​Quotes of the Day:

Being constantly offended does not mean you are right. It simply means you are too narcissistic and simple minded to tolerate opinions different from your own narrow view.

- Unknown

“Truth is not as straightforward as it seems. There are different ways to speak the truth, not all of them honest. On most issues, there are multiple truths we can choose to communicate. Our choice of truth will influence how those around us perceive an issue and react to it. We can select truths that engage people and inspire action, or we can deploy truths that deliberately mislead. Truth comes in many forms, and experienced communicators can exploit its very ability to shape our impression of reality.” 

- H. McDonald

“The masses have never thirsted after truth. They turn aside from evidence that is not to their taste, preferring to deify error. Whoever can supply them with illusions is easily their master; Whoever attempts to destroy their illusions is always their victim.”

 - Gustave Le Bon

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 9 (Putin's War)

2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (09.10.22) CDS comments on key events

3. SOF News Update - Monday, October 10, 2022

4. Law and the killing of a Russian propagandist: Some Q & A

5. Kremlin, shifting blame for war failures, axes military commanders

​6. Green Beret unit dedicates building to soldier killed in Niger ambush

7. Kyiv, other cities hit as Putin orders 'harsh response' to Crimea bridge attack

8. Taiwan says war with China 'absolutely' not an option, but bolstering defences

9. No Surprise That OPEC-Plus Sides With Russia Over Biden In Oil Market

10. 8 years of combat hardened Ukraine’s army into a fighting force

11. If Putin loses the war, what happens to the rest of the world?

12. 'Everyone's Drunk. No Uniforms. No Food.' Inside The Confusion Greeting Some Of Russia's Newly Mobilized Troops

13. The U.N. Abandons the Uyghurs

14. The World According to Xi Jinping

15. Will Putin's War in Ukraine Continue Without Him?

16. More than half of Ukraine's tank fleet now reportedly consists of captured Russian armor

17. Firepower & people: Army Chief on keys to future war (EXCLUSIVE)

18. US, China already gunning for 6G military supremacy

19. Taiwan stirs allies’ fear of entrapment in Asia

20. Opinion | The U.S. Has Leverage Over Saudi Arabia. It’s Time to Use It.

21. The War in Ukraine Launches a New Battle for the Russian Soul

22. Team Putin Wakes Up: We Never Should’ve Laughed at Ukraine

23. US Army adopts new multidomain operations doctrine

24. Retribution and Regime Change - The consequences of Putin's weakness

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 9 (Putin's War) 

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9

Key inflection in ongoing military operations on October 9:

• Ukrainian forces continued to advance east of the Oskil Rver in the direction of Luhansk Oblast and have entered Stel’makhivka (about 18km west of Svatove).[27] Russian forces launched unsuccessful assaults on Burdaka on the Kharkiv Oblast-Russian border, and Terny northeast of Lyman.[28]
• Russian sources reported that Russian forces attempted to attack in the direction of Ternovi Pody (approximately 30km northwest of Kherson City)[29] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces continued to target newly liberated settlements in northern Kherson Oblast with artillery, MLRS, and aviation.[30]
• Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces repelled over 30 attacks in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka areas.[31] Russian forces launched an unsuccessful assault southwest of Donetsk City.[32]
• Russian forces targeted residential areas of Zaporizhzhia City with cruise missiles.[33]
• A Russian milblogger accused North Ossetia and Vladikavkaz of failing to fulfill mobilization orders due to carelessness and the personal interests of regional officials.[34]
• Ukrainian sources reported that Russian occupation authorities are moving their families from Kherson Oblast to Crimea, and from Starobilsk to Luhansk City.[35]

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 9

Oct 9, 2022 - Press ISW

understandingwar.org

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 9

Special Edition on Russian Domestic Responses to the Kerch Strait Bridge Explosion

Kateryna Stepanenko and Frederick W. Kagan

October 9, 9:35 ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

This campaign assessment special edition focuses on Russian domestic responses to the Kerch Strait Bridge explosion on October 9 and changes within the Russian chain of command. Ukrainian forces continued to make advances towards Svatove-Kreminna highway on October 9. Those developments are summarized briefly and will be covered in more detail tomorrow.

The attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge, coupled with recent Russian military failures and partial mobilization, is generating direct criticism of Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin from the Russian pro-war nationalist community. Some milbloggers, who represent and speak to that community on Telegram, criticized Putin’s and the Kremlin’s failure to address major events forthrightly, noting that it is challenging to rally behind Putin when his government relies on secrecy.[1] Others noted that Putin has consistently failed to address incidents such as the sinking of the cruiser Moskva or the prisoner exchange of Azovstal fighters whom the Kremlin had consistently demonized since the Battle of Mariupol.[2] Some milbloggers said that Putin must retaliate for the explosion on the Kerch Strait Bridge lest his silence be perceived as ”weakness.”[3] Milbloggers who did not criticize Putin instead criticized Russian Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev’s silence following the explosion after he had made several public claims that an attack on the Crimean Bridge was a Russian “red line.”[4] Direct criticism of Putin from this community is almost unprecedented. Milbloggers and other nationalist figures continue to express overwhelming support for Putin’s goals in Ukraine and have hitherto blamed failures and setbacks on the Russian military command or the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

These critiques from the pro-war camp may indicate rising doubts about Putin’s ability to deliver on his promised goal of “denazifying” Ukraine and may undermine Putin’s appeal within his core constituency. Putin’s stated objectives for the invasion he launched on February 24 deeply resonated with the nationalist community, which firmly subscribes to the ideology of Russia’s historic and cultural superiority and right to control over the territories of the former Soviet Union and the Russian Empire. Recent military failures have caused some milbloggers to become concerned about Putin’s commitment to that ideology, however, with some milbloggers even accusing him of failing to uphold the ideology even prior to the full-scale invasion in February 2022. One milblogger noted on October 7 his disgust with the Russian political elite, including Putin, for consistently failing to seize Ukraine after the Euromaidan Revolution in 2014 and for conducting an “ugly special military operation” that only further united Ukrainians and the West against Russia.[5]

Milbloggers’ dissatisfaction with Putin’s inability to enforce his own “red lines” is rooted in his failure to properly establish information conditions prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Putin had defined red lines as NATO expansion and the delivery of strategic weapons systems including nuclear-capable systems to Ukraine prior to the invasion but he has not publicly adjusted these “red lines” since the invasion began.[6] Milbloggers have thus latched onto Medvedev’s declared “red lines,” which Putin has not publicly affirmed let alone enforced--facts that have only further disappointed them. The Kremlin has left room for confusion regarding its own vision for the war from the outset, a fact that may threaten its continuing support among people for whom the most extreme and grandiose objectives resonate.

Other Russian nationalists, propagandists, and proxy officials are blaming security services and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), a phenomenon that can undermine Putin’s regime in the long term. Komsomolkaya Pravda journalist and Russian reserve Colonel Viktor Baranets put responsibility for the explosion on the Kerch Strait Bridge on Russian security services, whom he called “traitors.”[7] Baranets’ statements prompted a wave of criticism from milbloggers, with some even accusing him of advocating for censorship among milbloggers and being affiliated with foreign agents.[8] Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov openly accused the Russian MoD of only releasing useless statements instead of actually regaining the initiative on the battlefield.[9] The Kremlin may be doubling down on the known milblogger distaste for the Russian MoD to use its military leadership as a scapegoat for its military failures.

The perception of the trajectory of the war and of Ukrainian capabilities is changing as well, and Russians are undergoing a rude awakening. Russian sources have recognized that the Ukrainian southern counter-offensive poses a significant threat to Russian forces across southern Ukraine.[10] This recognition is a significant deviation from the previous narrative presented by propagandists, milbloggers, and the Russian MoD for months that Ukrainian counter-offensives in Kherson Oblast were impossible or had failed.[11] Russian sources are shifting their alibis to claim that Ukrainians would not be successful without NATO’s direct involvement, advancing the narrative that Russia is fighting against the powerful Western bloc rather than lowly Ukraine.[12] It is unclear how such excuses are affecting domestic audiences from the information available in open source, but sudden departures from months-long declarations of Ukraine’s inability to advance in the south may prompt some concern among the Russian public that is already preoccupied with mobilization fears.

Russian voices within the information space demand that the Russian military retaliate for the Kerch Strait Bridge explosion by regaining the initiative on the battlefield and resuming the missile campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure. Solovyov cited Vladimir Lenin’s statement that “war must be waged for real or it must not be waged at all” and called for a massive campaign of strikes on Ukrainian critical infrastructure.[13] Milbloggers and proxy officials echoed Solovyov‘s statements, noting their fears of a repeated attack on the Crimean Bridge.[14]

It is becoming more evident that Russian voices in the information space are increasingly aware that the war is not going well, attacking the Kremlin’s strategy of silence and calling for Putin’s public involvement in the war. One milblogger even noted that this is the time for “radical, rapid, and urgent change” in Russia.[15] It is unclear if Putin will be able to fully satisfy these demands for change. Putin may attempt to address or deflect these critiques during his meeting with the Russian Security Council scheduled for October 10.[16] The framing within the information space of an urgent need for change within the Kremlin may pose threats to Putin when he is unable to make the changes necessary to alter the trajectory of the war in a meaningful way.

Putin is continuing to shuffle his senior military commanders, likely to deflect blame from himself and to regenerate enthusiasm in the extremist pro-war community. The Kremlin announced that Army General Sergei Surovikin has assumed command of the entire “special military operation,” as Putin refers to his ongoing invasion of Ukraine, on October 8.[17] The Russian pro-war, nationalist community cheered this announcement. A Telegram channel affiliated with the Wagner Group private military company controlled by Yevgeniy Prigozhin speculated that more changes would follow. The channel claimed that the Kremlin was also planning to replace Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valeriy Gerasimov in the coming week as a result of the Kerch Bridge incident.[18] It added, offering no evidence, that Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin would replace Shoigu and that Deputy Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant General Alexander Matovnikov would replace Gerasimov.

The Russian pro-war nationalist community greeted Surovikin’s appointment with irrational enthusiasm. Some milbloggers appeared to see Surovikin’s elevation as evidence that Putin was finally creating a unified headquarters to control the entire military operation and that Surovikin might have more power even than the Chief of the Russian General Staff.[19] These comments portray Surovikin’s appointment as a continuation of what they see as Putin’s loss of confidence in the Russian MoD and General Staff and turn toward the more total and brutal style of command and war they prefer. These reactions are odd considering that Surovikin is a conventional Russian general officer who has reportedly been commanding Russian operations in southern Ukraine since July.[20] He has hardly covered himself with glory in that role, as Russian forces there gained no meaningful ground and, in fact, suffered major losses in western Kherson under his command.

The pro-war community is relying on a belief that Surovikin’s reputed “toughness” will suffice to change the trajectory of the war. One milblogger praised Surovikin as a leader who takes decisive action—"heads can fly off shoulders instantly” in his command, and he “does not stand on ceremony with stupid commanders.”[21] Other milbloggers also praised Surovikin’s toughness.[22] The notion that Surovikin is “tougher” than his predecessor, Army General Alexander Dvornikov, or any of the other senior Russian commanders is bizarre. Dvornikov, like Surovikin and all the other Russian military district commanders, served in senior roles in Syria where they fought with extreme brutality. Dvornikov became known as “the butcher of Syria” for the viciousness with which Russian forces under his command waged war.[23] Milbloggers had also celebrated Dvornikov’s reported appointment as the commander of Russian troops in Ukraine in a similar manner, a fact they appear to have forgotten.[24] Any restraints on the brutality with which Russian troops have fought in Ukraine have resulted either from Putin’s decisions or inherent limitations in Russian capabilities—not from any tenderness on the part of Russian generals previously in command.

The “toughness” the pro-war community so loves, moreover, is a Soviet-era personality trait resulting from the brutalization of Soviet citizens and especially military personnel. It engenders fear in subordinates of the sort that inhibits honest reporting of problems or failures, encourages lying and blame-deflection, and produces the kind of robotic approach to executing orders that has contributed to Russian failures in Ukraine thus far. If Surovikin is indeed an even more toxic leader than his predecessors, he will only make Russia’s military problems more acute.

Prigozhin gave interviews that appear to confirm Western and Russian insider reports of fragmentation of the Kremlin and potential purges. Prigozhin offered a paean to Surovikin in his response to the announcement.[25] He recalled that Surovikin had jumped in his tank and “rushed to save his country” during the August Coup in 1991. That coup occurred when a group of hardliners sought to seize power from Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and stop him from taking the next step in breaking up the Soviet Union. Protestors took to the streets in Moscow in support of Gorbachev and his policies, and Surovikin sought to suppress them. Units under his command at the time killed three civilians.[26] Prigozhin noted that Surovikin had been right in 1991 in his efforts to preserve the Soviet Union and that Prigozhin himself had been on the wrong side along with others deluded by the promises of the West. Prigozhin added that many who had also been deluded have failed to see the light as he has done, noting darkly that those who destroyed the Soviet Union are still alive and well in Russia today.

Putin cannot do the one thing his hardline constituency demands—win the war. Shuffling senior commanders will not fix the systemic problems that have hamstrung Russian operations, logistics, defense industry, and mobilization from the outset of the invasion. Scapegoats can deflect criticism from Putin only for a time, and the appearance of direct criticism of Putin’s leadership among his most devoted hardline constituency is likely a harbinger of future dissatisfaction in that quarter.

Escalation, either conventional or nuclear, cannot solve Putin’s problems. If Russian forces are able to expand their attacks against Ukrainian population centers or critical infrastructure, or if Putin is willing to use tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine, he can only hope thereby to stop the Ukrainian counter-offensives for a time. Such attacks will not allow his forces to conquer Ukraine and achieve the objectives that extreme pro-war Russian nationalists demand. They may well trigger Western responses that Russian hardliners would see as validating their arguments—but at the cost of devastating Russia’s remaining military power and ability to achieve anything of real value. What could happen if Putin loses the support of the constituency most committed to his vision? It is hard to say.

Key inflection in ongoing military operations on October 9:

• Ukrainian forces continued to advance east of the Oskil Rver in the direction of Luhansk Oblast and have entered Stel’makhivka (about 18km west of Svatove).[27] Russian forces launched unsuccessful assaults on Burdaka on the Kharkiv Oblast-Russian border, and Terny northeast of Lyman.[28]
• Russian sources reported that Russian forces attempted to attack in the direction of Ternovi Pody (approximately 30km northwest of Kherson City)[29] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces continued to target newly liberated settlements in northern Kherson Oblast with artillery, MLRS, and aviation.[30]
• Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces repelled over 30 attacks in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka areas.[31] Russian forces launched an unsuccessful assault southwest of Donetsk City.[32]
• Russian forces targeted residential areas of Zaporizhzhia City with cruise missiles.[33]
• A Russian milblogger accused North Ossetia and Vladikavkaz of failing to fulfill mobilization orders due to carelessness and the personal interests of regional officials.[34]
• Ukrainian sources reported that Russian occupation authorities are moving their families from Kherson Oblast to Crimea, and from Starobilsk to Luhansk City.[35]

[23] Who is Russia's 'butcher of Syria,' now leading the invasion of Ukraine? : NPR

[26] Russian General Officer Guide ISW May 11 2022.pdf (understandingwar.org)

understandingwar.org

2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (09.10.22) CDS comments on key events

CDS Daily brief (09.10.22) CDS comments on key events

As of the morning of October 9, 2022, more than 1,219 Ukrainian children are victims of full-scale armed aggression by the Russian Federation, Prosecutor General's Office reports. According to the official information of juvenile prosecutors, 421 children died, and more than 798 were injured. However, the data is not conclusive since data collection continues in the areas of active hostilities, temporarily occupied areas, and liberated territories.

The Russian military fired S300 missiles at two residential areas of Zaporizhzhia at around 2 a.m. on October 9. The missiles were fired from the temporarily occupied territories, the towns of Melitopol and Berdyansk. In addition, four Kh-22 cruise missiles (from the Tu-22M3) and two Kh- 59 guided air missiles (from the Su-35) were launched. About 20 private houses and about 50 high-rise buildings were damaged. A 9-story high-rise apartment building was severely damaged, and almost an entire section of the building collapsed. Some low-rise private buildings were destroyed completely. As of 18:00, Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration (OMA) reported that 13 people, including one child, were killed, and 89, including 11 children, were injured. The information on victims is constantly updated. The previous devastating strike on Zaporizhzhya occurred on the night of October 6. Rescue workers completed cleaning up the rubble from the October 6 attack on the evening of October 9. They reported that 20 people, including one child, died in the attack.

Today at noon, in Myropilla, Sumy Oblast, the Russian military dropped a grenade from a drone in the very center of the village, in the recreation area near the store, head of Sumy OMA, Dmytro Zhivytskyi, reports. The store's employee, a 41-year-old woman, was injured and died due to massive bleeding from shrapnel wounds. At the time of the attack, many people were near the store, and when the woman was rescued, the Russians dropped another grenade from the drone. Miraculously, no one was injured in the second explosion.

Kamikaze drones were also spotted over at least two central Ukrainian oblasts, namely Poltava and Dnipropetrovsk, local authorities reported. In Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast, several drones were shot down.

In the recently liberated Lyman in Donetsk Oblast, the first 20 bodies were exhumed at the site of a mass civilian burial. It's estimated that about 200 people were buried there, including children. Excavations of another mass grave — a mass grave of Ukrainian soldiers — are also underway, Donetsk Oblast police said.

Eight regions of Ukraine, including the liberated territories of Kherson Oblast, came under Russian attacks on October 8. The information was made public at the morning oblast military administration round-up of 9:00 a.m. Sunday, October 9. A resident of the village of Moschenka, Chernihiv Oblast, died from an MLRS strike. Generally, 20 civilians were killed, and another 68 were injured on October 8 due to Russian aggression in Ukraine, the deputy head of the Office

of the President, Kyrylo Tymoshenko, said referring to the data of the Oblast military administrations.

Associated Press reports on the massive assault on the Ukrainian cultural values committed by the invading Russian troops. Russian soldiers looted artifacts in almost 40 Ukrainian museums, Ukraine's Minister of Culture told the agency. One of the most valuable artifacts now gone is the golden tiara, inlaid with precious stones some 1,500 years ago during the rule of Attila the Hun. Russian troops carted away the priceless crown and a hoard of other treasures after capturing the Ukrainian city of Melitopol in February. Additionally, over 2,000 exhibits were stolen from Mariupol museums. Among them are ancient religious icons, a unique handwritten Torah scroll, a 200-year-old Bible and more than 200 medals.

Occupied territories

On October 7, around 8 a.m., the Russian military fired at a convoy of civilian cars from an unidentified aircraft. People were standing in line for a pontoon crossing to the left bank of the Dnipro River near the Daryivski bridge in Kherson Oblast, Andrii Kovany, press officer of the Kherson Oblast police, informed. Eyewitnesses reported the sound of a plane in the air, which fired shells during a U-turn. It hit a minibus, where at least five people died, and the same number were injured. The police have launched a criminal investigation into the Russian military's violations of the laws and customs of war.

Automobile traffic across the Kerch Strait is experiencing significant difficulties on both sides of the bridge. According to eyewitnesses, only one lane is functional, and preference is given to cargo carriers. The head of the Crimean occupation authorities, Serhiy Aksynov, had promised, however, that passenger cars would enjoy priority. People have to wait in line to get onto the bridge for hours, Ukrinform reports. Lines are reported in the Kavkaz port as well. About 200 cars are waiting for a ferry crossing. According to Russian media reports, some drivers spent the whole night in line.

Operational situation

It is the 228th day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to protect Donbas"). The enemy tries to maintain control over the temporarily captured territories and concentrates its efforts on disrupting the counteroffensive actions of the Ukrainian troops in certain directions. Thus, almost forty combat clashes took place during the day. The tensest situation was in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka directions, where the Ukrainian defenders repelled more than 30 Russian attacks. The Russian military shells the positions of the Ukrainian troops along the entire contact line, carries out defense fortification in certain directions, and conducts aerial reconnaissance with UAVs.

The Russian forces continue to violate the norms of international humanitarian law, the laws and customs of war. Over the past day, the Russian military launched 3 missile strikes and 26 air strikes and carried out more than 75 MLRS attacks. At night, the Russian occupiers cynically struck Zaporizhzhia's residential buildings and civilian infrastructure.

In addition, more than thirty Ukrainian towns and villages were shelled, particularly Kharkiv, Chasiv Yar, Popivka, Hrabovske, Makiivka, Spirne, Bilohorivka, Ivanhrad, Opytne, Klyshchiivka, Novomykhailivka, Vuhledar, Nikopol, Urozhaine, and Davydiv Brid. Near the state border, Lypivka and Mykolaivka of Chernihiv Oblast, Lisne and Ryasne of Sumy Oblast, Chervona Zorya, Veterynarne, Strelecha, Krasne, Ogirtseve, Hlyboke, Zelene, Starytsa, Ternova and Chuhunivka of Kharkiv Oblast were shelled.

The threat of Russian air and missile strikes persists throughout the entire territory of Ukraine.

The aviation of the Ukrainian Defense Forces made over 30 strikes, in particular, 24 on manpower, weapons and military equipment concentration areas and 9 on the Russian anti- aircraft missile systems. Ukrainian air defense units shot down 5 UAVs.

Over the past day, Ukrainian missile forces and artillery hit 2 enemy command posts, 9 areas of manpower, weapons and military equipment concentration, three ammunition depots, and eleven other important objects.

The Kremlin allegedly replaced Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov with Tula Governor Oleksiy Dyumin and Deputy Commander-in- Chief of the Ground Forces Lieutenant General Oleksandr Matovnikov.

The morale and psychological state of the personnel of the invasion forces remain low. Kharkiv direction

• Zolochiv-Balakleya section: approximate length of combat line - 147 km, number of BTGs of the

RF Armed Forces - 10-12, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 13.3 km;

• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd, and 197th tank regiments, 245th motorized rifle regiment of the 47th tank division, 6th and 239th tank regiments, 228th motorized rifle regiment of the 90th tank division, 1st motorized rifle regiment, 1st tank regiment of the 2nd motorized rifle division, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 6th Combined Arms Army, 27th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Tank Army, 275th and 280th motorized rifle regiments, 11th tank regiment of the 18th motorized rifle division of the 11 Army Corps, 7th motorized rifle regiment of the 11th Army Corps, 80th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th Army Corps, 2nd and 45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 1st Army Corps of so-called DPR, PMCs.

Ukrainian troops continued their counteroffensive from Kharkiv Oblast in the direction of Svatove.

Russian troops repelled Ukrainian attacks southeast of Kupyansk, continued shelling Kupyansk and nearby villages and carried out artillery, air, and missile strikes at Kharkiv, Bogodukhiv, and near Izyum.

Collaborators [of Russian occupiers] began to be evacuated from Starobilsk to Luhansk.

Kramatorsk direction

● Balakleya - Siversk section: approximate length of the combat line - 184 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17-20, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;

● 252nd and 752nd motorized rifle regiments of the 3rd motorized rifle division, 1st, 13th, and 12th tank regiments, 423rd motorized rifle regiment of the 4th tank division, 201st military base, 15th, 21st, 30th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Combined Arms Army, 35th, 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 3rd and 14th separate SOF brigades, 2nd and 4th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Army Corps, 7th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Army Corps, PMCs.

The enemy used different types of artillery at the Ukrainian Defence Forces' positions in Pershotravneve, Novoyehorivka, Makiivka, Nove, Terny, Serebryanka, Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka.

Donetsk direction

● Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 235 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 17 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th tank regiment of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th, and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet," 336th separate marines brigade, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The Russian military shelled the areas around Verkhnokamianske, Yakovlivka, Bakhmutske, Bakhmut, Ivanhrad, Zaitseve, Vershyna, Zelenopillia, Opytne, Pervomaiske, Vodyane, Krasnohorivka, Maryinka, Novomykhailivka, and Pobeda.

Over the past day, units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled Russian attacks in the areas of Terny, Soledar, Bakhmutske, Bakhmut, Ivanhrad, Pervomaisk, Opytne, Nevelske and Pobeda. They struck railway stations in the Russian rear in Donetsk Oblast, namely Ilovaisk, damaging three diesel fuel tanks and the technical part of the station, and Karan in Andriivka, damaging the enemy ammunition storage area.

Zaporizhzhia direction

● Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 29th Combined Arms Army, 38th and 64th separate motorized rifle brigades, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37 separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined

Arms Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 136th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps, 39th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 68th Army Corps, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, and 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The Russian shelling damaged the infrastructure of more than twenty-five towns and villages, including Solodke, Zelene Pole, Novosilka, and Vuhledar. Russian troops continued to carry out artillery, air and missile strikes west of Hulyaipole, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and attacked Zaporizhzhia with Shahed-136 kamikaze drones, which were shot down. The Russian military conducted artillery fire and attacked the infrastructure in Nikopol and Marhanets, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast with a UAV.

Ukrainian forces shelled Russian personnel and equipment concentrations in the areas of Polohy and Tokmak. As a result, Russian forces suffered losses, at least 85 servicemen were killed, and more than twenty Russian soldiers were taken to a local hospital in Tokmak.

In the Melitopol district, under the guise of searching and fighting partisans, the [Russian] occupying forces search and steal private cars from the local garage cooperatives.

Tavriysk direction

-   Vasylivka – Stanislav section: approximate length of the battle line – 296 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 42, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 7 km;

-  Deployed BTGs: 114th, 143rd, and 394th motorized rifle regiments, 218th tank regiment of the 127th motorized rifle division, 57th and 60th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 37th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 429th motorized rifle regiment of the 19th motorized rifle division, 33rd and 255th motorized rifle regiments of the 20th motorized rifle division, 34th and 205th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division, 10th, 16th, 346th separate SOF brigades, 239th air assault regiment of the 76th Air assault division, 217th and 331st parachute airborne regiments of the 98th airborne division, 108 air assault regiment, 171st separate airborne assault battalion of the 7th Air assault division, 11th and 83rd separate airborne assault brigade, 4th military base of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 7 military base 49 Combined Arms Army, 224th, 237th and 126th separate coastal defence brigades, 127th separate ranger brigade, 1st and 3rd Army Corps, PMCs.

More than 45 towns and villages near the contact line were shelled by enemy tanks, mortars, barrel and rocket artillery, including Sukhy Stavok, Kvitneve, Myrne, Zorya and Ternovi Pody. The Russian forces attacked Mykolaiv, Ochakiv and several districts in Odesa Oblast with Shahed-136 kamikaze drones, but Ukrainian forces successfully shot them down.

Ukrainian troops struck three Russian manpower and equipment concentrations and a logistical point in the Beryslav district, Ukrainian aviation struck Russian anti-aircraft complexes in the Beryslav and Kakhovka districts, and hit five enemy fuel depots near Kiselyvka, Bilozerka district.

The Ukrainian Defense Forces continue to concentrate along the front line in the area of Davydiv Brid and Mala Oleksandrivka, equipping strongholds in Bezimenna. Fighting continues north and northwest of Kherson, near the Ukrainian bridgehead across the Inhulets River and northeast of Beryslav. The Ukrainian Defense forces repelled a Russian attack near Ternovi Pody.

Russian troops unsuccessfully tried to advance in the area of Davydiv Brid and Mala Oleksandrivka.

Russian troops repelled Ukrainian attempts to advance in the areas of Sukhanove, Pyatykhatky, Sadky, Ishchenko, Bruskynske, Shchaslyve, and Mala Semynykha in the north of Kherson Oblast and near Dudchany on the west bank of the Dnieper. They hold positions in Snihurivka; combat continues on the outskirts of the town.

The Russian military and their proxies are fleeing, frightened by the success of the Ukrainian Defense Forces. Representatives of the occupying authorities of Nova Kakhovka are taking their families to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. According to available information, on October 7, a convoy of 12 minivans left for the city of Sevastopol.

Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:

The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine and control the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the Black Sea and to maintain control over the captured territories.

On October 9, thirteen enemy warships and boats were on a mission in the Black Sea, conducting reconnaissance and controlling navigation in the Black Sea waters. There are 24 Kalibr missiles ready for a volley on four carriers: two surface and two underwater (one frigate 1135.6, one "Buyan-M" missile corvette and two submarines of project 636.3). In general, the current activity of the maritime groups of the Russian Federation is characterized by low intensity. The rocket threat to [the territory of] Ukraine remains high.

The Russian military continues shelling Ukrainian ports and coastal areas. On the night of October 9, the Russian forces attacked Odesa and Mykolayiv with "Shahid 136" and other kamikaze drones. At least 7 "Shahed-136" UAVs have been launched from Kherson Oblast towards the cities of Mykolaiv and Nikopol. Most of them were shot down by air defense.

In the military aviation domain, the enemy continues to use attack aircraft from the military airfields of "Novofedorivka", "Dzhankoy", "Belbek" and "Gvardiyskyi" for the bombing on the border of the Mykolaiv and Kherson Oblasts.

Due to the Kerch Strait bridge explosion, plane movement intensified, bringing officials and specialized units to investigate and eliminate the consequences of the "incident". Another batch of Chechen special forces arrived from the military airfield "Grozny" (Chechnya) to the military airfield "Belbek" on a Tu134AK passenger plane (registration number RA-65911). Servicemen from the Northern Fleet were delivered by the Il-62M passenger plane (registration number RA- 86495). Another batch of "Rosgvardiya" forces was delivered from the central part of Russia by Il-76MD military transport aircraft (registration number RA-86495). A Tu-154M passenger plane (registration number RA-85155) from the 224th Special Air Force Squadron of the Russian Air Force arrived from the Chkalov airfield near Moscow, carrying Vice Prime Minister Marat Khusnulin and other officials. Minister of Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation Aleksandr Kurenkov and other officials arrived on the Sukhoi-Superjet-100-95B passenger plane (registration number RA-89066).

The movement of military equipment by road and rail transport from the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea in the direction of Kherson Oblast remains consistently intensive. Railway freight trains arrive in the territory of Kherson Oblast from the Crimean direction, unloading military equipment and ammunition at the "Kalanchak", "Brylivka", and "Novooleksiiivka" stations.

"Grain Initiative": 13 ships with 230.7 thousand tons of agricultural products left for the countries of Africa, Asia and Europe from the ports of "Odesa", "Pivdenny", and "Chornomorsk". Among them are bulk carriers ARGONAUT, carrying 71 thousand tons of wheat for Indonesia, ALI A (7 thousand tons of wheat for Lebanon) and MEHMET BEY (8 thousand tons of soybeans for Egypt). Since the launch of the "grain corridor", 305 vessels have exported 6.8 million tons of Ukrainian food to the countries of Asia, Europe and Africa.

Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 09.10

Personnel - almost 62,500 people (+440);

Tanks 2,486 (+14);

Armored combat vehicles – 5,133 (+22);

Artillery systems – 1,477 (+18);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 348 (+3); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 180 (0); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 3,890 (+15); Aircraft - 266 (0);

Helicopters – 235 (+1);

UAV operational and tactical level – 1,086 (+7); Intercepted cruise missiles - 247 (+1);

Boats / ships - 15 (0).

Ukraine, general news

According to Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal, in next year's budget, 45% of all funds will be allocated for the army and security of the country. Another 30% would be spent on pensions,

social programs, education and medicine. On the other hand, expenditures on the government apparatus are being reduced due to the revision of the state functions. In particular, this week, the government transferred more than 800 companies with assets worth UAH 45 billion to the State Property Fund. The purpose of this decision is to reduce the state's share in the economy and remove ministries from managing companies, Shmyhal said.

International diplomatic aspect

"We don't really have anything more to add to the reports about the explosion on the [Crimea] bridge," White House national security spokesman John Kirby said. He thinks that both sides needed to find a way to negotiate an end to the war. Yet Putin had shown no interest and, "quite the contrary," by mobilizing hundreds of thousand for his war effort and illegally annexing territories, he has demonstrated his intention to carry on his aggressive war. That's why the US "are in touch almost daily with the Ukrainians and are going to continue to provide them security assistance."

The bridge over the Kerch Strait [suffered a low yesterday] is a symbol of the so-called Crimean consensus (the total support of any of Putin's actions at the expense of remaining rights and freedoms), fulfillment of Vladimir Putin's promise to restore Russia's "greatness," and a sort of his personal totem. The bridge has strategic importance (the railway link for the militarization of the peninsula since 2018), and, with the all-out war in Ukraine, Russia used it to deploy numerous air defense units and equipment to the south of Ukraine and invested heavily into the infrastructure's security. Moscow spent more than $48 million in 2022 to protect the bridge.

The Kremlin said it would retaliate for the humiliating blow. Putin tried to threaten Ukraine with all means he had (alluding to the nuclear ones) if Ukraine hit the newly annexed territories. Instead, the UAF has not stopped the liberation of Ukrainian oblasts, which Russians believe they have "legally" merged. There were explosions in Crimea, including Russia's Black Sea Fleet's HQ and now the bridge, deep into Russia-controlled territory. Therefore, it's one more argument for our partners to provide Ukraine with ATACMS and other long-range capabilities.

"Our understanding is that Mr Putin wants to have a new grand bargain, a new deal with the West. It's partly about Ukraine, no doubt. But the larger issue is really a new deal between Russia and the Western world," a spokesperson for Turkey's President Ibrahim Kalin said. It seems that there is way more goodwill in Ankara to negotiate peace than any appetite in Moscow for talks in good faith. Putin might rather be interested in setting a new status quo and getting an operational pause to replenish his wearied-off invasion forces for a future assault.

At the same time, President Volodymyr Zelensky rules out any negotiations with Vladimir Putin after illegally annexing yet another piece of Ukraine's territory. It's hardly possible to see the POTUS taking part in such negotiations or pushing the Ukrainian President for it.

Besides committing war crimes, Vladimir Putin has lost his remaining credibility, and his words mean nothing. In the meantime, "a new deal with the West" will remain a dream of a lonely tyrant. He tried to blackmail the US and Europe before the invasion. The Kremlin wanted the CEE

part of NATO to be disbanded and the US to "pack their belongings" and get out of the continent. As a small "gift" in this grand scheme, Putin thought to bring Ukraine and some other states into his sphere of influence. Such illusions were not acceptable before the full-fledged invasion. They are even more ridiculous after several humiliating defeats after Russia lost the ability to wage offensive operations and its mounting problems at the war theatre and home.

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3. SOF News Update - Monday, October 10, 2022

SOF News Update - Monday, October 10, 2022 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · October 10, 2022

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo: U.S. Air Force Special Warfare Airmen assigned to the 82nd Expeditionary Rescue Squadron perform static line and military free fall jumps from a KC-130J, flown by Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron-234, (VMGR-234) over Djibouti, June 21, 2021. Special Warfare Airmen maintain jump proficiency to enable rapid personnel recovery, combat search and rescue capabilities, and to rapidly deploy to austere locations to support U.S. and partner forces within the area of responsibility. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Daniel Asselta).

Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it five (almost) days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).

SOF News

Memorial for MG (Ret) Eldon Bargewell. A memorial is planned to honor MG Bargewell in his home town of Hoquiam, Washington. Bargewell earned many honors during his service to the nation – including the Distinguished Service Cross, 6 Bronze Stars (3 with V), and 4 Purple Hearts. He was a recipient of the 2010 Bull Simons Award given by the U.S Special Operations Command. The date for the ceremony and dedication of the memorial park is May 20, 2023 – on Armed Forces Day. General (Ret) Peter Schoomaker and Lt Gen (Ret) Lawson Magruder will be the speakers. SGM (Ret) Mike Vining will hosting a donors only reception. Members of the 2/ 75th will form the honor guard. Learn how to donate to the memorial at the Eldon Bargewell Memorial Group.

AFSOC: From JSOAC to SOTG. Air Force Special Operations Command has, for a long time, had a focus on providing crisis response capabilities and countering violent extremist organizations (C-VEO) utilizing the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC) deployment model. It is now shifting gears to develop the attributes and capability to succeed in the new operational environment – including campaigning in the gray zone, employing SOF-peculiar capabilities, and developing and advancing relations with international partners and allies. This transition is bringing about the Special Operations Task Group (SOTG). “From the ‘AFSOC We Have’ to the ‘AFSOC We Need'”, Air Force Special Operations Command, October 6, 2022.

SF, SFABs, and SPP – SFA Triad. A recent paper published by the Association of the U.S. Army entitled “The Army’s Security Force Assistance Triad: Security Force Assistance Brigades, Special Forces and the State Partnership Program” promotes the concept of the Army’s SFA effort is in leveraging relationships with allies and partners – utilizing an ‘SFA triad’. The 16-page PDF describes the unique contributions of the three components of the Army’s SFA community. “Security Force Triad is Powerful Army Tool”, AUSA, October 16, 2022.

New Dep Cdr for NSWC. Captain Andrew J. Schreiner, selected for promotion to rear admiral (lower half), will be assigned as deputy commander, Naval Special Warfare Command, San Diego, California. Schreiner is currently serving as commanding officer, Navy Reserve, United States Northern Command Headquarters, Fort Carson, Colorado.

AFSOC’s Aircraft. The Air Force Special Operations Command utilizes a variety of aircraft to accomplish its mission. A recent news article provides a description of three of these aircraft: the AC-130 Gunship, the MH-53 Pave Low, and the CV-22 Osprey. “The Aircraft of AFSOC”, by Christian Orr, 1945, October 3, 2022.

SEALs and Tear Gas Training. A video showing Navy SEAL candidates subjected to tear gas found its way to the media. And now there is an investigation into the tear gas training. Seems that the tear gas was ‘administered’ too close to the trainees and for too long of an ‘application’. Read more in “Tear gas video triggers investigation into Navy SEAL selection course”, CBS News, October 4, 2022.

AFSOC’s Mission Sustainment Teams. The Air Force Special Operations Command is trying out some new concepts for support operations overseas. They are forming up cross-functional support teams that can be deployed forward to support deployed AFSOC squadrons and units. “New Air Force special ops teams model future of ‘agile’ air wars”, Air Force Times, October 4, 2022.

Parachuting Into the Arctic. An airborne operation under very cold conditions requires extra preparation and a lot of training. Read more in “Frozen compass, frigid wind – How Green Berets would airdrop into the Arctic in a future war”, Task & Purpose, October 5, 2022.

Bolduc for Senator. Brigadier General (Ret) Don Bolduc, a retired Special Forces officer, is running for Senate in New Hampshire. Kevin Maurer, a journalist for Rolling Stone, has penned an article about Bolduc’s time in Afghanistan and on the campaign trail as he tries to unseat a Democrat Senator. Not quite a favorable piece; although he does write some nice things about Bolduc’s time in Afghanistan. “The Retreat of the MAGA General”, Rolling Stone, October 9, 2022.

SF and New Rifle Scopes. USSOCOM has placed an order with Lightforce USA for new scopes. “New rifle scopes come closer for US special forces”, Shepard Media News, October 6, 2022.

Former 2/75th Ranger Now Hollywood Star. A former member of the Rangers has leveraged his military time to land roles in TV and the movies. “Tim Abell Brings His Experience as an Army Ranger to His Acting Career”, War History Online, October 6, 2022.

Building Named for SFC Jeremiah Johnson. A member of the 3rd Special Forces Group who was killed during an October 2017 enemy attack in Niger has been honored at Fort Bragg with a building dedication. (Fayetteville Observer, Oct 6, 2022).

SOWF and Helping SOF Families. Alex McClintock is the surviving spouse and Declan is the son of U.S. Army Staff Sergeant Matthew McClintock, who lost his life in 2016 serving with the 19th Special Forces Group while deployed to Helmand province, Afghanistan. Alex and Declan have received valuable assistance from the Special Operations Warrior Foundation. Read “Against All Odds”, SOWF, October 6, 2022.

Osprey Recovered. While participating in a training exercise in Norway, a CV-22B Osprey from the 352nd Special Operations Wing experienced an inflight emergency and landed on the island of Senja. It sat there for 6 weeks until a recovery team was able to move it off the island. It is now at a Norwegian military base where maintainers from the 752nd Special Operations Aircraft Maintenance Squadron will perform repairs to get the aircraft flying again. Once repaired, it will fly home to its base in the United Kingdom. “Osprey Recovered in Norway”, DVIDS, October 5, 2022.

International SOF

AUKUS SOF and GPC. In September 2021 the trilateral AUKUS pact was announced – a collaboration of Australia, United Kingdom, and the United States. Dr. David Kilcullen has written an essay that explores the evolution of Australian, British, and American special operations from the War on Terror toward Great Power Competition . . . and examines how AUKUS can help reorient SOF to the new environment. “AUKUS and the Evolution of Special Operations for Great-Power Competition”, Security & Defense Plus, September 2022.

SFA in Niger. This paper provides a detailed analysis on the creation and employment of Niger’s Special Forces Command and security force assistance provided by other nations. “The Impact of Security Force Assistance in Niger: Meddling With Borders”, International Affairs, July, 2022.

Iran’s SF. The Islamic Republic of Iran has several special operations forces. One of these is the elite Quds Force – a unit that is responsible for exporting the regimes agenda into other countries. Learn more in “Quds: How Dangerous Are Iran’s Special Forces?”, by Maya Carlin, 1945, September 21, 2022.

NATO SOF and Airframes. European special operations forces are looking at how to best use their aviation capabilities as they shift focus from CT and COIN to operations against likely opponents in future conflicts. “NATO seeks to optimize SOF airframes to match peer adversaries”, Janes.com, October 7, 2022.

Canadian Military’s New Pistol. After a JTF-2 soldier was shot in the leg while using a Sig Sauer P320 on a training range. The Canadian Special Forces and Department of National Defense conducted an investigation. However, Canadian federal procurement officials have now chosen the Sig Sauer P320 as the pistol to replace their current handguns. “Canadian military’s new handgun was at centre of misfire probe last year”, CBC.CA, October 7, 2022.

SOF History

6th SOS Inactivated. The 6th Special Operations Squadron at Duke Field, Florida is being phased out. The squadron was the home of the Combat Aviation Advisors tasked with conducting Aviation Foreign Internal Defense (AvFID) and Security Force Assistance activities during the past few decades. “Inactivation of 6th Special Operations Squadron transitions a storied legacy”, 492nd Special Operations Wing, October 6, 2022.

Battle of Mogadishu. On the afternoon of 3 October 1993 Task Force Ranger sent 19 aircraft, 12 vehicles, and 160 men to kill or capture two leaders of a renegade Somali warlord’s clan. Read more in “Operation Gothic Serpent”, SOF News, July 18, 2020.

Podcast – Chaplain (MAJ) Jeff Struecker – Rangers, Somalia, and Faith. A retired chaplain and former member of Task Force Ranger recounts his experiences during Gothic Serpent. USSOCOM, YouTube, Oct 5, 2022, one hour.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UL4uCn5F6T8

DoE Commando Force. The Department of Energy had a nuclear commando task force in the 1980s that looked straight out of ‘Counter Strike’. Task & Purpose, September 27, 2022.

EC-130J – Final Broadcast. The airmen from the 193rd Special Operations Wing transmitted their last broadcast on September 17, 2022 at a community air show in Pennsylvania. The EC-130J Commando Solo performed its mission for many decades. “EC-130J Commando Solo performs final broadcast”, Pennsylvania National Guard, September 19, 2022.

50th Reunion of Arctic Rangers. More than 30 veterans from Company O (Arctic Ranger), 75th Infantry Regiment gathered for a reunion at Fort Bragg, N.C. in late September 2022. (DVIDS, Oct 6, 2022).

National Security, Defense, and Commentary

Aviation Advising – Making it Better. Jonathan Magill and Tobias Bernard Switzer collaborated in an article that points out the past successes and failures of the air advising effort in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. The Iraqis and Afghans were provided with aircraft that were too complex to fly and maintain. The U.S. air advisor effort utilized an ineffective ad hoc approach, and strategic policy makers had excessive ambitions that they couldn’t implement. The authors provide four recommendations to increase the capability and effectiveness of air advisors. “How to Improve Your Pickup Aviation Advising Game”, Modern War Institute at West Point, October 4, 2022.

Haiti, Chaos, and Foreign Troops. Gangs and protesters have caused unrest in Haiti. This is compounded by a severe shortage of water, fuel, and basic goods. The U.S. Embassy has warned U.S. citizens to leave due to the current health and security situation. The country’s leaders are considering asking for international intervention with foreign troops. “Haiti’s Leader Requests Foreign Armed Forces to Quell Chaos”, Voice of America, October 7, 2022. See also “US Reviewing Haiti’s Request for International Security Assistance”, Voice of America, October 8, 2022.

Votel Next CTC Distinguished Chair. General (Ret) Joseph Votel will be the next Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point Distinguished Chair. He is the former commander of JSOC, CENTCOM, and USSOCOM. “Combating Terrorism Center Announces New Distinguished Chair”, HSToday, October 4, 2022.

Women and Special Forces. David Walton provides his perspective on the selection and training of women in the SF training pipeline. He reviews the standards of training applied to those attending the Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) course and how they may or may not differ from men. “Are Green Berets Turning Pink? Integrating Women Into Special Forces”, War on the Rocks, September 20, 2022.

China and Influence Operations. The People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party continue to use organizations that operate in the United States to spread their narrative and influence U.S. policymakers. The U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) has issued a warning about these Chinese efforts. Read more in “US Intelligence Warning: China Escalating Influence Operations”, by Judith Bergman, Gatestone Institute, October 7, 2022.

Afghanistan Update. Read curated news and analysis about Afghanistan, the Afghan Evac community, efforts in the Senate and House to pass the Afghanistan Adjustment Act, and more. (Afghan Report, 30 Sep 2022).

ISIS Leaders Killed in Syria. American military forces killed senior leaders (The New York Times, Oct 6, 2022) of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria over the past several days in northern Syria. The first was during a nighttime helicopter raid (The Drive, Oct 6, 2022) conducted by SOF and the second action was a drone strike.

Ukraine

Ukraine Update. The Russians are withdrawing (retreating) in the northeast and in the south in the face of continuous Ukrainian offensive actions. Putin has called up an additional 300,000 Russians to provide more troops to the conflict. Thousands of Russian men have flown out or traveled via land routes to neighboring countries to escape the mobilization. Two arrived by boat in Alaska and have claimed asylum in the U.S. Putin has also once again threatened the use of nuclear weapons. Eight senior Russian generals have been fired since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine – in part for the failure to take Kyiv, topple the Ukrainian government, and the loss of territory on the eastern and southern fronts. The attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge (SOF News, Oct 8, 2022) has embarrassed Russia and the country has accused Ukraine of terrorism (Reuters, Oct 9, 2022). Russia has named a new commander for the war in Ukraine. (NYT, Oct 8, 2022). The latest shakeup has taken place in the past several days. (The Washington Post, Oct 8, 2022).

Report on Ukraine. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects, Congressional Research Service (CRS), September 14, 2022, PDF, 30 pages.

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47068

Fact Sheet – Assistance to Ukraine. In total, the United States, has committed approximately $17 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since January 2021. This includes more than $16 billion since the beginning of Russia’s invasion on February 24. A two-page PDF document lists the types and quantities of equipment and material provided to Ukraine as of the end of September 2022. “Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine”, DoD, 28 September 2022.

SOF and Resistance in Ukraine. In the new contemporary operational environment, Russia and China are flexing their muscles. U.S. special operations forces has embraced “resistance” as a core methodology to counter these moves. US SOF are employed around the world – in subtle ways – to cultivate and weaponize resistance movements worldwide. US SOF has promoted this resistance operating concept (ROC) since 2014 in Ukraine. Nicholas Krohley shares a unique perspective on ROC in “Guerrillas on the Bench: Operationalizing Resistance in Ukraine and Beyond”, Small Wars Journal, October 5, 2022.

Upcoming Events

November 8-9, 2022. Fort Bragg, NC

Modern Warfare Week

Global SOF Foundation

Books, Pubs, and Reports

Pub – IW Strategy. David H. Ucko and Thomas A. Marks have written a pub entitled Crafting Strategy for Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Analysis and Action, second edition, National Defense University Press, September 2022, PDF, 107 pages.

https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/strat-monograph/Crafting-Strategy-for-Irregular-Warfare_2ndEd.pdf

Sentinel. The October 2022 issue is now posted online. It includes a review of the books Tip of the Spear and Operation Pineapple Express. Other articles are on topics such as the 10th SFGA, Sandinistas, and more. This quality magazine is published by Chapter 78 of the Special Forces Association.

https://www.specialforces78.com/chapter-78-newsletter-for-october-2022/

Infantry. The Fall 2022 issue is now online. Articles about sniper courses, reconnaissance, the Russian BTGs, mortars, Army combatives, and more.

https://www.benning.army.mil/Infantry/Magazine/issues/2022/Fall/

DoS IG Report – Afghan Special Immigration Visa Program Metrices, Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of State, September 2022.

https://afghan-report.com/reports/dosig-afghan-siv-metrics-sep-2022/

Podcasts and Videos

Video – Inside the Special Forces Combat Diver Qualification Course, Coffee or Die Magazine, September 18, 2022, YouTube, 18 minutes.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AaNuUU10kTc

Video – Army Objective Force – Special Operations Modernisation, Australian Army, October 3, 2022, 3 minutes, YouTube. An initiative of the Army Objective Force is ensuring Special Operations remain contemporary, at the cutting edge, ready, and able to respond to the threats of the future.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dGy_sFvYfnw&t=1s

Video – Challenges and Support for Women in SOF, Special Operations Association of America (SOAA), October 7, 2022, 5 minutes. SOAA Board Member Jax Scott speaks about the hardships that women in special operations face. Informative about the Cultural Support Teams deployed to Afghanistan.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e44Pe158zhc

Podcast – After Mali: Learning From the French Experience of Irregular Warfare in the Sahel, Irregular Warfare Podcast, Modern War Institute at West Point, October 7, 2022. A panel discussion that explains why the French were involved in combat operations in the Sahel region of Africa and how their forces were organized against several armed insurgencies. The panelists explore the light-footprint approach and building partner-force capacity by the French.

https://mwi.usma.edu/after-mali-learning-from-the-french-experience-of-irregular-warfare-in-the-sahel/

sof.news · by SOF News · October 10, 2022

4.  Law and the killing of a Russian propagandist: Some Q & A

An important essay concluding with an important reminder:

None of this is to suggest there is any moral equivalency between Ukraine and Russia in this conflict; there isn’t: Ukraine is clearly the victim of horrific aggression. Rather, the question is whether or not fundamental jus in bello principles can survive an extraordinarily embittering conflict.

If LOAC norms are not enforced against both sides – irrespective of a belligerent’s jus ad bellum fault – the slipperiness of the downward slope of an already sickeningly bloody war could significantly increase…and leave civilians on both sides in yet greater danger.

Law and the killing of a Russian propagandist: Some Q & A

sites.duke.edu · by Charlie Dunlap, J.D. · October 9, 2022

Can a person identified as a journalist or political commentator who nevertheless spreads hateful propaganda and disinformation be legally targeted in war? That is one of many questions to be considered following the recent killing of a Russian nationalist.

Here’s the context: a front-page story in the October 5th edition of the New York Times alleges:

United States intelligence agencies believe parts of the Ukrainian government authorized the car bomb attack near Moscow in August that killed Daria Dugina, the daughter of a prominent Russian nationalist, an element of a covert campaign that U.S. officials fear could widen the conflict.

As will be detailed below, some consider Ms. Dugina a journalist; others label her a political commentator with “hawkish, imperialist views” like those of her father. Many saw her as a spreader of disinformation. However, no one alleges she was a member of the Russian armed forces or held any position in the Russian government; by all accounts, she was a civilian.

According to the Times, the U.S. did not approve of her killing. Unnamed U.S. officials also told the paper that the “United States took no part in either by providing intelligence or other assistance.” Importantly, the Times asserts:

American officials admonished Ukrainian officials over the assassination.”

When asked in August about Dugina’s killing, a U.S. State Department spokesman said:

I don’t have anything to share beyond what you have all heard publicly, and that is that Ukraine has denied any involvement in the attack on this individual. We unequivocally condemn the targeting of civilians. We condemn the targeting of civilians, whether that’s in Kyiv, whether that’s in Bucha, whether that’s in Kharkiv, whether that’s in Kramatorsk, whether that’s in Mariupol, or whether that’s in Moscow. That principle applies around the world. (Emphasis added.)

As we examine the Times’ allegation, let’s keep in mind the well-known military axiom that “” Retired Air Force colonel Mickey Addison

The first reports aren’t usually wrong because the people reporting the news are trying to get it wrong. The first reports are usually wrong because in fast moving situations it takes an enormous amount of skill and patience to sort through to find out what’s really going on.

Consequently, we’ll analyze the case based on the assumption that respected media reports are mostly accurate. Still, we need to keep an open mind because that assumption may prove to be erroneous as more information develops. We also need to carefully consider Ukraine’s denial of any involvement.

Is Ukraine governed by the international Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) in this conflict?

Yes. Ukraine is a party to most international treaties related to armed conflict (list here). The Russian Federation is likewise a party to a range of international treaties related to armed conflict, including the four original Geneva Conventions of 1949 (list is here).

Moreover, an expert points out, both “Russia, and Ukraine, recognize the existence of International Humanitarian Law” and adds that, “In fact, both sides claim that they did not violate the law, implying that the law exerts a form of constraint on them.”

However, a March 2022 article in the Washington Post reported that a somewhat different assertion was made by a Ukrainian official. Seeking comment from Alexei Arestovich (described by the Post as the “adviser to the head of the office of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky) about the dispersal of Ukrainian military assets into civilian areas, the Post reported:

[Arestovich] argued that international humanitarian laws or the laws of war don’t apply in this conflict because “the main task of Putin’s military campaign is the destruction of the Ukrainian nation.” He said Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly denied Ukraine’s existence as an independent nation.

“Therefore, what is happening here is not a competition of European armies according to established rules, but a struggle of the people for survival in the face of an existential threat,” said Arestovich.

It’s hard to know how widespread this thinking may be in the Ukrainian government but – regardless – it reflects an inaccurate understanding of LOAC.

As I explained in a previous post, there are two separate bodies of international law involved here. Assessing Russia’s accountability for waging of aggressive war is the purview of the jus ad bellum which governs the legality of the resort to force. Put in political terms, it determines what is an “act of war.”

The other, separate body of law is called jus in bello. The ICRC calls it the law that “regulates the conduct of parties engaged in an armed conflict.” Here’s the key (substituting “”LOAC” for International Humanitarian Law (IHL) terminology the ICRC uses):

[LOAC] applies to the belligerent parties irrespective of the reasons for the conflict or the justness of the causes for which they are fighting. If it were otherwise, implementing the law would be impossible, since every party would claim to be a victim of aggression. Moreover, [LOAC] is intended to protect victims of armed conflicts regardless of party affiliation. That is why jus in bello must remain independent of jus ad bellum.

Similarly, in March the Congressional Research Service discussed jus ad bellum and jus in bello explicitly in the context of the Russo-Ukraine conflict and concluded:

While they can be interrelated, jus ad bellum and jus in bello generally operate independently such that compliance with one category is required regardless of compliance with the other. For example, a state that is a victim of a jus ad bellum violation because it is attacked without a lawful basis must still comply with jus in bello when conducting military operations to defend itself.

To be clear, the wrongness of Russia’s initial resort to force (jus ad bellum) does not obviate the application of LOAC to the current in bello situation in Ukraine. LOAC applies, full stop.

What does LOAC say about killing civilians?

A lot. In fact, perhaps the most fundamental LOAC principle is the requirement to distinguish between civilians and combatants, and to direct attacks only against the latter. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) says:

The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians.

Furthermore, ICRC makes it clear that the murder of civilians has long been considered a war crime:

Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions prohibits “violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds” of civilians and persons hors de combat. All four Geneva Conventions list “wilful killing” of protected persons as a grave breach. The prohibition of murder is recognized as a fundamental guarantee by Additional Protocols I and II. Murder is also specified as a war crime under the Statute of the International Criminal Court with respect to both international and non-international armed conflicts… (Citations omitted).

The U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual (DoD LoW Manual) flatly states in ¶ 5.2.2 that “[c]ivilians must not be made the object of attack.”

What is “assassination”?

The Times called the killing of Dugina an “assassination.” What exactly does that mean?

In 1989 the late Hays Parks, then a Department of Defense lawyer, wrote the definitive memorandum regarding the legal meaning of “assassination.” I very much encourage you to read the full text, but I’ll give you a few highlights.

Parks was opining on the application of prohibition on assassination, and explained that:

Peacetime assassination…would seem to encompass the murder of a private individual or public figure for political purposes, and in some cases…also require that the act constitute a covert activity, particularly when the individual is a private citizen. Assassination is unlawful killing, and would be prohibited by international law even if there were no executive order proscribing it.

But Parks drew a careful distinction between such slayings, and the killing of an individual combatant in wartime. He points out:

[C]ombatants are legitimate targets at all times, regardless of their duties or activities at the time of their attack. Such attacks do not constitute assassination unless carried out in a “treacherous” manner, as prohibited by article 23(b) of the Annex to the [1907 Hague Convention IV]. While the term “treacherous” has not been defined, as previously noted… it is not regarded as prohibiting operations that depend upon the element of surprise, such as a commando raid or other form of attack behind enemy lines.

Parks cites the many examples of lawful wartime killings of individuals, including the World War II operation that resulted in the death of Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who masterminded the attack on Pearl Harbor.

In short, if the target is a combatant in an armed conflict the attack will typically be legal (assuming other targeting rules are observed). However, if the target is a civilian, it will typically be illegal unless the civilian’s protected status is compromised by “taking a direct part in hostilities.”

What authority says civilians lose their protection from attack by “taking a direct part in hostilities”?

Plenty. According to the ICRC

Similarly, the DoD LoW Manual states (¶ 5.8) that “Civilians who take a direct part in hostilities forfeit protection from being made the object of attack.” There is no real dispute about this axiom of international law; the issues arise as to what acts specifically amount to “taking a direct part in hostilities.”

What constitutes “taking a direct part in hostilities”?

The ICRC takes a rather narrow view of direct participation in hostilities, much of which comes out of their 2009 study, Direct Participation in Hostilities. It is summarized as follows:

Direct participation in hostilities consists of specific acts carried out by individuals as part of the conduct of hostilities between parties to an armed conflict.

Constitutive elements of direction participation in hostilities: In order to qualify as direct participation in hostilities, a specific act must meet the following cumulative criteria:

• the act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack (threshold of harm);
• there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct causation); and
• the act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent nexus).

Measures preparatory to the execution of a specific act of direct participation in hostilities, as well as the deployment to and the return from the location of its execution, constitute an integral part of that act.

Be aware that the ICRC study has been criticized by scholars and, in any event, as the DoD LoW Manual, points out (¶ 4.26.3), “the United States has not accepted the ICRC’s study on customary international humanitarian law nor its ‘interpretive guidance’ on direct participation in hostilities.”

Instead, the U.S. take a more expansive – yet also more nuanced – view of activities that constitute direct participation. In his authoritative study, Colonel Ted Richard summarizes the Manual’s lengthy approach this way:

The Manual elaborates as to factors for assessing whether an act by a civilian constitutes taking a direct part in hostilities, such as: the degree to which the act causes harm to the opposing party’s persons or objects; the degree to which the act is connected to the hostilities; the specific purpose underlying the act; the military significance of the activity to the party’s war effort; and the degree to which the activity is viewed inherently or traditionally as a military one.

Furthermore, the Manual also provides examples of activities that do not amount to “direct participation” starting with the position that “taking a direct part in hostilities does not encompass the general support that members of the civilian population provide to their State’s war effort…” (¶ 5.8.3)

Notably, also included in the examples (¶ 5.8.3.2) of activities that did not constitute direct participation is “mere sympathy or moral support for a party’s cause” and “independent journalism or public advocacy (e.g., opinion journalists who write columns supporting or criticizing a State’s war effort).” A footnote to that latter illustration points out:

Cf. ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ¶47 (Jun. 13, 2000) (“Whether the media constitutes a legitimate target group is a debatable issue. If the media is used to incite crimes, as in Rwanda, then it is a legitimate target. If it is merely disseminating propaganda to generate support for the war effort, it is not a legitimate target.”). (Emphasis added.)

Cornell Law School’s Legal information Institute elaborates on the degree of connection to actual crimes that is necessary for illegal incitement:

Direct incitement requires “a direct appeal to commit an act referred to in [the Genocide Convention]… it has to be more than a vague or indirect suggestion” (Nahimana, ICTR, Trial Judgment § 692; see also Akayesu, ICTR, Trial Judgment § 556)…. That is, it must be unambiguous in its intended context. (Emphasis added.).

Finally, the ICRC says:

Journalists are protected only as long as they do not take a direct part in the hostilities. News media, even when used for propaganda purposes, enjoy immunity from attacks, except when they are used for military purposes or to incite war crimes, genocide or acts of violence. (Emphasis added.).

Who was Daria Dugina?

Last August the

Ms. Dugina

Source: Wikipedia

Darya Dugina was herself a prominent journalist who vocally supported the invasion of Ukraine.

Earlier this year she was sanctioned by US and UK authorities, who accused her of contributing to online “disinformation” about Russia’s invasion.

In May, she described the war as a “clash of civilisations” in an interview and expressed pride in the fact that both she and her father had been targeted by Western sanctions.

The New York Times “as a commentator who combined hawkish, imperialist views with jargon-laden political philosophy.” It also said:

Ms. Dugina’s public commentary provided an ideological framework for Mr. Putin’s aggressive foreign policy. In an interview with a Russian broadcaster hours before her death, she cited the theories of Samuel Huntington and other scholars to describe the war in Ukraine as an inevitable clash of civilizations.

“This is liberal totalitarianism, this is liberal fascism, this is Western totalitarianism,” she said, describing what Russia, in her view, was fighting against. “It has reached its end.”

When she was sanctioned by the U.S. last March the U.S. Treasury accused her of seeking “contributors to write articles” for a Russian disinformation website.

What if Dugina was mistakenly killed?

The Times reports that “[s]ome American officials suspect Ms. Dugina’s father, a Russian ultranationalist, was the actual target.” This is significant since a could be a complete defense to a war crime charge under international law.

However, if a mistake was made, exoneration in this instance still depends upon whether or not the intended target was a lawful one. Obviously, an operation aiming to kill a protected civilian is not legalized simply because the wrong protected civilian was killed.

So who is Aleksandr Dugin, and would LOAC permit targeting him with lethal force? Back in August, the Times described him this way:

Mr. Dugin

Source: Wikipedia

“Mr. Dugin is a self-educated political philosopher frequently described as “Putin’s brain,” although the actual relationship between the two men is opaque and, some experts on the Kremlin say, often overstated. But Mr. Dugin has long been one of the most visible proponents of the idea of an imperial Russia at the helm of a “Eurasian” civilization locked in an existential conflict in the West.”

The U.S. Treasury says he was first sanctioned in 2015 “for being responsible for or complicit in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, or sovereignty or territorial integrity of Ukraine.” It said “Dugin was a leader of the Eurasian Youth Union, which actively recruited individuals with military and combat experience to fight on behalf of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic.“

As to his more recent activities, Treasury

Dugin controls Geopolitica, a website that serves as a platform for Russian ultra-nationalists to spread disinformation and propaganda targeting Western and other audiences. For example, on February 8, 2022, Geopolitica published an article falsely accusing the U.S. and NATO of provoking war with Russia, in order to “further terrorize the American people in all sorts of malicious ways.”

The BBC says this:

While Alexander Dugin is not a state official himself, he is nevertheless a symbolic figure in Russian politics.

His anti-Western, ultranationalist philosophy has become the dominant political ideology in Russia and has helped shape President Putin’s expansionist foreign policy, most prominently on Ukraine.

Did the activities of either of them amount to “direct involvement’?

Based on the available evidence, it doesn’t appear so. For example, recall the U.S. State Department’s statement last August in the aftermath of Dugina’s killing which broadly condemned the killing of civilians “whether that’s in Kyiv…or whether that’s in Moscow.” That seems to suggest the U.S. considered Dugina a protected civilian.

Additionally, the Times says “Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Ukraine’s president” declared that “any murder during wartime in some country or another must carry with it some kind of practical significance” adding that “[s]omeone like Dugina is not a tactical or a strategic target for Ukraine.” That appears to work counter to a finding of “direct involvement in hostilities.”

Dugina’s father was certainly closer to Putin and more well known than his daughter, but their views and activities seem materially similar. Moreover, the Times says “the United States is concerned that such attacks — while high in symbolic value — have little direct impact on the battlefield,” a conclusion that appears to undercut a finding of direct involvement in hostilities. (Emphasis added.)

The fact that she and her father were sanctioned by the U.S. and the U.K. doesn’t mean there was an adequate showing to make either of them a legal LOAC target. Sanctioning can lawfully be imposed for activities that don’t amount to direct involvement in hostilities.

It is important to remember that despite the references to “innocent civilians” by the media and others, LOAC does not use such phrasing as it would tacitly suggest there are civilians who are not “innocent” and somehow not entitled to protected status. To be clear, LOAC does not limit its protections to just “innocent” civilians.

So long as they aren’t directly participating in hostilities, civilians are legally protected from direct attack. This is true even if they are, for example, morally corrupt.

Furthermore, you may be surprised to learn that even serious criminal activity does not necessarily exclude someone from protected civilian status. As I wrote in 2016:

For example, Umm Sayeff, the wife of a former Islamic State leader killed in the May 2015 Special Forces raid that resulted in her capture, was charged on February 8 with conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terror organization in connection with the death of American hostage Kayla Mueller.

Sayeff is reported to have been As part of this network, Mueller was allegedly nto becoming the personal sex slave of Islamic State kingpin As loathsome as Sayeff’s behavior is alleged to be, it doesn’t necessarily follow that she would have lost her status as a “civilian” under targeting law.

It appears that even if one assumes Ms. Dugina and/or her father were spewing a repulsive political ideology and/or spreading noxious disinformation, such activities alone don’t necessarily amount to “direct participation” in an armed conflict so as to turn them into lawfully targetable persons.

Why doesn’t production of hateful propaganda make a person or an object a legitimate military target?

The highly-influential 1999 Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is insightful on this issue:

“Disrupting government propaganda may help to undermine the morale of the population and the armed forces, but justifying an attack on a civilian facility on such grounds alone may not meet the ‘effective contribution to military action’ and ‘definite military advantage’ criteria required by [LOAC].”

Moreover, the Committee determined that “the advantage [justifying an attack] should be substantial and relatively close rather than hardly perceptible and likely to appear only in the long term.”

The Committee found that “[w]hile stopping such propaganda may serve to demoralize the Yugoslav population and undermine the government’s political support, it is unlikely that either of these purposes would offer the ‘concrete and direct’ military advantage necessary to make them a legitimate military objective.”

Additionally, the Committee said that “[a]lthough NATO believed that Yugoslav broadcast facilities were ‘used entirely to incite hatred and propaganda’… it was not claimed that they were being used to incite violence akin to Radio Milles Collines during the Rwandan genocide, which might have justified their destruction.”

In short, it appears that even inciting “hatred and propaganda” is insufficient for lawful targetability.

As unsatisfying as it may be to some readers, the law seems to be that in order to turn a propagandizing civilian person or object into a legitimate target, it is necessary to show such person or object is producing substantial and direct incitement to commit specific, serious, and unlawful “violence” that is expected to occur relatively close in time.

Are attacks aimed primarily at intimidating the civilian population lawful?

In the days after Dugina’s killing , a Washington Post article headlined explained the impact of her death on Russian civilian elites who back Putin. According to the Post, propagandists were most effected:

Dugina’s death rocked the Russian TV anchors, journalists and other commentators who serve up propaganda justifying President Vladimir Putin’s invasion as a war against Western global power and “Nazis” in Ukraine. The killing immediately heightened a sense of vulnerability among Russia’s most elite and visible promoters of the war in Ukraine, who now realize that they might be targets and that the government is potentially unable to protect them

One can see how intimidating propagandists could benefit Ukraine, but using violence to do so is unlawful: The ICRC warns: The DoD LoW Manual says (¶ 5.2.2) says “[i]n general, military operations must not be directed against enemy civilians,” and adds:

In particular…[m]easures of intimidation or terrorism against the civilian population are prohibited including acts or threats of violence, the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population.

What about reprisal?

Last week the U.S. Justice Department told Congress that Could the international law concept of “reprisal” justify an otherwise unlawful attack against a civilian?

The DoD LoW Manual (¶ 18.18.1) defines “reprisals” as “acts taken against a party that would otherwise be unlawful, in order to persuade that party to cease violating the law.”

However, most countries – including both Ukraine and the Russian Federation – are parties to Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions which, in Article 51, forbids reprisals against civilians. Interestingly, the U.S. is not a party to Protocol I and does not consider this portion to be binding

The U.S. finds the provisions restricting reprisals to be “counterproductive [because] they remove a significant deterrent that protects civilians and war victims on all sides of a conflict,” according to the DoD LoW Manual. A footnote in the Manual (p. 1116, n. 225) makes it clear that it is a long-standing U.S. position by quoting a 1987 statement of Judge Abraham Sofaer, then legal advisor to the U.S. State Department.

Sofaer explained that the U.S. would not sign on to the elimination of reprisals because “[h]istorically, reciprocity has been the major sanction underlying the laws of war.”

He added if the prohibition came into force for the U.S., an “enemy could deliberately carry out attacks against friendly civilian populations, and the United States would be legally forbidden to reply in kind.” He warned that to “formally renounce even the option of such attacks … removes a significant deterrent that presently protects civilians and other war victims on all sides of a conflict.”

All of that said, given that Ukraine is a party to Protocol 1, it is precluded from taking reprisals against Russian civilians despite Ukrainian civilians being the victim, the Department of Justice tells us, of “shocking crimes” at the hands of Russia.

Concluding thoughts

Allow me to reiterate, we are dealing here with allegations that have yet been definitively proved. Still, there are troubling issues deserving of further exploration.

Recall that the Times says that “American officials admonished Ukrainian officials over the assassination.” Ask yourself: if the reports are true, is an admonishment really a sufficient response for the deliberate murder of a civilian – an act the ICRC considers a war crime?

Should the U.S. pass what information it has to an international investigatory body of some kind? The International Criminal Court – ICC – does have an ongoing investigation of the war, but its jurisdiction appears to be limited to alleged crimes “committed on any part of the territory of Ukraine.” Ideally, Ukrainians themselves would investigate the accusation in a transparent manner.

The Times article says U.S. officials did not disclose “whether President Volodymyr Zelensky had signed off on the mission.” If it is true that Ukraine is behind the assassination of Daria Dugina, I’m not sure which would be more troubling: if President Zelensky signed off on the deliberate murder of a civilian, or if an operation was conducted deep into Russian territory without his knowledge.

The latter would be extremely unsettling as the U.S delivers billions of dollars in weapons to Ukraine, but wants to avoid the provocation of their use against targets on Russian soil.

Consequently, Americans leaders need to know who is authorizing operations against Russia. In this respect the Times says “U.S. officials…lack a complete picture of the competing power centers within the Ukrainian government, including the military, the security services and Mr. Zelensky’s office.” That’s worrisome.

Still, It isn’t hard to understand why some Ukrainians might want to lash out at Russian civilians. After all, the UN reports that as of October 3rd, 6,114 [Ukrainian] civilians have been killed in the war, and it “believes that the actual figures are considerably higher.”

But as this post explains, the deliberate killing of civilians not directly involved in hostilities cannot be tolerated – even if those civilians are rabid supporters of the enemy. As Article 22 of the annex to the still-in-effect 1907 Hague Convention puts it: “The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.”

Americans strongly support Ukraine because it holds the moral high ground. Maintaining that high ground in their eyes and those of other supporters is vital because, among other things, it underpins the rationale to provide enormous amount of military and economic aid. Aid from the West–and especially the U.S.–has been essential for Ukraine’s survival against the Russian onslaught. But public support can be fragile.

Why? Consider this observation from Michael Reisman’s and Chris T Antoniou’s 1994 book, The Laws of War:

In modern popular democracies, even a limited armed conflict requires a substantial base of public support. That support can erode or even reverse itself rapidly, no matter how worthy the political objective, if the people believe that the war is being conducted in an unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way.

It is worth remembering the U.S. experience after it was the victim victimized by vicious aggression on 9/11. Initially, America enjoyed tremendous international support…until various illegalities came to light. It is hard to shake the impact of unlawful conduct. As General David Petraeus has said about abuses at Abu Gahrib and Guantanamo: they are “nonbiodegradable. . . . The enemy continues to beat you with them like a stick.”

None of this is to suggest there is any moral equivalency between Ukraine and Russia in this conflict; there isn’t: Ukraine is clearly the victim of horrific aggression. Rather, the question is whether or not fundamental jus in bello principles can survive an extraordinarily embittering conflict.

If LOAC norms are not enforced against both sides – irrespective of a belligerent’s jus ad bellum fault – the slipperiness of the downward slope of an already sickeningly bloody war could significantly increase…and leave civilians on both sides in yet greater danger.

Remember what we like to say on Lawfire®: gather the facts, examine the law, evaluate the arguments – and then decide for yourself!

sites.duke.edu · by Charlie Dunlap, J.D. · October 9, 2022

5. Kremlin, shifting blame for war failures, axes military commanders

“It takes a brave man to be a coward in the Red Army.”

-- Joseph Stalin

Kremlin, shifting blame for war failures, axes military commanders

By Mary Ilyushina and Natalia Abbakumova 

Updated October 8, 2022 at 9:40 a.m. EDT|Published October 7, 2022 at 4:20 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Mary Ilyushina · October 7, 2022

Russian Ground Forces Gen. Alexander Dvornikov, who over a 44-year military career was best-known for scorched-earth tactics in campaigns he led in Syria and Chechnya, was named overall operational commander of the war in Ukraine in April. He lasted about seven weeks before being dismissed as part of what appeared to be a wider shake-up in response to heavy losses and strategic failures.

Around the same time, Col. Gen. Andrey Serdyukov, another four-decade serviceman, the commander in chief of the elite airborne troops, was stripped of his post after nearly all divisions of the airborne forces suffered major losses.

And just last week Col. Gen. Alexander Zhuravlev, the head of the Western Military District responsible for Kharkiv, where Russian forces lost huge swaths of territory in early September, was removed after four years on the job, according to Russian business daily RBC.

Far from bestowing glory on Russia’s military brass, the war in Ukraine is proving toxic for top commanders, with at least eight generals fired, reassigned or otherwise sidelined since the start of the invasion on Feb. 24. Western governments have said that at least 10 others were killed in battle, a remarkably high number that military analysts say is evidence of grievous strategic errors.

The upheaval in the upper ranks of uniformed officers highlights Russia’s fundamental mistakes in war planning, and the dysfunctional chain of command that resulted first in Moscow’s failure to achieve its primary military objective — the quick capture of Kyiv and toppling of the Ukrainian government — and more recently in the retreats on the eastern and southern fronts.

But the dismissals also reflect a scramble by political elites to place blame for the costly and faltering war as open criticism grows louder, particularly among pro-war hawks and propagandists.

Like their badly prepared forces on the front, the commanders in the Russian Armed Forces are turning out to be easy targets, even as senior political leaders, including Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, the Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, and President Vladimir Putin himself had largely avoided direct criticism. Recent criticism of Shoigu, however, has signaled that his job, too, may finally be in jeopardy.

Unlike in Ukraine, where the top generals, including the commander in chief, Valery Zaluzhny, and Oleksandr Syrsky, who led the recent Kharkiv offensive, are now revered figures, it has often been difficult to know who in Russia is actually running the war. Personnel changes are often carried out with little public announcement and trickle into the Russia media with little or no explanation.

On Friday, RBC reported that the commander of Russia’s eastern military district, Col. Gen. Alexander Chaiko, had been replaced by Lt. Gen. Rustam Muradov. No explanation was given for the switch.

In a rare public announcement of staffing changes, the Russian Defense Ministry said late last month that it removed the general responsible for “the logistics support of the Armed Forces,” Dmitry Bulgakov, and appointed in his place Col. Gen. Mikhail Mizintsev.

Mizintsev was an obscure figure before the Ukraine war but has earned the gruesome moniker “Butcher of Mariupol” after Ukrainian officials and activists accused him of orchestrating a brutal siege of the southern Ukrainian port city that has killed thousands of civilians and razed residential buildings.

And on Friday, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet admitted after weeks of speculation that it had replaced its commander, Adm. Igor Osipov, with Vice Adm. Viktor Sokolov who vowed to “increase the combat readiness of the fleet.”

In late April, Ukraine sank the fleet’s flagship, the cruiser Moskva, with an audacious but successful strike using two Neptune anti-ship missiles. On Navy Day, in July, the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet was attacked by a makeshift combat drone that dropped an explosive device on its roof, a symbolic attack that showed Ukraine’s ability to strike deep into Russian positions.

The recent public announcements of dismissals may reflect a growing imperative to satisfy demands for blame and accountability. Such calls, and criticism of the war effort in general, have been amplified since Putin’s declaration of a partial military mobilization last month, which led more than 200,000 fighting-age men to flee the country, and set off angry complaints over men wrongly being called to service and conscripts receiving poor treatment, including minimal food and rusting weapons.

After a long string of failures and few significant victories, the knives now seem to be out for Russian generals, amid criticism from prominent Russian military correspondents, state television propagandists and even members of the normally obedient parliament.

Two Russian lawmakers — chairman of the defense committee Andrey Kartapolov and anticorruption committee member Vasily Piskarev — are holding closed-door meetings in the lower house of the parliament, the State Duma, to review the “situation with the supply of the Russian army.”

Kartapolov and Piskarev also sent a written request to the prosecutor general, asking him to investigate “how the financing was wasted in the rear,” alleging that commanders have been looting the military budget.

The head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, who sent his own fighters to Ukraine, slammed the commander of the Central Military District, Alexander Lapin, as a “talentless” leader and a product of “nepotism” in the leadership of the general staff, for deploying fighters from one of the self-declared pro-Russian separatist areas without proper support or preparation.

“The colonel-general deployed mobilized fighters from the Luhansk People’s Republic and other units on all frontiers of the Lyman direction, but did not provide them with communication, did not ensure coordination and a proper supply of ammunition,” Kadyrov wrote in a scathing post last Saturday. Critics, including Kadyrov and Kartapolov, have accused top officers of lying about what is happening on the front.

“It’s necessary to stop lying,” Kartapolov, the defense committee chairman, said, lashing out on Soloviev Live, an online channel run by top state television propagandist Vladimir Soloviev. “Almost all the border villages of the Belgorod Region have been destroyed, but we are learning this from anyone: governors, Telegram channels, military correspondents. But not the Defense Ministry,” Kartapolov said.

In a different show this week, Soloviev said that “lies on every level must be punished most severely.” “I don’t pretend to know the art of warfare, but what is the genius idea behind the general staff plans now?” Soloviev asked rhetorically. “Do you think time is on our side? [Ukrainians] have concentrated weapons and mercenaries … and what have you done in that time?”

According to Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT), an independent group that has been monitoring Russian military activities in Ukraine since 2014, Col. Gen. Gennady Zhidko took over from Dvornikov in May as the overall commander of the Russian war.

Dvornikov’s dismissal may have been linked to the destruction of the 58th Combined Arms Army, normally stationed in the southern Vladikavkaz, which was lauded as one the most combat-ready Russian armies and key to the invasion of Georgia in 2008, BBC’s Russian service reported.

But Zhidko, who also held the title of deputy defense minister, in what appears to be a damning trend for generals in Ukraine, was in charge for about a month before more problems emerged, and he was demoted to the head of the Eastern Military District.

It remained unknown who exactly was in charge of the war until Saturday, a day after this article was first published, when the Defense Ministry announced the appointment of Gen. Sergei Surovikin as overall commander in Ukraine.

In June, Surovikin took over the Army Group “South” and was active in the Luhansk region.

The Washington Post · by Mary Ilyushina · October 7, 2022

6. Green Beret unit dedicates building to soldier killed in Niger ambush

Green Beret unit dedicates building to soldier killed in Niger ambush

armytimes.com · by Rachel Nostrant · October 7, 2022

The headquarters building for Group Support Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, was dedicated to Sgt. 1st Class Jeremiah Johnson on Tuesday, five years to the day of the ambushed mission that took the lives of Johnson and three other U.S. soldiers in Niger.

Johnson, Sgt. La David Johnson, Staff Sgt. Dustin Wright and Staff Sgt. Bryan Black were killed Oct. 4, 2017, near Tongo Tongo, Niger, returning from a mission alongside 30 Nigerien partnered forces. The group was ambushed by small-arms fire, rocket propelled grenades and technical vehicles by approximately 50 Islamic State militants.

“I am so proud of what my son did,” Debra Gannon, Johnson’s mother said in an interview with Army Times following the ceremony.

“I would give anything in the world to have him back and have none of this out there but it happened and I can’t do anything to change that, and the fact that they are honoring him, in this way, I am more than proud — the pride that I have in my son is beyond words,” she said.

Soldiers gather outside Johnson Hall on Fort Bragg, N.C. (Photo Courtesy of Debra Gannon)

The move to name the headquarters building after Johnson — who of the four killed was the only soldier assigned to GSB — has been in the works for more than a year, Capt. Nicholas Erikson, a public affairs officer for 3rd Group told Army Times.

“Members of GSB lobbied to name the building after Jeremiah Johnson — who was assigned to GSB’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Reconnaissance Detachment — was killed in action,” Erikson said.

All four soldiers killed in the ambush have also been memorialized with stones on the Group Memorial Walk and have plaques commemorating their lives and sacrifice inside the 3rd Group headquarters building, he added.

The fifth anniversary and the dedication ceremony were also observed with a memorial ruck run hosted by the soldiers of GSB. They will “always remember Jeremiah and continue to tell his story,” GSB commander Lt. Col. Michael E. Ashton said of the dedication.

Staff Sgt. Bryan Black, from left, Staff Sgt. Jeremiah Johnson, Sgt. La David Johnson and Staff Sgt. Dustin Wright were killed in Niger when a joint patrol of American and Niger forces was ambushed on Oct. 4. (U.S. Army via AP)

The Niger ambush has been the source of great controversy for the Army. Originally, statements from top military brass placed the blame for the botched mission on the soldiers themselves.

Top leaders — including former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Joseph Dunford and U.S. Africa Command boss Gen. Thomas Waldhauser — repeatedly told the families and the media that the men weren’t properly prepared.

The team leader, Capt. Michael Perozeni, shouldered much of the blame for the ambush until it was revealed that he asked not to continue the mission after the helicopter assault force they were supporting unexpectedly pulled out due to weather issues, according to the redacted investigation.

Perozeni was concerned because his team had been up for 18 hours and still had to travel 25 kilometers through difficult terrain under limited visibility to conduct the raid on their own, the investigation stated. Despite the concerns, the team was directed by their battalion commander in Chad to continue the mission anyway.

“I am glad that they are getting word out there about what happened that day, and that more and more people are finding out the truth and that the blame is taken off of those boys, because that hurt me beyond words,” Gannon said.

“My son was one hell of a soldier.”

For their actions that day, both La David Johnson and Jeremiah Johnson received Silver Stars and were made honorary Green Berets. Wright was also awarded the Silver Star, and Black received a Bronze Star with Valor device.

About Rachel Nostrant

Rachel is a Marine Corps veteran and a master's candidate at New York University's Business & Economic Reporting program.

7. Kyiv, other cities hit as Putin orders 'harsh response' to Crimea bridge attack

Just more indications of the evil nature of the Putin regime.

Kyiv, other cities hit as Putin orders 'harsh response' to Crimea bridge attack

Reuters · by Max Hunder

• Summary
• Attacks across Ukrainian cities during Monday rush hour
• 'They are trying to destroy us,' says Zelenskiy
• Apparent revenge for explosion on Crimea bridge
• Ukraine says 11 major infrastructure targets hit
• Power, water, heat knocked out in swaths of country

KYIV, Oct 10 (Reuters) - Russia fired cruise missiles at cities across Ukraine during rush hour on Monday morning, killing civilians and knocking out power and heat, in what President Vladimir Putin declared to be revenge for Ukrainian attacks including on a bridge to Crimea.

The missiles tore into busy intersections, parks and tourist sites in the centre of downtown Kyiv with an intensity not seen even when Russian forces attempted to capture the capital early in the war.

Explosions were also reported in Lviv, Ternopil and Zhytomyr in western Ukraine, Dnipro and Kremenchuk in central Ukraine, Zaporizhzhia in the south and Kharkiv in the east.

In a televised address, Putin said he had ordered "massive" long-range strikes against Ukrainian energy, command and communication targets, using missiles fired from air, sea and land, in response to what he described as terrorist attacks, including Saturday's explosion at the Kerch Strait bridge.

"The Kyiv regime, with its actions, has put itself on the same level as international terrorist organisations. With the most odious groups. To leave such acts without a response is simply impossible," Putin said.

The Kremlin was humiliated on Saturday when an explosion damaged the only bridge over the Kerch Strait linking Ukraine's Crimea peninsula, annexed by Moscow in 2014, to Russia proper. Ukraine has not claimed responsibility for the blast on the bridge but has celebrated it.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said Monday's rush hour attacks were deliberately timed to kill people as well as to knock out Ukraine's power grid. His prime minister said 11 major infrastructure targets were hit in eight regions, leaving swaths of the country with no power, water or heat.

In Kyiv, the body of a man in jeans lay in a street at a major intersection, surrounded by flaming cars. In a park, a soldier cut through the clothes of a woman who lay in the grass to try to treat her wounds. Two other women were bleeding nearby.

'THEY ARE TRYING TO DESTROY US'

A huge crater gaped next to a children's playground in a central Kyiv park. The remains of an apparent missile were buried, smoking in the mud.

More volleys of missiles struck the capital again later in the morning. Pedestrians huddled for shelter at the entrance of Metro stations and inside parking garages.

Germany said a building housing its consulate in Kyiv had been hit in Monday's strike, though it had not been used since the war started on Feb. 24.

The European Union condemned Monday's "barbaric and cowardly attacks" on Ukraine.

By mid-morning, Ukraine's defence ministry said Russia had fired 81 cruise missiles, and Ukraine's air defences had shot down 43 of them. Police said at least five people had been killed and 12 wounded in Kyiv.

Security camera footage showed shrapnel and flames engulfing a glass-bottomed footbridge across a wooded valley in the city centre, one of Kyiv's most popular tourist sites. One pedestrian ran away from the blast. Reuters later saw a huge crater beneath the bridge, which was damaged but remained standing.

1/15

A missile strikes near the glass bridge, as Russia's invasion of Ukraine continues, in Kyiv, Ukraine October 10, 2022 in this screen grab from a video obtained by REUTERS

"They are trying to destroy us and wipe us off the face of the earth," Zelenskiy said on the Telegram messaging app. "The air raid sirens do not subside throughout Ukraine."

Zelenskiy later filmed a video message on a mobile phone on an empty central Kyiv street. He said the strikes had two main targets: energy infrastructure and people.

"Such a time and such targets were specially chosen to cause as much damage as possible," he said.

Prime Minister Denys Shmygal promised to restore utilities as quickly as possible. Officials reported that power was down in Ukraine's second largest city Kharkiv and nearby Poltava.

Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba tweeted: "Putin's only tactic is terror on peaceful Ukrainian cities, but he will not break Ukraine down. This is also his response to all appeasers who want to talk with him about peace: Putin is a terrorist who talks with missiles."

Olena Somyk, 41, sheltered with her 6-year-old daughter, Daria, in an underground garage where hundreds of other people waited for the all-clear. She had reached Kyiv earlier in the war after fleeing through Russia and across Europe from the Russian-occupied southern city of Kherson.

"Really, I think they did this because they are bastards," said Somyk. Putin, she said, "is a small angry man, so we don't know what more to expect".

BELARUS ESCALATION

In another sign of possible escalation, Putin's closest ally, President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus, said on Monday he had ordered troops to deploy jointly with Russian forces near Ukraine, which he accused of planning attacks on Belarus with its Western backers.

"Their owners are pushing them to start a war against Belarus to drag us there," he said, citing no evidence. Lukashenko allowed Belarus to be used as a staging ground for Russia early in the war but has not sent his troops to fight.

Commentators on Russian television have increasingly been calling for massive retaliation against Ukraine, with the military leadership facing public criticism for the first time as Russian forces have been beaten back on the battlefield.

Ramzan Kadyrov, the staunchly pro-Kremlin leader of Russia's Chechnya region who had demanded in recent days that military commanders be sacked, hailed Monday's attacks: "Now I am 100% satisfied with how the special military operation is being conducted."

"We warned you Zelensky, that Russia hasn't even got started yet, so stop complaining ... and run! Run away without looking back to the West," he wrote.

The Kerch Bridge, which Putin personally opened, is a major supply route for Russian forces in southern Ukraine and a symbol of Russia's control of Crimea.

Russia has faced major setbacks on the battlefield since the start of September, with Ukrainian forces bursting through front lines and recapturing territory. Putin responded to the losses by ordering a mobilisation of hundreds of thousands of reservists, proclaiming the annexation of occupied territory and threatening repeatedly to use nuclear weapons.

Reporting by Max Hunder, Jonathan Landay in Kyiv, Sergiy Chalyi in Zaporizhzhia and Reuters bureaux; Writing by Peter Graff; Editing by Michael Perry, Simon Cameron-Moore and Gareth Jones

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Max Hunder

8. Taiwan says war with China 'absolutely' not an option, but bolstering defences

Excerpts:

China calls Tsai - re-elected by a landslide in 2020 on a promise to stand up to Beijing - a separatist and refuses to speak to her.

Tsai's speech comes less than a week before China's ruling Communist Party's congress opens in Beijing, where President Xi Jinping is widely expected to win a precedent-breaking third five-year term.

An official familiar with Tsai's thinking, speaking on condition of anonymity, told reporters the president was looking to "clearly convey" her position to the world and Beijing.

"Standing firm on the status quo of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is the main axis of Tsai's comments on cross-strait relations this year," the official said, adding this was the world's expectation and responsibility of both Taipei and Beijing.

Taiwan says war with China 'absolutely' not an option, but bolstering defences

Reuters · by Yimou Lee

TAIPEI, Oct 10 (Reuters) - War between Taiwan and China is "absolutely not an option", Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen said on Monday, as she reiterated her willingness to talk to Beijing and also pledged to boost the island's defences including with precision missiles.

China again rejected her latest overture, saying the island was an inseparable part of its territory.

Democratic Taiwan, which China claims as its own, has come under increasing military and political pressure from Beijing, especially after Chinese war games in early August following a Taipei visit by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi.

Any conflict over Taiwan could drag in the United States, Japan and perhaps much of the world, as well as shatter the global economy, especially given Taiwan's dominant position as a maker of semiconductors used in everything from smartphones and tablets to fighter jets.

Tsai, in her national day speech outside the presidential office under a grey sky, said it was "regrettable" that China had escalated its intimidation and threatened peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and region.

China should not think there is room for compromise in the commitment of Taiwan's people to democracy and freedom, she said.

"I want to make clear to the Beijing authorities that armed confrontation is absolutely not an option for our two sides. Only by respecting the commitment of the Taiwanese people to our sovereignty, democracy, and freedom can there be a foundation for resuming constructive interaction across the Taiwan Strait."

Speaking in Beijing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said Taiwan is part of China, "has no president and is not an independent country".

"The root cause of the current tensions in the Taiwan Strait lies in the Democratic Progressive Party authorities' stubborn insistence on Taiwan independence and secession," she said, referring to Taiwan's ruling party. "We are willing to create a broad space for peaceful reunification, but we will never leave any space for Taiwan independence and secession activities."

China calls Tsai - re-elected by a landslide in 2020 on a promise to stand up to Beijing - a separatist and refuses to speak to her.

Tsai's speech comes less than a week before China's ruling Communist Party's congress opens in Beijing, where President Xi Jinping is widely expected to win a precedent-breaking third five-year term.

An official familiar with Tsai's thinking, speaking on condition of anonymity, told reporters the president was looking to "clearly convey" her position to the world and Beijing.

"Standing firm on the status quo of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is the main axis of Tsai's comments on cross-strait relations this year," the official said, adding this was the world's expectation and responsibility of both Taipei and Beijing.

'NO ROOM FOR COMPROMISE'

Tsai said, to applause, that her government looked forward to the gradual post-pandemic resumption of healthy and orderly people-to-people exchanges across the strait, which would ease tensions.

But the broad consensus in Taiwan is that its sovereignty and free and democratic way of life must be defended, she added.

"On this point, we have no room for compromise," she said.

Tsai has made strengthening Taiwan's defences a cornerstone of her administration to enable it to mount a more credible deterrence to China, which is ramping up an ambitious modernisation programme of its own military.

Taiwan will show the world it is taking responsibility for its own defence, Tsai said.

Taiwan is increasing mass production of precision missiles and high-performance naval vessels, and working to acquire small, highly mobile weapons that will ensure Taiwan is fully prepared to respond to "external military threats", she added.

The military tensions have raised concerns, especially in the United States, about the concentration of chip making in Taiwan.

"I want to specifically emphasise one point to my fellow citizens and the international community, which is that the concentration of the semiconductor sector in Taiwan is not a risk," she said.

"We will continue to maintain Taiwan's advantages and capacity in leading-edge semiconductor manufacturing processes, and will help optimise the worldwide restructuring of the semiconductor supply chain, giving our semiconductor firms an even more prominent global role," she added.

Reporting by Yimou Lee and Ben Blanchard; Additional reporting by Martin Pollard in Beijing; Editing by Shri Navaratnam and Gerry Doyle

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Yimou Lee

9. No Surprise That OPEC-Plus Sides With Russia Over Biden In Oil Market

Excerpt:

There is clearly bad blood between Biden and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman over the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, and the White House’s attempts to resurrect a nuclear deal with Iran, Saudi Arabia’s arch enemy. The Saudis view Russia as a more important ally than the United States right now. OPEC-plus wants to keep Russia in the fold and Moscow happy. The cartel could care less about its relations with the West.

No Surprise That OPEC-Plus Sides With Russia Over Biden In Oil Market

Forbes · by Dan Eberhart · October 7, 2022

... [+]AFP via Getty Images

OPEC-plus's headline-grabbing decision to cut production by 2 million barrels per day in November is a slap in the face to President Joe Biden and other Western leaders.

While the actual drop will be about 1.2 million barrels a day due to the Saudi-led cartel’s ongoing failure to hit production targets, the reduction is still a heavy blow to President Joe Biden’s efforts to rein in energy prices.

Even if executed at a 60% level, the OPEC-plus cuts will push inventory draws into bullish territory. That puts benchmark Brent crude on the path to reach $100 a barrel before the end of the year. The assault on oil markets comes when the global economy is already teetering on the cusp of recession and right as the northern hemisphere heads into the cold winter months.

OPEC-plus leaders claim their decision is in response to an “uncertain” global economic outlook and the need for long-term guidance in the oil market and that it needs more spare production capacity to deal with the volatile market going forward.

But politics are clearly at play. The Saudi Arabia-led cartel and its allies, mainly Russia, are siding with Moscow over the West, which lobbied hard against further cuts by the group of 26 producing nations. President Biden was disappointed by the “short-sighted decision,” and the White House said it was clear that OPEC-plus aligned with Russia.

The Great Power Competition is alive and well.

OPEC-plus is opting for a “sell more for less” strategy amid weaker-than-expected demand as the threat of recession looms. That is precisely the outcome Moscow wants in the face of tightening Western sanctions, a European Union import ban set to take effect on December 5th, and a price cap on Russian exports imposed by the G7 nations.

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Even if Russia receives less cash for its crude oil due to the price cap – and remember, it’s already selling oil at a significant discount to China and India – it will still generate healthy revenues to fund its war against Ukraine.

This is a major victory for Russia and a big hit to the G7 – the United States, Canada, Japan, France, Italy, the UK, and Germany.

Why did the Saudis do it? It’s no secret that Saudi Arabia and other OPEC-plus member nations were getting tired of Western interventions in the global oil market, which they consider theirs alone to control. They have also been frustrated by the United States and Europe’s ongoing attempts to dismiss oil’s role in the energy transition in their efforts to tackle climate change.

In response to the OPEC-plus cuts, Democrats in Congress are introducing bills to reduce our military assistance to the Saudis, but that’s aiming at the wrong target – it won’t do any good to cut military aid to Saudi Arabia. We must address our failing energy policy and take an America First approach to reduce gas prices.

The Biden administration has released record amounts of oil from U.S. strategic reserves this year to combat rising oil prices, taking Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) inventories down to a 40-year low. That has only further weakened U.S. energy security and leaves our nation ill-equipped to deal with a worsening supply crunch.

Policymakers should be doing everything in their power to produce more energy here in America, not asking foreign regimes for more oil. It is time to get serious about reducing prices and stop pretending that energy security doesn’t matter.

Instead, Biden has restricted drilling on federal lands, reversed efforts to streamline the permitting process, and generally demonized U.S. oil producers even though we are decades away from completing the transition to a low-carbon economy. He’s also done zero to address the demand side of the equation. The Biden administration’s energy policy is gaslighting at its finest.

The Biden administration’s criticism of the Saudis for cutting production is an excuse for the administration’s restrictions on domestic oil and gas production.

It’s ridiculous that any politician would blame the Saudis when our own policies have made us more dependent on foreign – and often hostile – energy suppliers. Saudi Arabia isn’t the villain; our bad policies are.

There is clearly bad blood between Biden and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman over the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, and the White House’s attempts to resurrect a nuclear deal with Iran, Saudi Arabia’s arch enemy. The Saudis view Russia as a more important ally than the United States right now. OPEC-plus wants to keep Russia in the fold and Moscow happy. The cartel could care less about its relations with the West.

America should boost our production to help slash prices, not rely on the Saudis.

Forbes · by Dan Eberhart · October 7, 2022

10. 8 years of combat hardened Ukraine’s army into a fighting force

Interesting analysis:

The military was among the last institutions in Ukraine to change. Still, according to Zagorodnyuk, the reforms were “transformational.” Add NATO training, the development of a new U.S.-style corps of noncommissioned officers with decision-making powers and accorded greater respect, plus eight years of experience fighting in Donbas, and the profile of Ukraine’s military has become dramatically different from Russia’s.

On Sunday, the German newspaper Welt am Sonntag reported the European Union has agreed to train a further 15,000 Ukrainian soldiers in EU countries, starting with Germany and Poland.

According to Zagorodnyuk, as many as 500,000 Ukrainian men and women cycled through the trenches along the 2015 Donbas cease-fire line, where fighting continued daily despite the truce, right up to Putin’s Feb. 24 invasion.

After intervening directly, if covertly, to decide the 2014-2015 Donbas conflict, Russia mostly sent officers to coordinate the fight in the trenches. As a result, it never had that training ground for its troops. Whereas the vast majority of Russian soldiers who came to Ukraine in February had never been to war, Ukraine had both a serving military and deep bench of reserves that had.

8 years of combat hardened Ukraine’s army into a fighting force

Stars and Stripes · by Marc Champion · October 9, 2022

This satellite image provided by Maxar Technologies shows damage to the Kerch Bridge, which connects the Crimean Peninsula with Russia crossing a strait between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, and rail cars on fire on Saturday, Oct. 8, 2022. (Maxar Technologies)

When Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered unmarked troops to Ukraine in 2014, first in Crimea and then the eastern borderlands of Donbas, they were better equipped, trained and organized — and they crushed their opponents.

Eight years on, the roles are reversed. That’s due to a multitude of factors: The modern weapons and training provided to Ukraine by its allies, the vastly better morale of its military, the caliber of its commanders, intelligence and planning aid from the US, plus catastrophic tactical errors by the Kremlin and its generals.

One cause, however, stands out: The very different ways in which two armies both with Soviet roots have learned to fight.

The impact on and off the battlefield has been profound, with Ukrainian forces able to conduct rapid, combined force operations in a September drive from Kharkiv in the northeast to the Donbas region that, just months earlier, had proved beyond the capabilities of their Russian adversaries.

In the southern Kherson region, Ukraine has added a third major front where is forcing Russian troops into retreat, following Kharkiv and, back in April, the capital, Kyiv. On Saturday, a huge explosion hit the bridge Putin built to connect Crimea with the mainland.

“He is not joking,” U.S. President Biden said Thursday, of Putin’s threats to deploy tactical nuclear weapons. “Because his military is, you might say, significantly underperforming.”

The poor Russian performance has sparked a backlash at home, with hawkish figures from Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov to reputed mercenary chief Yevgeniy Prigozhin lashing out at the failures of military commanders. On Saturday, Putin for the first time publicly put a single general — Sergei Surovikin — in command of the entire Ukraine operation. Surovikin heads Russia’s air force and had been in charge of the invasion’s southern theater.

People close to the Russian defense ministry said they recognized the efficiency of Ukraine’s more devolved command structure from the early stages of the war. Russian military bloggers, meanwhile, have described the disorienting effect of attacks from the rear by small, mobile Ukrainian units, because it’s difficult to know in real time how big the threat of encirclement is.

After its 2015 defeat, Ukraine’s regular army had to be rebuilt almost from scratch. Hollowed out by decades of underfunding, corruption and later deliberate degradation under the pro-Russian former president Viktor Yanukovych, it could field just 6,000 combat ready troops against Russia’s hybrid forces.

A clutch of defense ministers Yanukovych appointed before being forced from office in 2014 have since been prosecuted; in one case the charge was “treason in the interests of the Russian Federation.” By the time Andriy Zagorodnyuk, a civilian entrepreneur, was parachuted into the ministry to drive reform in 2015, it was clear to him that a Russian plan to “demilitarize” Ukraine had been underway for years.

“It was never just about the Donbas,” said Zagorodnyuk, interviewed in Kyiv. “It was from the start about controlling all of Ukraine.”

When Putin launched his invasion earlier this year, it was with a military that for eight years had been lavished with extra spending and equipment. If the U.S. agreed with the Kremlin on anything, it was that Ukraine’s defense force was outclassed and that Kyiv could fall in a matter of days.

That didn’t happen in part because at the core of Ukraine’s military reform, according to Zagorodnyuk, was the principle of “mission task command,” in which decision-making is handed to the lowest possible level.

“It is exactly the opposite of what happened in the post-Soviet and Russian armed forces,” said Zagorodnyuk, who served as defense minister from 2019 to 2020. He traced a 30-year post-independence trajectory in which both nations — including their militaries — were learning from very different pasts: One authoritarian and imperial, the other rebellious and individualistic. “It’s the same reason why the war is being fought.”

The military was among the last institutions in Ukraine to change. Still, according to Zagorodnyuk, the reforms were “transformational.” Add NATO training, the development of a new U.S.-style corps of noncommissioned officers with decision-making powers and accorded greater respect, plus eight years of experience fighting in Donbas, and the profile of Ukraine’s military has become dramatically different from Russia’s.

On Sunday, the German newspaper Welt am Sonntag reported the European Union has agreed to train a further 15,000 Ukrainian soldiers in EU countries, starting with Germany and Poland.

According to Zagorodnyuk, as many as 500,000 Ukrainian men and women cycled through the trenches along the 2015 Donbas cease-fire line, where fighting continued daily despite the truce, right up to Putin’s Feb. 24 invasion.

After intervening directly, if covertly, to decide the 2014-2015 Donbas conflict, Russia mostly sent officers to coordinate the fight in the trenches. As a result, it never had that training ground for its troops. Whereas the vast majority of Russian soldiers who came to Ukraine in February had never been to war, Ukraine had both a serving military and deep bench of reserves that had.

At least as important are the young officers who served in Donbas from 2014, trained with NATO and rose to become generals — including the 49-year-old commander in chief of Ukraine’s armed forces, Valeriy Zaluzhnyi.

That difference has significant implications as Putin orders a mobilization of fighting age men that have at some point served in the armed forces, months after Ukraine ordered its own draft. Russia’s mobilization aims to raise about 300,000 recruits, but there are few qualified officers available to train them into a fighting force, and no empowered NCOs to mentor them within units.

Nor can the rigid, top down nature of the Russian military command structure be easily altered in the political system Putin has created since coming to power more than 20 years ago.

While the war’s outcome is far from decided and Russia’s armed forces retain advantages in key areas such as sheer quantities of artillery, long range missiles and aircraft, they have for now lost the initiative to Ukraine.

“I think our experience since 1991 contributed a lot,” says Mykola Bielieskov, research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies, a Ukraine government think tank. That includes the 2004 Orange and 2014 Maidan popular revolts, as well as the Donbas conflict that followed, when Ukrainians instantly self-organized to feed protesters, form militias or crowdfund basic medical and military supplies.

By February, when Ukraine came under attack from a vastly larger and better equipped Russian force, it was only the instinct to self-organize that saved cities like Kharkiv, Mykolayiv and Kryvyi Rih from being overwhelmed, because in many cases there was little or no regular army to defend them.

“We needed to improvise to survive,” Bielieskov said. If people had waited for orders from Kyiv, or “we’d fought the way the Russians do, we’d have been quickly overwhelmed.”

As Ukraine has moved onto the offensive, those advantages have been on display again. Like Russia, it has faced the challenge of having to break through defensive lines without the air superiority needed to protect its forces from ambush or counterattack.

Reliant on slow moving artillery, Russia could only pound Ukraine’s defenses and then edge slowly forward in Donbas. In its drive east from Kharkiv, by contrast, Ukraine, could bring its heavy guns forward in real time to perform the role of air cover, according to Bielieskov.

That was partly down to having some mobile systems like the French Caesar and Polish Krab self-propelled howitzers to deploy. But it was also because Ukraine’s gunners had learned to rapidly dismantle and reassemble the much more plentiful, static, U.S. M777 howitzers.

“I think the Russians made a big mistake giving us eight years to prepare,” Bielieskov said.

Stars and Stripes · by Marc Champion · October 9, 2022

11. If Putin loses the war, what happens to the rest of the world?

Excerpts:

This is what Putin’s monumental miscalculation has wrought for a country that, whatever its shortcomings, has no shortage of proud traditions and gifted citizens, and which during his early years in power had attained a place of significant influence and respect in the world. Russia has arrived at a critical, even existential, crossroads at least three times since World War I — during its 1917 revolution, facing the German onslaught on its territory that began in 1941, and then in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. These were huge and very different challenges, and Russia is in some ways still working its way through the consequences of all those upheavals.

With his Ukraine invasion, and the folly of his many moves since, Putin appears to be driving the country toward another crossroads. The outcome looks every bit as uncertain and potentially destabilizing as those earlier cataclysmic events.

If Putin loses the war, what happens to the rest of the world?​

A former CIA leader on the cataclysms that may lie ahead — and how the U.S. should deal with them.

John McLaughlin

Special Contributor

October 10, 2022​

grid.news · by John McLaughlin

In October 1989, I was in what was then West Germany. It was one month before the Berlin Wall was breached — a stunning moment that would lead in short order to the collapse of communist East Germany and the reunification of the German state less than a year later. In hindsight, the discussions I had in West Germany that fall were almost as remarkable as the globe-changing events that followed; every German leader I met with then — to a person — insisted that Germany would not and could not be reunited in their lifetimes.

I was there with then-CIA Director William Webster, meeting with senior intelligence and government officials to better understand the changes sweeping across the Soviet satellite countries of Eastern Europe. These people simply could not conceive of a reunified German state and an effective end to the Cold War, nor could they envision the path that might take them there. Never mind that CIA analysts were telling me that the “German Question” — a phrase implying reunification — was back on the table.

I share this history to make two points. First, as the physicist Niels Bohr famously said, “prediction is difficult — especially about the future.” Second, I think we have arrived at a moment in the Ukraine War that shares much in common with 1989 in West Germany, in that this is a time when all of us have trouble imagining the future with any certainty, and some of us may be looking ahead with too much certainty, just as those German officials did in 1989. And as a result, many of us may look back and wonder how we missed what was coming.

Such forward thinking may be especially difficult for the Russians themselves. I sensed this in recent off-the-record meetings with very knowledgeable, internationally minded Russians, people who strongly oppose the war (”off-the-record” meaning I can discuss what they said, but not who said it). These are sophisticated policy analysts who left Russia as President Vladimir Putin went to war. While they fully understand that the war in Ukraine is going very badly for their country, and that Russia might actually lose, they can’t quite get their heads around how that would look and where it might lead.

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In particular, the idea that Putin’s regime might collapse is almost impossible for them to visualize. Putin and his system are so deeply embedded in their experience of Russia that even the most clear-eyed Russians I have spoken with believe that even if the Russians lose (I can’t speak to whether they think a win is still possible), Putin would hang on to power in some weakened state.

They may be right. But increasingly, such assumptions look as shaky as the assumptions made by those West German officials more than three decades ago. We — and they — should not be surprised by a Ukrainian victory, and if that happens, we should not be surprised to see some startling changes within the Kremlin itself. Back in April, when the war was still young, I wrote for Grid that having watched Putin closely for 20 years, “this is the first time that I doubt his ability to survive politically.” I stand by those words now, particularly given what we have seen since: Russia’s catastrophic defeats on the battlefield, Putin’s narrowing of diplomatic exit ramps with his sham annexation of territory in eastern and southern Ukraine, an emerging opposition in Russia, new reservations expressed by Putin’s foreign allies, the desperation shown by his highly unpopular “partial mobilization,” and the stampede for the exits that the mobilization has inspired.

This weekend’s explosion on the Kerch Strait Bridge is both a symbolic and strategic blow to Putin and his war. Symbolic, because the bridge — which links the Russian-held Crimean peninsula to Russia — was a point of pride for the Russian leader. He attended the opening in 2018. It’s a strategic nightmare because the bridge is a critical supply route for the Russians in Crimea.

It’s only the latest in a series of events that raise questions about what a Russian defeat might look like — and then what it will mean for the region and the world.

These are questions as profound as those the world wrestled with when the Berlin Wall came down. Perhaps more so.

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Might Russia lose?

There is no question: Ukrainians have the battlefield momentum right now. Their forces are advancing on two fronts, either taking or threatening territory that Putin announced just 10 days ago would be Russian territory “forever.” The U.S. and NATO weapons flow continues. Reports of chaos and even anger within the Russian army come almost daily.

I believe some version of defeat is increasingly likely for Russia. I base that on all that we now see, and on my own and others’ experiences with war.

Militarily, the Russians have failed in their theater-level strategy — unrealistic estimates of the force required, an absence of senior enlisted leaders empowered to make decisions at the front, and a gross underestimate of the Ukrainian and NATO responses. The Russians have also failed on the logistical front — here, I take my cue from University of St. Andrews scholar Phillip O’Brien, who has studied World War II logistics more extensively than anyone I know. He believes that Russia will not be able to train its new raw (and perhaps unwilling) recruits adequately, nor equip them properly, in time to swing the battlefield momentum.

Then there is the more elusive metric: the will to fight. My own understanding of this comes from direct engagement in one war (Vietnam) and indirect involvement in two others (Afghanistan and Iraq). Ultimately, any war becomes very personal and its success rests heavily on whether individual soldiers are ready to risk their lives to defeat an opponent. An army arrives at that readiness through some combination of strong identification with a cause, a government that commands respect, and a conviction that one must destroy the adversary to save oneself and one’s comrades. By now, it is clear that on all these fronts, the Ukrainians hold the overwhelming advantage.

So a Ukrainian victory over the vaunted Russian army is increasingly possible.

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What defeat might look like

How to define a victory for Ukraine? Or, from the other side, what would defeat look like for Russia? To some degree, only Putin himself can answer that — given that he has shifted his war aims and narrative multiple times since the first troops rolled in. But I think he would see it as a defeat if his forces were driven back to the small areas of Donetsk and Luhansk where Russian proxies held sway as Putin’s invasion kicked off on Feb. 24.

That said, the way things are going, “defeat” could look worse from the Russian perspective; Ukraine may push further and expel Russian forces from those territories Putin held prior to the war. It is harder perhaps to imagine a Ukrainian recapture of Crimea, which Putin seized in 2014, but even this is no longer out of the question.

It would be hard for Putin to spin any of these outcomes into “mission accomplished”; as Grid has reported, some of his most stalwart pro-war propagandists have begun questioning Russia’s performance and demanded that more territory be taken, no matter the costs to Russian soldiers. For many vocal and influential Russians, any of the above scenarios would be seen as an unacceptable humiliation.

Several analysts have argued that Russia still has a vast military that it has yet to commit, and which dwarfs the Ukrainian capability. But where is it? Is Putin saving this card for a larger battle with NATO — even though he calls the battle with Kviv “existential”? And if he really holds that military strength, why must he mobilize 300,000 untrained and unwilling Russians to continue the fight in Ukraine?

Something doesn’t add up.

The nuclear fears

If the Russians lose, or appear on the verge of losing, then what?

Putin has pointed repeatedly to his nuclear arsenal and called its potential use “no bluff.” Whether he would go this far is simply unknowable, perhaps even to Putin himself. Russian doctrine does allow for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the event its conventional forces are overwhelmed, but this has never been tested on the battlefield. The White House and Pentagon have surely been gaming out such scenarios and potential responses; no doubt their European counterparts have been as well. Perhaps the best odds anyone can give regarding Putin going nuclear is that the chances are not zero; the West would be foolish to rule it out.

If Putin did resort to nukes, what would the U.S. and its allies do? I have no “inside” information, but I suspect the answer would depend on factors such as where Putin strikes, and with what kind and yield of weapon (ground attack or air detonation, e.g.). There would be no shortage of potential retaliation targets — as suggested by some retired U.S. military officers — ranging from supply depots to Black Sea bases and many others. The U.S., which has impressive conventional capabilities, would not have to “go nuclear” to make its point in a devastating way. So, while I do not know what the U.S. contingency plan is, I’m confident there is one.

What should the U.S. do in this nightmare scenario? My own advice — in the event Putin deploys a small tactical nuclear weapon: Don’t be hasty. Condemn the act in the most serious terms but hold any retaliation long enough to let the world and his fellow Russians absorb what he has done. How long to hold fire would depend partly on how the world reacted; for one thing, a Russian nuclear attack would confront China and Putin’s other enablers — all of whom oppose any “first use” of nuclear weapons — with an act they would almost certainly deplore and probably condemn outright. U.S. retaliation might be essential eventually, but an instant response would raise unprecedented questions of nuclear escalation. It would probably also be twisted by Putin and some of his foreign backers who’ve argued that he was pushed to war by U.S. and NATO policies.

The fall of Putin?

It is no longer unthinkable that Putin will lose power in the event of a catastrophic outcome in Ukraine — the collapse of the Russian military or its expulsion from the country. Exactly how this would unfold is not clear, which helps explain why even those sophisticated Russians I spoke with find the scenarios so hard to fathom.

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Under Putin’s own last round of constitutional changes, in the event that a sitting president leaves office, the prime minister (currently an obscure former taxation official hand-picked by Putin), would become president for 90 days or until a new election can be held. Of course, the problem with this orderly scenario is that no one sees Putin allowing it to happen.

But if Russia suffers defeat in Ukraine, the Russian elite and all those ultranationalists who dominate the media would have to contemplate a world in which Russia and many of its leaders remain under Western sanctions, with a weak and globally isolated leader at the helm, and Russia carrying little weight on the world stage. Would they accept that? Their capacity for sycophancy has been almost boundless, but it is already fraying; calls for a more competent and brutal campaign have filled the airwaves lately, and public criticism of the mobilization has been heard all over the vast reaches of the Russian Federation.

One possibility is that as the bad news persists, Russian military and security service leaders might act as a kind of informal “politburo” and inform Putin that they can no longer support him, and that it is time for him to retire to his dacha with some honor intact.

That may prove to be wishful thinking as well. Other outcomes are possible — including a breakdown of public order — but with Russia’s highly centralized system and the security services willing so far to brutally put down all forms of protest, that scenario is even harder to imagine.

Finally, some Russians — struggling to imagine the aftermath of a Russian loss — sketch yet another scenario, one that might be described as a slow fading away for the Russian leader. A weakened Putin would cling to power, many more Russians would leave the country, and Russia would for a time simply exist as a dispirited and weak country.

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This is what Putin’s monumental miscalculation has wrought for a country that, whatever its shortcomings, has no shortage of proud traditions and gifted citizens, and which during his early years in power had attained a place of significant influence and respect in the world. Russia has arrived at a critical, even existential, crossroads at least three times since World War I — during its 1917 revolution, facing the German onslaught on its territory that began in 1941, and then in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. These were huge and very different challenges, and Russia is in some ways still working its way through the consequences of all those upheavals.

With his Ukraine invasion, and the folly of his many moves since, Putin appears to be driving the country toward another crossroads. The outcome looks every bit as uncertain and potentially destabilizing as those earlier cataclysmic events.

Thanks to Lillian Barkley for copy editing this article.

grid.news · by John McLaughlin

12. 'Everyone's Drunk. No Uniforms. No Food.' Inside The Confusion Greeting Some Of Russia's Newly Mobilized Troops

'Everyone's Drunk. No Uniforms. No Food.' Inside The Confusion Greeting Some Of Russia's Newly Mobilized Troops

October 09, 2022 19:45 GMT

By Siberia.Realities

rferl.org · by Siberia.Realities

Four days after Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the order to mobilize hundreds of thousands of men to fight in Ukraine, Aleksandr Koltun, a 35-year-old father of six, showed up at the local draft board office in the Siberian city of Bratsk and presented himself for service.

He, and a batch of other conscripts, were sent later that day to Novosibirsk for further preparations for deployment.

Nine days later, his relatives said, he was dead.

“My daughter-in-law…told me, she called me in tears in the middle of the night and said that Sasha had died,” Koltun’s mother, Yelena Gudo, said, using Aleksandr’s familiar, affectionate name.

Russia is continuing to ramp up its mobilization efforts, a massive campaign aimed at shoring up the faltering, seven-month war in Ukraine and, by extension, the credibility of the Kremlin. Tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of Russians are being called up under the process.

By all accounts, the process has been chaotic and haphazard.

Newly mobilized soldiers -- known colloquially in Russian as mobiki -- have reported being left without food and water while awaiting orders; videos have shown logistics officers telling new conscripts to buy their own equipment, or take first-aid supplies from their own home medicine cabinets -- or even their wives’ personal sanitary supplies. Soldiers have taken to posting videos on Russian social networks complaining about the conditions and disorganization.

The process has also seen a small, but growing number of fatalities. At least 16 people have died, according to news reports and activists, since Putin made the announcement on September 21.

Many of the deaths have been reported as suicides. Others, like Koltun’s, are unexplained, and his relatives fear they will never find out how he died.

“What really happened there, we still don’t know,” she told RFE/RL’s Siberia Realities.

'All Mothers Need To Think Before Sending Their Sons There'

Koltun and his wife Galina, his relatives told RFE/RL, were raising six children together in a one-room apartment that Galina has been given free-of-charge by the government due to her being an orphan.

Four of their children were from Galina’s first marriage; the youngest was a 16-month-old girl.

Koltun first worked as a security guard and later he and his mother pooled resources to invest in a shoe shop in Bratsk, an industrial city of 224,000 located on the banks of the Angara River

He had also served previously in the military -- in the Airborne Forces -- which made him a prime candidate to be mobilized under the Putin order, an order that prioritized men in the reserves or those simply with prior military service. He showed up at the local recruitment office on September 25, to present his papers.

“I didn’t want to let him go,” Gudo, Koltun’s mother, told RFE/RL. “I said: ‘Son, you have such a large family, with whom will they be? And he said that the sooner he leaves, the sooner he will return.

“All mothers need to think before sending their sons there,” she said.

Aleksandr Koltun and his mother, Yelena.

Anastasia Pestova, who said she was a friend of the family, told RFE/RL that all Koltun’s relatives and friends were against Aleksandr's decision to volunteer.

“You can’t say that he joined the army because of the money,” she told RFE/RL “They didn't need it, they had a good, big car. Both mother and wife, of course, tried to dissuade him. They were afraid for him.”

Koltun called his relatives from Novosibirsk, where he and the other men from Bratsk had been sent for further preparations and training.

Gudo said her son brought 7,000 rubles (about $112) with him to Novosibirsk, but when he called on October 2, he no longer had any money. He said that at the staging grounds, unidentified people were selling “bad” vodka, that the conscripts were drinking heavily. She said Koltun told her he wasn’t.

“But what the hell is going on there?” she asked.

When he called “he said that it was a complete mess,” Gudo said. “He said ‘we walk and wander back and forth, everyone's drunk, they didn’t give us any uniforms, there's no food'.’”

“He said that he was only eating what he brought from home. How is this possible in the army?” Gudo said.

Photo Gallery:

Tearful Farewells And Religious Blessings As Mobilized Russians Head To War Against Ukraine

• RFE/RL

Following Russian President Vladimir Putin's recently announced "partial mobilization" for the war in Ukraine, many draftees, including some claiming to have no military experience, are reporting to their assigned collection points around the country for service.

She said on October 3 that they were sent a photograph of Koltun from Novosibirsk, via WhatsApp, by a friend who had been mobilized with him. In the photograph, Koltun was seen sitting on concrete, huddled in pain, waiting for an ambulance.

“He had recently been diagnosed with a hernia, but he believed that it would not prevent him from serving. He didn't care about such things. But I cannot believe that there was no medical commission during the mobilization! They were not even given basic medical exams,” she said.

Gudo said neither she nor her daughter-in-law -- Koltun’s wife -- heard any official notice or condolence or explanation from the draft board or military recruiters about the death.

Gudo said they were told by officials that her son’s body would be returned from Novosibirsk to Bratsk on October 10, and they were presented with a 180,000-ruble (US$2,900) bill for the cost of transporting it.

City officials have offered to compensate them for the transportation, she said.

“We still don't have a death certificate. It looks like he had a heart attack, but he didn't have any heart problems,” she said.

“How is this possible?” she said. “This is mobilization.”

'He Couldn't Walk On His Own'

The reports of deaths -- accidental or otherwise -- make up a tiny proportion of all the men who have been mobilized. Still, the cases have reverberated for families and helped to erode confidence in the system, and add to doubts about the goals of the Ukraine war.

Denis Kozlov, 44, was among the first group of men mobilized from the Argayshsky district, in the central region of Chelyabinsk, on September 27.

“We didn’t resist this plan, because Denis dreamed of being a military man since childhood. He graduated from the Chelyabinsk Tank School, served in Ulan-Ude for quite a bit,” his mother, Zoya, told RFE/RL.

SEE ALSO:

Across Russia, Putin's Mobilization Seeps Deeper Into An Anxious Society

Kozlov had torn cartilage in one of his knees, but he did not want to be seen as dodging the new draft, so, his mother said, he went to the draft board and presented his medical records.

“But there was no medical commission here, so he was put on a bus along with his medical documents,” she said. “We figured that the medical board on the draft commission, if anything, will wrap up his case” and send him home.

Three days later, Kozlov was returned home, she said: in an ambulance, on a stretcher.

“I ran around to the neighbors, asking for help to take Denis out of the ambulance,” she said. “He couldn't walk on his own. He was conscious, but even my father and I did not immediately recognize him.”

Kozlov died not long afterward and his mother suspects it was not of natural causes.

“His nose was broken when he was brought” home, she said. “All the neighbors saw it, and his stomach was all blue. I'm sure he was beaten there, and very badly. But now I can't prove anything! I have lived my life here and I know how they will ‘investigate.’”

“I don't have any piece of paper to prove that my son was beaten and didn't die of an illness,” she said.

Kozlov was laid to rest on October 3, three days after coming home.

'Mistakes Must Be Corrected'

On September 26, just five days after the mobilization announcement, amid the growing reports of disorganized procedures as well as public protests, Putin publicly acknowledged problems with the process.

SEE ALSO:

Live Briefing: Russia Invades Ukraine

“In the course of this mobilization, many questions are coming up, and all mistakes must be corrected and prevented from happening in the future,” Putin said during a meeting of his Security Council.

“For example, I’m thinking of fathers of many children, or people suffering from chronic diseases, or who those who are already past conscription age,” he said.

rferl.org · by Siberia.Realities

13. The U.N. Abandons the Uyghurs

Excerpt:

Pragmatists might be pleased that the motion Thursday failed by only two votes, after a fierce lobbying campaign by Beijing to defeat it. But what a disgrace. Everyone knows the U.N. Human Rights Council is a sinkhole of moral equivalence. But if it can’t pass a motion merely to open discussion on China’s abuses in Xinjiang, there is no reason for it to exist, or for the United States to continue to be a member.

The U.N. Abandons the Uyghurs

The Human Rights Council votes not to discuss its own commissioner’s findings on Chinese abuses in Xinjiang.

By The Editorial BoardFollow

Oct. 9, 2022 6:01 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-u-n-abandons-the-uyghurs-human-rights-council-vote-china-ukraine-xinjiang-province-11665350883?mod=opinion_lead_pos3

If pathological optimists still think the U.N. Human Rights Council cares about human rights, they might want to note events last week. A motion was made in Geneva to debate China’s abuses against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang province, and the council voted 19-17 not even to discuss it.

Siding with China against the motion were regular lackeys such as Cuba and Venezuela, as well as countries such as Nepal, Indonesia and Pakistan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates that don’t want to offend China or are on the hook as part of its Belt and Road Initiative.

The last four in that list are majority Muslim nations voting to ignore the documented persecution of a Chinese Muslim minority group. Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim country, and Pakistan’s state religion is Islam.

In addition to China, the other nations on the dishonor role were: Bolivia, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Eritrea, Gabon, Kazakhstan, Mauritania, Namibia, Senegal, Sudan and Uzbekistan. There were also 11 abstentions, including India, Mexico and Ukraine. Perhaps Kyiv hopes to keep China from giving military aid to Russia’s invaders, but this wasn’t Ukraine’s finest hour. Mexico under President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has never met a left-wing dictatorship it didn’t support.

In August the U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights published a report that drew on interviews with former detainees in Xinjiang. “A consistent theme was description of constant hunger and, consequently, significant to severe weight loss during their periods in the facilities,” it said. “Almost all interviewees described either injections, pills or both being administered regularly.”

Read on, if you have the stomach. “Some also spoke of various forms of sexual violence, including some instances of rape,” the report said. “Several women recounted being subject to invasive gynaecological examinations, including one woman who described this taking place in a group setting.”

Routine abuses included being deprived of sleep and prayer, in addition to being forced to sing patriotic songs. The report asked China to look into “allegations of torture, sexual violence, ill-treatment, forced medical treatment, as well as forced labor and reports of deaths in custody.” It said the pattern of repeated maltreatment in Xinjiang “may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity.”

Pragmatists might be pleased that the motion Thursday failed by only two votes, after a fierce lobbying campaign by Beijing to defeat it. But what a disgrace. Everyone knows the U.N. Human Rights Council is a sinkhole of moral equivalence. But if it can’t pass a motion merely to open discussion on China’s abuses in Xinjiang, there is no reason for it to exist, or for the United States to continue to be a member.

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Appeared in the October 10, 2022, print edition as 'The U.N. Abandons the Uyghurs'.

14. The World According to Xi Jinping

Excerpts:

This should, therefore, cause Washington and its partners to carefully evaluate their existing China strategies. The United States should realize that China represents the most politically and ideologically disciplined challenger it has ever faced during its century of geopolitical dominance. U.S. strategists should avoid “mirror imaging” and should not assume that Beijing will act in ways that Washington would construe as rational or serving China’s self-interests.

The West won an ideological contest in the twentieth century. But China is not the Soviet Union, not least because China now has the second-largest economy in the world. And although Xi may not be Stalin, he is certainly not Mikhail Gorbachev, either. Xi’s adherence to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy has helped him consolidate his personal power. But this same ideological stance has also created dilemmas that the CCP will find difficult to resolve, especially as slowing economic growth puts in doubt the party’s long-standing social contract with the people.

Whatever may unfold, Xi will not abandon his ideology. He is a true believer. And this presents one further test for the United States and its allies. To prevail in the unfolding ideological war that now stretches before them will require a radical reembrace of the principles that distinguish liberal-democratic political systems. Western leaders must defend those ideals in word and deed. They, too, must become true believers.

The World According to Xi Jinping

What China’s Ideologue in Chief Really Believes

By Kevin Rudd

November/December 2022

Foreign Affairs · by Kevin Rudd · October 10, 2022

In the post–Cold War era, the Western world has suffered no shortage of grand theories of history and international relations. The settings and actors may change, but the global geopolitical drama goes on: variants of realism and liberalism compete to explain and predict state behavior, scholars debate whether the world is witnessing the end of history, a clash of civilizations, or something else entirely. And it is no surprise that the question that now attracts more analytical attention than any other is the rise of China under President Xi Jinping and the challenge it presents to American power. In the run-up to the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as Xi has maneuvered to consolidate his power and secure an unprecedented third term, Western analysts have sought to decode the worldview that drives him and his ambitions for China.

One important body of thought has been largely absent from this search for understanding, however: Marxism-Leninism. This is odd because Marxism-Leninism has been China’s official ideology since 1949. But the omission is also understandable, since most Western thinkers long ago came to see communist ideology as effectively dead—even in China, where, in the late 1970s, the CCP leader Deng Xiaoping set aside the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy of his predecessor, Mao Zedong, in favor of something more akin to state capitalism. Deng summed up his thoughts on the matter with characteristic bluntness: Bu zhenglun, “Let’s dispense with theory,” he told attendees at a major CCP conference in 1981. His successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao followed his lead, rapidly expanding the role of the market in the Chinese domestic economy and embracing a foreign policy that maximized China’s participation in a global economic order led by the United States.

Xi has brought that era of pragmatic, nonideological governance to a crashing halt. In its place, he has developed a new form of Marxist nationalism that now shapes the presentation and substance of China’s politics, economy, and foreign policy. In doing so, Xi is not constructing theoretical castles in the air to rationalize decisions that the CCP has made for other, more practical reasons. Under Xi, ideology drives policy more often than the other way around. Xi has pushed politics to the Leninist left, economics to the Marxist left, and foreign policy to the nationalist right. He has reasserted the influence and control the CCP exerts over all domains of public policy and private life, reinvigorated state-owned enterprises, and placed new restrictions on the private sector. Meanwhile, he has stoked nationalism by pursuing an increasingly assertive foreign policy, turbocharged by a Marxist-inspired belief that history is irreversibly on China’s side and that a world anchored in Chinese power would produce a more just international order. In short, Xi’s rise has meant nothing less than the return of Ideological Man.

These ideological trends are not simply a throwback to the Mao era. Xi’s worldview is more complex than Mao’s, blending ideological purity with technocratic pragmatism. Xi’s pronouncements about history, power, and justice might strike Western audiences as impenetrable or irrelevant. But the West ignores Xi’s ideological messaging at its own peril. No matter how abstract and unfamiliar his ideas might be, they are having profound effects on the real-world content of Chinese politics and foreign policy—and thus, as China’s rise continues, on the rest of the world.

PARTY MAN

Like all Marxist-Leninists, Xi bases his thinking on historical materialism (an approach to history focused on the inevitability of progress through ongoing class struggle) and dialectical materialism (an approach to politics that focuses on how change occurs when contradictory forces collide and are resolved). In his published writings, Xi deploys historical materialism to position the Chinese revolution in world history in a context in which China’s move to a more advanced stage of socialism necessarily accompanies the decline of capitalist systems. Through the lens of dialectical materialism, he portrays his agenda as a step forward in an ever-intensifying contest between the CCP and reactionary forces at home (an arrogant private sector, Western-influenced nongovernmental organizations, religious movements) and abroad (the United States and its allies).

These concepts may seem abstruse and arcane to those outside China. But they are taken seriously by elites in the CCP, senior Chinese officials, and many of the international relations scholars who advise the government. And Xi’s published writings on theory are vastly more extensive than those of any other Chinese leader since Mao. The CCP also draws on the kinds of economic and strategic advice that typically guide Western political systems. But within the Chinese system, Marxism-Leninism still serves as the ideological headwaters of a world view that places China on the right side of history and portrays the United States as struggling in the throes of inevitable capitalist decline, consumed by its own internal political contradictions and destined to fall by the wayside. That, in Xi’s view, will be the real end of history.

Under Xi, ideology drives policy more often than the other way around.

In 2013, barely five months after his appointment as party general secretary, Xi gave an address to the Central Conference on Ideology and Propaganda, a gathering of top party leaders in Beijing. The contents of the speech were not reported at the time but were leaked three months later and published by China Digital Times. The speech offers an unfiltered portrait of Xi’s deepest political convictions. In it, he dwells on the risks of the ideological decay that led to the collapse of Soviet communism, the West’s role in fomenting ideological division within China, and the need to crack down on all forms of dissent. “The disintegration of a regime often starts from the ideological area,” Xi said. “Political unrest and regime change may occur overnight, but ideological evolution is a long-term process,” he continued, warning that once “ideological defenses are breached, other defenses become very difficult to hold.” But the CCP “has justice on our side,” he assured his audience, encouraging them not to be “evasive, bashful, or mince our words” in dealing with Western countries, whose goal is “to vie with us for the battlefields of people’s hearts and for the masses, and in the end to overthrow the leadership of the CCP and China’s socialist system.”

This meant cracking down on anyone “harboring dissent and discord” and demanding that CCP members demonstrate loyalty not only to the party but also to Xi personally. What followed was an internal “cleansing” of the CCP, accomplished by purging any perceived political or institutional opposition, in large part through a decadelong anticorruption campaign that had begun even before the speech. A “rectification campaign” brought another round of purges to the party’s political and legal affairs apparatus. Xi also reasserted party control over the People’s Liberation Army and the People’s Armed Police and centralized China’s cybersecurity and surveillance systems. Finally, in 2019, Xi introduced a party-wide education campaign titled “Don’t Forget the Party’s Original Purpose, Keep the Mission in Mind.” According to an official document announcing the initiative, its goal was for party members “to gain theoretical learning and to be baptized in ideology and politics.” By around the end of his first term, it had become clear that Xi sought nothing less than to transform the CCP into the high church of a revitalized, secular faith.

HIGH MARX

In contrast to those immediate moves toward a more Leninist discipline in domestic politics, the shift to Marxist orthodoxy in economic policy under Xi has been more gradual. Economic management had long been the domain of the technocrats who serve on the State Council, China’s administrative cabinet. Xi’s personal interests also lay more in party history, political ideology, and grand strategy than in the details of financial and economic management. But as the party apparatus increasingly asserted control of the economic departments of the state, China’s policy debates on the relative roles of the state and the market became increasingly ideological. Xi also progressively lost confidence in market economics following the global financial crisis of 2008 and China’s homegrown financial crisis of 2015, which was sparked by the bursting of a stock market bubble and led to a nearly 50 percent collapse in the value of Chinese stocks before the markets finally settled in 2016.

China’s economic policy trajectory under Xi—from a consensus in support of market reforms to an embrace of increased party and state intervention—has therefore been uneven, contested, and at times contradictory. Indeed, in late 2013, less than six months after Xi’s revivalist sermon on ideology and propaganda, the Central Committee of the CCP (the top several hundred leaders of the party) adopted a remarkably reformist document on the economy, starkly titled “The Decision.” It outlined a series of policy measures that would allow the market to play “the decisive role” in the allocation of resources in the economy. But the rollout of these policies slowed to a standstill in 2015, while state-owned enterprises received trillions of dollars in investment from “industry guidance funds” between 2015 and 2021—a massive infusion of government support that brought the Chinese state roaring back to the center of economic policy.

Posters of Mao, Xi, and other senior Chinese leaders, Juancheng, China, February 2015

Reuters

At the 19th CCP Party Congress, in 2017, Xi announced that going forward, the party’s central ideological challenge would be to rectify the “unbalanced and inadequate development” that had emerged during the “reform and opening” period of market-based policy changes that Deng had inaugurated in the late 1970s. In a little-noticed speech published in the party’s ideological journal in 2021, Xi in effect challenged Deng’s definition of “the primary stage of socialism” and Deng’s belief that China would need to endure inequality for hundreds of years before achieving prosperity for all. Instead, Xi hailed a faster transition to a higher phase of socialism, declaring that “thanks to many decades of hard work, [this] is a period that marks a new starting point for us.” Xi rejected Deng’s gradualism and the notion that China was doomed to an indefinite future of developmental imperfection and class inequality. Through more rigorous adherence to Marxist principles, he promised, China could achieve both national greatness and greater economic equality in the not-too-distant future.

Such an outcome would rely on party committees increasing their influence on private firms by playing a larger role in selecting senior management and making critical board decisions. And as the Chinese state began securing equity in private firms, the state would also encourage successful entrepreneurs to invest in state-owned enterprises, mixing the market and the state to an ever-greater degree.

Meanwhile, CCP economic planners would be tasked with designing a “dual circulation economy,” which in effect meant that China would become increasingly self-reliant across all sectors of the economy while the world’s economies would become increasingly dependent on China. And in late 2020, Xi laid out an approach to income redistribution known as the “common prosperity agenda,” through which the rich were to be expected to “voluntarily” redistribute funds to state-favored programs to reduce income inequality. By the end of 2021, it was clear that Deng’s era of “reform and opening” was coming to a close. In its place stood a new statist economic orthodoxy.

“HISTORY IS THE BEST TEXTBOOK”

Xi’s push toward Leninist politics and Marxist economics has been accompanied by his adoption of an increasingly bracing form of nationalism, fueling an assertiveness abroad that has replaced the traditional caution and risk aversion that were the hallmarks of China’s foreign policy during the Deng era. Xi’s recognition of the importance of nationalism was evident early in his tenure. “In the West, there are people who say that China should change the angle of its historical propaganda, it should no longer make propaganda about its history of humiliation,” he noted in his 2013 speech. “But as I see it, we cannot heed this; forgetting history means betrayal. History objectively exists. History is the best textbook. A nation without historical memory does not have a future.” Immediately after Xi was installed as CCP general secretary in 2012, he led the newly appointed Politburo Standing Committee on a tour of an exhibition at the National Museum of China in Beijing titled “The Road to Rejuvenation,” which chronicled the perfidy of the Western imperial powers and Japan and the party’s heroic response during China’s “100 years of national humiliation.”

In the years since, the concept of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” has become the centerpiece of Xi’s nationalist vision. His goal is for China to become the preeminent Asian and global power by 2049. In 2017, Xi identified a number of quantitative benchmarks that the country must reach by 2035 on the road to that status, including becoming a “medium-level developed economy” and having “basically completed the modernization of China’s national defense and its armed forces.” To capture and codify his vision, Xi has introduced or highlighted a number of ideological concepts that collectively authorize China’s new, more assertive approach. First among these is “comprehensive national power” (zonghe guoli), which the CCP uses to quantify China’s combined military, economic, and technological power and foreign policy influence. Whereas this concept was used by Xi’s predecessors, only Xi was bold enough to claim that China’s power has grown so rapidly that the country has already “entered the leading ranks of the world.” Xi has also emphasized rapid changes in “the international balance of forces” (guoji liliang duibi), which refers to official comparisons the party uses to measure China’s progress in catching up with the United States and its allies. Official CCP rhetoric also features references to growing “multipolarity” (duojihua) in the international system and to irreversible increases in China’s power. Xi has also rehabilitated a Maoist aphorism hailing “the rise of the East and the decline of the West” (dongsheng xijiang) as a euphemism for China surpassing the United States.

Xi’s public praise for China’s growing national power has been much sharper and more expansive than that of his predecessors. In 2013, the CCP formally abandoned Deng’s traditional “diplomatic guidance,” dating from 1992, that China should “hide its strength, bide its time, and never take the lead.” Xi used the 2017 Party Congress Report to describe how China had promoted its “economic, scientific, technological, military, and comprehensive national power” to the extent that it had now “entered into the leading ranks of the world”—and that owing to an unprecedented increase in China’s international standing, “the Chinese nation, with an entirely new posture, now stands tall and firm in the East.”

THEORY AND PRACTICE

What matters most to those warily eyeing China’s rise is how these changing ideological formulations have been put into practice. Xi’s doctrinal statements are not only theoretical—they are also operational. They have laid the groundwork for a wide range of foreign policy steps that would have been unimaginable under earlier leaders. China has embarked on a series of island reclamations in the South China Sea and turned them into garrisons, ignoring earlier formal guarantees that it would not. Under Xi, the country has carried out large-scale, live-fire missile strikes around the Taiwanese coast, simulating a maritime and air blockade of the island—something that previous Chinese regimes refrained from doing despite having the ability to do so. Xi has intensified China’s border conflict with India through repeated border clashes and by building new roads, airfields, and other military-related infrastructure near the border. And China has embraced a new policy of economic and trade coercion against states whose policies offend Beijing and that are vulnerable to Chinese pressure.

China has also become far more aggressive in going after critics abroad. In July 2021, Beijing for the first time announced sanctions against individuals and institutions in the West that have had the temerity to criticize China. The sanctions are in harmony with the new ethos of “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy, which encourages Chinese diplomats to routinely and publicly attack their host governments—a radical departure from Chinese diplomatic practice over the last 35 years.

Xi’s ideological beliefs have committed China to the goal of building what Xi describes as a “fairer and more just” international system—one anchored in Chinese power rather than American power and one that reflects norms more consistent with Marxist-Leninist values. For that reason, China has pushed to strip UN resolutions of all references to universal human rights and has built a new set of China-centric international institutions, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, to rival and eventually replace Western-dominated ones. A Marxist-Leninist quest for a “more just” world also shapes China’s promotion of its own national development model across the global South as an alternative to the “Washington consensus” of free markets and democratic governance. And Beijing has offered a ready supply of surveillance technologies, police training, and intelligence collaboration to countries around the world, such as Ecuador, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe, that have eschewed the classical Western liberal-democratic model.

These changes in Chinese foreign and security policy were signaled well in advance by earlier shifts in Xi’s ideological line. Using what Western audiences might see as obscure, theoretical mumbo jumbo, Xi has communicated to the party a crystal-clear message: China is much more powerful than it ever was, and he intends to use this power to change the course of history.

IN IT TO WIN IT

Xi is 69 years old and seems unlikely to retire; as a lifelong student and practitioner of Chinese politics, he knows full well that if he did leave office, he and his family would be vulnerable to retribution from his successors. So Xi is likely to lead the country for the rest of his life, although his formal designations may change over time. His mother is 96 and his father lived until he was 89. If their longevity is any indication of his, he is poised to remain China’s paramount leader until at least the late 2030s.

Xi faces few political vulnerabilities. Elements of China’s society may begin to chafe at the increasingly repressive apparatus he has built. But contemporary surveillance technologies allow him to control dissent in ways that Mao and Joseph Stalin could hardly imagine. Xi exhibits growing confidence in China’s rising “nationalist generation,” especially the elites who have been educated at home rather than abroad, who came of age under his leadership rather than during the more liberal regimes of his predecessors, and who see themselves as the vanguard of Xi’s political revolution. It would be foolish to assume that Xi’s Marxist-Leninist vision will implode under the weight of its own internal contradictions in the near to medium term. If political change does come, it will more likely arrive after Xi’s death than before it.

But Xi is not completely secure. His Achilles’ heel is the economy. Xi’s Marxist vision of greater party control over the private sector, an expanding role for state-owned enterprises and industrial policy, and the quest for “common prosperity” through redistribution is likely to shrink economic growth over time. That is because declining business confidence will reduce private fixed capital investment in response to growing perceptions of political and regulatory risk; after all, what the state gives, the state can also take away. This applies in particular to the technology, finance, and property sectors, which have been China’s principal domestic growth engines for the last two decades. China’s attractiveness to foreign investors has also declined because of supply chain uncertainty and the impact of the new doctrines of national economic self-sufficiency. At home, China’s business elites have been spooked by the anticorruption campaign, the arbitrary nature of the party-controlled judicial system, and a growing number of high-profile tech titans falling out of political favor. And China has yet to figure out how to leave behind its “zero covid” strategy, which has compounded the country’s economic slowdown.

Xi speaking at an event commemorating the 200th birthday of Karl Marx, Beijing, May 2018

Jason Lee / Reuters

Adding to these weaknesses are a number of long-term structural trends: a rapidly aging population, a shrinking workforce, low productivity growth, and high levels of debt shared between state and private financial institutions. Whereas the CCP had once expected average annual growth to remain around six percent for the rest of the 2020s before slowing to around four percent for the 2030s, some analysts now worry that in the absence of a radical course correction, the economy will soon begin to stagnate, topping out at around three percent in the 2020s before falling to around two percent in the 2030s. As a result, China might enter the 2030s still locked in the so-called middle-income trap, with an economy smaller or only marginally larger than that of the United States. For China’s leadership, that outcome would have profound consequences. If employment and income growth falter, China’s budget would come under pressure, forcing the CCP to choose between providing health care, elder care, and pension entitlements on the one hand and pursuing national security goals, industrial policy, and the Belt and Road Initiative on the other. Meanwhile, China’s gravitational pull on the rest of the global economy would be called into question. The debate over whether the world has already witnessed “peak China” is only just beginning, and when it comes to China’s long-term growth, the jury is still out.

Therefore, the critical question for China in the 2020s is whether Xi can engineer a course correction to recover from the significant slowing of economic growth. That, however, would involve a considerable loss of face for him. More likely, he will try to muddle through, making as few ideological and rhetorical adjustments as possible and putting in place a new team of economic policymakers, hoping they can find a way to magically restore growth.

Xi’s Marxist nationalism is an ideological blueprint for the future; it is the truth about China that is hiding in plain sight. Under Xi, the CCP will evaluate changing international circumstances through the prism of dialectical analysis—and not necessarily in ways that will make sense to outsiders. For example, Xi will see new Western institutions intended to balance against China, such as the Quad (the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, a strategic cooperation agreement between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) and the AUKUS (a defense agreement linking Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), as both strategically hostile and ideologically predictable, requiring new forms of political, ideological, and military “struggle” to roll back. In his Marxist-Leninist view, China’s ultimate victory is guaranteed because the deep forces of historical determinism are on the CCP’s side, and the West is in structural decline.

Xi now sees threats on every front.

This view will affect the likelihood of conflict in Asia. Since 2002, the CCP’s code language for its belief that war was unlikely has been the official phrase “China continues to enjoy a period of strategic opportunity.” This statement is meant to convey that China will face a low risk of conflict for the foreseeable future and can therefore seek economic and foreign policy advantages while the United States is bogged down elsewhere, especially in the broader Middle East. But in the wake of Washington’s official labeling of China as a “strategic competitor” in 2017, the ongoing U.S.-Chinese trade war, mutual (if selective) forms of economic decoupling, and the hardening of U.S. alliances with Australia, Japan, South Korea, and NATO, the CCP is likely to change its formal analytical conclusion about the strategic environment.

The danger is that dialectical methodologies and the binary conclusions that they produce can lead to spectacularly incorrect conclusions when applied to the real world of international security. In the 1950s, Mao saw it as dialectically inevitable that the United States would attack China to snuff out the Chinese revolution on behalf of the forces of capitalism and imperialism. Despite the Korean War and two crises in the Taiwan Strait during that decade, no such attack materialized. Had Mao not taken such an ideological view, the thawing of China’s relationship with the United States could perhaps have been initiated a decade earlier than it was, particularly given the unfolding reality of the Sino-Soviet split that began after 1959. In similar fashion, Xi now sees threats on every front and has embarked on the securitization of virtually every aspect of Chinese public policy and private life. And once such threat perceptions become formal analytical conclusions and are translated into the CCP bureaucracies, the Chinese system might begin to function as if armed conflict were inevitable.

Xi’s ideological pronouncements shape how the CCP and its nearly 100 million members understand their country and its role in the world. They take such texts seriously; the rest of the world should, too. At the very least, Xi’s embrace of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy should put to rest any wishful thinking that Xi’s China might peacefully liberalize its politics and economy. And it should make clear that China’s approach to foreign policy is driven not only by a rolling calculus of strategic risk and opportunity but also by an underlying belief that the forces of historical change are inexorably driving the country forward.

China might begin to function as if armed conflict is inevitable.

This should, therefore, cause Washington and its partners to carefully evaluate their existing China strategies. The United States should realize that China represents the most politically and ideologically disciplined challenger it has ever faced during its century of geopolitical dominance. U.S. strategists should avoid “mirror imaging” and should not assume that Beijing will act in ways that Washington would construe as rational or serving China’s self-interests.

The West won an ideological contest in the twentieth century. But China is not the Soviet Union, not least because China now has the second-largest economy in the world. And although Xi may not be Stalin, he is certainly not Mikhail Gorbachev, either. Xi’s adherence to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy has helped him consolidate his personal power. But this same ideological stance has also created dilemmas that the CCP will find difficult to resolve, especially as slowing economic growth puts in doubt the party’s long-standing social contract with the people.

Whatever may unfold, Xi will not abandon his ideology. He is a true believer. And this presents one further test for the United States and its allies. To prevail in the unfolding ideological war that now stretches before them will require a radical reembrace of the principles that distinguish liberal-democratic political systems. Western leaders must defend those ideals in word and deed. They, too, must become true believers.

• KEVIN RUDD is President of the Asia Society, in New York, and previously served as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Australia.

Foreign Affairs · by Kevin Rudd · October 10, 2022

15. Will Putin's War in Ukraine Continue Without Him?

Conclusion:

If Putin departs office (voluntarily or not) with the war in Ukraine ongoing, his successor may elect to quit fighting, but the decision will not be easy or risk free, and this holds regardless of who replaces Putin, whether it is Medvedev, Sobyanin, or even Navalny. Given his responsibility for starting the war, Putin is highly susceptible to blame and punishment for how the war ends and is apt to keep fighting despite mounting costs and little hope of winning. But any new leader who inherits Putin’s war would not be immune to similar domestic pressures. With any case of costly, protracted war, the politics of blame can have a powerful impact on war termination decision-making and potentially drive new leaders to keep fighting even if they did not support the war prior to taking office. But Russia’s current domestic political environment, with its vicious blame game pitting political versus military leadership, would be especially problematic for a new political leader seeking to extricate Russia from the war. Looking at the historical record, many new leaders in comparable circumstances have decided to keep fighting an ongoing war or else push for peace only to have the extrication process drag on for years. It is difficult and probably pointless to predict the outcome of any wartime change of leadership in the case of Russia’s war in Ukraine. At a minimum, however, the West should not assume a change of leadership would result in an end to the war, at least in the short term, as Putin’s war could very well continue without Putin.

Will Putin's War in Ukraine Continue Without Him? - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Shawn Cochran · October 10, 2022

Will Russia’s war in Ukraine continue if Russian President Vladimir Putin leaves office? Since the invasion in February, there has been ongoing deliberation about how long Putin will remain in power, his hypothetical demise an outcome of failing health or domestic political ouster. Underpinning this deliberation is speculation, or perhaps hope, that without Putin, Russia might be more apt to abandon its war in Ukraine and seek a negotiated peace. Although supported by conventional views of war termination, any such assumption is problematic. History demonstrates that the leader who starts a costly, protracted war is rarely willing to end the war short of victory — but history also shows that leadership change does not always facilitate peace.

For political leaders, the desire to avoid blame and domestic punishment for a failed war can have a powerful effect on war termination decision-making. Per the conventional wisdom, leaders responsible for starting a war are uniquely susceptible to blame and punishment for a how a war ends and are thus prone to keep fighting even with little hope of victory. Accordingly, leadership change is often a necessary precursor to war termination. Such a view may be well-founded, but it does not necessarily follow that new leaders — those who merely inherit an ongoing war — are free from domestic pressures and risks associated with ending the war under less than favorable terms.

Within the most relevant population of wars — those characterized as costly, protracted foreign military interventions — I assessed the decision-making and behaviors of 85 individual wartime leaders, to include a mix of leaders linked to the start of their respective wars and new leaders who took over with the war ongoing. Through review of primary source documents from more than a dozen countries and personal interaction with former government officials and journalists with relevant firsthand knowledge, I found that new leaders remain susceptible to the domestic pressures and risks associated with war termination, or they at least perceive themselves to be at risk and behave accordingly. Particularly, many new leaders behave like their predecessors and prove similarly unable or unwilling to cut the state’s losses and seek peace. This is because the politics of blame associated with war termination is complex and varied, with multiple potential blame narratives extending beyond the leader who starts a failed war.

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A wartime transfer of leadership in Russia could go in many different directions. Pundits have identified a host of potential successors, ranging from the outspoken hawk Dmitry Medvedev to Sergei Sobyanin, who has consistently sought to distance himself from Putin’s war in Ukraine. Some have even raised the possibility, even if slim, of imprisoned opposition leader Alexey Navalny replacing Putin. While individual differences certainly matter, the politics of blame associated with war termination does not discriminate: Any new leader who seeks to extricate Russia from Putin’s war likely will face tough domestic hurdles. Russia’s current domestic political environment, as characterized by an intense blame game pitting political versus military leadership, would be especially dangerous for Putin’s successor and disincentive any move to abandon Russia’s war aims in Ukraine and seek peace, at least in the short term. This holds even for a successor who opposed or did not openly support Putin’s war prior to taking office. Thus, Putin’s war may very well continue without Putin.

The Conventional View of Leadership Change and War Termination

Going back more than 70 years, scholars have argued that political leadership change serves as an important, even necessary, condition for the termination of protracted armed conflict given that leaders who start a war generally prove unable or unwilling to end the war short of victory. The predominant explanation for this leadership behavior centers on the logic of political survival, or the idea that political decision-making is influenced by the desire to avoid blame and domestic political punishment for bad policy outcomes. Particularly, leaders who are closely linked to the start of a war are most likely to be held liable by the population and other governing elites — and subsequently punished — if the war ends poorly. Thus, these leaders are prone to keep fighting despite mounting costs and little hope of winning.

As political scientist Sarah Croco explains, “The primary factor in determining a leader’s choice between continuation and termination of the conflict is the probability of punishment if he or she accepts any outcome less than a win.” And specifically, for a leader closely linked to the start of a failed war, the probability of punishment “will almost always be very near one,” whereas for subsequent leaders who merely inherit a failed war, this risk “will most likely be zero.” Shielded from blame, these new leaders “will not face this hard choice” of whether to quit the war or keep fighting. Applied to the case of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the implication is that Putin’s deposal would remove a major hurdle to war termination, with Putin’s successor far more apt to seek peace even if this means abandoning the state’s war aims and accepting military defeat.

Is There a Difference Between Leaders Who Start a War and Those Who Inherit a War?

The leadership change theory of war termination, reiterated in various forms over the years, is widely accepted and effectively represents the conventional wisdom. But the theory is flawed or at least incomplete. One can readily find cases in which political leadership change helped facilitate an end to costly, protracted war. However, even if leadership change is often a necessary condition for war termination, it is rarely a sufficient condition. In other words, war termination is often preceded by a change of leadership, but most wartime changes of leadership do not result in war termination.

For example, scholars point to Mikhail Gorbachev’s accession as key to the Soviet Union’s exit from Afghanistan and likewise note the formation of the Mendès-France government in 1954 as facilitating an end to France’s post-colonial war in Indochina. But Gorbachev was the fourth Soviet premier to preside over the 10-year Afghan conflict, and France experienced no less than nine wartime changes of government before Pierre Mendès-France accepted military defeat and extricated the French army from Indochina. With the 85 cases of political leaders embroiled in wars characterized as costly, protracted foreign military interventions, the data shows that 86 percent of initial leaders responsible for starting a war keep fighting until they either leave office or achieve what can reasonably be interpreted as a win. Amongst those new leaders who merely inherit an ongoing war, 66 percent likewise prove unable or unwilling to terminate short of victory.

Of course, the status of the war matters when a new leader takes over. If the war is going as planned and victory is readily within reach at acceptable cost, there is little incentive for any leader to quit. Of greater interest is how leaders respond once a war has proven more costly and more difficult than expected at the outset, or when the likelihood of success dwindles. While it is difficult to generalize these latter conditions across cases, further analysis into individual cases shows that new leaders elect to keep fighting wars that have degenerated to costly quagmires with little hope of winning. In some cases, new leaders even escalate an ongoing war while in private expressing a belief in the pointlessness of further fighting and a desire to cut the state’s losses and seek peace. Overall, the distinction between leadership types may be statistically significant, but qualitatively, they are not that different, with more than half of new leaders behaving like their predecessors responsible for starting the war.

Why New Leaders Behave Like Their Predecessors

Based on my research, I argue that new leaders behave as if they are at risk of punishment for a failed war because they are at risk, often facing the same hard choice as their predecessors. Absent clear-cut military victory or defeat, the domestic politics of war termination equates to the politics of blame. The leadership change theory of war termination accounts for this dynamic but incorporates a narrow conception of blame that oversimplifies how the domestic audience draws the line of responsibility between policy outcome and political leadership. Particularly, the conventional theory takes for granted that, in a wartime context, the lines trace reflexively back to leadership associated with the start of the war. Deeper research into the politics of blame, however, reveals that how a domestic audience assigns responsibility for policy failure is far more complex and varied.

I propose that there are at least four distinct blame narratives associated with political leadership and war termination. The pretender narrative targets political leadership’s lack of judgement and competence in instigating a failed war. The decision to go to war was misguided and based on faulty assessments or narrow interests, and any assurances of victory made at the outset have proven a façade. In contrast, the bungler narrative maligns political leadership for ineffective prosecution of the war regardless of who started the war. Associated critiques relate to inadequately resourcing the military, tying the military’s hands, or otherwise adopting a “no win” approach. The backstabber narrative cites political leadership for prematurely and unnecessarily terminating a war that was still winnable and still worth fighting. Success remained within reach, but political leadership pulled the plug before the military could finish the job and thus snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. Finally, the sellout narrative focuses on political leadership’s failure to procure the best possible outcome despite military defeat, highlighting leadership’s role in an unfair peace settlement that betrays the nation’s sacrifice.

Each of these narratives is distinct, holding political leadership accountable for a failed war in different ways. The key is that only one, the pretender narrative, is constrained to the leader who starts a war, with new leaders still susceptible to blame and domestic repercussions tied to multiple alternative narratives. This remaining risk can have a powerful effect on war termination decision-making and helps explain why so many new leaders behave like their predecessors.

What Does This Mean for Russia’s War in Ukraine?

For Putin, the war in Ukraine could be, effectively, a matter of political survival because defeat could very well lead to his ouster. But the risk of punishment does not just pertain to Putin’s remaining tenure in office. Defeat in Ukraine would significantly taint Putin’s image and long-term legacy. Putin envisions himself as a modern-day Peter the Great and wants to be remembered as such. He sees it as his mission and destiny to return Russia to its rightful status as a world power, erasing the indignity of a loss in the Cold War and subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union. The situation in Ukraine puts this personal legacy at risk, and the West should not underestimate how far Putin will go to stave off defeat.

But what if Putin is deposed with the war ongoing, whether due to declining health or domestic opposition? For any successor, the current state of Russian domestic politics would be a proverbial minefield and disincentivize any move to extricate Russia from the conflict, at least in the short term. According to one Russian journalist, a vicious blame game has erupted in Russia over the flailing special military operation. Particularly, Kremlin officials are working to shift blame from Putin to senior military leaders, effectively “manufacturing a crisis with its Ministry of Defense in an attempt to distance President Vladimir Putin from the stunning retreats and other embarrassing battlefield failures.” Military leadership, already on edge given a rash of senior commander firings, is pushing back, deflecting blame to other parts of the state for providing faulty intelligence and for inadequately resourcing the military, or otherwise tying the military’s hands.

The central role of the military in the politics of blame is especially problematic. For new political leadership seeking to end a protracted war short of achieving the state’s objectives, the support of military leadership is critical given what civil-military relations scholar Peter Feaver refers to as the special moral competence of the armed forces in the context of war termination. Absent this support, new political leadership is more vulnerable to attacks by hawkish elements of the political opposition and more susceptible to backstabber and sellout accusations. But garnering military leadership backing for military withdrawal in such a scenario is no easy task. Even if military leadership is in favor of abandoning the war, military leadership is unlikely to support any such move unless there is a strong civil-military relationship, or civil-military bargain, characterized by mutual trust so that military leadership does not fear being scapegoated by political leadership in an effort to deflect blame. This condition does not currently exist amidst Russia’s vicious blame game, and it would likely take time to build in the wake of a change in political leadership, as history suggests that the Russian military’s sensitivity to scapegoating goes deeper than the current conflict. In the course of Russia’s First Chechen War (1994-1996), for example, Russian Gen. Alexander Lebed declared to the media, “Every time, the orders were explicit and came from the highest level … And every time, when we [the military] had done their dirty work for them [the politicians], they ran away and left us to take all the blame … Believe me, the army will never allow that to happen again.”

Will Putin’s War Continue Without Putin?

If Putin departs office (voluntarily or not) with the war in Ukraine ongoing, his successor may elect to quit fighting, but the decision will not be easy or risk free, and this holds regardless of who replaces Putin, whether it is Medvedev, Sobyanin, or even Navalny. Given his responsibility for starting the war, Putin is highly susceptible to blame and punishment for how the war ends and is apt to keep fighting despite mounting costs and little hope of winning. But any new leader who inherits Putin’s war would not be immune to similar domestic pressures. With any case of costly, protracted war, the politics of blame can have a powerful impact on war termination decision-making and potentially drive new leaders to keep fighting even if they did not support the war prior to taking office. But Russia’s current domestic political environment, with its vicious blame game pitting political versus military leadership, would be especially problematic for a new political leader seeking to extricate Russia from the war. Looking at the historical record, many new leaders in comparable circumstances have decided to keep fighting an ongoing war or else push for peace only to have the extrication process drag on for years. It is difficult and probably pointless to predict the outcome of any wartime change of leadership in the case of Russia’s war in Ukraine. At a minimum, however, the West should not assume a change of leadership would result in an end to the war, at least in the short term, as Putin’s war could very well continue without Putin.

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Shawn T. Cochran, PhD, is the is the author of War Termination as a Civil-Military Bargain as well as multiple articles on the domestic politics of war termination. He is a senior political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. He recently completed 25 years in the Air Force, last serving as the Dean of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies.

Photo credit: kremlin.ru

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Shawn Cochran · October 10, 2022

16.  More than half of Ukraine's tank fleet now reportedly consists of captured Russian armor

​Sun Tzu said:

9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.

​

I am not sure he envisioned being able to "forage" from the enemy on your own territory.

More than half of Ukraine's tank fleet now reportedly consists of captured Russian armor

Tanks for the laughs!

BY JARED KELLER | PUBLISHED OCT 9, 2022 6:05 PM

taskandpurpose.com · by Jared Keller · October 9, 2022

Despite its ongoing war with Russia, the Ukrainian military is only growing larger and larger — and not just thanks to the massive influx of aid from Western countries.

The British Ministry of Defense reported in an intelligence update on Friday that Ukrainian troops had likely captured “at least” 440 Russian tanks and an additional 650 armored vehicles, adding that “over half of Ukraine’s currently fielded tank fleet potentially consists of captured vehicles.”

Those tank capture numbers line up with estimates from the open-source research group Oryx, which suggests based on visual evidence that Ukrainian forces have likely captured some 457 tanks since the beginning of the Russian invasion in February.

“Re-purposed captured Russian equipment now makes up a large proportion of Ukraine’s military hardware,” the MoD said. “The failure of Russian crews to destroy intact equipment before withdrawing or surrendering highlights their poor state of training and low levels of battle discipline.”

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Ukraine has been snagging Russian tanks since the start of the invasion, forcing the latter to turn to ancient armor to even out the battlefield losses despite the fact that it started with a significant firepower advantage over the former.

That trend has only accelerated in the last several weeks amid an ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive fueled by captured Russian weapons. According to a September report in Foreign Policy, a Ukrainian military official stated that Ukrainian forces had captured “over 200” vehicles from retreating Russian forces during a week-long push to recapture Kharkiv Oblast alone.

As a spokesman for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense put it in a sardonic mid-September tweet: “Russia is trying to maintain its status as the largest supplier of military equipment for the Ukrainian army.”

russia is trying to maintain its status as the largest supplier of military equipment for the Ukrainian army, and even to improve its status, knowing that lend-lease will soon come into effect.#UAarmy loves its trophy ammo  pic.twitter.com/2NMPAPPgP2

— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) September 11, 2022

Using the enemy’s own armor against them may seem like the ultimate Uno reverse card, but it’s worth noting that most of those tanks are, well, old: As Forbes notes (citing Oryx data), the vast majority of the destroyed or captured tanks encountered by Ukrainian forces are decades-old Soviet-designed T-72 and T-80 main battle tanks that require significant repairs to get up and running.

Indeed, despite the influx of billions in foreign military aid from Western countries to Ukraine — including the crucial M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS — Ukrainian officials have insisted to allied governments that they believe a fresh batch of fresh and more modern tanks could help turn the Ukrainian counteroffensive “into a tipping point” for the war, as the Washington Post reported in early September.

“Virtually no outside nations have provided tanks to Ukraine” beyond a few hundred T-72s from Poland and the Czech Republic, the Post reported after Ukrainian officials urged the German government to send the war-torn country its older Leopold I tanks.

The Biden administration initially did not take a public position on the U.S. sending tanks to Ukraine, with a National Security Council spokesman stating that the White House “encourage[s] all countries to make their own sovereign decisions about the type of security assistance that they provide to Ukraine … We appreciate the significant security assistance that Germany has provided to Ukraine.”

But a senior U.S. defense official told reporters that supplying American M1 Abrams main battle tanks to the Ukrainian military was “absolutely on the table.”

“In terms of the immediate fight, the tanks that are available that could be provided very quickly with little to no training are Soviet-type tanks,” the official said, “but we’re certainly open to other options provided that the training, maintenance, and sustainment can be taken care of.”

Time will tell whether the U.S. and European allies can continue to funnel heavy weapons into Ukraine to bolster the country’s defense against the Russian invasion at their current pace. But one thing is clear: tank warfare is as relevant as before, even if the Russians are absolutely horrible at it.

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• How Air Force maintainers achieved a rare perfect inspection on a 49-year-old aircraft
• Why hundreds of Camp Pendleton Marines have been stuck in sweltering hot barracks for years
• The Air Force has finally rescued a stranded Osprey aircraft from a remote Norwegian island

Want to write for Task & Purpose? Click here. Or check out the latest stories on our homepage.

taskandpurpose.com · by Jared Keller · October 9, 2022

17. Firepower & people: Army Chief on keys to future war (EXCLUSIVE)

It would appear that the Army may be divesting itself of all that is related to irregular warfare. We may not be learning all the lessons from Ukraine (e.g., it is not either/or but is both/and)

Firepower & people: Army Chief on keys to future war (EXCLUSIVE) - Breaking Defense

The Ukraine war proves the US Army is right to focus on high-tech long-range weapons and old-school high-intensity training, Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville tells Breaking Defense.

breakingdefense.com · by Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. · October 10, 2022

Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. James C. McConville. (DoD photo /Lisa Ferdinando)

WASHINGTON — As Ukraine’s underdog army pushes back the Russian invaders, what lessons should the American military take to heart?

The US Army’s top officer doesn’t hesitate: “We’re seeing the impact of long-range precision fires,” Gen. James McConville said at once. “The HIMARS has been a game changer for the Ukrainians.”

“The battle has shifted,” said McConville, the Army Chief of Staff, in a late September interview with Breaking Defense.

The first phase of the fight, a desperate defense against onrushing Russian armor, put a premium on man-portable anti-tank missiles like the US Javelin and British NLAW. The defenders also needed shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, like the venerable Stinger, to take out Russian helicopters and ground-attack aircraft.

But as Ukraine stabilized the front and then went on the offensive, both sides shifted emphasis to artillery, seeking to disrupt enemy advances and soften up sectors for attack. Ukrainian forces urgently needed the ability to strike deeply and accurately at Russian supply depots, transport hubs, and other critical targets far behind the front lines. So the West began supplying long-range artillery systems, like the American HIMARS missile launcher.

“The Ukrainians initially had a lot of success with what I would call short-range weapons systems, like the Javelin, like the Stinger,” McConville said. But over time, “they found that having artillery – [like] the triple-7s [i.e. the M777 155 mm howitzer] — gave them much more capability. And now with HIMARS, [they have] the ability to engage across the depth of the battlefield.”

Long-Range, High-Tech, High Lethality

Such “Long-Range Precision Fires” – from GPS-guided howitzer shells to hypersonic missiles – have been the US Army’s No. 1 priority for research, development, and acquisition since 2017.

That’s when then-Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Mark Milley, now chairman of the Joint Chiefs, used the annual Association of the US Army conference as a platform to set the service on a bold new course, refocusing from grueling guerilla warfare in the Middle East to high-tech conflict with China and Russia. McConville, who was Milley’s deputy, succeeded him as chief in 2019 and is now shepherding several programs the two men started into production.

“Those capabilities will be coming into the force starting next year,” McConville said. “That will fundamentally change how we do business.”

In 2023, the Army will get its first combat-ready prototypes for three new Long-Range Precision Fires systems:

• the hypersonic Dark Eagle missile, whose classified range is estimated at over 1,700 miles;
• the Mid-Range Capability (MRC), aka Typhon, which repurposes Navy SM-6s and Tomahawks for strikes at ranges of about 1,000 miles; and
• the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), an all-new weapon designed to fit in existing HIMARS launchers and hit targets over 300 miles away.

By comparison, the farthest-striking missile currently available to the Army is the HIMARS-launched ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System), with a maximum range of under 200 miles. And the US hasn’t actually given any ATACMS to Ukraine, just the 40-mile GMRLS rockets. That range is adequate for most targets in eastern Ukraine, but not for the vast distances of the western Pacific.

“We are developing systems that help us deal with the ranges and the speeds that are required in an environment that is much larger,” McConville said.

What’s more, the Army aims to upgrade these new weapons with sophisticated seekers that let them strike moving targets, including ships at sea. That makes them much more useful in the Pacific, historically a Navy-dominated theater, where the Army seeks a new role supporting the fleet with land-based anti-ship strikes.

“Long range precision fires gives you the ability to penetrate integrated air and missile defenses,” McConville said. “It gives you the ability to sink ships – which, again, can be very helpful if someone’s considering some type of amphibious operation.” (While McConville doesn’t offer examples, the most-discussed amphibious scenario is a Chinese attempt to land troops on Taiwan).

Of course, the US isn’t the only one developing such long-range precision-guided weapons. So is Russia – although it has resorted increasingly to indiscriminate strikes against civilians in Ukraine – and China. That puts a premium on missile defenses, McConville said, another of the Army’s six modernization priorities. But it also requires US forces to stay on the move and spread out, so they don’t provide big, static targets, like the Russian ammo dumps and air bases repeatedly ravaged by Ukrainian strikes.

Army soldiers fire an M777 howitzer. (US Army/ Laura Buchta

Dispersion and mobility are tactics the Army must relearn after a generation in Afghanistan and Iraq, where US forces built up an extensive, static infrastructure of big bases, supply dumps, and well-appointed command posts.

“Commanders… will no longer be able to have the large command posts that they had in Afghanistan or Iraq… with stadium-type seats and a lot of big screens,” McConville said. “In the future, the battlefield will be so lethal, and there’ll be the ability to gather [targeting] information on where our command posts are, so we’re going to have to move them very, very quickly, and they’ll have to be dispersed and smaller.”

The new approach will require a change in mindset, doctrine, and doctrine – which leads to what McConville considers the most crucial weapons system: the human brain.

The Human Factor: Training & Doctrine

Western weapons have made a major difference in Ukraine, McConville told Breaking Defense. But weapons are nothing without soldiers to wield them. So, he said, what’s most important in this war – and every war – is the human factor: the Ukrainian soldiers’ will and skill.

Both have grown with eight years of combat experience and Western training since Russia’s initial, more limited invasion in 2014, when Ukraine ceded Crimea without a shot and then suffered heavy losses in the Donbas.

“This is not the Ukrainian army of 2014,” McConville emphasized. Today, he said, “the Ukrainian army is very competent and very committed. With the training that’s going on, that NATO is conducting for the Ukrainians, they pick up these [new] capabilities very quickly.”

Admittedly, much of Ukraine’s success is due to Russian incompetence. But McConville warns against understating either the Russian threat or the Ukrainian accomplishment in repelling it.

“We should not underestimate what the Ukrainians are doing,” he said. “They’ve done a lot of training, they have learned, they’re a learning organization, and they are performing very, very well on the battlefield.”

The US, likewise, has changed its training in recent years to emphasize high-intensity combat against a well-armed nation-state.

“If you go out to our national training centers, now, it’s large scale combat operations, where, over the last 20 years, we’d been focused on counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, irregular warfare,” McConville said. “If you have command posts, you have to move them often, or they’re going to be targeted…. Your command posts are going to be jammed, your computers are going to be taken away from you.”

That’s down to what the Army calls “long-range effects.” Those include not only Long-Range Precision Firepower, like HIMARS and hypersonics, but non-lethal tools like hacking and radio jamming to disable the command, control, and communications systems on which all modern militaries depend. The Army’s new Multi-Domain Task Forces are meant to combine firepower, electronic attack, and cyber warfare to cripple an enemy military’s digital nervous system — and potential enemies aim to do the same to US units.

That means commanders can’t count on live drone feeds from the battlespace or constant communications with frontline forces. It means junior officers must learn to fight in the dark, without detailed intelligence or instructions from higher headquarters.

“You will have to develop organizations that are trained, disciplined and fit,” McConvile said, “to the level that they can operate off of truly off mission command.”

That’s the doctrine whereby commanders tell subordinates what they must accomplish – “commander’s intent” – without micromanaging how they accomplish those missions. Planning, coordination, and orders still matter, but the emphasis is increasingly on adaptability, improvisation, and initiative.

“How we do command and control will change,” McConville said. “It’ll be much more focused on mission command. You’ll give orders that are more based on the commander’s intent, because you may not have the ability, in this very lethal and complex environment, to continue to give orders to your subordinate units. They may be dispersed, they may have to operate on intent, you may not be able to contact them.”

In such chaotic high-tech conflicts, drones, robots, and networks all play a useful role, McConville said, but such AI systems are also vulnerable to disruption and deception. Just as armies have long used camouflage to trick the human eye, he said, today they’re finding ways to “confuse the algorithm.” So while artificial intelligence can support human soldiers, McConville believes that it can’t replace them.

“You’re going to see our ground forces enabled by robotic combat vehicles and unmanned aerial systems,” he said. “We’re going to have autonomous vehicles, we’re going to have autonomous aircraft — but at the end of the day, I still think there’s a place for soldiers in the decision making loop, and you want them in a position where they can see the battlefield, because when you’re looking through cameras and drones, you can’t get the full picture.”

“At the end of the day, people are your greatest strength,” McConville emphasized. “They’re the most important weapons system.”

“We equip our soldiers with the best gear, but having soldiers that are willing to fight and defend their country in a very lethal battlefield is extremely important,” he said. “That’s what we’re seeing in Ukraine.”

“What makes the difference is the will to fight. All conflicts are a battle of wills.”

breakingdefense.com · by Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. · October 10, 2022

18. US, China already gunning for 6G military supremacy

US, China already gunning for 6G military supremacy

Rivals in a race to develop and apply next-generation 6G killer apps including for guiding hypersonic missile

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · October 10, 2022

With 5G broadband networks still being rolled out worldwide, the US and China are racing for supremacy in next-generation 6G, with significant implications for future warfighting.

An August report by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) notes that China is following a centralized command model in applying 6G technology to military purposes. On the other side, the US is relying more on enabling lower levels of command and operators to take the initiative to make critical decisions.

The IISS report says that 6G technology may play a key role in China’s hypersonic weapons program, including in solving the current communication blackout at hypersonic speeds.

In January, South China Morning Post reported that Chinese researchers had developed a 6G laser device that can penetrate the signal-blocking plasma layer on the surface of missiles in hypersonic flight. The report also noted that the breakthrough has other military applications, such as detecting stealth aircraft or high-speed space communications.

Apart from 6G’s potential application in China’s hypersonic weapons program, the report mentions that the technology can improve space-based surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, turbocharge data processing and enable more devices to be connected across multiple frequencies.

It also says that integrating AI and machine learning across 6G applications can allow the military to leverage big data to improve decision-making, defense mobilization, and command and control. 6G could also provide virtual and extended reality training for military personnel.

Asia Times has reported that China’s fighter pilot training has been criticized as heavily scripted and dependent on ground control, which prevents pilots from taking the initiative or making decisions on the fly to adapt to rapidly changing battlefield conditions. However, 6G technology could significantly improve China’s fighter pilot training, providing more realistic and unpredictable scenarios that accurately mirror real-life combat situations.

6G applications could improve China’s fighter pilot training. Photo: eng.chinamil.com.cn

While the IISS report mentions that China’s military approach to 6G mirrors that of the US, it notes that the US has a more human-centric approach, viewing it as an enabling technology for operators and lower levels of command to cope with battlefield uncertainty and take the initiative in decision-making.

It also says that the US aims to leverage 6G to organize data between itself and its allies to increase processing speed.

The IISS report also mentions that the US views 6G as a leapfrog technology that will help it maintain its military edge, emphasizing at-scale prototyping and experimentation for its development, alongside collaboration with industry leaders, other government agencies and international partners.

In this regard, the US-South Korea partnership on critical and emerging technologies such as 6G could be significant. According to IDTechEX, South Korea’s flagship tech firm, Samsung, has ten times more 5G-related patents than the next ten patentors combined and is likewise investing heavily in 6G and the leading-edge chips that will drive the technology.

The contrast between China’s centralized but rigid and the US’s hands-off but less coherent approaches to developing 6G technology for military purposes also extends to their research bases. The IISS report notes that China’s state-centric approach to developing 6G enables it to channel all its resources under direct government control to influence and manipulate global standards-setting.

The report notes that this statist approach has helped China to build its telecoms industry from being a negligible player in the 1980s to a position of advantage in 5G telecoms, providing a solid base for 6G technology and undercutting competitor costs by as much as 30%. However, the report notes that China faces significant constraints in developing 6G technology, such as reliance on foreign inputs, US sanctions and export controls.

In contrast, the IISS states that the US has not prioritized the development of next-generation telecom networks to the extent of China, notably in developing 5G infrastructure and services.

Although the IISS report mentions the long-term erosion of the US telecoms industry, it also highlights the US strength in innovation and that US firms are well-positioned in 6G-enabling technologies such as software and semiconductors. It also mentions that the US is adopting a state-centric approach in developing critical strategic technologies to regain its lost momentum, potentially taking note of China’s advantages with this approach.

In the US context, a state-led method involves establishing partnerships with allies and partner nations to accelerate technology development to leverage US strengths and exclude China.

The report also cautions against a global network infrastructure standards conflict resulting from the diverging interests of China and the US, alongside the rollout of next-generation telecoms technology to third-party markets.

Asia Times has previously reported that China is gradually catching up with US leadership in establishing technological standards while noting that politicizing them risks fragmenting global standards and disrupting trade and innovation.

Besides China and the US, the EU, Japan and others are implementing international standards, meaning a US or China standards monopoly will be difficult, if not implausible.

The China-US race for 6G supremacy cuts across various fields ranging from defense and security, economics, politics and even society.

US and China are locked in a race for technological supremacy that will define the course of the 21st century. Image: Facebook / PIME Asia News

But even as the rival superpowers seek to leverage 6G for a new military edge, the decisive factor may be which of the two can provide 6G technology as a global public good, cementing its legitimacy as a global technology leader.

Just as the US dollar became the de facto currency for international trade and cemented US dominance in the global financial system, widespread adaptation of either Chinese or US 6G technology may establish either superpower as the center of the technology-driven Fourth Industrial Revolution.

Alternatively, the ongoing race for 6G and technology standards conflict could result in a bifurcated global internet with China controlling one side and the US the other.

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · October 10, 2022

19. Taiwan stirs allies’ fear of entrapment in Asia

Excerpts:

No US ally wants to see China invade and conquer Taiwan, but it is equally true that no ally wants US recklessness or ineptitude to contribute to heightened tensions. It is not just Chinese actions — but also Biden’s ‘gaffes’ and Washington’s policy evolutions — that are eroding the delicate bargain that underpins the modern US–China relationship.

Nobody in the region will applaud a display of US strength if the result is an avoidable security crisis. For US allies, both history and recent developments show that traditional ideas about reputation are extremely resilient, especially in Washington, even in the face of clearly contradictory evidence.

Allied leaders will need to think carefully and work hard — speaking bluntly and often to counterparts in Washington — to ensure their fears are accurately understood in the corridors of American power.

Taiwan stirs allies’ fear of entrapment in Asia | East Asia Forum

eastasiaforum.org · by Iain Henry · October 9, 2022

Author: Iain Henry, ANU

During the Trump presidency, it was unsurprising that several US allies in Asia were concerned about the risk of abandonment — the possibility that Washington might not fulfil its alliance commitments. But allies can also fear entrapment — the risk that US actions might raise tensions, or even start a conflict, that allies would rather avoid.

These fears were common during the Cold War, when crises on the Korean Peninsula, across the Taiwan Strait and in Indochina, all increased the risk of global war.

Policymakers — especially those in Washington — instinctively worry that such crises are tests of national reputation. Strategic ‘common sense’, informed mainly by the theory of deterrence, suggests that any display of weakness will encourage adversaries to initiate new conflicts, and will lead US allies to shift toward neutralism or abandon their alliance with Washington.

In 1954, the United States decided against intervening to defeat a communist insurgency in Indochina. Several prominent US officials perceived the subsequent negotiated settlement to be a defeat that damaged Washington’s reputation. Then US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, thought that to prevent the loss of ‘any more prestige in this area’, the United States should adopt a position of ‘de facto belligerency for a certain period’.

When the First Taiwan Strait Crisis erupted later in 1954, this desire to demonstrate strength merged with an imagined need to display loyalty to allies. It seemed likely that Communist China would invade several small islands then occupied by Chinese Nationalist troops. The islands were not important from a military standpoint, but Dulles claimed that because ‘it was in many quarters assumed that we would defend the islands … our failure to do so indicated that we were running away’.

His instinct was that those states observing the crisis wanted to see Washington stand firm and confront China. He thought that ‘running away’ would carry reputational consequences and imperil the United States’ alliances in Asia.

But the reality was different. Most US allies in Asia thought de-escalation and negotiation were the most prudent policies. They didn’t think the islands were worth substantial risks of war. Though these allied views were accurately reported to Washington by its overseas embassies, it took months for these arguments to break through and challenge the prevailing conviction that the United States’ national reputation was at stake.

This incorrect belief both aggravated and prolonged the crisis. China fired the first shot, but Washington’s belief that its reputation was at stake risked escalating the crisis, possibly into a general war. Tensions eventually subsided, but US allies learned valuable lessons about how to best manage the risk of entrapment.

Beliefs about reputation are still extremely important today. Because US allies are undeniably concerned about China’s growing power, traditional ideas of international reputation would expect these allies to be pleased by a demonstration that Washington is willing to confront Beijing. Some have argued that if the United States did not defend Taiwan from a Chinese attack, allies in Asia would ‘conclude that the United States cannot be relied upon and that it is pulling back from the region’.

US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan in August serves as a case study through which to think more carefully about this argument. US President Joe Biden was reportedly opposed to the visit, but some suggested that cancelling it would damage US credibility.

If the ‘common sense’ ideas about national reputation and credibility are correct, then US allies — worried about Chinese power and assertiveness — should have welcomed any sign that Washington is willing to confront Beijing. But neighbouring countries predominantly perceived the visit as an unnecessary escalation that did nothing to enhance Taiwan’s security or regional stability. One Japanese expert described it as having no ‘strategic benefit for us’, while an Australian commentator condemned it as ‘an unnecessary crisis’.

Such expressions of concern should ring alarm bells in Washington. Though some have argued that Japan and Australia are determined to help the United States defend Taiwan, this is far from certain. Less reflexive, assumption-laden analysis is sorely needed.

No US ally wants to see China invade and conquer Taiwan, but it is equally true that no ally wants US recklessness or ineptitude to contribute to heightened tensions. It is not just Chinese actions — but also Biden’s ‘gaffes’ and Washington’s policy evolutions — that are eroding the delicate bargain that underpins the modern US–China relationship.

Nobody in the region will applaud a display of US strength if the result is an avoidable security crisis. For US allies, both history and recent developments show that traditional ideas about reputation are extremely resilient, especially in Washington, even in the face of clearly contradictory evidence.

Allied leaders will need to think carefully and work hard — speaking bluntly and often to counterparts in Washington — to ensure their fears are accurately understood in the corridors of American power.

Iain Henry is Senior Lecturer in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University and author of Reliability and Alliance Interdependence published by Cornell University Press.

eastasiaforum.org · by Iain Henry · October 9, 2022

20. Opinion | The U.S. Has Leverage Over Saudi Arabia. It’s Time to Use It.

Opinion | The U.S. Has Leverage Over Saudi Arabia. It’s Time to Use It.

Opinion by SEN. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, REP. RO KHANNA and JEFFREY SONNENFELD

10/09/2022 06:25 PM EDT

Politico

Magazine

Opinion | The U.S. Has Leverage Over Saudi Arabia. It’s Time to Use It.

Sen. Richard Blumenthal and Rep. Ro Khanna propose new legislation to respond to Saudi’s embrace of Vladimir Putin and to rebalance the U.S.’s relationship with Riyadh.

Saudi Arabia Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman talks with Russia President Vladimir Putin during a G20 session with other heads of state, Friday, Nov. 30, 2018 in Buenos Aires, Argentina. | Pablo Martinez Monsivais/AP Photo

Opinion by Sen. Richard Blumenthal, Rep. Ro Khanna and Jeffrey Sonnenfeld

10/09/2022 06:25 PM EDT

Richard Blumenthal represents Connecticut, Ron Wyden represents Oregon and Mark Udall represents Colorado in the U.S. Senate.

Ro Khanna, a Democrat, represents the 17th district of California. He serves on the House Armed Services Committee.

Jeffrey Sonnenfeld is senior associate dean of leadership studies and Lester Crown professor of leadership practice. The opinions expressed here do not reflect the opinions of Yale University.

This week, Saudi Arabia colluded with Russia — deciding to cut 2 million barrels a day of oil production at the OPEC+ meeting, thus raising the price of gas to Russia’s advantage. The shocking move will worsen global inflation, undermine successful efforts in the U.S. to bring down the price of gas, and help fuel Putin’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

The Saudi decision was a pointed blow to the U.S., but the U.S. also has a way to respond: It can promptly pause the massive transfer of American warfare technology into the eager hands of the Saudis. Simply put, America shouldn’t be providing such unlimited control of strategic defense systems to an apparent ally of our greatest enemy — nuclear bomb extortionist Vladmir Putin.

That is why we are proposing bicameral legislation in the Senate and House on Tuesday that will immediately halt all U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia. For several years now, our colleagues have been considering similar proposals, but those measures haven’t passed. Due to intense bipartisan blowback to Saudi’s collusion with Russia, we think this time is different. Based on our conversation with colleagues, our legislation is already garnering bipartisan support in both chambers.

What would lead the Saudis so unwisely to err with their recent OPEC+ mistake? Stunned energy commentators have suggested that the Saudis were merely concerned about their endangered financial returns, acting rationally. Denying any political motives, Ali Shihabi, a Saudi analyst, insisted in the New York Times that the move was merely “to keep the price in an acceptable band.”

But this claim is unjustified. OPEC has never cut production in such a record tight market and these production cuts will lead to unsustainably low oil inventories, sending the price of oil skyrocketing out of any “acceptable band.” Furthermore, the G-7 oil price caps plan is not targeted at OPEC; it is strictly limited to Russian oil.

Nor can this Saudi move be justified by the non-existent global recession its leaders cite. Presently markets are very tight, with lush 73 percent profit margins for Saudi Arabia. In other words, there was no immediate need for Saudi Arabia to reduce supply unless they were seeking to harm the U.S. to the benefit of Russia.

Every OPEC member has been making massive profits recently — except Russia because it is OPEC’s least efficient producer. It costs Russia $46/barrel to extract oil but, with U.S. technology, the Saudi’s cost is only $22/barrel. Plus, only Russia has had to offer huge $35/barrel discounts to customers like India and China since few others want sanctioned Russian oil.

To be clear, Saudi Arabia remains important to energy security and stability in the Middle East, to global economic prosperity, and as a regional ally against Iran, but it made a terrible mistake this week. The country’s support for Russia should spark a far-reaching review of the U.S.-Saudi relationship — even as the regime tries to “sportswash” its international image in the wake of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi’s brutal murder and the humanitarian disaster caused by Saudi’s war in Yemen.

Members of Congress are already talking about how best to respond. Some propose extending domestic antitrust laws to international commerce. Others propose reviving a GOP initiative to withdraw U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia. But that idea has failed previously given that the U.S. would rather have its own troops there than Russian or Chinese troops.

A simpler, far more urgent move to fortify U.S. national security would be to pause all U.S. military supplies, sales and other weapons aid to Saudi Arabia. This includes the controversial, new and hastily planned Red Sands testing facilities in Saudi Arabia.

U.S. military collaboration with the Saudi regime is more extensive than many realize, but that also gives the U.S. significant economic and security leverage over Riyadh. Today, Saudi Arabia is hugely dependent on U.S. defense assistance, purchasing the vast majority of its arms from the United States. The country cannot substitute defense suppliers unless it wishes to partner with Russia, Iran or China for far inferior systems which have no interoperability with their existing weaponry. (While Saudi does source some military technology from other countries, that’s typically low-grade weaponry and small arms such as legacy grenade launchers, rifles and ammunition.)

Perhaps even more important than Saudi’s reliance on U.S. arms is its reliance on U.S. companies to help build up the local defense industry through big-ticket joint ventures. These sensitive and intensive arrangements — which have received little public attention — were largely initiated in 2017 and have outsourced U.S. sensitive technology and U.S. jobs to Saudi Arabia without any U.S. control. The U.S. doesn’t have arrangements of this magnitude with any other allies.

Given the early-stage nature of these joint ventures as well as minimal interoperability between Saudi’s current weapons system and potential foreign replacements, Saudi can do little to respond to this proposed legislation other than come back to the table and negotiate with the U.S. in good faith. As one expert noted, “it would take decades to transition away from U.S. and UK aircraft, for example, to Russian or Chinese aircraft. Same is true for tanks, communication and other hi-tech equipment.” It would be a severe challenge, if not downright impossible, for Saudi to execute an overnight short-term sourcing pivot if faced with a ban on arms sales. And any ban could be temporary — until Saudi Arabia reconsiders its embrace of Putin.

Maybe it is worth considering some ancient Russian wisdom ourselves. Over a century ago, Russian playwright Anton Chekhov warned, “Knowledge is of no value unless you put it into practice.” Perhaps the same is true about leverage. It is of no value unless used.

POLITICO

Politico

21. The War in Ukraine Launches a New Battle for the Russian Soul

Excerpt:

The last time people were writing in Russian so urgently was in the late nineteen-eighties. Soviet citizens back then had been confronted with their past—the Stalinist terror. That moment gave Russia, among other things, Memorial, the human-rights organization that, along with Ukrainian and Belarusian activists, won the Nobel Peace Prize last week. Now Russian citizens are being confronted with their present. The writers in exile have physically fled their country (as has much of Memorial’s leadership) and are trying to write their way to a new Russia. Their imagination extends far beyond the Russian constitution to a world that’s radically different, and better than not only Putin’s revanchist Russian World but the world we currently inhabit.

The War in Ukraine Launches a New Battle for the Russian Soul

The last time people were writing in Russian so urgently was in the late nineteen-eighties, when Soviet citizens were confronted with the terror of the Stalinist past.

By 

The New Yorker · by Masha Gessen · October 9, 2022

Russia says that it has expanded. On September 30th, President Vladimir Putin signed a document that ostensibly accepted four Ukrainian regions as members of the Russian Federation. The residents of those regions, Putin said in a speech, “have become our citizens forever.” He made this assertion as the Ukrainian Army was liberating territory to which Russia was laying claim. He was not just trying to snatch propaganda victory from the jaws of evident military defeat; he was laying the groundwork for fighting for those lands ever more aggressively. A week and a half earlier, he had ordered the military to draft hundreds of thousands of new soldiers, and had threatened to use nuclear weapons.

A Russia that includes parts, or all, of Ukraine and untold other lands is the Russian World, a vague and expansive idea pioneered by the self-styled philosopher Aleksandr Dugin, some of whose ideas have been adopted by the Kremlin. In August, his thirty-two-year-old daughter, Darya, also an imperialist pundit, was killed by a car bomb that may have been intended for him. Last week, the Times reported that U.S. intelligence believes a part of the Ukrainian government may have been behind the attack. If true, this suggests that the government puts strong, probably unfounded, faith in the power of the concept of the Russian World.

Putin, in his speech, described both the Russian World and the larger world as he sees it. According to him, the West destroyed the Soviet Union in 1991, but Russia came back, defiant and strong. Now the West wants to destroy Russia. “They see our thought and our philosophy as a direct threat,” he said. “That is why they target our philosophers for murder.” The ultimate goal of the West—specifically, the United States and Great Britain—is to subjugate people around the world and force them to give up traditional values, to have “ ‘parent No. 1,’ ‘parent No. 2,’ and ‘parent No. 3’ instead of mother and father (they have completely lost it!),” and to teach schoolchildren that “there are some other genders besides men and women and offer them sex-change operations.” Putin has said, repeatedly, that only Russia can save the world from this menace. This is the story of a world in which his war in Ukraine—and the draft, and even, perhaps, a nuclear strike—makes sense.

But when the world shaped by the feedback loop of propaganda collides with the world of facts on the ground, things begin to crack. On October 5th, two videos circulated widely on Russian-language social media, including in normally pro-war quarters. The videos show a crowd of men in uniform. They say that there are five hundred of them and that they were recently drafted. They complain of “animal-like” conditions, of having to buy their own food and bulletproof vests, and of a lack of organization. “We are not registered as part of any detachment,” one man says. “We have weapons, but these are not officially issued to us.” Meanwhile, some Russian television propagandists have been acknowledging Ukrainian victories, and urging Russians to prepare for a long wait before their country can attack again.

It’s too early to make assumptions about where these tiny cracks may lead. It is not too early, however, to think about what a future, militarily defeated Russia might look like. This is what Alexey Navalny, the opposition politician who has been in prison since January, 2021, has been doing. The Washington Post recently published an op-ed, smuggled out by Navalny’s legal team, in which he writes that Russia deserves to lose the war and that, once it does, it must be reconstituted as a parliamentary, rather than a Presidential, republic. This, he argues, will insure that no one person can usurp power in Russia as Putin has.

Navalny’s op-ed serves to illustrate Putin’s wisdom, of sorts—the wisdom of keeping his most important political opponent behind bars. Navalny seems to have missed a cultural turning point. In the seven and a half months since Russia launched its full-scale invasion, hundreds of thousands of Russians have left their country. Many of them are journalists, writers, poets, or artists, and they, along with some who are still in Russia, have been producing essays, poems, Facebook posts, and podcasts trying to grapple with the condition of being citizens of a country waging a genocidal colonial war. Some of their Ukrainian counterparts have scoffed at their soul-searching. Ukrainians, indeed, have bigger and more immediate problems. But they also have certainty—they know who they are in the world, while for Russians nothing is as it once seemed to be.

One of the earliest examples of this outpouring was a poem, by the children’s-book author Alexey Oleynikov, about the incongruity of trying to flee Russia with a pet hedgehog in tow. One stanza reads, “We will not wash the shame off until our old age, until we die / There have been worse times, but there has never been a more ridiculous time.” Posted on Facebook, the poem went viral in March. May’s viral poem, by the actress and poet Zhenya Berkovich, tells of a young Russian man visited by the ghost of his grandfather, who fought in the Second World War; the ghost asks his grandson to forget him, lest the memory of his valor be used to justify the current war. This month’s viral poem, by Eli Bar-Yahalom, an Israeli Russian, is a dialogue between God and a Muscovite who hopes to return home someday. “There is no resurrecting Bucha, no raising up Irpin,” God says, referring to suburbs of Kyiv where Russians appear to have committed war crimes. There are also at least two Russian-language podcasts devoted to the issues of individual and collective responsibility for the war. And Linor Goralik, an acclaimed Russian writer born in Ukraine and living in Israel, has founded an online journal called roar (Russian Oppositional Arts Review), which has published three packed issues.

The last time people were writing in Russian so urgently was in the late nineteen-eighties. Soviet citizens back then had been confronted with their past—the Stalinist terror. That moment gave Russia, among other things, Memorial, the human-rights organization that, along with Ukrainian and Belarusian activists, won the Nobel Peace Prize last week. Now Russian citizens are being confronted with their present. The writers in exile have physically fled their country (as has much of Memorial’s leadership) and are trying to write their way to a new Russia. Their imagination extends far beyond the Russian constitution to a world that’s radically different, and better than not only Putin’s revanchist Russian World but the world we currently inhabit.

The New Yorker · by Masha Gessen · October 9, 2022

22. Team Putin Wakes Up: We Never Should’ve Laughed at Ukraine

Team Putin Wakes Up: We Never Should’ve Laughed at Ukraine

“A war should be waged for real or not at all. Now we don’t have any other options,” Russian state TV host Sergey Mardan said following a series of losses.

Julia Davis

Updated Oct. 09, 2022 2:59AM ET / Published Oct. 08, 2022 5:03PM ET 

The Daily Beast · October 8, 2022

Anadolu Agency via Getty

Russia experienced a number of embarrassing setbacks on the battlefield in Ukraine, but none of them were as humiliating as an explosion that rocked the Crimean Bridge, also known as Kerch Strait Bridge or Kerch Bridge, early Saturday morning.

During his Saturday broadcast on Solovyov Live, Russian state TV host Sergey Mardan opened his show with heavy sighs. He noted, “All day long we’ll be talking about how this happened and what will come of it. I can tell you right now that nothing good will come of it, that’s for sure.” Mardan grimly concluded: “They’ve achieved an enormous propagandistic effect.”

Repeatedly referring to Ukrainians with an often-used slur, Mardan complained that Russia apparently underestimated not only them, but also the Americans. Chauvinistic disregard for the Ukrainians as Russia’s “lesser” opponents manifests in the way Russian propagandists tend to blame the West for any painful blows inflicted in the course of Russia’s ill-fated invasion.

Mardan noted: “There was no shock that they would try to attack the Crimean bridge, but there was an initial shock that they managed to pull it off, especially in the early morning hours.” He explained that—as usual—the West is to blame: “Many competent people explain that this was a complicated task—not just journalists or commentators, but specialists. There is a high level of certainty that an operation of this magnitude could have been staged only by Western intelligence agencies.”

Mardan urged the Russians to stop underestimating the Ukrainian Armed Forces, bristling even at the comparisons to ISIS. He asserted: “Comparing Ukraine to ISIS is insulting to the Russian Army, which has been fighting them on an enormous front for seven months… ISIS are tribespeople in sandals made out of tires. They have no cities, power plants, railways or factories. Ukraine has it all. Ukraine is a cruel, motivated, well-prepared enemy. This is an enemy nation that has been waging a full-fledged war against us for at least seven and a half months. We keep calling it a special military operation, but they are waging war… Good Lord, I can’t keep listening to this thick and sticky rhetoric, it’s time to stop talking about the peace process and the collective West. This rhetoric doesn’t look good—in fact, it’s harmful. Since the mobilization has been announced, we’re talking about war, a people’s war.”

Black smoke billows from a fire on the Kerch bridge that links Crimea to Russia, after a truck exploded, near Kerch.

AFP

Mardan predicted an escalation, quoted Vladimir Lenin and urged a harsh response: “We stand on the precipice of another escalation. It’s unavoidable… A war should be waged for real or not at all. Now we don’t have any other options… No one will allow us to retreat, even though some would like that—and actually want that to happen. We should have no illusions about that.”

He somberly revisited fantasies harbored by many Russians in the very beginning of the invasion, stoked by top propagandists on state television, who predicted that a war against Ukraine would be fast, pain-free and nearly bloodless.

That dream rapidly evaporated and reality hit hard, affecting even the staunch supporters of Putin’s war. Mardan reminisced: “During the first week, we had a naive expectation of another “Crimean miracle,” like it happened in 2014. There we were, at Kyiv’s door, having solved all problems… That hope was gone 1-2 weeks later.”

Mardan grumbled about the problems Russia continues to have with supplying its existing forces, especially in light of the recently announced partial mobilization. He outlined the well-known shortages of uniforms, drones and basic gear, which have been replenished through donations and crowdfunding. The host noted that at this point, every grandma in Russia knows what a quadcopter is, having had to contribute funds to supply the Army. Now the citizens are being prepared to skip New Year’s celebrations, to do without Christmas trees or fancy lights adorning city centers—with that money to be sent to the front, securing winter uniforms for the troops. Mardan sternly noted: “This is no time to celebrate.”

He also revealed that not everyone is as receptive to the idea of an indefinite war against Ukraine as Russian public polls alleged. Behind the scenes, many are anxious for the armed conflict to be over. In light of this rapidly growing trend, state TV propagandists have been tasked with convincing the public that unless Russia wins, its citizens would be locked “in concentration camps,” enslaved by the West or killed. Mardan said, “After the mobilization, I noticed the growth of pacifist inclinations in my circles, among the people of my generation or older. Very cautiously, they’re starting to come out and say how nice it would be if everything came to an end, since we’re not pulling through.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Alexey Danichev

The host proposed that the best strategy to shut down those inclinations was to vividly paint what the future of Russia would look like if it’s defeated in this war. He suggested, “We should be painting the image of defeat with the same colors we used to describe the impending victory back in March, when we were planning a parade on Khreshchatyk [the main street of Kyiv]. I was dreaming about those scenes, as well as some of my colleagues.”

Mardan invited his guest, political commentator Evgeny Norin, to specify what Russia’s defeat would look like. Norin ushered in the historical memories of Russia’s distant past. He opined: “Russia’s defeat would resemble the Mongol yoke, with a modern technological twist… Crimea, Donbas and other contested regions would be taken away, just to put us in our place. From the standpoint of national humiliation, we would be forced to give up Sevastopol. Remember the fate of Serbia and Yugoslavia, who had to give up all of their military and political elites. Of course, many people here would say, ‘So they’ll cut off their heads, no big deal.’ Our soft pacifists say exactly that… Naturally, we’d also be forced to pay an enormous amount of reparations, huge amounts would be taken.”

Mardan and Norin concurred that Russian oligarchs and major companies would find a way not to pay and the cost of reparations would land on everyday citizens. Norin mused that Russia would not be allowed to manufacture anything that is more sophisticated than a foot stool and Western companies would lure away all of the specialists—much as they’re already doing. He predicted: “After the capitulation, we would be unable to offer them anything aside from the joy of standing by your Motherland.”

Norin darkly predicted that Russia’s capitulation “would be like Yugoslavia on steroids,” with decolonization as “a cherry on top.” He said Russia would be forced to break up into at least 10 separate parts, with Sharia law being instituted in at least some of them.

During the same show, State Duma member Alexander Kazakov offered a cheerful imperialistic prediction of what will happen if Russia perseveres and prevails: “If we win, we’ll take back what’s ours and whatever is theirs as well.”

The Daily Beast · October 8, 2022

23. US Army adopts new multidomain operations doctrine

Excerpt:

The new doctrine also triggers an update to 368 other doctrinal publications, he added, which will take place over the next several years.

US Army adopts new multidomain operations doctrine

Defense News · by Jen Judson · October 10, 2022

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Army, recognizing it will operate not just on land but also across air, sea, space and cyberspace, is releasing its first new doctrine in 40 years.

The 280-page doctrine for multidomain operations, titled “Field Manual 3-0,″ will make its debut at the Association of the U.S. Army’s annual conference, which runs Oct. 10-12.

Army leaders said it will be a key guide for the force, but stressed the service will continue to evolve the doctrine as it moves forward with its biggest weapon system modernization push since the 1980s. The service hopes to have a fully modernized force by 2030.

“There is not a time in recent history that is so potentially dangerous,” Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville writes in the manual’s foreword. “Russia, our acute threat, is conducting an unprovoked war on the sovereign country of Ukraine. Our pacing challenge, China, with an economy nearly equal in size to ours, is building a world-class military to challenge us and threatening its neighbors, including Taiwan.”

Meanwhile, McConville adds, “we cannot take our eyes off our persistent threats: North Korea, Iran, and violent extremists.”

The new manual “demonstrates the first principles of speed, range, and convergence of the cutting-edge technologies needed to achieve future decision dominance and overmatch against our adversaries,” he writes.

McConville notes how potential opponents could increasingly challenge the Army. He writes that while Army forces have used space and cyberspace capabilities for more than two decades, they have never employed them in combat against capable opponents. Likewise, “Air and Maritime capabilities have long enabled successful operations on land, but it has been decades since air-ground integration and close cooperation between land and naval forces have been effectively challenged by a threat.”

Initiated in March 2017 as a pilot program, the Army’s multidomain task force was designed to defeat an enemy’s anti-access/area denial capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region. (MC2 Matthew Dickinson/U.S. Navy)

The Army last issued a new doctrine, dubbed AirLand Battle, in 1982. This manual focused on close coordination between land and air forces, and it stemmed from lessons learned from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. It provided a basis for how the U.S. Army could fight and win against the Soviet Union.

The Army’s new manual reflects nearly five years spent by the service first developing multidomain operations as a warfighting concept and later as a doctrine.

The service released several versions of the multidomain operations concept beginning in 2018 and has refined it through evaluations, exercises, war games and its first multidomain task force. The task forces, established to test the concept, will now serve as operational units around the globe. There will be five tailored to operate in specific theaters, from Indo-Pacific Command to European Command.

Three key phases

The doctrine lays out three phases of multidomain operations: competition, crisis and armed conflict. It addresses the challenge of peer competitors using layered capabilities at standoff range to deter, requiring the U.S. as well as its partners and allies to use redundant, land-based capabilities to destroy or degrade threat-networked intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities as well as long-range fires, the field manual explains.

China and Russia are positioned to “win without fighting” when it can control the narrative and facts on the ground, so the Army must establish a truthful narrative to contest that approach during both competition and crisis phases of operation, it adds.

What is multidomain battle?

The eight-chapter document, emphasizes the Army must assume it is always visible to the enemy. And for the first time the Army included a chapter on its operations in largely maritime environments, Richard Creed, director of the service’s Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, told Defense News in a recent interview.

“When you think about the importance of INDOPACOM and the dynamics based on the geography of a theater like that, you understand [that] land forces, the Army in particular, have huge contributions to make in any campaign in that type of environment,” he said.

‘We’re at an inflection point’

The Army doesn’t yet have much of the modernized equipment meant to enable multidomain operations, but McConville told Defense News in a recent interview it still makes sense to move forward with the doctrine.

“We’re at an inflection point,” McConville said.

Indeed, the Army initially expected to release the doctrine over the summer.

While the extra time provided the service an opportunity to observe and learn from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the major ideas in the doctrine did not change, according to Creed.

Polish and American troops take part in tactical and fire training on April 8, 2022, in Nowa Deba, Poland. (Jeff J. Mitchell/Getty Images)

“What we did do, however, in light of our continuous observations of what’s been going on in the Russia-Ukraine war, is to make sure that we’re looking at those events through a lens that didn’t appeal to our preconceived notions,” he explained.

Creed said it was important to move quickly with the new document because “doctrine drives culture ... and it certainly drives the readiness culture in terms of what you’re training against, what kinds of military problems you’re trying to solve. And cultural shifts take a long time.”

The next step, Creed said, is to help soldiers internalize the doctrine.

“We’re going to have to train our people to execute it,” he said. “We’re going to have to develop leaders who understand it, and we have to play around with it during the execution of training and operations to foster what people like to call ‘a campaign of learning.’ ”

In the late 1990s, the Army updated its 1982 doctrine to adjust to what it termed “full-spectrum operations.” Similarly, Creed said, he expects the multidomain operations doctrine to require an update in the 2030 time frame.

“We will have an army that looks very different than the army now in terms of the equipment and the organizations that it fields and is trained to execute multidomain operations,” he said. “Between then and now, we’re going to do the best we can with the force that we have.

“The force that we have is capable of executing what we’re putting into doctrine just fine.”

The new doctrine also triggers an update to 368 other doctrinal publications, he added, which will take place over the next several years.

About Jen Judson

Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science degree in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts degree from Kenyon College.

​24. Retribution and Regime Change - The consequences of Putin's weakness

Excerpts:

Even if something does break in Moscow the risk is that it won’t be clean. Instead of Putin being replaced by a new leader who appreciates the situation and wishes to negotiate the withdrawal of Russian forces it as likely that there will be a messier situation, with different groups jockeying for position and possibly clashing with each other. There will be ultra-nationalists in this mix and some, including Prigohzin, with their private armies, but not many moderates. Even if a new leader was ready to do a deal they would be constrained by Putin’s legacy, not least his illegal annexation of Ukrainian provinces. This legacy would have to be repudiated and reversed for there to be a serious negotiation. That would be a difficult move for any would-be leader unsure of his position. While it may seem that Putin’s departure has become a necessary condition for a proper peace settlement it is unlikely to be sufficient.

If hardliners take power having objected not so much to the war but the way it has been prosecuted they will face the same corrosive issues – of shortages of men and equipment, messed up logistics and stretched command networks. As seriously they will face a country unsettled and anxious, possible on the edge of the sort of chaos that has engulfed Russian society in the past at the end of failed wars.

Retribution and Regime Change

The consequences of Putin's weakness

https://samf.substack.com/p/retribution-and-regime-change?utm_source=email

Lawrence Freedman

2 min ago

2

General Sergei Surovikin, the new commander of Russian forces in Ukraine

Everything that now happens in this war, including the murderous missile attacks on Ukrainian cities, has to be understood in terms of the logic of Putin’s exposed position as a failed war leader. He is desperately trying to demonstrate to his hard-line critics that he is up to the task. The opening salvos of this week, ending yet more innocent lives for no discernible military gain, will not make Ukraine less determined or able to win this war. They will have the opposite effect.

The trigger was the damage inflicted on the Kerch bridge last Saturday. The bridge was built at considerable expense to connect Crimea to the mainland and opened by Putin with great fanfare in 2018. The attack combined a symbolic blow with painful practical consequences. Although some road and rail traffic will still pass through, the loss of so much capacity adds to the headaches for Russian logisticians. This link is vital to keeping Crimea, and, through Crimea, forces in southern Ukraine, supplied. News of the attack left the normal suspects on Russian state media unsure about whether to be angrier with the shoddy security that allowed the attack to happen or the audacity of the Ukrainians in mounting the attack. TV Host Vladimir Solovyov, who has been increasingly despondent of late, demanded to know ‘when will we start fighting?’, adding, channeling his inner Machiavelli, that ‘it’s better to be feared than laughed at’. When on the night of 9 October Putin declared this to be a terrorist act against vital civilian infrastructure (despite its evident military value) it was clear that he shared this sentiment.

Putin’s statement claimed that ‘high-precision weapons’ were used against ‘Ukrainian infrastructure, energy infrastructure, military command and communications’, as both an answer to the ‘crimes of the Kyiv regime’ and a warning against further ‘terrorist attacks on the territory of the Russian Federation.’ Some infrastructure targets were hit but so have, just in Kyiv, a playground, a symbolic glass bridge in a park (which survived), and the German consulate. As Kyiv is Ukraine’s main decision-making centre it is telling that none of these supposedly weapons hit anything of political or military significance.

State Media’s Margarita Simonyan, who had called the bridge attack a ‘red line’ for Russia expressed delight at the landing of our ‘little response’. Yet while they might satisfy urges for vengeance their impact will be limited unless they become part of a persistent campaign. Alexander Kots, a war reporter, has expressed his hope that this was not a ‘one-off act of retribution, but a new system for carrying out the conflict’ to be continued until Ukraine ‘loses its ability to function.’ Former President Dmitri Medvedev, who once appeared as a serious figure, has expressed his conviction that the goal of ‘future actions’ (but not current?) must be the ‘complete dismantling of the political regime in Ukraine.’

Such hopes are contradicted by the harsh reality of Russia’s position. Putin’s statement highlighted retribution. Russia lacks the missiles to mount attacks of this sort often, as it is running out of stocks and the Ukrainians are claiming a high success rate in intercepting many of those already used. This is not therefore a new war-winning strategy but a sociopath’s tantrum. Putin’s anger is not only with the material consequences of the Kerch bridge attack, but that it showed him unable to defend Russian territory. For a man who built his career by cultivating an image as a resolute and ruthless strongman, nothing is more undermining than to appear weak and helpless. It is not ‘the political regime in Ukraine’ that is most at risk but Russia’s.

A Failed War Leader

In most countries, and not just democracies, leaders who fail badly in war will not stay in power for long. Yet the consensus view has been that Putin will avoid this fate. This view is starting to be challenged without anyone having much of an idea about how he might go and what will replace him.

Confidence in Putin’s durability reflects his success over the years in rigging elections, marginalizing critics through imprisonment, exile and death, putting loyalists in key state positions, and retaining popular support in Russia. At least until the start of 2022 he was associated with the return of order, prosperity, and restoring Russia to its rightful position on the world stage. His control over the media meant that news of adverse developments could be muffled and their impact blunted. Even when these developments became impossible to ignore, it still seemed that Putin would be able to extricate himself and Russia from this morass by declaring victory and withdrawing Russian forces, perhaps after cutting a deal that left him with something to show for all the trouble. That opportunity has now passed.

For a long time Putin’s control over the media allowed him to ignore the growing gap between his claimed ambitions and the situation on the ground. It was evident from the start of the Special Military Operation on 24 February that all was not going to plan. Yet despite many subsequent setbacks, Putin continued to claim that success would eventually be Russia’s. This official optimism lasted to the end of August. Ukraine’s offensives had yet to show much progress and Russia had not given up on its own. Putin could hope that the prospect of a long cold winter ahead would lead Europe to abandon its support for Ukraine, pushing it to end the war on Russian terms.

This optimism has now evaporated and it is impossible to pretend that all is well. The costs of this doomed enterprise are being felt at home, marked by those left dead, wounded and traumatized by the fighting, and the flight of men fearful of facing a similar fate if they are sent to the front. Those in the West who doubted that Ukraine’s fight back could lead to all occupied territory being liberated assumed that Putin could be persuaded to agree some compromise deal, one that would leave him with some of Ukraine’s territory if not as much as he wanted. Yet at no point has Putin given any encouragement to such views. It has become very difficult to imagine a ‘face-saving’ deal as there is not much ‘face’ left to be saved. Humiliation has occurred. Moreover Putin has put himself in the position where agreeing a peace involving even partial withdrawal from currently occupied territory would mean abandoning territory that he claims to have acquired for Russia. And Ukraine has rejected any talk of a partial withdrawal.

The annexations generated more embarrassment than enthusiasm as Ukrainian forces keep taking back more territory. The mobilisation intended to generate the extra combat power required to regain the military initiative was chaotic, further destabilising Russian society and politics.

Russia Can Lose

It no longer seems preposterous to suggest that Russia can lose this war. The images of late February, of Ukrainians making Molotov cocktails, have been replaced by those of highly professional forces on the move. The Russian army is a shadow of its former self, and its former self was less than it claimed. Well over seven months into the war its best units have been torn apart. Their replacements are often cobbled together using whoever happens to be available. Years of defence production have been lost, with valuable equipment captured by the enemy. Many senior commanders have been killed while the officer corps has been shredded. Troops at the front are having a harrowing experience and are consequently demoralised. The race is now on to establish defensive lines that can be held and cope with an enemy that has superior intelligence, equipment, and morale. Moscow now faces the prospect of the attrition of its armed forces continuing apace as its occupation becomes increasingly untenable.

Although nervousness has now displaced bravado in the Russian debate it has not yet reached the stage of challenging the rationale for the war or urging the need for a credible way out. The major preoccupation is with allocating blame for the incompetence with which the war has been fought up to now. Solovyov complained about the ‘genius idea of the General Staff’, accusing military leaders of squandering the vast budgets they had received over the years. Kirill Stremousov, deputy head of the Russian administration in Kherson, after promising that Russian forces were not so much retreating as regrouping, still complained about incompetence verging on treachery. ‘Indeed,’ he observed, ‘many people say that if they were the minister of defense [Sergei Shoigu], who brought things to this state of affairs, they would shoot themselves, if they were real officers.’

Two critics to watch are those deploying their own private armies -  Ramzan Kadyrov with his Chechens and Yevgeniy Prigozhin with his Wagner group. Kadyrov has complained that General Lapin, the Commander of the Central Military district, should be demoted to private and sent barefoot to the front, while Prigozhin has referred to military leaders as ‘pieces of garbage’. With Moscow in a febrile state, they see themselves as key players in shaping either the next stage of the Putin era or whatever it is that follows him. Prigozhin has his own means of recruitment (he was the one filmed offering prisoners opportunities to escape their sentences by fighting at the front) and seems to have deployed them to meet his own strategic objectives without regard to the wider needs of the Russian operation. His forces have been conducting the only serious offensive operation, against Artemovsk and Bakhmut in Donetsk, where it has been the familiar story of modest progress in a narrow area at heavy cost. One explanation may be that Prigohzin is keen to demonstrate that he can deliver success even while the rest of the army is falling back.

New Commanders

The main response to military failings so far has been to replace senior commanders. Thus the commander in the Black Sea Fleet was fired after the sinking of the flagship, Moskva, as was, last month, the deputy defense minister in charge of logistics, and the commander in the Western Military District who had lost Kharkiv and begun to lose Luhansk. The most important change is that General Sergei Surovikin has been named as the overall commander of Kremlin forces engaged in Ukraine. Up to June he was in command of Russia's Aerospace Forces (an amalgamation of the Russian Air Force, the Air and Missile Forces, and the Space Forces) after which he was put in charge of forces in southern Ukraine. Before that he was a notorious commander of Russian air operations in Syria, which were conducted with notable indifference to humanitarian consequences, and which no doubt appeared to Putin as a recommendation.

The other interesting item in his biography is that he was an active member of the attempted coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991, when he was responsible for the deaths of three anti-coup demonstrators. This led to one of his two spells in prison. The other was for arms trafficking. Prigohzin, no stranger to criminality himself, was quick to praise the appointment: ‘Surovikin is the most able commander in the Russian army’, he gushed, adding that Surovikin was a ‘legendary figure, he was born to serve his motherland faithfully.’ Some see him as a the uktra-nationalist’s rival to General Lapin for Gerasimov’s position as Chief of the General Staff.

Putin will have mixed feelings about becoming beholden to these characters. Dictators tend to get worried about men in uniform turning out to be even stronger than they are. But for the moment he needs them to keep his critics on side as well as improving Russia’s military performance. The need to calm his critics is also explains why he has lashed out against Ukrainian cities. The hardliners have been demanding attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure for some time and they now have got what they wanted. But they will inevitably be disappointed with the results. The electricity will be turned back on, the rubble cleared, and Ukraine’s armies will continue to press forward. These attacks could well be repeated, because it is part of the mind-set of Putin and his generals that enemies can be forced to capitulate by such means. But stocks of Kalibr and Iskander missiles are running low. According to Ukrainian accounts, over half of the missiles launched were shot down by their defences, and improved defensive systems, for which they have been lobbying for months, should be in place in November. What still matters most is the coming weeks of battle. This will determine how much the Ukrainians can ‘de-occupy’ their land but also the mood in Moscow and Putin’s personal position.

Trouble at the Top

The Washington Post has reported that US intelligence has picked up at least one member of Putin’s inner circle grumbling about the mismanagement of the war effort. US officials were quoted as reporting ‘growing alarm from a number of Putin’s inner circle’, and that ‘a lot of people … are convinced this isn’t going well or the right course of action.’ It would be surprising if this was not the case. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has acknowledged disagreements around the big decisions, such as mobilization. ‘There is disagreement over such moments. Some think we should act differently. But this is all part of the usual working process.’ He denied that there were any splits, and so far there have been no reports of any challenges to Putin from among the inner circle.

This is a personalist dictatorship with key members of the elite beholden to the man who gave them their positions, and the privileges that go with them. Such regimes can be brittle because they allow little scope for direct challenges until the situation becomes unbearable for other members of the elite. There is no longer a royal family or a ruling party to structure questions of political succession. Putin has failed to identify a chosen successor and there are no obvious candidates to take his place. Sergey Radchenko recently offered a list: Medvedev with his genocidal rhetoric but no longer taken seriously; chairman of the State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin who controls the legislature; Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, an able technocrat, occupying the position from which Putin launched his presidnetial bid; one of his predecessors Sergei Kirienko, with the thankless task of overseeing occupied Ukrainian territory; head of the National Guard Viktor Zolotov; Minister of Emergency Situations Alexander Kurenkov; and then the outsiders Kadyrov and Prigozhin. There is no figure here that the malcontents can gather around.

It still seems likely that a crunch point is most likely to come when the military position starts to appear unsustainable - because units keep on retreating, or can no longer be supplied, or are becoming mutinous, or a combination of all three. Russian history provides little guidance as to what might then happen. The Russian military tradition is one of strict subordination to the civilian authorities. There have only been a few occasions when members of the military have been prominent in trying to effect change at the top. Three come to mind: the Decembrist revolt of 1825 in the aftermath of the sudden death of Tsar Alexander 1, in which officers trying to encourage reforms were smashed by loyalist units using heavy artillery; the March 1917 Russian revolution, which overthrew the Tsar, only to be overthrown in turn by the Bolsheviks; and the shambles of the 1991 coup against Mikhail Gorbachev, which was led by the KGB but in which there was active military participation, including, as noted, Sergei Surovikin. If there are lessons from these occasions, a successful coup requires unity among the plotters, a credible leader, sufficient guns, a modicum of public support or at least acquiesence, and a plausible programme to address the problems that have prompted the coup in the first place.

Even if something does break in Moscow the risk is that it won’t be clean. Instead of Putin being replaced by a new leader who appreciates the situation and wishes to negotiate the withdrawal of Russian forces it as likely that there will be a messier situation, with different groups jockeying for position and possibly clashing with each other. There will be ultra-nationalists in this mix and some, including Prigohzin, with their private armies, but not many moderates. Even if a new leader was ready to do a deal they would be constrained by Putin’s legacy, not least his illegal annexation of Ukrainian provinces. This legacy would have to be repudiated and reversed for there to be a serious negotiation. That would be a difficult move for any would-be leader unsure of his position. While it may seem that Putin’s departure has become a necessary condition for a proper peace settlement it is unlikely to be sufficient.

If hardliners take power having objected not so much to the war but the way it has been prosecuted they will face the same corrosive issues – of shortages of men and equipment, messed up logistics and stretched command networks. As seriously they will face a country unsettled and anxious, possible on the edge of the sort of chaos that has engulfed Russian society in the past at the end of failed wars.​

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com