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Quotes of the Day:
“Truth in the final analysis, has proved to be America’s most important Cold War special operations instrument. It exposes Soviet falsehoods (if and when discovered) and publicizes U.S. foreign policy/national defense positions in positive ways.
- The late COL John M. Collins, aka The Warlord.
“Education is not the filling of a pail, but the lighting of the fire.”
- William Yeats
"There are only two ways to live your life. One is as though nothing is a miracle. The other is as though everything is a miracle."
- Albert Einstein
1. Arms reduction talks with N. Korea could be an option, says U.S. official
2. Washington: If Pyongyang uses nuke, the regime will be terminated
3. U.S. condemns N. Korea's missile launches, urges Pyongyang to engage in dialogue
4. Department Press Briefing – October 28, 2022 - United States Department of State - Korea Excertps
5. Central Cadres Training School to erect monument honoring Kim Jong Un
6. Korean and European ambassadors “North Korea’s nuclear weapons and human rights are two sides of the same coin… must be approached simultaneously.”
7. Is it time to accept North Korea is a nuclear power?
8. This is not the time to abandon North Korean denuclearization
9. Putin 'worried' about South Korea sending weapons to Ukraine
10. Would North Korea Ever Turn Its Nuclear Missiles on China?
11. North Korea-backed Kimsuky gang hacking Android phones to gather intelligence
12. The Guardian view on Korean soft power: harder than it looks
13. Afraid Of Kim's Nukes? Build A Bunker, South Korean Professor Says
1. Arms reduction talks with N. Korea could be an option, says U.S. official
No. No. No.
I hope EAP will help Secretary Jecknis understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.
If we agree to arms control negotiations we will confirm for Kim Jong Un that his strategy works and rather than negotiate in good faith as a responsible member of the international community Kim will double down on his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies. Why? because they work.
We need to adopt a plan B that is based on a human rights upfront approach, a massive information and influence campaign and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea built on a foundation deterrence, strength, and resolve, because it is only a free and unified Korea that will lead to denuclearization of the north and and end to the human rights atrocities being conducted by the most evil mafia like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime.
Arms reduction talks with N. Korea could be an option, says U.S. official
donga.com
Posted October. 29, 2022 07:31,
Updated October. 29, 2022 07:31
Arms reduction talks with N. Korea could be an option, says U.S. official. October. 29, 2022 07:31. weappon@donga.com.
A high-ranking official of the Biden administration said on Thursday that if North Korea wants a dialogue, arms reduction talks could be one option. This can be interpreted as if the North agrees on talks without conditions, on the premise that recognizing North Korea as a nuclear state leads to arms reduction, the joint South Korea-U.S. military exercises could be scaled down. This is the first time the Biden administration mentioned the possibility of arms reduction talks with the North.
At the 2022 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, Bonnie Jenkins, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, said the U.S. wouldn’t say ‘no’ to Kim Jong Un when he calls to talk about arms reduction, adding that they need to start by talking about what arms reduction means for the North. Arms reduction talks normally take place when nuclear states want to lower the risk of nuclear war. It is a negotiation for an agreement to reduce nuclear arms.
The U.S. has been dismissing the idea of nuclear arms reduction talks, saying, “The talks would mean recognizing North Korea as a nuclear state.” In addition, there have been many concerns that if the U.S. and North Korea engage in nuclear arms talks, the North might demand to halt the joint South Korea-U.S. military exercises and withdraw U.S. Armed Forces in Korea.
In fact, Under Secretary Jenkins said that they can also have a dialogue on risk reduction, which can lead to a traditional arms reduction agreement, suggesting the U.S. can adjust its military response posture as a reward for reducing nuclear arms.
The U.S. Defense Department released the public versions of three strategic documents — the National Defense Strategy, the Nuclear Posture Review, and the Missile Defense Review. The documents stated that any nuclear attack by North Korea against the United States or its allies and partners is unacceptable and will result at the end of that regime. The United States will continue to field flexible nuclear forces, including the capability to deploy strategic bombers forward. Plus, it highlighted that the U.S. could strengthen extended deterrence, and a forum for high-level engagement could be held regularly for supporting rapid crisis response.”
According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the South Korean military detected two short-range ballistic missiles being fired from the area of Tongchon County in Kangwon Province toward the East Coast between around 11:59 a.m. and 12:18 p.m. local time on Friday. The short-range ballistic missiles traveled about 230 kilometers at an altitude of around 24 kilometers. At Tongchon, where the North launched its first ballistic missile, KN-24, an SRBM of August 2019 was also fired.
한국어
donga.com
2. Washington: If Pyongyang uses nuke, the regime will be terminated
We need to cease the talk about arms control negotiations or we will have Kim around a lot longer causing the world problems.
I think Secretary Jenkins' remarks are not in accord with the NDS. Could it be that State and DOD are not talking??
Excerpts:
In this light, the Biden administration effectively announced North Korea as a third nuclear threat after China and Russia and mentioned the “nuclear deterrence dilemma,” saying that Pyongyang’s provocations can lead to global conflict. This reveals the underlying concern that if a military conflict occurs in the Korean Peninsula due to the bonding of stronger ties among North Korea, China, and Russia, it can lead to armed conflict between nuclear powers in which nuclear-armed countries, including China and Russia, intervene.
...
Separately from the National Defense Strategy, Bonnie Jenkins, undersecretary for arms reduction at the U.S. State Department, said, “If North Korea wants dialogue, (negotiations) for arms reduction can be an option.” It is the first time the Biden administration has mentioned the possibility of arms reduction with Pyongyang. It made the remarks under the compelling premise that the North is a nuclear state, which could spark controversy. Pyongyang recently conducted an extensive drill on the operation of tactical nuclear weapons units and fired two short-range ballistic missiles into the East Sea again on Friday. Seoul should cautiously and meticulously respond, regardless of whether mentioning arms reduction is a measure to bring Pyongyang to the negotiating table or an approach combining hardline and friendly measures.
Washington: If Pyongyang uses nuke, the regime will be terminated
donga.com
Posted October. 29, 2022 07:29,
Updated October. 29, 2022 07:29
Washington: If Pyongyang uses nuke, the regime will be terminated. October. 29, 2022 07:29. .
The Joe Biden administration warned that the North’s attacking the U.S., an ally or partner with nuclear weapons, cannot be tolerated, and it will result in the termination of the regime. Washington made the remarks in its National Defense Strategy and the Nuclear Preparedness Report on Friday, saying that there is no scenario in which the Kim Jong Un regime survives even after using a nuclear weapon.”
The warnings, including “termination of the regime,” were already found on NPR from the Trump administration in 2018, but the situation is now different. Russian President Vladimir Putin is intensifying threats to use tactical nuclear weapons in the face of strong resistance in the Ukraine War. China’s threat against Taiwan is also worrisome. Taking advantage of such situations, the Kim Jong Un administration is stepping up efforts to complete and perfect tactical nuclear weapons.
In this light, the Biden administration effectively announced North Korea as a third nuclear threat after China and Russia and mentioned the “nuclear deterrence dilemma,” saying that Pyongyang’s provocations can lead to global conflict. This reveals the underlying concern that if a military conflict occurs in the Korean Peninsula due to the bonding of stronger ties among North Korea, China, and Russia, it can lead to armed conflict between nuclear powers in which nuclear-armed countries, including China and Russia, intervene.
NPR said that the U.S. would mobilize nuclear capabilities flexibly, including forward deployment of strategic bombers and nuclear weapons, to deter nuclear conflict in the region. Washington seems to be declining the demand for the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea and sharing nuclear weapons. However, it is also true that watchers are growing concerned about whether Washington can practically counter the North’s nuclear threat merely with the strengthening of efforts to deter nuclear proliferation. As such, discussions and actions to strengthen the capability to execute the nuclear umbrella should follow.
Separately from the National Defense Strategy, Bonnie Jenkins, undersecretary for arms reduction at the U.S. State Department, said, “If North Korea wants dialogue, (negotiations) for arms reduction can be an option.” It is the first time the Biden administration has mentioned the possibility of arms reduction with Pyongyang. It made the remarks under the compelling premise that the North is a nuclear state, which could spark controversy. Pyongyang recently conducted an extensive drill on the operation of tactical nuclear weapons units and fired two short-range ballistic missiles into the East Sea again on Friday. Seoul should cautiously and meticulously respond, regardless of whether mentioning arms reduction is a measure to bring Pyongyang to the negotiating table or an approach combining hardline and friendly measures.
한국어
donga.com
3. U.S. condemns N. Korea's missile launches, urges Pyongyang to engage in dialogue
Our official spokespeople are not calling for arms control negotiations.
The problem remains Kim Jong Un himself.
Excerpts:
The state department spokesperson reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to engage in diplomacy but said the North refuses to do so.
"We continue to seek serious and sustained dialogue with the DPRK, but the DPRK refuses to engage," the spokesperson said, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
"Our commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea and Japan remains ironclad."
(LEAD) U.S. condemns N. Korea's missile launches, urges Pyongyang to engage in dialogue | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · October 29, 2022
(ATTN: UPDATES with remarks from a defense department spokesperson, additional background, more information in paras 6-13; ADDS photo)
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Oct. 28 (Yonhap) -- The United States on Friday condemned North Korea's latest missile launch, while calling on the recalcitrant state to engage in serious dialogue.
A state department spokesperson said the missile launches violated multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions.
"The United States condemns the DPRK's ballistic missile launches. These launches are in violation of multiple United Nations Security Council Resolutions unanimously adopted by the council, and threaten peace and stability in the region," the spokesperson told Yonhap News Agency on condition of anonymity.
North Korea fired two short-range ballistic missiles Friday (Seoul time).
The country has so far launched a total of 46 ballistic missiles this year, the largest number of ballistic missiles it has fired in a single year.
A defense department spokesperson said the latest missile launch did not pose any immediate threat to the U.S. or its allies in the region, while highlighting U.S. commitment to the defense of U.S. allies, including South Korea.
"We can confirm that North Korea did launch two ballistic missiles," Sabrina Singh, deputy spokesperson for the department, said when asked about the missile launch. "We have assessed that these launches, this event does not pose any immediate threat to U.S. personnel or our allies."
"But the actions that the DPRK has taken, again, further destabilize the region and our commitments to the Republic of Korea and Japan remain ironclad ," she added, referring to South Korea by its official name.
The North's latest missile launch came shortly after the U.S. Department of Defense released its National Defense Strategy, along with a nuclear posture review, in which it said a nuclear attack by North Korea will result in the "end of the regime."
Singh insisted the purpose of the review is to dissuade any use of nuclear weapons.
"We released a nuclear posture review because we believe that a nuclear weapon should never be used, and part of this review is to ensure that we are deterring other nations from using nuclear weapons," she said.
U.S. officials have said Pyongyang may be prepared to conduct a nuclear test "at any time."
North Korea conducted its sixth and last nuclear test in September 2017.
The state department spokesperson reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to engage in diplomacy but said the North refuses to do so.
"We continue to seek serious and sustained dialogue with the DPRK, but the DPRK refuses to engage," the spokesperson said, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
"Our commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea and Japan remains ironclad."
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · October 29, 2022
4. Department Press Briefing – October 28, 2022 - United States Department of State - Korea Excertps
Two important exchanges on Korea. It is good to see our excellent Voice of America journalists recognized at these important briefings (in this case Jiha Ham).
Jiha Ham's exchange is very important because Mr. Price seems to clean up Secretary Jenkins' misspeaking at Carnegie this week and definitely states no change to US policy and that policy DOES NOT include arms control negotiations.
VOA is doing its job of explaining US policy to foreign audiences - to include north Korea. Excellent work by the Korea Service of VOA.
Let’s go to the line of Janne Pak.
OPERATOR: Janne, your line is now open.
QUESTION: Yes, thanks, Ned. Thanks for taking my question. Happy Friday.
MR PRICE: Happy Friday.
QUESTION: I have a quick question. I have two questions, issues related to Korea and Russia. And first question: In the review of the nuclear posture of the U.S. National Defense Strategy report, it was stated that if North Korea launches a nuclear attack on the United States or its allies, then North Korea and Kim Jong-un regime will come to an end. Do you think this strategy is effective even if dialogue and diplomacy with the North Korea do not work?
Second question: Russian President Putin warned that Russia and South Korean relations would break if South Korea provided arms to Ukraine. How can the U.S. see Russia’s warning that South Korea is supporting Ukraine along with its allies? Thank you very much.
MR PRICE: Thanks, Janne. So I will – I won’t comment on the Nuclear Posture Review. I know DOD has spoken to that along with the Missile Defense Review and the broader strategy document that they released yesterday. As you know, they addressed a number of regions and challenges in the context of those three rollouts, and so I would refer you to the statements they made and the documents they released yesterday.
But your question, your first question, gets at something that is vitally important to us, and that’s the role of extended deterrence and the role of extended deterrence in our alliance with our South Korean allies. As you know, there was a meeting of the U.S.-ROK Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group. We believe it’s a substantive and sustainable forum where we can discuss all aspects of our cooperation and coordination – diplomatic, economic, informational, and military – and how they contribute to deterring threats to the alliance.
In the context of that meeting last month, we discussed the threat from the DPRK and expanding coordination against all avenues of potential aggression, and we’ll also discuss how the United States and the ROK can – and we also discussed how the United States and the ROK can cooperate with other regional partners to address our many shared security challenges.
When it comes to your question regarding South Korea and Ukraine and Russia, the point we’ll make is that countries around the world will determine the level and form of assistance that they wish to provide to Ukraine. Our message has been to underline the importance of sending a very clear signal to the people of Ukraine, to the Government of Ukraine, of strong international support, and at the same time, concurrently, a strong message to the Russian Federation that the world will not stand with President Putin’s attempts to subvert the rules-based order and to essentially erase the identity of the Ukrainian people, to erase Ukraine from the map. A hundred and forty-three countries did so most recently in the UN General Assembly. We have worked with dozens of countries, some 50 countries around the world, to provide security assistance to Ukraine but also to hold Russia accountable through sanctions, export controls, and other economic and financial measures.
We are not going to speak to what other countries are providing or should provide, but again, our message has been to underline the importance of this support both for the signal it sends, the practical impact it has both on Ukraine’s ability to resist Russian aggression and to inhibit Russia’s own ability to wage this aggression.
...
We’ll take a final question or two. Let’s see. Jiha Ham.
OPERATOR: Jiha, your line is open.
QUESTION: Hi, Ned. Thank you for taking my question. I have a question on North Korea. Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins yesterday at an event said that arms control can always be an option. Even with North Korea, the U.S. can have conversation with Kim Jong-un about arms control. So I’m wondering if you can tell us what’s your position on this. I mean, is arms control now an option? That’s something that you can consider? When you say you have no preconditions to talk, I mean, does that mean that you can also have arms control negotiations with North Korea? Thanks.
MR PRICE: Thanks, Jiha. I want to be very clear about this. There has been no change to U.S. policy. The U.S. DPRK policy remains the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and we continue to be open to diplomacy with the DPRK. We continue to reach out to the DPRK. We’re committed to pursuing a diplomatic approach. We’re prepared to meet without preconditions, and we call on the DPRK to engage in serious and sustained diplomacy. In the face of the DPRK’s continued threats and provocations, we’ve taken steps together with our allies and partners to reinforce defense, to reinforce deterrence, and we’re continuing to consult closely with the ROK, with Japan, and with our other allies and partners about how best to engage the DPRK.
Department Press Briefing – October 28, 2022 - United States Department of State
state.gov · by Ned Price, Department Spokesperson
2:12 p.m. EDT
MR PRICE: Thanks very much. Happy Friday, everyone. Apologies for the slight delay in the start. I have a few items at the top and then we’ll turn to your questions for a few minutes.
First, as you know, Secretary Blinken is wrapping up his visit to Montreal, Canada today after a successful day in Ottawa yesterday. As his visit showcases, the United States and Canada have a deep and abiding friendship, and this trip advanced our vital partnership in addressing global issues related to Ukraine, Haiti, the Indo-Pacific and Arctic regions, as well as migration in the Americas and across the world.
On Haiti, both Canada and the United States are seized with the urgency of the multiple crises in that country and their terrible impact on the Haitian people. We welcome Canada’s decision to send a high-level assessment team to Haiti – they are on the ground now – as well as our own teams’ multiple trips to Haiti over the past month. Building on that work we have already done together – including coordinating with international partners, creating a UN Security Basket Fund for Haiti, a multi-donor fund managed by the United Nations Development Program in coordination with the Haitian National Police, UN Integrated Office in Haiti, and other stakeholders, and delivery by U.S. and Canadian military planes of HNP-purchased armored vehicles.
Yesterday in Ottawa, Secretary Blinken met with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly. Joined by Deputy Prime Minister Freeland and Foreign Minister Joly, he spoke with Ukrainian refugees and volunteers at a community center that provides assistance to displaced Ukrainians.
Today in Montreal, Secretary Blinken joined Foreign Minister Joly for a conversation with rising Canadian leaders to discuss our cooperation on combating the climate crisis, promoting clean energy, supporting an inclusive economic recovery, and addressing all forms of discrimination and exclusion. The Secretary also visited a facility with new technology to recycle lithium for use in recyclable electric car batteries. This showcases how supply chain cooperation with Canada advances North American competitiveness.
As President Biden said earlier this year, the United States has no closer friend than Canada. We have been friends, partners, and allies for over 150 years, working together to advance shared priorities. We thank Prime Minister Trudeau and Foreign Minister Joly for hosting Secretary Blinken and look forward to working side-by-side to promote security and prosperity in our hemisphere and around the world.
Finally, before we turn to questions, I want to address the Iranian authorities’ cruel treatment of deceased Radio Farda journalist Reza Haghighatnejad and his family.
As you may know, Reza Haghighatnejad died of cancer on October 17th in Germany. We offer our condolences to Reza’s loved ones. Reza was a brilliant journalist dedicated to freedom of speech and uncovering the truth.
Reza’s family wished to have him buried in his hometown of Shiraz, and repatriated his remains to Iran on October 25th. We are disgusted to learn that the IRGC seized Reza’s remains at the airport and are pressuring the family to agree to have his body buried elsewhere.
We call on Iranian authorities to immediately release Reza’s remains to his family and to cease this act of intimidation. His family should be allowed to mourn his passing in peace. The Iranian authorities’ behavior is something we strongly condemn. It is, once again, an abhorrent practice of intimidating and detaining journalists in general. And the treatment of Reza Haghighatnejad’s remains underscores just how much Iran’s leadership fears journalists, even after their death.
With that, we will turn to questions. Operator, if you wouldn’t mind repeating the instructions for questions.
OPERATOR: If not already done so, please press 1 then 0 on your telephone keypad to get into the question queue.
MR PRICE: Great. Let’s start with the line of Matt Lee.
OPERATOR: Matt Lee, your line is open.
QUESTION: Hi there. Hi, Ned. Happy Friday. Thank you.
MR PRICE: Happy Friday.
QUESTION: Just on Haiti, you guys say that you’re seized with the urgency of the situation. But it’s been two weeks now since the emergency request came from the Haitian Government. And I’m just wondering if there – if after the discussions in Ottawa and again today in Montreal, if you guys are any closer to figuring out exactly how you’re going to – if you’re going to respond to this request for security assistance, and who might be involved in it, and who would lead it. It sounds though nobody is really particularly interested in doing that even though everyone understands the seriousness of the situation. Thank you.
MR PRICE: Great. Thanks, Matt. So a couple things I’d say. First is that for weeks now, we have been responding to what is an urgent humanitarian situation that, at its core, has some elements of an emergent security situation as well. We have been working with the international community for weeks on a couple fronts. As you know, on October 21st the UN Security Council unanimously adopted the sanctions resolution that we put forth with our close partner and penholder, Mexico. By adopting this resolution, we took an important step to help stymie the activities of criminal actors in Haiti, and it was after robust and inclusive negotiations that did take some time in New York that this resolution was truly reflective of council consensus and was an important step both in the direction of accountability and to put pressure on those who are blocking the provision of much-needed supplies to the Haitian people, including food and fuel.
We’ve taken other steps as well. It was a couple weeks ago now that together with our Canadian partners, our militaries delivered supplies that had been purchased by the Haitian National Police. Ultimately, this is a challenge that the Haitian National Police will need to be in a position to address, and the provision of these materials will help them do that, will help them confront the underlying security challenge that has exacerbated the attendant humanitarian crisis as well.
We are, as we’ve said for some time now, continuing to work on a resolution to authorize a non-UN international security assistance mission to improve that security situation and, again, to enable the flow of desperately needed humanitarian aid. This came at the request and has come at the request of the Government of Haiti, but it’s also one of the options that the secretary-general recommended to the Security Council; it’s something that we heard echoed by the secretary general of the OAS as well.
The resolution that’s being discussed needs to be limited, carefully scoped. We’ve made clear it would be a non-UN mission led by a partner country, with deep and necessary experience required for any such effort to be effective. And we’ll consider – continue to consider the most effective means to directly support, enable, and resource this effort. A number of countries around the world are working with us on this. As the Secretary and Foreign Minister Joly said yesterday, this is a work in progress, but we are absolutely working on it. We know that the status quo is not sustainable. We are going to continue to discuss with partners what they – what role they may be able to be – they may be able to provide when it comes to helping to address the security challenge that has in many ways exacerbated the humanitarian challenge.
With that, why don’t we go to the line of Guita Aryan.
OPERATOR: And Guita, your line is open.
QUESTION: Thank you. Hi, Ned. Thank you for taking my question. Thirteen congressmen have written a letter to six technology companies asking them to expedite more help to the Iranian protesters. I was wondering if these companies that are taking advantage of the general license, the latest one to do this, report back to the State Department or the Treasury Department about what they’ve been doing and if the – and who from this side, whether it’s State Department or Treasury again, follows up with them to see how much help or what kind of help they’ve provided. Thank you.
MR PRICE: Thanks, Guita. So I’m familiar with the letter that you referenced. Of course, we’ve been working closely with technology companies. Our Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman held a roundtable discussion just a couple weeks ago to discuss what the United States and specifically what the private sector can do to enable the people of Iran to have their voices heard both inside of Iran and by the outside world. We believe it’s vitally important that their – that their messages be heard and that they be in a position to convey them to the rest of the world.
When it comes to the general license, as we said when we announced it, the general license itself is self-executing. That enables it to be especially effective and swift when it comes to enabling private sector companies in the United States to provide their wares – hardware and software – to the people of Iran. And that’s the case because by its self-executing nature, companies don’t need to go to the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, or OFAC, to determine if their technology is permissible under the – under what the general license spells out. Instead, it is incumbent on them to determine whether their technology is applicable under the general license, and if so, they’re in a position to provide that to the people of Iran.
So to your specific question, companies are not required to go to the Treasury Department or to the State Department, but we have continued to have a conversation with the private sector, helping, working with them, answering questions about the general license, answering questions about the needs of the Iranian people, and helping to clarify what they may be in a position to do. Ultimately, private companies are going to make their own decisions, but as we know, there are a number of private companies that have technology, software, hardware that, in the hands of the Iranian people or when made accessible to the Iranian people, would enable them to achieve that important, indispensable goal of having their voices heard by the rest of the world. And that’s something we want to continue to be in a position to support.
We’ll go to Shaun Tandon.
OPERATOR: Shaun, your line is open.
QUESTION: Thanks, Ned. Good afternoon. Two things, if you don’t mind. Brazil, of course, is heading into a second round of elections this weekend. I know you made some comments before the first round, but I wanted to see if the United States had any message on the conduct of the elections. Do you have any guidelines that you could share with us about when you’d recognize the winner, and do you have any message to the candidates in terms of potentially conceding defeat?
And also, if you don’t mind, there are security alerts in recent days both in South Africa and Nigeria. In both countries, particularly in South Africa, the authorities – some of the government leaders voiced concern about what they said was a lack of communication from the U.S. side. To what extent has the United States been in touch with these two countries about the security situation? To what extent do you believe that they have the situation under control?
Thank you.
MR PRICE: Thanks, Shaun. So first on Brazil, we spoke after the conclusion of the first round. We congratulated the people of Brazil and their institutions on what was a successful first round election. It was conducted with credibility; it was conducted with transparency. And the people of Brazil, the United States, countries around the world have every confidence that Brazil will be able to hold the second round and final round in the same manner.
We support the Brazilian people’s democratic right to choose their next leader and, again, we share their confidence that authorities will conduct this upcoming round with the same professionalism and the same spirit of peace and civic duty. That would be our message to the candidates. That would be our message to those in Brazil – in Brazil’s institutions. These – Brazil’s democracy is time-tested. Its democratic institutions serve as a model for nations in the hemisphere and the world. And again, we have every expectation and confidence that the same will be true when Brazil concludes it’s second round in the coming days.
When it comes to the question you raised about Nigeria and South Africa, of course we have no higher priority than the safety and security of American citizens around the world. That, of course, includes individuals, Americans, who are working in our embassies, in missions around the world. We also have a responsibility to the American citizen community around the world that we provide them with timely notification when we have information available to us regarding a potential threat. We take the – our obligation to the so-called “no double standard” extraordinarily seriously. So in that vein, when we are in possession of information regarding a potential threat, we do provide it to American personnel. We take steps – prudent steps to mitigate the threat, but also to inform the public.
And with that in mind, effective October 27th, our embassy in Abuja went on ordered departure status for eligible family members. The authorized departure status remains in place as of now for non-emergency U.S. direct hires in Abuja. We made that decision to recommend ordered departure for EFMs in Abuja out of an abundance of caution – as we said before – related to an elevated risk of terrorist – of terror attacks in Nigeria. And we’ve put out attendant messaging to the American citizen community.
We do cooperate closely with countries around the world – certainly close partners like South Africa, like Nigeria – on shared security concerns. And any potential threat in either country could well pose a shared threat to our interests as well. We’ve been in close contact with Nigerian authorities. We appreciate the effort of our Nigerian partners to address security threats in Abuja and across the country. The same is true of our relationship with South Africa. We have a close relationship with our South African partners, and we deeply appreciate efforts that they make to protect their interests, and in turn, our interests in the country as well.
Let’s go to the line of Janne Pak.
OPERATOR: Janne, your line is now open.
QUESTION: Yes, thanks, Ned. Thanks for taking my question. Happy Friday.
MR PRICE: Happy Friday.
QUESTION: I have a quick question. I have two questions, issues related to Korea and Russia. And first question: In the review of the nuclear posture of the U.S. National Defense Strategy report, it was stated that if North Korea launches a nuclear attack on the United States or its allies, then North Korea and Kim Jong-un regime will come to an end. Do you think this strategy is effective even if dialogue and diplomacy with the North Korea do not work?
Second question: Russian President Putin warned that Russia and South Korean relations would break if South Korea provided arms to Ukraine. How can the U.S. see Russia’s warning that South Korea is supporting Ukraine along with its allies? Thank you very much.
MR PRICE: Thanks, Janne. So I will – I won’t comment on the Nuclear Posture Review. I know DOD has spoken to that along with the Missile Defense Review and the broader strategy document that they released yesterday. As you know, they addressed a number of regions and challenges in the context of those three rollouts, and so I would refer you to the statements they made and the documents they released yesterday.
But your question, your first question, gets at something that is vitally important to us, and that’s the role of extended deterrence and the role of extended deterrence in our alliance with our South Korean allies. As you know, there was a meeting of the U.S.-ROK Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group. We believe it’s a substantive and sustainable forum where we can discuss all aspects of our cooperation and coordination – diplomatic, economic, informational, and military – and how they contribute to deterring threats to the alliance.
In the context of that meeting last month, we discussed the threat from the DPRK and expanding coordination against all avenues of potential aggression, and we’ll also discuss how the United States and the ROK can – and we also discussed how the United States and the ROK can cooperate with other regional partners to address our many shared security challenges.
When it comes to your question regarding South Korea and Ukraine and Russia, the point we’ll make is that countries around the world will determine the level and form of assistance that they wish to provide to Ukraine. Our message has been to underline the importance of sending a very clear signal to the people of Ukraine, to the Government of Ukraine, of strong international support, and at the same time, concurrently, a strong message to the Russian Federation that the world will not stand with President Putin’s attempts to subvert the rules-based order and to essentially erase the identity of the Ukrainian people, to erase Ukraine from the map. A hundred and forty-three countries did so most recently in the UN General Assembly. We have worked with dozens of countries, some 50 countries around the world, to provide security assistance to Ukraine but also to hold Russia accountable through sanctions, export controls, and other economic and financial measures.
We are not going to speak to what other countries are providing or should provide, but again, our message has been to underline the importance of this support both for the signal it sends, the practical impact it has both on Ukraine’s ability to resist Russian aggression and to inhibit Russia’s own ability to wage this aggression.
Let’s go to Kylie Atwood.
OPERATOR: And Kylie, your line is open.
QUESTION: Great, thanks for doing this. Quick question following up on something that the Secretary said yesterday where he said the United States is looking at everything that they can do to disrupt Iranian weaponry from going to Russia, and that doesn’t just include sanctions. So I’m just wondering if the U.S. is actually hopeful that these efforts are going to be able to stop further shipments of Iranian weaponry from going to Russia, and if the U.S. would consider or would work with allies to potentially intercept these shipments or if that would be considered directly pulling the United States into the war. Thanks.
MR PRICE: Thanks, Kylie. So to – you alluded to the Secretary’s comments yesterday, but he made clear that we are focused and have been focused on the threat presented by Iran’s UAV technology, technology that actors in the region and beyond have used to dangerous effect in the region, in places like Iraq, in places like Syria, against our partners in the region and, in some cases, well beyond the region, and now to include inside of Ukraine on the part of Russia. We are going to use every tool at our disposal. You know that just a couple of weeks ago now we issued another round of sanctions against those that are responsible for the proliferation of some of this technology.
Our focus on this is not – has not emerged only in the context of the new information we released about Iran’s support to Russia’s war in Ukraine. In fact, it was late last year that we announced a round of sanctions against Iranian UAV proliferators. We will continue to have a – we will continue to focus on those who are responsible for the provision of this technology. We’re going to continue to look at our sanctions authorities and what more we can do to wield those authorities against those responsible for this threat. I would say stay tuned on that. We are supporting the efforts of the United Nations Security Council to investigate Iran’s – the threat posed by Iran’s UAV program.
The – over the past seven years, the secretary-general has submitted to the Security Council 13 reports summarizing its investigations and findings on noncompliance. We are providing information directly to the council and to its experts, one of whom the members of the UN Security Council heard from last week. We have tools, as you alluded to, that go beyond sanctions and other economic measures. We are going to do what is ultimately in our interest, what is ultimately in our interest in countering and disrupting the flow of this technology from Iran to countries and to entities around the world.
Of course, we’re not going to broadcast that or preview it, but as we’ve demonstrated, when it comes to countering Iran’s malign activity across the board – its support for terrorist organizations, its support for proxies, its ballistic missile programs, its nuclear program, we are going to use every tool. We’re not going to leave anything off the table. And ultimately, we are going to do what we can to disrupt the threat that these malign activities pose.
We’ll go to Simon Lewis.
OPERATOR: And Simon, your line is open.
QUESTION: Thank you. Thanks, Ned. I wonder if we could ask for an update on the peace talks happening between parties in Ethiopia. It’s going on in South Africa at the moment. Is there any update from the U.S. side on how it’s going? Is there any sort of tangible progress? And do you see a hope of something coming out of that? And I wonder if sort of additionally to that there’s been reports of airstrikes against – by the Ethiopian Government against other groups, not the Tigrayans, but the fact that they’re doing airstrikes while engaging in peace talks. Does that potentially undermine these talks? Thanks.
MR PRICE: Thanks, Simon. So a couple of things on this. First, we are going to refer to the African Union on details related to the talks. These are AU-led talks. They will be in a position to offer any relevant updates or details. We are of course supportive of this process. Our Special Envoy Mike Hammer remains in South Africa. He is both an observer and a participant to these talks. The second point is that these talks began on October 25th, just two or three days ago now, so this is still in the earliest stages of a process bringing together parties that of course are separated by quite a bit of distance at this point.
We of course have hope for these talks. We believe these AU-led talks present the best opportunity for the parties to come together to discuss their differences, and ultimately to bridge their differences. We call on the Government of Ethiopia and Tigrayan authorities to continue to engage seriously in these AU-led talks to achieve a few things: one, an immediate cessation of hostilities; two is the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all Ethiopians in need; three is additional measures to protect civilians in the face of atrocities and human rights abuses that have been reported; and four is Eritrea’s withdrawal from northern Ethiopia.
There is no solution that involves fighting; there is no military solution. And this mediation effort provides a chance to resolve political issues and to achieve a lasting peace for all Ethiopians. It’s why we’re so invested in it, and it’s why we will remain closely – a close observer and participant as these go forward.
We’ll take a final question or two. Let’s see. Jiha Ham.
OPERATOR: Jiha, your line is open.
QUESTION: Hi, Ned. Thank you for taking my question. I have a question on North Korea. Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins yesterday at an event said that arms control can always be an option. Even with North Korea, the U.S. can have conversation with Kim Jong-un about arms control. So I’m wondering if you can tell us what’s your position on this. I mean, is arms control now an option? That’s something that you can consider? When you say you have no preconditions to talk, I mean, does that mean that you can also have arms control negotiations with North Korea? Thanks.
MR PRICE: Thanks, Jiha. I want to be very clear about this. There has been no change to U.S. policy. The U.S. DPRK policy remains the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and we continue to be open to diplomacy with the DPRK. We continue to reach out to the DPRK. We’re committed to pursuing a diplomatic approach. We’re prepared to meet without preconditions, and we call on the DPRK to engage in serious and sustained diplomacy. In the face of the DPRK’s continued threats and provocations, we’ve taken steps together with our allies and partners to reinforce defense, to reinforce deterrence, and we’re continuing to consult closely with the ROK, with Japan, and with our other allies and partners about how best to engage the DPRK.
We’ll take a final question from Alex Raufoglu.
OPERATOR: Alex, your line is open. My apologies. Once more, Alex, your line is open.
QUESTION: Yes, can you hear me?
MR PRICE: Yes, go ahead.
QUESTION: Okay. Hi, Ned. Thank you so much for doing this. Happy Friday. I want to ask you about Armenia-Azerbaijan, but just before that very quickly I want to clarify what you told Kylie on Iran and Russia. As you know, the numbers are coming in. Ukraine claims that it’s succeeded in downing Iranian drones. Do you still believe that? Is it your assessment that the transfer of drones is still ongoing as we speak despite international pressure?
And now on Armenia-Azerbaijan, I just was wondering if you could please provide us with some details of Assistant Secretary Donfried’s call to Baku this morning, and whether the U.S. is currently preparing the next round of talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan. There’s some confusion about the peace process right now ahead of Black Sea summit, which was hosted by Putin on Monday. And he yesterday laid out his viewpoints, and he touches on a sort of competing Washington plan, which simply goes against what we have discussed a couple weeks ago. I just want to give you a chance to clear out the air on this. Is there indeed any Washington plan on Armenia-Azerbaijan? And if so, how does it differ from Putin’s version of peacemaking? And given that, what are your expectations from the upcoming Sochi meeting? Thanks so much.
MR PRICE: Thanks very much, Alex. First, there continues to be misinformation and, probably more accurately, disinformation emanating from certain corners, including from Moscow, when it comes to our intentions vis-à-vis Armenia and Azerbaijan. The United States is a partner to both of these countries. We have been a partner to both of these countries over the course of decades.
There is no greater supporter than the United States for the sovereignty and the independence of the countries of the South Caucasus, including Armenia and Azerbaijan. The restoration of Armenia, Azerbaijan’s independence in 1991 from the Soviet Union – it was a seminal event that guaranteed each of these countries the right to pursue their own foreign policy interests, to pursue their own interests independent of Moscow or any other country around the world.
So when we engage with Armenia and Azerbaijan, we are doing so with one purpose in mind and one purpose only, and that is to put an end to the violence and to put these countries on the path to a lasting and comprehensive peace. We have encouraged and been clear with these countries – Armenia and Azerbaijan – that they should meet in whatever format is most useful to them. We do believe in the utility of direct dialogue to resolving issues and to reaching that lasting peace.
I’m not going to comment specifically on the efforts of the Russian Federation except to say that, again, it is up to these two countries to decide the approach they will take to these upcoming talks. We – I think the world knows of Russia’s history when it comes to its neighbors and its neighborhood. Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and it’s ongoing brutal invasion of Ukraine show that Moscow has little respect for its neighbors’ sovereignty, and it’s hardly a reliable, long-term partner. We think that is in stark contrast to the United States. And again, our only intent is to help these countries achieve for themselves an end to the violence and a lasting and a comprehensive peace that the people of Armenia and Azerbaijan so desperately want.
When it comes to your first question regarding Iran’s provision of UAVs to Russia, I’m not in a position to go beyond what we’ve already said, and that is namely we began warning in July of Iran’s intent to provide this UAV technology to Russia. We know that dozens of these drones have been delivered to Russia. We know that Iranians have been present on Crimea – in Crimea working hand in hand with the Russians as Russians have used this technology with brutal effect against the people of Ukraine.
We’re going to continue to keep a focus on this relationship between Iran and Russia. It’s a relationship that is of concern to us. It’s a relationship that should be of concern to countries around the world. And the world will increasingly see what these two countries – the objectives they harbor and the damage they’re able to inflict, not only on Ukraine, but potentially against shared interests and shared values in the region and well beyond.
With that, we’ll call it a day. Thank you everyone for tuning in, and we will see you on Monday.
(The briefing was concluded at 2:48 p.m.)
# # #
state.gov · by Ned Price, Department Spokesperson
5. Central Cadres Training School to erect monument honoring Kim Jong Un
Yes. During times of crisis and hard times the thing to do is erect a new monument to the regime.
Central Cadres Training School to erect monument honoring Kim Jong Un
The new monument will demonstrate that the youngest Kim has joined the ranks of his predecessors, while also bringing his first decade in power to a conclusion
By Jeong Tae Joo - 2022.10.28 4:00pm
dailynk.com
Kim Jong Un on a visit to the Central Cadres Training School on Oct. 17. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)
The Workers’ Party’s Central Committee recently ordered the erection of a monument at Central Cadres Training School to honor North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s first lecture at the academy, Daily NK has learned.
A Daily NK source in North Korea said Wednesday that the Workers’ Party’s Central Committee had ordered Mansudae Art Studio to build the monument at the Central Cadres Training School this year, “a deeply meaningful year concluding the first decade of the Supreme Leader’s first 10 years of revolutionary leadership.”
The monument will reportedly include Kim’s portrait and what the North Korean leader said during his lecture, and will be located on the campus of the Central Cadres Training School in the Tongdaewon 2-dong neighborhood of Pyongyang’s Tongdaewon District.
The source said monuments such as this – in this case produced to commemorate Kim’s onsite guidance visit and commemorative lecture at the school on Oct. 17 – are erected to honor only members of the Kim family as leadership idolization symbols on par with statues and mosaic murals.
The placing of a monument to Kim Jong Un at the Workers’ Party’s leading training facility for cadres, alongside pre-existing monuments with the teachings of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, aims to demonstrate that the youngest Kim has joined the ranks of his predecessors, while also bringing his first decade in power to a conclusion.
The source said the leadership is lending significance to the effort to produce and erect the monument, declaring that Kim’s commemorative address — which “creatively elaborated on the theory of Juche-based Revolutionary Party Building, the essence of the revolutionary ideology of the Kim Jong Un age” — was worth “engraving in splendid manner” as an event “worthy of attention in the Workers’ Party’s history.”
The source said the leadership is telling Mansudae Art Studio that erecting the monument to the youngest Kim after erecting monuments with the handwriting of Kim Il Sung in 1948 and Kim Jong Il in 1998 is “highly significant.”
In short, it appears that the leadership is praising Kim’s commemorative address at the Central Cadres Training School as an important act in establishing a new revolutionary theory that opened an era in the history of the party, possibly as groundwork to make “Kimjongunism” an official doctrine in the future.
Meanwhile, students at provincial, city and country cadre schools nationwide have begun intensive studies of Kim’s lecture at the Central Cadres Training School, during which the North Korean leader stressed, “The cause of party building is precisely a revolutionary cause, and the level of party building can be called the level of revolutionary development.”
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com
6. Korean and European ambassadors “North Korea’s nuclear weapons and human rights are two sides of the same coin… must be approached simultaneously.”
This is one of the most important articles we have seen lately. This is a google translation of the Korean version. I really wish VOA would translate more articles in English so we can exploit the gerat reporting they do.
The ROK and the EU recognize that Human Rights are not only a moral imperative by a national security issue as well.
From the ROK Ambassador's statement we should be able to develop an alliance strategy that is based on a human rights upfront, a massive information and influence campaign, and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea.
Excerpts:
Looking back on relations with North Korea over the past few decades, Ambassador Hwang said that it must be acknowledged that the international community, including South Korea and the United States, has focused on North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.
"I firmly believe that the human rights situation in North Korea deserves as much attention as the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program," he said.
[녹취: 황준국 대사] “I strongly believe that the DPRK the human rights situation deserves as much attention as its WMD program. The DPRK's nuclear program and its human rights situation are like two sides of the same coin since both are directly tied to the unique regime's preservation. Therefore, the notion that the DPRK's human rights is a second tier to North Korea's nuclear issue should be dispelled.”
Ambassador Hwang said, “North Korea’s nuclear program and human rights situation are two sides of the same coin, as both are directly related to the preservation of the unique North Korean regime. must be eradicated,” he said.
“Protecting and promoting the universal values of freedom and human rights throughout the world is one of the top foreign policies of the new South Korean government,” he said. ” he added.
He also emphasized that the North Korean human rights issue is at the heart of this commitment not only in the context of promoting universal values, but also because it is at the heart of the Korean Peninsula issue and relates to the fundamental rights of our North Korean brothers and sisters.
It is also gratifying to note that the Ambassadors are paying attention to the briefings they received in New York this week from the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), to include Robert Collins. These words are almost verbatim from Collins' briefings and reports:
[녹취: 황준국 대사] “The DPRK human rights issue is at the very core of this commitment not only in the context of promoting universal values, but also because this is at the heart of Korean peninsula issues, and related to the basic rights of our Korean brothers and sisters.”
Littis Porauskas, Lithuania's ambassador to the United Nations, who co-hosted the event, pointed out the problem that the North Korean regime is raising funds for nuclear and missile development through human rights violations.
Ambassador Porauskas criticized the North Korean regime for diverting resources from its residents and systematically using forced labor to generate revenue to support its illegal weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.
[녹취: 포라우스카스 대사] “The regime diverts resources from the people and systematically uses forced labor to generate revenue in support of its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. A population of 25 million people is under constant surveillance by the DPRK’s three internal security organizations, comprising 270,000 agents. The degree of coercion, control, surveillance and punishment experienced by the people of the DPRK today is practically unparalleled in the contemporary world”
Korean and European ambassadors “North Korea’s nuclear weapons and human rights are two sides of the same coin… must be approached simultaneously.”
2022.10.29
https://www.voakorea.com/a/6810316.html?utm_source=pocket_mylist
The South Korean and European Union ambassadors urged that North Korea's human rights abuses be treated with the same weight as the nuclear threat. He pointed out that human rights violations such as forced labor eventually lead to the development of weapons of mass destruction. Reporter Kim Young-kwon reports.
South Korean Ambassador to the United Nations Hwang Jun-guk emphasized that North Korean human rights issues should be treated as importantly as nuclear issues during a video conference on human rights in North Korea co-hosted by the UN representatives to the United Nations in Lithuania and the Czech Republic as well as the North Korean Human Rights Commission as a side event of the UN General Assembly on the 28th.
Looking back on relations with North Korea over the past few decades, Ambassador Hwang said that it must be acknowledged that the international community, including South Korea and the United States, has focused on North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.
"I firmly believe that the human rights situation in North Korea deserves as much attention as the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program," he said.
[녹취: 황준국 대사] “I strongly believe that the DPRK the human rights situation deserves as much attention as its WMD program. The DPRK's nuclear program and its human rights situation are like two sides of the same coin since both are directly tied to the unique regime's preservation. Therefore, the notion that the DPRK's human rights is a second tier to North Korea's nuclear issue should be dispelled.”
Ambassador Hwang said, “North Korea’s nuclear program and human rights situation are two sides of the same coin, as both are directly related to the preservation of the unique North Korean regime. must be eradicated,” he said.
“Protecting and promoting the universal values of freedom and human rights throughout the world is one of the top foreign policies of the new South Korean government,” he said. ” he added.
He also emphasized that the North Korean human rights issue is at the heart of this commitment not only in the context of promoting universal values, but also because it is at the heart of the Korean Peninsula issue and relates to the fundamental rights of our North Korean brothers and sisters.
[녹취: 황준국 대사] “The DPRK human rights issue is at the very core of this commitment not only in the context of promoting universal values, but also because this is at the heart of Korean peninsula issues, and related to the basic rights of our Korean brothers and sisters.”
Littis Porauskas, Lithuania's ambassador to the United Nations, who co-hosted the event, pointed out the problem that the North Korean regime is raising funds for nuclear and missile development through human rights violations.
Ambassador Porauskas criticized the North Korean regime for diverting resources from its residents and systematically using forced labor to generate revenue to support its illegal weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.
[녹취: 포라우스카스 대사] “The regime diverts resources from the people and systematically uses forced labor to generate revenue in support of its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. A population of 25 million people is under constant surveillance by the DPRK’s three internal security organizations, comprising 270,000 agents. The degree of coercion, control, surveillance and punishment experienced by the people of the DPRK today is practically unparalleled in the contemporary world”
It also pointed out that North Korea's 25 million population is under constant surveillance by three domestic security agencies of 270,000 agents.
"The degree of coercion, control, surveillance and punishment that North Koreans are experiencing today is virtually unprecedented in the modern world," he said.
Jakub Kulhanek, Ambassador to the United Nations of the Czech Republic, the chair of the European Union tour, underscored the importance of accountability efforts to prevent human rights violations by the North Korean regime.
"North Korea's terrible human rights record is no longer a secret," said Ambassador Coolhanek. "The situation has only gotten worse in the past few years." “I believe accountability is essential as a first step towards preventing human rights violations and accessing justice,” he said.
[녹취: 쿨하넥 대사] “The appalling human rights record of North Korea is no secret, in fact, the situation has only worsened over the past years…Let me also add that I believe that accountability is essential for the prevention of human rights violations and access to justice as a first step,”
He said it was important to discuss how to better document and investigate human rights violations by the North Korean regime.
Ambassador Koolhanek is scheduled to submit a resolution condemning the human rights situation in North Korea to the 3rd Committee of the UN General Assembly on behalf of the European Union on the 1st of next month.
Elizabeth Salmon, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in North Korea
The UN Special Rapporteur on North Korean Human Rights, Elizabeth Salmon, and South Korea's Ambassador for International Cooperation on North Korean Human Rights Shinhwa Lee, who attended the event, repeatedly emphasized the points mentioned in the interactive dialogue on human rights in North Korea held by the 3rd Committee of the UN General Assembly on the 26th.
Special Rapporteur Salmon said the international community should focus on the 25 million North Koreans.
"Tackling only the missile and nuclear weapons issue will not improve the human rights situation of North Koreans, and on the other hand, it may not fundamentally solve the security issue."
[녹취] “Addressing exclusively the issue of missiles and nuclear weapons will not improve the human rights situation of the North Korean people, and on the other hand, will may not fundamentally solve security issues either.”
Rapporteur Salmon reiterated that the international community should first focus on victims of human rights violations, and that it will focus on the various human rights violations experienced by North Korean women and girls.
7. Is it time to accept North Korea is a nuclear power?
No. north Korea is a noncompliant, unsafe nuclear experimentrer (according to Dr. Bruce Bennett who described it this way some years ago).
There is no doubt that north Korea possesses nuclear weapons. But we do not need to legitimize the regime along the lines of Pakistan and India. To do so means success for Kim's political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies (I know everyone tires of me saying that but I cannot emphasize it enough because there are pundits and press who want to make concessions to appease the regime - this is very dangerous).
Excerpts:
Kim is now focused on his five-year plan for military modernization announced in January 2021 and no offers of talks from the Biden administration or others have yet turned his head in the slightest.
As Panda acknowledged, “There’s a set of cooperative options which would require the North Koreans being willing to sit down at the table and talk about some of those things with us. I don’t think that we are even close to sitting down with the North Koreans.”
And, in fairness to Kim, the reticence is not all down to Pyongyang.
“Big policy shifts in the US would require the President’s backing, and I really see no evidence that Joe Biden really sees the North Korean issue as deserving of tremendous political capital,” Panda said.
He added what many experts believe – and what even some US and South Korean lawmakers admit behind closed doors: “We will be living with a nuclear armed North Korea probably for a few decades to come at least.”
Not if we pursue a free and unified Korea.
Is it time to accept North Korea is a nuclear power? | CNN
CNN · by Paula Hancocks · October 29, 2022
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Is pushing to denuclearize North Korea an outdated aim?
02:21 - Source: CNN
Seoul, South Korea CNN —
As a statement of intent, it was about as blunt as they get.
North Korea has developed nuclear weapons and will never give them up, its leader, Kim Jong Un, told the world last month.
The move was “irreversible,” he said; the weapons represent the “dignity, body, and absolute power of the state” and Pyongyang will continue to develop them “as long as nuclear weapons exist on Earth.”
Kim may be no stranger to colorful language, but it is worth taking his vow – which he signed into law – seriously. Bear in mind that this is a dictator who cannot be voted out of power and who generally does what he says he will do.
Bear in mind too that North Korea has staged a record number of missile launches this year – more than 20; claims it is deploying tactical nuclear weapons to field units, something CNN cannot independently confirm; and is also believed to be ready for a seventh underground nuclear test.
All this has prompted a growing number of experts to question whether now is the time to call a spade a spade and accept that North Korea is in fact a nuclear state. Doing so would entail giving up once and for all the optimistic – some might say delusional – hopes that Pyongyang’s program is somehow incomplete or that it might yet be persuaded to give it up voluntarily.
As Ankit Panda, a Stanton senior fellow in the nuclear policy program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, put it: “We simply have to treat North Korea as it is, rather than as we would like it to be.”
Saying the unsayable
From a purely factual point of view, North Korea has nuclear weapons, and few who follow events there closely dispute that.
A recent Nuclear Notebook column from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists estimated that North Korea may have produced enough fissile material to build between 45 and 55 nuclear weapons. What’s more, the recent missile tests suggest it has a number of methods of delivering those weapons.
Kim Jong Un inspects a missile test at an undisclosed location in North Korea, in a photograph Pyongyang released on October 10, 2022.
Korean Central News Agency/AP/File
Publicly acknowledging this reality is, however, fraught with peril for countries such as the United States.
One of the most compelling reasons for Washington not to do so is its fears of sparking a nuclear arms race in Asia.
South Korea, Japan and Taiwan are just a few of the neighbors that would likely want to match Pyongyang’s status.
But some experts say that refusing to acknowledge North Korea’s nuclear prowess – in the face of increasingly obvious evidence to the contrary – does little to reassure these countries. Rather, the impression that allies have their heads in the sand may make them more nervous.
“Let’s accept (it), North Korea is a nuclear arms state, and North Korea has all necessary delivery systems including pretty efficient ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles),” said Andrei Lankov, a professor at Kookmin University in Seoul and a preeminent academic authority on North Korea.
The Israel solution
A better approach, some suggest, might be to treat North Korea’s nuclear program in a similar way to Israel’s – with tacit acceptance.
That’s the solution favored by Jeffrey Lewis, an adjunct professor at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in Monterey.
“I think that the crucial step that (US President Joe) Biden needs to take is to make clear both to himself and to the US government that we are not going to get North Korea to disarm and that is fundamentally accepting North Korea as a nuclear state. You don’t necessarily need to legally recognize it,” Lewis said.
Both Israel and India offer examples of what the US could aspire to in dealing with North Korea, he added.
North Korea held what it called "tactical" nuclear missile tests personally "guided" by Kim Jong Un from September 25 to October 9.
KCNA/KCNA
Israel, widely believed to have started its nuclear program in the 1960s, has always claimed nuclear ambiguity while refusing to be a party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, while India embraced nuclear ambiguity for decades before abandoning that policy with its 1998 nuclear test.
“In both of those cases, the US knew those countries had the bomb, but the deal was, if you don’t talk about it, if you don’t make an issue out of it, if you don’t cause political problems, then we’re not going to respond. I think that’s the same place we want to get to with North Korea,” Lewis said.
Denuclearization: ‘Like chasing a miracle’
At present though, Washington shows no signs of abandoning its approach of hoping to persuade Pyongyang to give up its nukes.
Indeed, US Vice President Kamala Harris underlined it during a recent visit to the DMZ, the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea.
“Our shared goal – the United States and the Republic of Korea – is a complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” Harris said.
That may be a worthy goal, but many experts see it as increasingly unrealistic.
“Nobody disagrees that denuclearization would be a very desirable outcome on the Korean Peninsula, it’s simply not a tractable one,” Panda said.
One problem standing in the way of denuclearization is that Kim’s likely biggest priority is ensuring the survival of his regime.
And if he wasn’t paranoid enough already, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (in which a nuclear power has attacked a non-nuclear power) will have served as a timely reinforcement of his belief that “nuclear weapons are the only reliable guarantee of security,” said Lankov, from Kookmin University.
A TV screen at a railway station in Seoul, South Korea, shows an image of a North Korean missile launch on October 10, 2022.
Ahn Young-joon/AP
Trying to convince Kim otherwise seems a non-starter, as Pyongyang has made clear it will not even consider engaging with a US administration that wants to talk about denuclearization.
“If America wants to talk about denuclearization, (North Korea is) not going to talk and if the Americans are not talking, (North Korea) will launch more and more missiles and better and better missiles,” Lankov said. “It’s a simple choice.”
There is also the problem that if North Korea’s increasingly concerned neighbors conclude Washington’s approach is going nowhere, this might itself bring about the arms race the US is so keen to avoid.
Cheong Seong-chang, a senior researcher at the Sejong Institute, a Korean think tank, is among the growing number of conservative voices calling for South Korea to build its own nuclear weapons program to counter Pyongyang’s.
Efforts to prevent North Korea developing nuclear weapons have “ended in failure,” he said, “and even now, pursuing denuclearization is like chasing a miracle.”
Was Trump on the right track?
Still, however remote the denuclearization dream seems, there are those who say the alternative – of accepting North Korea’s nuclear status, however subtly – would be a mistake.
“We (would be) basically (saying to) Kim Jong Un, after all of this tug of war and rustling, (that) you’re just going to get what you want. The bigger question (then) of course is: where does that leave the entire region?” said Soo Kim, a former CIA officer who is now a researcher at US think tank RAND Corporation.
That leaves one other option open to the Biden administration and its allies, though it’s one that may seem unlikely in the current climate.
They could pursue a deal in which Pyongyang offers to freeze its arms development in return for sanctions relief.
Image released by the North Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on April 26, 2022 shows missiles are displayed during a military parade at Kim Il-sung Square in Pyongyang to mark the 90th anniversary of the founding of the North Korean People\'s Revolutionary Army (KPRA). Leader Kim Jong-un inspects the military parade The North Korean leader said he will expand nuclear weapons capability at the fastest speed, according to North Korean state media.
EyePress News/Reuters
What North Korea learned from Ukraine: Now's the perfect time for a nuclear push
In other words, not a million miles away from the deal Kim offered then US President Donald Trump at their summit in Hanoi, Vietnam, in February 2019.
This option has its backers. “A freeze is a really solid way to start things out. It’s very hard to get rid of weapons that exist, but what is possible … is to prevent things from getting worse. It takes some of the pressure off and it opens up space for other kinds of negotiations,” said Lewis of the James Martin Center.
However, the Trump-era overtones might make this a non-starter. Asked if he thought President Biden might consider this tactic, Lewis smiled and said, “I’m a professor, so I specialize in giving advice that no one is ever going to take.”
We don’t talk anymore
But even if the Biden administration was so inclined, that ship may have sailed; the Kim of 2019 was far more willing to engage than the Kim of 2022.
And that, perhaps, is the biggest problem at the heart of all the options on the table: they rely on some form of engagement with North Korea – something entirely lacking at present.
Health workers in Pyongyang disinfect a bus, as part of preventative measures against Covid-19.
Kim Won Jin/AFP/Getty Images
Is North Korea hiding a bigger problem behind its Covid-19 outbreak?
Kim is now focused on his five-year plan for military modernization announced in January 2021 and no offers of talks from the Biden administration or others have yet turned his head in the slightest.
As Panda acknowledged, “There’s a set of cooperative options which would require the North Koreans being willing to sit down at the table and talk about some of those things with us. I don’t think that we are even close to sitting down with the North Koreans.”
And, in fairness to Kim, the reticence is not all down to Pyongyang.
“Big policy shifts in the US would require the President’s backing, and I really see no evidence that Joe Biden really sees the North Korean issue as deserving of tremendous political capital,” Panda said.
He added what many experts believe – and what even some US and South Korean lawmakers admit behind closed doors: “We will be living with a nuclear armed North Korea probably for a few decades to come at least.”
CNN · by Paula Hancocks · October 29, 2022
8. This is not the time to abandon North Korean denuclearization
Important essay from Bruce Klingner.
This is not the time to abandon North Korean denuclearization
BY BRUCE KLINGNER, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 10/29/22 8:00 AM ET
THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY CONTRIBUTORS ARE THEIR OWN AND NOT THE VIEW OF THE HILL
The Hill · by Caroline Vakil · October 29, 2022
The recent spate of North Korean missile tests has resurrected the “denuclearization vs arms control” debate.
Eleven United Nations resolutions require Pyongyang to denuclearize by abandoning its nuclear and missile programs in their entirety. Arms control advocates deride this as an unrealistic policy goal and call, instead, for freezing North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. But they have yet to provide a convincing argument that an arms control approach would be any more successful at curbing the North Korean threat — or even induce Pyongyang to resume negotiations, for that matter. The regime has rejected all U.S. and South Korean entreaties for dialogue for several years.
Arms control proponents have mischaracterized denuclearization as requiring North Korea to rapidly abandon the entirety of its nuclear and missile programs before receiving any benefits. But denuclearization proposals, including previous agreements with Pyongyang, call for incremental implementation over a period of years based on reciprocal actions by all parties. In this, they follow the path of arms control treaty negotiations with the Soviet Union.
Nor is the “new” arms control approach all that new. The “limit and freeze” approach did not work when North Korea signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (1985), International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards (1992), the inter-Korean nuclear agreement (1992) and the Agreed Framework (1994). North Korea violated each of those agreements, then failed to abide by its commitment in subsequent denuclearization accords.
North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un’s denuclearization vow in the 2018 Singapore summit statement was also a sham. Having repeatedly broken its word, why should we believe Pyongyang would honor its signature on an arms control agreement?
Abandoning denuclearization as a policy objective would have significant repercussions. If the U.S. forsook denuclearization, it would undermine the 11 UN resolutions requiring North Korea to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programs in a complete, verifiable, irreversible manner.
Such a policy shift would also remove the legal authority for Washington and other nations to impose and enforce sanctions for Pyongyang’s violations of international agreements. How could the U.S. negotiate “partial sanctions relief” for constraints on North Korean nuclear and missile programs if they no longer violated UN resolutions?
Formally renouncing denuclearization would contradict the Non-Proliferation Treaty and decades of U.S. non-proliferation policy. It would send a dangerous signal to other nuclear weapons aspirants that they can violate agreements and outlast international resolve to uphold them.
Legitimizing North Korea’s nuclear and missile arsenals could exacerbate South Korean and Japanese concerns about the viability of the U.S. commitment to their defense. They might worry that Washington would only seek to limit Pyongyang’s production of ICBMs capable of hitting the American homeland while allowing Pyongyang to retain hundreds of nuclear-capable short- and medium-range missiles. These concerns could increase advocacy within South Korea for an indigenous nuclear weapons program and greater reliance on preemption strategies.
Arms control advocates hope that, by renouncing denuclearization, the U.S. could coax Pyongyang to resume talking. There is no reason to believe such a major unilateral concession would spark any reciprocal diplomatic, security or military response.
Over the years, the United States and the international community provided North Korea with security guarantees, the curtailment of military exercises and a reduction of allied deterrence, large-scale economic benefits and humanitarian assistance. They have also overlooked human rights abuses, violations of UN resolutions and U.S. laws. They have even reduced sanctions ― all to no avail. Pyongyang continued to build its nuclear and missile forces.
An effective arms control treaty would require, as was included in nuclear, chemical and conventional force agreements with the Soviet Union, a comprehensive verification protocol of data declaration, monitoring and on-site inspections, including short-notice challenge inspections of non-declared facilities. Pyongyang has resisted or rejected such provisions during Six Party Talks and subsequent diplomatic engagements.
I remain a strong advocate for continued diplomatic outreach to North Korea in order to lay the foundation for negotiations on North Korea’s nuclear and missile forces, as well as tension reduction and confidence-building measures. I favor a comprehensive agreement that retains denuclearization as a stated goal that would be implemented in incremental steps over a lengthy period of time. Others instead favor a series of smaller agreements, each of which hopefully leads to subsequent accords, though abandoning the goal of ever reaching the denuclearization goal line.
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As we continue to debate the best path forward, the biggest impediment remains North Korea’s refusal to talk and unwillingness to abide by previous commitments. We should be forward leaning in calling for dialogue and negotiations with North Korean officials, but reticent to offer concessions just to get them into the room.
The United States and its allies must also protect their national security by augmenting and improving their deterrence and defense capabilities.
Bruce Klingner, a former CIA deputy division chief for Korea, is a senior research fellow in The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center.
The Hill · by Caroline Vakil · October 29, 2022
9. Putin 'worried' about South Korea sending weapons to Ukraine
Perhaps because they are good and they work and would be superior to Russia's weapons?
Putin 'worried' about South Korea sending weapons to Ukraine
by Joel Gehrke, Foreign Affairs Reporter | October 28, 2022 07:05 PM
Washington Examiner · October 28, 2022
South Korea has a sovereign right to send weapons to Ukraine if it should so choose, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol maintained in the face of a new threat from Russia.
“This is a matter of our sovereignty,” the South Korean president told reporters Friday. “We are making efforts to have peaceful and sound relations with all countries in the world, including Russia.”
Yoon emphasized that the South Koreans “have not provided any lethal weapons” to Ukraine, although he touted his government's "humanitarian and peaceful support to Ukraine.” Yet Russian officials believe that Seoul “has decided" to open its arsenal for the international effort to arm Ukraine to repel the Russian invasion, according to the Kremlin.
“Right now, we know that the Republic of Korea has decided to supply weapons and arms to Ukraine,” Russian President Vladimir Putin said Thursday at the Valdai Discussion Club. "This is going to destroy our relations.”
RUSSIA OFFERS TO STOP ATTACKING ELECTRIC GRID IN EXCHANGE FOR UKRAINIAN
Putin’s complaint may be an encouraging sign for Ukraine and its Western backers despite South Korea’s denial that it is sending weapons to the Ukrainians. “That shows that they are worried,” a senior European official in Kyiv said in reference to the Russians. "The good news is their intelligence really, sometimes, also is correct as well.”
Putin implied that the weapons would be delivered “through Poland,” although to the contemporaneous interpreter. He aired that complaint just days after South Korean defense companies announced the first deliveries of tanks and howitzers to Poland.
"Poland, which is suffering a vacuum in its military force following its military aid to Ukraine, will be able to fill the vacuum as fast as possible through its deal with us,” an official for Hanwha Defense, a South Korean company, said last week during a ceremonial unveiling of two dozen K-9 howitzers destined for Poland.
Those howitzers, as well as the 10 Hyundai K-2 main battle tanks that were unveiled at a parallel event, represent the leading edge of a major arms deal package between Seoul and Warsaw. Polish authorities have opted to purchase 1,000 of the K-2 tanks, a total of 672 howitzers, and even 48 FA-50 light fighter jets.
"The Korean weapons system was the most attractive in terms of technology, price, and timing,” Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Blaszczak said in July.
Those purchases will help with the replacement of the legacy Soviet tanks and other weaponry that Poland has provided to Ukraine since Putin launched his campaign to overthrow Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in February. They also represent a defense industrial landmark as a key U.S. ally in the Indo-Pacific region emerges as a major supplier of weaponry to a member of NATO, the U.S.-led transatlantic alliance.
“We've worked with dozens of countries, some 50 countries around the world, to provide security assistance to Ukraine — but also to hold Russia accountable through sanctions, export controls, and other economic and financial measures,” State Department spokesman Ned Price told reporters on Friday. “Our message has been to underline the importance of this support, both for the signal it sends, the practical impact it has, both on Ukraine's ability to resist Russian aggression and to inhibit Russia's own ability to wage this aggression.”
Putin, in his remarks Thursday, paired his accusation that South Korea is sending weapons to Ukraine with a threat to increase ties with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un.
“What would the Republic of Korea think if we resumed our military cooperation with the DPRK?” he said, using the acronym for the Kim regime. “Would you be happy? I would like you to think about that.”
CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM THE WASHINGTON EXAMINER
Russia has begun to obtain weapons from North Korea in order to replenish its arsenal of rockets and artillery, according to the U.S. Defense Department.
Yoon’s team reiterated that South Korea has not sent weapons to Ukraine. "Our stance remains the same that we have not provided nonhumanitarian aid or lethal weapons to Ukraine," a Yoon spokesman told the Korea Times. “However, Yoon's comment on the sovereignty means that whatever type of support we provide to Ukraine, it is our decision."
Washington Examiner · October 28, 2022
10. Would North Korea Ever Turn Its Nuclear Missiles on China?
Good question. Based on some Track II discussions I have participated in with Chinese scholars and former officials it seems they are not concerned about this. It is more concerned with a north-South war and north Korean instability and regime collapse. That said, there is really no love between north Korea and China and if sChina were to threaten China it is possible it could happen and war and collapse scenarios could cause their employment.
But this excerpt is why we have tried to engage China about contingencies on the Korean peninsula since we wrote the first regie collapse plan in the 1990s.
Some optimists may conclude that the risk of Kim targeting China is simply another problem for Beijing. But it is just as important to examine the dangers for the Combined Forces Command as well. If U.S. and Korean soldiers find themselves caught in the crossfire between China and Korea, this could lead to serious collateral damage. Moreover, lack of coordination and communication between China and the Combined Forces Command during a nuclear crisis could even lead to inadvertent escalation. For instance, Beijing might mistakenly believe that Combined Forces Command anti-missile capabilities aimed against North Korea were targeting Chinese forces — a risk that was already demonstrated during the 2016 THAAD disputes.
Chinese intervention in a future North Korean contingency creates both problems and opportunities for the United States. If China can see that Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons directly threaten its own national security, it could take North Korea’s nuclear threat more seriously. Washington and Beijing could then share the burden of containing Kim’s nuclear ambitions, perhaps even working together to build future contingency plans for the peninsula. Conversely, if Beijing sees Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons as a threat, but decides to continue formulating its own plans for a future North Korean contingency, there is still considerable value in pushing for improved communication. Considering Beijing and Washington’s competing interests and deepening distrust for each other, mitigating the risk of accidental escalation and collateral damage should be a priority for both sides.
Would North Korea Ever Turn Its Nuclear Missiles on China?
19fortyfive.com · by Diana Myers · October 29, 2022
The Other North Korea Nuclear Threat: Chinese President Xi Jinping has stipulated a “three nos” policy for the Korean Peninsula: no war, no chaos, and no nuclear weapons. So far, he’s two for three. In fact, Beijing has largely been willing to overlook North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal based on the assumption it does not pose a direct threat to China. The risk, however, is that Beijing’s very commitment to the “three nos” might one day render this assumption false. If the North Korean government was poised to collapse, or to launch an attack on South Korea, Beijing would be tempted to intervene in order to prevent chaos or war. In doing so, they might also seek to forcibly secure North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Which is exactly when Pyongyang would be tempted to use them against China.
North Korean Special-Operations Forces. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
The China-North Korea alliance is contentious. North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un has always been leery of China’s true intentions and suspicious of Beijing’s attempts to control North Korea. The cracks in the alliance have deepened in the last seven decades and will likely continue to do so as Kim builds and tests more nuclear weapons against Beijing’s wishes. The Hermit Kingdom’s juche ideology stresses self-reliance not only in relation to the Western world but also in relation to its dependence on Chinese protection. For Kim, nuclear weapons are the ultimate form of self-reliance. What’s more, his regime’s ideology is explicitly anti-sadae, meaning that it opposes serving the needs of great powers. This also includes serving China in return for protection against other foes. In 2018, a high-profile member of the North Korean elite declared that “although Japan is a century-old enemy [of North Korea], China is a thousand-year-old enemy.”
Recognizing the volatility of Pyongyang’s relationship with Beijing does not necessarily mean that China will be eager to work with the United States to contain North Korea. Rather it increases the risks that any military contingency on the peninsula poses for U.S. and South Korean forces — both of getting caught in a nuclear crossfire and of inadvertent escalation with China. To forestall this risk, Washington and Beijing should lay the groundwork for improved communication and coordination in any future Korean contingency.
When Would North Korea Be a Threat to China?
Beijing has long feared that a conflict on the Peninsula would create collateral damage for China, such as a North Korean refugee crisis and even the possibility of radioactive fallout floating into Chinese territory. However, Beijing has avoided addressing the possibility that Kim’s nuclear weapons could pose a direct threat during a future Korean contingency where Beijing intervenes as a third-party actor.
As Beijing continues its path toward regional and global preeminence, having a bellicose nuclear neighbor with little respect for its “big brother” does not help — particularly when that neighbor’s nuclear activities risk pushing other neighbors to go nuclear. In the words of Andrew Scobell, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Beijing sees Pyongyang as a “troubled teenager lacking adult supervision who lives right next door in a decrepit old house with a large arsenal of lethal weapons” and whose “strong self-destructive tendencies” might damage China’s “newly remodeled mansion.”
Nonetheless, Beijing knows that it can do little to curb Kim’s relentless nuclear ambitions, so it seeks to maintain the status quo. Beijing hopes to remain on amenable terms with its uncontrollable “little brother” in the hopes of preserving stability within North Korea and preventing regime collapse. However, this strategy may have an impending expiration date.
Were Kim to launch a diversionary attack on South Korea to avert an internal coup, Beijing would almost certainly intervene to secure its interests. China has made it clear that it will not be coming to North Korea’s aid if Pyongyang initiates a conflict against South Korea and the United States. Instead, China would be concerned about the collateral damage, as well as the U.S. military response this would invite. Therefore, the best course of action for Beijing would be to either prevent or contain a North Korean attack.
North Korea’s New Hypersonic Missile. Image Credit: KCNA/North Korean State Media.
But Beijing’s lack of support for Pyongyang — let alone a potential effort to prevent an attack against Seoul — would create further tension and distrust. Kim may even worry that Beijing would take advantage of a conflict by attempting to install a puppet leader or expand its territory by sending forces into North Korea under the guise of stabilization.
Pyongyang has good reason to be concerned about this. Prominent Chinese military authors have argued that commanders should use crises as “windows of opportunity” to advance national interests. Beijing may feel compelled to take advantage of Kim’s vulnerability to create more favorable conditions. But having China, a thousand-year enemy of the Korean people, take over North Korea could be just as, if not more, unacceptable to Kim than having the United States do so. Under such circumstances, Kim may conclude it is necessary to threaten Beijing with nuclear weapons to deter Chinese intervention.
The Case for Entering Nuclear Threshold
Of course, Beijing would likely be quick to try to seize or destroy Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons during any North Korean contingency. However, Beijing should not be so quick to assume that such intervention will not be met with strong pushback. The People’s Liberation Army is vastly superior to the Korean People’s Army, but this is exactly why the Kim family has built weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear weapons have become the regime’s ultimate tool to thwart great power influence and maintain its sovereignty. Moreover, unless Beijing has exceptional intelligence and knows exactly where all of Kim’s nuclear weapons are, Chinese forces may not be able to seize or destroy all of them. This would leave Pyongyang with the opportunity to strike back against Beijing with some of its remaining forces.
Would Kim really dare to do so when Beijing maintains clear nuclear superiority? It’s possible. After all, Washington still considers Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons a threat despite America’s substantial nuclear superiority. Moreover, nuclear parity and superiority may not be as salient when Pyongyang can hold one to two major targets hostage to deter intervention. To establish deterrence, Kim simply needs to be able to threaten unacceptable losses and communicate his willingness to follow through. The nuclear asymmetry between the United States and North Korea has not prevented Kim from building more weapons, nor has it prevented Kim from threatening to use them against the United States. Moreover, Pyongyang has many more short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles than it does intercontinental ballistic missiles, and Beijing is geographically closer than Washington.
The regime’s aggressive push to amass a more expansive and capable nuclear arsenal signals its desire to double down on this strategy. Some experts estimate that Kim could have more than 200 nuclear warheads by 2027. As North Korea develops survivable retaliatory strike capabilities, Pyongyang can engage in more saber-rattling against both Washington and Beijing. On the precipice of regime failure, Kim might well be inclined to follow through on these threats. Kim’s nuclear weapons are synonymous with his survival, and any power that attempts to take them away would be operating under Kim’s nuclear shadow. Indeed, the risk is all the higher, because so far Chinese security experts have not taken the nuclear threat against Beijing seriously.
Why Should the United States Care About This?
Despite both having cause for concern, Beijing and Washington are no closer to seeing eye-to-eye on North Korea. Recently, one former U.S. Forces Korea commander argued that China needs to be included in future war plans for the peninsula. But the ongoing strategic competition between the United States and China makes political cooperation in a future North Korea contingency difficult. However, the failure to plan a contingency that includes the threat or actual use of nuclear weapons against China could lead to catastrophic results for all parties. Moreover, as Beijing continues to expand its economic and political influence in the region, the stakes for having a stable and conflict-free Korean Peninsula will become even higher. Therefore, strategists in Beijing and Washington should both be thinking about how to deal with an increasingly bellicose Kim armed with plenty of nuclear — not to mention chemical and biological — weapons.
Image: KCNA/North Korean State Media.
Some optimists may conclude that the risk of Kim targeting China is simply another problem for Beijing. But it is just as important to examine the dangers for the Combined Forces Command as well. If U.S. and Korean soldiers find themselves caught in the crossfire between China and Korea, this could lead to serious collateral damage. Moreover, lack of coordination and communication between China and the Combined Forces Command during a nuclear crisis could even lead to inadvertent escalation. For instance, Beijing might mistakenly believe that Combined Forces Command anti-missile capabilities aimed against North Korea were targeting Chinese forces — a risk that was already demonstrated during the 2016 THAAD disputes.
Chinese intervention in a future North Korean contingency creates both problems and opportunities for the United States. If China can see that Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons directly threaten its own national security, it could take North Korea’s nuclear threat more seriously. Washington and Beijing could then share the burden of containing Kim’s nuclear ambitions, perhaps even working together to build future contingency plans for the peninsula. Conversely, if Beijing sees Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons as a threat, but decides to continue formulating its own plans for a future North Korean contingency, there is still considerable value in pushing for improved communication. Considering Beijing and Washington’s competing interests and deepening distrust for each other, mitigating the risk of accidental escalation and collateral damage should be a priority for both sides.
Diana Y. Myers is a former Air Force Ph.D. fellow at the RAND Corporation and holds a Ph.D. in public policy analysis. A more detailed analysis of this issue can be found in her doctoral dissertation, “Thinking About the Unthinkable: Examining North Korea’s Evolving Military Threat Against China.” She currently serves as an active-duty officer in the United States Air Force.
The opinions presented in this article are entirely her own and do not represent the views of the U.S. Air Force or of the U.S. government.
19fortyfive.com · by Diana Myers · October 29, 2022
11. North Korea-backed Kimsuky gang hacking Android phones to gather intelligence
The "all-purpose sword" (cyber) is an important and valuable capability for the Kim family regime.
North Korea-backed Kimsuky gang hacking Android phones to gather intelligence
Attacks on phones are becoming more common and sophisticated. North Korean hackers are taking advantage.
By Claudia Glover
techmonitor.ai · by Claudia Glover · October 28, 2022
North Korean cybercrime gang Kimsuky is hacking Android phones to steal data as part of a government intelligence-gathering mission which is focused on South Korea, Japan and the US, new research has revealed. Cyberattacks on smartphones are on the rise globally and could have dangerous implications for companies which allow staff to use their own devices for work purposes.
Hackers backed by the North Korean government are targeting Android devices. (Photo courtesy of lebedev/Shutterstock)
South Korean cybersecurity company S2W has released research into the gang, which it believes is sponsored by the government in Pyongyang. According to the report, the hackers are targeting individuals and companies across the public and private sectors in South Korea, Japan and the US, in a bid to gather as much intelligence as possible for North Korea.
How is North Korea targeting Android phones?
S2W has warned that Kimsuky is using three different malware families – FastFire, FastViewer and FastSpy – to access Android phones. Handsets running on the Google operating system number some three billion around the world, and are particularly popular in South Korea as it is the home of leading Android phone producer Samsung.
FastFire malware is deployed camouflaged as a Google security plugin, explain Lee Sebin and Shin Yeongjae, researchers at S2W. This approach makes sense for the targets, explains Marcus Fowler, SVP strategic engagements and threats and CEO at security vendor Darktrace Federal, which works with the US defence sector. “Kimsuky’s MO appears to be intelligence gathering and Android is the dominant device provider in South Korea, thereby offering the most opportunities for intelligence collection,” he says. “Attackers both state and non-state will always aim to maximise their return on investment and will therefore target market leaders to increase their chances of success,” he continues.
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Victims could face serious consequences. “Targeting mobile phones offers personal details, communications and even geolocation for this pursuit,” says Fowler. “The targeted individual could be tracked, impersonated or even blackmailed based on what is found.”
North Korea has a long history of using cybercrime to help boost its economy as it combats an array of international sanctions. North Korean state-backed hacking gangs such as the Lazarus APT have carried out cryptocurrency heists, launched ransomware attacks and even robbed banks.
Mobile devices are popular cyberattack vector
Mobile device cyber attacks appear to be on the rise, as cybercriminals become smarter and are able to deploy automated attacks which target multiple devices at once, says Fowler. “The trend is growing but it is nothing new,” he says. “What’s changed is that attacks used to focus more heavily on specific individuals, but today, increasing automation and faster computers enable attackers to scale up their operations and conduct these widespread attacks with greater efficiency and speed,” he says.
The UK suffered 158,126 cyberattacks on mobile devices in the second quarter of this year according to research from ThreatFabric. This means it is the seventh most attacked country in the world when it comes to these kind of incidents, with Spain topping the list and the US in fifth. Neither Japan nor South Korea features in the top ten. The most common malware used during this period was Hydra, a banking trojan designed to steal credentials and gain control of the victim’s account.
Many companies allow their workers to use their own devices for work purposes, particularly since the Covid-19 pandemic and the rise of remote working. This presents a security risk as one compromised device can leave entire networks open to attack.
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According to a recent report by security company Comparitech, 67% of teams use their own devices regularly for work, while 35% of employees claim they need to work around their company’s security policy to get their job done, suggesting measures to prevent attacks are being bypassed.
Implementing multi-factor authentication (MFA) on a smartphone could protect it from being attacked. According to a report by security company Digital Shadows, two-factor authentication (2FA) deals with the problem of credential theft and subsequent reuse. “2FA is used for online banking, e-commerce, social media and other platforms. So far, it’s the best defence we have against cybercriminals phishing for our credentials or coaxing them out of us through some other social engineering means,” it says.
Ironically, however, the implementation of MFA may increase the risk of the device being attacked, notes Fowler, as specific types of attacks can be launched against devices with this type of security in place. “Adopting MFA to fight credential theft might make mobile phones more attractive targets for intelligence operators looking to gain access to their targets’ accounts,” he adds.
techmonitor.ai · by Claudia Glover · October 28, 2022
12. The Guardian view on Korean soft power: harder than it looks
A lesson in public diplomacy for all of us.
The Guardian view on Korean soft power: harder than it looks | Editorial
Pop music and TV shows might not sound like a serious business, but public diplomacy matters – whatever form it comes in
The Guardian · by Editorial · October 28, 2022
Squid Game gripped viewers in 94 countries, becoming the most watched Netflix show ever. The Oxford English Dictionary added 26 Korean words. The K-pop band BTS has topped charts internationally and met Joe Biden at the White House this summer. After sweeping through Asia years ago, hallyu – the “Korean wave” of culture – has crashed upon western shores too, as documented in a new exhibition at the V&A in London.
This is a serious business. A recent book, Shrimp to Whale, plays on an old saying portraying Korea as a tiny creature surrounded by leviathans and captures its triumphant postwar ascent from abject poverty and trauma. South Korea still regards itself as a middle power. But in economics, technology and especially culture it is now a powerhouse. One government source jokes that soft power – a country’s ability to get what it wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment – is the South’s nuclear weapon.
Joseph Nye, who coined the term soft power in the late 1980s, has suggested that it depends on a nation’s culture, political values and foreign policies. Building it is not as straightforward as amassing the bombs and tanks required for hard power. China has invested heavily in soft-power initiatives, but has yet to produce a Blackpink or Snowpiercer. Its determination to micromanage cultural projects hampers the ability to appeal to foreign audiences. (Prof Nye has suggested that its influence will remain limited for as long as it “fans the flames of nationalism and holds tight the reins of party control”).
In contrast, democratic South Korea has pursued an arm’s-length approach, modelled partly on UK initiatives such as the British Council. Squid Game and the Oscar-winning Parasite hardly shed a flattering light on the nation that produced them: they have triumphed by capturing the monstrous cruelties and inequality of modern capitalism there, in a way that has resonated more widely.
The strategy is a recognition that soft power belongs to nations, not governments. The origins of South Korea’s status as a cultural behemoth are complex. But if the state can take some credit, civil society should take more. There was outrage in 2016 when it emerged that then-president Park Geun-hye’s administration had blacklisted thousands of artists and entertainers – a reversion to the kind of censorship and punishment once seen under authoritarian leaders, including Ms Park’s father. It is the people who have nurtured, promoted and defended media and artistic independence.
Globally, this is an era in which diplomatic platitudes have been stripped away, and force laid bare once more. Nationalist strongmen are in charge around the world. Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine was the ultimate assertion of hard power. Yet the video addresses by Volodymyr Zelenskiy, who has so consummately inhabited the role of war leader; the sharing of daily life by citizens; even the defiant humour of postage stamps have all helped to bolster public support for Ukraine in other countries. In doing so, they have helped to maintain the political will to keep supplying it with heavy weaponry in the face of Russian menace. Soft power is hard to define and harder to master. But it counts.
13. Afraid Of Kim's Nukes? Build A Bunker, South Korean Professor Says
Or you can practice hiding under desks as we did as school kids during the Cold War.
Photos at the link: https://www.barrons.com/articles/afraid-of-kim-s-nukes-build-a-bunker-south-korean-professor-says-01666857308
Afraid Of Kim's Nukes? Build A Bunker, South Korean Professor Says
Barron's · by Cat Barton and Kang Jin-kyu
Built on his property in Jecheon city about 75 miles (120 kilometres) southeast of the capital Seoul, the government-funded bunker is part of a campaign by Lee to get South Koreans to take preparations for a nuclear fallout more seriously.
"Just 100 kilometres away from here we have North Korea, from which biological or nuclear missiles could fly," Lee told AFP.
He said he was also extremely concerned about a Fukushima-style meltdown at one of South Korea's ageing nuclear reactors.
"South Koreans have not been required to build personal shelters for ages. There's a lack of public shelters and in many cases they're far away," he added.
South Korea has a "first-class shelter system for the military", Lee says, but "the civilian side lags far behind"
Anthony WALLACE
Since the Korean War ended in 1953 with an armistice rather than a peace treaty, Seoul has remained technically at war with Pyongyang, and both sides routinely accuse each other of "provocations" that could tip them back into open conflict.
Pyongyang conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, and leader Kim Jong Un has recently ramped up work on weapons programmes banned by the UN, including staging drills it claimed simulated showering South Korea with tactical nukes.
Although Seoul's military maintains what it calls an "utmost readiness" for an attack, Lee said most civilians have forgotten the war and are not prepared.
South Korea has a network of more than 17,000 bomb shelters nationwide, according to interior ministry data, with over 3,000 of them in Seoul.
Lee says most South Korean civilians are not prepared for an attack
Anthony WALLACE
The city's subway stations double as public air raid shelters but they are not nuclear-safe.
In the 1970s, the country had a law requiring buildings over a certain size in major cities to have a basement, which would serve as a bunker in war.
But in Seoul, due to soaring property prices, most private buildings have converted those basements into parking space or the dank subterranean flats made famous by Oscar-winning movie "Parasite".
This has Lee, a mild-mannered professor at Semyung University, concerned.
South Korea has a "first-class shelter system for the military", he said, but "the civilian side lags far behind".
Lee's "model" bunker cost around 70 million won ($48,000) -- excluding labour costs -- to construct, which was covered by a ministry of education research grant that he applied for and won.
He said he hopes it will inspire others to follow suit, adding that he has had many enquiries about his blueprint, including from officials from South Korea's Air Force, who inspected his bunker earlier this year.
For urban high-rise apartment dwellers, Lee recommends retro-fitting basement parking lots to double as bunkers, and says the government should nuclear-proof subway tunnels.
Lee says people who construct nuclear-proof bunkers prefer to keep them secret
Anthony WALLACE
Although many in South Korea have grown numb to the constant threats from Pyongyang, there are signs that more citizens like Lee are taking matters into their own hands.
One local company, Chumdan Bunker System, started selling nuclear-proof bunkers at a Seoul showroom in 2017 -- the year that Kim conducted his last nuclear test.
Chumdan's website advertises "an underground bunker capable of withstanding nuclear explosions, radiation, chemical agents".
But the company told AFP that while they were seeing growing interest in their products, this had not yet translated into sales growth.
"There has been an increase in online traffic to our website but the number of actual orders remain the same," an Chamdan employee told AFP.
Lee said people who construct nuclear-proof bunkers prefer to keep them secret, fearing they will be inundated with requests from friends, family and neighbours for shelter during an emergency.
Lee says he hopes to inspire others to build their own bunkers
Anthony WALLACE
"Even when I built this bunker, all these people were telling me they'd come if the country comes under attack. But this place can only fit 12 people," he said.
Barron's · by Cat Barton and Kang Jin-kyu
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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