Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“It is indeed probable that more harm and misery have been caused by men determined to use coercion to stamp out moral evil than by men intent on doing evil.”

- F.A. Hayek

“The meaning of life is to find your gift. The purpose of life is to give it away.”

- Pablo Picasso

“In wine there is wisdom, in beer there is freedom, in water there is bacteria.”

- Benjamin Franklin

1. North Korea’s Failed Spy Satellite Wasn’t Ready for Military Use, Seoul Analysis Shows

2. S. Korea retrieves N. Korean spy satellite wreckage, ends salvage operation: military

3. The Crisis in South Korea-China Relations: Lessons from History and Ways Forward

4. Unification Ministry to slash budgets of bodies promoting inter-Korean projects

5. S. Korea respects IAEA report on Fukushima wastewater discharge: official

6. Korea, China hold first high-level meeting in months

7. Flexibility matters when it comes to diplomacy (with north Korea)

8. N. Korea says it has achieved economic goals for H1 in key sectors

9. Court rejects another gov't application to deposit compensation for forced labor victims

10. N.Korea Hints at Sending Athletes to Asian Para Games, Paris Paralympics

11. Time for 'K-diplomacy'

12. Military Manpower commissioner against conscripting women, military exemption for BTS

13. Most kimchi from China contains aspartame

1. North Korea’s Failed Spy Satellite Wasn’t Ready for Military Use, Seoul Analysis Shows

A lot to parse here.

Did north Korean scientists knowingly attempt a launch when the system was not ready? Was Kim informed or were they afraid to tell him something he did not want to hear so they launched on his orders being unable to speak truth to power? Did Kim order thel launch to keep up with South Korea's very successful launch (five satellites in orbit and also South Korea's satellite that is orbiting the moon and sending back data)? How can we effectively use this information to undermine the legitimacy of the regime?

North Korea’s Failed Spy Satellite Wasn’t Ready for Military Use, Seoul Analysis Shows

Wreckage recovered last month was analyzed jointly by South Korea, U.S.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-koreas-failed-spy-satellite-wasnt-ready-for-military-use-seoul-analysis-shows-703b0b83?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

By Timothy W. Martin and Dasl Yoon

July 5, 2023 7:01 am ET

A part of North Korea’s ‘Chollima-1’ rocket that was salvaged from the Yellow Sea last month. PHOTO: YONHAP/POOL/SHUTTERSTOCK

SEOUL—North Korea’s spy satellite, which exploded midflight and fell into the Yellow Sea, couldn’t be used for military purposes, according to a South Korean analysis of the recovered debris.

The May 31 failed launch represented the Kim Jong Un regime’s first attempt at sending a spy satellite into space. Such technology—one of Kim’s central weapons pursuits—would give Pyongyang surveillance capabilities it lacks now and aid the targeting of a potential nuclear strike.

To recover the satellite debris, South Korea deployed search naval vessels, deep-sea divers and aircraft. They recovered the rocket and parts of the satellite last month. South Korea and the U.S. then conducted a joint analysis.

On Wednesday, South Korea’s military said that, based on its evaluation of the wreckage, the North Korean spy satellite shouldn’t be considered military grade. Left unaddressed were questions such as whether any of the satellite’s components were sourced outside North Korea and what type of engine and fuel were used in the rocket.

North Korea’s Spy Satellite Crashes Into Sea, Fails to Reach Space

(2nd LD) S. Korea retrieves N. Korean spy satellite wreckage, ends salvage operation: military | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · July 5, 2023

(ATTN: ADDS more details in 4th para)

SEOUL, July 5 (Yonhap) -- South Korea has retrieved a North Korean spy satellite wreckage and concluded it has "no military utility," Seoul's military said Wednesday, ending a 36-day operation to salvage the sunken debris from a failed North Korean space rocket launch in late May.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said that the military raised key parts of the rocket and the satellite through the search and salvage operation in the Yellow Sea from May 31 through Wednesday, and it worked in tandem with the United States to examine and analyze them.

"As a result of the exhaustive analysis by South Korean and U.S. experts, we have assessed it has no military utility as a reconnaissance satellite," the JCS said in a press release.

The military's capability assessment on the satellite wreckage spawned speculation that it might have recovered key camera components or other pieces of optical equipment installed in the satellite. To perform as a full-fledged spy satellite, one has to have a sub-meter resolution camera, observers said.

The allies' joint analysis drew keen attention as it could shed light on the progress of the North's long-range rocket development and space programs, as well as which countries have wittingly or unwittingly aided its weapons development efforts.

The JCS did not detail the findings through the allies' analysis of the wreckage nor did it disclose any photos of the retrieved part of the satellite.

Last month, a Seoul official struck a cautious note, insinuating that disclosing all the information the military gleaned from the salvage operation would rather benefit the North Korean military.

After the rocket fell into the waters some 200 kilometers west of the South Korean western island of Eocheong on May 31, the military carried out the retrieval operation involving Navy ships, maritime aircraft and deep-sea divers for over a month.

The operation had been hindered by poor underwater visibility, fast currents, the heavy weight of the sunken wreckage and other challenges.

But it raised a presumed part of the rocket's second stage on June 15. The lifted part was around 12 meters long and 2 to 3 meters in diameter.

"Our military has demonstrated its outstanding operational capabilities as it recovered multiple parts of the wreckage despite the unforgiving operational environment," the JCS said.

The North has claimed that the May 31 launch involved the new Chollima-1 rocket carrying the satellite, Malligyong-1. Soon after the botched launch, the North's state media acknowledged the rocket crashed into the sea due to the abnormal starting of the second-stage engine.

Seoul and Washington have long viewed what the North claimed to be a space rocket launch as a violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions banning any launch using ballistic missile technology.

The salvaged wreckage of a North Korean space rocket is displayed on the deck of the ROKS Gwangyang at the Navy's Second Fleet in Pyeongtaek, 60 kilometers south of Seoul, on June 16, 2023. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · July 5, 2023

3. The Crisis in South Korea-China Relations: Lessons from History and Ways Forward

Conclusion:

Last of all, national unity is important. Currently, the South Korea has serious factional strife and national division in its domestic politics. The external pressure from the triangular structure and the logic of political interests in domestic politics is in a vicious cycle that exerts a reverse synergy effect. This is also a common phenomenon in Korean history. At the root of all the national crises that Korea has experienced, including the Imjin War, the Byeongja Horan, the Qing-Japanese War, and the Korean War, were serious factional battles between political camps and division of national opinion in internal affairs. Aside from seeking a good path forward for foreign and security policies beyond the triangular structure, reform of the domestic political structure is perhaps more urgent.

The Crisis in South Korea-China Relations: Lessons from History and Ways Forward

https://www.keaf.org/en/book/EAF_Policy_Debates/The_Crisis_in_South_Korea_China_Relations_Lessons_from_History_and_Ways_Forward?ckattempt=1

Date2023-07-05
PublisherEast Asia Foundation
AuthorMoongi Lee(Professor, Division of International Studies at Sejong University)
EAF Policy Debates_No.198.pdf

Summary

With South Korea-China relations relatively stagnant, or even deteriorating, since the inauguration of the Yoon Suk Yeol government, there are many voices calling for the restoration of cooperative relations and a search for improvement. To this end, it is necessary to start with an accurate diagnosis of the fundamental causes of the current crisis in South Korea-China relations. It is not in the bilateral relationship itself, but rather the contradictory structure of the trilateral relationship among South Korea, the United States and China. The Korean Peninsula has now fallen into the “trap of a triangular structure” commonly experienced in Korea’s history. Therefore, the idea of improving the Korea-China cooperative relationship by simply stitching the two countries together doesn’t address the underlying problems and is not sustainable. The best way to escape the trap of the triangular structure is cooperation between South Korea and China. Lessons and implications from history will be helpful in initiating this. This essay underscores the importance of balanced diplomacy, preventive diplomacy, self-discipline and self-determination, as well as domestic political integration in the future of South Korea-China relations.

With South Korea-China relations recently in a rapid vortex, debates on the topic are hot both inside and outside of Korea. There are differences over such questions as: 1) Are South Korea-China relations a matter between the two countries alone, or among three countries, including the United States? 2) Where and with whom does the fundamental cause of the current tension in South Korea-China relations lie? 3) Is this a matter of choosing between security and the economy? 4) Are values and ideology important in South Korea’s response strategy, or is the practical national interest more important? 5) What strategies should South Korea use to avoid falling into the trap of geopolitical and economic security crises on the global stage?

The crisis facing South Korea-China relations is multifaceted, but, in Seoul’s view, the most serious problem is the economy and security issues as they directly affect the country’s national interests. First, in terms of the economy, South Korea-China economic cooperation has hit a wall. Trade with China, which used to be the largest source of South Korea’s trade surplus, has now become a source of trade deficits. The trade balance between South Korea and China fell from a surplus of $24.3 billion ($162.9 billion in exports and $138.6 billion in imports) in 2021 to a surplus of $1.2 billion ($155.8 billion in exports and $155.4 billion in imports) in 2022. But in 2023, it began to turn into a deficit. In the first quarter of 2023, the trade balance with China recorded a deficit of about $7.9 billion (about 35 percent of South Korea’s total trade deficit).

A more serious threat to bilateral economic relations than the balance of trade is the crisis of supply chain disruptions. In 2021, both South Korea and China experienced unintended consequences during the so-called “diesel exhaust fluid crisis.” However, bilateral supply chain crises between South Korea and China such as this have relatively large room for resolution through consultation between the two governments, because the benefits of interdependence are great for the overall economy of the two countries. The real crisis ahead is the impact of global supply chain competition in the context of US-China competition. The economic conflict between the US and China, which began in earnest under the Donald Trump administration in 2017, began with tariffs to correct trade imbalances, moving to exclude China from global supply chains to dampen China’s pursuit of capacity in high-tech fields under the Joe Biden administration in 2021. In particular, as South Korea’s foreign and security policy has recently tilted in a one-sided direction favoring the South Korea-US alliance, there is a growing risk that supply chain instability triggered by competition between the US and China will spread to South Korea.

The South Korean government participates in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and is certain to join the CHIP4, a semiconductor alliance that excludes China. These are US-led multilateral cooperative organizations designed to exclude China from the global supply chain. If CHIP4 becomes a reality, China will also counterattack using various means, making South Korea even more vulnerable in the supply chain structure between the two countries. According to a research report by the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), 958 items in South Korea are more than 70 percent dependent on China’s exports to South Korea, while only 33 items in China are dependent on Korean exports to China.

In terms of diplomacy and security, differences in perception and conflicts between South Korea and China continue to worsen. The conflicts began in earnest with the deployment of the THAAD anti-missile system by US Forces Korea in 2016. After the inauguration of the Moon Jae-in government in 2017, South Korea sought to ease the conflict by issuing what it calls “three don’ts” to China: Seoul will not deploy additional THAAD systems, will not be incorporated into the US missile defense system, and will not engage in a military alliance among South Korea, the US and Japan. However, given that North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, which were the reasons cited by South Korea and the US for the deployment of THAAD, have not been resolved at all, and that conflicts between the US and China are also spreading in East Asia, the fundamental issues that caused the THAAD conflict are far from being resolved. The Yoon Suk Yeol government has conveyed to China that it will not recognize the former government’s “three don’ts” as an official agreement between the two countries, and made it clear that the issue is not subject to consultation with China because additional THAAD deployments are a sovereign issue of South Korea. In South Korea-China relations, the THAAD issue is a latent conflict that could emerge at any time.

Among South Korea’s foreign and security policies, the most sensitive and publicly criticized by China is that on Taiwan. Beijing is very temperamental about the subtle change in the South Korean government’s position on Taiwan. On Feb. 22, 2023, Foreign Minister Park Jin told CNN that “South Korea opposes unilateral changes in the status quo by force,” and China’s foreign ministry snapped back by saying that South Korea should not interfere with its internal affairs. A more intense confrontation occurred following remarks made in President Yoon’s interview with Reuters on April 19 ahead of a state visit to the US. Yoon called the Taiwan issue “a global issue” similar to the North Korean issue and “not simply an issue between China and Taiwan,” and said that he “absolutely oppose[s] attempts to change the status quo by force… with the international community.” The next day, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson strongly protested, calling the statements a denial of the One China principle and an intervention in the country’s domestic affairs. Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang also issued harsh criticism, saying, “Those who play with fire on the question of Taiwan will burn themselves.” China is particularly sensitive to the absence of respect for the One China policy and the addition of the phrase “with the international community,” noting that Yoon’s remarks have altered the existing position of the South Korean government. This change is understood in conjunction with the recent strengthening of military cooperation between South Korea, the US and Japan.

Recently, the South Korean government harshly criticized the Chinese side, taking issue with the so-called "betting remarks" made by Chinese Ambassador to South Korea Xing Haiming during talks with Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung. South Korea’s Foreign Ministry summoned Xing on June 9, a day after his remarks, and warned him that “it [was] a provocative remark that goes beyond diplomatic practice and is interference in domestic affairs.” In response, China’s Foreign Ministry also summoned South Korean Ambassador to China Chung Jae-ho. Yoon also came forward to accuse Xing of being like Yuan Shikai, who was dispatched to Joseon at the end of the 19th century and engaged in all kinds of tyranny and internal interference, and ruling party lawmakers insisted on the expulsion of Xing. The incident further worsened the public sentiment between the two countries, which was already bad. In light of the current relationship between the two countries, it is also unclear whether South Korea will hold the next tripartite summit among South Korea, China and Japan in the second half of this year, which it is currently preparing as the chair country.

South Korea-China relations have deteriorated overall in recent years. Of course, it is not a relationship that can easily reach catastrophe. The need for economic interdependence and cooperation between the two countries is still great, and the need for strategic communication between the two sides is also very great to manage the situation on the Korean Peninsula, including North Korea. The two governments also still emphasize the need for cooperation and communication. In fact, there are few purely bilateral issues among the issues of conflict between South Korea and China. Bilateral relations have often deteriorated due to historical and cultural issues, which are related to public sentiment in the two countries. Most of the difficult conflict issues arise from trilateral relations including North Korea or the US rather than bilateral relations. In other words, the essence of the crisis in South Korea-China relations is not their bilateral relationship, but a three-way relationship. Therefore, the direction of problem solving and the development of South Korea-China relations should be sought in an accurate understanding of the characteristics and nature of the three-way relationship. In this regard, lessons from history will be of great help.

The Trap of a Triangular Structure

As competition between the US and China has intensified, the Korean Peninsula is rapidly being sucked into the “trap of a triangular structure.” However, this triangular crisis is a repeat of a familiar pattern in our history. Almost all national difficulties in Korean history arose from the crisis structure of a triangular relationship. Since the Goryeo Dynasty, when Korea’s territory was fixed to the Korean Peninsula, all wars have occurred in a crisis structure called the Triangular Structure, with China always on one point of the triangle without exception. Of course, the relationship between China and the state on the Korean Peninsula has sometimes been defined by cooperation and sometimes by conflict.

The Goryeo Dynasty (918-1392) was the most prosperous period of the nomadic tribes in the north. Due to this, Goryeo spent most of its time in a triangular structure with the Chinese Empire of Song and the Qidan (Liao), Nüzhen (Jin), and Mongolian (Yuan), which rose one after another in the north. When the northern nomadic peoples rose, without exception, they invaded Goryeo, which was in a tribute relationship with the Song Dynasty. In Korea’s history, Goryeo was the time when the triangular structure was so prevalent that it impacted everyday life. The national crisis of the Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910) also occurred in a typical triangular trap. The Imjin War was a war between Japan and the Ming Dynasty, and the Byeongja Horan was a war in which conflicts and confrontations between Ming and Later Jin (the predecessor of Qing) exploded on the Korean Peninsula. The Qing-Japanese War at the end of the Joseon Dynasty was also a typical triangular conflict that took place on the Korean Peninsula for control over Joseon. Immediately after liberation of the Korean Peninsula, the structural causes of division and war were also passed on to the Korean Peninsula as a confrontation between maritime capitalist forces and continental communist forces formed with the advent of the Cold War. It was also the result of falling into the trap of a triangular structure.

In this way, when a power struggle broke out in the relationships between surrounding powers, the Korean Peninsula fell into a triangular trap without exception and faced serious crises. However, the difference between historical triangular structures and today's is that Korea now exists in a “double triangular structure” due to the division of the two Koreas. South and North Korea are competing against each other and at the same time are situated in a triangle with the US and China. The Korean Peninsula is a place where two triangular structures overlap and operate in both the South and the North.

This triangular structure facing the Korean Peninsula is one in which opportunities and crises coexist in different situations across South and North Korea. The process of change on the Korean Peninsula through the post-Cold War era clearly contrasts the different opportunities and crises faced by the two Koreas under this triangular structure. When US-China relations were cooperative, South Korea greatly expanded its space for diplomatic autonomy and opportunity, while North Korea fell into diplomatic isolation and faced a major crisis. The 20 years after South Korea-China diplomatic relations were established was such an era. However, when US-China relations are confrontational, South Korea receives extreme pressure from both countries to pick a side, greatly weakening diplomatic autonomy. On the other hand, North Korea is a strategic partner that China should never overlook, and there is more room for North Korea to benefit between China and the US. As confrontation and competition between the US and China intensify, the risk of a choice dilemma increases in South Korea, and the space for choice opportunities in North Korea increases. This has been the situation on the Korean Peninsula over the past decade.

Meanwhile, it should also be noted that Korea’s crisis in the face of the confrontation between the U.S. and China is not only about the pressure to choose a side, but also the risk of exclusion. The two powers exert strong pressure on the Koreas to choose a side, but in some cases they may decide on important issues on the Korean Peninsula by excluding the Koreas through some kind of compromise. The issue of the Korean Peninsula is an absolute priority for South Korea, but it is only one of numerous issues for the US and China, and there is a risk of Korean issues being linked to other issues at an East Asian or global level. This situation was evidenced in the country’s collapse during the late Joseon Dynasty and the division immediately after the liberation. Examples include the Tianjin Treaty (1885), signed by Li Hongzhang and Ito Hirobumi immediately after the Gapsin Coup, the Taft–Katsura agreement (1905) right before the Eulsa Treaty, and the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers (1945), which provided a decisive cause for division of the Korean Peninsula by causing controversy over approval/refusal of the result upon liberation. Therefore, the difficulty facing Korea in the triangular structure is that the risk of a choice dilemma and exclusion coexist like two sides of a coin.

Lessons from History

Given this trap of a triangular structure, Korean ancestors also worried about similar problems as South Koreans do today, and engaged in internal political disputes over how to respond. The fundamental issue was whether to prioritize values and ideologies or practical national interests. The confrontation between domestic political forces during the Byeongja Horan and the Qing-Japanese War is a relatively clear case. Advocates of Chinese order, which emphasized ideology and cause, insisted on loyalty to Sino-centrism, and those who wanted to adapt to the changing international order sought balanced diplomacy or attempted to escape China on a practical level. According to Koreans’ dominant historical perception, the integrity (the spirit of a classical scholar) of forces that value ideology and justification is highly appreciated, but their choice was a conservative regression that lacked insight into the future. On the other hand, those who attempted practical, balanced diplomacy or an alternative to Sino-centrism were frustrated by repeated defeats in internal power struggles, even though they had the foresight to read the big trends of history. The result was, as we all know, a disastrous national crisis. At least from historical experience, factional political diplomacy, which pursues ideology and values, is very dangerous, and balanced diplomacy centered on practicality seems inevitable.

In addition to balanced diplomacy, preventive diplomacy is also very important. Balanced foreign policy between the US and China does not mean intermediate centrism or a mechanical balance. It refers to a strategy that selectively chooses pro-US or pro-China policies according to the national interests that apply to each case. Naturally, preventive diplomacy that seeks consent through sufficient explanation in advance to each side should be faithfully conducted. The fact that South Korea-China relations deteriorated so much due to the THAAD issue in 2016 is largely due to the Park Geun-hye government's failure in preventive diplomacy with China. Another point to emphasize is that not all diplomatic and security issues are necessarily bilateral between the US and China. In many cases, South Korea may create a space for cooperation between the three parties by leading the compromise between the US and China. It should also be noted that almost every country in the world, not just South Korea, is impacted by the relationship between the US and China. Solidarity among countries that share interests in the middle zone can also be a good way to minimize selection pressure. Europe, India and Southeast Asia will become important partners, and the South Korean diplomatic landscape needs to be diversified.

Another direction is to secure self-strengthening and self-determination. The US and China also put “pressure to select” on South Korea, but in some cases, they may try to compromise and bargain while excluding the Korean parties. This is also an important lesson in history. It goes without saying that in order to strengthen the right to self-determination so that it is not swayed by the US and China, commensurate national power is necessary. The strategy of relying on foreign powers is the path to limitations and deepening domestic divisions and conflicts in the future. In the current security environment, maintaining the South Korea-US alliance is inevitable, but the method of entrusting everything to this alliance is dangerous. It is necessary to secure the right to self-determination on issues on the Korean Peninsula through constant strategies to strengthen South Korea.

Last of all, national unity is important. Currently, the South Korea has serious factional strife and national division in its domestic politics. The external pressure from the triangular structure and the logic of political interests in domestic politics is in a vicious cycle that exerts a reverse synergy effect. This is also a common phenomenon in Korean history. At the root of all the national crises that Korea has experienced, including the Imjin War, the Byeongja Horan, the Qing-Japanese War, and the Korean War, were serious factional battles between political camps and division of national opinion in internal affairs. Aside from seeking a good path forward for foreign and security policies beyond the triangular structure, reform of the domestic political structure is perhaps more urgent.

--- The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect any official position of the East Asia Foundation.

About the Author

Moongi Lee(Professor, Division of International Studies at Sejong University)

Moongi Lee received his Ph.D. in political science from the School of Government at Peking University and is currently a professor in the Division of International Studies at Sejong University. He served as the editor-in-chief of the Journal of Contemporary China, as chairman of the China Subcommittee of the Korean Association of International Studies, and as policy advisor to the Ministry of Unification. He studies Chinese politics and Korea-China relations, and currently focuses on the history of modern and contemporary Korea-China relations. Major papers and books include Modern China's World Strategy: China's Power and Korea-China Relations (2022, in Korean), "China’s Perception and Policy toward Neighboring States at the Late 19th Century: Comparison of Chosun and Vietnam" (2018, in Korean), “Chinese Dream and Foreign Policy: Domestic Politics and the Changes of Foreign Policy in the Xi Jinping Era" (2018, in Korean).

4. Unification Ministry to slash budgets of bodies promoting inter-Korean projects

A criteria for funding should be the right answer to this question: How does this activity advance the cause of Korean unification - does it contribute to solving the "Korea question?" (para 60 of the Armistice).

Wednesday

July 5, 2023

dictionary + A - A

Unification Ministry to slash budgets of bodies promoting inter-Korean projects

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/07/05/national/northKorea/Korea-Unification-Ministry-restructuring/20230705165323802.html

A view of the shuttered Kaesong Industrial Complex at the inter-Korean border from the Dora Observatory in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in Paju, Gyeonggi, in May. [YONHAP]

The Unification Ministry began downsizing key organizations supporting inter-Korean cooperation projects, including one advocating for the currently shuttered Kaesong Industrial Complex, according to various sources.

This comes after President Yoon Suk Yeol recently told the ministry to stop acting as if its raison d'être is to help the North Korean regime, pointedly dubbing the agency the "ministry to support North Korea."

Major organizations under the Unification Ministry up for restructuring include the Kaeseong Industrial District Foundation and the South-North Korea Exchanges and Cooperation Support Association.

The JoongAng Ilbo first reported Tuesday that a plan was underway to drastically reduce, or even freeze, the budgets for Unification Ministry organizations supporting inter-Korean cooperation. Such organizations have received funding from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund, created to support mutual exchanges and cooperation between the South and North.

The paper quoted a high-ranking government official as saying Monday, "Last month, a reform plan centered on large-scale budget and personnel cuts was delivered to organizations under the Ministry of Unification related to inter-Korean cooperation."

In particular, the official said the Kaeseong Industrial District Foundation faces "intense restructuring" or even a budget freeze if organizational reforms yield no tangible results.

The foundation has for years supported the reopening of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, a symbol of inter-Korean reconciliation located just north of the demilitarized zone, as well as businesses impacted by its closing. The joint economic project in the border city of Kaesong in North Korea was suspended by the Park Geun-hye government in February 2016 in response to Pyongyang's nuclear and missile provocations.

"We have already been notified of the goal to reduce next year's budget by more than 30 percent compared to this year," another source familiar with the situation told the JoongAng Ilbo regarding the foundation.

The ministry is expected to come up with a reform plan by mid-July after an initial review and has already started providing information on other employment opportunities and voluntary retirement packages to employees starting last week, according to the source.

The Kaesong Industrial Complex has received 8 billion won ($6.16 million) a year from the Unification Ministry, despite being shuttered for over six years. This is almost as much money as it received when it was open, or around 9 to 10 billion won.

This comes amid reports that North Korea is trying to run the Kaesong Industrial Complex's factories without the South using Chinese investment.

In May, the Unification Ministry also said it detected signs that North Korea was illegally running the factories in the Kaesong Industrial Complex, warning of potential legal action to protect the property rights of South Korean owners.

Kim Yung-ho, the unification minister nominee, speaks to reporters Friday in front of the Office of the Inter-Korean Dialogue in Jongno District, central Seoul, his temporary office to prepare for a parliamentary confirmation hearing. [YONHAP]

Yoon last week tapped Kim Yung-ho, a political science and diplomacy professor at Sungshin Women's University known for his hardline stance against North Korea, as his new unification minister nominee, signaling a shakeup at the ministry.

Critics warn that the Yoon administration's move to reduce the Kaeseong Industrial District Foundation could hurt South Korean companies impacted by the shuttering of the complex. They stress the need to maintain at least a skeleton crew that could reopen the complex someday.

A senior official from Yoon's People Power Party (PPP) said even the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) secretariat kept a "one-person liaison office" even after liquidating the light water reactor nuclear power plant project. KEDO, launched in 1995 under the 1994 North Korea-U.S. Agreed Framework, has been defunct since 2006.

The South-North Korea Exchanges and Cooperation Support Association, founded in 2007 to promote cooperation projects, including mineral resource exploitation, is also being restructured.

Officials point out that budgets related to the association have been virtually frozen or suspended, with only minimum labor costs spent.

"Budget cuts for next year are unavoidable," said an official familiar with the association's situation, noting that members have been informed of a "minimum 30%" restructuring plan.

Officials at the association believe the "minimum" measures requested by the government suggest an open-ended restructuring drive that could lead to major changes at the Unification Ministry headquarters itself.

A Unification Ministry official also confirmed the JoongAng Ilbo report, telling reporters in a briefing Tuesday that the ministry "ordered each institution to prepare a budget plan," noting that the targets are the Kaeseong Industrial District Foundation and the South-North Korea Exchanges and Cooperation Support Association.

"Operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex have been suspended, with exchanges and cooperation between the two Koreas virtually halted, so [the two organizations] are in a situation where their workload has decreased," the official added.

The ministry said it gave no further instructions regarding the plan to reduce personnel at the organizations.

However, given that the two organizations spend more than 90 percent of their budget on fixed costs such as rent and labor, a large-scale manpower reduction appears inevitable.

The Unification Ministry is tasked with establishing comprehensive policies on unification and inter-Korean dialogue, exchanges and cooperation, coordinating plans to carry out such policies, and handling education as well as other unification-related affairs.

The ministry shakeup also comes as the government prioritizes other issues, such as promoting awareness of the North Korean human rights situation.

The PPP official told the JoongAng Ilbo that President Yoon told the unification minister nominee and other new appointees that "North Korea policy should not deviate from the government's foreign policy position focusing on value diplomacy," adding that fundamental reform of the Unification Ministry will begin in earnest after candidate Kim Yung-ho's confirmation hearing is completed.

An employee cleans the Ministry of Unification signboard in front of the central government complex in Gwanghwamun, central Seoul. [JOONGANG PHOTOS]

BY SARAH KIM, KANG TAE-HWA [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]

5. S. Korea respects IAEA report on Fukushima wastewater discharge: official

But not the opposition party.

(LEAD) S. Korea respects IAEA report on Fukushima wastewater discharge: official | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · July 5, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES with more remarks in paras 7-9)

By Kim Han-joo

SEOUL, July 5 (Yonhap) -- The South Korea government respects the outcome of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s safety review of Japan's plan to release contaminated water from its crippled Fukushima plant, an official said Wednesday.

On Tuesday, the U.N. nuclear watchdog announced that its two-year review found Japan's plan to release water from the plant into the sea to be consistent with its safety standards. The agency also said the treated water would have a negligible radiological impact on both people and the environment.

"It has been the government's longstanding stance to recognize the IAEA as a prestigious internationally agreed-upon agency, and we hold respect for its findings," said Park Ku-yeon, the first deputy chief of the Office for Government Policy Coordination, during a daily briefing.

Park also mentioned that efforts are under way to expedite the timeline for announcing the Seoul government's own scientific report, which will be announced along with an in-depth analysis of the IAEA's final report.

The government is currently in the final stage of conducting its own scientific analysis of the discharge plan. This analysis is based on the findings of an on-site inspection of the plant completed in late May, as well as expert analyses conducted by the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety since 2021.

It is largely expected that the results will be announced after IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi's three-day visit to South Korea, which is scheduled for Friday, following his ongoing four-day trip to Japan.

Park said the government's assessment of the IAEA report will be conducted separately from Grossi's visit.

"Director General Grossi will come to South Korea and explain the contents that have already been announced," Park said, emphasizing that Seoul's analysis is a separate matter.

The director general is also scheduled to meet with the head of the country's nuclear safety watchdog, the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, as well as Foreign Minister Park Jin.

The results of the IAEA review are expected to provide further momentum to Japan's intention to begin discharging the water from the plant, which was damaged by a massive earthquake and subsequent tsunami in 2011.

Despite continued opposition from neighboring countries, including South Korea and China, recent media reports suggested that Japan might commence the water release, estimated to span decades, as early as August.

Park Ku-yeon (3rd from L), the first deputy chief of the Office for Government Policy Coordination, speaks during a daily briefing on July 5, 2023. (Yonhap)

khj@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · July 5, 2023

6. Korea, China hold first high-level meeting in months

Wednesday

July 5, 2023

dictionary + A - A

Korea, China hold first high-level meeting in months

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/07/05/national/diplomacy/korea-china-taiwan/20230705185545027.html

Deputy Foreign Minister Choi Yong-sam, left, meets with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong in Beijing on Tuesday. [MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS]

Deputy Foreign Minister Choi Yong-sam met with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong in Beijing on Tuesday, marking the first high-level meeting between the two countries in months since relations frayed over several diplomatic disputes.

“They discussed measures taken by the two governments for stable management and development of relations since the inauguration of the new Korean government in May of last year,” said the Foreign Ministry in a statement. “The two sides agreed that meticulous efforts are required to promote bilateral relations based on mutual respect and mutual benefit.”

Choi conveyed Korea’s continued respect for the One China policy, while requesting Beijing’s close cooperation on countering security threats from North Korea, said the Foreign Ministry.

“The two sides agreed on the need for trade promotion and stable supply chain management and agreed to make efforts to expand people-to-people and cultural exchanges for the long-term and future-oriented promotion of bilateral relations,” it added.

Choi and Sun’s meeting comes in the wake of a series of incidents that have chilled relations between Seoul and Beijing.

In an interview with Reuters in April, Presidential Yoon Suk Yeol said Taiwan was "not simply an issue between China and Taiwan.”

His subsequent statement about opposing “attempts to change the status quo [on Taiwan] by force” met with strong opposition from Beijing.

When a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson called Yoon’s comments meddlesome, the Korean government responded by summoning the Chinese ambassador to Seoul.

More recently, the two governments engaged in tit-for-tat summons of each other’s envoys over Chinese Ambassador to Seoul Xing Haiming’s comments during a meeting with the leader of the Democratic Party (DP) in Korea last month.

In the meeting, held at Xing's diplomatic residence in Seoul and live streamed on the DP's YouTube channel, the Chinese ambassador suggested that Korea should not “bet on China’s defeat” in the ongoing U.S.-China rivalry and would "regret" siding with the United States.

While both foreign ministers of Korea and China will be present at the Asean Regional Forum in Indonesia next week, neither government has announced if they will be meeting on the sidelines of the forum.

The last foreign ministerial meeting between Beijing and Korea was in August last year when Foreign Minister Park Jin visited Qingdao for the meeting.

BY ESTHER CHUNG [chung.juhee@joongang.co.kr]

7. Flexibility matters when it comes to diplomacy (with north Korea)

Excerpt:

The problem is not the willingness of the U.S. and Japan to have dialogue with North Korea and China, but the intention of North Korea and China to isolate South Korea from their dialogue with the U.S. and Japan. North Korea will most likely reject any dialogue with South Korea even after turning to dialogue with the U.S. and Japan. The North’s strategy of insulating the South from whatever it does is deep-rooted, but the degree will be severe this time considering the conservative Yoon administration’s hard-line policy toward North Korea. China also would pressure South Korea by being reluctant to have high-level talks with the Yoon government after branding it as the most anti-Chinese government in the South in history. What matters for us is how to deal with such hawkish stances of North Korea and China.

Wednesday

July 5, 2023

dictionary + A - A

Flexibility matters when it comes to diplomacy

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/07/05/opinion/columns/flexibility-matters-diplomacy-North-Korea/20230705201716029.html

Wi Sung-lac

The author is a former South Korean representative to the six-party talks and head of the diplomacy and security division of the JoongAng Ilbo’s Reset Korea campaign.

Amid a tense standoff between South and North Korea, South Korea’s relations with China continue to worsen. After inter-Korean dialogue came to a halt, communication channels between South Korea and China also are being shut. That’s in sharp contrast with South Korea’s even closer ties with the United States and Japan. Then, signs of dialogue between Japan and North Korea, the U.S. and China, and Japan and China have shown. Some people accuse the Yoon Suk Yeol administration — and the U.S. and Japanese governments — of only helping deepen South Korea’s isolation by joining with the U.S. and Japan to pressure North Korea and check China even when Japan wants to talk with North Korea — and after the U.S. and Japan started dialogue with China.

But such accusations look like an emotional reaction. First of all, given the U.S. and Japan’s original stance to have dialogue with North Korea, their rapprochement with Pyongyang is nothing new. In particular, high-level talks between the U.S. and China and Japan and China are not abnormal, given their need for dialogue to manage conflict around them. North Korea tends to have dialogue with foreign countries — only temporarily when the need arises. But the country is bent on sophisticating its nuclear and missile capability after stopping dialogue with others. Internally, North Korea suffers from its colossal lockdown from the Covid-19 pandemic, coupled with its chronic economic hardship. So, the country must strike a delicate balance between the strategic need to show off its missile capabilities and the need for external exchanges — and economic aid from neighbors — to improve the people’s livelihood. But the North would persist with nuclear and missile provocations at least until the U.S. presidential election in 2024. Pyongyang could even be tempted to have dialogue with Tokyo before the U.S. election though Japan is not its main partner for dialogue.

The problem is not the willingness of the U.S. and Japan to have dialogue with North Korea and China, but the intention of North Korea and China to isolate South Korea from their dialogue with the U.S. and Japan. North Korea will most likely reject any dialogue with South Korea even after turning to dialogue with the U.S. and Japan. The North’s strategy of insulating the South from whatever it does is deep-rooted, but the degree will be severe this time considering the conservative Yoon administration’s hard-line policy toward North Korea. China also would pressure South Korea by being reluctant to have high-level talks with the Yoon government after branding it as the most anti-Chinese government in the South in history. What matters for us is how to deal with such hawkish stances of North Korea and China.

More dark clouds are expected to gather on the future of South Korea. North Korea will continue launching ICBMs and satellites to the point of proclaiming the completion of its audacious nuclear program through another — and probably final — nuclear test. That will certainly worsen the inter-Korean relations further. China’s apparent embracing of North Korea even under such circumstances will make Seoul-Beijing relations be frozen further. President Yoon plans to participate in the NATO summit this month and later a South Korea-U.S.-Japan summit in Washington to reinforce security cooperation with the ally and Japan. At every possible moment, China and North Korea will protest the move vehemently.

The situation will be headed to an inflection point around the time of the U.S. presidential election in November. After judging that it already proved the level of its nuclear and missile technology, North Korea may turn to dialogue with a new U.S. administration. The policy shift could be more drastic if Donald Trump returns or at least a new U.S. president with views on North Korea similar to Trump’s appears. Even if Joe Biden is reelected president, North Korea will likely attempt to turn the situation around. How will the Yoon administration respond to that? The conservative government needs to prepare for such a possibility in advance.

In the past, South Korea often opposed a sudden turnaround in the mood toward dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea. If that opposition does not work, the South demanded that the U.S. get an agreement from the North to have dialogue with South Korea when the U.S. and North Korea meet.

What’s important for South Korea is to play a role in promoting denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula while strengthening nuclear deterrence and pressuring North Korea. What matters is South Korea’s role as a contributor to peace, not an obstructor.

To do that, the country must have a diplomatic position compatible with a positive actor rather than getting stuck in negative feeling. Maintaining overly confrontational posture toward North Korea and China is not productive as it narrows South Korea’ diplomatic space. Instead of falling into the temptation for obstructor, the government must leave room for diplomacy with North Korea and China to brace for the turnaround and accumulate diplomatic assets for later. The Yoon administration must keep in mind the possibility of North Korea turning to dialogue. The government must keep dialogue channels with China open, too. I hope the government proves its wisdom and ability to cope with such changes in the future.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.

8. N. Korea says it has achieved economic goals for H1 in key sectors

Figures lie and liars figure.

N. Korea says it has achieved economic goals for H1 in key sectors | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · July 4, 2023

SEOUL, July 4 (Yonhap) -- North Korea claimed Tuesday it has exceeded its goals across key economic sectors during the first half of the year, backed by efforts to accomplish its 12 major economic priorities for this year.

In an apparent bid to boost self-reliance amid deepening economic hardships, North Korea earlier this year identified 12 major economic goals for the year and picked raising grain output as its top task.

"Dazzling, miraculous feats were accomplished in the agriculture front," the North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said. "In the construction sector, new standards and records were incessantly created."

The KCNA said that North Korea carried out irrigation projects to prevent damage from droughts and floods, including maintenance of some 24,000 kilometers of irrigation waterways, and said that a "scientific" approach to farming will help increase production at low output farms.

The state media reported that key industrial sectors exceeded their production goals, saying that power and coal production came in at 101 percent and 104 percent of their initial goals.

Production in the metals and chemicals industries also came in at 112 percent and 102 percent of their goals, according to the KCNA.

The state media, however, did not disclose its target figures for production.

In the construction front, the KCNA noted that 13,400 new homes were built in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang, adding that major housing projects are under way in the Hwasong district of Pyongyang and the mining town of Komdok.

This photo, released by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on June 21, 2023, shows one of the posters encouraging North Korean people to endeavor to implement the tasks set forth at a recent plenary meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the North's ruling Workers' Party. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · July 4, 2023

9. Court rejects another gov't application to deposit compensation for forced labor victims

This will generate more friction.

(2nd LD) Court rejects another gov't application to deposit compensation for forced labor victims | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · July 5, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES headline, lead and paras 3-4 with details on court decision to reject gov't deposit; TRIMS)

SUWON, South Korea, July 5 (Yonhap) -- A regional district court turned down Wednesday a government application to deposit compensation for two late forced labor victims under Japan's 1910-1945 colonization of the Korean Peninsula, citing opposition from the victims' surviving families.

A government-affiliated foundation handling the compensation matter had submitted the request to the Suwon District Court on Tuesday.

The Suwon court rejected the request saying clear opposition from the recipients has been confirmed in the application documents, so it does not meet the requirements for a third-party reimbursement under the Civil Code.

The decision marks the third such rejection by a district court after two similar government requests were denied by the courts in Gwangju and Jeonju. The Jeonju District Court is reviewing the case again after the foundation modified the application to change the payee from the deceased victim to her children.

Seeking to mend ties with Japan, the government announced a plan in March to compensate 15 Korean victims of Japanese wartime forced labor through the foundation without compensation from liable Japanese firms.

The four are among the 15 victims who won damages suits against Japanese companies, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. and Nippon Steel Corp., at South Korea's Supreme Court in 2018. The 11 others have accepted the compensation from the government's third-party reimbursement plan.

The government announced Monday that it had began a process to deposit the compensation for the four opposing victims -- two alive and the other two dead.

The government has also filed for the deposit of compensation for the other two victims with the Gwangju District Court and Jeonju District Court, respectively, but the Gwangju court dismissed the application on the grounds that the victim is refusing the third-party reimbursement plan.

On Wednesday, the Jeonju District Court also decided to reject the deposit application, citing erroneous paperwork.

A group of professors make a statement against the Seoul government's plan to compensate the Korean victims of Japan's wartime forced labor through a Seoul-backed public foundation, instead of direct payment from responsible Japanese firms, during a news conference at Korea University in Seoul on March 22, 2023. (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · July 5, 2023

10. N.Korea Hints at Sending Athletes to Asian Para Games, Paris Paralympics

Coming out of its shell?

N.Korea Hints at Sending Athletes to Asian Para Games, Paris Paralympics

english.chosun.com

July 05, 2023 08:21

North Korea will likely join the Asian Para Games and next year's Paralympics in Paris after it hinted at participating in the Asian Games in Hangzhou, China in September.

The North's Central Committee of the Korean Federation for the Protection of the Disabled on Tuesday uploaded a post onto its website claiming the regime's disabled athletes are determined to see their flag flying high and to have their national anthem play while they stand on the podium, fueling speculation of a return to the international arena.

The North has not participated in any international sports competitions since closing its borders in 2020 due to COVID-19 concerns. After unilaterally withdrawing from the Tokyo Olympics in 2021, North Korea was banned from all international events by the International Olympic Committee until Dec. 31 last year.

Last month, North Korea's Foreign Ministry also hinted at possible participation in the 2024 Paris Summer Olympics.

N.Korea to Take Part in Asian Games in Hangzhou

N.Korea Expected to Take Part in Asian Games in Hangzhou

english.chosun.com

11. Time for 'K-diplomacy'

Time for 'K-diplomacy'

The Korea Times · July 5, 2023

Significant increase in official development assistance should be first step

By Kim Won-soo

These days, there is plenty of buzz around South Korea's popular culture, sometimes called "K-culture," which comprises a wide variety of domains such as K-pop, K-movies, K-dramas, K-food, K-beauty and so on.

There could be many factors at work behind the dramatic surge of K-culture. One of the most fundamental reasons could be because K-pop or K-culture more generally has found universal appeal ― with Korean characteristics ― among people around the world, especially the younger generations.

We could potentially apply this idea to international politics and start thinking about "K-diplomacy." Korea could make a meaningful contribution on the global diplomatic stage by tapping into a set of its strengths, with both universal and regional appeal.

Globally, South Korea is one of the few exemplary cases to overcome both economic and political backwardness following the end of World War II. In 2021, Korea was reclassified by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as an advanced economy, the first-ever upgrade made by the U.N. agency since its inception in 1964. This shows why Korea has become a model that many developing states around the globe want to emulate. Simply put, Korea has universal appeal in international relations.

Regionally, South Korea is facing one of the hardest diplomatic challenges, stemming from its unique geopolitical location. It is under constant threat as a divided country, surrounded by the four most powerful states in the world, namely the United States, China, Japan and Russia. The politics of division is rearing its ugly head around the Korean Peninsula in ways that are somewhat reminiscent of the Cold War era. A major difference is that the land-based authoritarian bloc of China, Russia and North Korea is now led by China, not Russia. Another difference is South Korea's relatively increased power compared to that of the other five countries.

South Korea has maneuvered with reasonable success both diplomatically and economically in one of the toughest geopolitical environments between the United States (its foremost ally) and China (its largest trading partner). Now it requires even more political finesse as the U.S.-China rivalry is intensifying in all domains of international relations. This is not entirely bad news, however. South Korea is in fact uniquely positioned to play a bridging role between the U.S. and China. It could help identify issues of mutual concern, such as climate change and terrorists gaining access to weapons of mass destruction.

South Korea could try to combine its universal appeal and regional maneuvers into a diplomatic brand of its own called K-diplomacy. To that end, I firmly believe the aspirations of the Yoon Suk Yeol administration to become a global pivotal state are both desirable and achievable. They are desirable because they can pave the way for K-diplomacy to flourish. It is possible if they are backed by creative thinking and dexterous execution.

In this regard, I applaud the efforts by the Yoon government to increase South Korea's official development assistance (ODA) significantly this year. The Yoon government recently announced an ambitious plan to raise next year's ODA budget by 43 percent. If this plan moves ahead as announced, it deserves a big welcome for two reasons. First, it would send a clear message around the world about South Korea's resolve to contribute to the successful development of less developed states. Second, it would be regarded as a politically courageous move, as it would be immensely unpopular nationally, significantly raising the government budget for international assistance at a time of economic slowdown. This could in turn help solidify South Korea's global image as a donor country following its entry into the OECD's Development Assistance Committee in 2020. The share of ODA in gross national income would rise from a meager 0.17 percent to 0.29 percent, moving one step closer to the OECD average of 0.36 percent.

Increasing ODA is clearly a welcome first step. Efforts must be made to ensure that it has a real impact on recipient countries. Effective aid will be an enabler for K-diplomacy. But there is still a long way to go before K-diplomacy can be recognized globally. Above all, it requires collective efforts by all stakeholders in South Korea, whether they be the government, the National Assembly, businesses, civil society or academia, to define its diplomatic priorities carefully and implement them consistently while contributing to the global development agenda. Its success will eventually hinge on whether and how much the South Korean people and government are collectively willing and ready to turn their geopolitical challenges into diplomatic opportunities. Together we may succeed, but divided we will perish.

Kim Won-soo (wsk4321@gmail.com) is the former under-secretary-general of the United Nations and a high representative for disarmament. He is a chair professor at Kyung Hee University.

The Korea Times · July 5, 2023

12. Military Manpower commissioner against conscripting women, military exemption for BTS

Military Manpower commissioner against conscripting women, military exemption for BTS

koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · July 5, 2023

The head of South Korea's Military Manpower Agency on Wednesday said he opposes the idea of expanding military conscription to female citizens and extending the mandatory military service period for eligible male citizens as potential solutions to address manpower shortages within the military.

"It seems impractical to extend the shortened period of military service. In my opinion, it's impossible," said Lee Ki-sik, the commissioner of the Military Manpower Administration, during a press conference held in Seoul.

In 2003, the military service period was reduced from 26 to 24 months as a measure to alleviate the burden of conscription. Since 2018, there has been a further reduction, with the service period now standing at 18 months.

Lee also emphasized that it is "premature to push for female conscription" and expressed concerns about initiating a discussion on the issue. He explained that having such a discussion "at a time when the population is declining could only fuel social conflict" between men and women.

In South Korea, all able-bodied male citizens are required by law to serve in the military for at least 18 months between ages 18 and 35. Female citizens are exempt from mandatory conscription.

Lee assessed that the initial phase of the decline in military human resources has already been completed and that the current level of military manpower will be sustained until the mid-2030s.

During the period, the South Korean military should rather prioritize enhancing automation levels as a means to address the impending demographic challenges.

Speaking at the news conference, Lee also said that the office aims to decrease the number of exemptions from military conscription and alternative service systems.

There is currently an exemption and alternative service system in place for athletes and artists who have been recognized for promoting national prestige through achievements such as winning designated international awards or national contests.

When asked about granting military exemptions to BTS, Lee emphasized the importance of fairness and stated that the BTS members should fulfill their military services.

"There is indeed a debate regarding whether BTS members should be exempt from military service based on national interest," Lee said. "However, my view is that the principle of fairness should be given priority over national interest when it comes to fulfilling the obligation of military service."

Lee emphasized that allowing BTS members to evade military duty would set a negative precedent.

"I believe that BTS should fulfill their military duty," Lee said. "This is not merely my personal opinion but rather a reflection of the existing regulations outlined in the Military Service Act."

By Ji Da-gyum (dagyumji@heraldcorp.com)

koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · July 5, 2023

13. Most kimchi from China contains aspartame

Most kimchi from China contains aspartame

koreaherald.com · by Kim So-hyun · July 5, 2023

Of the 1,737 batches of kimchi imports from China to South Korea made last month, 88 percent, or 1,525, contained aspartame, a common artificial sweetener that is likely to be declared by the World Health Organization as a possible carcinogen.

The declaration would put aspartame on the third-highest of the WHO's four categories for cancer causes, behind carcinogenic and probably carcinogenic and means there is limited evidence it causes cancer. Aloe vera, mobile phones and carpentry are also in this category.

Traditional pickled vegetables such as kimchi are also in this category, but the use of aspartame and its classification as a possible additional risk -- albeit at much higher amounts than are present in kimchi -- is still likely to unnerve consumers.

According to the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety, some 22,632 metric tons of Chinese-made kimchi worth nearly $12.63 million were imported into South Korea last month.

Local kimchi producers such as Daesang Jongga, CJ Bibigo and Pulmuone use plum extracts and sugar to sweeten their kimchi.

Industry sources said that the reason so many kimchi producers in China use aspartame instead of sugar or corn syrup is to keep the kimchi from losing its crunchiness or ripening too fast on its way from the factory in China to Korean customers.

A cancer research arm of the WHO is expected to list aspartame, used in diet sodas and other food and drink products as “possibly carcinogenic to humans” this month for the first time, Reuters reported last week.

The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) assesses whether something is a potential hazard or not, and a separate WHO expert committee on food additives, called JECFA (the Joint WHO and Food and Agriculture Organization’s Expert Committee on Food Additives), advises on how much of a product a person can safely consume.

JECFA, whose views are widely shared by national regulators, is scheduled to announce its findings on aspartame use on July 14, according to news reports.

Since 1981, JECFA has said aspartame is safe to consume within accepted daily limits – an adult weighing 60 kilograms would have to drink between 12 and 36 cans of diet soda, depending on the amount of aspartame in the beverage, every day to be at risk.

The news that aspartame will be listed as “possibly carcinogenic” has food and beverage companies on alert, with the local makgeolli sales already taking a hit after news reports that much of the traditional Korean rice wine contain aspartame.

And according to the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety, an adult weighing 60 kilograms would have to drink 33 bottles of makgeolli to reach the maximum acceptable daily amount of aspartame. That's the alcoholic equivalent of about five bottles of whiskey.

Alcohol is included in the WHO's top category of cancer risk, as a confirmed carcinogen.

By Kim So-hyun (sophie@heraldcorp.com)

koreaherald.com · by Kim So-hyun · July 5, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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