(apologies for my tardiness. A late start and there was a surprising amount to cover and comment on especially concerning SOF snd IW).

Quotes of the Day:

“That is a great mystery,” said Doctor Winter. “That is a mystery that has disturbed rulers all over the world—how the people know. It disturbs the invaders now, I am told, how news runs through censorships, how the truth of things fights free of control. It is a great mystery.”

- John Steinbeck, The Moon is Down

(I would urge all naysayers of psychological warfare, psychological operations, and influence operations to reflect on the above quote. Yes it is a mystery as to how it happens, but like the air power theory of the bomber, the message always finds a way to get through.)

“Anyone taken as an individual, is tolerably sensible and reasonable. But as a member of a crowd, he at once becomes a blockhead.” 

- Friedrich Schiller.

"Re-examine all that you have been told... dismiss that which insults your soul."

-Walt Whitman

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 9, 2023

2. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, June 9, 2023

3. The Pentagon Is Freaking Out About a Potential War With China

4. With eye on China, US and five allies condemn trade-related 'economic coercion'

5. China can't rely on Southeast Asian exports to offset a U.S. slowdown

6. How the US is deepening military alliances in China’s backyard

7. The ‘Status Quo’ and Taiwan - Pearls and Irritations

8. The Role of Special Operations Forces in Irregular Warfare within the Framework of Great Power Competition

9. How Can Special Operations Forces Contribute to Strategic Competition?

10. From Counterinsurgency to Conventional Warfare: The Changing Role of U.S. Special Operations Forces

11. Fusing Deterrence: Integrating Leaders Across US Special Operations and Nuclear Enterprise Domains

12. Special Forces Parachuted With Nukes Strapped To Them During The Cold War

13. Irregular warfare infiltrates West Virginia this month

14.  U.S. Defense Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific: Background and Issues for Congress

15. 4 Indigenous children lost in jungle for 40 days after plane crash are found alive in Colombia

16. Gerasimov Invites Top Chinese General to Visit Russia to ‘Expand Military Cooperation’

17. Russian Troops Killed ‘Retreating Through Their Own Minefields’

18. Marines want to use Tomahawks to sink enemy ships from 1,000 miles away

19. China adopts Sun Tzu's "Art of War," uses deceit, espionage to gain global recognition: Expert

20. China’s New Conscription Rules Reveal Concerns

21. More than Half of the Pentagon’s Major Arms Efforts Are Late, GAO Finds

22. Death of Peace: The 60th Anniversary of JFK’s Speech at American University

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 9, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2023

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least four areas of the front on June 9, making further gains around Bakhmut and in Western Donetsk.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged on June 9 that the Ukrainian counteroffensive recently began and noted that Ukrainian forces still have offensive potential, a departure from previous Kremlin efforts to downplay Ukrainian counteroffensives.
• Contrarily, much of the Russian information space prematurely claimed that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has failed after Russian forces damaged more Western-provided Ukrainian military equipment on June 9.
• Ukrainian officials directly acknowledged that Ukrainian forces expect to suffer equipment losses during counteroffensive operations.
• The Russian command structure responsible for areas of southern Ukraine is unclear and likely overlapping.
• Russian forces carried out missile and drone strikes across Ukraine on the night of June 8 to 9.
• Several independent sources reported additional evidence that an internal explosion likely destroyed the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam on June 6.
• The White House revealed on June 9 that Iran is helping Russia build a drone manufacturing factory in Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan, Russia, underscoring the growing military cooperation between Tehran and Moscow despite Western sanctions.
• Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov discussed increasing Russian-Chinese military cooperation with Chinese Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Staff Department Chief of Staff Liu Zhenli on June 9.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited and localized ground attacks south of Kreminna.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks near Bakhmut and on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks on the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russia continues to evade international sanctions and has reportedly restored access to key Western microchips and electronics that Russia needs to produce military equipment.
• A Ukrainian report states that Russian authorities may be preparing evacuations from northern Crimea.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on June 9 that Russia will begin deploying tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus in July 2023, and this is not an escalation from Putin’s prior nuclear weapons rhetoric.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 9, 2023

Jun 9, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 9, 2023

Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Annika Ganzeveld, and Mason Clark

June 9, 2023, 7:50 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:30pm ET on June 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least four areas of the front on June 9. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled limited and localized Ukrainian ground attacks in the Kreminna area.[1] Ukrainian officials stated on June 9 that Ukrainian forces advanced 1.2 kilometers in continued offensive operations near Bakhmut on June 8.[2] Ukrainian forces continued limited counteroffensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast near the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border on June 9, and made tactical gains in the area.[3] Ukrainian forces also continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast overnight from June 8 to 9 and during the day on June 9, and a Russian source suggested that Ukrainian forces made incremental gains during the attacks.[4]

Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged on June 9 that the Ukrainian counteroffensive recently began and noted that Ukrainian forces still have offensive potential, a departure from previous Kremlin efforts to downplay Ukrainian counteroffensives.[5] Putin stated that fighting has been ongoing for five days and claimed that Ukrainian forces “did not reach their aims in any area of combat” after committing “strategic reserves.”[6] Putin claimed that Ukrainian forces suffered significant losses and attributed Russian successes to superior Russian military equipment and personnel. Putin added that the Russian military command is “realistically” assessing the current situation and “will proceed from these realities.” Putin’s discussion of the Ukrainian counteroffensive is a notable departure from his previous distanced approach to discussing battlefield realities and may indicate that the Kremlin is learning from its previous failed approach to rhetorically downplay successful Ukrainian counteroffensives in 2022. ISW previously reported on May 2 that the Kremlin reportedly adopted a new information policy directing officials to not downplay the prospects of a Ukrainian counteroffensive and focus on the Russian fight against Western-provided weapon systems.[7]

Contrarily, much of the Russian information space prematurely claimed that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has failed after Russian forces damaged more Western-provided Ukrainian military equipment on June 9. Battlefield footage shows damaged or destroyed Western-provided infantry fighting vehicles and tanks in western Zaporizhia Oblast, though the number of Ukrainian vehicles several Russian sources claimed Russian forces destroyed are highly inflated.[8] Ukrainian forces previously lost military equipment in the same location on June 8.[9] Some prominent Russian ultranationalists claimed that damaged or destroyed Western-provided equipment indicated that Ukrainian forces failed to launch a large-scale counteroffensive.[10] Russian nationalists are widely celebrating the 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District), despite Russian forces only executing basic defensive operations that should not be so unusual as to deserve wide praise. One Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian offensive activity is in the decline, while a retired Russian general expressed gratitude to elements of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army and proclaimed these elements as heroes despite battles continuing along different frontlines.[11] Another Russian milblogger claimed that a counteroffensive can only last up to 10 to 15 days, implying that Ukrainian counteroffensive will soon culminate.[12] However, other ultranationalists warned that Ukrainian forces have not yet carried out the main offensive and noted that Russian forces are reinforcing the second echelon in anticipation of Ukrainian breakthroughs.[13] A Wagner-affiliated milblogger condemned the excessive enthusiasm around the destruction of Ukrainian military equipment, noting that Western kit is not “some kind of magic.”[14] Many Russian ultranationalists appear to be overcorrecting for their previous fears of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[15]

Ukrainian officials directly acknowledged that Ukrainian forces expect to suffer equipment losses during counteroffensive operations. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on June 9 that losses are expected during combat operations and that “military equipment that cannot be destroyed” has yet to be invented.[16] Malyar added that Russian sources are heavily amplifying footage of Ukrainian equipment losses for informational effects.[17] The Economist reported that Ukrainian forces are using critical Western equipment in areas of the frontline where Ukrainian forces have recently suffered equipment losses.[18] ISW previously assessed that Ukrainian forces appear to have committed only a portion of their available reserves for current counteroffensive operations, and that the existing reports of damaged Western-provided equipment are not a definitive measure of current Ukrainian combat power.[19] Available footage of Ukrainian equipment losses additionally indicates that many of these armored vehicles have been rendered immobile, but not outright destroyed, and are likely recoverable by Ukrainian forces.[20] The footage also suggests that the Ukrainian crews of these armored vehicles, who are far more valuable than the vehicles themselves and can remount new or repaired vehicles, likely survived and withdrew once the vehicles became immobilized.[21]

The Russian command structure responsible for areas of southern Ukraine is unclear and likely overlapping. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published a video statement on June 8 from the commander of the Russian grouping in the Zaporizhia operational direction, Colonel General Alexander Romanchuk, wherein he reported details about Ukrainian assaults in southern Ukraine.[22] Romanchuk is reportedly the Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD), although his level of responsibility for southern Ukraine remains unclear.[23] A Russian colonel previously claimed that Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinksy also played a decisive role in commanding Russian forces that repelled recent Ukrainian assaults in southern Ukraine.[24] Teplinsky is rumored to be deputy theater commander and responsible for the Zaporizhia, Kherson, and southern Donetsk operational directions.[25] It is unclear if Romanchuk would report to Teplinsky or SMD Commander Colonel General Sergey Kuzovlev. The Russian MoD also claimed that overall theater commander and Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov took command of Russian operations in southern Ukraine on June 5.[26] The command relations between these four officers — Romanchuk, Teplinsky, Kuzovlev, and Gerasimov — who have all been described as primarily responsible for Russian forces in this area are unclear.

Russian forces carried out missile and drone strikes across Ukraine on the night of June 8 to 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 16 Shahed-131/136 drones and six Kh-101/55 cruise missiles fired from two Tu-95 aircraft over the Caspian Sea and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 10 Shahed drones and four Kh-101/55 missiles.[27] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces launched eight missile strikes against residential buildings in Zhytomyr Oblast.[28] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that current Russian missile strikes aim to distract Ukrainian air defense systems, while Russian missile strikes in May mainly targeted Kyiv.[29]

Several independent sources reported additional evidence that an internal explosion likely destroyed the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam on June 6. Norwegian seismic monitoring center NORSAR reported that seismic data indicates that an explosion occurred on June 6 at 2:54am local time, about the same time as the collapse of the KHPP dam.[30] NORSAR seismologist Volker Oye stated that seismic data indicated a pulse of energy that was “typical of an explosion.”[31] Seismic data cannot locate the energy pulse of the explosion to a more exact location than within 20 to 30km of the KHPP, however.[32] Oye stated that it would be an “unusual coincidence” if something other than an explosion caused the energy pulse.[33] The New York Times reported that an unnamed senior White House official stated that US spy satellites equipped with infrared sensors detected an explosion at the KHPP dam before it collapsed.[34] The Wall Street Journal reported that multiple engineers and munition experts assessed that an explosive blast likely detonated at a specific point or multiple points of weakness, which destroyed the KHPP dam.[35] ISW previously reported that engineering and munitions experts that the New York Times interviewed believe that a deliberate explosion caused the KHPP dam’s collapse.[36] The preponderance of evidence suggests that a deliberate explosion damaged the KHPP dam. ISW continues to assess that the balance of evidence, reasoning, and rhetoric suggests that the Russians deliberately damaged the dam.[37]

The White House revealed on June 9 that Iran is helping Russia build a drone manufacturing factory in Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan, Russia, underscoring the growing military cooperation between Tehran and Moscow despite Western sanctions.[38] National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby stated on June 9 that the drone factory — which the Wall Street Journal reported in February 2023 could produce at least 6,000 Iranian Shahed-136 drones — could be operational by early 2024.[39] Kirby previously announced on May 15 that Russia is seeking to purchase new drones from Iran after expending most of its Iranian drone supply.[40] A factory producing Iranian drones in Russia would support Russia’s war effort against Ukraine. Russia could provide Iran with advanced military equipment that would modernize Iran’s air force, such as Su-35 fighter jets, attack helicopters, radars, and YAK-130 combat trainer aircraft, in return for helping construct the factory. Officials of an unspecified US ally previously stated that Iranian officials travelled to Yelabuga in January 2023 to discuss the construction of a new drone manufacturing facility in the city, reporting the same claim the facility could produce 6,000 or more drones in the coming years.[41]

Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov discussed increasing Russian-Chinese military cooperation with Chinese Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Staff Department Chief of Staff Liu Zhenli on June 9. Gerasimov emphasized the importance of joint military exercises within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Association of South East Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) Defense Ministers Meeting (SMOA Plus) format.[42] Gerasimov also claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping confirmed that Russian–Chinese strategic cooperation is at “the highest level.”[43]

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least four areas of the front on June 9, making further gains around Bakhmut and in Western Donetsk.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged on June 9 that the Ukrainian counteroffensive recently began and noted that Ukrainian forces still have offensive potential, a departure from previous Kremlin efforts to downplay Ukrainian counteroffensives.
• Contrarily, much of the Russian information space prematurely claimed that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has failed after Russian forces damaged more Western-provided Ukrainian military equipment on June 9.
• Ukrainian officials directly acknowledged that Ukrainian forces expect to suffer equipment losses during counteroffensive operations.
• The Russian command structure responsible for areas of southern Ukraine is unclear and likely overlapping.
• Russian forces carried out missile and drone strikes across Ukraine on the night of June 8 to 9.
• Several independent sources reported additional evidence that an internal explosion likely destroyed the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam on June 6.
• The White House revealed on June 9 that Iran is helping Russia build a drone manufacturing factory in Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan, Russia, underscoring the growing military cooperation between Tehran and Moscow despite Western sanctions.
• Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov discussed increasing Russian-Chinese military cooperation with Chinese Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Staff Department Chief of Staff Liu Zhenli on June 9.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited and localized ground attacks south of Kreminna.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks near Bakhmut and on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks on the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russia continues to evade international sanctions and has reportedly restored access to key Western microchips and electronics that Russia needs to produce military equipment.
• A Ukrainian report states that Russian authorities may be preparing evacuations from northern Crimea.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on June 9 that Russia will begin deploying tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus in July 2023, and this is not an escalation from Putin’s prior nuclear weapons rhetoric.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited and localized ground attacks south of Kreminna on June 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna) and Vesele (32km south of Kreminna).[44] The Russian Southern Group of Forces spokesperson claimed that Russian sources repelled three Ukrainian ground attacks in the Lysychansk direction.[45] A Russian milblogger indicated that limited engagements near Bilohorivka continue and claimed that the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 123rdMotorized Rifle Brigade made marginal advances in the area.[46] Former LNR official Rodion Miroshnik claimed that Russian forces control most of Bilohorivka, but ISW is unable to confirm this claim.[47] Geolocated combat footage published on June 9 shows that the Russan 24th Separate Guards Spetsnaz Brigade continues to operate in the Kreminna area.[48] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty also stated that Russian forces are anticipating Ukrainian attacks but are unsure where Ukrainian forces would attack on the Luhansk frontline.[49]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click here to read ISW’s retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.

Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks around Bakhmut on June 9. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces are conducting active operations in the Bakhmut area.[50] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Ukrainian operations are ongoing in the Bakhmut direction and that Russian forces are on the defensive in Bakhmut.[51] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted 15 engagements near Bakhmut on June 9.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces made limited advances west of Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) and toward Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), and that Ukrainian forces conducted assault operations near Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut).[53] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near: Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut), Ivanivske (6k west of Bakhmut), Bila Hora (12km southwest of Bakhmut), and Stupochky (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[54] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted ground attacks southwest of Berkhivka.[55] Another milblogger amplified footage on June 8 purportedly showing the 200th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 14th Army Corps (Northern Fleet) operating near Bakhmut.[56]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on June 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Opytne (3km southwest of Avdiivka), Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), and Nevelske (13km southwest of Avdiivka) and that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Marinka.[57] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted assault operations near Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka) and Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka).[58] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that a Chechen “Akhmat” unit is operating, looting goods, and filming staged combat videos in the southwestern part of Donetsk City.[59]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks on the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and made marginal gains in the area on June 9. Geolocated footage published on June 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces made marginal gains east of Blahodatne (5km south of Velyka Novosilka).[60] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian aviation conducted airstrikes near Blahodatne, further indicating that Ukrainian forces are operating near the settlement.[61] The Russian MoD reported that Russian forces repelled four Ukrainian assaults south and southwest of Velyka Novosilka.[62]

Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 9. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled two Ukrainian attacks south and southeast of Orikhiv.[63] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces intensified ongoing ground assaults south and southeast of Orikhiv on the night of June 8 to 9 and continued attacking Russian positions throughout the day.[64] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces pushed through the first lines of defense of Russian forces in the area, although other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces later recaptured these positions.[65] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced closer to Robotyne (15km south of Orikhiv) despite Russian forces recapturing positions.[66] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment and 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) as well as the 22nd Separate Guards Special Purpose (GRU) Brigade defended against Ukrainian assaults south and southeast of Orikhiv.[67] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces continued assaults southwest of Orikhiv and that Russian forces forced Ukrainian forces to retreat from recently captured positions near Lobkove (25km southwest of Orikhiv).[68] Milbloggers claimed that neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces control Lobkove, although geolocated footage published on June 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces are still operating close to the settlement.[69]

Ukrainian forces continued to strike rear Russian positions throughout southern Ukraine on June 8 and 9. Russian and Ukrainian sources claimed on June 8 that residents heard explosions in Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast, and Russian sources speculated that Ukrainian forces struck the city with Storm Shadow Cruise missiles.[70] Geolocated footage published on June 8 shows a gas station on fire in Berdyansk, although it is unclear if it occurred as a result of a Ukrainian strike.[71] Geolocated footage published on June 9 shows the aftermath of a Ukrainian strike on a Russian military headquarters on the Arabat Spit south of Henichesk, Kherson Oblast.[72] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a children’s recreation area with Storm Shadow missiles in the area.[73]

Ukrainian officials continue to report that declining water levels in the Kakhovka reservoir do not currently threaten the safety of the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Ukrainian state nuclear energy agency Enerhoatom reported on June 9 that the situation at the ZNPP remains stable and controlled and that the cooling pond at the ZNPP has enough water to cool the facility.[74] Enerhoatom also reported that the ZNPP will have access to water for the cooling pond even at the lowest possible water levels in the Kakhovka reservoir.[75]

A Russian source claimed that Russian forces are still operating on the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast as of June 9. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 9 that Russian units continue to conduct combat activities on the Kinburn Spit and that the spit is not an island due to flooding.[76] The southern branch of the Ukrainian government organization ”Forests of Ukraine” previously reported that flooding completely cut off the Kinburn Spit from mainland Ukraine as of the evening of June 7.[77] ISW has not observed recent confirmation that Russian forces are operating on the Kinburn Spit since flooding began as a result of the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) on June 6.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia plans to offer veteran status to conscripts serving in border regions of Russia. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairman Andrey Kartapolov stated on June 9 that any serviceman that undertakes the task of protecting the Russian borders should receive veteran statuses and noted that the defense committee is presently working on this issue.[78] Kartapolov added that the proposed law would also retroactively extend the veteran status to servicemen who previously defended the borders. Russian officials previously stated that conscripts defended Belgorod Oblast against incursions, which indicates that Kartapolov’s announcement likely implies conscripts.[79] The Kremlin has been steadily expanding its veteran benefits to Russian servicemen and civilians involved in its invasion, likely in an attempt to incentivize support for the Russian war effort.

Russia continues to evade international sanctions and has reportedly restored access to key Western microchips and electronics that Russia needs to produce military equipment.[80] US Department of State sanctions coordinator Jim O’Brien reported that Russian access to microchips and electronic are at “about pre-war levels” because European countries are continuing to sell materials to countries that resell supplies to Russia. O’Brien noted that US identified five countries that enable Russian circumvention of sanctions: Turkey, Kazakhstan, Georgia, the United Arab Emirates, and Armenia.

Zaporizhia Oblast occupation officials claim to have created a local “people’s militia” to patrol the occupied region.[81] Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Head Yevgeny Balitsky announced on June 9 that Russian officials swore personnel into the “people’s militia” who will work with occupation police and military commandant’s office, likely in an effort to intensify repressions in occupied territories.

The Donetsk People’s Republic’s (DNR) Federal Security Service (FSB) reportedly arrested former DNR Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Mikhailenko for allegedly supplying Ukrainian intelligence with information since 2018.[82]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

A Ukrainian report states that Russian authorities may be preparing for evacuations from northern Crimea. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on June 9 that Russian authorities have ordered occupation officials in northern Crimea to prepare for evacuations further into Crimea or into Russia.[83] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Crimean partisans have also observed evacuation preparations in Armyansk. The Ukrainian Resistance Center also reported that occupation authorities are preparing to loot areas of northern Crimea in tandem with evacuations.

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine is extraordinarily unlikely).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on June 9 that Russia will begin deploying tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus in July 2023.[84] Putin met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Sochi, Russia, and stated that the necessary Belarusian storage facilities will finish construction on July 7 and 8, after which Russia will begin transferring tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus. Putin emphasized that the deployment of Russian weapons on Belarusian territory is proceeding according to plan. Putin’s announcement does not represent an escalation in prior Russian nuclear weapons rhetoric, and Russia remains unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, as ISW has previously assessed.[85] Putin’s announcement is also very unlikely to require a change in NATO’s nuclear posture.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, June 9, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china%E2%80%93taiwan-weekly-update-june-9-2023

Key Takeaways  

1. Ongoing sexual harassment scandals primarily within the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) may increase the domestic appeal of Taiwan People's Party (TPP) presidential candidate Ko Wen-je, who promotes cross-strait policies broadly emphasizing economic and political engagement with China.
2. Chinese participation in high-level dialogue with the United States may aim to mitigate the risks of additional US sanctions and export controls on Chinese technological sectors.
3. Chinese military activities in the Indo-Pacific may undermine the Global Security Initiative’s (GSI) ability to re-orient Indo-Pacific security cooperation away from the United States.

CHINA–TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, JUNE 9, 2023

Jun 9, 2023 - Press ISW

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, June 9, 2023

Authors: Nils Peterson and Roy Eakin of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: June 7, 2023, Noon ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on Chinese Communist Party paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways  

1. Ongoing sexual harassment scandals primarily within the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) may increase the domestic appeal of Taiwan People's Party (TPP) presidential candidate Ko Wen-je, who promotes cross-strait policies broadly emphasizing economic and political engagement with China.
2. Chinese participation in high-level dialogue with the United States may aim to mitigate the risks of additional US sanctions and export controls on Chinese technological sectors.
3. Chinese military activities in the Indo-Pacific may undermine the Global Security Initiative’s (GSI) ability to re-orient Indo-Pacific security cooperation away from the United States.

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

Terminology: 1992 Consensus: a disputed cross-strait policy formulation supported in different formations by the CCP and KMT that acts as a precondition to cross-strait dialogue. The DPP does not support the 1992 Consensus. 

Ongoing sexual harassment scandals primarily within the DPP may increase the domestic appeal of TPP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je, who promotes cross-strait policies broadly emphasizing economic and political engagement with China. The scandals began on May 31 when a DPP Women’s Department employee said she was sexually harassed during her time with the party.[1] Some sexual harassment claims are also arising in the KMT against tangential party figures.[2] KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih claimed solidarity with all victims of sexual assault.[3] The TPP under their presidential candidate Ko Wen-je has not faced harassment allegations. Ko attacked the DPP for not doing enough for the victims. In concert with societal criticism, this prompted DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te and Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen to publicly apologize and launch three internal party processes to prevent further sexual harassment in the DPP.[4] Ko’s June 4–8 visit to Japan along with absence of sexual harassment allegations toward members of his party has distanced him from press coverage of the scandals. He frames his candidacy as an alternative to the DPP and KMT that can better manage cross-strait relations via unspecified economic and political engagement. He does this without providing details about his policy platform. This framing positions Ko as the candidate who could pick up swing voters offput by the DPP-centric sexual assault scandal but also wary of the KMT’s deep support for the 1992 Consensus.[5]

KMT-leaning media outlets are using the sexual harassment scandals to frame the DPP as immoral, which is unlikely to generate additional support for the KMT while the party maintains its unpopular cross-strait policy. [6] KMT-leaning media outlets frame the DPP as irresponsible and unfit to govern due to the scandal.[7] The KMT endorsed the 1992 Consensus as the basis for cross-strait policy in the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections. This contributed to the party’s defeat in presidential elections.[8] Swing voters leaning towards voting for the DPP but now having scandal induced doubts have the option of voting for Ko Wen-je, whose amorphous policy positions are closer to the DPP when compared to Hou Yu-ih.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Chinese participation in high-level dialogue with the United States may aim to mitigate the risks of additional US sanctions and export controls on Chinese technological sectors. Chinese Foreign Ministry Officials Ma Zhaoxu and Yang Tao met with US State Department Official Daniel Kritenbrink and US National Security Council Official Sarah Beran on June 5. They discussed US-China lines of communication, cross-strait relations, and US-China policy challenges.[9] This is part of a larger resumption of high-level dialogue between US and Chinese officials with the United States signaling that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken will visit China in late June.[10] The United States previously imposed export controls limiting Chinese access to semiconductor manufacturing equipment.[11] This is part of a larger international push to limit China’s ability to leverage technological developments for military purposes, which includes sanctions by US allies like Japan and the Netherlands.[12]  The party views this as a threat to China’s technological and development ambitions, as evidenced by CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping previously lamenting “external attempts to contain China” at the CCP’s 20th Party Congress in 2022. [13]  The CCP can use the appearance of dialogue to frame new export controls as unprovoked escalations.

The CCP may also attempt to use dialogue as a way to encourage the United States to change its rhetoric and public discourse towards China. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs frequently condemns the US government and media for supporting a so-called “China threat narrative.”[14] China’s desire for the United States to change its rhetoric is evident with Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang calling for US officials to “correct” their perceptions of China.[15]

China conducted aggressive naval actions near US naval ships in the Taiwan Strait ahead of the high-level US-China dialogue, which signals China’s willingness to continue engaging in provocative military activity. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) destroyer Luyang III came within 150 yards of the USS Chung-Hoon destroyer and Canadian HMCS Montreal frigate as they transited through the Taiwan Strait on June 3.[16] Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu defended this action on June 4 by saying that the United States should “not come close to [Chinese] waters and airspace.”[17] China’s unsafe and unprofessional naval interaction in the Taiwan Strait is part of a larger trend involving the PLA projecting control over regional territory the party claims as its own. A People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) J-16 Shenyang fighter jet maneuvered towards a US Air Force RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea on May 26.[18]

China is unlikely to frame itself as the aggressor when engaging in provocative military activity in the Indo-Pacific. China engaged in this activity at time when it frequently frames US actions as being motivated by “bloc confrontation” and a “Cold War mentality.” [19] This framing portrays provocative military activity as a response to US actions that are supposedly motivated by “bloc confrontation.”

Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu introduced a four-point Asia-Pacific security cooperation proposal on June 4 as part of a larger promotion of the Global Security Initiative (GSI), which may aim reduce regional countries’ security cooperation with the United States. The GSI is a Chinese security initiative that aims to reform international security norms.[20] The four points include avoiding “bloc confrontation” and promoting “mutual trust over bullying and hegemony.”[21] Li’s condemnation of “bloc confrontation” and “hegemony” aim to appeal to many Southeast Asian states’ anti-colonial sympathies and reluctance to choose between the United States and China. These points simultaneously aim to encourage Indo-Pacific states to participate in the GSI by framing it as a mutually beneficial initiative with norms appealing to the interests of regional countries.

Chinese military activities in the Indo-Pacific may undermine the GSI’s ability to re-orient Indo-Pacific security cooperation away from the United States. Chinese military activities counter the GSI’s claims to oppose hegemonism and “bloc confrontation.” China maintains ongoing territorial disputes with many states in the Indo-Pacific, especially involving the South and East China Seas.[22] These disputes frequently highlight China’s willingness to bully states in the region with provocative military actions, such as the Chinese Coast Guard’s decision to flash lasers at Philippine Coast Guard vessels near the South China Sea’s Second Thomas Shoal in February.[23] Provocative Chinese military activity in the South China Sea is further evident with China’s militarization of South China Sea artificial islands.[24] A Chinese research vessel also operated within Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) from May 7 to June 5, despite Vietnamese calls for the vessel to leave.[25] These actions highlight China’s prioritization of its own interests and ambitions over lofty principles that the GSI claims to embody. This type of aggressive activity can prove counter-productive by making states in the region view security cooperation with the United States as a critical tool needed to address Chinese aggression. This is evident with the Philippines’ April decision to expand the United States’ access to Philippine bases as a part of the US–Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.[26]

Chinese Minister of State Security Chen Yixin’s article calling for CCP party cadres to study a new anti-espionage law may aim to set conditions for the party to strengthen existing efforts to counter foreign influences it deems subversive. Chen wrote an article in the CCP Central Party School Study Times that both called for cadres to “focus on the newly-revised [sic] Anti-Espionage Law” and said that “it is necessary to carry out the anti-espionage struggle…and severely crack down on foreign espionage activities.”[27] He did not describe specific espionage activities. Chen wrote the article amid CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping’s warning that “external” forces aim to undermine China.[28] The CCP previously raided foreign firms in April and May in line with the new anti-espionage law it adopted in April.[29] Continued study of the anti-espionage law indicates the party could target other foreign entities that deal with information that party leadership deems sensitive.

3. The Pentagon Is Freaking Out About a Potential War With China

Excerpts:

“The thing we see across all the wargames is that there are major losses on all sides. And the impact of that on our society is quite devastating,” said Becca Wasser, who played the role of the Chinese leadership in the Select Committee’s wargame and is head of the gaming lab at the Center for a New American Security. “The most common thread in these exercises is that the United States needs to take steps now in the Indo-Pacific to ensure the conflict doesn’t happen in the future. We are hugely behind the curve. Ukraine is our wakeup call. This is our watershed moment.”

The problem has come into sharp relief only in the last few years as Russia invaded Ukraine, leading to a prolonged war that has drained U.S. munitions stockpiles, and China dramatically escalated both its military spending and aggressive rhetoric against Taiwan. In the last year the U.S. has allocated nearly $50 billion in security aid to Kyiv, possibly cutting further into its deterrent against China. In other words, the failure to deter Vladimir Putin from invading Ukraine and the stress this has put on the U.S. defense industrial base should be sounding alarms for the U.S. military posture vis-a-vis Taiwan, many defense experts say. Yet critics on both sides of the aisle say the Biden administration has been slow to respond to what is minimally required to prevent an Indo-Pacific catastrophe, which is the need to rapidly build up a better deterrent — especially new stockpiles of munitions that would convince China it could be too costly to attack Taiwan.

“There is a recognition of the challenge that goes to the top of the Pentagon, but across the board there is more talk than action,” says Seth Jones, a former Obama-era defense official who compiled a report on one of the wargames conducted at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

And this is the real and proverbial inflection point in the history of the military industrial congressional complex with effects that reverberate today and probably for decades to come:

All this became clear to mandarins of the U.S. defense industry one evening in the autumn of 1993, when then-Deputy Defense Secretary William Perry gathered about a dozen or so of them at the Pentagon. Perry fed them a nice dinner and then delivered a blunt and stomach-turning message: The fat years of the Cold War were over. The military-industrial complex was done. Defense budgets would continue to shrink dramatically and many of them would soon be out of business. “We will stand by and watch it happen,” Perry told them, adding that the defense companies should “adjust their plans accordingly.” As Perry later recounted, that meeting “precipitated a whole series of consolidations” involving mergers and industry drop-outs, as well as dependence on global supply lines that came to incorporate China, a possible future adversary.

The 1993 dinner, which became known as the Last Supper, marked a fundamental shift in mindset that shaped the course of the next 30 years. At least until 9/11, that time period was marked by ever-plummeting budgets, pell-mell departure of firms from defense contracting and, above all, complacency in the face of what seemed a serene future with no obvious strategic threat on the horizon. Even Perry, who soon after became President Bill Clinton’s defense secretary, admitted years later that the unwinding of America’s Cold War defense apparatus went much too far. Before long the industry underwent what Paul Kaminski, former under secretary of defense for procurement, called “excessive vertical integration,” dwindling to one or two monopoly suppliers for everything from large-scale weapons systems to a whole array of crucial components such as processors and sensors used in flight controls.

And this is why there may be cuts to SOF and what we can see is the growth of anti-Irregular Warfare antibodies. I can see the subtle change in narrative that we squandered all this money on IW for the past two decades and it is SOF that does that IW stuff; therefore we do not need to continue to fund SOF because we are not going to do that IW stuff again. Ot we will accept risk in IW because a conventional force can be adjusted to conduct IW if necessary while an IW force can easily be reprogrammed and trained to conduct large scale combat operations (LSCO). The problem with that is IW will be a part of LSCO and conducted before, during, and after LSCO.

But this is in part because of the 20-year-long “war on terror,” in which the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and the huge expenses of occupation, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism sucked up so much in resources and attention, with the Pentagon spending nearly $14 trillion in response to 9/11, according to the Costs of War project at Brown University. Added to this was the huge cost of caring for the post-9/11 war veterans. (As a percentage of GDP the 2023 budget was still just over 3 percent but this was largely due to the rapid growth of the economy.)

“The 20 years post 9/11 really ought to be acknowledged as the era of the Great Distraction,” says retired Air Force Lt. Gen. David Deptula. “We got too distracted from the real threats posed by China and Russia.”

This article is heavily weighted to service discussion and as noted large scale combat operations. There is no mention of SOF or IW other than the reference to $14 trillion on the GWOT. This is because USSOCOM only has service-like responsibilities and it especially ASD SO/LIC has no actual service authorities - SOF is not a service and only partly service like. It only has a "seat next to the table" but not really a "seat at the table" (ASD SO/LIC and SEC 922) . Sec 922 did not go far enough and the Nunn Cohen amendment to Goldwater Nichols which envisioned single ownership of Low Intensity Conflict (which can be considered analogous to today's IW) has never been realized. And they stopped short of making SOF a separate service in 1987 because they thought it was a bridge too far due to service hostility to SOF, but they recognized that it would someday be necessary and hoped it would someday be established.

THE FRIDAY READ

The Pentagon Is Freaking Out About a Potential War With China

(Because America might lose.)

Politico · 

For three decades Washington has stripped its defense industrial base bare. The problem: We may need it soon.

Illustrations by Brian Stauffer for POLITICO

By Michael Hirsh

06/09/2023 04:30 AM EDT

Michael Hirsh is the former foreign editor and chief diplomatic correspondent for Newsweek, and the former national editor for Politico Magazine.

The war began in the early morning hours with a massive bombardment — China’s version of “shock and awe.” Chinese planes and rockets swiftly destroyed most of Taiwan’s navy and air force as the People’s Liberation army and navy mounted a massive amphibious assault across the 100-mile Taiwan Strait. Having taken seriously President Joe Biden’s pledge to defend the island, Beijing also struck pre-emptively at U.S. and allied air bases and ships in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. managed to even the odds for a time by deploying more sophisticated submarines as well as B-21 and B-2 stealth bombers to get inside China’s air defense zones, but Washington ran out of key munitions in a matter of days and saw its network access severed. The United States and its main ally, Japan, lost thousands of servicemembers, dozens of ships, and hundreds of aircraft. Taiwan’s economy was devastated. And as a protracted siege ensued, the U.S. was much slower to rebuild, taking years to replace ships as it reckoned with how shriveled its industrial base had become compared to China’s.

The Chinese “just ran rings around us,” said former Joint Chiefs Vice Chair Gen. John Hyten in one after-action report. “They knew exactly what we were going to do before we did it.”

Dozens of versions of the above war-game scenario have been enacted over the last few years, most recently in April by the House Select Committee on competition with China. And while the ultimate outcome in these exercises is not always clear — the U.S. does better in some than others — the cost is. In every exercise the U.S. uses up all its long-range air-to-surface missiles in a few days, with a substantial portion of its planes destroyed on the ground. In every exercise the U.S. is not engaged in an abstract push-button war from 30,000 feet up like the ones Americans have come to expect since the end of the Cold War, but a horrifically bloody one.

And that’s assuming the U.S.-China war doesn’t go nuclear.

“The thing we see across all the wargames is that there are major losses on all sides. And the impact of that on our society is quite devastating,” said Becca Wasser, who played the role of the Chinese leadership in the Select Committee’s wargame and is head of the gaming lab at the Center for a New American Security. “The most common thread in these exercises is that the United States needs to take steps now in the Indo-Pacific to ensure the conflict doesn’t happen in the future. We are hugely behind the curve. Ukraine is our wakeup call. This is our watershed moment.”

The problem has come into sharp relief only in the last few years as Russia invaded Ukraine, leading to a prolonged war that has drained U.S. munitions stockpiles, and China dramatically escalated both its military spending and aggressive rhetoric against Taiwan. In the last year the U.S. has allocated nearly $50 billion in security aid to Kyiv, possibly cutting further into its deterrent against China. In other words, the failure to deter Vladimir Putin from invading Ukraine and the stress this has put on the U.S. defense industrial base should be sounding alarms for the U.S. military posture vis-a-vis Taiwan, many defense experts say. Yet critics on both sides of the aisle say the Biden administration has been slow to respond to what is minimally required to prevent an Indo-Pacific catastrophe, which is the need to rapidly build up a better deterrent — especially new stockpiles of munitions that would convince China it could be too costly to attack Taiwan.

“There is a recognition of the challenge that goes to the top of the Pentagon, but across the board there is more talk than action,” says Seth Jones, a former Obama-era defense official who compiled a report on one of the wargames conducted at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

But a swift response may not be possible, in large part because of how shrunken the U.S. manufacturing base has become since the Cold War. All of a sudden, Washington is reckoning with the fact that so many parts and pieces of munitions, planes, and ships it needs are being manufactured overseas, including in China. Among the deficiencies: components of solid rocket motors, shell casings, machine tools, fuses and precursor elements to propellants and explosives, many of which are made in China and India. Beyond that, skilled labor is sorely lacking, and the learning curve is steep. The U.S. has slashed defense workers to a third of what they were in 1985 — a number that has remained flat — and seen some 17,000 companies leave the industry, said David Norquist, president of the National Defense Industrial Association. And commercial companies are leery of the Pentagon’s tangle of rules and restrictions.

“Unfortunately, the more you dig under the hood the more problems you see,” said a senior Democratic defense expert in the Senate who was granted anonymity because he was not allowed to speak on the record for his boss. “This is largely a function of the post-Cold War period being focused on efficiency. Since the Gulf War we came to expect too much from smart munitions. We haven’t needed stockpiles or found ourselves critically low on spare parts. So we’ve decreased the wiggle room.” At a military conference earlier this year, the Navy’s intelligence chief, Rear Adm. Mike Studeman, called the problem “China blindness,” saying: “It’s very unsettling to see how much the U.S. is not connecting the dots on our number one challenge.”

The administration’s response, including the fiscal 2024 defense authorization bill, was also delayed because of the protracted negotiations over Biden’s budget and the debt ceiling. Sen. Jack Reed, the Democratic chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, had been planning to hold hearings on America’s defense industrial base, but put those plans off because of the time being devoted to budget and debt dickering.

The most urgent task is to manufacture and move massive numbers of missiles and other high-tech munitions to East Asia to shore up the U.S. deterrent against China, says Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.), chair of the Select Committee. What is most needed: far more Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs), Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASMs), Harpoon anti-ship missiles, Tomahawk cruise missiles and other munitions, Gallagher said.

“You need this to be prioritized at the SecDef [secretary of defense] level,” Gallagher told me in an interview in early May. But when Gallagher asked Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin questions about Taiwan’s defenses at a recent hearing, “he couldn’t really answer,” Gallagher said. “I asked Austin point blank, ‘What is your highest priority?’ and he responded with all this jargon about readiness levels.” Gallagher said the Pentagon should offer prime missile contractors such as Lockheed Martin a slew of new multi-year contracts.

The Pentagon declined to comment, but at a meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations on May 3, Under Secretary of Defense William LaPlante said the Biden administration and its allies in Europe and Asia were moving quickly to fill the gaps.

“We’re in the middle of a pivot, and that’s very exciting to see,” said LaPlante, who added that he just returned from a meeting of NATO and “all we’re talking about is our industrial base.” Biden’s proposed defense budget plans for the first time to procure missiles and other munitions with multi-year contracts, as is now done with planes and ships. LaPlante said the administration is beginning to deliver some large weapons systems to overseas allies in record time. New NATO member Finland, for example, got approval for 65 F-35 fighters only in February of 2020 and is slated to have the planes delivered next year.

Some U.S. intelligence and defense officials fear that Beijing understands the deficiency in American readiness all too well and could try to exploit it by attacking or blockading Taiwan in the next few years. Earlier this year, CIA Director Bill Burns said the United States believes that Chinese President Xi Jinping has ordered his military to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. This was so, Burns said, despite the likelihood that Xi was “surprised and unsettled” by the “very poor performance” of the Russian military in Ukraine.

In April, China’s military completed three days of large-scale combat exercises around Taiwan that rehearsed blockading the island and said in a statement it is “ready to fight … at any time to resolutely smash any form of ‘Taiwan independence’ and foreign interference attempts.” The actions followed U.S. pledges to arm up Taiwan and Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s diplomatically risky meeting on U.S. soil with U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy. In recent months several Chinese fighter jets have buzzed American military aircraft over the South China sea. Barring a confrontation over Taiwan, however, Xi and other senior Chinese officials have said they do not want war with the United States. Relations between the two powers should not be a “zero-sum game where one side outcompetes or thrives at the expense of the other,” as Xi told Biden at their last bilateral meeting in Bali in November, according to a Chinese Foreign Ministry statement.

So far, China’s actions seem to be speaking louder than such words. LaPlante conceded that fears Beijing is calculating it must act against Taiwan sooner than later are “a very valid concern. It is always a question that is on everybody’s mind.” In an interview, LaPlante said that sense of urgency is why Biden has invoked the emergency Defense Production Act, enacted during the Korean War, to rebuild and expand the nation’s domestic hypersonic missile industry. This is a key area of Chinese advancement, and U.S. officials fear that Beijing seeks to use hypersonics to push U.S. ships and bases out of close range in the Asia-Pacific region.

Many critics say it’s not enough. “We’re in a window of maximum danger,” says Christian Brose, a former senior aide to the late Sen. John McCain, who for years was a lone voice in the wilderness warning against the Chinese and Russian buildup. “We could throw a trillion dollars a year at the defense budget now, and we’re not going to get a meaningful increase in traditional military capabilities in the next five years. They cannot be produced.”

One of the reasons, again, is that China and other countries — not all of them friendly — make and supply a lot of that stuff now. Over decades of what many say was delusional thinking by both political parties about turning China into a friendly “stakeholder” in a peaceful international system, Washington heedlessly ceded shipbuilding, aircraft parts and circuit boards over to China and other cheap overseas labor forces. America’s new F-35 fighter jets, for example, contain a magnet component made with an alloy almost exclusively manufactured in China. China also totally dominates machine tools and rare earth metals, essentials for manufacturing missiles and munitions, as well as lithium used in batteries, cobalt and the aluminum and titanium used in semiconductors. While Beijing has made new advances in explosives, most American military explosives are made at a single aging Army plant in Tennessee, Forbes reported in March.

“While they were industrializing, we were deindustrializing,” says Brose. Today China commands some 45 percent to 50 percent of total shipbuilding globally, while the United States has less than one percent. “Given those numbers, explain to me how the United States is going to win a traditional shipbuilding race with China?”

“The bottom line is this whole problem was decades in the making,” added Brose. “It’s not something that just kind of crept up on us and surprised us over the last couple of years.”

The Biden administration can hardly bear most of the blame. For decades after the Cold War, Washington was lulled into defense doldrums from which it is still not fully awakened. The mid-to-late 1990s were an era of American triumphalism, when the prospect of traditional warfare seemed remote. The Berlin Wall fell in 1989, and by the end of 1991 the Soviet Union had disintegrated. Most officials expected a “peace dividend”: A deflated post-Soviet Russia was seeking U.S. economic advice in shifting to a market economy, and under the Nunn-Lugar program, Moscow was cooperating in eliminating nukes. Washington hopefully brought China into the World Trade Organization, expecting Beijing to observe at least some rules in the U.S.-dominated international system — a policy supported by both political parties.

All this became clear to mandarins of the U.S. defense industry one evening in the autumn of 1993, when then-Deputy Defense Secretary William Perry gathered about a dozen or so of them at the Pentagon. Perry fed them a nice dinner and then delivered a blunt and stomach-turning message: The fat years of the Cold War were over. The military-industrial complex was done. Defense budgets would continue to shrink dramatically and many of them would soon be out of business. “We will stand by and watch it happen,” Perry told them, adding that the defense companies should “adjust their plans accordingly.” As Perry later recounted, that meeting “precipitated a whole series of consolidations” involving mergers and industry drop-outs, as well as dependence on global supply lines that came to incorporate China, a possible future adversary.

The 1993 dinner, which became known as the Last Supper, marked a fundamental shift in mindset that shaped the course of the next 30 years. At least until 9/11, that time period was marked by ever-plummeting budgets, pell-mell departure of firms from defense contracting and, above all, complacency in the face of what seemed a serene future with no obvious strategic threat on the horizon. Even Perry, who soon after became President Bill Clinton’s defense secretary, admitted years later that the unwinding of America’s Cold War defense apparatus went much too far. Before long the industry underwent what Paul Kaminski, former under secretary of defense for procurement, called “excessive vertical integration,” dwindling to one or two monopoly suppliers for everything from large-scale weapons systems to a whole array of crucial components such as processors and sensors used in flight controls.

And after the Gulf War and the advent of the “smart bomb” era in 1991, when the Pentagon thought it could take out enemies quickly from the air, complacency spread far and wide. Both Democratic and Republican administrations pushed industry to globalize, even though Cold War-era export restrictions continue to obstruct defense technology sharing. Defense spending dropped from 5.2 percent of GDP in 1990 to 3.0 percent in 2000, according to the Mercatus Center at George Mason University.

Today the Pentagon suddenly finds itself scrambling to re-weaponize across the board — from submarines to aircraft to surface-to-air missiles — as Washington awakens to the reality of twin strategic threats from China and Russia. That may seem surprising at a time when the Pentagon still commands an $858 billion budget that exceeds the discretionary spending of every other federal agency put together, and which is almost twice as high as in the late ‘90s. Biden’s $886 billion request for 2024 would put the defense budget “at one of the highest levels in absolute terms since World War II — far higher than the peaks of the Korean or Vietnam wars or the peak of the Cold War,” said William Hartung, a military budget expert at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. “And the U.S. spends more than the next 10 countries in the world combined, most of whom are U.S. allies, including about three times what China spends.”

But this is in part because of the 20-year-long “war on terror,” in which the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and the huge expenses of occupation, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism sucked up so much in resources and attention, with the Pentagon spending nearly $14 trillion in response to 9/11, according to the Costs of War project at Brown University. Added to this was the huge cost of caring for the post-9/11 war veterans. (As a percentage of GDP the 2023 budget was still just over 3 percent but this was largely due to the rapid growth of the economy.)

“The 20 years post 9/11 really ought to be acknowledged as the era of the Great Distraction,” says retired Air Force Lt. Gen. David Deptula. “We got too distracted from the real threats posed by China and Russia.”

Hartung, who helped compile the Costs of War estimate, said such claims are “overblown” since the Defense Department had ample funds to spend on weapons modernization over the past decade as those wars wound down. The direct costs of war in Afghanistan and Iraq were probably less than a quarter of that $14 trillion, Hartung said. A bigger problem was inefficiency and waste: A lot of money continued to go to antiquated weapons systems that the Pentagon sought to retire but members of Congress wanted to maintain because they were produced in their districts or states. Hartung and other Pentagon critics say the five remaining major weapons contractors — Lockheed Martin, Boeing, General Dynamics, Raytheon, and Northrop Grumman — have also squandered billions on stock buybacks and bloated executive compensation.

Muddling things further is that Congress remains confused about what needs to be prioritized, and “right now there isn’t a consistent demand signal from the DoD to industry,” said CNAS’s Wasser. The problem is not partisanship, she said, since “the China challenge is one of the rare areas of agreement on Capitol Hill these days,” but rather “how Congress and the Pentagon communicate with each other.”

Thus the Ukraine drain has only exacerbated what one defense analyst, Mackenzie Eaglen, has called the “terrible 20s,” the effect of congressional squabbling that delayed weapons modernization bills has left the military with “aged chassis, hulls, and airframes that cannot be upgraded with today’s technology and cannot generate the kind of power needed to survive any fight.” These include Eisenhower-era B-52s and Minuteman missiles that have exceeded their shelf life.

“It’s a horror story,” Eaglen said in an interview. “We can’t put any more Band-Aids on a defense industrial base that has reacted to government signals for the past three decades and is now purely a peacetime industrial base. There is no more ‘Freedom’s Forge’ or ‘Arsenal of Democracy.’”

Indeed, the Ukraine invasion has signaled the start of a new era of industrial warfare, in which Washington may have begun to cut into its own deterrence posture by delivering more than 10,000 Javelin anti-armor missiles and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to Ukraine (though many of these munitions would not likely be used in a war with China).

“We haven’t fired munitions at this rate since World War II,” said the Senate defense expert who spoke on condition of anonymity. “And air defense was not something we had to worry about for 20 years in Iraq and Afghanistan, so we sort of took our eye off the ball.”

The main goal against China, experts say, should be not to fight a war but to deter Beijing from starting one. Yet questions remain whether the Biden administration has fully grasped the scale of the problem.

“They came to power not wanting to deal with these issues,” says Bill Greenwalt, an expert in the defense industrial base at the American Enterprise Institute. “Now they’re starting to get mugged by reality in a sense.” The Senate expert on the Democratic side agreed that “the sense of urgency is nowhere near what it should be. … Many don’t yet see this as an existential threat. There are some people who think we’re crying wolf.”

Some critics make the case that the strategic threat is exaggerated: China’s economy is suffering record low growth, and the Biden administration has barred it from getting advanced computer chips that Beijing can’t make on its own. Russia seems hopelessly bogged down in Ukraine. The administration also argues that it has moved quickly in some key areas that shore up deterrence. It is negotiating new agreements with Pacific allies, especially the AUKUS pact between the U.S., Britain and Australia, which will see four U.S. Virginia-class submarines (state-of-the-art attack subs) and one U.K. Astute-class submarine begin deployments to Australia in 2027. It has gained access to several bases in the Philippines. The administration has also embraced defense-related industrial policy, with a $52.7 billion investment in domestic semiconductor manufacturing.

Mark Cancian of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who produced a report on one of the wargames in January called “The First Battle of the Next War,” said that while the proposed defense budget through fiscal 2024 is not enough to make a difference, the administration’s “Future Years Defense Plans” stretching out to 2027 could mean that increased munitions production will suffice as a Band-Aid. Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks, who is running the modernization program, said she is expediting the FYDPs to address the Taiwan threat.

Under the Biden administration, there has also been serious pushback by the Federal Trade Commission toward defense industry mergers for the first time in recent history. In 2022 the FTC sued to block Lockheed Martin’s $4.4 billion acquisition of engine-maker Aerojet Rocketdyne. But consolidation is still outpacing government efforts, especially when it comes to big-name contractors buying up smaller, less visible suppliers. And there is little or no cooperation across government agencies to prevent that. It also took the Biden administration until March of this year to put in place an assistant defense secretary for industrial policy, Laura Taylor-Kale.

Yet another problem is the long lead time for planning, development and manufacture, as the handful of major contractors left, such as Lockheed Martin and Raytheon Technologies, await multi-year contracts under an antiquated acquisition process dating from the early Cold War. They are also demanding reform of just-in-time inventories, another post-Cold War efficiency measure that prevents a buildup of reserve capacity.

“If you knew that we had to defend Taiwan in three years, then we’re already two years too late,” says Heather Penney, a former Air National Guard pilot and senior fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. “It takes two years to budget for these platforms, a year to set up supply, a third year to put all that together, and it takes roughly five years to produce an experienced combat pilot.”

Beyond that, although the U.S. has always considered itself a Pacific power, Taiwan is literally in China’s backyard and Beijing considers ownership of it a vital national interest. “The most important thing to remember is that China is fighting a home game in that region where the U.S. is fighting an away game, so we have to bring much more mass to bear,” says Wasser. “Attrition is baked into Chinese assumptions.”

Politicians and generals are always fighting the last war and often forgetting the lessons. Or at least misunderstanding them.

Americans have always seen ourselves as the “arsenal of democracy,” and history tends to glorify the rapid build-up of America’s World War II military in only a few years. We did it once, the thinking goes, against two formidable foes at the same time, Germany and Japan — so why would it be so hard for the most technologically advanced nation on earth to achieve the same thing against China and Russia?

But in truth the changeover from peacetime to a wartime footing then took longer than most people think. Through the 1930s, especially as the Japanese ravaged Asia, prescient congressmembers such as Carl Vinson of Georgia pushed through legislation for a bigger navy — and got one. By the time war came, the entire allied effort depended on “the immense shipbuilding program of the United States,” then-U.K. Prime Minister Winston Churchill said in 1942. Even coming out of the Great Depression, there was a strong U.S. manufacturing base across the board from major automakers to mom-and-pop toolmakers.

“We lack that today,” says Penney. “Unlike World War II, America no longer has the skilled manufacturing base to spin up and support wartime production.”

Another obstacle is that the mindset of a later conflict, the Cold War, still dominates Pentagon acquisition policy. The so-called “planning, programming, budgeting and execution” (PPBE) system still drives contracting. But it was designed more than a half century ago for the much slower defense buildup of the Cold War and is clogged with bureaucracy. “We were competing then against a system of five-year planning by the USSR,” says Greenwalt. “In effect we became the Soviet Union when we adopted this process.”

In 2021 former Google CEO Eric Schmidt called the PPBE system an “outdated, industrial-age budgeting process” that “creates a valley of death for new technology … preventing the flexible investment needed in prototypes, concepts, and experimentation of new concepts and technologies like AI.” Senate Armed Services Chair Reed calls the PPBE process “one of those relics of days gone by.” One casualty of the PPBE process was the Pentagon’s failed attempt to build a cloud computing system, JEDI, after long delays in contract procurement.

Currently a 14-member Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution Reform is looking at ways to change the 61-year-old system, which requires corporate strategists to plan for new programs long before getting funding, allowing commercial technology and modernization to surge ahead of government efforts. But critics say the lead must come from the Pentagon, which is the only entity that can push real change and shift priorities for industry.

“The DoD is a monopsony; the U.S. government is the only buyer,” says Jones. “So if the Pentagon sends out a demand signal that they are prepared to buy these kinds of systems on a significant scale, industry will commit.”

Gallagher, chair of the Select Committee, agrees with that assessment. While the industrial base needs a longer fix, he believes the munitions gap in East Asia could be addressed in the next several years if the Pentagon swiftly makes fresh demands of industry. “The most obvious concern is we don’t have any long-range munitions deployed west of the international dateline,” he said. But he points to what former Defense Secretaries Robert Gates and Ashton Carter did when U.S. troops were being killed and maimed in large numbers by IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan, prioritizing production of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, or MRAP. Gallagher believes that at the very least the Pentagon could “MacGyver” — that is, force a quick turnaround on production lines — to supply hundreds of long-range Harpoon missiles to the Taiwanese military.

“Maybe I’m an optimist, but you’ve got to be an optimist when it comes to preventing World War III,” says Gallagher.

What is clear is that should war come, it may already be too late to match China ship-for-ship, and plane-for-plane.

The Biden administration has made some efforts to change this. Under the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress required the Navy to increase the number of its combat ships to 355 (from fewer than 300 now) “as soon as practicable.” But the DoD’s building plans don’t make that feasible for decades, perhaps until the 2050s. Meanwhile, under China’s more autocratic, less bureaucratic system, the People’s Liberation Army Navy passed the U.S. Navy in fleet size around 2020, now has around 340 warships and is expected to grow to 400 ships by 2025, according to the Pentagon’s 2022 China Military Power Report. The U.S. is currently building only 1.2 subs a year (despite a congressional requirement for two a year), and Biden’s fiscal 2024 budget calls for building only nine new battle force ships.

So now may be the time for a radical shift in defense thinking. First, this would mean de-emphasizing traditional platforms like expensive, and newly vulnerable, aircraft carriers and moving to exploit the best of U.S. high tech advantages, including the most recent breakthroughs in artificial intelligence that American industry dominates and which could power new generations of drone aircraft and ships.

“The only way we win is by radically scaling our investments in non-traditional military capabilities, such as lower-cost autonomous systems,” says Brose, who is chief strategy officer at a company that makes such systems, Anduril Industries.

This is just beginning to happen. Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall, for example, is leading the development of “collaborative combat aircraft” under which a thousand or more drone “wingmen” operate alongside a much smaller number of piloted planes, part of a program called Next Generation Air Dominance. In early April, Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro announced the service is ready to expand the use of unmanned systems to the broader fleet. But in other areas change is glacial: The Navy just suspended its own “Snakehead” project which would have built smaller, underwater autonomous vehicles because budget money wasn’t available for the next-generation submarines that could carry and launch the Snakeheads.

Kendall recently urged Congress to give the military the authority to start new developmental programs before a budget is approved. “Time is going by, and all those things that we worked hard to understand and formulate good solutions to, we’re not able to act on them yet,” Kendall said at the Space Symposium in Colorado Springs, Colo., on April 19. “That’s a lot to give away to an adversary when it’s totally unnecessary.”

Frank Calvelli, assistant secretary of the Air Force for space acquisition and integration, is pushing the U.S. Space Force to move from buying billion-dollar satellites that on average take seven years to develop to building smaller and more expendable ones in three years. Calvelli said that big satellites aren’t needed for most war planning and only make “big juicy targets.” “Our competitors seem to have figured out speed. It’s time we do the same,” Calvelli said, referring to China.

Another partial solution is to accelerate co-production with allies such as Australia — in effect pooling industrial bases. China may dominate shipbuilding for example, but Nos. 2 and 3 in the field are South Korea and Japan, both close U.S. allies. But here as well too much of the antiquated Cold War-era structure remains: Congress must act to update two sets of regulations — the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the Export Administration Regulations — which make it nearly impossible to share dual-use technologies even with friendly countries.

Even now, LaPlante conceded, “AUKUS will not work if we don’t have the data sharing piece worked out.”

If the United States can’t manage to shore up its conventional deterrent through such means — rapid modernization, co-production and expedited munitions — then it may have to rely on a third option, by far the most frightening one: its nuclear deterrent. This is what happened during the last major Taiwan crisis of the Cold War, in 1958, when U.S. generals threatened nuclear strikes on mainland China that would have left millions dead, according to classified documents revealed by Pentagon Papers whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg in 2021.

Today, as tensions rise between the major nuclear powers, brinkmanship has again become a possibility, says CSIS’s Jones. Among major U.S. allies such as Japan and Korea, it has also led to discussions about whether they should develop nuclear arsenals if the U.S. fails to beef up its conventional deterrent sufficiently in the Indo-Pacific. “We are in an era when we have the prospect of direct war between nuclear powers close to their home territories. This is mainly what is driving tensions,” says Jones.

After Pearl Harbor, Japanese Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto was famously said to have warned (though the quote is apocryphal) that he thought all Japan had achieved with the surprise attack was to “awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve.” That is pretty much what happened, and the United States utterly destroyed Japan’s military machine.

But now, says Jones, the giant is “lying in bed still. Its eyes are open and it’s recognizing there’s a problem. But it’s got to get out of bed.”

POLITICO

Politico · by DAVID FREEDLANDER

4. With eye on China, US and five allies condemn trade-related 'economic coercion'

This is where the real war with China might be in progress right now: economic warfare.

With eye on China, US and five allies condemn trade-related 'economic coercion'

Reuters · by Jeff Mason

WASHINGTON, June 9 (Reuters) - The United States and five of its allies on Friday condemned the use of trade practices that amount to economic coercion in a joint declaration that did not single out other countries but appeared to be aimed at China.

Australia, Britain, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand jointly released the statement with the United States, emphasizing that "trade-related economic coercion and non-market-oriented policies and practices" threatened the multi-lateral trading system and "harms relations between countries."

The statement comes after the Group of Seven leaders last month agreed to a new initiative to counter economic coercion and pledged action to ensure that any actors attempting to weaponize economic dependence would fail and face consequences.

The United States, Britain, Japan and Canada are also members of the G7.

The countries expressed concern about "pervasive subsidization," anti-competitive practices by state-owned enterprises, forced technology transfer, and government interference with corporate decision-making.

Washington has regularly raised such concerns about trade practices by Beijing, and an official from the office of the U.S. Trade Representative, who spoke to reporters about the joint declaration, cited China for imposing a ban on imports from Lithuania after Lithuania allowed Taiwan to open a de facto embassy.

China, which regards the democratically-ruled Taiwan as part of its territory, suspended imports of beef, dairy and beer from Lithuania last year.

In May, Beijing protested the G7's declarations, including on economic coercion, saying the U.S. was "pushing hard to weave an anti-China net in the Western world."

In their joint statement on Friday, the U.S. and its five allies also raised concerns about forced labor.

"We are also seriously concerned about the use of forced labour, including state-sponsored forced labour, in global supply chains. All forms of forced labour are gross abuses of human rights, as well as economic issues, and it is a moral imperative to end these practices," they said.

Reporting by Jeff Mason; Additional reporting by Dan Whitcomb; Editing by Sonali Paul

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Jeff Mason

Thomson Reuters

Jeff Mason is a White House Correspondent for Reuters. He has covered the presidencies of Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden and the presidential campaigns of Biden, Trump, Obama, Hillary Clinton and John McCain. He served as president of the White House Correspondents’ Association in 2016-2017, leading the press corps in advocating for press freedom in the early days of the Trump administration. His and the WHCA's work was recognized with Deutsche Welle's "Freedom of Speech Award." Jeff has asked pointed questions of domestic and foreign leaders, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korea's Kim Jong Un. He is a winner of the WHCA's “Excellence in Presidential News Coverage Under Deadline Pressure" award and co-winner of the Association for Business Journalists' "Breaking News" award. Jeff began his career in Frankfurt, Germany as a business reporter before being posted to Brussels, Belgium, where he covered the European Union. Jeff appears regularly on television and radio and teaches political journalism at Georgetown University. He is a graduate of Northwestern University's Medill School of Journalism and a former Fulbright scholar.

Reuters · by Jeff Mason

5. China can't rely on Southeast Asian exports to offset a U.S. slowdown

China can't rely on Southeast Asian exports to offset a U.S. slowdown

KEY POINTS

• China’s exports to the U.S. fell by 18% from a year ago in U.S. dollar terms in May. That’s according to official figures accessed through Wind Information. Exports to Southeast Asia also fell.
• 
  
• Southeast Asia can’t fully offset the loss from the U.S. market, said Bruce Pang, chief economist and head of research for Greater China at JLL.
• 
  
• Slowing global growth, especially in the U.S. and Southeast Asia, doesn’t bode well for the outlook on Chinese exports.
• 
  

CNBC · by Evelyn Cheng · June 9, 2023

Pictured here is a cargo ship sailing from China's Yantai port to Indonesia on April 23, 2023.

Future Publishing | Future Publishing | Getty Images

BEIJING — China can't easily rely on its neighbors as export markets in a global slowdown, the latest trade data show.

Exports to the Association of Southeast Asia Nations have been growing. The 10-member bloc surpassed the European Union during the pandemic to become China's largest trading partner on a regional basis.

Data showed that exports to Southeast Asia fell by 16% in May compared to a year ago, dragging down China's overall exports.

Exports to the U.S. — China's largest trading partner on a single-country basis — fell by 18% from a year ago in U.S. dollar terms in May. That's according to official figures accessed through Wind Information.

At $42.48 billion, the U.S. exports in May were more than the $41.49 billion China exported to Southeast Asia that month, according to customs data.

Southeast Asia can't fully offset the loss from the U.S. market, said Bruce Pang, chief economist and head of research for Greater China at JLL.

ASEAN is made up of 10 countries: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

The U.S. is one single market versus a grouping of 10 countries, Pang pointed out, adding that companies can also sell at higher profit margins in the U.S. market.

Trade has been a key driver of China's growth, especially during the pandemic.

Exports still account for about 18% of the economy, although that's well below the roughly 30% share it once had, Tao Wang, head of Asia economics and chief China economist at UBS Investment Bank, told reporters Monday.

Drag from the U.S.

Slowing global growth, especially in the U.S. and Southeast Asia, doesn't bode well for the outlook on Chinese exports.

"We expect China's exports will remain subdued, as we anticipate the US economy to enter recession in H2 while global destocking pressures continue to rise," Lloyd Chan, senior economist at Oxford Economics, said in a note Wednesday.

Boosting trade with developing countries has gained urgency with the closing of the US market and the EU-China investment deal falling apart after the Ukraine war.

Jack Zhang

University of Kansas, assistant professor of political science

Businesses in the U.S. have also been working through high inventory that didn't get sold in the second half of last year due to high inflation.

U.S. GDP is expected to slow from 2.1% in 2022 to 1.6% this year, according to the International Monetary Fund.

Southeast Asia also slowing

ASEAN's GDP is set to slow to 4.6% growth this year, down from last year's 5.7% pace, the IMF said in April, when it trimmed its forecast for the region's GDP growth by 0.1 percentage points.

"The sizeable slump in May reaffirms our suspicion that China's monthly export data to some ASEAN economies – particularly Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand — may be somewhat distorted," Nomura economists said in a note Wednesday.

"Given the apparent plunge, exports to ASEAN has turned from a major driver to a drag, making a negative contribution of -2.4pp to headline growth in May."

The U.S. and ASEAN each accounted for 15% of China's total exports in May, according to CNBC calculations of Wind Information data.

On a year-to-date basis, the bloc has a slightly higher share, at 16% of China's exports versus the United States' 14% share, the data showed.

"Looking forward, [China's] exports are likely to shrink further on a high base, the deepening global manufacturing downturn and intensifying trade sanctions from the West," the Nomura analysts said.

Regional trade strategy

The export declines come as U.S.-China relations remain tense, and Beijing has sought to bolster trade with the developing countries in Asia Pacific.

"It's 20-25% more expensive to sell lots of stuff to the US, particularly intermediate goods like machine parts," Jack Zhang, assistant professor of political science at the University of Kansas, told CNBC in an email.

"Boosting trade with developing countries has gained urgency with the closing of the US market and the EU-China investment deal falling apart after the Ukraine war," he said.

The 10-nation bloc — along with Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand — signed a free trade agreement with China in 2020. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership or RCEP is the largest such deal in the world.

Beijing has said it would also like to join another trade bloc — the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. The U.S. is not part of the CPTPP, while the U.K. announced a deal to join it in March.

RCEP has boosted China's trade with ASEAN, as has the shift of some labor-intensive manufacturing to the region, Zhang said.

Meanwhile, he noted that "China has been ramping up negotiations for China-ASEAN FTA (CAFTA 3.0), it's exploring FTAs with Mercusor in LatAm and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)."

The Mercusor trade bloc includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.

— CNBC's Clement Tan contributed to this report.

CNBC · by Evelyn Cheng · June 9, 2023

6. How the US is deepening military alliances in China’s backyard

Our "Asia Pivot" has turned out to be an "Asian pirouette" doing a 360 instead of a 180 but hopefully now we are really focusing on Asia (or as most like to call it the INDOPACIFIC)

Excerpt:

This is only one strand of an overall American effort to reboot the Asia “pivot” that President Barack Obama launched in 2011. But in a sign of how much concern about China has risen over the past decade, “pivot 2.0” comes with more substance and greater European involvement, senior officials say.

How the US is deepening military alliances in China’s backyard

The Biden administration is stepping up security initiatives to boost deterrence and better prepare for potential conflict over Taiwan

Demetri Sevastopulo in Tokyo and Kathrin Hille in Clark, Philippines JUNE 1 2023

Financial Times · by Demetri Sevastopulo · June 1, 2023

In the three decades since the end of the cold war, the leafy streets around Mimosa Plus Golf Course in Clark, an area about 92km north of the Philippines’ capital Manila, have been largely quiet, populated mainly by retirees.

But one day in April, about 100 US troops were sitting on a pavement and more spilling out of a hotel — a reminder of an era when Clark was the world’s biggest air base outside US territory.

“They’re back,” says onlooker Denmark Blances, a tourism student. “I’ve never seen so many US uniforms.” The troops were participating in Balikatan, or “shoulder to shoulder”, a large military exercise the US conducts annually with its oldest ally in Asia. This year it involved more than 17,600 members of the forces, the most since the US lost permanent access to Clark in 1991.

The stepped-up drills are just one element of an expansive, multi-pronged strategy that the Biden administration has introduced across the Indo-Pacific to counter what it sees as the growing military threat from China in the region.

When Joe Biden took office, there was some concern, particularly among allies such as Japan, that he might adopt a weaker approach on China than his predecessor Donald Trump, who took a much sharper position than previous US presidents.

Yet Biden has taken an unexpectedly tough stance in terms of security and other measures such as export controls designed to prevent China from obtaining advanced semiconductors.

In the diplomatic realm, he has sought to ramp up co-ordination with allies in Asia that were already becoming tougher on China, while persuading initially reluctant European allies to strike a tougher tone. That has been accompanied by numerous security initiatives designed to boost deterrence in Asia, and to help Washington and its allies to better prepare for conflict with China over Taiwan if deterrence fails.

Ely Ratner, the Pentagon’s top Asia official, says there has been “extraordinary alignment” between US allies on everything from Indo-Pacific strategy documents to drills and joint exercises they have conducted in the region. This is part of a wider effort to create what officials describe as a more “latticed” security architecture across the region to boost deterrence.

“This is manifesting itself in the degree to which partners are investing in their own capabilities, increasingly co-operating with each other and wanting to deepen alliances and partnerships with us,” says Ratner. “All these trends are occurring at the same time with everyone rowing in the same direction.”

The overriding challenge for Washington is to find ways to overcome the so-called tyranny of distance that puts it on the back foot. Not only does China have far more ships and aircraft within striking distance of Taiwan, the US also must contend with the large distances between its deployed forces across the Indo-Pacific, a massive region that spans more than 50 per cent of the planet.

In a recent success, the US convinced Manila to give its military access to four more bases in the Philippines, including three in the north of the main island of Luzon, a strategic location near Taiwan. It marked a big shift from the previous administration of Rodrigo Duterte, which came close to cropping the alliance with the US as it aligned more closely with China.

This is only one strand of an overall American effort to reboot the Asia “pivot” that President Barack Obama launched in 2011. But in a sign of how much concern about China has risen over the past decade, “pivot 2.0” comes with more substance and greater European involvement, senior officials say.

American soldiers take part in joint military exercises with the Philippines in April. The US recently convinced Manila to give its military access to four more bases in the country © Jam Sta Rosa/AFP/Getty Images

“The pivot was pilloried, probably rightly in many respects. One of the biggest concerns was the idea that we were pivoting to Asia from Europe,” says a senior US official. “It is undeniable now that a huge part of our strategy . . . is to link these two theatres in both strategic and practical ways.”

While the US has encouraged Asian allies, such as Japan and South Korea, to increase their support for Ukraine, it has also urged European countries, including the UK, France and Germany, to become more visible in the Indo-Pacific by sailing navy ships through the South China Sea.

For all the security-related activity, however, it is not clear if the US is doing enough to prevent China from shifting the balance of power in the region in its direction. It also does not have the sort of joint military plans for Asia that it has with Nato in Europe.

Some critics say that, under the Biden administration, the US has focused too much on its military and not enough on an economic strategy to counter the gravitational pull of the Chinese market.

Kori Schake, head of foreign policy and defence studies at AEI, a Washington-based think-tank, says: “What they’ve gotten terribly wrong is a strategy that over-militarises the China problem because it fails to deliver on an economic vision that helps the US and allies reduce their reliance on China.”

USS Milius and USNS Charles Drew in the Philippine Sea. The US has encouraged European countries to become more visible in the Indo-Pacific by sailing navy ships through the South China Sea © U.S. Navy/Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Greg JohnsonABACA/Reuters

Other observers also fear the Russian invasion of Ukraine could take Washington’s attention and resources, such as weapons, away from Asia over time. Jennifer Lind, an Asia security expert at Dartmouth College, says the Biden administration “scores highly on tactics” but that its focus on the war raging in Europe has the potential to become an obstacle.

“While the Biden administration manages a superpower competition with China, it is wading deeper and deeper into the Russia-Ukraine war,” says Lind. “As that war drags on, the risks of trade-offs will grow.”

Smoother transition

From the very start of his administration, Biden made some big moves to assert the influence of the US in the Indo-Pacific.

In early 2021, he resurrected the Quad, a security grouping formed in 2007 consisting of the US, Japan, Australia and India that had fallen dormant after Canberra and New Delhi grew concerned about provoking Beijing.

Later that year, the US signed the Aukus deal with the UK and Australia to enable Canberra to obtain a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines. To cover the two decades before the new submarines are built, the US will deploy four nuclear-powered submarines in Australia from 2027, and later sell at least three Virginia-class submarines to Canberra.

The US also agreed to deploy more fighter jets, bombers and other assets to Australia on a rotational basis to respond to the growing Chinese presence in the western Pacific.

Biden’s next step was to strengthen Washington’s relationship with Tokyo. His administration has increased co-operation over everything from military exercises and table-top war games to joint operational planning for any potential conflict.

Prime ministers Fumio Kishida of Japan, right, Anthony Albanese of Australia, left, Narendra Modi of India, and Joe Biden at the G7 last month. The countries make up the Quad security group © Jonathan Ernst/POOL/AFP/Getty Images

But the biggest milestone in the Indo-Pacific region has been the seismic shift in Japan’s defence policy in response to China, which it has called its “greatest strategic challenge”. In December 2022, Tokyo unveiled its landmark national security strategy, which pledged to significantly boost defence spending and acquire counterstrike weapons. In the short term, Tokyo plans to buy 400 American Tomahawk cruise missiles, giving it the ability to strike China.

More recently, in January, the two countries announced that the US Marine Corps would deploy mobile units with intelligence and surveillance capabilities and anti-ship weapons, known as the Marine Littoral Regiment, in Okinawa, the Japanese island where the US has long had a military presence. They also agreed to increase training and exercises on the Nansei chain of islands, a critical region for defending Taiwan.

“The most important development in the Indo-Pacific since the turn of the century, beyond China’s trajectory, was Japan’s new national security announcements and the alliance announcements in January,” says Phil Davidson, the former head of US Indo-Pacific command. “Those were really powerful.”

But the US is not only focused on its biggest allies. It has also been forced to step up co-operation with smaller Pacific Island nations after Beijing shocked Washington last year by signing a security pact with the Solomon Islands.

In response, the US last week signed a security pact with Papua New Guinea and extended so-called Compact of Free Association agreements with Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia — deals that will give the US military exclusive access to facilities for two decades.

“The Biden team has made remarkable progress in expanding access to facilities in east Asia over the past six months,” says Zack Cooper, a former Pentagon official. “Deals with Japan, the Philippines, Australia, Papua New Guinea and the Freely Associated States are all critical to dispersing US forces and assets.”

Kurt Campbell, the top White House Indo-Pacific official, says: “Our sustained engagement with the Indo-Pacific region has been a top priority for this administration as we reaffirm our commitments and expand opportunities of collaboration between the US and our partners.”

‘Unity of effort’

While the US wants to tackle what it sees as its disadvantage of distance, it also plans to deploy military assets more widely across the region, creating a more mobile, dispersed force that is less vulnerable to Chinese missiles.

“We are [what is known as] a ‘stand-in force’ and the key to that is fighting within the weapons engagement zone,” says Colonel Timothy Brady, commander of an Okinawa-based unit operating within an area susceptible to such attacks.

Wendy Sherman, right, US deputy secretary of state, and Ely Ratner, the Pentagon’s top Asia official. Ratner says Washington’s strategy has boosted the independent co-operation of its allies © Amanda Andrade-Rhoades/Reuters

But with China having far more facilities to operate from, argues Cooper, this means the US “era of seamlessly projecting power in Asia in a contingency is over”.

This is forcing the Pentagon to seek out fresh approaches. In addition to the Marine Corps’ “stand-in force” concept, the US Air Force is adopting an “agile combat employment” model, which would allow it to rapidly deploy mobile units.

“These are intended to allow smaller units to maintain combat effectiveness, helping to minimise the juicy targets that China could hit while still retaining the US ability to operate in a contingency,” Cooper adds.

A senior US official says that as well as changing how its forces are positioned, the Pentagon also needs to do more in terms of procuring long-range missiles and unmanned systems. This would reduce the risk of having too many assets concentrated in places vulnerable to missile attacks.

Rory Medcalf, an Indo-Pacific expert at the Australian National University, says US efforts to be more agile would send an important message. “Demonstrating that the US is able . . . to deploy quickly in the Indo-Pacific, would be good,” says Medcalf. “It’s really those signals to reassure partners that China is not going to be able to take out a few [sophisticated] platforms in the early days of a conflict, which would effectively knock America out of the war.”

Ratner, of the Pentagon, argues that one of the “most novel” parts of Washington’s approach is the extent to which its allies are increasingly networking together. This is one element of a wider strategy to create “a more resilient, distributed, mobile and lethal presence in the Indo-Pacific region”, he says.

Japan, for instance, has signed Reciprocal Access Agreements with Australia and the UK, which will allow its military to exercise with British and Australian forces in their countries and vice versa. Tokyo and Manila are negotiating similar terms.

Steven Rudder, centre, former head of US marine forces in the Pacific, with fellow military officials and representatives. He says alliances in the region can work as a deterrent © David Mareuil/Anadolu Agency/Getty

Lieutenant General Steven Rudder, who retired last year as the head of US marine forces in the Pacific, says these alliances can have powerful effects. “Interoperability with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and India etc, creates this unity of effort, which is . . . a deterrence model of its own.”

Ratner says the Pentagon is also trying to integrate Japan into its initiatives with Australian forces aimed at boosting interoperability between all three militaries. In a historic first, Japan last year sent fighter jets to take part in Pitch Black, a multilateral air force exercise based out of the northern Australian city of Darwin. Germany and South Korea also participated for the first time.

According to the US official, Washington is hopeful about finalising some trilateral defence co-operation with Japan and South Korea when Lloyd Austin, the US defence secretary, attends the Shangri-La Dialogue security forum in Singapore this week.

He adds: “For all the gloom that tends to permeate discussions of international geopolitics right now, that’s just not the picture in the Indo-Pacific.”

Possibility of war

While the Biden team has made big strides towards boosting deterrence, the ultimate challenge is how well it is prepared for the possibility of war over Taiwan if those efforts fall short.

Obstacles range from ensuring Taipei can obtain the weapons it needs to defend itself to streamlining US bureaucracy to expedite their delivery. The war in Ukraine has underscored the need to preposition weapons in and around Taiwan because of the difficulty of supplying arms to an island once a conflict has begun.

Michael Green, a former top White House Asia official, says another challenge for the US is the need to expand its “access, basing and overflight” rights — a reference to agreements made with other countries to allow its military to operate with fewer restraints during wartime. “They’re making some progress, but don’t have all the agreements the Pentagon would like,” he says.

The Philippines is a prime example of a success that also remains a challenge. While President Ferdinand Marcos Jr approved US access to bases in his country, he said during a visit to the US this month that he did not want the Philippines to become a “stage post” for military action.

Aircraft take off from the USS Ronald Reagan’s deck. There is concern among US allies in the Indo-Pacific region that a build-up of military assets could make their countries a target for Beijing © U.S. Navy/Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Gray Gibson/ABACA/Reuters

“There’s a lot more work that needs to be done on scenario development, and that will take years,” says the senior US official, referring to the two sides working out how they would handle various situations during a conflict.

Even with Japan, the strongest US ally in the region, Washington has to tread carefully. “It’s not even like in Iraq or Afghanistan, where we had a little more freedom of manoeuvre,” says one US general. “In Japan and the Philippines, we have to work with the governments and with the public opinion.”

Local concerns particularly come into play when the pre-positioning of weapons is involved because of anxiety that a build-up of military assets could make their country a more likely target for Beijing.

Arguably the biggest challenge for the US, however, is to get its allies to the point where they are conducting joint operational exercises based on actual joint war plans. This particularly applies to Japan and Australia, the nations most likely to fight alongside the US in a war in the region.

“What would be helpful in the region is deeper day-to-day operational integration between US and Japanese self-defence forces, between US and Australian forces,” says one former senior US military officer, adding that integration with British, Canadian and French forces would also be welcome.

Integration is a two-way street. The US military must also “learn much more serious habits of true collaboration . . . based on joint decision-making and shared operational concepts,” says the senior US official.

Pentagon planners want to have joint war plans with allies in the Indo-Pacific just as they have had for decades in Europe with Nato.

The issue of joint planning is very sensitive among allies, however, as leaks could reinforce Beijing’s narrative that the US and its partners are teaming up to contain China and spark retaliation.

“The Pentagon wants joint plans that it can execute. That is the next big thing in case we have to fight China,” the person says. “That is a big ask for our allies.”

Cartography by Liz Faunce

Financial Times · by Demetri Sevastopulo · June 1, 2023

7. The ‘Status Quo’ and Taiwan - Pearls and Irritations

A view from Australia. Note the author's differentiation between a war for the status quo of Taiwan or a war for Taiwan independence. Is that a distinction without a difference?

I think the author may be offering a naive "solution" for Australia because if war breaks out over Taiwan it will not matter if we describe it as a war to maintain the status quo as we might view it. If the PRC goes to war over Taiwan it will be to ensure Taiwan does not exist and is absorbed back into the PRC thus completing Chinese reunification.

Excerpts:

In this regard, it is worth pointing out that the much vaunted “interchangeability” of US forces with the ADF creates the possibility that US assets operating out of Australia could be badged as Australian, thus making Australia an active belligerent, and a proxy of the US, in a war against China.

It is obvious that opposition to a war over the status of Taiwan and support for independence for Taiwan are mutually exclusive goals. The latter proposition simply brings the prospect of war closer.

The best contribution Australia can make to the avoidance of war is to make it absolutely clear to the USA, Taiwan and the PRC that Australia will not participate in a war over the status of Taiwan and will not allow Australian territory, facilities or assets to be used in the prosecution of such a war”.

The ‘Status Quo’ and Taiwan - Pearls and Irritations

johnmenadue.com · by John Lander · June 9, 2023

Pearls and Irritations

John Menadue’s Public Policy Journal

The ‘Status Quo’ and Taiwan

Mainstream media frequently describes Taiwan as “an island that the PRC claims, but has never ruled”. This has given rise to an increasing perception of Taiwan as a separate sovereign entity.

In both historical and legal terms it is not. Most countries and the United Nations Organisation have long accepted that Taiwan, despite being internally self-ruled, is a province of China.

In the Instrument of Surrender signed on 2 September 1945, Japan undertook to “carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration” which included that the “The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out”. It is clear from the Instrument of Surrender that the provisions of both the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations had legal status, and accordingly, Japan returned Taiwan to Chinese sovereignty. Japan reaffirmed those provisions in the Treaty of Taipei in 1950. and again in the Joint Communique on recognition of the PRC in 1972, so the legal status of both Declarations is not in doubt.

If defence and foreign affairs powers are considered a prerequisite for self-governance, then no State of a federation could be considered internally self-governing. Taiwan’s political system is presidential, with legislative elections. Taiwan makes laws that apply within the province, which accords with the notion of internal self-governance.

It has been asserted that, because reunification of Taiwan into the life of the nation is the goal stated by President Xi and other top Chinese leaders, this means that they believe the ‘status quo’ cannot be maintained.

This assertion is simply incorrect. Neither President Xi nor any other top PRC leaders have ever stated that the current status of Taiwan as a province of China (the ‘status quo’) cannot be maintained. That would be a dramatic change of policy that would capture the attention of the whole world! Any change to the way Taiwan is administered within the sovereign territory of China would not, from the PRC’s perspective, change the status of Taiwan as a province of China.

The PRC’s policy regarding Taiwan was set out in Xi Jinping’s report 20th National Peoples Congress: “Taiwan is China’s Taiwan…We will continue to strive for peaceful reunification…, but we will never promise to renounce the use of force… This is directed solely at interference by outside forces and the few separatists seeking ‘Taiwan independence’ …”

This wording is drawn from the White Paper issued in August 2022 by the Taiwan Office of the State Council and the State Council Information Office.

The process of peaceful reunification has been ongoing since 1989, with the promotion of leadership talks; two-way family, business, work and tourism visits; two-way trade (the Mainland of China is Taiwan’s biggest trading partner); two-way investment (the Mainland is both the largest source of investment into Taiwan and the largest destination for investment from Taiwan).

This was all formalised under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement in 2002. The White Paper makes it clear that the PRC intends this process to continue (unless disrupted by war) until its goal is achieved.

It has been argued that although the Biden administration may intend to use Taiwan as a proxy in a war against China, it has not said so. While it is true that President Biden himself has not explicitly stated this intention, the same is not true of the Administration. Elbridge Colby, who was directly involved in the writing of the US National Defence Strategy, spelled it out at length in ‘The Strategy of Denial’. Perhaps those who doubt US intentions should read the article in Pearls & Irritations entitled ‘Strategists admit West is goading China into war’.

President Xi, in a video call on 18 March 2022, responded to Biden’s assurance that the US “does not support Taiwan independence,“ that: “people on the US side have not followed through on the important common understandings reached by the two Presidents and have not acted on President Biden’s positive statements”.

Many commentators in the US and Australia have argued that the Chinese leadership has set a timetable for reunification. The estimates of a timetable vary from a few years hence to a few decades, depending on the particular pundit’s interpretation.

It is true that President Xi and others have expressed the ambition to complete the peaceful reunification of Taiwan in time for the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the PRC in 2049 (or earlier). However, they have never stated that force shall be used to achieve that goal. Use of force is reserved as a last resort to prevent independence.

It has been argued that, in a US war with China over Taiwan, US forces from the US and from American aircraft carriers would do most of the work. Also, US forces in Okinawa and Guam are closer than Australian territory, so Australian territory would not be useful. US National Security Adviser, JakeSullivan, and Biden’s ‘Asia Tsar’, KurtCampbell, would appear to disagree with this view. Both have described Australia as at the forefront of the projection of US power in the Indo-Pacific.

Most defence/military analysts consider American bases in Australia as central to the conduct of US military operations in the East Asian theatre, thus making Australian territory “useful” and also at risk, in a war between USA and China.

Not only Australian assets and facilities – army, navy and airforce -operating with US forces outside Australia, but those located on Australian territory, are regarded as highly significant – especially the US Indo-Pacific Command and fuel dump in Darwin; the strategic bomber base being developed at Tindal in the Northern Territory; RAN Naval base at Stirling in Western Australia; many other bases to which the Force Posture Agreement grants US access, and, most importantly, North-West Cape and Pine Gap communications facilities.

In this regard, it is worth pointing out that the much vaunted “interchangeability” of US forces with the ADF creates the possibility that US assets operating out of Australia could be badged as Australian, thus making Australia an active belligerent, and a proxy of the US, in a war against China.

It is obvious that opposition to a war over the status of Taiwan and support for independence for Taiwan are mutually exclusive goals. The latter proposition simply brings the prospect of war closer.

The best contribution Australia can make to the avoidance of war is to make it absolutely clear to the USA, Taiwan and the PRC that Australia will not participate in a war over the status of Taiwan and will not allow Australian territory, facilities or assets to be used in the prosecution of such a war”.

John Lander

John Lander worked in the China section of the Department of Foreign Affairs in the lead-up to the recognition of the People’s Republic of China in 1972 and several other occasions in the 1970s and 1980s. He was deputy ambassador in Beijing 1974-76 (including a couple of stints as Chargé d’Affaires). He was heavily involved in negotiation of many aspects in the early development of Australia-China relations, especially student/teacher exchange, air traffic agreement and consular relations. He has made numerous visits to China in the years 2000-2019.

• John Lander
• https://johnmenadue.com/author/john-lander/
• The debate about ‘Independence for Taiwan’
• John Lander
• https://johnmenadue.com/author/john-lander/
• War mongering and the peace rally
• John Lander
• https://johnmenadue.com/author/john-lander/
• The US is preparing Australia to fight its war against China
• John Lander
• https://johnmenadue.com/author/john-lander/
• Pelosi’s visit has brought the day of reckoning over Taiwan much closer

8. The Role of Special Operations Forces in Irregular Warfare within the Framework of Great Power Competition

In my mind, the bottom line is to use the right force for the right mission at the right time so that we can campaign to win in the gray zone of strategic competition.

Our failure to campaign to win in the gray zone of strategic competition will lead to us losing without fighting as General MIlley said in the Joint Concept for Competing.

We must also consider the original intent of Nunn Cohen and Sec 922 of the 2018 NDAA and Congress' intent for some organization to "own" low intensity conflict (today's irregular warfare ) and for SOF to have actual service authorities for porper oversight.

Please see this GAO article on Sec 922: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-19-386

Conclusion:

In conclusion, while SOF offers unique advantages in the realm of irregular warfare, it is essential to mitigate potential drawbacks such as overextension, mission creep, and the neglect of a comprehensive strategy. Instead of assigning SOF as the leading effort, an approach that holistically incorporates all elements of national power, with SOF serving as one critical component, is likely to yield more sustainable and effective results in the context of global great power competition. This balanced approach will enable the United States to protect its interests, maintain strategic stability, and promote a rules-based international order.

​Lastly I would remind us that ​strategic competition (formerly great power competition) is really what George Kennan (HERE  ) and Paul Smith (HERE ) would describe as political warfare. Political Warfare is being practiced by the revisionist, rogue, and revolutionary powers of China, Rusia, Iran, and north Korea and even violent extremist organizations (with their own characteristics). Political warfare requires the US government to conduct the whole of government (e.g., interagency) competitive statecraft. Irregular warfare is the military contribution to competitive statecraft (e.g., political warfare).

The Role of Special Operations Forces in Irregular Warfare within the Framework of Great Power Competition

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/role-special-operations-forces-irregular-warfare-within-sal-artiaga/?utm_source=pocket_saves

Status is reachable

Sal Artiaga

Independent Consultant & Irregular Warfare Strategist | SOF Sensitive Activities Expert | Network Developer | PhD Candidate | MBA | MA

June 10, 2023

The Role of Special Operations Forces in Irregular Warfare within the Framework of Great Power Competition

Introduction

In an era defined by increasing geopolitical tensions and evolving threats, irregular warfare emerges as a salient component of global conflict. The United States Special Operations Forces (SOF) stand at the crux of this irregular warfare landscape, uniquely equipped to respond to diverse challenges and ensure national security interests. However, the question arises whether SOF should be the leading effort in American irregular warfare across the globe within the context of great power competition.

Advantages of SOF Leadership in Irregular Warfare

SOF's distinct capabilities offer several advantages in leading irregular warfare. First, their rigorous training, adaptability, and in-depth cultural knowledge afford them the capability to work in diverse environments, allowing them to engage effectively with local populations and build partner capacity. This can lead to fostering alliances, aiding in stabilization efforts, and undercutting the influence of rival powers.

Second, their small footprint and low visibility operations can serve American strategic interests without escalating tensions in the delicate balance of great power competition. The small-scale, low-visibility nature of SOF operations can mitigate the risk of direct confrontation, thereby aiding in maintaining relative peace.

Finally, SOF’s inherent flexibility allows them to adapt rapidly to evolving threats and situations. In the context of irregular warfare, which often involves asymmetrical and unconventional threats, this ability to adapt is crucial.

Potential Drawbacks of SOF Leadership in Irregular Warfare

Despite the advantages, there are compelling reasons to question the desirability of assigning the leading role in irregular warfare to SOF.

Firstly, over-reliance on SOF can lead to overextension and burnout. With Special Forces often being the first responders to crises worldwide, the perpetual high operational tempo can risk degradation of the force's readiness, morale, and overall capability.

Secondly, a heavy reliance on SOF in irregular warfare might also overshadow the need for a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach. Irregular warfare often involves components of political, economic, and information warfare, which are beyond the traditional remit of military forces. A strategy overly dependent on SOF may neglect these critical dimensions of conflict.

Finally, the risk of mission creep is a major concern. Entrusting SOF with the leading role in irregular warfare can lead to an expansion of their mission set that deviates from their core competencies, diluting their effectiveness and compromising their strategic utility.

The Balanced Approach

In the context of great power competition, SOF undeniably plays a critical role in irregular warfare. However, placing them at the forefront of irregular warfare efforts should be balanced against the potential drawbacks.

Instead of overemphasizing the role of SOF, a balanced approach should include a comprehensive, whole-of-government strategy that leverages all elements of national power - diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) - to effectively respond to the complexities of irregular warfare.

SOF, with its unique capabilities, can and should be a key component of this comprehensive strategy. They can serve as a potent tool for achieving strategic objectives within the irregular warfare landscape, particularly when integrated effectively with other governmental efforts.

Conclusion

In conclusion, while SOF offers unique advantages in the realm of irregular warfare, it is essential to mitigate potential drawbacks such as overextension, mission creep, and the neglect of a comprehensive strategy. Instead of assigning SOF as the leading effort, an approach that holistically incorporates all elements of national power, with SOF serving as one critical component, is likely to yield more sustainable and effective results in the context of global great power competition. This balanced approach will enable the United States to protect its interests, maintain strategic stability, and promote a rules-based international order.

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Status is reachable

Sal Artiaga

Independent Consultant & Irregular Warfare Strategist | SOF Sensitive Activities Expert | Network Developer | PhD Candidate | MBA | MA

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I am excited to share my latest exploration into a critical facet of national security: the role of U.S. Special Operations Forces in irregular warfare, particularly within the framework of global great power competition. This piece offers an analysis of the strategic implications, advantages, and potential drawbacks of leading with SOF in this context. It emphasizes the need for a comprehensive and balanced approach to irregular warfare. As we navigate this intricate geopolitical landscape, such conversations are pivotal in shaping effective strategies. I look forward to hearing your thoughts and insights. #SpecialOperationsForces #IrregularWarfare #GreatPowerCompetition #nationalsecurity #security #specialforces #usasoc #socom #armedforces #power

9. How Can Special Operations Forces Contribute to Strategic Competition?

Again , as a reminder the 2018 NDAA also had Sec 922 which should have transformed SOF giving it more service-like authorities (closer to actual service authorities) with the intersection of ASD SO/LIC into the ADCON chain of command from POTUS to SECDEF to ASD SO/LIC to USSOCOM - similar to all the service relationship.s. But in practice I do not think ASD SO/LIC has been allowed to exercise service responsibilities anywhere near what Congress intended in 2018 or what Nunn Cohen intended in 1987. Again, please refer to this GOA article: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-19-386

Excerpts:

The testimony highlighted one overarching problem: policy-makers have not clearly articulated the goals for and desired effects of competition; therefore, organizations such as SOCOM must identify problems that they are uniquely suited to solve in a competitive setting. Ideas have included “serving as key sensors for the Joint All-Domain Command and Control concept, conducting operational preparation of the environment and information operations, ensuring cross-domain and transregional integration, or imposing costs in other theaters as part of a protracted conflagration or ‘horizontal escalation’ with competitors like China or Russia.” However, these ideas have not been refined into executable campaigns to be approved by policy-makers.

...

During the Global War on Terror, special operations forces enjoyed massive intelligence and operational advantages over their nonstate adversaries. Because of this, current operations have been prioritized over longer-term efforts such as strategic planning and force design and development. As Schroden pointed out,

Anyone familiar with SOCOM headquarters can, for example, appreciate the dominant size and stature that the operations directorate (J3) has over the plans directorate (J5). For SOCOM to reap the advantages of its unique blend of authorities for integrating the operational and institutional components of competition campaigns, it will need to reinvigorate and invest in the people, processes, and priority of its J5 relative to other staff sections.

​Conclusion:​

In his closing remarks, Schroden called the 2018 National Defense Strategy an “inflection point similar to the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.” He said, “At that time, there was a strong impetus to get after the problem of terrorism, but with minimal strategic guidance…. Today, the special operations enterprise—and DOD more broadly—once again needs to translate ideas such as strategic competition and campaigning into tactical actions via a clear framework of activities and associated authorities, policies, permissions, and oversight.” Schroden went on to point out that it took at least half a decade for SOF to become the world’s premier counterterrorism force and that while it remains to be seen how long it will take for them to become a premier force in strategic competition, “the gauntlet for them to do so has been thrown.”

How Can Special Operations Forces Contribute to Strategic Competition?

cna.org · by Countering Threats and Challenges Programs

The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) marked a dramatic shift in the defense priorities of the United States. The strategy said, “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in US national security,” meaning that powers such as China and Russia would now be the focus of DOD rather than nonstate terrorist groups.

Against this backdrop, Dr. Jonathan Schroden testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, and Capabilities, on May 17, 2023. The title of the hearing was “The Implications of Competition Campaigning for US Special Operations Forces.” The focus of Schroden’s testimony was on how special operations forces (SOF) can contribute to interstate strategic competition and what obstacles stand in their way.

How Special Operations Forces Can Contribute to Strategic Competition

Schroden’s testimony highlighted a variety of areas where special ops forces can contribute to competition, including “intelligence operations, information sharing, foreign internal defense, security cooperation, proxy and surrogate operations, and information operations.” Schroden went on to point out that the special operators have played a large role in these areas during past eras of interstate competition, including the Cold War. Additionally, special operators are developing new capabilities that can be used for the competition, including foreign internal defense, security force assistance, and counterthreat finance, as well as electromagnetic warfare and information, cyber, and space operations. Indeed, Schroden pointed out that the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) can “turn the crank of force design, force development, and force employment faster than any other part of DOD, which should lend it an inherent advantage in generating innovative capabilities and force packages designed for competition today and in the future.” However, several challenges prevent the command from fully utilizing these advantages.

The testimony highlighted one overarching problem: policy-makers have not clearly articulated the goals for and desired effects of competition; therefore, organizations such as SOCOM must identify problems that they are uniquely suited to solve in a competitive setting. Ideas have included “serving as key sensors for the Joint All-Domain Command and Control concept, conducting operational preparation of the environment and information operations, ensuring cross-domain and transregional integration, or imposing costs in other theaters as part of a protracted conflagration or ‘horizontal escalation’ with competitors like China or Russia.” However, these ideas have not been refined into executable campaigns to be approved by policy-makers.

Cultural Adjustments from the Counterterrorism Era

During the Global War on Terror, special operations forces enjoyed massive intelligence and operational advantages over their nonstate adversaries. Because of this, current operations have been prioritized over longer-term efforts such as strategic planning and force design and development. As Schroden pointed out,

Anyone familiar with SOCOM headquarters can, for example, appreciate the dominant size and stature that the operations directorate (J3) has over the plans directorate (J5). For SOCOM to reap the advantages of its unique blend of authorities for integrating the operational and institutional components of competition campaigns, it will need to reinvigorate and invest in the people, processes, and priority of its J5 relative to other staff sections.

Schroden also referenced the SOCOM Comprehensive Review, which found that the command tended to place operational deployments over health-of-the-force priorities—thereby risking the burn-out of the force. To address this risk, the command needs a longer-term, more balanced view of deployment cycles and operational tempo and a shift in culture to prioritize these aspects of force management.

The shift in focus from counterterrorism to strategic competition also means that SOCOM’s role is changing. While it was previously supported by the joint force, it will now have the role of supporting the joint force. This shift will require the command to spend some of its funding on capabilities designed to provide this support, rather than exclusively covering its own needs. Again, this will require a shift in culture for a force, which will take time and sustained attention to address. As Schroden pointed out, “As might be expected, these ideas have not yet been widely accepted across SOF formations, even though they have been articulated in SOCOM’s vision and strategy for over a year.”

Structural Challenges Within Special Operations Command

The SOF enterprise has several structural and process issues that must be overcome for special operators to be fully utilized in a competitive environment. First is a lack of fully effective civilian oversight. Schroden pointed out that there is an imbalance between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and SOCOM, saying, “Such oversight is achievable in the current arrangement only if the Secretary of Defense demands it or if the SOCOM commander allows it—hardly the foundation on which such oversight is supposed to reside.”

Another structural challenge is determining what role the SOCOM commander should play in shaping the future of SOF—that is, whether the commander acts as a director of force design or acts as a force integrator, deferring more to the support needs of their parent services in the joint force. Schroden pointed out that while the latter would make it easier for SOCOM to expediate its transition to a support force, the commander will likely want to play a more directive role. He went on to say that “being more than a force integrator will require SOCOM to do more than issue another SOF Operating Concept; rather, the command will need to immediately rebalance its headquarters, quickly develop a substantive and tangible vision for integrated future SOF formations, and engage in a virtuous cycle of force design, analysis, and experimentation that can leapfrog its components’ efforts.”

Conclusion

In his closing remarks, Schroden called the 2018 National Defense Strategy an “inflection point similar to the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.” He said, “At that time, there was a strong impetus to get after the problem of terrorism, but with minimal strategic guidance…. Today, the special operations enterprise—and DOD more broadly—once again needs to translate ideas such as strategic competition and campaigning into tactical actions via a clear framework of activities and associated authorities, policies, permissions, and oversight.” Schroden went on to point out that it took at least half a decade for SOF to become the world’s premier counterterrorism force and that while it remains to be seen how long it will take for them to become a premier force in strategic competition, “the gauntlet for them to do so has been thrown.”

Jonathan Schroden is the Director of CNA's and its Special Operations Program.

cna.org · by Countering Threats and Challenges Programs

10. From Counterinsurgency to Conventional Warfare: The Changing Role of U.S. Special Operations Forces

I have been proven wrong. I used to lecture to students in my course "Unconventional Warfare and Special Operations for Policy Makers and Strategists" that SOF would never suffer what it did in the post Vietnam era.  I would say that congress would protect SOF because there was no longer an y question of the value of SOF to US national security. Those of us who served in the era between Vietnam and 9-11 found that SOF had to fight for relevance especially in the late 1970s-early 1980s. And despite the growth of two groups in the 1980s (reactivation of 1st and 3d SFGs) and the establishment of USSOCOM in 1987 SOF was never fully resourced (especially at the tactical training levels- recall DFTs then JCETs and $100 OPTs - sending 1st SFG equipment to 5th SFG (e.g., SATCOM radios and LTDs) for ODS). I naively believed that after 9-11 that was no longer the case. But I was wrong. The knives are out and we could make a strategic error here. And although there are those who will take issue with this statement, USSOCOM is only 2% of the DOD budget (recognizing that SOF does benefit from the services providing it service common equipment without cost) and 78K personnel (military and civilian) and yes an important number of those personnel are non-SOF personnel that are provided by the services and bring important skills to USSOCOM in intelligence, communication, and logistics.

Regarding the 3000 or so non-SOF personnel that the Army wants to claw back, I think it would be useful to consider the Abrams Charter when the Rangers were re-established in the 1970s.  The purpose was to train Ranger battalions to be leite light infantry, the best in the world. But more importantly these Rangers would raise the level of training, skills, and morale of the rest of the Army because they would take their leadership skills and seed them throughout the Army as they continued to rotate between the Rangers and the rest of the infantry divisions in the Army. We should view the Army experts that enable SOF through the lens of the intent of the Abrams Charter. I have seen amazing contributions by intelligence, communications, and logistics professionals who adapt to work in complex environments throughout the INDOPACIFIC especially as everyone else was focused on the wars in CENTCOM.. In particular in the INDOPACIFIC these personnel have dealt with long distance support for very dispersed units, indigenous logistics and intelligence support, and non-standard equipment and tactics, techniques, and procedures, often devising innovative new methods that are non-doctrinal but suited for the situation. They also have greater opportunities for experience throughout the theater than most conventional units so when they rotate back to conventional units they will bring tremendous amounts of experience and expertise with them. They also develop relationships with host nation counterparts in their functional areas that serve SOF and conventional units. This will increase their capabilities to support large scale combat operations in the theater.

Yes, I am biased toward SOF but I also believe that for a small investment DOD gets a great return on investment one of those investments has to be in people getting SOF experience. I sand ready for incoming fire from those I know who will rebuke me.

Excerpts:

A Controversial Proposal and Its Critics

However, this strategic shift is not without contention. Opinions vary, with some lawmakers voicing serious reservations about the proposed cuts. This concern is particularly noticeable among Republicans, who, at recent hearings, contended that it would be a misjudgment to presuppose that SOF would be less critical in a conflict with China.

Retired Lt. Gen. Ken Tovo, former commanding general of Army Special Operations Command, has also expressed his disquiet over the proposed cuts. He warns that if the reductions affect the intelligence community, crucial to the functioning of special operations forces, the consequences could be “crippling” and “devastating.”

Pending Decisions and Their Potential Impacts

This strategy, awaiting the green light from Army Secretary Christine Wormuth, is part of a broader evaluation of force structure as the Army grapples with a recruiting decline and potential reductions in its overall force size. The timeline for implementing the cuts—whether in 2025 alone or until 2029—remains a subject of deliberation.

While the Army’s future force structure remains under consideration, Army leaders are studying how to optimally structure the force to deter adversaries and win future battles. This strategic reorientation significantly departs from the Army’s recent emphasis on counterterrorism operations.

...

In conclusion, the proposed reduction in SOF programs marks a significant moment of change for the U.S. Army. As the nation’s military strategy undergoes reassessment, focusing increasingly on potential large-scale conflicts with countries like China, the emphasis is shifting from counterinsurgency towards more conventional warfare capabilities. The debate over this paradigm shift reflects the complexity and multi-dimensional challenges the U.S. military faces in today’s rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape.

Critics of the proposed cuts underscore the vital role that special operations forces have played in the U.S. military operations over the past two decades. Their concerns highlight the potential risks of reducing these battle-tested capabilities. However, supporters argue for the need to adapt to emerging threats, emphasizing the necessity for capabilities like long-range missile strikes and cyber warfare.

Ultimately, the decision hinges on a strategic evaluation of the best way forward to maintain U.S. military dominance while effectively responding to new threats and challenges. This pivotal juncture demands a careful and balanced approach to ensure the U.S. military remains prepared and effective, no matter the nature of the battles it may face in the 21st century.

From Counterinsurgency to Conventional Warfare: The Changing Role of U.S. Special Operations Forces

sofrep.com · by SOFREP · June 9, 2023

by SOFREP 22 hours ago

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US Special Operations Forces in action.

A monumental potential shift is on the horizon for the U.S. Army. At the heart of this sea of change lies a proposition to reduce special operations forces (SOF) programs by an estimated 10% in the forthcoming years. This decrease is part of a larger migration from unconventional warfare to an emphasis on conventional capabilities and larger-scale combat operations.

A Two-Decade Reliance on Special Operations Forces

The U.S. military’s reliance on its special operations forces for counterinsurgency operations has been integral over the past two decades. The number of U.S. special operations forces across all military branches doubled after the events of 9/11. This increase reflected the new reality of the Global War on Terror, with swift nighttime raids and training militias in the Middle East and Africa becoming central to the U.S. strategy. However, this trend is poised for a significant reconfiguration.

The Total Army Analysis, a strategic planning methodology used by the Army, projects a budget request for fiscal years 2025 to 2029, suggesting a roughly 10% reduction to SOF. The proposed reductions would mainly affect logistical and intelligence support—often called enablers—and could result in structural changes to some elite units.

The motivation behind this strategic pivot is fueled mainly by a change in geopolitical attention, focusing on potential conflict scenarios with nations like China. The Pentagon is redirecting its resources towards capabilities such as long-range missile strikes and cyber warfare, which are more relevant to these large-scale combat operations.

A Controversial Proposal and Its Critics

However, this strategic shift is not without contention. Opinions vary, with some lawmakers voicing serious reservations about the proposed cuts. This concern is particularly noticeable among Republicans, who, at recent hearings, contended that it would be a misjudgment to presuppose that SOF would be less critical in a conflict with China.

Retired Lt. Gen. Ken Tovo, former commanding general of Army Special Operations Command, has also expressed his disquiet over the proposed cuts. He warns that if the reductions affect the intelligence community, crucial to the functioning of special operations forces, the consequences could be “crippling” and “devastating.”

Pending Decisions and Their Potential Impacts

This strategy, awaiting the green light from Army Secretary Christine Wormuth, is part of a broader evaluation of force structure as the Army grapples with a recruiting decline and potential reductions in its overall force size. The timeline for implementing the cuts—whether in 2025 alone or until 2029—remains a subject of deliberation.

While the Army’s future force structure remains under consideration, Army leaders are studying how to optimally structure the force to deter adversaries and win future battles. This strategic reorientation significantly departs from the Army’s recent emphasis on counterterrorism operations.

The Debate over the Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces

As the Army evaluates this new strategic trajectory, it is apparent that the implications could be broad and far-reaching. SOF have been central to U.S. military operations over the last two decades, and any changes to their structure and funding could profoundly affect the U.S. military’s capabilities.

The proposal marks a crucial juncture for the U.S. Army and its most elite warriors. The SF’s role is being scrutinized as the military shifts toward potential large-scale conflicts with near-peer adversaries. While some see this as an essential adaptation to evolving threats, others caution against the potential risks of scaling back capabilities that have been at the heart of U.S. military operations for the past two decades.

In the face of growing global threats, the debate surrounding the future of U.S. special operations forces is vital. As Senator Joni Ernst, the ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee’s emerging threats subpanel, noted at a recent hearing, “We can’t get to a point where we’re faced with a crisis, and we do not have the operators that are able to step forward.”

The fate of the U.S. SOF remains uncertain. For now, the debate continues, with consequential decisions awaiting on the horizon. This issue underlines the complex challenges faced by the U.S. military as it navigates the changing contours of global security in the 21st century.

The Future of SOF in the U.S. Military

Read Next: Army finally releases official history of the Iraq War, and the conclusions are damning

In conclusion, the proposed reduction in SOF programs marks a significant moment of change for the U.S. Army. As the nation’s military strategy undergoes reassessment, focusing increasingly on potential large-scale conflicts with countries like China, the emphasis is shifting from counterinsurgency towards more conventional warfare capabilities. The debate over this paradigm shift reflects the complexity and multi-dimensional challenges the U.S. military faces in today’s rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape.

Critics of the proposed cuts underscore the vital role that special operations forces have played in the U.S. military operations over the past two decades. Their concerns highlight the potential risks of reducing these battle-tested capabilities. However, supporters argue for the need to adapt to emerging threats, emphasizing the necessity for capabilities like long-range missile strikes and cyber warfare.

Ultimately, the decision hinges on a strategic evaluation of the best way forward to maintain U.S. military dominance while effectively responding to new threats and challenges. This pivotal juncture demands a careful and balanced approach to ensure the U.S. military remains prepared and effective, no matter the nature of the battles it may face in the 21st century.

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sofrep.com · by SOFREP · June 9, 2023

11. Fusing Deterrence: Integrating Leaders Across US Special Operations and Nuclear Enterprise Domains

We will need our IW capabilities even more after nuclear war. Who better to operate in the post apocalypse world. 

Einstein: "I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones."

We should consider three types of deterrence: nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence, and unconventional deterrence as the three pillars of integrated deterrence: 

Excepts:

Integrating two communities that operate on opposite sides of a linear warfighting spectrum seems difficult, but what if Western linear thinking is the root cause of this difficulty? Perhaps integration should be reframed along an Eastern, circular-infinite-spectrum thought lens.

If special operations and nuclear deterrence operations are placed on a spectrum of conflict, it is easy to think they sit at opposite ends. However, if you take an Eastern view that employs a circular-infinite-spectrum, it is possible to see the line bend inward, with one end touching the other. In short, it is possible to integrate both approaches to warfare as a means of achieving integrated deterrence.

Given the varying interests of our adversaries, credible deterrence will look different to China than it does to Russia or North Korea. Integrated deterrence is therefore​ ​not a prefabricated, one-size-fits-all solution. Deterrence tactics without a deterrence strategy are just as useless.

Understanding the complexity of the problem-set is critical, if exceedingly difficult. U.S. Strategic Command alone cannot achieve this objective, because it is only one piece of the deterrence puzzle.

Fusing Deterrence: Integrating Leaders Across US Special Operations and Nuclear Enterprise Domains

19fortyfive.com · by Daniel S. Adam and Adam Lowther · June 9, 2023

After World War II, the United States military disbanded units dedicated to sabotage, guerilla warfare, and clandestine operations. These units put into action the very outside-the-box thinking that proved crucial during the war. After more than a decade, President John Kennedy identified an irregular warfare gap and took action to ensure that the military developed and maintained a special operations capability. This took place at a time when the Cold War was in full swing and the nuclear arms race was the central focus.

The irregular warfare of special operations was forced to the margins as the United States built a massive nuclear arsenal. After all, nuclear war with the Soviets appeared imminent. Fortunately, the Cold War ended as it began, and neither a nuclear holocaust nor a Soviet invasion of Europe occurred.

A New Era Demands New Approaches

Near the end of the Cold War, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which sought to compel the services to integrate their approaches to warfare. It also authorized the establishment of US Special Operations Command (SOCOM). The creation of SOCOM came in response to the failure of Operation Eagle Claw (1979) — the American effort to rescue hostages from Tehran.

Over the next three decades, SOCOM personnel developed comprehensive plans and standard operating procedures, as well as collecting immense amounts of critical data, trends, and lessons learned to retain the competitive advantage at tactical, operational, and strategic levels in the fight against America’s adversaries. As the era of combat geared to countering violent extremism concludes, a new direction for the U.S. government and military is emerging — great power competition.

With the nation’s nuclear enterprise finally receiving some due attention and funding, it is also time to bring military special operations organizations into the discussion as they shift to a greater focus on Russia, China, and North Korea. Given the strengths of special operations, and SOCOM leadership’s effort to move from a “supported” to a “supporting” role, there is a significant opportunity to demonstrate special operations’ value in an integrated deterrence strategy that is still ill-defined.

Are the nation’s military leaders prepared to construct a fully integrated military strategy that integrates deterrence across domains with whole-of-government capabilities? The jury is still out.

Integrating Two Communities to Strengthen Deterrence

While it seems unlikely that special operations units would face a similar fate to their World War II predecessors — absorption into conventional forces — relegating them to counterterrorism missions or other poorly defined supporting roles would be a mistake.

What is perhaps a more useful approach is to take the lessons learned from special operations’ 20-year fight to counter violent extremism and see where they might be applied to integrated deterrence and to the emerging tripolar nuclear competition between the United States, Russia, and China. Any new war will only be won through innovative programs, out-of-the-box-thinking, and fully integrating cross-functional problem solvers—a strength of special operations.

The process begins by considering how barriers, assumptions, and biases within special operations and nuclear deterrence operations communities discourage professionals from integrating and leveraging their expertise to develop and put into action a fully integrated military deterrence strategy. Admittedly, this sounds like something straight from an Army training course, but the point is clear. Unidentified barriers, biases, and assumptions make any successful cultural integration extremely difficult. And in this case, these are two of the least understood and most reclusive military communities.

Some of the perceived differences between the two communities are illustrative. First, special operations missions are mostly tactical, but often have strategic implications. Nuclear operations are always strategic. Second, special operators work in the grey zone and have a “get it done at any cost, cowboy” mentality. Nuclear operations strictly follow technical order checklists and are “safe, secure, and effective robots.” While these perceptions are only partially correct, both communities live in a world where mission failure is not an option.

Integrating two communities that operate on opposite sides of a linear warfighting spectrum seems difficult, but what if Western linear thinking is the root cause of this difficulty? Perhaps integration should be reframed along an Eastern, circular-infinite-spectrum thought lens.

If special operations and nuclear deterrence operations are placed on a spectrum of conflict, it is easy to think they sit at opposite ends. However, if you take an Eastern view that employs a circular-infinite-spectrum, it is possible to see the line bend inward, with one end touching the other. In short, it is possible to integrate both approaches to warfare as a means of achieving integrated deterrence.

Given the varying interests of our adversaries, credible deterrence will look different to China than it does to Russia or North Korea. Integrated deterrence is therefore​ ​not a prefabricated, one-size-fits-all solution. Deterrence tactics without a deterrence strategy are just as useless.

Understanding the complexity of the problem-set is critical, if exceedingly difficult. U.S. Strategic Command alone cannot achieve this objective, because it is only one piece of the deterrence puzzle.

Special operations conduct irregular warfare using the overarching doctrinal tenets of “deter, assure, dissuade, deny, and strike.” Nuclear operations’ doctrinal tenets are exactly the same. The main difference lies in that special operations activities are a strategic deterrence microcosm, and nuclear operations activities are the macrocosm. Though traditionally perceived to operate on different ends of the linear warfighting spectrum, each prosecutes military operations through the same doctrinal lenses.

All of this is to say that it is time special operations and nuclear deterrence operations join forces to develop a meaningful strategy to deter America’s adversaries.

Major Daniel S. Adams spent the first decade of his career as an enlisted Air Force Special Tactics Combat Controller. He is now an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) nuclear operations officer and a former instructor at the USAF Weapons School. Dr. Adam Lowther founded the Air Force’s School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies (SANDS) and taught planning at the US Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies.

The views expressed in this article represent the personal views of the authors and are not necessarily the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force or the U.S. Government.

19fortyfive.com · by Daniel S. Adam and Adam Lowther · June 9, 2023

12. Special Forces Parachuted With Nukes Strapped To Them During The Cold War

There is a SOF- Nuclear relationship. I have heard some interesting stories from my SF brothers who actually jumped these devices.

Special Forces Parachuted With Nukes Strapped To Them During The Cold War

Special Forces “Green Light” teams trained to deploy small nuclear bombs called Special Atomic Demolition Munitions during the Cold War.

BY

OLIVER PARKEN

|

PUBLISHED JUN 9, 2023 5:32 PM EDT

thedrive.com · by Oliver Parken · June 9, 2023

For U.S. special operations personnel, conducting high-altitude parachute jumps are pretty much par for the course. Yet doing so with a nuclear bomb strapped between your legs is on an entirely different level.

That’s exactly what can be seen in the top shot above. Here, a U.S. Army Special Forces paratrooper is pictured free-falling during a training exercise with a Special Atomic Demolition Munition, or SADM, harnessed to them. A form of atomic demolition munition (ADM), SADMs were man-portable nuclear weapons, also known as "backpack nukes." These munitions were fitted into specially designed hard/cloth carrying cases for their transportation on the backs (or between the legs) of special operators. SADMs weighed in the region of 150 pounds, with their warheads – the W-54/B-54 – contributing around 50-55 pounds. SADMs were extremely small, just 24 inches long by 16 inches wide.

But why did special operations personnel train with these munitions? In order to unpack this question, we need to look back to the 1950s and 1960s when the U.S. began to diversify its nuclear weapons capabilities.

The atomic blasts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 imparted a level of devastation never before seen in the history of human conflict. Just a few years later, the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb in August 1949, codenamed “Joe-1” by the U.S. While the U.S. military conducted further tests of such weapons into the early part of the Cold War, a broader view emerged that smaller nuclear weapons for limited tactical purposes would likely prove critical for operations on the ground in future conflicts.

Mushroom cloud pictured following the Hiroshima bombing, August 6, 1945. Bettmann via Getty Images

Indeed, the idea of using tactical nuclear weapons in a possible conflict involving the Soviet Union became an important component of President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s ‘New Look’ policy during the early to mid 1950s and into the early 1960s. As such, scientists and technicians at the Los Alamos and Sandia nuclear weapons laboratories began miniaturizing the size of the warheads used in nuclear weapons.

At the same time, the U.S. Army was making moves to acquire different sorts of battlefield nuclear weapons, including short-range ballistic missiles and the infamous M28/M29 Davy Crockett recoilless gun which fired nuclear warheads with a yield of roughly 10-20 tons of TNT. Part of the push towards fielding a broader range of nuclear weapons by the Army also included the development of atomic demolition munitions (ADMs).

Davy Crockett recoilless gun. U.S. Army

ADMs were designed to be used on or below the ground’s surface (or even underwater) against specific targets to block and deny enemy forces. The initial objective of ADMs was to manage nuclear landscaping – creating giant craters or destroying mountainsides that could obstruct enemy forces. It was envisaged that small teams of engineers or special operations forces would carry and operate ADMs.

The munitions first entered the U.S. Army’s nuclear arsenal in 1954, with one of the first ADM tests taking place during Operation Teapot (1955), part of a series of nuclear tests conducted at the Nevada Test Site. During said test, an 8,000 pound ADM bomb with a yield of 1.2 kilotons was detonated, creating a crater 300 feet wide and 128 feet deep.

Into the 1960s, a whole family of ADMs was developed. This included the Tactical Atomic Demolition Munition (TADM), sporting a W-30 warhead. TADMs weighed around 840 pounds as a complete system, and around 300 were produced between 1961-1966. Medium Atomic Demolition Munitions (MADM) were also developed. Sporting the W-45 warhead, each weighed around 400 pounds. 350 MADMs were produced between 1962-1966. The warhead on both TADM and MADM munitions could be customized for various yields.

Internal view of a Medium Atomic Demolition Munition (nuclear landmine). DoD

Desiring a much lighter, man-portable ADM, the Army ended up producing around 300 SADMs between 1964-1966. Production on an interim W-54 Mod 0 weapon started in April 1963, while the W-54 Mod 1 SADM was placed into production in August 1964. The Mod 1 SADM constituted the warhead, a fuzing/firing system, a mechanical timer, a ferroelectric firing set and its sealed housing. Later, the W-54 Mod 2 SADM was put into production in June 1965. At least two different SADM designs, the XM129 and XM159, were created.

Carrying case for the Special Atomic Demolition Munition (SADM), a tactical nuclear weapon. Glen George McDuff via Wikimedia Commons

At the heart of the SADM system was the W-54 tactical nuclear warhead. The W-54 was developed in the late 1950s – initially by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory until early 1959 (designated the XXW-51), and, thereafter, by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (then re-designated the XW-54). The W-54 warhead measured just 16 inches in length and 10.75 inches in diameter. The yield of W-54 warheads was variable, from ten tons of explosive TNT to 1,000 tons of explosive TNT.

U.S. officials examine a M-388 Davy Crockett nuclear weapon. The W54 nuclear warhead was used in the man-portable M-388 Davy Crockett projectile. The unusually small size of the warhead is apparent. DoD

Compared to heavier ADMs, the Army envisaged that light weight SADMs could more easily be used tactically for operations behind enemy lines in Eastern Europe. In this sense, the munitions would be used to frustrate enemy forces by blowing up fortified structures, tunnels, mountain passes, and viaducts. Alongside their deployment via land or sea, SADMs were also designed to be sent behind enemy lines from the air. Two-man parachute teams – one individual carrying the disassembled weapon in a bag made of canvas – would descend to target points before setting up the device’s explosive timer. Owing to the U.S.'s nuclear doctrine dictating that no single person ever have the means to employ a nuclear weapon on their own, teams of at least two would accompany the bomb (with just one individual carrying it). The detonation code would be split between the two special operators, with both halves needed to start the weapon's countdown.

The idea of using Special Forces teams, known as “Green Light” units, to transport ADMs behind enemy lines had roots stretching back to 1956. Indeed, using special operations units to harass and frustrate the enemy using ADMs chimes with the historical origins of the Army's Special Forces in the early 1950s. It was envisaged that these elite units would 'stay behind' in rear areas to target enemy forces and even mobilize local resistance against them. However, early ADMs – such as the ADM-4 – were too large and heavy to be carried by one or two men. The production of SADMs moved the concept along quickly.

To be selected for the Green Lights was a rare and highly secret thing. As Annie Jacobsen notes in her book, Surprise, Kill, Vanish: The Secret History of CIA Paramilitary Armies, Operators, and Assassins, Green Lights personnel were pulled from Army Special Forces, Navy SEAL units, and the Marines. Units worked under pseudonyms, and wore fatigues with no markings or insignia. Initial training involved learning infiltration techniques including parachute launches and wet-deck submarine launches. Overall, the instruction of Green Light units took place over the course of a week, consisting of eight to 12 hours each day.

Parachute missions involving SADMs were performed over the sea, as well as over land during the 1960s and 1970s, in order to train for their potential detonation overseas. In 1972, Green Light units parachuted near the White Mountain National Forest in New Hampshire. As Foreign Policy notes, the nuclear weapon used was a training dummy. Navy SEALs also performed underwater training with the munitions. Moreover, drills with the SADMs also occurred outside the U.S., with Special Forces teams even skiing with them in the Bavarian Alps during, for example.

“Timing was everything” when it came to parachuting from planes with nuclear weapons, Billy Waugh recalls of his time with the Green Lights in Surprise, Kill, Vanish. “You had to jump quickly – you couldn’t afford to be spread out when you landed on the ground.” Indeed, the jumper’s rigging was designed in such a way that the nuclear component would fall to the end of a 17-foot-long lowering line once outside of the aircraft.

Parachute training with an SADM. Sandia National Laboratories archive photo

Once SADMs were fixed in place, and their detonation charges triggered, Green Light personnel needed to retreat to a ‘safe’ location to avoid being caught in the explosion. This would have been a difficult task given that the timers could not be relied on for complete accuracy. As Army field manuals from the time indicated, it was “not possible to state that [SADM timers] will fire at a specific time.”

Furthermore, there was also the fact that Green Light teams would also have had to make their way out of enemy territory once the munition was detonated. According to Bill Flavin, who commanded a Special Forces SADM team during the Cold War, “there were real issues with the operational wisdom of the program, and those who were to conduct the mission were sure that whomever thought this up was using bad hemp.” Indeed, many special operators accordingly described the work of Green Light teams as suicide missions.

As SADMs were never used on foreign soil during the Cold War, those realities were, thankfully, never realized. That the U.S. military was training Special Forces personnel to personally transport nuclear weapons behind enemy lines gained wider traction publicly in 1984. Ex-Army intelligence officer William Arkin and colleagues presented sketches and descriptions of the SADM to the Natural Resources Defense Council, with the revelations reverberating within Congress and among the public. From there, the weapon was slowly phased out, and was officially retired in 1989.

So there you have it, the crazy history behind the U.S. military’s SADMs. The next time you think that your job is stressful, just remember you don’t have a nuclear bomb literally strapped to you as you jump out of a perfectly good airplane.

Contact the author: oliver@thewarzone.com

thedrive.com · by Oliver Parken · June 9, 2023

13. Irregular warfare infiltrates West Virginia this month

Ridge Runner.

Note we are very good at focusing on the tactical: JSOU and the Irregular Warfare Center are contributing to this.

But who is the champion of irregular warfare in DOD? Who is the senior leader who ensures that the DOD maintains a sufficient level of experience in irregular warfare so we can campaign to win in the gray zone of strategic competition. We are developing or sustaining great tactical skills through these long standing exercises but where is the irregular warfare proficient campaign headquarters? Who insures the integration of irregular warfare into and in support of the whole of government effort of competitive statecraft in strategic competition?

Irregular warfare infiltrates West Virginia this month - WV MetroNews

wvmetronews.com · by Mike Nolting · June 8, 2023

CAMP DAWSON, W.Va. — The West Virginia National Guard, in cooperation with the Joint Special Operations University and the Irregular Warfare Center, is hosting about 300 special operations troops and support staff for the Ridge Runner Irregular Warfare Exercise at Camp Dawson in Preston County through June 16.

Brian Abraham

The Department of Defense (DOD) defines irregular warfare as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations.”

Active duty soldiers from the Texas-based 5/19th Special Forces Group, 92nd Civil Affairs, 6th PSYOPS, and the USMC will train alongside special operations forces from the United Kingdom, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Observers from Canada, Romania, Georgia, Moldova, Qatar, Hungary, Germany, Finland, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, France, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom Special Air Service will also participate.

The operation is a validation exercise for the soldiers of the Texas-based 5/19th Special Forces. If the unit is validated in the exercise, they’ll deploy to the Baltic region soon to conduct a similar operation.

Brig. Gen. William Crane

Justice administration Chief of Staff Brian Abraham said this is another opportunity to continue spreading that message to another group of soldiers following successful training at Fola earlier this spring.

“The governor understands the opportunities that West Virginia presents to the world to be able to come and train here; we have a very unique topography here,” Abraham told MetroNews at Camp Dawson Wednesday. “We’ve got other areas of the state of West Virginia besides the Camp Dawson area—down at the Fola Mine in Clay and Nicholas counties.”

The Ridge Runner exercise takes place in the fictional country of Vandalia (West Virginia), which has been broken up similarly to the Soviet Union in the 1990s. Now, due to economic and energy concerns, “bad actors” are trying to reunify the country. Soldiers, most of whom are not in uniform, must work with local officials and residents to maintain independence.

Soldiers must pursue the objective while at the same time determining the alliances of those in the area of operations.

“So, if a bad actor decides to invade another country, there’s a resistance force that’s already in place that can hopefully get them to take their own territory back,” state Adjutant General Bill Crane said.

Ridge Runner Director Major Michael Susick said West Virginia is the perfect place to conduct the exercise to challenge the soldiers. The terrain, communications, and connectivity conditions in the state can be very similar to the conditions modern-day soldiers on the battlefield face.

“It’s very tough to make communications with very limited GPS capability, so you’re seeing more of the peer-to-peer type capability where it’s just natural here in West Virginia,” Susick said. “So, it’s very challenging for the teams to operate, and it’s very challenging for commands to control those elements.”

Military officials have land agreements to operate on 500,000 acres, role players, and some help from local officials.

The soldiers begin operations Thursday in six “lanes” across the state. “Lanes” have been established in Huntington, Charleston, Beckley, Bluefield, Morgantown, and a Nicholas/Randolph “lane.”

The operational regions will be permissive, or free for forces to interact with the population and move freely, semi-permissive, or limited movement and interactions, and non-permissive, meaning it is not safe to move freely or interact with the population.

“They’ll go through a fictitious customs or port of entry, and then from there they’ll establish a link up with a special operations liaison, an officer or non-commissioned officer (NCO),” Susick said. “So, it’s very similar to what we do when we move overseas with the embassy.”

In addition to military operations, the soldiers will work with local leaders to solve area problems and gain the confidence of the local population. The exercise is a realistic vehicle for the special forces to work with conventional forces and local populations.

“Strengthening that mechanism on how they can inform the populace, so if hostilities do occur, how can people get out or how can they hunker down to protect their citizens,” Susick said.

An after-action review will be held on June 16.

wvmetronews.com · by Mike Nolting · June 8, 2023

14. U.S. Defense Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific: Background and Issues for Congress

A very through 55 page report that can be downloaded here: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47589

I will be incorporating some of these charts in my lectures on Asian security.

 U.S. Defense Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific: Background and Issues for Congress 

June 6, 2023 

The Indo-Pacific occupies a central role in U.S. national strategy and hosts a large number of U.S. military forces. To enable the operation of these forces and accomplish its strategic objectives, the United States maintains and uses at least 66 significant defense sites spread across the region. This defense infrastructure network performs and supports numerous military functions, including basing for military personnel and weapon systems; domain awareness and area defense; maintenance and repair; training and exercises, storage and prepositioning of materiel; and research, development, testing, and evaluation activities. Some Indo-Pacific installations are located in U.S. states, territories, or possessions (such as Hawaii and Guam); others are located in allied or partner nations (such as South Korea and Japan). In addition to installations directly owned or operated by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S. military also makes use of sites operated by allied or partner nations (such as the Philippines and Australia). 

DOD’s basing posture in the Indo-Pacific reflects in part the legacy of decisions made under the geopolitical and technological conditions of the Cold War. Following the Obama Administration’s announcement of a “pivot to Asia,” the focus of U.S. strategy (and with it, regional defense infrastructure) shifted toward prevailing in competition against peer or near-peer rivals—particularly the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Since 2011, the United States has negotiated access to 12 new defense sites in the Philippines and Australia, constructed new installations in Japan and Guam, and expanded facilities at dozens of existing installations across the region. Congress’ role in these developments has included, for example, appropriating over $8.9 billion for new military construction projects at Indo-Pacific sites since fiscal year (FY) 2020 and establishing infrastructure improvements as an investment priority through the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI).

Issues that Congress may consider include (1) whether DOD’s current regional basing posture adequately supports strategic goals and operational requirements, and (2) whether the construction, maintenance, and utilization of defense infrastructure is appropriately resourced and managed. Within these issue areas, particular questions that may be raised in the 118th Congress include 

• • What criteria should inform the placement of U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific, and what role should Congress play in determining those criteria? 
• • How can DOD optimize the organization, operation, and resilience of its Indo-Pacific installations, and what assessment and oversight options are available to Congress? 
• • What is an appropriate level of investment for military construction, facilities sustainment, and related infrastructure activities? 

15. 4 Indigenous children lost in jungle for 40 days after plane crash are found alive in Colombia

​What an incredible and heartwarming story.

​

4 Indigenous children lost in jungle for 40 days after plane crash are found alive in Colombia

AP · by MANUEL RUEDA · June 10, 2023

BOGOTA, Colombia (AP) — Four Indigenous children who disappeared 40 days ago after surviving a small plane crash in the Amazon jungle were found alive Friday, Colombian authorities announced, ending an intense search that gripped the nation.

The children were alone when searchers found them and are now receiving medical attention, President Gustavo Petro told reporters upon his return to Bogota from Cuba, where he signed a cease-fire agreement with representatives of the National Liberation Army rebel group.

The president said the youngsters are an “example of survival” and predicted their saga “will remain in history.”

No details were immediately released on how the youngsters managed to survive on their own for so many days.

The crash happened in the early hours of May 1, when the Cessna single-engine propeller plane with six passengers and a pilot declared an emergency due to an engine failure.

The small aircraft fell off radar a short time later and a frantic search for survivors began. Two weeks after the crash, on May 16, a search team found the plane in a thick patch of the rainforest and recovered the bodies of the three adults on board, but the small children were nowhere to be found.

Sensing that they could be alive, Colombia’s army stepped up the hunt for the children and flew 150 soldiers with dogs into the area to track the group of four siblings, ages 13, 9, 4 and 11 months. Dozens of volunteers from Indigenous tribes also helped search.

On Friday, the military tweeted pictures showing a group of soldiers and volunteers posing with the children, who were wrapped in thermal blankets. One of the soldiers held a bottle to the smallest child’s lips.

The air force later shared a video on Twitter showing soldiers using a line to load the children onto a helicopter that then flew off in the dark. The tweet said the aircraft was headed to the town of San Jose del Guaviare, but gave no further details.

“The union of our efforts made this possible” Colombia’s military command wrote on its Twitter account.

During the search, in an area where visibility is greatly limited by mist and thick folliage, soldiers on helicopters dropped boxes of food into the jungle, hoping that it would help sustain the children. Planes flying over the jungle fired flares to help search crews on the ground at night, and rescuers used megaphones that blasted a message recorded by the siblings’ grandmother, telling them to stay in one place.

Rumors also emerged about the childrens’ wheareabouts and on May 18, President Petro tweeted that the children had been found. He then deleted the message, claiming he had been misinformed by a government agency.

The group of four children had been travelling with their mother from the Amazonian village of Araracuara to San Jose del Guaviare, a small city on the edge of the Amazon rainforest.

They are members of the Huitoto people, and officials said the oldest children in the group had some knowledge of how to survive in the rainforest.

On Friday, after confirming the children had been rescued, the president said that for a while he had believed the children were rescued by one of the nomadic tribes that still roam the remote swath of the jungle where the plane fell and have little contact with authorities.

authorities.

But Petro added that the children were first found by one of the rescue dogs that soldiers took into the jungle.

Officials did not say how far the children were from the crash site when they were found. But the teams had been searching within a 4.5-kilometer (nearly 3-mile) radius from the site where the small plane nosedived into the forest floor.

As the search progressed, soldiers found small clues in the jungle that led them to believe the children were still living, including a pair of footprints, a baby bottle, diapers and pieces of fruit that looked like it had been bitten by humans.

“The jungle saved them” Petro said. “They are children of the jungle, and now they are also children of Colombia.”

AP · by MANUEL RUEDA · June 10, 2023

16. Gerasimov Invites Top Chinese General to Visit Russia to ‘Expand Military Cooperation’

Little Green Men and New Generation/Non-Linear Warfare meets Unrestricted Warfare and Three Warfares (sychological, legal or lawfare, and media or public opinion warfare)

Gerasimov Invites Top Chinese General to Visit Russia to ‘Expand Military Cooperation’

kyivpost.com

Concerns that China is increasingly likely to provide military support to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine have deepened as a result of recent evidence of closer cooperation.

by Steve Brown | June 9, 2023, 3:22 pm

Russia's army Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov attends an expanded meeting of the Russian Defence Ministry Board at the National Defence Control Centre in Moscow, on December 21, 2022. Russian President described today the conflict in Ukraine as a "shared tragedy" but placed blame for the outbreak of hostilities on Ukraine and its allies, not Moscow. Sergey Fadeichev / Sputnik / AFP

• South Korea

Valery Gerasimov, Russia’s top general, has held a video conversation with his Chinese counterpart, Liu Zhenli, during which the pair pledged to continue joint military training exercises and cooperation, according to Russian news agencies.

It was also reported that Gerasimov extended an invitation for Liu to visit Russia, telling him: “I am convinced that your extensive experience will contribute both to the development of the Chinese armed forces and to the expansion of military cooperation between our countries.”

Liu Zhenli is a former commander of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Ground Forces and is the current Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission.

President Xi has appeared to increase collaboration with Russia in a number of areas since the war with Ukraine began, leading to the United States accusing Beijing of backing the Kremlin’s war efforts. China has so far been reluctant to provide Moscow with weaponry, despite some commercially available Chinese equipment appearing on the Ukrainian battlefield.

There was, however, a suggestion this month that Beijing may be moving to provide more serious military hardware to Russia. This view was reinforced by a video posted by Ramzan Kadyrov the Head of the Chechen Republic, whose forces, nicknamed “kadyrovites,” are formally part of the Russian National Guard. Kadyrov’s forces have actively participated in the war against Ukraine since the beginning of the full-scale invasion.

The vehicles shown in the video seem to be the commercial “export” version of the ZFB-05 Xinxing armored personnel carrier, manufactured by the Shaanxi Baoji Special Vehicles Manufacturing company, which is in service with the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA).

It is still unclear whether these vehicles were sourced directly from China or elsewhere. China has exported the Tiger to several other countries primarily to police or internal security units often as military aid. China considers the vehicle to be a “dual use” rather than a dedicated military vehicle for which export authorization from Beijing is not, therefore, required.

This, combined with the reports of senior Chinese military leaders being in contact with leaders of Russia’s armed forces, could be a significant development.

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Steve Brown

After a career as a British Army Ammunition Specialist and Bomb Disposal Officer, Steve later worked in the fields of ammunition destruction, demining and explosive ordnance disposal with the UN and NATO. In 2017, after taking early retirement, he moved to Ukraine with his Ukrainian wife and two sons where he became a full-time writer. He now works as an English language editor with the Kyiv Post.

kyivpost.com

17. Russian Troops Killed ‘Retreating Through Their Own Minefields’

Not an approved, recommended, or sound technique I am sure.

Russian Troops Killed ‘Retreating Through Their Own Minefields’

kyivpost.com

• According to western analysts, some Russian formations are conducting “credible” defense operations while others aren’t faring anywhere near as well.

by Kyiv Post | June 10, 2023, 4:36 pm

Photo: illustrative / AFP

Russian troops are suffering casualties in the face of ongoing Ukrainian attacks due to being blown up in their own minefields, according to reports.

In an evaluation of the Russian military’s performance against Ukrainian attacks this week, the British Ministry of Defence (MoD) in its daily report on Saturday, said: “Russian performance has been mixed: some units are likely conducting credible manoeuvre defence operations while others have pulled back in some disorder, amid increased reports of Russian casualties as they withdraw through their own minefields.”

Latest Defence Intelligence update on the situation in Ukraine - 10 June 2023.

Find out more about Defence Intelligence's use of language: https://t.co/Sr1VlSp8Hy

 #StandWithUkraine  pic.twitter.com/lBSwEVN2pH

— Ministry of Defence  (@DefenceHQ) June 10, 2023

The MoD did not provide further details but said "Ukrainian forces have likely made good progress” and “penetrated the first line of Russian defences" in some areas.

Kyiv has been tight-lipped about ongoing offensive actions and a lack of media at the front lines means reports are sparse, though on Saturday afternoon President Zelensky said counteroffensive action is underway against Russian forces, but did not elaborate further.

As for what's happening on the front lines, some videos from the past week have surfaced.

Russian sources have made a big deal of pictures and video of abandoned and destroyed Ukrainian tanks and vehicles in the western Zaporizhia Oblast, claiming that because they include a number of western-supplied Leopard tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles, it’s indicative of a failed main counteroffensive attempt.

But video purporting to show the attack from the Ukrainian viewpoint shows the crews managed to escape.

The rear M2 Bradley later deployed smoke grenades to cover the retreat and most, if not all, soldiers and crews managed to evacuate. pic.twitter.com/iDuGARRE3d

— MilitaryLand.net (@Militarylandnet) June 10, 2023

18. Marines want to use Tomahawks to sink enemy ships from 1,000 miles away

Marines want to use Tomahawks to sink enemy ships from 1,000 miles away

The Marine Corps’ current anti-ship system has a range of just 115 miles.

BY JEFF SCHOGOL | PUBLISHED JUN 8, 2023 3:14 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · June 8, 2023

The Navy is developing a new long-range anti-ship missile — dubbed the Maritime Strike Tomahawk — that would allow Marine units based on Japanese islands to sink Chinese ships taking part in an invasion of Taiwan.

Right now, the Marine Corps’ Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, or NMESIS, uses Naval Strike Missiles, which have a range of up to 115 miles.

A recent war game conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank showed that for NMESIS to be effective during a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the system would have to be on the island before hostiles commence, said retired Marine Col. Mark Cancian, a senior adviser with the CSIS International Security Program.

Moreover, the diplomatic hurdles involved with deploying a Marine unit equipped with NMESIS to Taiwan before such an invasion are immense, Cancian told Task & Purpose. Because of the range and quantity of Chinese weapons, it is not likely that the Marines could deploy NMESIS to Taiwan after an invasion had started.

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Tomahawk missiles, however, have a range of up to 1,000 miles, according to Raytheon Missile & Defense, the company that makes the cruise missiles. The Maritime Strike Tomahawk, or MST, is intended to strike moving targets at sea.

NMESIS fires from a remotely operated JLTV-based launcher in November 2020. (U.S. Marine Corps photo.)

The next integration of the Tomahawks, Block V, will include the ability to strike ships, said Lee Willett, a naval analyst. The Navy expects to receive its first Maritime Strike Tomahawks in late 2024.

The Marine Corps has notified the Navy that it would like to buy Maritime Strike Tomahawks and has submitted a request for funding to do so, said Willett, who writes for Janes, a defense publication.

Maritime Strike Tomahawks would give the Marine Corps a long-range strike capability, allowing it to protect forward-deployed Marine units, which would be able to operate within range of an enemy’s long-range defenses, Willett told Task & Purpose.

The Marines activated their first Long Range Missile battery earlier this year and the Corps plans to ultimately have a battalion of three such batteries operational by 2030, said Cathy Close, a spokeswoman for Marine Corps Combat Development and Integration.

The Department of the Navy’s latest proposed budget plans on buying 34 land attack Tomahawks for the Marine Corps next fiscal year. The Marines were allotted 13 Tomahawks this fiscal year and 48 Tomahawks in fiscal 2022.

A BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missile is launched from its Mark 41 vertical launch system aboard the destroyer USS Fife (DD-991) during Operation Desert Storm. (Photo by © CORBIS/Corbis via Getty Images)

“Based on the Navy’s development schedule, procurement [of Maritime Strike Tomahawks] may begin as early as the late 2020s,” Close told Task & Purpose. “The Marine Corps does not have any Maritime Strike Tomahawks now as MST is a developmental program in the Navy.”

The Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations concept, or EABO, calls for putting small numbers of Marines ashore on temporary locations, such as remote islands in the Pacific, from which they could target enemy ships.

“Conceptually, MST broadens the Tomahawk target set to include moving targets such as ships, in which case a geographic combatant commander could employ ground-launched MSTs as part of a Naval sea control or sea denial campaign,” Close said. “One purpose and value of EABO is to enable distributed long-range fires, such as those provided by Tomahawk missiles, in support of the Joint Force.”

If the Marines had Maritime Strike Tomahawks, they would be able to sink Chinese ships from bases much further away from Taiwan, said Stacie Pettyjohn, director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Studies think tank in Washington, D.C.

“Unlike NSM [Naval Strike Missiles], MST would provide the Marines with an anti-ship weapon with enough range to reach parts of the Taiwan strait from the Southern Ryukyus and Kyushu [Japan],” Pettyjohn told Task & Purpose. “Theoretically then the Marine Littoral Regiment could try to sink parts of the invasion fleet crossing the strait in addition to conducting sea denial operations in the East China Sea and northern Philippine Sea.”

Chinese soldiers quickly get out of their cars to take up positions in Jiangxi, China, January 29, 2023. (CFOTO/Future Publishing via Getty Images)

But targeting Chinese invasion ships from Japanese islands would be difficult, and the subsonic Tomahawk missiles may not be able to get through Chinese air defenses to reach their targets, Pettyjohn said. The Marines are also not expected to have many Tomahawks by fiscal 2026, and top defense officials believe China could try to invade Taiwan by 2027.

The Marines may find that Maritime Strike Tomahawks would be better used to defend Japanese waters and possibly prevent Chinese ships from from passing through the Miyako Strait, a key waterway that the People’s Liberation Army Navy would need to transit in order to leave the “first island chain,” which includes Japan and Taiwan, Pettyjohn said.

Maritime Strike Tomahawks could also become an effective weapon to defend Marine bases, said Navy strategy expert Steven Wills.

“The only challenge I see is that Tomahawk missile production would need to substantially ramp up in order to supply both of the maritime services as well as the Air Force,” said Wills, a retired Navy lieutenant commander who is now with CNA, a federally funded research and development center.

During World War II, Marine base defense battalions used 5-inch guns from old battleships on Wake Island and Midway Island during World War II, Wills told Task & Purpose.

“Today’s Marine Littoral Regiment, armed with antiship and anti-air weapons is the lineal descendent of the World War II base defense battalions,” Wills told Task & Purpose. “Arming today’s Marines with cruise missiles to attack ships is like giving the 1941 Marines old battleship weapons, only with much improved accuracy and firepower.”

The latest on Task & Purpose

• Air Force said AI drone killed its human operator in a simulation
• The Army says it’s made ‘significant improvements’ to its troubled new infantry squad vehicle
• What we know about China’s hacking of Navy systems
• Taliban moving captured US military vehicles and Soviet tanks to Iranian border
• Five juveniles arrested for attack on Marines caught on video

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · June 8, 2023

19. 

Everyone uses the Sun Tzu!!

Note this caveat: This report is auto-generated from ANI news service. ThePrint holds no responsibility for its content.

Excerpt:

Vas Shenoy, a political researcher, writes in The Times of Israel that phrases such as indirect strategy, maximum profit with minimum effort, avoiding combat, some and mirrors, and deceit, are the terms used by Sun Tzu.

China adopts Sun Tzu's "Art of War," uses deceit, espionage to gain global recognition: Expert

theprint.in · by ANI · June 9, 2023

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Beijing [China], June 9 (ANI): The modern People’s Republic of China (PRC) has not only adopted Sun Tzu’s philosophies but all Chinese military troops appear to have memorized his work, reported The Times of Israel.

Sun Tzu was a military strategist who lived during the Eastern Zhou period of 771 to 256 BCE. He is famously known for his book ‘The Art of War’, a guide on how to successfully engage in conflict and battle.

Vas Shenoy, a political researcher, writes in The Times of Israel that phrases such as indirect strategy, maximum profit with minimum effort, avoiding combat, some and mirrors, and deceit, are the terms used by Sun Tzu.

Russia’s attack on Ukraine today has brought war back to Europe. Vladimir Putin’s attack on Kyiv does not follow Master Sun’s maxim that an enemy should be subdued without a fight, but China has continued to prefer cold wars over hot wars.

With the exception of Xi Jinping, every member of the Central Military Commission is a general or admiral who has mastered the “Art of War” to the letter, wrote Vas Shenoy.

The first precept of Xi Jinping’s China is the employment of espionage and unconventional warfare. China has more active hackers (live agents) than the majority of other nations. The most active spies are those that aggressively seek economic, technological, and personal information and spread misinformation, as per The Times of Israel.

There are no restrictions on what the PRC can do, from selling surveillance cameras to survey streets, traffic signals, and sensitive installations to a contemporary app like TikTok that is used to collect data on users throughout the world, distort information, and propagate propaganda.

There are 102 abroad Chinese police stations in 53 nations, including Italy, France, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, according to the human rights organisation Safeguard Defenders, which brought attention to the matter for the first time in 2022.

These Chinese spies run illegal Chinese police stations, gathering information on Chinese citizens and those who oppose the current Chinese regime. They live legally in Italy and other countries that housed them under the pretext of police stations. All of this was accomplished by deceiving the host government.

Another instance of the current Chinese government using Master Sun’s technique is attacking where resistance is little. You dissipate, moving in the direction of the place of least resistance, wherever they strike.

Pakistan, which is currently in upheaval, can serve as an example. The nation is China’s go-to ally in any situation and was a crucial ally of NATO during its invasion of Afghanistan.

As a result of the current unrest in Pakistan and the West’s abandoning of Afghanistan, China has gained access to Afghanistan’s natural riches, particularly lithium, the fuel of the future. Afghanistan, ruled by the Taliban and considered a pariah by the West and a threat to its patron Pakistan, maybe the newest member of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), taking the place of Italy, which seems is on its way out.

Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Beijing on February 4, 2022. He and Chinese Premier Xi declared a relationship with “no limits.” The two nations, who have a 4,200 km shared border, were adversaries during the Cold War. The genuine start of the Sino-Russian rapprochement came following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Following his “no limits friendship” proclamation, Putin invaded Ukraine, isolating Russia and forcing it to depend on China. Russia has changed from being a rival to being an extension of China.

By supporting Putin, Xi could put another Master Sun’s teaching into practice in a single action, reported The Times of Israel. (ANI)

This report is auto-generated from ANI news service. ThePrint holds no responsibility for its content.

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theprint.in · by ANI · June 9, 2023

20.  China’s New Conscription Rules Reveal Concerns

China’s New Conscription Rules Reveal Concerns

New sections on wartime drafts, punishment, and physical fitness offer a glimpse into PLA leaders’ minds.

By THOMAS CORBETT and PETER W. SINGER

JUNE 8, 2023

COMMENTARY

THE CHINA INTELLIGENCE

CHINA

PERSONNEL

TRAINING & SIMULATION

defenseone.com · by Thomas Corbett

New recruits to China's People's Liberation Army receive a lecture from veterans near Zhangzhou, China, on September 4, 2022. (CFOTO/Future Publishing via Getty Images)

New sections on wartime drafts, punishment, and physical fitness offer a glimpse into PLA leaders’ minds.

|

June 8, 2023 11:11 AM ET

• Commentary
• The China Intelligence
• China
• Personnel
• Training & Simulation
• 
  

Recent revisions to the regulations that govern China’s draft highlight some of the military’s deepest insecurities about its own capabilities and people.

In April, China’s Central Military Commission announced that it had revised the “Regulations on Conscription Work.” Released by the Xinhua state news agency, the announcement said that the revisions were carried out to implement “Xi Jinping Thought on strengthening the military” and improve the quality of conscripts to the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA. Yet certain changes inadvertently highlight some of the PLA’s deepest insecurities about its own capabilities and people.

Perhaps most notably, the updated Regulations have a brand-new chapter about the wartime conscription process. The new rules allow the CMC to adjust conscription requirements at will after issuing a national defense mobilization order. It also indicates that during wartime, former soldiers can be called up as a supplement to active service units.

All this strongly suggests that the PLA is thinking not just about what it would actually need in wartime, but also how it continues to suffer from poor retention of its personnel. In particular, better-educated personnel tend to leave after their two-year enlistment is up, put off by the harsh conditions and attracted by more appealing options in the private sector.

In recent years, the PLA has made numerous efforts to boost retention. In 2021, for example, leaders changed the policy that demobilized all conscripted personnel who were not promoted to NCO. Those who wished to stay on could do so in a “second enlistment.” Although the PLA has not released details on the decision to create the second enlistment program, the new Regulations indicate it has not made the headway it hoped in retaining talent.

The Regulations also add a section on punishments—and the crimes that will incur them, such as evading a conscription call, refusal to serve once recruited, obstructing citizens from fulfilling their military service obligations, corruption and malpractice, and dereliction of duty. While the Regulations do not specify punishments, the PLA has been known to issue fines of up to $6,760, and prohibit the recruit from resuming college, going abroad, obtaining government aid or subsidies, obtaining civil service or state-owned enterprise employment, or receiving a business license.

The new section on crimes and punishment suggests that these issues remain malignant. Refusal to serve, in particular, is likely a much bigger problem than most realize. A ten-year study of the PLA showed that it’s not uncommon for new recruits to refuse the conscription call after receiving their notifications or even after they have fully entered service. In one example from 2020, a fresh 20-year-old college student joined the PLA in Anhui Province, only to quit on the first day of training. Although his training unit and family attempted to convince him otherwise, he refused to participate and was expelled.

Such personal issues of fortitude may also explain the new Regulations’ increased scrutiny on physical and political examinations. They stipulate additional spot checks for those who pass the physical exams, and if too many fail this extra inspection, then the entire batch of candidates will undergo re-examination. This may be the latest attempt to address poor fitness among PLA recruits. At least as far back as 2013, the sedentary lifestyle of many modern Chinese citizens has contributed to high levels of failure on the physical examination. For example, one Beijing recruiting office found that 60 percent of its college recruits were failing due to high BMI and shortsightedness, both symptoms associated with modern urban lifestyles. Likewise, the PLA ascribes rising increased injury rates among recruits to low physical fitness. It also appears that these issues persist well into the enlistment period, with physical fitness often a contributing factor to poor training performance.

Beyond these brand-new sections, changes to the Regulations emphasize recruiting college-educated personnel and personnel with important skills. Chinese leaders associate educational levels with personnel quality, and want to improving the latter by increasing the former. In recent years, Xi has called personnel quality the key to building a world-class military, and has vowed to continue efforts to recruit more college-educated personnel. While the 2001 Regulations began focusing more on college-educated personnel, by 2009 the PLA had only recruited around 2,000 college graduates in total. This and other shortfalls led the PLA to increase the percentage of personnel with an urban background (strongly correlated with education), and restructure the entire recruitment cycle to attract graduates who may be looking for direction after leaving college.

Data provided by China’s National Bureau of Statistics show the reforms have worked to an extent, with an increase in personnel with at least some college education from 46.6 percent in 2000 to 56.81 percent by 2020. Although these numbers show a promising trend, the push within the new Regulations and anecdotal evidence points toward the PLA hoping for college education levels to reach closer to 70 percent. For example, Article 4 explicitly calls on colleges to assist the military in handling matters related to conscription work. Article 5 also stipulates that local governments give priority to recruiting college graduates and personnel with desirable professional skills. This aligns with the CCP leadership’s insistence on pushing for higher education levels and targeting those with STEM backgrounds, graduates of advanced technical schools, and those with the high-tech skills needed for modern combat readiness.

Although the new Regulations are an important step in formalizing a number of key processes in the PLA’s conscription system, they also expose underlying issues that concern its leadership. Some, such as issues of candidate health, are faced by militaries around the world, including the U.S. Others, such as the retention and college education issue, are more specific to the PLA. In both cases, how and whether the PLA is able to answer these personnel challenges will both shape its own future capabilities as well as security dynamics beyond China.

21. More than Half of the Pentagon’s Major Arms Efforts Are Late, GAO Finds

More than Half of the Pentagon’s Major Arms Efforts Are Late, GAO Finds

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

The guided-missile destroyer USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000) arrives at Commander, Fleet Activities Yokosuka (CFAY) for a scheduled port visit. Zumwalt is currently operating in the U.S. 7th Fleet area of operations. U.S Navy photo by Seaman Darren Cordoviz

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Science & Tech

The watchdog urges the military to better follow commercial practices.

|

June 9, 2023 03:03 PM ET

• Defense Budget

By Patrick Tucker

Science & Technology Editor, Defense One

June 9, 2023 03:03 PM ET

• Defense Budget

The Pentagon’s uneven adoption of commercial practices is among the reasons more than half of its major acquisition programs are late, according to a new report by the Government Accountability Office.

Those delays are affecting a wide variety of key weapons such as the Air Force’s Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile and the Navy’s Zumwalt destroyer, programs that are part of efforts to deter large, high-tech adversaries.

But it’s not all bad news. GAO praised some programs, including some that use the Middle Tier of Acquisition pathway, for using “certain product development practices aligned with key product development principles employed by leading companies.”

Those principles include things like:

• Defining project goals before allocating funding by establishing performance tenants beforehand.
• Using modern design tools like 3-D printing and virtual twinning to make custom parts and prototypes faster
• Dropping over-ambitious capability goals to get a minimal viable product earlier
• Incorporating operators’ feedback as weapons are being designed rather than saddling them with products that don’t meet their needs.

GAO singled out some success stories, such as the Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon System, which cut development time by using 3-D printing and iterative design—essentially, continuing to design and redesign a product rather than declare it “finished.” And the Army’s Extended Range Cannon Artillery program “reported that it obtained end-user feedback through soldier touchpoints, surveys, written reports, and interviews. According to the program, this feedback has informed design upgrades, new features, and changes to make the system more effective.”

But GAO’s annual report on major weapons is also full of examples of programs that are not following the principles. One example is the Navy’s DDG 1000 Zumwalt guided-missile destroyer, which is to complete operational testing in December, a year later than GAO expected last year. A big part of the reason is that the Navy decided to add to its wishlist for the destroyer rather than subtract. It’s trying to integrate an experimental hypersonic missile onto the ship.

“If the hypersonic weapon is not ready for integration on the DDG 1000 at the time of the aforementioned maintenance period, the Navy may have to extend the duration of the planned maintenance period or wait for the next scheduled period to incorporate the system on the ship,” the report said.

But as the Pentagon becomes more ambitious in its technology wants and needs, there is also a chance for delays even in programs that are implementing the principles. For instance, the report applauds the Army’s IVAS program—which seeks to give soldiers an augmented-reality headset for training and more advanced targeting—for continually seeking feedback from operators to improve its relevance and ease of use. But the program, beset by hardware and software problems and originally scheduled for September 2021, is now slated to arrive in 2024.

Bottom line: the Defense Department pays a lot of lip service to things like modular open architectures, iterative design, and soldier feedback. But it’s not following its own advice as often as it should. Even when it is, innovation is an imperfect process fraught with moments of failure. The Pentagon has to both increase its tolerance for experimental failure without letting failures drive up costs and delays.

22. Death of Peace: The 60th Anniversary of JFK’s Speech at American University

I too can cherry pick from JFK speeches. I would choose his Naval Academy address and argue that he would understand today's environment.  

John F. Kennedy

United States Military Academy Commencement Address

delivered 6 June 1962, West Point, New York

https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkwestpointcommencementspeech.htm

Excerpts: 

Korea has not been the only battleground since the end of the Second World War. Men have fought and died in Malaya, in Greece, in the Philippines, in Algeria and Cuba and Cyprus, and almost continuously on the Indo-Chinese Peninsula. No nuclear weapons have been fired. No massive nuclear retaliation has been considered appropriate. This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin -- war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It is a form of warfare uniquely adapted to what has been strangely called "wars of liberation," to undermine the efforts of new and poor countries to maintain the freedom that they have finally achieved. It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires in those situations where we must counter it, and these are the kinds of challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved, a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.

And to be fair to Lt Col Davis - I suppose if we synthesized both of JFK's speeches they might be useful for considering a strategic way forward to today.

Death of Peace: The 60th Anniversary of JFK’s Speech at American University

19fortyfive.com · by Daniel Davis · June 10, 2023

Today marks the 60th anniversary of perhaps the most remarkable speech President John F. Kennedy ever gave.

In it he laid out, from a position of unrivaled American strength, a path to peaceful coexistence with our most hated, powerful and feared enemy, the Soviet Union. Whatever hope was kindled on that day was snuffed out mere months later, however, as Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963. Such principled, passionate desire for peace has not been seen in the White House since. For the sake of our continued security and prosperity, the United States today urgently needs to resurrect that spirit.

The Vital Call for Peace

Kennedy delivered the keynote address for the graduating class at American University on June 10, 1963. He stunned many observers in both Washington and Moscow at the time by laying out a comprehensive argument for peace between the two archrivals and advocating a reduction in nuclear weapons, starting with a test ban treaty. Unsurprisingly, some criticized the president at the time for believing peace could ever come between two such staunch opponents. Such obstructive thinking remains pervasive in the United States today.

Too often we view those who advocate for peace as being weak, insufferably naïve to the harsh realities of the world. I approach the topic from the exact opposite perspective. As I routinely write and argue on televised appearances, we must see the world as it is, taking it in all its harsh, cruel realities, and seek to craft a quality and sustainable life for American citizens in spite of those realities. I have personally seen the devastation war imposes on its victims, fighting through four combat deployments during my 21-year career in the Army.

Further, my advocacy for peace is grounded on the firm understanding of the reality that there are evil men in this world and that at times it is necessary to fight to keep one’s family and nation safe. I unapologetically argue that maintaining a strong and capable national defense capacity is vital. In 1963, Kennedy had this same experience and motivation.

Fears We Should Keep

The 35th president was a combat veteran of World War II and saw the utter devastation that resulted from the use of nuclear weapons. He wisely feared the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war. Many today have lost that very healthy fear, including many of those who should most acutely understand the dangers. Instead of leading the way to explain the cataclysmic risks of any nuclear exchange and being passionate advocates for finding peaceful coexistence with our nuclear-armed adversaries, too many of today’s retired generals seem to go out of their way to dismiss the concerns.

Former four-star General Ben Hodges, for example, routinely claims Russia would never use nuclear weapons and aggressively advocates the U.S. supporting Ukraine with the most offensive and lethal aid and weaponry, seemingly unconcerned about the possibility Russia might resort to nuclear weapons if it were to ever be in danger of losing. It was precisely the recognition of this dynamic that in part animated Kennedy to deliver his peace speech 60 years ago.

To understand the gravity of Kennedy’s speech at American University, it is crucial to understand the context. First, it was only 18 years since World War II had ended with the nuclear detonations in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was two years since the USSR had tested a 100 megaton nuclear bomb (3,800 times more powerful than the Hiroshima blast), and a mere eight months after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, during which the world was a hair’s breadth away from nuclear Armageddon. Far from wanting to talk peace, most in America wanted to build up defenses, especially our nuclear arsenal, to be prepared for a war against the USSR.

Further, the United States was then the unrivaled economic power on the planet. It had remained unscathed during World War II and was an engine of economic growth throughout the free world. The United States had the most powerful conventional army, navy, and air force in the world, and our nuclear arsenal was three times larger than the Soviets’ stockpiles. From this position of unequaled power, Kennedy could have pressed to expand America’s economic and military advantages in an effort to increase deterrence against Moscow. Instead, he chose a much more principled, courageous – and effective – path.

The Peace That Makes Life Worth Living

In his remarkable speech, Kennedy didn’t flinch on calling out Soviet behavior or threats. He did not downplay the risk to American and global security represented by the USSR. Yet he also avoided the hubris that has afflicted most of the U.S. and the West over the past several decades. He called for self-reflection by all Americans. Among the most substantive of his many excellent points, Kennedy said:

• What kind of peace do we seek? Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war. Not the peace of the grave or the security of the slave. I am talking about genuine peace, the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living, the kind that enables men and nations to grow and to hope and to build a better life for their children — not merely peace for Americans but peace for all men and women — not merely peace in our time but peace for all time.
• Today, should total war ever break out again — no matter how — our two countries would become the primary targets. It is an ironic but accurate fact that the two strongest powers are the two in the most danger of devastation. All we have built, all we have worked for, would be destroyed in the first 24 hours.
• For we are both devoting massive sums of money to weapons that could be better devoted to combating ignorance, poverty, and disease. We are both caught up in a vicious and dangerous cycle in which suspicion on one side breeds suspicion on the other, and new weapons beget counterweapons.
• Let us examine our attitude toward peace itself. Too many of us think it is impossible. Too many think it unreal. But that is a dangerous, defeatist belief. It leads to the conclusion that war is inevitable — that mankind is doomed — that we are gripped by forces we cannot control. … But (I also warn) the American people not to fall into the same trap as the Soviets, not to see only a distorted and desperate view of the other side, not to see conflict as inevitable, accommodation as impossible, and communication as nothing more than an exchange of threats.

And lastly:

• This generation of Americans has already had enough — more than enough — of war and hate and oppression. We shall be prepared if others wish it. We shall be alert to try to stop it. But we shall also do our part to build a world of peace where the weak are safe and the strong are just. We are not helpless before that task or hopeless of its success. Confident and unafraid, we labor on — not toward a strategy of annihilation but toward a strategy of peace.

So many of the themes Kennedy articulated back then are especially relevant today. The need to recalibrate our actions and attitudes towards Russia is urgent. The animosity and hatred among many in both Russia and the United States against one another are as acute as they have been in many decades. Talk of nuclear escalation in the Russian-Ukrainian war, by both Western and Russian voices, is far too cavalier.

Presidential Obsessions With War

The ramifications of any nuclear exchange between Moscow and Washington are just as catastrophic today as in 1963, and the need to lower tensions and seek peace is more urgent than ever. Yet there has been little interest in decades from any occupant of the White House in pursuing a difficult peace with Russia.

Every occupant of the Oval Office since Kennedy died has been more interested in tying his legacy, to one degree or another, to being a “wartime president.” Though Jimmy Carter does deserve credit for trying to broker peace in the Middle East (and won a Nobel Peace prize for it after leaving office), even his record on war and peace was mixed while in office. After 9/11, however, it seems every president has considered it a necessity to bolster his legacy by wanting to show military strength above any interest in peace.

The efforts U.S. presidents since 2001 have made toward peace have usually been characterized by trying to coerce other global players to adopt policies and behaviors beneficial to us, irrespective of how or whether it may benefit another party. Engagement via diplomacy, allowing each side to get something valuable to itself in a final settlement, has almost vanished.

The result has often been that because of our great economic and military power, we have frequently gotten our way. But at a cost. Anger and resentment has been building against our country for decades, and now as other players are growing in power of their own, they are demonstrating they are less and less willing to bend to our will and more willing to pursue their own interests, which increasingly come at our expense.

Where Is the Modern-Day Kennedy?

It has rightfully been said that with great power comes great responsibility. I would add to that, however, that to wield great power also requires wisdom. We must recognize that to rely purely on American military and economic power to try and compel all other nations to submit to our preferences on all matters is ultimately self-defeating. Wisdom recognizes that sometimes the most powerful and persuasive means to achieving beneficial outcomes for America involve humility, the willingness to give as well as take, and recognizing that sometimes we must give a tactical win up front in order to gain a bigger strategic prize later.

As the war between Russia and Ukraine rages on, the stakes for global security keep rising. Russian, American, and Western actors increasingly warn of the potential for nuclear escalation. Yet thus far the only answer from any party seems to be more threats, more weapons, and more ammunition. Putin shows no interest in even having peace talks. Zelensky rejects any consideration of a negotiated settlement. The United States only says it will support Ukraine militarily “for as long as it takes.” To break this impasse, someone must become a modern-day Kennedy.

To seek peace, we must overcome the perception that to talk about anything besides war and threats is somehow weak. To the contrary, for the United States to seek peace from a position of great strength would demonstrate wisdom and give our country the best chance to prevent further war and ensure continued national security and economic prosperity for our countrymen and allies.

To succeed, we would have to display some humility and accept that to find an end to this current war, every player is going to have to come away with something it considers valuable. That means no one is going to end up with everything they want. Ideally, Ukraine would end up with all of its territory, all the way to the 1991 borders, and Russia would end up with a solution that satisfied Moscow’s long-term security requirements. But an ideal outcome is not realistic in the current environment.

With patience, a great deal of hard work, and an understanding that no one will be happy at the end, a negotiated settlement leading to eventual peace is attainable. First and foremost, that will require extraordinary leadership by the United States, likely meaning the president. Without first having a desire to seek peace, no negotiated solution is possible, and the matter will continue to be settled on the battlefield. That likely means considerably more killing and more destruction, with no end in sight, for the people of Ukraine.

Worse, in perpetuating a conflict in which no side is willing to consider ending the war on anything other than maximalist terms of its choosing, the risk of catastrophic nuclear escalation will remain an open threat. If any party eventually uses so much as a tactical nuclear device — resulting either by accident, miscalculation, or a foolish act by one party or another — the cost in lives could be in the tens or hundreds of millions. Taken far enough, the possibility of mutual assured destruction cannot be discounted.

Sixty years ago, John F. Kennedy recognized the potential existential consequences of continued animosity between the USSR and the United States. Those same terrifying potentials exist today. It is more crucial than ever that leaders and people soberly recognize what is really at stake and seek to develop a spirit of peace while there is still time. Ignore the dangers and retain our current force-only posture, and we may one day lose everything.

A 19FortyFive Contributing Editor, Daniel L. Davis is a Senior Fellow for Defense Priorities and a former Lt. Col. in the U.S. Army who deployed into combat zones four times. He is the author of “The Eleventh Hour in 2020 America.” Follow him @DanielLDavis.

19fortyfive.com · by Daniel Davis · June 10, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com