Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners


Quotes of the Day:


​"​The blind heart is worse than the blind eye,​ ​​​​​And the half-truth more dangerous than the lie. ​"​
​- ​Jan Struther

"The realization that we are all basically the same human beings who seek happiness and try to avoid suffering is very helpful in developing a sense of brotherhood and sisterhood; a warm feeling of love and compassion for others." 
- Tenzin Gyatso, 14th Dalai Lama

​"​It’s possible to fight intolerance, stupidity, and fanaticism when they come separately. When you get all three together it’s probably wiser to get out, if only to preserve your sanity.​"
- ​P. D. James, the protagonist Adam Dalgliesh speaking, in Devices and Desires (1989)



​1. N. Korea's military claims to be 'gravely' watching Seoul-Washington aircraft carrier drills

2. N. Korea says its missile tests are 'self-defense' actions against U.S. threats

3. U.S. military footage shows arrival of new rotational force in Korea

4.  New COVID-19 cases fall to lowest Saturday tally in 3 months

5. What’s behind the sudden increase in missile tests from North Korea?

6. Satellites Can’t Get Information Into North Korea Now, but Could Have 20 Years Ago

7. North Korea’s 2022 Missile Activity: Implications for Alliance Security

8. Analysis | Washington’s Asia strategy leading up to the midterms: Keep calm and carry on

9. Analysis: North Korean missile launches are a test for Biden

10. Seoul must sternly counter Pyongyang’s airborne protest but avoid skirmish

​11. ​Is Kim Jong-un emulating Putin's saber-rattling?

12. S. Korea, US, Japan agree on more efforts against NK cryptocurrency theft

​13. ​Escapes increase as North Korean workers in Russia are told to ship out to Ukraine

​14. ​North Korea comes up short again on having enough food to feed its people





1.  N. Korea's military claims to be 'gravely' watching Seoul-Washington aircraft carrier drills


We must not allow ourselves to be duped by the north's Propaganda and Agitation Department that is trying to create the image that the increase in tensions is the fault of the US and the alliance.


We must never ever forget that Kim Jong Un fears the Korean people living in the north more than he fears the US or the alliance military.


I heard an uninformed pundit speaking on NPR yesterday say that the US started this provocation cycle with the "restart" of the annual August exercises after "5 years." Here is the sad fact: even when Trump unilaterally (and without coordination with the US military or our ally South Korea) cancelled Ulchi Freedom Guardian in 2018 (four years ago) we still conducted August exercises in some form (and sometimes under a new or no name and sometimes only a compost computer simulation exercise which has always been the foundation of the August exercises, field trying was always an adjunct to the foundational theater level training) ) every year. And the north knew we were conducting exercises. We did not just restart exercises after 5 years. 


To think that the alliance began this provocation cycle in August neglects the fact that the north has conducted some 30+ missile firings this year, dating back to January. Why is the conduct of a defensive exercise considered the start of the provocation cycle? Those who want to "blame" the US and the alliance are in full support of the regime's propaganda narrative and are in support of the regime strategy. We must use the north's actions and rhetoric as an opportunity to show Kim and the world that his strategy will not be successful. If we make concessions (e..g, sanctions relief or cancelling exercises) we are simply proving to Kim Jong Un that his strategy is successful.


We also need a strong influence component to keep in mind that when we talk about regimn's threats (nuclear and missile)we are reinforcing the regime's legitimacy when we show fear. If we must address the threats we need to also include a human right component and remind the Korean people in the north and the international community that the Korean people in the north suffer solely because of Kim Jong Un's policy decision to prioritize nuclear and missile development over the welfare of the people. Their suffering is also exacerbated by the incompetent agricultural, industrial, and economic policies based on Juche ideology.


We should remember that we need to recognize Kim Jong Un's political warfare, blackmail diplomac, and advanced war fighting strategies, understand them, expose them, and attack them (with a superior political warfare strategy built on a foundation of strength and deterrence). Our influence campaign and pressure must lead to three options for KJU: he must change his behavior and act as a responsible member of the international community, he must be forced by the military and elite to change his behavior, or he will himself be changed by the Korean people in the north who he fears has the power to change him.


(LEAD) N. Korea's military claims to be 'gravely' watching Seoul-Washington aircraft carrier drills | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · October 8, 2022

(ATTN: UPDATES with China's response in last 2 paras)

SEOUL, Oct. 8 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's military said Saturday it is "gravely" watching the Seoul-Washington joint naval exercises involving a nuclear-powered U.S. aircraft carrier, calling the operation "a military bluff."

Tensions have been escalating between the communist state and the Seoul-Washington alliance, following Pyongyang's launch of an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) over Japan on Tuesday and the entailing South Korea-U.S. joint drills.

The 103,000-ton USS Ronald Reagan, the cream of the joint naval drills held Saturday, is being thoroughly monitored in the East Sea, an unnamed spokesperson for the North's defense ministry said in an interview with the state-run Korean Central News Agency.

"The nuclear-powered USS Ronald Reagan has conspired with the South Korean naval vessels to execute joint sea drills against our nation," the spokesperson told the North Korean news outlet.

"The move is a military bluff that is aimed at our just response for their apparently provocative, threatening South Korea-U.S. drills," the spokesperson added.

The North apparently referred to its recent firing of a series of ballistic missiles as "our just response."

"The DPRK armed forces are gravely watching the development of the current situation, which is very worrisome," the spokesperson said. DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's official name.

Seoul and Washington held the joint naval drills in the international waters of the East Sea on Friday and Saturday.

Meanwhile, Mao Ning, a spokesperson for China's foreign ministry, expressed hope that concerned parties will refrain from tough language and create conditions for the resumption of dialogue, while portraying the situation on the peninsula as "complex and sensitive."

She reiterated China's position that each side's concerns should be settled through dialogue and negotiations in a "balanced" manner.


jwc@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · October 8, 2022




2. N. Korea says its missile tests are 'self-defense' actions against U.S. threats



Admit nothing, deny everything, and make counter accusations.


Please remind me how many times the US has attacked North Korea or flown missiles over their territory since 1953? How many nKPA soldiers have been killed by the US or by offensive action by the ROK/US Alliance since 1953? I still have the fingers left on both hands to count the number of incidents.


(LEAD) N. Korea says its missile tests are 'self-defense' actions against U.S. threats | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · October 8, 2022

(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with details; ADDS byline)

By Kim Soo-yeon

SEOUL, Oct. 8 (Yonhap) -- North Korea stressed Saturday that its latest missile tests are "regular and self-defense" actions against U.S. military threats, taking issue with a U.N. aviation agency's condemnation of its recent ballistic missile firing.

In a statement, North Korea's National Aviation

Administration (NAA) said, "The missile test launch by the DPRK is a regular and planned self-defensive step for defending the country's security and the regional peace from the U.S. direct military threats that have lasted for more than half a century." The DPRK is the acronym for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a specialized U.N. agency handling affairs related to international air navigation, formally described the North's continued launching of ballistic missiles over or near international air routes without prior notice as a serious threat to the safety of civil aviation.

The North, however, claimed its missile testing did not pose any threat or harm to the safety of civilian aviation or neighboring countries.

It made clear that its missile activities are aimed at countering U.S. military threats and criticized the ICAO's move.

"We categorically condemns and rejects this as a political provocation of the U.S. and its vassal forces aimed to infringe upon the

sovereignty of the DPRK," the NAA said.

North Korea has ratcheted up tensions on the peninsula with a string of weapons tests, including the firing of an intermediate-range ballistic missile over Japan on Tuesday.

Pyongyang's missile tests are widely viewed as its protest against joint military exercises by South Korea and the U.S. as the Kim Jong-un regime regarded them as a rehearsal for invasion.

The allies staged large-scale annual combined military drills from late August till early September. They also staged joint naval exercises involving a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the USS Ronald Reagan, earlier this week in a show of force against the North's provocations.


sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · October 8, 2022


3. U.S. military footage shows arrival of new rotational force in Korea


Unfortunately these units are not equivalent in combat power. We need to return to permanently assigned ground combat forces.



What is a Stryker Brigade Combat Team?

 The Stryker Brigade Combat Team – or SBCT – is an infantry-centric unit with 3,600 soldiers

that combines many of the best characteristics of the current Army forces and exploits technology

to fill a current operations capability gap between the Army’s heavy and light forces.

https://www.usarpac.army.mil/docs/Whatis_SBCT.pdf


OVERVIEW OF THE STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-21-31/c01.htm


U.S. military footage shows arrival of new rotational force in Korea | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · October 8, 2022

SEOUL, Oct. 8 (Yonhap) -- The U.S. military on Saturday released footage showing a Stryker armored fighting vehicle arriving in a port city south of Seoul as part of a new American rotational force to operate here for nine months.

The Eighth Army disclosed the video clip, in which the vehicle was seen disembarking at the port in Pyeongtaek, 70 kilometers south of Seoul, to work as a key asset of the 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT).

The SBCT will replace the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) -- a transition that the U.S. military said would enable "greater mobility and concentration of combat power."

The ABCT operates M-1 Abrams tanks and M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, while the Stryker team uses the eight-wheeled armored vehicle, which the U.S. Army says combines firepower, battlefield mobility, survivability and versatility with reduced logistics requirements.

The shift comes as Seoul and Washington are striving to strengthen deterrence against Pyongyang's evolving nuclear and missile threats.


sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · October 8, 2022



4. New COVID-19 cases fall to lowest Saturday tally in 3 months



I was wrong in my concern that there would be an increase in cases following Chuseok. I am happy to be wrong in this case.


(LEAD) New COVID-19 cases fall to lowest Saturday tally in 3 months | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 정주원 · October 8, 2022

(ATTN: ADDS details in paras 7-11, photo)

SEOUL, Oct. 8 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's new coronavirus cases declined to the lowest tally for a Saturday in three months as the country seeks to return to pre-pandemic normalcy.

The country reported 19,431 new COVID-19 infections, including 59 from overseas, bringing the total caseload to 24,953,135, the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA) said.

The figure is the lowest Saturday tally since July 2, when the cases hit 10,708.

The latest virus wave, triggered by the spread of a highly contagious omicron variant, has been on a downturn since mid-August, when it peaked at above 180,000 cases.

The government lifted all outdoor mask mandates on Sept. 26, while maintaining the indoor mandates for further monitoring.

In October, the daily new cases have remained under 30,000, except for Wednesday.


Of the 19,431 new COVID-19 cases, Seoul reported 3,963 new infections and the surrounding Gyeonggi Province added 5,328. Incheon, a port city 27 kilometers west of Seoul, identified 1,062 new cases.

Imported cases sharply decreased, with the daily toll staying below 100 since Wednesday.

The figure decreased in the wake of the lifting of the COVID-19 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing requirement for inbound travelers on the first day of their arrival, the last antivirus restriction for arrivals, last Saturday.

The government also scrapped the restrictions on in-person visits to nursing homes, senior care hospitals and other related facilities Tuesday.

In-person visits to such facilities had been banned since July to prevent mass infections among high-risk groups.

New deaths from COVID-19 stood at 32 on Saturday, down nine from Friday, raising the death toll to 28,646.

The number of critically ill patients came to 287, down 42 from a day earlier.


jwc@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 정주원 · October 8, 2022


5. What’s behind the sudden increase in missile tests from North Korea?


Excerpts:


“At this point, for Kim Jong-un to turn back and halt provocations would seem counterproductive to his interests, not to mention the amount of resources squandered to conduct these weapons tests,” said Soo Kim, an analyst at the RAND Corporation.
“We are in a cycle of weapons provocations. What’s left, essentially, is an intercontinental ballistic missile test and potentially the long-awaited seventh nuclear test.”


Concur. But we should not fear these "tests/". We must see the opportunity they present to show Kim his strategy will fail.





What’s behind the sudden increase in missile tests from North Korea?

Justin McCurry

in Tokyo

With six launches in 12 days, North Korea is flexing its muscles and taking advantage of geopolitical turmoil across the world

The Guardian · by Justin McCurry · October 6, 2022

Millions of residents of northern Japan will have felt a sense of deja vu on Tuesday morning when they were alerted to a North Korean missile flying overhead. Five years earlier, they had twice been shaken from their slumber by Japanese government warnings to seek shelter after missile launches by Pyongyang.

The intermediate-range missile involved in this week’s test was far from buzzing the rooftops of Hokkaido farmhouses – it flew at an altitude of 1,000km as it made its way to the Pacific Ocean, where it splashed down, without incident, more than 3,000km east of Japan.

However, it caused understandable anxiety among residents, even though its record-breaking flight was intended as a message not to Japan, but to the Biden White House.

North Korea has fired another ballistic missile, South says

Read more

As is the case with every other major display of North Korean military might, timing and context are as important as any indication that the regime’s weapons are becoming more technologically advanced – and more threatening.

The consensus among Pyongyang watchers was that the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, would avoid taking any action that could steal the regional limelight from China – the North’s main ally and biggest aid donor – as it prepares to hold a rare Communist party congress on 16 October.

But there are compelling reasons why Pyongyang has chosen this moment to launch a missile, believed to be a Hwasong-12, that is theoretically capable of striking the US Pacific territory of Guam.

It was a reminder that North Korea’s weapons technology is advancing – having flown further than any other missile to date – as part of a wider demonstration of the regime’s ballistic capabilities. It has conducted eight missile launches in just 10 days, and an unprecedented 40 so far this year, according to the UN.

It would be wrong to understate the role pure indignation plays in the North’s timing. This week’s tests come soon after the US and South Korea resumed large-scale naval drills that Pyongyang believes are a rehearsal for an invasion, and after a visit to the heavily armed border dividing the Korean peninsula by the US vice-president, Kamala Harris.


Vice-president Kamala Harris is briefed at a military operation post as she visits the demilitarised zone separating North and South Korea in September Photograph: Leah Millis/AFP/Getty Images

A consequence of global disunity

In strategic terms, Pyongyang’s more assertive behaviour is a consequence of global political instability that has given it an opportunity to provoke its neighbours without fear of inviting another round of sanctions.

The war in Ukraine has not only become a distraction for Joe Biden, it has opened the door to closer ties between Pyongyang and Moscow, while recent Chinese military activity in the Taiwan Strait has enabled the North to exploit rising tensions between Washington and Beijing.

The heady days of unity on display in 2017, when the UN security council, including Russia and China, imposed heavy sanctions on the North, are over. That much was clear in May this year, when China and Russia vetoed a resolution imposing new penalties on the regime.

That disunity means more serious provocations lie on the horizon, as the North continues to exploit Ukraine, Taiwan and a hamstrung security council to push its status as a legitimate nuclear state with the ability to target the US mainland with a nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile [ICBM].

As the Centre for Strategic and International Studies noted this week, previous sequences of North Korean ballistic missile tests have been followed by a nuclear test.

US and South Korean officials have been warning for months that a seventh nuclear test is imminent, while satellite imagery of a fully primed Punggye-ri testing site suggests the only question now is one of political timing.

“At this point, for Kim Jong-un to turn back and halt provocations would seem counterproductive to his interests, not to mention the amount of resources squandered to conduct these weapons tests,” said Soo Kim, an analyst at the RAND Corporation.

“We are in a cycle of weapons provocations. What’s left, essentially, is an intercontinental ballistic missile test and potentially the long-awaited seventh nuclear test.”

The Guardian · by Justin McCurry · October 6, 2022



6. Satellites Can’t Get Information Into North Korea Now, but Could Have 20 Years Ago


Some very interesting history and description of the challenges that exist.


Few have as much understanding of the information technology issues with north Korea than Martyn Williams.

Satellites Can’t Get Information Into North Korea Now, but Could Have 20 Years Ago

https://www.38north.org/2022/10/satellites-cant-get-information-into-north-korea-now-but-could-have-20-years-ago/

The recent deployment of the Space X Starlink satellite Internet service to Ukraine and Iran has many wondering if such a system could be used to beam uncensored information into North Korea. Penetrating the North’s information blockade has been a challenge for decades, and satellite platforms are often seen as a possible solution. However, upon closer examination, the possibility of reaching North Koreans in this way is quite limited.

Today’s satellites that can beam high-speed Internet and television require outdoor antennas, which are inconceivable in a society as tightly surveilled as North Korea. Some satellites can communicate directly with handheld devices, but they are only useful for short messages and would be expensive as a means of mass communication.

Satellite technology could take a step forward next year when Space X says it will have a service available that can reach smartphones, but for now, satellites are not able to play a major role in breaking the state’s block on external information. But there was a time when satellite technology looked more promising—almost 20 years ago, on March 13, 2004, a satellite was launched from Kennedy Space Center that could have revolutionized information access in North Korea.

MBSat-1

Cast your mind back, if you can, to the mid-2000s. Nokia dominated the cellphone market, the Motorola Razr was one of the hottest new phones, Samsung and LG were competing for third place in the cellphone market and NTT DoCoMo’s i-Mode service in Japan was the hottest mobile Internet service in the world.

3G networks were only a few years, old and if you were lucky, you might have been able to watch low-resolution video clips on your phone.

Against that backdrop, engineers at Japan’s Toshiba had been developing a satellite broadcasting service that could deliver about 20 live streaming TV and radio channels directly to cellphones without the need for a satellite dish or high-speed cellular network.

Typically, satellite reception requires a carefully aligned dish antenna. The antenna collects the weak signal, which is coming from a satellite 36,000 kilometers away, and focuses it on a receiving element on the dish.

But Toshiba’s system used a satellite with a massive 12-meter antenna area, so the signal reaching Earth was much stronger than on other systems. It also used lower frequencies, which were easier to receive with a compact antenna. The result was a service with enough bandwidth to deliver multiple television and radio channels live to a compact, battery-powered receiver.

Figure 1. An image of MBSat-1 in orbit with the 12-meter antenna deployed.

(Image: The Japanese Mobile Broadcasting Corporation, or MBCO)

Commercial Service

After the March 2004 launch of the satellite, commercial service started in Japan in October that year and in South Korea in May 2005. The Korean service was run by an SK Telecom affiliate called TU Media, and it carried 15 video channels and 19 radio channels.

They included channels from major South Korean broadcasters SBS, MBC, EBS, MBN and YTN.

The signal was robust and could be viewed just about anywhere there was a clear view of the sky. Because it was a broadcasting service, it didn’t require a two-way data connection, and that meant the technology could have easily worked in North Korea.

To match the service launch, both Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics produced mobile phones with built-in satellite receivers.

Figure 2. An LG handset receiving satellite broadcasts, on show in Seoul, South Korea, on October 11, 2005.

(Image: Martyn Williams)

Unfortunately, the service never became profitable.

The launch of the iPhone in 2007 together with faster data networks and unlimited data plans gave birth to the smartphone era, and the way people consumed information on phones was forever changed. In South Korea, a competing and free terrestrial mobile broadcasting service called T-DMB also provided competition for the subscription satellite service.

TU Media had attracted 2 million subscribers by June 2009, which was short of where it needed to be to become a commercially viable service, and it eventually shut down service in August 2012. By that point, the companion service targeting Japan had already closed in 2009.

So as the Kim Jong Un era was beginning and a crackdown on foreign information began to resurge, one of the potentially most effective technologies for penetrating North Korea was gone just as it was about to be needed most.

There were, at that time, and still are, no reports of satellite-capable phones ever being smuggled into North Korea.

Figure 3. An SK Telecom handset receiving satellite broadcasts, on show in Seoul, South Korea on June 24, 2005.

(Image: Martyn Williams)

North Korean Problems

In theory, North Koreans could receive hundreds of uncensored satellite TV channels today if they just installed a satellite dish and receiver. But the heavy social control in the country means that even if a citizen managed to get their hands on the equipment needed, it could not realistically be installed outdoors without attracting immediate attention and punishment.

While some citizens manage to receive cross-border television from South Korea and those near the northern border might receive a Chinese cellular network, the only routine foreign broadcasting available to most North Koreans is still via radio. That’s why shortwave and mediumwave broadcasting remains an important method of reaching North Koreans even while it’s disappearing elsewhere in the world.

Yes, the S-DMB service could have been revolutionary at one point. Ignore for a moment that a subscription was required for the commercial service—the technology platform itself with MBSat-1 satellite could have provided live television to handheld receivers across North Korea.

If that had happened, the North Korean authorities would likely have attempted to jam the signal as they do today with some radio broadcasts. That could have achieved success in cities, but doing so across the entire country would be difficult, meaning at least some programming would have gotten through.

After TU Media closed its service, the satellite remained in position and could theoretically have been used for broadcasting to North Korea. But absent of a deep-pocketed benefactor or government to pay for the service, the satellite was sold in mid-2013 to Asia Broadcast Satellite, a Bermuda-based satellite operator, and repositioned to provide direct-to-car broadcasting over the Middle East.

Today, the satellite remains in orbit over the Indian Ocean, although it is at the end of its life. The coverage map clearly shows its original use covering Japan and South Korea.

Figure 4. The Japan-South Korea footprint of MBSat-1 is clearly visible despite the satellite’s repositioning over the Middle East.

(Image: Asia Broadcast Satellite)

Satellite Potential

Looking ahead, it appears unlikely that such a service will ever exist again. Several other mobile satellite broadcasting ventures have emerged, but the only commercially successful service in the world is run by Sirius XM in the United States and Canada, and those signals don’t reach North Korea.

If satellite is ever to help break the state’s stranglehold on information, it will likely come in the next few years as satellite Internet companies such as Starlink and OneWeb develop technology that can communicate directly with portable devices. Until then, scratchy AM radio remains the best way to broadcast across North Korea in real time.



7. North Korea’s 2022 Missile Activity: Implications for Alliance Security


Very useful analysis. A good overview of the current threats.


And an important conclusion here:


Thus, despite North Korea’s missile threat to the US homeland and improving conventional SRBM capabilities, the US-ROK alliance is still able to deter North Korea—just as the US and its allies successfully deterred the Soviet Union under conditions of US conventional inferiority and nuclear parity. Maintaining this deterrence, however, will require continued efforts to uphold US military and political credibility, alliance solidarity and South Korean and Japanese conventional military capability. It also will require ongoing efforts to blunt the effectiveness of North Korean missile attacks through active theater and homeland missile defenses, as well as passive defense measures such as hardening, dispersal, mobility, decoys and camouflage.


This is why we need to have a superior political warfare strategy to complement the strength of our deterrence and defense capabilities.

North Korea’s 2022 Missile Activity: Implications for Alliance Security

https://www.38north.org/2022/10/north-koreas-2022-missile-activity-implications-for-alliance-security/


North Korea’s latest missile launches, including the launch of an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) over Japan on October 4 and two short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) on October 6, provide a stark reminder of the numerous missile programs it is pursuing. This year alone, despite a short summer respite, Pyongyang has launched 43 missiles through October 6, including two unspecified cruise missiles and 41 ballistic missiles from short range up to intercontinental range. Although a great deal about North Korea’s missile program remains unknown—particularly the numbers of new missiles to be deployed and their accuracy—there are two key security implications for the United States, the Republic of Korea (South Korea or ROK) and Japan.

  • The resumption of IRBM and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) testing underscores how the North’s nuclear threat against the US homeland bolsters its ability to deter a US-initiated attack and dissuade US escalation in a provocation or conflict initiated by North Korea; and
  • This year’s tests provide further evidence that North Korea’s new, solid-propellant short-range missiles have the potential to substantially improve Pyongyang’s conventional warfighting capabilities if deployed in sufficient numbers.

However, despite these improvements, the fundamental military and strategic situation remain: the US-ROK alliance retains clear conventional military superiority on the peninsula, the US retains overwhelming nuclear superiority over North Korea, and both of these things will almost certainly remain the case. Maintaining this situation, however, will require continued efforts to uphold US military and political credibility, alliance solidarity and South Korean and Japanese conventional military capability. It also will require ongoing efforts to blunt the effectiveness of North Korean missile attacks through active and passive defense measures.

Missile Activity to Date

Thus far in 2022, we have seen 22 North Korean ballistic missile launch events involving the launch of 41 ballistic missiles—the most ballistic missile launch events and launches detected in any year to date, and it’s only early October. These include:[1]

  • Thirty-one launches of solid-propellant short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), probably including the previously-tested KN-23, KN-24 and KN-25, as well as a new-type, smaller missile linked by the North Koreans to “tactical nukes.”[2]
  • Two launches of a new maneuvering reentry vehicle (MaRV) on a liquid-propellant medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) booster first tested in 2021; the North touted this as a second type of “hypersonic missile” that it claims has completed development.
  • Two tests (one probable) of the Hwasong-12 liquid-propellant IRBM, the first since 2017, with the North now claiming that series production and deployment of the system is either imminent or underway and a probable full-range (4,600 km) test in October.
  • Most significantly, the resumption of ICBM testing after more than four years, with two apparent full-up tests (one successful), and up to four apparent scaled-down component tests (three successful), for the new, very large Hwasong-17 liquid-propellant missile.[3]

In addition, North Korea showcased a new, solid-propellant submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) even larger than the Pukguksong-5 missile in its 2021 military parades, which also has not yet been flight tested.

Key Unknowns Remain

Assessing the cumulative impact of this series of activities is complicated by the fact that a great deal about North Korea’s missile program remains unknown. Moreover, most of what we think we know from open sources about North Korean missiles—especially the newer systems—comes from what the North Koreans themselves say and the photos and videos they release. (Interestingly, the North has not provided any information on the ten launch events, involving 24 missiles, since April 16. On October 6, it did characterize recent launches as “the just counteraction taken by the Korean People’s Army against south Korea-U.S. joint drills escalating the military tensions on the Korean peninsula.”[4])

Among the key unknowns are:

  • The number of launchers and missiles that have been and will be produced/deployed for each type of missile system;
  • System accuracy;
  • Warhead weights and types;
  • The role North Korea intends for each type of missile system in its military strategy; and
  • The extent to which the North chooses to retire, retain, or improve its large existing force of legacy systems as new systems come online.

The overall dimensions of the threat posed by North Korea’s missile force are difficult to judge in the absence of this information, especially how many targets can be engaged (especially in the US homeland) and the full conventional warfighting effectiveness of Pyongyang’s theater missile force.

Implications for Alliance Security

Considering the available information and North Korea’s large, longstanding legacy missile force, this year’s missile activity demonstrates two major strategic-level issues for the United States, South Korea and Japan.

  1. Underscores a growing nuclear threat to US territory.

The resumption of IRBM and ICBM testing underscores the importance of North Korea’s relatively recent capability to deliver nuclear warheads against Guam, Hawaii and North America. In conjunction with its 25-year-long ability to threaten South Korea and Japan with nuclear weapons, this bolsters North Korea’s ability to:

  • Preserve the existence of the regime;
  • Deter any US-initiated attack; and
  • Dissuade US conventional or nuclear escalation in a provocation or conflict initiated by Pyongyang.

The testing seen this year also reminds us, however, that while the North probably regards its ICBMs as sufficiently reliable for the above purposes, they are not highly reliable. This is due to:

  • The lack of flight testing since November 2017 of the apparently already-deployed Hwasong-15 ICBM (assuming the missile tested successfully on March 24 was a Hwasong-17);
  • The two failures out of this year’s six apparently ICBM-related tests; and
  • The lack of any full-range ICBM flight testing to successful reentry.

As the threat to the US homeland increases, the risk increases that (a) the North could perceive it has increased freedom of action; and (b) Japan or South Korea can perceive the US nuclear umbrella is no longer sufficiently credible and decide they need an independent nuclear force.

  1. An improving conventional warfighting capability.

This year’s tests provide further evidence of three attributes of North Korea’s new, solid-propellant SRBMs that collectively have the potential to substantially improve Pyongyang’s conventional warfighting capabilities. If deployed in large numbers, the four types of new missiles together will allow more intense conventional missile attacks, and the ability to tailor particular types of attacks to particular missile types.

First, this year’s tests underscore that these missiles are reliable and making progress toward deployment. For instance:

  • Only one of the 31 SRBM launches detected this year seems to have failed—the first known failure of the KN-23 out of at least 19 probable launches since 2019; and
  • This year the North claimed that the rail-mobile version of the KN-23 was operational, and that the ATACMS-like KN-24 SRBM is in the process of deployment.

Second, the tests continue to imply that these systems have improved accuracy compared to the earlier Scud-class and KN-02 SRBMs, thus allowing more effective strikes against US and ROK targets on the peninsula with fewer missiles per target, and allowing more targets to be attacked for a given force size.

Third, the testing also emphasizes that the new SRBMs use flight profiles that provide more options to evade and attack US and ROK missile defenses, and allow the North to do so with fewer missiles (thus making more missiles available for other targets).

Implications for Overall Military Balance

Recent improvements in North Korea’s missile force capabilities, however, are not enough to change the fundamental military and strategic situation regarding the peninsula. This is for several reasons, including:

  • North Korea has had such a large SRBM and MRBM force for so long, as well as an overwhelming artillery capability against Seoul and other targets within range of the DMZ, that its new solid-propellant SRBMs will add only incrementally to its theater threat.
  • North Korea has long had many avenues to evade and penetrate theater missile defenses—including defense saturation, defense suppression, early-release submunitions and penetration aids. The new low-trajectory SRBMs and even “hypersonic missiles,” therefore, will provide additional options rather than “change the game.”
  • Although the North Korean ICBM threat to the US homeland is recent and important, the alliance retains clear conventional military superiority on the peninsula, the US retains overwhelming nuclear superiority over North Korea, and both of these things will almost certainly remain the case.

The Bottom Line

Thus, despite North Korea’s missile threat to the US homeland and improving conventional SRBM capabilities, the US-ROK alliance is still able to deter North Korea—just as the US and its allies successfully deterred the Soviet Union under conditions of US conventional inferiority and nuclear parity. Maintaining this deterrence, however, will require continued efforts to uphold US military and political credibility, alliance solidarity and South Korean and Japanese conventional military capability. It also will require ongoing efforts to blunt the effectiveness of North Korean missile attacks through active theater and homeland missile defenses, as well as passive defense measures such as hardening, dispersal, mobility, decoys and camouflage.

  1. [1]
  2. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/cns-north-korea-missile-test-database. All launch-related data drawn from this source unless otherwise indicated.
  3. [2]
  4. See Colin Zwirko and Jeongmin Kim, “North Korea fires short-range ballistic missile toward East Sea, Seoul says,” NK News, September 25, 2022, https://www.nknews.org/2022/09/north-korea-fires-ballistic-missile-toward-east-sea-south-korean-military; Hyung-Jin Kim and Kim Tong-Hyung, “NKorea test launches missiles on eve of Harris trip to Seoul,” AP News, September 28, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/kamala-harris-seoul-south-korea-north-joint-chiefs-of-staff-d281b4dc04219c0d85713f3cf15cb7ba; Chris Megerian and Kim Tong-Hyung, “North Korea fires missiles after Harris leaves South Korea,” AP News, September 29, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/japan-asia-tokyo-kamala-harris-seoul-388f6a766cf95995096d261444c612c6; Hyung-Jin Kim and Mari Yamaguchi, “North Korea conducts 4th round of missile tests in 1 week,” AP News, October 1, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/japan-kamala-harris-north-korea-sea-of-government-and-politics-3ebe2e4bf519fc11a68e2e3071860e08; Joseph Dempsey, Twitter Post, May 12, 2022, 8:19 a.m., https://twitter.com/JosephHDempsey/status/1524726012529065986; Hyung-Jin Kim and Kim Tong-Hyung, “N.Korea flies warplanes near S.Korea after missile launches,” AP News, October 6, 2022. https://apnews.com/article/japan-seoul-south-korea-north-joint-chiefs-of-staff-6cbb36c582a09b7c9b6005ebdaa863d6; and Vann H. Van Diepen, “North Korea’s New Short-Range Ballistic Missile,” 38 North, April 25, 2022. https://www.38north.org/2022/04/north-koreas-new-short-range-ballistic-missile.
  5. [3]
  6. See Vann H. Van Diepen, “Burying the Lede: North Korea Conceals That “Spy Satellite” Tests Are First Launches of New Large ICBM,” 38 North, March 16, 2022, https://www.38north.org/2022/03/burying-the-lead-north-korea-conceals-that-spy-satellite-tests-are-first-launches-of-new-large-icbm; Joseph Dempsey, Twitter Post, May 4, 2022, 6:37 a.m., https://twitter.com/JosephHDempsey/status/1521801097685438464; Jonathan McDowell, Twitter Post, May 4, 2022, 1:32 a.m., https://twitter.com/planet4589/status/1521724313182871552; Michael Duitsman, Twitter Post, May 4, 2022, 1:46 p.m., https://mobile.twitter.com/DuitsmanMS/status/1521909116041523201; and Yoonjung Seo, Gawon Bae, Junko Ogura and Barbara Starr, “North Korea tests presumed ICBM and two other missiles, South Korea says,” CNN, May 25, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/24/asia/north-korea-missile-intl/index.html.
  7. [4]
  8. “DPRK Foreign Ministry Issues Press Statement,” KCNA, October 6, 2022, http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/80eafd5238eebdf01f9489f46322435d.kcmsf.



8. Analysis | Washington’s Asia strategy leading up to the midterms: Keep calm and carry on



Excerpts:



Admittedly, clouds are continuing to form on the horizon, and the Indo-Pacific is undergoing geopolitical shifts that have not yet produced discernible consequences. Some trendlines, such as North Korea’s accelerating nuclear missile program and the PRC’s continued efforts to project greater influence through illiberal means, will bring more disquiet than a stable equilibrium to many stakeholders in Asia, including the United States. Moreover, the outcomes of the U.S. midterm elections will either enable — or hinder — the Biden administration’s ability to further project its foreign policy agenda toward Asia.


In looking at the big picture, there is a bipartisan consensus that China is the defining foreign policy challenge for the United States in the long term and that the United States needs to support Taiwan’s democratic progress. On a more granular level, Democrats and Republicans disagree on how the United States can execute a durable China strategy. Irrespective of the results, the elections will not singlehandedly alleviate the effects of preexisting quandaries that have traditionally stymied American efforts to shape the landscape in Asia. Looking ahead, despite the U.S. government’s competing priorities in multiple theaters, Washington will need to continue using its various instruments of national power and coordinate closely with fellow Quad members, Australia, India, and Japan, to uphold and protect a free and open Indo-Pacific.



Analysis | Washington’s Asia strategy leading up to the midterms: Keep calm and carry on

Medium · by Institute for the Study of Diplomacy · October 7, 2022

Analysis | Washington’s Asia strategy leading up to the midterms: Keep calm and carry on

Eleanor Shiori Hughes


U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris addresses service members aboard USS Howard (DDG 83) during her visit to Commander Fleet Activities Yokosuka. (Image: U.S. Pacific Fleet via Flickr)

Last week, Vice President Kamala Harris and over 50 foreign dignitaries flew to Tokyo to attend the state funeral of the late Prime Minister Abe Shinzō. Harris led the U.S. presidential delegation, and shortly thereafter, made her way to Yokosuka naval base, where she spoke to U.S. navy personnel and denounced China for its aggression in the region, including on the Taiwan Strait.

Due to rapid geopolitical shifts in East Asia and the Pacific, U.S.-China relations have increasingly taken on a zero-sum logic, narrowing the space for cooperation. China is carrying out an ambitious long-term agenda to cement itself as a regional hegemon and achieve global acceptance of its foreign and domestic objectives. In response, Vice President Harris recently traveled to Japan and South Korea to underscore longstanding U.S. policy vis-à-vis the Indo-Pacific and reaffirm the Biden administration’s “allies-first” approach as the centerpiece of its foreign policy. While many stakeholders in both Washington and Indo-Pacific capitals have welcomed this agenda, the Biden administration has not yet fully realized its vision to engage in a free and open architecture in Asia. Due to the long-term nature of China’s strategic objectives, the U.S. government ought to maintain a steady presence in the region by continuing to preserve its alliances. And with the upcoming U.S. midterm elections on November 8th, it would be prudent to take stock of the state of U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific, how other countries are also vehicles for delivering a positive vision of the region, and why there is still reason to keep calm and carry on.

The strategic choice between the Atlantic and the Pacific

Over the past several months, the war in Ukraine has led the United States to refocus its strategic priorities on the European continent. Through the “Pivot to Asia” strategy, former President Barack Obama and his administration sought to reorient America’s foreign policy priorities to meet some of the most pressing twenty-first-century challenges in Asia. But once Donald Trump took over the Oval Office, his administration made it an article of faith that the United States is once again living in an era of great power rivalry — in this case, namely with China. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War — and even after the Soviet Union’s collapse — the United States may have had the luxury of choosing to focus on strategic challenges in either Europe or Asia. But gone are those days. Washington lacks the necessary stamina to sensibly respond to China as the defining foreign policy challenge of this century on its own. But if the past is prologue, the Biden administration must figure out how to maintain a favorable balance of power in Europe while entrenching its presence in Asia.

The Biden administration has rightfully emphasized cooperation with like-minded allies and partners, but this pledge is just a starting point. The administration published an Indo-Pacific Strategy this past February and released a first-ever U.S. strategy for the Pacific Islands region this past week. However, Beijing is closely watching whether the United States and Western Europe will remain united in response to Russia’s aggression on Ukraine. The PRC has high ambitions to fundamentally change the Indo-Pacific chessboard in its geopolitical favor, and they are in it for the long haul. Washington ought to continue to support its allies and friends in keeping pace with this challenge.

America is not the only country shaping the Indo-Pacific

U.S. regional allies offer a steady counterweight to Chinese power. Countries such as Australia and Japan have employed the Free and Open Indo-Pacific framework to address the China challenge through democratic norms and institution-building. For one, Australian decision-makers are oftentimes present in U.S. intelligence networks, including the Pentagon and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii. While its military is only as large as the U.S. Marine Corps, Australia is also a member of Five Eyes, along with the newly-established AUKUS grouping with the United Kingdom. Washington has no qualms over incorporating Canberra into its intelligence-sharing mechanisms.

Meanwhile, over the past several years, Japan underwent a major grand strategy transformation under the late Prime Minister Abe Shinzō. He revolutionized Japanese foreign policy by publishing Japan’s first National Security Council in 2013 and reinterpreting Article 9 of Japan’s constitution to allow collective self-defense in 2015. As evidenced by the U.S. withdrawal from what is now known as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), former President Trump was not as oriented towards multilateral institution-building. Biden may have largely eschewed prioritization of economic engagement in Asia in his first year of office, but with the formal launching of the long-awaited Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) earlier this summer, Tokyo recognizes that America’s renewed emphasis on regional economic integration is still a work in progress.

Just a few months ago, South Korea underwent a new transition of power favorable to the U.S. government. President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol took office on May 10th. While his predecessor Moon Jae-in eyed delivering a formal peace declaration with North Korea and taking a more cautious approach in dealing with China, President Yoon demonstrated that he is more in sync with the U.S., Japan, Australia, and other players in acknowledging strategic interest and priorities vis-à-vis the PRC’s aggressive posture across multiple fronts. The recent joint statement that came out of his first summit with President Biden suggests that South Korea plans to up its cooperation with the U.S. and its diplomatic standing globally. But going forward, Seoul will need to take a concrete look at what tradeoffs and risks it is willing to take with allies and partners. The hope is that Seoul will create a comprehensive blueprint, outlining how it plans to marshal resources to shape the rules-based liberal order in Asia and begin to iron out differences with Japan.

Lastly, India has been walking on a tightrope, particularly because it has not fully condemned the Ukraine war. It relies heavily on military parts from Russia, yet it was only a few years ago that it confronted a bloody skirmish with China along the disputed Himalayan border, where twenty Indian and at least four Chinese soldiers were killed. New Delhi may not be fully aligned with the West in regard to Putin’s authoritarian measures, but while in Uzbekistan last month, Prime Minister Narenda Modi told Putin that “today’s era is not the era for war.” As a member of the Quad, India is a critical player in America’s ongoing saga of institutionalizing its Indo-Pacific strategy. Moreover, one should not rule out the possibility that New Delhi’s relations with Moscow will experience a gradual cleavage.

Despite uncertainties, the time is right to keep calm and carry on

Admittedly, clouds are continuing to form on the horizon, and the Indo-Pacific is undergoing geopolitical shifts that have not yet produced discernible consequences. Some trendlines, such as North Korea’s accelerating nuclear missile program and the PRC’s continued efforts to project greater influence through illiberal means, will bring more disquiet than a stable equilibrium to many stakeholders in Asia, including the United States. Moreover, the outcomes of the U.S. midterm elections will either enable — or hinder — the Biden administration’s ability to further project its foreign policy agenda toward Asia.

In looking at the big picture, there is a bipartisan consensus that China is the defining foreign policy challenge for the United States in the long term and that the United States needs to support Taiwan’s democratic progress. On a more granular level, Democrats and Republicans disagree on how the United States can execute a durable China strategy. Irrespective of the results, the elections will not singlehandedly alleviate the effects of preexisting quandaries that have traditionally stymied American efforts to shape the landscape in Asia. Looking ahead, despite the U.S. government’s competing priorities in multiple theaters, Washington will need to continue using its various instruments of national power and coordinate closely with fellow Quad members, Australia, India, and Japan, to uphold and protect a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Medium · by Institute for the Study of Diplomacy · October 7, 2022




9. Analysis: North Korean missile launches are a test for Biden



The regime will not give up nuclear weapons. Its political warfare strategy seeks to legitimize it as a nuclear power through arms control negotiations, and it will continue to both try to subvert the South to create political chaos and develop advanced warfighting capabilities to be able to dominate the peninsula under. the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty adn Gulag State to ensure regime survival.


Excerpts:

And, perhaps most important, each test sends a clear message that despite all the many problems the Biden administration faces — the war in Ukraine; increasing Chinese aggression; a shaky economy at home — Washington must deal with North Korea as it is. Meaning, a nation that, after many years of striving, is on the edge of being a legitimate nuclear power, and not one that has shown any recent signs of being willing to abandon its nuclear weapons.
Long-term, Kim likely wants U.S. recognition that North Korea is a full nuclear state. Negotiations could then arrange a North Korean roll-back of parts of its weapons program in return for lifting crippling international sanctions and eventually signing a peace treaty to formally end the Korean War.




Analysis: North Korean missile launches are a test for Biden

AP · by FOSTER KLUG · October 6, 2022

TOKYO (AP) — A drumbeat of increasingly powerful North Korean missile launches. A U.S. aircraft carrier floats off the Korean Peninsula. North Korean warplanes buzz the border with South Korea. Worldwide cries of condemnation and worry.

It’s a pattern that has repeated many times over the years, and, as in the past, there are plenty of signs in the latest cycle that point to North Korea eventually testing a nuclear bomb.

Yes, this is part of North Korea’s dogged march toward building a viable arsenal of nuclear-tipped missiles able to target any city on the U.S. mainland. But the nation’s extraordinary run of missile tests this year — its most ever — is also meant to grab the attention of an important, and decidedly distracted, audience of one: President Joe Biden.

Washington has responded to the missiles with tough statements and weapons launches of its own in military drills with ally Seoul.

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So far, however, there’s been little indication that the Biden administration will — or even can — pursue the messy, politically dangerous diplomacy needed to peacefully solve a problem that has bedeviled U.S. presidents for decades.

Thursday’s launches, believed to be two short-range ballistic missiles, were North Korea’s sixth round in less than two weeks. On Tuesday, Pyongyang staged its longest-ever launch, sending a missile capable of hitting U.S. military concerns on Guam flying over U.S. ally Japan and into the Pacific.

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Later Thursday, North Korea flew 12 warplanes near the Korean border, the world’s most heavily armed, prompting South Korea to launch 30 military planes in response.

North Korea is a small, impoverished, widely shunned nation sandwiched between great powers, but it has built, against great odds, its atomic weapons program through tenacity, shrewd political maneuvering and cutthroat persistence.

Each North Korean weapons test does at least three things at once.

It allows Kim Jong Un to show his people that he’s a strong leader capable of standing up to foreign aggressors.

His scientists can work on solving the technological issues still holding back the weapons program, including miniaturizing warheads so they fit on an array of missiles and making sure the long-range missiles can smoothly reenter the Earth’s atmosphere.

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And, perhaps most important, each test sends a clear message that despite all the many problems the Biden administration faces — the war in Ukraine; increasing Chinese aggression; a shaky economy at home — Washington must deal with North Korea as it is. Meaning, a nation that, after many years of striving, is on the edge of being a legitimate nuclear power, and not one that has shown any recent signs of being willing to abandon its nuclear weapons.

Long-term, Kim likely wants U.S. recognition that North Korea is a full nuclear state. Negotiations could then arrange a North Korean roll-back of parts of its weapons program in return for lifting crippling international sanctions and eventually signing a peace treaty to formally end the Korean War.

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Further down the road, North Korea wants the nearly 30,000 U.S. forces in South Korea to leave, opening the way for its eventual control of the peninsula.

In the short term, Pyongyang has maintained that talks can’t happen unless Washington abandons its “hostility.” Presumably, this means economic sanctions, the presence of those U.S. troops and their annual military drills with South Korean soldiers that the North sees as invasion preparation.

It is unclear, however, how patient Kim can afford to be.

The North’s economy, never great, appears to be worse than at any time in Kim’s rule, after three years of some of the tightest border controls in the world during the pandemic, crushing sanctions, natural disasters and government mismanagement.

Its weapons tests may be a move to force more favorable conditions in future talks.

Something similar happened after a sequence of long-range missile and nuclear tests during the Trump administration that had many fearing war.

Donald Trump staged face-to-face summits with Kim in 2018-19 aimed at convincing North Korea to give up its nuclear program in return for economic and political benefits. These ultimately failed, with North Korea refusing to go far enough in its disarmament pledges.

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After taking office last year, Biden signaled a rejection of both Trump’s personal diplomacy with Kim and Barack Obama’s more hands-off “strategic patience” policy, in favor of a more incremental approach, where the North gave up parts of its program in return for benefits and sanctions relief.

The goal, however, remained the same: North Korea’s total denuclearization. A growing number of analysts believe that this might now be impossible, as Kim likely sees a completed nuclear weapons program as his sole guarantee for regime survival.

In the meantime, confrontation rules the day.

For the second time in two weeks Washington has sent the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier to waters east of South Korea, a move North Korea called “a serious threat to the stability of the situation on the Korean Peninsula.”

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The United States and South Korea responded this week to the missiles with their own land-to-land ballistic missiles and precision-guided bombs dropped from fighter jets.

As the Biden administration considers next steps, it is closely watching how North Korea’s weapons tests influence its allies in Northeast Asia.

When the North fired its midrange missile over Japan on Tuesday, there were moments of panic as sirens alerted residents in northern Japan to evacuate, train service stopped and newspapers put out special editions.

In South Korea, whose capital Seoul is about an hour’s drive from the inter-Korean border, each progression in the North’s nuclear program raises doubts about Washington’s pledge of nuclear protection, leading to calls for an indigenous nuclear program.

The question for some in Seoul is: If North Korea threatens to hit U.S. cities with its nuclear-armed missiles, will Washington really step in should Pyongyang attack?

Looking ahead, then, expect more missile tests — and, possibly, just in time for crucial U.S. midterm elections in November, a nuclear explosion — as North Korea continues to maneuver in its long face-off with Washington and its allies.

___

Foster Klug, AP’s news director for the Koreas, Japan, Australia and the South Pacific, has covered North Korea — from Washington, Seoul and Pyongyang — since 2005.

AP · by FOSTER KLUG · October 6, 2022


10. Seoul must sternly counter Pyongyang’s airborne protest but avoid skirmish


Excerpts:


The most worrisome of all is the possibility for the North to cross the red line and stage a local provocation. Pyongyang could spark an exchange of fires within the demilitarized zone or fire artillery ammunition across the military demarcation line or the northern limit line. Notably, there is a strong chance that the North intentionally causes a skirmish or uses a sly plot to eventually back out. The South should thoroughly prepare itself and counter the North’s reckless provocations sternly and decisively to crush the North’s desire for provocations.


In addition, the South Korean government and military authority should display capabilities to respond calmly and manage crises to prevent an accidental skirmish from intensifying into an outbreak of warfare. The current situation of confrontation will unlikely end any time soon. The South should keep a close watch on the North’s subsequent acts of provocations and respond sternly and decisively to disempower Pyongyang and completely deplete its resources. “Peace through power” is not bragging of power but long-term warfare that should be based on thorough preparedness.



Seoul must sternly counter Pyongyang’s airborne protest but avoid skirmish

donga.com

Posted October. 08, 2022 07:39,

Updated October. 08, 2022 07:39

Seoul must sternly counter Pyongyang’s airborne protest but avoid skirmish. October. 08, 2022 07:39. .

North Korea is boldly intensifying its provocations, elevating military tension. The North fired a mix of two ballistic missiles in the morning on Thursday before staging a show of air protest through formation flight with 12 bombers and fighter jets and conducting artillery drills in the afternoon. The South Korean military urgently sortied more than 30 fighter jets to counter the provocation. At the same time, South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, as well as South Korea and the U.S., conducted joint military drills involving a U.S. nuclear aircraft carrier in the East Sea.


The North’s airborne protest is quite unusual. Pyongyang’s conducting of a bombing drill by mobilizing its aged aircraft despite the shortage of aviation fuel is an unprecedented new form of provocation. In the face of joint drills by Seoul and Washington and by Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo in response to Pyongyang’s provocations and the allies’ deployment of strategic assets, Pyongyang is apparently determined to go all the way to use every measure at its disposal and continue acts of threats and provocations against the allied forces. If this situation continues, it will only be a matter of time for the North to fire long-range missiles threatening the U.S. mainland and conduct a seventh nuclear test.


Such a situation of tension is graver now than five years ago when the Korean Peninsula was at risk of imminent warfare. International sanctions and the measure of pressure to suppress Pyongyang’s desire are not functioning and operational, while Russia, which possesses the most significant quantity of nuclear weapons worldwide, is threatening to use nuclear weapons immediately. By taking advantage of the aggressive mood of this new Cold War era, the North is confident that China and Russia are endorsing the Pyongyang regime.


Meanwhile, the three allies, namely South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, are solidifying the joint defense system to counter the North’s threat, which is effectively transforming the Korean Peninsula into the frontier of the duel between North Korea, China, and Russia versus South Korea, the U.S., and Japan.


The most worrisome of all is the possibility for the North to cross the red line and stage a local provocation. Pyongyang could spark an exchange of fires within the demilitarized zone or fire artillery ammunition across the military demarcation line or the northern limit line. Notably, there is a strong chance that the North intentionally causes a skirmish or uses a sly plot to eventually back out. The South should thoroughly prepare itself and counter the North’s reckless provocations sternly and decisively to crush the North’s desire for provocations.


In addition, the South Korean government and military authority should display capabilities to respond calmly and manage crises to prevent an accidental skirmish from intensifying into an outbreak of warfare. The current situation of confrontation will unlikely end any time soon. The South should keep a close watch on the North’s subsequent acts of provocations and respond sternly and decisively to disempower Pyongyang and completely deplete its resources. “Peace through power” is not bragging of power but long-term warfare that should be based on thorough preparedness.

한국어

donga.com




11. Is Kim Jong-un emulating Putin's saber-rattling?



Probably. And his actions are probably welcomed by Russia (and China) by creating dilemmas for the ROK/US alliance.


Excerpts:


"It's possible that the North Koreans want the U.S. and South Korea to think that any efforts to deter the DPRK's provocative behavior would be met with commensurate retaliation," Soo Kim, a policy analyst at the Rand Corporation, told The Korea Times.

...

"And perhaps Pyeongyang banks on the small chance that U.S.-led deterrence would indeed be discouraged as a result of the Kim regime's aggressive behavior. The hope, however, is that the U.S. would not be discouraged so, and instead continue to demonstrate alliance solidarity and the will to execute effective deterrence against the DPRK's provocations," Kim said.
...

"Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un (and his sister Yo-jong) have normalized the idea of preemptive nuclear strikes on their neighbor by frequently talking about it," Sung-yoon Lee, a professor at Tufts University, said. "In April, the Kim siblings took a page from Putin's playbook and issued their first nuclear threat against South Korea. Kim Jong-un did it again in July and September. Hence it is not surprising that he is escalating tension on several levels even as South Korea and the U.S. have resumed live military exercises."
...

Cheong Seong-chang, director of the Center for North Korean Studies at The Sejong Institute, said that Kim and Putin are not comparable when it comes to their motives and goals with nuclear weapons.

"Kim and Putin may be viewed as similar types of politicians by people with a limited understanding of the two countries and their circumstances in that they both are portrayed as insane and hostile. But they are two very different people," he said.

Putin went to war with Ukraine because he wanted to annex the country. But the purpose of Kim's nuclear bombs and provocations has nothing to do with territorial ambitions, according to Cheong.

"Putin started the war with conventional weapons. If a war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, it is highly likely that Kim would resort to nuclear weapons from the get-go, because North Korea falls far behind the South in conventional weapons capabilities. So he would go for a nuclear option from the start," he said.


Is Kim Jong-un emulating Putin's saber-rattling?

The Korea Times · October 7, 2022

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, left, holds hands with Russian leader Vladimir Putin before they hold a summit in Vladivostok, Russia, in this April 25, 2019 file photo. Korea Times file


Effectiveness of US-led deterrence against North Korea called into question

By Kang Hyun-kyung


The latest developments in North Korea's provocations show that its leader Kim Jong-un has become dangerously bolder and more fearless.


Kim gave the North Korean military the green light to go ahead with the launches of two short-range ballistic missiles that flew over the East Sea on Thursday, the day when South Korea, the United States and Japan conducted another trilateral military exercise, following the first one on Sept. 30. The U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan joined both drills.


Later in the day, 12 North Korean warplanes ― eight fighter jets and four bombers ― flew in a squadron formation, staying within North Korean airspace but on the southern side of a surveillance line set by the South, presumably in response to the trilateral maritime exercise. The warplanes conducted air-to-ground firing drills. The South Korean military reacted swiftly by mobilizing 30 F-15 K fighters which confronted the North Korean jets in the air for approximately an hour, according South Korea's military.


Such antagonistic air drills by North Korea are unprecedented.


The North's dangerous course of action has brought the U.S.-led deterrence against North Korea into question, partly because the Nimitz-class supercarrier USS Ronald Reagan is part of the U.S.' strategic military assets designed to deter its enemies, including North Korea, from provocations rather than invite further ones.


"It's possible that the North Koreans want the U.S. and South Korea to think that any efforts to deter the DPRK's provocative behavior would be met with commensurate retaliation," Soo Kim, a policy analyst at the Rand Corporation, told The Korea Times.


DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which is North Korea's official name.


"And perhaps Pyeongyang banks on the small chance that U.S.-led deterrence would indeed be discouraged as a result of the Kim regime's aggressive behavior. The hope, however, is that the U.S. would not be discouraged so, and instead continue to demonstrate alliance solidarity and the will to execute effective deterrence against the DPRK's provocations," Kim said.


The analyst said the fact that North Korea has caught the attention of the leaders of South Korea, the United States and Japan ― as seen in a flurry of phone talks among them earlier this week ― could be seen, in a way, as encouraging.


"This is a time where alliance solidarity and a swift and effective response to North Korea's provocations are necessary. It's also important for the allies to not simply react to the North Korean missile tests in a mechanical way, but to respond commensurately in a way, appropriate to the type and intent of each provocation," she said.


Some other experts, especially those based in the United States and Britain, view North Korea's Kim to be emulating Russian leader Vladimir Putin, who threatened to use nuclear weapons after facing major setbacks in Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Recently, the Russian leader issued renewed threats that he would resort to using weapons of mass destruction.


"Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un (and his sister Yo-jong) have normalized the idea of preemptive nuclear strikes on their neighbor by frequently talking about it," Sung-yoon Lee, a professor at Tufts University, said. "In April, the Kim siblings took a page from Putin's playbook and issued their first nuclear threat against South Korea. Kim Jong-un did it again in July and September. Hence it is not surprising that he is escalating tension on several levels even as South Korea and the U.S. have resumed live military exercises."


The U.S. carrier USS Ronald Reagan is escorted as it arrives in Busan, South Korea on Sept. 23. AP-Yonhap


In the Western media, Kim Jong-un is likened to Putin as they have both threatened to use nuclear weapons.


But Hyun In-ae, a professor of North Korea studies at Ewha Womens University in Seoul, disagreed.


"North Koreans don't like to follow or emulate others. Just as its 'juche' ideology suggests, they were taught to find their own path, rather than follow or mimic what others did," she told The Korea Times.


However, Hyun said she would not rule out the possibility that the North Korean leader was encouraged to maintain his course based on Putin's actions.


"It's true that North Korea rarely cares about others and about how others feel about them, and this is why they keep destabilizing regional peace by test-firing missiles and conducting nuclear tests. But deep inside in his heart, the North Korean leader must feel insecurity about his actions as he is depicted as a troubled loner responsible for regional and international insecurity," she said. "Thus, Putin, who orchestrated Russia's invasion of Ukraine and drew condemnation from the international community, would make the North Korean leader feel that he is not alone. Hence Putin's supportive role for North Korea's Kim."


Cheong Seong-chang, director of the Center for North Korean Studies at The Sejong Institute, said that Kim and Putin are not comparable when it comes to their motives and goals with nuclear weapons.


"Kim and Putin may be viewed as similar types of politicians by people with a limited understanding of the two countries and their circumstances in that they both are portrayed as insane and hostile. But they are two very different people," he said.


Putin went to war with Ukraine because he wanted to annex the country. But the purpose of Kim's nuclear bombs and provocations has nothing to do with territorial ambitions, according to Cheong.


"Putin started the war with conventional weapons. If a war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, it is highly likely that Kim would resort to nuclear weapons from the get-go, because North Korea falls far behind the South in conventional weapons capabilities. So he would go for a nuclear option from the start," he said.


Kim Jong-un, left, and Russian leader Vladimir Putin toast with Russian wine after a summit on April 25, 2019 in Russia. Korea Times file


Amid speculation of the alleged shared traits between Kim and Putin, the North Korean leader's congratulatory letter sent to Putin on his 70th birthday was made public in North Korea's state-controlled newspaper on Friday.


Kim lauded Putin for his "energetic leadership," saying it played a critical role in modern-day Russia's "remarkable accomplishments for the realization of the country's grand strategic goals" and for this reason, he is "admired and widely supported by fellow Russians."


"Russia nowadays was able to thwart challenges and threats posed by the United States and its followers because of your excellent leadership and strong will to protect Russia's dignity and national interest from them," the letter reads.

Kim then vowed to lift North Korea-Russia relations to the next level.


Regarding the North's continued provocations, Lee said North Korea's forthcoming key anniversary could have motivated Kim opt for bolder moves.


"Kim is setting the stage for a bigger provocation, which may come as soon as the Party Founding Day anniversary on Oct. 10," he observed.


His remarks indicate that as the key anniversary is approaching, the North Korean leader may want to boost the morale of his military, as well as the North Korean public, to make them feel proud of their "great nation and great leader."


The Korea Times · October 7, 2022



12. S. Korea, US, Japan agree on more efforts against NK cryptocurrency theft


The regime's cyber capabilities are keeping Kim Jong Un afloat. We ended to aggressively attack them.



S. Korea, US, Japan agree on more efforts against NK cryptocurrency theft

The Korea Times · October 7, 2022

This Feb. 17, 2021 file photo, provided by the U.S. Department of Justice, shows three North Korean hackers charged by the U.S. government with criminal cyber activities of attempting to steal a total of $1.3 billion in cash and cryptocurrency from banks and businesses around the world. YonhapTop South Korean, U.S. and Japanese nuclear envoys on Friday agreed to redouble joint efforts to block North Korea's nuclear and missile program financing through cryptocurrency theft, according to Seoul's foreign ministry.


They also agreed to strengthen international cooperation to foil the secretive North's illicit trade via maritime routes.


The move came as Kim Gunn, special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, had phone consultations with his American and Japanese counterparts ― Sung Kim and Takehiro Funakoshi ― on ways to deal with the North's continued provocations highlighted by a string of ballistic missile launches.

Concerns have also grown that Pyongyang may conduct its seventh nuclear test in the near future.


According to a U.N. Security Council report released in April, the North is suspected of having stolen as much as $400 million worth of cryptocurrency in 2021.


The three sides also agreed to further strengthen international cooperation to prevent attempts by North Korea in evading sanctions, such as through illicit ship-to-ship transfers of goods. (Yonhap)



The Korea Times · October 7, 2022




13.  Escapes increase as North Korean workers in Russia are told to ship out to Ukraine

​​



When Ukraine retakes the Russian occupied areas what will they do with koreans from the north that they encounter?



Escapes increase as North Korean workers in Russia are told to ship out to Ukraine

Orders went out to settle their affairs by the end of September and wait in ‘standby’ for Ukraine assignments.

By Jieun Kim for RFA Korean

2022.10.05

rfa.org

More and more North Korean construction workers deployed to Russia are escaping from their jobs after hearing they are to be sent to Russian-controlled areas in Ukraine, sources in Russia told RFA.

The cash-strapped North Korean government sends legions of workers to Russia to earn desperately needed foreign currency. Workers forward the lion’s share of their salaries to the government, but what they get to keep is greater than what they could earn doing similar work back home.

But now that there is demand for construction in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, increasing numbers of North Korean construction workers are abandoning their jobs and going into hiding, a Russian citizen of Korean descent told RFA’s Korean Service on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

“The North Korean workers are nowhere to be seen at the construction sites these days. This is because the command ordered they stop work for an internal investigation as increasing numbers of them are trying to escape after hearing they would be deployed to Ukraine’s Donbas region.” said the source.

“The workers are shaken by the news. … Pyongyang in early September ordered the dispatching companies to gather workers and put them on standby instead of taking on new work where they are currently dispatched,” the source said.

The workers are well aware of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, according to the source. Though the North Korean government is able to control media within its borders, it cannot as easily control what information is available to its citizens overseas.

“After getting the news that the workers would soon be moved to a new construction site in Ukraine, and needed to settle everything by the end of September, many have escaped. It’s not only the construction workers, but also management officials escaping,” said the source.

The construction sites of Vladivostok in the Russian Far East are empty, a source there told RFA on condition of anonymity to speak freely.

“I know that some North Korean companies are on alert as the officials in charge of worker management escaped one after another,” the second source said.

The problem of workers escaping is not new. Even in times of relative peace, many North Koreans deployed to Russia go missing, according to the second source.

“At the end of each year, results must be reported and the managers must pay the workers their share and forward the rest [to Pyongyang],” the second source said. “However, managers and officials of some companies, who did not receive payment from local companies often escape because they are afraid of punishment they might receive after the review session.”

“North Korean workers live a tired life of despair. They cannot save any money even though they work all day from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. and then do additional overtime work at night,” said the second source.

“There are frequent cases where disgruntled workers escape, and others escape because they fear punishment.”

Once news came from the North Korean consulate to prepare to be shipped out to Ukraine, escape numbers rose, the second source said.

Russia’s Ambassador to North Koera Alexander Matsegora mentioned the possibility of sending North Korean workers to Ukraine in an interview with the Russian newspaper Izvestia in July.

There were 21,000 North Korean workers living in Russia as of September 2018, a December 2018 statement from the Russian foreign ministry said. Approximately 19,000 of those were employed at factories, farms and construction sites.

Following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2397 in Dec. 2017, tens of thousands of North Korean workers in Russia were repatriated by the end of 2019.

Though sanctions prohibit North Korea from sending workers overseas and preclude countries from issuing work visas to North Koreans, Pyongyang has been known to dispatch workers to China and Russia on short-term student or visitor visas to get around sanctions.

Translated by Leejin J. Chung. Written in English by Eugene Whong.

rfa.org



14. North Korea comes up short again on having enough food to feed its people



As anyone who reads my comments know, I will continue to emphasize these points:

In light of the current situation, U.S. experts say Pyongyang’s rejection of food aid from other countries has worsened the severe food shortage.
“[North Korean leader] Kim Jong Un has refused nearly all offers of aid, especially from both the U.S. and South Korea,” David Maxwell, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told RFA on Monday.
“Unfortunately, there is nothing the U.S., South Korea, or the international community can do about the food shortages in North Korea unless Kim Jong Un is willing to accept aid in accordance with standard procedures for distribution transparency and accountability.”
“The Korean people in the north are suffering solely because of the deliberate policy decisions by Kim Jong Un to prioritize nuclear weapons and missile development over the welfare of the North Korean people,” Maxwell said. “The international community wants to relieve their suffering, but the problem lies solely with Kim Jong Un.”




North Korea comes up short again on having enough food to feed its people

Economic constraints and a reduced harvest are to blame, says the UN Food and Agriculture Organization

By Jinwoo Cho and Jung Min Noh for RFA Korean

2022.10.04

rfa.org

North Korea is among 45 countries worldwide requiring external assistance for food to feed its population due to economic constraints and an expected poor harvest this year, according to a report by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations.

In its quarterly report “Crop Prospects and Quarterly Global Report Food Situation” issued on Sept. 30, the FAO evaluates the grain production and food situation of low-income countries around the globe.

The 47-page report notes that high inflation rates and challenging macroeconomic environments are aggravating food insecurity conditions globally, particularly in low-income food-deficit countries.

“In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, persisting economic constraints, exacerbated by expectations of a reduced 2022 harvest, may worsen the food insecurity situation, with large numbers of people suffering from low levels of food consumption and very poor dietary diversity,” the report says, using the country’s official name.

Chronic food shortages and dependency on international food assistance are nothing new in North Korea, a diplomatically isolated country weighed down by its centrally controlled planned economy and its juche, or self-reliance philosophy, and plagued by harsh weather.

North Korea has been classified as a country lacking general access to food and in need of external food aid since the FAO began its research on the topic in 2007

The FAO forecasts that North Korea, along with Nepal, Myanmar and Sri Lanka will suffer from food shortages this year due to lower-than-average grain yields.

The report also pointed to worsening weather conditions, such as poor rainfall, as one of the reasons for North Korea’s below-normal agricultural production.

In addition, as the worsening economic situation in North Korea continues, imports of essential agricultural products and humanitarian goods have fallen sharply, making North Korea’s 26 million people feel more vulnerable to food security this year.

In particular, the FAO pointed out that the decline in the nation’s grain harvests is causing most of the population to suffer from low food consumption and poor diets.

However, like the previous report, the current document did not specify the amount of grain that North Korea must import due to food shortages there.

In its December 2021 report, the FAO estimated that North Korea needed more than 1.06 million metric tons of food imports to make up for food shortages between November 2020 and October 2021.


A satellite image of Mangyongdae district in Pyongyang, North Korea (L), captured by the European Space Agency's (ESA) Sentinel-2B on Sept. 12, 2022, shows several areas of damaged rice fields where the soil has been exposed (in brown). A vegetation index analysis of the same area (R) shows poor growth and serious damage to farmland. Credit: ESA/RFA graphic


Problem lies with Kin Jong Un

In light of the current situation, U.S. experts say Pyongyang’s rejection of food aid from other countries has worsened the severe food shortage.

“[North Korean leader] Kim Jong Un has refused nearly all offers of aid, especially from both the U.S. and South Korea,” David Maxwell, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told RFA on Monday.

“Unfortunately, there is nothing the U.S., South Korea, or the international community can do about the food shortages in North Korea unless Kim Jong Un is willing to accept aid in accordance with standard procedures for distribution transparency and accountability.”

“The Korean people in the north are suffering solely because of the deliberate policy decisions by Kim Jong Un to prioritize nuclear weapons and missile development over the welfare of the North Korean people,” Maxwell said. “The international community wants to relieve their suffering, but the problem lies solely with Kim Jong Un.”

Soo Kim, a policy analyst focused on national security and policy issues in the Indo-Pacific at the RAND Corporation, agreed that the Kim regime is the greatest obstacle to getting international food aid to North Koreans.

“Kim does not prioritize the lives of his people, and he is willing to let the North Korean population suffer as long as it does not adversely impact his leadership and interests,” she said.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) forecast in its “Rice Outlook: September 2022” report that global rice production will increase while North Korea's rice production will fall further this year compared to 2021.

The USDA forecast that North Korea will produce 1.36 million metric tons of dehusked rice this year, 38,000 metric tons less than the amount produced in 2021.

The agency also predicted that the country’s rice imports this year will reach 180,000 metric tons, up 30,000 metric tons from 2021.

A South Korean scholar’s analysis of satellite images of North Korea appear to back up findings and forecasts in the two reports, indicating expected significant decreases this year due to flood damage in about 30% of the country’s rice fields.

Chung Songhak, deputy director of the National Land and Satellite Information Research Institute at Kyungpook National University in South Korea, cited images of Pyongyang's Mangyongdae district captured by European Space Agency’s Sentinel-2B satellites on Sept. 12, showing several areas of damaged rice fields where the soil has been exposed.

By region, rice growth at cooperative farms in Pyongyang’s Mangyongdae district was the lowest, followed by Pongsan and Unpa counties in North Hwanghae province, Sunchon city in South Pyongan province, and Chaeryong county in South Hwanghae province, Chung said.

Four factors have affected rice farming in North Korea this year, he said.

“First, the lack of water due to high temperatures and the drought from spring earlier this year,” Chung said. “Second, there was not enough manpower mobilization for the cooperative farms due to the [coronavirus] quarantine and movement control of residents.”

“Third, it rained heavily after rice planting was over,” he said, citing record-levels of heavy rains damaging agricultural lands, with paddy banks collapsing and rice braids washed away.”

“Fourth, the damaged paddy fields could not be restored, and rice did not grow well,” he said.

Translated by Leejin J. Chung for RFA Korean. Written in English by Roseanne Gerin.

rfa.org








​​



De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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