just to get North Korea to come to the negotiating table.”
“Our treaty obligations to defend South Korea will still be extant,” Harris said. “And North Korea’s missile, nuclear and conventional capabilities will still be extant.”
Retired Army Gen. Robert Abrams, the former commander of U.S. Forces Korea, said during the discussion that “we ought to be really careful and proceed deliberately” in declaring a formal end to the war.
“That declaration … is not an end-state or an objective unto itself, but rather a way to achieve that end-state,” he said.
Discussions over Korean War’s formal end are ‘coming to a finish,’ official says
With her brother on her back, a Korean girl tiredly trudges by a stalled M-26 tank in Haengju, Korea, June 9, 1951. (U.S. Army)
SEOUL, South Korea — Discussions over an end-of-war declaration with North Korea will soon come to a close, a South Korean government official said.
The country’s Ministry of Unification chief, Lee In-young, made the remarks during an academic conference at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies’ campus in Seoul on Friday.
The Unification Minister said Seoul and Washington, D.C., “have been holding deep discussions very seriously” regarding a declaration to formally end the war, adding that it “is coming to a finish to some degree.”
Lee said an end-of-war declaration “is a reasonable approach” to the ongoing impasse on the Korean Peninsula.
“South Korea, North Korea and the U.S. can form trust amongst one another after putting down their antagonism and confrontations without any drastic situational changes,” he said.
Lee also qualified his remarks by addressing the uncertainty surrounding North Korea reciprocating a potential end-of-war declaration.
“It is yet not transparent whether North Korea would respond to some degree in its relations with South Korea and the U.S. in the future,” he said. “But North Korea seems to be trying to come out with its response strategies, while seeing follow-up responses with South Korea and the U.S.”
Diplomats from the U.S. and South Korea have been holding talks in recent weeks to officially end the 1950-53 Korean War. The war ended with the signing of an armistice agreement that stopped the immediate conflict without the long-term resolution of a peace treaty. The armistice was intended to be a temporary agreement.
South Korean President Moon Jae-in, whose term ends next year, broached the topic during a speech before the U.N. General Assembly in September. He called for the signatories to “come together and declare that the war on the Korean Peninsula is over.”
"When the parties involved in the Korean War stand together and proclaim an end to the war, I believe we can make irreversible progress in denuclearization and usher in an era of complete peace," Moon said in reference to the U.S., North Korea and China.
Former officials who oversaw the U.S.’s role in South Korea have viewed the possibility of an end-of-war declaration with caution. Defense experts have widely called into question whether Pyongyang would change the course of its weapons program and open up to the international community following such a declaration.
Former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Harry Harris, during a discussion panel in New York on Wednesday, reiterated that the U.S. “must not relax sanctions or reduce joint military exercises just to get North Korea to come to the negotiating table.”
“Our treaty obligations to defend South Korea will still be extant,” Harris said. “And North Korea’s missile, nuclear and conventional capabilities will still be extant.”
Retired Army Gen. Robert Abrams, the former commander of U.S. Forces Korea, said during the discussion that “we ought to be really careful and proceed deliberately” in declaring a formal end to the war.
“That declaration … is not an end-state or an objective unto itself, but rather a way to achieve that end-state,” he said.
David Choi
6. Cheong Wa Dae expresses regret as ex-President Chun dies without apology
Excerpts:
The presidential office "prays for the deceased and delivered words of sympathy to the bereaved family," Park said.
Chun "didn't reveal the truth of history until the end," Park said, adding that the presidential office "expresses regret because there is no sincere apology."
...
A senior presidential official said the presidential office has no plan to provide support for Chun's funeral. The official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, also indicated Cheong Wa Dae has not considered holding a state funeral for him.
The stance compares with when late former President Roh Tae-woo died last month.
Roh, a close friend of Chun, was also accused of being deeply involved in the 1979 coup and the bloody crackdown on the Gwangju uprising, but he delivered his message of apology over the crackdown through his family members before he died.
Last month, South Korea held a five-day state funeral for Roh, and President Moon Jae-in sent flowers of condolence.
(LEAD) Cheong Wa Dae expresses regret as ex-President Chun dies without apology | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with remarks, details from para 5, photo)
By Kim Deok-hyun
SEOUL, Nov. 23 (Yonhap) -- The presidential office Cheong Wa Dae expressed regret that former President Chun Doo-hwan died without an apology for the bloody crackdown on a 1980 pro-democracy uprising, even as it said it prays for the soul of the deceased.
Presidential spokesperson Park Kyung-mee told reporters that Cheong Wa Dae has no plan to offer flowers or a condolence visit to Chun, who died at his home earlier in the day at 90 after battling blood cancer and chronic ailments.
The presidential office "prays for the deceased and delivered words of sympathy to the bereaved family," Park said.
Chun "didn't reveal the truth of history until the end," Park said, adding that the presidential office "expresses regret because there is no sincere apology."
Chun, an ex-Army general who seized power in a military coup in 1979, ordered his troops to ruthlessly quell the pro-democracy civil uprising in the southwestern city of Gwangju the following year.
The former strongman never issued an apology or showed remorse for those killed in the uprising and had drawn a firestorm of criticism from the victims' families by calling the uprising a "riot."
The crackdown left more than 200 dead and 1,800 others wounded.
In 1996, Chun was convicted of mutiny and sentenced to death, partly due to his order of the crackdown on the Gwangju uprising, but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. A year later, he was released following a presidential pardon.
A senior presidential official said the presidential office has no plan to provide support for Chun's funeral. The official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, also indicated Cheong Wa Dae has not considered holding a state funeral for him.
The stance compares with when late former President Roh Tae-woo died last month.
Roh, a close friend of Chun, was also accused of being deeply involved in the 1979 coup and the bloody crackdown on the Gwangju uprising, but he delivered his message of apology over the crackdown through his family members before he died.
Last month, South Korea held a five-day state funeral for Roh, and President Moon Jae-in sent flowers of condolence.
kdh@yna.co.kr
(END)
7. Tumultuous inter-Korean relations under rule of late ex-President Chun
Some Korean history often overlooked.
Tumultuous inter-Korean relations under rule of late ex-President Chun | Yonhap News Agency
By Choi Soo-hyang
SEOUL, Nov. 23 (Yonhap) -- Inter-Korean relations went through turbulent developments under the military junta of former South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan, who died Tuesday, highlighted by the first-ever reunion of families on the peninsula separated by the 1950-53 Korean War and two deadly terrorist attacks by the North.
The Army general-turned-strongman rose to power in a 1979 coup and ruled the country until 1988. He died at his home in Seoul at the age of 90.
In 1983, relations between the two Koreas hit one of their lowest ebbs after 17 high-ranking South Korean officials were killed in a bomb attack in Burma, now called Myanmar, blamed on the North, during Chun's visit to the Southeast Asian country.
Chun survived the assassination attempt, but many of his Cabinet ministers were killed.
About a year later, Pyongyang offered to provide humanitarian assistance to the flood-hit South Korea in an apparent peace overture.
The relief materials -- including 8,000 tons of rice, 100,000 tons of cement, clothes and medicines -- were delivered to Seoul in September 1984, marking the first such exchange of aid between the two sides since the Korean War.
The reconciliatory mood led to a series of inter-Korean talks and the first-ever reunion of families separated by the three-year conflict the next year. But the thaw did not last long.
In 1987, North Korean agents launched a bombing attack on a Korean Air Lines passenger plane near Myanmar, killing all 115 people on board. The plane was heading for Seoul from Baghdad when the explosion took place.
Kim Hyon-hui, one of the North Korean agents involved in the bombing, later said the attack was aimed at disrupting the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics.
It was not until the administration of Roh Tae-woo, Chun's friend who succeeded him, that the two Koreas saw major progress in their relations.
Under Roh's presidency, South and North Korea held their first-ever prime ministerial talks in 1990 and concurrently joined the United Nations the following year.
scaaet@yna.co.kr
(END)
8. N. Korea holds nationwide computer programming competition
The regime takes its all purpose sword seriously. It is a key instrument of regime power.
N. Korea holds nationwide computer programming competition | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Nov. 23 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has opened a nationwide computer programming competition aimed at cultivating talents to lead the country's information and technology development, a propaganda outlet said Tuesday.
A semifinal for the competition, organized by the Kimchaek University of Technology, took place between Nov. 5-15, with the final match slated to kick off Friday for an 11-day run, according to DPRK Today.
In an interview with it, the university's vice president said around 1,240 participants, ranging from teachers and researchers to college and middle school students, took part in three rounds of preliminary contests in the runup to the final.
"We have drawn outstanding researchers who showed great performances in international programming competitions to successfully hold this event which is aimed at boosting our programming capabilities critical for information and technology development and the national economy," the vice president said.
North Korea is known to have 6,800-strong cyberwarfare specialists in operation and working to boost its cyber capabilities based on the latest technologies.
scaaet@yna.co.kr
(END)
9. Family of assassinated N. Korean defector requests state panel probe
I remember this. We should never forget that north Korea has operatives in South Korea who are trained to carry out these types of (and other) operations.
Family of assassinated N. Korean defector requests state panel probe | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Nov. 23 (Yonhap) -- The bereaved family of a prominent North Korean defector, who was assassinated in South Korea more than two decades ago, has formally asked a state reconciliation panel here to look into the truth behind his killing, a civic group official said Tuesday.
In 1997, Lee Han-young, nephew of the late North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's estranged wife Song Hye-rim, was shot by a North Korean agent in front of his apartment on the outskirts of Seoul, 15 years after he defected to the South. Lee died 10 days after the incident.
Do Hee-youn, head of the Citizens' Coalition for Human Rights of Abductees and North Korean Refugees, said he submitted an application for a probe to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on Monday on behalf of Lee's family. His family members are seeking the recovery of their honor and that of the victim, as well as the North's apology, state compensation and measures to prevent the recurrence of such a case, according to Do.
Lee's wife had previously filed a suit against the state, demanding compensation for failing to protect him. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the family in 2008.
Despite the ruling, the family argued that the country did not take "minimal measures" to restore the honor of the victim and the remaining family members.
The commission will decide whether to start the probe within 90 days after receiving the application.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
Related Articles
10. State Department clarifies expectations of Seoul regarding Beijing
Key rhetorical question and statements:
South Korea's First Vice Foreign Minister Choi Jong-kun posed a “rhetorical question” in a strategic forum held at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank in Washington on Nov. 15 and asked, “For the interest of the United States, which one is better? South Korea having a really bad relationship with China, or South Korea having a good working relationship with China. Which one will be good for the interest of the United States? I do not have a clear answer.”
Choi had been on a visit to Washington for bilateral and trilateral meetings with his U.S. and Japanese counterparts to discuss North Korea and other regional issues.
The State Department spokesperson, however, had a clear answer on what Washington expects from its allies and said, “We must meet this new moment of accelerating global 21st century challenges, from the pandemic to the climate crisis to nuclear proliferation, which can only be solved by nations working together and in common. We can’t do it alone.”
Similarly, the official added that China can “do more” to combat North Korean sanctions evasion efforts happening in Chinese waters and urged Beijing to “fully and completely fulfill their obligations” under UN Security Council resolutions.
Tuesday
November 23, 2021
State Department clarifies expectations of Seoul regarding Beijing
U.S. President Joe Biden holds a virtual summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping at the White House in Washington on Nov. 15. [REUTERS/YONHAP]
The U.S. State Department stressed Tuesday that South Korea and the United States must work together against China's rising assertions, clarifying what role Washington expects Seoul to play amid its growing rivalry with Beijing.
“American leadership must meet this new moment of growing authoritarianism, including the growing ambitions of the [People's Republic of China] to rival the United States,” a State Department spokesperson told the Voice of America Tuesday, in response to a question about what sort of Seoul-Beijing relationship is in the interest of Washington.
South Korea's First Vice Foreign Minister Choi Jong-kun posed a “rhetorical question” in a strategic forum held at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank in Washington on Nov. 15 and asked, “For the interest of the United States, which one is better? South Korea having a really bad relationship with China, or South Korea having a good working relationship with China. Which one will be good for the interest of the United States? I do not have a clear answer.”
Choi had been on a visit to Washington for bilateral and trilateral meetings with his U.S. and Japanese counterparts to discuss North Korea and other regional issues.
The State Department spokesperson, however, had a clear answer on what Washington expects from its allies and said, “We must meet this new moment of accelerating global 21st century challenges, from the pandemic to the climate crisis to nuclear proliferation, which can only be solved by nations working together and in common. We can’t do it alone.”
Similarly, the official added that China can “do more” to combat North Korean sanctions evasion efforts happening in Chinese waters and urged Beijing to “fully and completely fulfill their obligations” under UN Security Council resolutions.
Describing the Seoul-Washington alliance as the “linchpin of peace, security and prosperity for Northeast Asia, the broader Indo-Pacific region and beyond,” the spokesperson said the two countries’ military and defense ties are “ironclad” as are “bonds based on mutual trust and shared economic and democratic values.”
The official added that the “increasing economic, technological, diplomatic, people-to-people ties are equally strong and enduring.”
The Sino-U.S. technological rivalry has often put South Korea in a difficult position, including most lately SK hynix’s plans to upgrade a large chip-making plant in China. U.S. officials reportedly do not want advanced equipment used in the process to enter into the country, fearing it could be used to bolster Chinese military and strategic capabilities.
Choi during the CSIS speech said that South Korea is worried about supply chain resilience and overdependence on China. But he also pointed out that Korea’s trade volume with China is larger than that of the United States and Japan put together, benefitting Korean companies.
Seoul's First Vice Foreign Minister Choi Jong-kun speaks at the South Korea-U.S. Strategic Forum held at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank in Washington on Nov. 15. [NEWS1]
Despite the Joe Biden administration’s push for strengthened trilateral cooperation with its East Asian allies, in part to counter China’s rising assertions in the region and for unity in responding to North Korea’s threats, South Korea and Japan have been riddled by deteriorated relations over history issues.
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman on Nov. 17 ended up in an awkward situation, holding a solo press conference because of her Korean and Japanese counterparts' dispute over the Dokdo islets in the East Sea.
Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Takeo Mori boycotted what should have been a joint press briefing with Choi and Sherman that would have showcased three-way cooperation following their trilateral talks in Washington. Mori pulled out last minute as Japan protested a visit by Korea's police commissioner general to the Dokdo islets.
Ned Price, the U.S. State Department spokesman, said in a press briefing Monday on Washington’s take on Tokyo skipping the joint conference, “Everything we’re trying to achieve will be more successful if we have a deep trilateral relationship,” which includes areas of common interests such as a free and open Indo-Pacific, North Korea, climate change and economic prosperity.
He added that “the trilateral session itself was very constructive” and was “an opportunity for the three countries to compare notes to discuss these many areas, shared areas of concern, to discuss our common objectives.”
11. Experts: US Boycott of Beijing Olympics Would Dash Seoul's Hopes for Diplomacy
More comments on the end of war declaration from a number of us.
Experts: US Boycott of Beijing Olympics Would Dash Seoul's Hopes for Diplomacy
November 22, 2021 9:23 PM
WASHINGTON —
A U.S. diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Olympics would deal a blow to Seoul's attempts to resume diplomacy with North Korea, experts said.
Last week, U.S. President Joe Biden said that his administration was "considering" a diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics in February.
Such a boycott would mean the U.S. would not send government officials to the Winter Games although it would allow athletes to compete.
Many human rights groups and some lawmakers in Congress called for a U.S. diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Olympics, citing Beijing's human rights abuses.
FILE - Activists hold a rally to protest the treatment of Uyghur women and to call for the Biden administration to boycott the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, outside of the White House in Washington, May 27, 2021.
South Korea has been pushing for a declaration to end the Korean War. That war concluded with the Korean Armistice Agreement in 1953, which announced a cease-fire rather than complete peace.
Diplomatic setback
Seoul sees an end-of-war declaration as the key to jump-starting nuclear talks with North Korea, which have been stalled since October 2019. It also believes the Beijing Olympics will offer a diplomatic venue where the leaders of the U.S., China, South Korea and North Korea could discuss such a declaration.
"An end-of-war declaration in particular is … almost a last-ditch effort by President Moon. So I would not be surprised if they tried to engage in Olympics diplomacy again," said Olivia Enos, senior policy analyst in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.
"But I think those efforts will be likely futile," added Enos.
FILE - U.S. Special Representative for North Korea, Sung Kim, left, and South Korean Unification Minister Lee In-young meet to discuss North Korea issues at the unification ministry in Seoul, South Korea, June 22, 2021.
Washington, however, has not publicly endorsed Seoul's proposal. After talks with her South Korean and Japanese counterparts last week, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman said that the U.S. was "very satisfied with the consultations" with Seoul and Tokyo on the issue, without giving further details.
Security concerns
Washington has been reluctant to accept Seoul's proposed end-of-war declaration out of concern it could undermine the security of East Asia, according to experts.
Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation, said, "The U.S. is not interested in an end-of-war declaration but is discussing it only since a valuable ally has raised the topic."
David Maxwell, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said, "The U.S. is also concerned with the political warfare strategy of North Korea, China and Russia. They have already laid the groundwork to blame the U.S. for not reaching an end-of-war declaration."
VOA's Korean Service sought comment on an end-of-war declaration from South Korea's presidential office but did not get a response.
Potential consequences
Some raised concerns that declaring a formal end to the war could undermine the presence of the United Nations Command (UNC) in South Korea, which could lead to calls for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the country.
Bruce Bennett, an adjunct international/defense researcher at the RAND Corporation, said, "The declaration could provide some sort of a justification for North Korea to push for the termination of the armistice agreement and dissolution of UNC."
As a U.S.-led multilateral military force, the UNC defends South Korea and upholds the Korean Armistice Agreement.
FILE - South Korea and U.S. soldiers stand guard outside the conference building of United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission during a visit of South Korean Unification Minister Lee In-young to the south side of the truce village of Panmunjom i
"We would back our way into dissolving the only internationally recognized legal instrument that has prevented the resumption of hostilities on the peninsula" because there will be calls to rescind U.N. Security Council Resolution 84, which activated UNC, said General Robert Abrams, former commander of United States Forces Korea, during a virtual forum held by The Korea Society last week.
Earlier this month, North Korea's U.N. ambassador, Kim Song, said, "Immediate measures should be taken to dismantle the UNC in South Korea."
An end-of-war declaration, however, does not have the legal power to automatically end UNC or the armistice agreement but, nonetheless, could provide a justification for such calls, according to Klingner.
Klingner said that aside from its impact on UNC, precipitously declaring the war's end could "generate a domino effect advocacy" for other actions that could undermine security in the region, such as removing about 28,000 U.S. troops from South Korea and ending joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises.
Scott Snyder, director of the program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, said, "The main effect of an end-of-war declaration is that it misrepresents the real situation on the ground." Snyder added: "The key to achieving an end-of-war declaration is to achieve the conditions of peace necessary to declare that the war is indeed over."
12. Catching Korea off guard (trilateral meeting in Washington)
Key point:
I often feel the power of Japan’s diplomacy. Japan has a presence as the third largest economy in the world, and many Americans seem to be charmed by its delicate and steady approach. If diplomacy means getting what you want, Japan took Korea by surprise in Washington last week.
Tuesday
November 23, 2021
Catching Korea off guard
PARK HYUN-YOUNG
The author is a Washington correspondentof the JoongAng Ilbo.
As I work in Washington DC, I often feel the power of Japan’s diplomacy. Japan has a presence as the third largest economy in the world, and many Americans seem to be charmed by its delicate and steady approach. If diplomacy means getting what you want, Japan took Korea by surprise in Washington last week.
Korea, the U.S. and Japan were scheduled to have a joint press conference after a vice foreign ministerial meeting. As the Biden administration’s motto is to value alliance, it revived the diplomatic event after four years. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman prepared a grand press event. The Dean Acheson auditorium, which is ten times larger than the regular briefing room, was reserved to invite reporters from the three countries. As the Biden administration believes that the power of America comes from alliance, it was a chance to send messages to the “enemies.”
But the plan fell through as Japan lashed out at Korean police chief Kim Chang-ryong’s Dokdo visit and notified the U.S. that it would not attend the meeting. Japan’s rhetoric was that if Japanese reporters ask questions to Japanese foreign ministry deputy secretary general Takeo Mori about the visit, he would have to give harsh answers, so it wouldn’t attend at all.
The fiasco showed that the U.S. has no solution for Korea-Japan discord. I also saw the power of Tokyo’s persuasion to make unreasonable demands to Washington. Some critics say that Japan made a plan that the U.S. had to comply with Japan’s demand even as it lost face.
In the end, Deputy Secretary Sherman chose to have a conference by herself. As a result, Korea lost the chance to advocate for the Korean government’s foreign policy strategies to the U.S. media, including the efforts to reinforce the alliance after the Korea-U.S. summit in May and the declaration to end the war as an entry to North Korea’s denuclearization.
Japan also made the “achievement” of bringing the Dokdo issue into the spotlight. In Washington, after a high-level U.S. official mentioned the “disagreement between Korea and Japan,” foreign media started reporting that the press conference was canceled due to an “islet dispute,” (Reuters), “a dispute” (The Guardian) and a “feud” (Bloomberg).
Making an international issue out of Dokdo benefits Japan. It succeeded in turning the territory effectively controlled by Korea into a subject of territorial dispute.
If Korea didn’t know about the consequence of the police chief’s trip to Dokdo the day before Korea-U.S.-Japan consultation, it was either incompetent or naïve.
13. How to Deliver Relief to North Koreans Without Lifting Sanctions
I believe China's and Russia's calls for lifting sanctions are less about concern for the welfare of the suffering Koreans in the north and more about trying to undermine the US position and legtimacy.
The author provides some interesting perspectives and rightly places the blame on the Kim family regime.
North Korea’s humanitarian crisis is of its own making, but sanctions should not stand in the way of humanitarian aid. Lifting sanctions, however, does nothing to solve the country’s crisis and only serves to undermine the credibility of the Security Council by sending the wrong message. Moreover, it is unlikely that the United Kingdom, the United States, and France will view China and Russia’s proposal as anything other than acting to undermine the sanctions regime. Instead of lifting sanctions, getting smart about implementation by addressing the underlying problems will ultimately do more to benefit North Korea’s humanitarian crisis.
How to Deliver Relief to North Koreans Without Lifting Sanctions
To address the grim humanitarian situation in North Korea, countries should get smart about implementing sanctions, not lift them.
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Last month, Tomas Ojea Quintana, the U.N. special rapporteur on human rights in North Korea, called on the Security Council to ease sanctions against North Korea, citing the country’s dire humanitarian situation. Likewise, Russia and China introduced a proposal to lift portions of the sectoral sanctions that ban North Korean exports of statues, seafood, labor, and textiles — a similar proposal to the one introduced in 2019.
Lifting international sanctions against North Korea, however, will not address the country’s humanitarian crisis. Instead, countries should get smart about implementing sanctions obligations by ensuring that compliance does not disproportionately undermine humanitarian efforts.
The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that nearly 40 percent of North Korea’s population need humanitarian assistance due to food insecurity, high malnutrition rates, and inadequate access to quality health care, clean water, and sanitation. Further compounding the country’s poor situation was its decision to shut down borders and restrict all travel to stave off COVID-19 outbreaks. Consequently, nearly all in-country humanitarian operations have ceased, resulting in a severely reduced capacity to monitor the humanitarian crisis. In a recent speech, Kim Jong Un reportedly described the situation as “grim” and “unprecedented,” further suggesting the need to mobilize labor. It was a rare admission by a usually reticent and unrevealing leader.
Lifting sanctions, however, will not alleviate North Korea’s humanitarian crisis.
Despite evidence to the contrary, Russia and China argue that lifting the overseas labor repatriation requirement would “enhance the livelihood of the civilian population.” This position simply ignores that North Korea’s overseas laborers are — in effect — forced laborers. They work back-breaking jobs in exchange for a pittance and squalid living quarters, only to see their earnings confiscated and sent back to the regime.
In early October, the U.N. Security Council released the latest report from the Panel of Experts on the North Korean sanctions regime. To be sure, the report also paints an equally depressing picture — pointing to official statements that summarized the country’s failure to fulfill its grain production quotas for the year as a “food crisis.” But unsurprisingly, the panel’s report also found that despite the growing humanitarian crisis, North Korea continued to make improvements to its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, procure goods and technologies for its weapons programs, illicitly import petroleum, and conduct a range of cyber operations aimed at hacking banks and exchange houses.
Lifting sanctions to relieve the humanitarian crisis is not only ineffective, but smacks of an all too expedient solution that glosses over the regime’s brutal history of diverting the country’s scarce resources to support its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. When not spending on his nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, Kim Jong Un spends scarce resources on white elephant projects that most of the country will never benefit from.
Practically, North Korea remains under a range of autonomous sanctions that effectively freeze the country out of international trade and financial systems. That means, even if there were some forms of international sanctions relief, North Korea would still find itself unable to repatriate overseas earnings. The Financial Action Task Force, which is the international standard-setting body for financial crime still considers North Korea to be a “high risk” jurisdiction, citing serious flaws in the country’s anti-money laundering rules and regulations — as in, there are none.
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Lifting sanctions is also somewhat of a moot point, given North Korea’s self-imposed border closures. Although there may be emerging signs that point to the county reopening trade along its border with China, others have concluded that the draconian measures have instead undermined humanitarian efforts.
Rather than lifting sanctions and giving material benefits to a regime that has no interest in giving up its nuclear weapons, a better approach is to effectively address points of failure. The first order of business is for the U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea to quickly find a solution to the lack of a stable banking channel for humanitarian work. As highlighted in the panel’s reports since 2017, the lack of a banking channel severely hamstrings aid workers’ ability to conduct in-country operations. In the absence of proper banking channels, humanitarian organizations have had to resort to alternative methods to move currency into North Korea, which puts personnel at risk. Interestingly, despite the political gridlock among the committee’s permanent members, establishing and ensuring a stable and transparent banking channel enjoys widespread support.
Second, sanctions “over-enforcement” is a concern that disproportionately affects humanitarian organizations. Humanitarian organizations’ responses to the Panel of Experts survey have claimed that Chinese customs authorities rarely know or understand the difference between prohibited goods and non-prohibited goods, often causing delays or rejecting humanitarian goods outright. Wheelchairs and metal crutches, for example, have been turned away at the border because they contain metal — ignoring the humanitarian exemptions allowed for under the resolutions. Humanitarian organizations have even reported that customs officials have, in many cases, solicited bribes.
Banks have a responsibility, too. Many humanitarian groups have reported being turned away by international banks just because the organization deals with North Korea. Such “de-risking” underscores the continued and persistent need to raise awareness among financial institutions about a risk-based approach to sanctions implementation. Not every group that conducts business with North Korea is a sanctions-evader. In fact, understanding risk when it comes to sanctions implementation and compliance is just as much about understanding what is not considered a risk.
North Korea’s humanitarian crisis is of its own making, but sanctions should not stand in the way of humanitarian aid. Lifting sanctions, however, does nothing to solve the country’s crisis and only serves to undermine the credibility of the Security Council by sending the wrong message. Moreover, it is unlikely that the United Kingdom, the United States, and France will view China and Russia’s proposal as anything other than acting to undermine the sanctions regime. Instead of lifting sanctions, getting smart about implementation by addressing the underlying problems will ultimately do more to benefit North Korea’s humanitarian crisis.
GUEST AUTHOR
Aaron Arnold
Aaron Arnold is a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, where he focuses on sanctions and counter-proliferation.
14. N. Korean investigation finds over 110 cases of "unauthorized entry" into Pyongyang
Will have to give this some thought. This is surely an indicator (perhaps multiple indicators). "Something is rotten in the state of Denmark." (or the city of Pyongyang).
N. Korean investigation finds over 110 cases of "unauthorized entry" into Pyongyang - Daily NK
The Central Military Commission and the Central Emergency Anti-epidemic Command issued an order on Nov. 3 to replace all personnel at No. 10 Checkpoints
A recent investigation by North Korean authorities identified a high incidence of unauthorized entry into Pyongyang. Following the investigation, the authorities have decided to replace all personnel of the No. 10 Checkpoints, which are responsible for overseeing people’s entry into the capital city.
Despite the intense anti-disease measures that are already in effect, it appears the government is once again tightening movement restrictions and punishing those who have “failed” to protect the “capital of the revolution.”
According to a military source inside North Korea on Nov. 9, this decision was based on a report recently submitted by the Emergency Anti-epidemic Command to the Central Military Commission.
The report included a comprehensive evaluation of the implementation of entry restrictions into the capital. In particular, it was reported that in the third quarter of this year alone there were over 110 violations of regulations regarding people’s entry into Pyongyang. The authorities, for their part, saw this as a problem for the “protection of the leadership of the revolution.”
Disease control officials testing drivers for COVID-19 symptoms in Pyongyang’s Manggyongdae District. / Image: Rodong Sinmun
In response, the Central Military Commission and the Central Emergency Anti-epidemic Command issued an order on Nov. 3 to replace personnel at all No. 10 Checkpoints under the command of the Capital Security Command, along with all personnel at security checkpoints under the command of the General Staff Department’s Operations Bureau. Personnel at these checkpoints manage the entry of people into the capital city.
The source said that the authorities, in order to underscore the seriousness of this matter, also ordered that these changes be carried out by Nov. 10.
Personnel involved in running checkpoints at certain places where “unauthorized entry” occurred – including the Sunhwa River, Mangyongdae, Seumul-ri, Kan-ri, Jangchon, Sangwon, Myungho-dong, and Dongbuk-ri checkpoints – have been demoted.
Personnel at other checkpoints have suffered the humiliation of being transferred out of their posts. While they have not been directly punished, they face political repercussions and will lose the qualifications necessary to become high-ranking officials in the future.
“The preventive measures against COVID-19 and the closure of the border since last year were aimed directly at protecting the leadership,” said the source, adding, “The country strove to eliminate any possibility that the Supreme Leader [Kim Jong Un] could be infected, but lower-level officials have rendered these efforts futile.”
The move to punish checkpoint personnel may also be an attempt by mid- and high-level officials to avoid taking responsibility for cracks in anti-disease measures.
“Ranking officials have been assigned from the Capital Security Command as well as the executive, personnel, and operations departments of the General Staff Department Operations Bureau to directly oversee staff turnover at the checkpoints,” the source said, adding, “A detailed investigation is also underway to ensure there are no further problems.”
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
15. S Korea groans under US, China supply chain pressure
Economic warfare and the ROK caught in the middle? (again?)
S Korea groans under US, China supply chain pressure
Washington leans heavily on Seoul’s flagship chip sector while Beijing halts exports of urea
SEOUL – The middle ground between China and the United States is collapsing under South Korea’s feet as it is torn in opposite directions by the two giant economies it seeks to balance between.
On the one hand, it is being “requested” to submit detailed information on its flagship industrial sector to the United States which is also pressuring the country’s number-two memory chipmaker to halt shipments of advanced machinery to China. That move could halt an upgrade to a major DRAM fab, in a sector where large-scale capital investment is crucial.
On the other hand, the country’s diesel vehicle drivers are suffering from operational angst after China halted exports of urea, used to make a solution that caps diesel emissions.
Former Korean War foe China is Korea’s largest trade partner. However, South Korea shares its political system, and its only significant security alliance and defense relationship, with the United States.
This is creating an increasingly fraught situation for a country at the center of trans-global supply webs in industries including semiconductors, electronic devices, autos, shipping, steel and petrochemicals, and for which international trade is the economic lifeblood.
Chip angst, urea shortages
The number two player in Korea’s leading industry is currently being buffeted by risks swirling in the international trade environment as logistical problems and political animosities impact the value chain.
However, with the US holding a wide range of patents in chip-making technology and design, and with Washington having identified semiconductors as an Achilles heel in China’s industrial portfolio, it is applying pressure to prevent the Korean firm from shipping the equipment to China, according to a Reuters exclusive report last week.
Hynix’s Wuxi fab makes approximately half of SK hynix’s DRAM chips, which amount to some 15% of the global total, Reuters found.
“The technology in question is highly sensitive…. there are legitimate concerns about the risks to national security in terms of where this technology ends up,” visiting US Trade Representative Katherine Tai said in an interview with domestic media in Seoul on Monday.
The US is reportedly worried that ASML’s EUV machines could be used by the Chinese military. ASML’s CEO Peter Wennink also travelled to Seoul last week according to local media. SK hynix’s CEO Lee Seok-hee was keeping matters close to his chest on Monday, telling reporters only, “We will respond to the matter wisely while cooperating with interested parties.”
South Korea’s SK Hynix is caught in the middle of a Beijing-Washington dispute that could delay or halt the modernization of a key plant in China. Photo: AFP/Jung Yeon-Je
In what may be an indication of the seriousness of matters, Tai is on a four-day visit to South Korea – the first visit by a US trade secretary to South Korea in a decade – that also takes her to two other Indo-Pacific allies, India and Japan. She met Korean business representatives over the weekend.
Previously, in September, Washington had asked major international chipmakers to share detailed dossiers of corporate and technological information, a surprise request that raised hackles in local media and political circles.
“South Korea is deeply concerned that the request for information by the US government is not only broad in scope, but also includes some key corporate secrets of our companies,” Korea Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo told Tai in Paris in October.
Even so, the country’s two leading chipmakers, Samsung Electronics and SK hynix submitted the requested information earlier this month.
“The request for information is a part of the US government’s effort to try to identify the bottlenecks because our partners in industry and in governments have shared with us and we’ve experienced ourselves that there are information gaps about where the problems are in the supply chain through production and also among the customer base,” Tai said.
And chips are not the only supply chain issue Korea is struggling with.
Urea is widely used in South Korea as the base of urea solution, a chemical used in diesel vehicles to cap emissions. According to the semi-official Yonhap news agency, 97.6% of South Korea’s urea imports came from cost-efficient producer China in the first nine months of this year, up from 88% in 2020.
Beijing imposed urea export restrictions in mid-October as the country was hammered by blackouts, partly caused by a shortage of coal, from which urea is extracted. Ironically, one reason China suffered a coal shortage was its long series of political and trade disputes with Australia, a key exporter of raw materials including coal.
The effect on South Korea has not been catastrophic but has been alarming.
Reports over the last two weeks have aired footage of lines of trucks queuing up at supply stations to acquire the product, owners of diesel cars lining up on foot with buckets with the same intention, and uniformed troops transferring boxes of urea to civilian supply centers.
In flashing red-light mode, Korea has lifted tariffs on urea and shipped in emergency airlifts of the product from Australia. Seoul reportedly plans to diversity its urea supply to Vietnam and Saudi Arabia and raise national stockpiles. It is also turning the taps back on domestic supply.
This week, the crisis appears to be dying down. Still, it has renewed bad memories of the steps taken by an angry Beijing in 2017.
That year, US troops deployed a THAAD missile defense system in South Korea in a step aimed at North Korea – but which China insisted could snoop on its own systems.
In apparent retaliation, Chinese travel agents halted group tours to South Korea, while consumer boycotts damaged the Chinese operations of automaker Hyundai and forced Lotte to close down retail operations in the country. And imports of “Korean Wave” products – movies, TV dramas, pop and games – largely dried up.
THAAD interceptors and a Standard-Missile 3 Block IA missile being launched. Photo: AFP / DoD / Missile Defense Agency
Supply chain – or vulnerability chain?
Supply chain storms are becoming uncomfortably frequent for an industrial powerhouse whose exporters have, since the 1960s, massively enriched their country by astutely leveraging the potential of global trade.
The recent collateral damage stemming from the Beijing-Washington trade spat is just the latest crisis facing Seoul mandarins and captains of industry.
In 2018, as historical and political tensions rose to a breaking point, Tokyo removed Korea from its “white list” of favored trade partners, and placed onerous bureaucratic restrictions on the supply, by Japanese companies, of three products critical to Korea’s semiconductor sector.
Though Tokyo’s action slowed, but did not halt, the exports, Korea reacted by diversifying its own supply chain and turning to domestic manufacturing. There was considerable self-praise in government and media about how the country had overcome what was widely seen as a challenge from a key national competitor.
In 2020, in a continuation of long-term trends, China was Korea’s leading trade partner, buying a whopping $132.6 billion worth of South Korean products, or 25.8% of overall exports.
The United States, was in distant second place, buying $74.4 billion (14.5% of total). Adding to China’s heft, Korea’s fourth-largest partner was Hong Kong, which acquired $30.7 billion (6%). The fifth-placed nation was Japan, with $25.1 billion (or 4.9%).
This data shows that Korea has suffered high-profile supply chain issues in recent years with all of its top export buyers – bar number three player Vietnam (which in 2020 bought $48.5 billion worth, or 9.5% of Korean exports).
Which way to turn?
Orville Schell, the Arthur Ross Director of the Center on US-China Relations at the Asia Society in New York, suggested that the best days of global trade may have passed.
A shortage of coal has led to reduced exports of urea from China. Photo: AFP / Li Xiaolong / Imaginechina
Speaking on a webinar, “South Korea’s Supply Chain Disruptions” hosted by the Seoul branch of the Asia Society last week, Schell said that now that China and the US were no longer on “convergent courses… countries like Korea, that have traditionally wanted to stay in the middle, find themselves stuck in the middle.”
This means that “the ground where you could have an alliance with the US and trade with China is shrinking daily,” Schell, the author of ten books on China and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, added.
He was careful to avoid blaming Seoul for the predicament it finds itself in.
“I don’t think Seoul’s position is wrong per se, I think it is really important that countries like Korea and Singapore, try to keep a position that can play to both sides,” he said.
“However, I think Korea sometimes is a little bit blind to the realities of the trends, and I sometimes wonder whether Korea has an adequate appreciation of what the alternative scenarios are if things continue to go as they are now.”
Schell saw villains in both camps
“We are all adjusting to a post-engagement world where we could usually rely on a relationship with China that trade was not generally used as a punitive tool,” he said. “This is something quite new with Xi Jinping; Deng Xiaoping was not a nationalist, nor was Jiang Zemin or Hu Jintao; there is something new happening here as China gets stronger.”
Washington did not escape criticism.
“It is shocking that the Americans can’t even get ambassadors to key countries like Korea and China,” Schell lamented. “This is part of the dysfunction of the American political system, which has very harmful effects around the world.”
Trade Representative Katherine Tai says there are concerns about the risks to US security in terms of where chip-making technology ends up. Photo: AFP / Susan Walsh
Though trade warrior Donald Trump has exited the White House and a more conventional leader, Joe Biden, has entered, Washington looks set to remove its kid gloves in trade.
“I think Korea and every county is going to find a much more aggressive policy coming out of Washington in terms of making good trade arrangements,” Schell said. “I don’t think we are at the point where the [multinational] Trans-Pacific Partnership is coming back on board – though I wish we did.”
He advised Seoul not to keep betting on the status quo.
“I think Korea needs to be more realistic about what the future may hold – we see intimations and suggestions of it everywhere,” Schell said. “To ignore these and hope that the middle ground will continue to be viable, I think, is very naïve.”
But one Korean, who spoke to Asia Times on condition of anonymity as he has sensitive professional relationships with North Korea, called for a more radical response.
He advised that the next Seoul government, which will take office in May after an election in March, should not shift to one side or the other, but should use policy to reset off-kilter national vulnerabilities.
“We need to rebalance our relationships,” he said. “We need to be more integrated with security with China, and more integrated with the economy of the United States.”
16. North Korea Remains the Land of Bad Options: What to Do About Human Rights?
Mr Bandow and I rarely agree but I agree with the statement in this conclusion:
Human rights and peace are both required on the Korean Peninsula. This is a mission to which the Biden administration should do all that it can. Without genuine peace, human rights are unlikely to improve. Without Pyongyang willing to improve the status of its own people, a stable peace also is problematic. The challenge is finding policies to advance both.
North Korea Remains the Land of Bad Options: What to Do About Human Rights?
Pyongyang has an underlying human-rights problem and is struggling to endure the negative impact of the pandemic
Tomas Ojea Quintana, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, recently filed his last report on human rights in North Korea. Unsurprisingly, his conclusions were harsh.
Pyongyang responded that Quintana’s “reckless remarks” were “not a mere nonsense of an individual with a topsy-turvy insight but a scheme worked out at the urging of the United States.” The [North] Korea Association for Human Rights Studies, through its unnamed spokesman, opined that “the ‘special rapporteur,’ not being content with distorting our reality, has pointed a finger at our ‘people’s livelihood’ and viciously picked on the most realistic and appropriate anti-epidemic measures taken by our state for our own specific need in order to cope with the global epidemic.”
“The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has never been more isolated from the international community than at this point in time,” Quintana said. “This is having a dramatic impact on the human rights of the people inside of the country, and dampens hopes of achieving sustainable peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. I today urge the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the international community and its individual members to reverse this trajectory by reviving the spirit of multilateral cooperation that enabled the foundation of the United Nations in the first place.”
His statement recognized the North’s underlying human rights problem as well as the negative impact of measures taken to combat the pandemic. Although the UN typically has been reluctant to criticize its members, the human rights failings of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have been so grievous that many governments agreed to make an exception. In 2014 the UN Human Rights Council issued a harsh assessment of the DPRK: a 36-page report backed by 372 pages of findings. At that point, everything was on the table. “Among the violations to be investigated were those pertaining to the right to food, those associated with prison camps, torture and inhuman treatment, arbitrary detention, discrimination, freedom of expression, the right to life, freedom of movement, and enforced disappearances, including in the form of abductions of nationals of other states,” according to the assessment.
Quintana’s latest report is notable for its emphasis on the well-being of the North Korean people.
“Even prior to the pandemic, over 40 per cent of people were food insecure, with many suffering from malnutrition and stunted growth,” the report stated. “The country’s health infrastructure suffers from underinvestment, with critical shortages of essential medical supplies, and the absence of equipment and adequately trained staff. The lack of access to clean and safe water, sanitation and hygiene services at home, schools and in hospitals also underpins many health and nutrition issues.”
Ultimately, the DPRK bears the brunt of the blame for the situation since the regime has implemented the sort of central economic planning which has failed around the world. There is a reason why countries with socialist systems so often seem to suffer from repeated “inclement weather” upon which malnutrition and even starvation are typically blamed. Also, resulting from “the weather” is insufficient investment in health care.
Having an inadequate medical system is a major reason the regime fought the pandemic with its usual tools of force and repression. While that helped prevent the pervasive spread of the coronavirus in the DPRK isolation has reduced incomes of and international aid for the Korean people.
“The draconian steps the Government of the DPR Korea has taken to prevent Covid-19 from entering reportedly include a policy of shooting individuals who attempt to enter or leave the country,” Quintana observed. “Increased restrictions on freedom of movement and the shutting of national borders has chocked market activity that has become essential for people’s access to basic necessities, including food. The food situation is a priority concern. President Kim Jong Un himself acknowledged the dire food situation earlier this year. The most vulnerable members of the population, including children and the elderly and persons in detention, face the risk of starvation. The lifesaving humanitarian work of the United Nations and other international actors has also ground to a halt, with no United Nations international staff currently in the country.”
Pyongyang is embarrassed by both judgments. Indeed, it is hard to know which charge is worse from the regime’s viewpoint—that North Korea’s health care system is inadequate or that North Korea’s policies are harming people’s health. “The people of the DPR Korea should not have to choose between the fear of hunger and the fear of Covid-19,” Quintana noted. Additionally, he criticized both regime policies and international sanctions. Although Pyongyang has routinely denounced Western economic restrictions. Such rules have provided a political boost of sorts for Kim Jong-un. “Prioritizing pressure has further isolated the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and had humanitarian and human rights consequences,” Quintana said. “It is by no means certain that the country will emerge from this isolation as the world emerges from Covid-19. If steps are not taken now, the country’s extreme isolation could crystalize and become the new norm.”
Indeed, it is important not to underestimate Kim’s undoubtedly calculated embrace of isolation. He previously initiated modest economic reforms and undertook international diplomacy with aplomb. However, he has since reversed the former and abandoned the latter. Indeed, his government now exhibits fear of outside contact, especially with South Korea, increasing penalties of those caught listening to outside music and programs, including teens.
Quintana urged Western policy to respond. “This is the time to send clear signals, take concrete action and find creative ways to give momentum to the stalled diplomatic process for securing a peaceful resolution to the conflict,” he told members of the United Nations. Although it would then be up to the DPRK to engage, he doesn’t want the West to give Kim any excuse to maintain isolation.
And, as is appropriate for someone tasked with confronting the human-rights issue, he concluded with a strong affirmation of that mission:
“I would like to highlight that adopting a determined approach to engagement does not require the neglect of human rights violations, including the issues I have highlighted in my final report to the General Assembly before you: kwanliso (political prison camps), the worst forms of child labor, oppression of exercise of freedom of religion and access to information,” Quintana said. “Some of the most serious human rights violations also qualify as crimes against humanity. These crimes are likely ongoing, epitomized by the continued operation of large political prison camps. In this report, I reiterate that the existence of kwanliso (political prison camps) represents the worst excesses of a system of governance that systematically violates the human rights of its people.”
Human rights and peace are both required on the Korean Peninsula. This is a mission to which the Biden administration should do all that it can. Without genuine peace, human rights are unlikely to improve. Without Pyongyang willing to improve the status of its own people, a stable peace also is problematic. The challenge is finding policies to advance both.
Image: Reuters
17. Seoul’s leftists now blame Washington for the Dokdo dispute
Yes, the US called these "islands" LIancourt Rocks.
Excerpts:
Song Young-gil, the head of the DP, blamed the United States for taking a vague stance on why the press conference was canceled. He argued that Sherman took this stance to try to blame both South Korea and Japan and that she should change her way of thinking.
“Isn’t it obvious that we cannot get along with Japan, which caused the Pacific War and colonized us while shouting ‘Tenno Heika Banzai’?” Song asked. The Japanese phrase he mentioned roughly translates as “Long live His Majesty the Emperor.” Song added that he wants to emphasize this fact to the United States.
Song continued to blame the United States for the ongoing dispute over the islets as well. “Dokdo is a part of South Korean territory, but the United States failed to take care of this and fell to the Japanese lobby during the Treaty of San Francisco [in 1951],” Song argued. “The United States is responsible for making it a disputed territory.”
The treaty was signed on September 8, 1951, in order to reestablish peaceful relations between Japan and the Allied Powers. Japan regained its sovereignty over its territory. Under the treaty, Japan was supposed to acknowledge the independence of Korea, including Jeju Island and Ulleungdo Island. However, the Japanese government argued that Takeshima (Dokdo) is not specifically mentioned in the treaty, so it can claim sovereignty over the islet.
A senior official from the presidential Blue House also released a statement on November 18 that said “Dokdo is our territory.” The official reemphasized that the “Dokdo islets are our territory, historically, geopolitically, and under international law.” The official argued that if it is true that the Japanese side did not attend the press conference due to a visit by a police commissioner, “it is very unusual.”
Seoul’s leftists now blame Washington for the Dokdo dispute - OKN
South Korea’s mistake marred first meeting with Kishida’s Foreign Ministry
The United States, South Korea, and Japan held trilateral vice-ministerial level meetings this week in Washington D.C., but a planned joint press conference was canceled likely due to a visit by the chief of South Korea’s police to the disputed islets claimed by both Seoul and Tokyo.
Kim Chang-yong, South Korea’s police commissioner general, visited the South Korea-controlled Dokdo islets in the East Sea shortly before the important trilateral meetings. South Korean conservatives criticized the Moon Jae-in administration for upsetting Japan at an important time when top diplomats were meeting to discuss cooperation on North Korean denuclearization.
The ruling Democratic Party (DP), on the other hand, argued that the commissioner has the right to visit the islet anytime he wants since it is under his “jurisdiction.” The DP criticized the United States for taking a vague stance on Dokdo, which is called Takeshima by Japan. It went further to say that Washington is “responsible” for the dispute over the Dokdo islets.
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman met with South Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Choi Jong-kun and Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Takeo Mori on Wednesday. The three were supposed to hold a press conference together, but Sherman ended up holding a solo press conference. It was reported that Mori boycotted the press briefing at the last minute after his government lodged a strong protest over Kim’s visit to Dokdo this week. Choi agreed that Sherman should do the press conference alone, according to media reports.
“I want to note at the outset that as has been the case for some time, there are some bilateral differences between Japan and the ROK that are continuing to be resolved, and one of those differences which is unrelated to today’s meeting has led to the change in format for today’s press availability,” Sherman said during the press briefing. “Nonetheless, we had a very constructive trilateral meeting today.” She did not provide further details.
Police Commissioner General Kim visited Dokdo Tuesday by helicopter for an inspection and to convey words of encouragement to the officers guarding the islets. It was the first visit in 12 years by the head of the national police agency. The police agency argued that the visit was initially meant to be unpublicized but was leaked to the press.
Chung Jin-suk, deputy speaker of the National Assembly and a lawmaker of the main opposition People Power Party (PPP), was leading a delegation of lawmakers to meet with Japanese politicians in Tokyo when the media reported the commissioner’s visit to the Dokdo islet. Chung said it felt like getting hit in the back of his head, since they visited Tokyo to improve bilateral relations. “Even Kang Chang-il, South Korean Ambassador to Japan, asked whether the commissioner really had to visit the Dokdo islet on the day the delegation from the National Assembly arrived in Tokyo,” Chung said.
Song Young-gil, the head of the DP, blamed the United States for taking a vague stance on why the press conference was canceled. He argued that Sherman took this stance to try to blame both South Korea and Japan and that she should change her way of thinking.
“Isn’t it obvious that we cannot get along with Japan, which caused the Pacific War and colonized us while shouting ‘Tenno Heika Banzai’?” Song asked. The Japanese phrase he mentioned roughly translates as “Long live His Majesty the Emperor.” Song added that he wants to emphasize this fact to the United States.
Song continued to blame the United States for the ongoing dispute over the islets as well. “Dokdo is a part of South Korean territory, but the United States failed to take care of this and fell to the Japanese lobby during the Treaty of San Francisco [in 1951],” Song argued. “The United States is responsible for making it a disputed territory.”
The treaty was signed on September 8, 1951, in order to reestablish peaceful relations between Japan and the Allied Powers. Japan regained its sovereignty over its territory. Under the treaty, Japan was supposed to acknowledge the independence of Korea, including Jeju Island and Ulleungdo Island. However, the Japanese government argued that Takeshima (Dokdo) is not specifically mentioned in the treaty, so it can claim sovereignty over the islet.
A senior official from the presidential Blue House also released a statement on November 18 that said “Dokdo is our territory.” The official reemphasized that the “Dokdo islets are our territory, historically, geopolitically, and under international law.” The official argued that if it is true that the Japanese side did not attend the press conference due to a visit by a police commissioner, “it is very unusual.”
Experts in Washington raised concerns that this could be evidence of a crack in the trilateral cooperation. Scott Snyder, a senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, told the Voice of America (VOA) that, “It’s emblematic of the challenge associated with a trilateral framework in which there are two countries that are having difficulties in their own bilateral relationship.” He added that “it is disappointing any time that trilateral cooperation or coordination is slowed by a dispute between the two. It shows that the U.S. is in a difficult position it clearly values the alliance with each and among them.”
David Maxwell, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told the VOA that “I think the only thing that’s really going to solve these issues will be the strong and direct leadership of the President of the ROK and the Prime Minister of Japan, who both must pledge to put their national security and national prosperity ahead of these historical issues.”
As of yet, the Moon administration appears to be putting symbolic nationalism over essential trilateral coordination.
18. North Korean Hackers Caught Snooping on China’s Cyber Squad
Allies, "closer than lips and teeth." They were just looking for best practices.
North Korean Hackers Caught Snooping on China’s Cyber Squad
North Korean hackers are under fierce pressure to raise revenue to fund regime goals. Now they’re trying to spy on Chinese security researchers to get better hacking tools.
Updated Nov. 22, 2021 5:10AM ET / Published Nov. 22, 2021 5:03AM ET
exclusive
Photo Illustration by Thomas Levinson/Photos Getty Images
A real diplomat is one who can cut his neighbor’s throat without having his neighbor notice it, Trygve Lie, former secretary-general of the United Nations, once allegedly said.
The North Korean government seems to have understood the assignment.
Hackers with suspected links to the Pyongyang dictatorship have been going after Chinese security researchers in an apparent attempt to steal their hacking techniques and use them as their own, according to CrowdStrike research shared exclusively with The Daily Beast.
In this case, North Korean hackers targeted Chinese security researchers with Chinese-language lure documents labeled “Securitystatuscheck.zip” and “_signed.pdf,” in the hopes that the researchers would be compelled to click on them. While the documents, which CrowdStrike uncovered in June, contained cybersecurity information from China’s Ministry of Public Security and the National Information Security Standardization Technical Committee, the hacking team was likely sending booby-trapped documents.
The North Korean hacking gang responsible, which cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike calls “Stardust Chollima”—and which other researchers label Lazarus Group—in all likelihood sent the lures over email, Adam Meyers, vice president of intelligence at CrowdStrike, told The Daily Beast. CrowdStrike does not have access to those emails or the initial routes to victims, but this campaign appears to imitate earlier North Korean hacking missions that used email and social media to attempt distributing malware to security researchers, says Meyers.
The tactic of targeting security researchers in other countries could be particularly useful for the North Korean government. It could broaden Kim Jong Un’s hacking team’s roadmap to outsmarting other hackers around the world. And these operations, Meyers told The Daily Beast, likely make it possible for the North Koreans to steal exploits or learn new hacking skills they otherwise wouldn’t have.
For North Korea, which runs hacking operations aimed at raising revenue to fund the regime—including its nuclear weapons program—new hacking know-how could make all the difference.
“For vulnerability research in particular that would be interesting—it in effect allows you to collect and steal weapons that you can use for other operations. It could also give them insight into new techniques that they’re not aware of and how research is being conducted,” Meyers said. “It also lets you know what the security posture looks like in other countries.”
It’s just the latest signal that the North Korean government may be working to obtain new hacking techniques and tools in an effort to run financially motivated hacking operations. But instead of diligent, internal research, this hacking campaign suggests that instead of innovating on their own, they’re straight up working to crib hacking playbooks from security researchers abroad.
It wouldn’t be the first time. North Korean hackers earlier this year ran an elaborate campaign, complete with a fake security research blog, a fake company, and bogus Twitter personas, to try hacking security researchers and collect intelligence on their latest cybersecurity work, according to an investigation published earlier this year by Google. In that campaign, the hackers targeted researchers via Twitter, LinkedIn, Telegram, Discord, Keybase, and email, using aliases such as Billy Brown and Guo Zhang, later lacing malware capable of stealing files on their computers.
But the hackers don’t appear to have stopped. The campaign in China is likely an extension and continuation of that earlier campaign targeting security researchers, with a focus on neighboring China this time around, according to CrowdStrike.
Meyers said the hacking branches of the North Korean government are likely being ordered to find ways to fund regime goals, with a focus on, “how do you make sure you have access to the latest vulnerabilities, the latest exploitation techniques, the latest research that’s going on. There’s constantly innovation in that space [and] this helps the North Korean intelligence services improve their capabilities by stealing this type of information,” he said.
In particular, the North Korean hacking team could be interested in obtaining especially sensitive vulnerabilities called “zero days,” which are software or hardware flaws that companies don’t know about and therefore can’t fix, making them especially powerful if they’re used. The vulnerabilities are known as zero days because the companies, if they ever find someone taking advantage, will have zero days to patch.
Chinese hackers are prolific at obtaining zero days, making them a ripe target for any hacking team interested in running off with someone else’s find, Vikram Thakur, a technical director at Symantec, told The Daily Beast
Chinese security researchers are a prime target, as “the most number of zero days found by any country in the world is probably China,” said Thakur, who is dedicated to tracking North Korean hacking teams. “In my opinion… Lazarus [Group] or North Korea would have been trying to arm themselves with zero days.”
China is, indeed, at the top of its game when it comes to zero days, according to FireEye research. Over the last decade, North Korea used three zero days. But China’s used 20—far more than any other country.
At least, China had the most prowess in this department last year. As the thinking goes, North Korea might be trying to ride China’s coattails and change that balance. James Sadowski, a senior analyst in strategic analysis at Mandiant Threat Intelligence, told The Daily Beast last week the number of zero days used has only been creeping up since they first published their report. The count now is at 76, according to Sadowski.
“It’s always hard to know [the] real end goal of attackers,” said Anton Cherepanov, a senior malware researcher at the Slovakia-based cybersecurity firm ESET, who recently found what he thinks is potentially another prong of the broad campaign against security researchers. (Early this month, Cherepanov found a popular reverse-engineering software, IDA Pro, was tampered with—software that is almost exclusively used by security researchers.)
“In case of Chinese researchers, I guess that the attackers are interested in vulnerabilities [and, or] exploits for certain products,” Cherepanov said.
Either way, this campaign targeting Chinese language hackers looked particularly determined. One of the best ways to get targets to click on documents laden with malware or spammy links is to instill fear in victims—such as by claiming an urgent task is at hand, by referencing their sensitive information, or by imitating a boss or controlling authority. By referencing Chinese government security authorities, the lures appear to have been very well-tailored for Chinese nationals, and in particular, security experts.
”In China, generally any email coming from any governmental-sounding body is considered the highest priority for any individual in the country,” Thakur said. “If a researcher gets a technical sounding email from the government, the chances of that researcher, that end-user clicking on the lure is extremely high.”
It’s unclear from the CrowdStrike research if the North Koreans were able to claim any victims, but even a mere attempt at hacking security researchers in neighboring China shows these hacking teams are shameless about their thievery hacking missions, and aren’t going to be deterred easily.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
