WEL NEWSLETTER August 2022, Vol. 12, No. 5
Hello,

Happy August Readers,

It’s about now that I start to remind myself to enjoy the last wonderful days of summer, for soon, we will face colder days.

This month, we welcome Brett Book, our newest articling student. I always look forward to the fresh outlook on the law and the practice of law through the eyes and ears of a new student. Brett has been working with us for a few years now helping out while at CanAge and finishing his degree, so he is not entirely new to us.

Brett, in addition to the dedicated work he will provide our clients, together with our team, will also help us move more of our WEL publications to e-books and help develop our next WEL book on Will Challenges. Oliver O’Brien our student-at-law from England will join Brett in this initiative in September.

As ever, enjoy the read,
Kim
I. WEL NEWS
1. WEL ARTICLING STUDENT, BRETT BOOK
WEL is pleased to welcome Brett Book, Articling Student. Brett joined us August 3, 2022.
 
After completing law school in British Columbia, Brett and his partner Maggie are very excited to be home. Inspired by Maggie’s devotion to the compassionate care of older adults and vulnerable persons, Brett dedicated much of his time in law school to the advancement of the rights of older adults, both as a Policy Officer with CanAge (Canada’s National Seniors Advocacy Organization) and as a Student Clinician at the Thompson Rivers University Community Legal Clinic. Brett is excited to be in Toronto working in the job of his dreams.

2. STEP GOLF DAY, JULY 22, 2022   
Kimberly Whaley and Bryan Gilmartin were invited to the STEP Golf Day at the 4 Seasons Golf Course on July 22, 2022 along with Janis Armstrong, Elaine Blades, Darren Cooper, Katy Basi, Sathees Ratnam, Lee Fernandes, David Stephens, Grace Chow, and Angela Ross. It was a beautiful sunny day and a fun day for all of us.  Thanks to Janis for organizing this fun event.
3. LAWYERS FEED THE HUNGRY GOLF DAY, JUNE 8, 2022
Kimberly Whaley, Matthew Rendely, Daniel Paperny, and Bryan Gilmartin participated in the LSO Lawyers Fees the Hungry Golf Day, 15th Annual Bugsy and Ken Charity Event on June 8, 2022 at the Wyndance Golf Club. It was a fun event for a charitable cause.

4. MONEY & FAMILY LAW, APRIL 20222
Rebecca Betel’s and Natalie Kodsi’s article “First Comes Love, Then Comes Marriage”: Capacity to Marry, Separate and Divorce” was published in Money & Family Law, April 2022, Issue 37-4.
5. STEP PCA 2022/2023
Kimberly Whaley, John Poyser, Bryan Gilmartin, Matthew Rendely and Sammi Whaley will be heading over to London for the 2022/2023 STEP Private Client Awards. WEL PARTNERS has been shortlisted as a finalist for the category of, Vulnerable Client Advisory Practice of the Year. The award recipients will be announced in London on Wednesday September 14. We are all very excited here at WEL given the hard work our team engages in on behalf of the Vulnerable. It has been an honor to be named in this category alongside our colleagues and co-finalists: Kith & Kin Law Corporation, Penningtons Manches Cooper, Renaissance Legal, and Thomson Snell & Passmore. This is a very distinguished honor and we feel very privileged. Winners will be announced in 20 days, 10 hours, 14 minutes and 32 seconds…

Ceremony: 14 September 2022, London Hilton on Park Lane
6. EASTER SEALS DROP ZONE TORONTO, OCTOBER 1, 2022
On Saturday October 1, 2022, team members from WEL Partners and Hull and Hull LLP will assemble and ascend to the top of a high rise building. From there, they will rappel down the side of the building until they reach ground level. The motto for the team: “WEL, we’re here for more than the HULL of it”
 
The event itself is organized by Easter Seals and is known as the ‘Drop Zone.’ Easter Seals is Canada’s largest local provider of programs, services, and issues-leadership and development for the disability community. This event will raise money to help provide children living with physical disabilities the tools they need to reach their full potential and make their own positive impact on the world.
 
With your support, Easter Seals can help kids be kids and set them up with the equipment, confidence, and self-expression to grow into enriched adults. In anticipation of this event, the firm will be accepting donations for this wonderful charity initiative. 

Our team fundraising page:
 
To have a look at past Drop Zone footage you can visit Youtube: https://youtu.be/AyK3PSZY5do

II. SHOUT OUTS
BEST LAWYERS IN CANADA 
We are so honoured and proud to be rated by Best Lawyers in Canada, 17th edition. 

Best Lawyers

Albert H. Oosterhoff (2020)
Trusts and Estates

John E. S. Poyser (2009)
Trusts and Estates

Kimberly A. Whaley CS (2009)
Trusts and Estates

Best Lawyers: Ones To Watch

Bryan Gilmartin (2022)
Trusts and Estates

Daniel M. Paperny (2022)
Trusts and Estates

Matthew Rendely (2022)
Trusts and Estates

OBA AWARD FOR EXCELLENCE IN ELDER LAW
WEL congratulates Melissa Miller, Howie, Sacks & Henry LLP, on receiving the 2022 OBA Award of Excellence in Elder Law.
 
WEL CONGRATULES TYLER FLEMING
Congratulations to Tyler Fleming, Director, Investor Office at the Ontario Securities Commission, for his recent nomination for the ‘United Nations Heathy Ageing 50’, a recognition that will honour 50 leaders globally who have contributed to fostering healthy ageing in their respective area of work, and will enhance OSC’s vision of a stronger more secure financial future for Ontario seniors, a recognition that will honour 50 leaders globally who have contributed to fostering healthy aging in their respective area of work. The initiative is part of the UN’s Decade of Healthy Ageing, which aims to foster healthy aging and improve the lives of older people. 
 
The nomination recognizes Tyler’s leadership in advancing the OSC’s vision of a stronger more secure financial future for Ontario seniors, particularly through the OSC’s Seniors Strategy. The OSC is grateful to SEAC for its longstanding and continuing support of the Strategy, and the expertise, consultation and guidance SEAC provided in the development and continued implementation of the Strategy.
 
You are welcome to see the OSC’s recognition of Tyler’s nomination here.
III. LAW REVIEW
(i) RECOVERY OF PERSONAL TAX DEBT FROM TRUSTEE
By Albert H. Oosterhoff
 
1. Introduction

Canada (National Revenue) v Shaker[1] should never have been placed before the court. It betrays a complete misunderstanding of basic trust law principles on the part of the Canada Revenue Agency. Fortunately, the court frustrated the CRA’s attempt to recover a trustee’s personal tax debt from property the title to which was held in trust by the taxpayer and others. Perhaps, faute de mieux, the reasons be helpful to inform lawyers who may never have taken a trusts course about these basic principles.

2. Facts

In January 2022, the CRA registered a certificate with the court against the taxpayer, Mr Shaker, in which it claimed a tax debt in excess of $4.7 million plus interest under s 223 of the Income Tax Act.[2] It also claimed a writ of execution and filed it in Ottawa and Toronto. In February 2022, the Respondents (the Department of Justice on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada and the CRA) brought an ex parte motion to obtain an interim charge to secure payment of the tax debt against Shaker’s interest in certain property in Toronto. They asserted that Shaker had a legal interest in the property as trustee and therefore had an interest in the property within the meaning of Rule 458 of the Federal Court Rules.[3] The order was granted on 4 March 2022.

Rule 458 authorizes the court to make an order imposing an interim charge for securing a debt owed to a judgment creditor ‘on real property … or on an interest in real property … if the judgment debtor, directly or indirectly, owns the real property …, [or] holds an interest in the real property, including a beneficial interest …’ Under the same rule, the court may also order the judgment debtor to show cause why the charge should not be made absolute.

The court did in fact order Shaker to show cause why the interim charge should not be made absolute.

Shaker brought a motion to discharge the interim charge on the ground that his interest in the property was solely that of a trustee and that Rule 458 cannot be applied to a trustee’s legal interest in trust property.

Shaker’s motion was combined with the show cause hearing. At the hearing, the Respondents withdrew their request that the interim charge be made absolute and requested instead that the proceeds of the pending sale of the property to a third party be paid into court to allow the Respondents to cross-examine Shaker on the affidavit he filed in support of his motion.

The evidence before the court showed that Shaker had a legal interest in the property as a trustee of a trust. The trust acquired the property in 2007 and title was registered in the names of Shaker and his co-trustees. In his affidavit, Shaker stated that he is not and has not been a beneficiary of the trust, has no direct or indirect interest in the assets of the trust, and is not and has not been an officer, director, or shareholder of any beneficiary of the trust.

3. Analysis and Decision

For the purpose of the hearing, Justice Walker assumed that Shaker is a judgment debtor in his personal capacity and not in his capacity as trustee of the trust. Her Honour agreed with Shaker’s argument that the Respondents’ interpretation of the term ‘judgment debtor’ in Rule 458 ignored the fact that Shaker incurred the tax debt in his personal capacity and not in his capacity as trustee of the trust, and that a trustee of trust property does not ‘hold an interest’ in that trust property within the meaning of Rule 458.

Her Honour described the basic principle that a trustee acts in two distinct capacities, his personal capacity, and his capacity as a trustee. As trustee he is a fiduciary and acts for the sole benefit of the beneficiaries. The trustee must maintain the distinction between his personal affairs and the affairs and properties of the trust in order to safeguard the interests of the trust beneficiaries. If a trustee has incurred a personal debt, her creditors cannot gain access to the trust property to satisfy their debt. Since the tax debt was Shaker’s personal debt and not a debt of the trust, the CRA could not reach the trust property to satisfy the debt, for the trust property belongs to the beneficiaries.

Shaker argued that the reference to a judgment debtor’s ‘interest in real property’ in Rule 458 does not extend to his legal interest in the trust property. Her Honour agreed. Our law recognizes a distinction between legal and beneficial ownership and a beneficiary can enforce her beneficial ownership rights against the trustee. She referred to Valard Construction Ltd v Bird Construction Co,[4] which makes this point, and also to Canada v Canada North Group Inc,[5] in which Justice Coté stated, ‘Property held in trust cannot be said to belong to the trustee because “in equity it belongs to another person”’. Thus, a trustee cannot use trust property to satisfy a personal debt, and neither can his creditors.

Her Honour then went on dismiss the Respondents’ request for payment of the proceeds of sale into court and the opportunity to cross-examine Shaker on his affidavit. She said that the Respondents could not now abandon their previous theory that Shaker’s legal interest as trustee in the trust property was sufficient to support the interim charge, so that they could now engage in a cross-examination of him. Previously, they did not assert, and their evidence did not establish that Shaker had a beneficial interest in the trust property, and to permit them to make a general inquiry into Shaker’s affairs based on their unsubstantiated belief that he may have a beneficial interest in the trust was unwarranted.[6]

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[1] 2022 FC 407.
[2] RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp).
[3] SOR/98-106.
[4] 2018 SCC 8.
[5] 2021 SCC 30, para 47.
[6] For an unrelated proceeding in connection with the sale of the property, see Shaker v Luna, 2022 ONSC 2000.
(ii) ‘THE BEST LAID SCHEMES O’ MICE AN’ MEN/GANG AFT A- GLEY’
By Albert Oosterhoff

The above dictum from Robert Burns’ poem, ‘To a Mouse’, is proved true regularly and to sort the consequences people often have to resort to the courts. Prtenjaca v Wells-Prtenjaca,[1] is a recent example.

Mom and Dad decide to assist son and daughter-in-law by helping them purchase a house. They decide to live together in the house. Soon things go awry – all right, ‘a-gley’, if you wish. What began as an amicable arrangement falls apart. Recriminations fly back and forth. And the parties go to court to resolve their problems. All because they failed to reduce their arrangement to writing. And then the court has to resort to the much overused (by default) device of the presumed resulting trust, and that takes up precious court time and is costly for the parties. And worst of all, it leads to a broken family.

In 2014, the parents and plaintiffs, John and Donna, and the defendants, their son Devon and his wife Shelly, decided to sell their houses and to buy another property in which they would all live together. John and Donna also had two other children. The purchase price was approximately $490,000 and $100,000 was required as a down payment in order to obtain a mortgage. The parties intended that all four would hold title, but John did not want his name on title because of outstanding debt obligations. The mortgage broker advised them that Donna should be removed from the agreement of purchase and sale to comply with the conditions of mortgage financing. However, he said that she could be added to the title once the purchase closed. The mortgage lender also required Donna to sign a preprinted form entitled ‘Down Payment Gift Letter’ on the broker’s letterhead. In fact, both she and John signed it. In it they stated that the moneys the parents supplied were a gift and that the donors were the parents of the mortgagors. John and Donna understood that this was necessary for Devon and Shelly to obtain mortgage financing. However John later deposed that he and Donna never intended that the money they advanced would be a gift. Instead, they intended that if the parties decided to sell the property, they would all recoup their initial moneys and renovation costs and split any appreciation in value.

The parents contributed $100,000 from the proceeds of sale of their house to complete the purchase. The defendants financed the balance of the purchased price with a mortgage in the amount of $389,900. The parents also received $109,000, being the balance of the proceeds from the sale of their home. Apart from their interest in the new house, this amount represented their remaining assets. The parents paid the defendants a further $30,000 toward the acquisition of the property, as agreed. John then spent another $35,600 to renovate the basement as a separate living space for the parents. The defendants claimed that they spent $30,700 in improving the property.

After they took possession, the defendants paid all mortgage payments. For the first two years the parents paid 50% of the utilities and one-third of the property taxes and insurance. Thereafter, they paid $800 per month for those purposes.

In 2017 the defendants remortgaged the property for $470,000, without telling the parents. They did not pay any portion of the funds obtained from the refinancing to the parents. In 2018 the relationship between the parties broke down. The defendants asked the plaintiffs to move out of the property and offered to repay them $160,000 for moneys they contributed to the acquisition and improvements made to the property. The parents did not accept the offer and brought this action in 2020. In it they claimed a one-half interest in the property under a resulting or constructive trust. The defendants claimed that moneys paid by the plaintiffs were gifts and counterclaimed for damages.

The plaintiffs then brought a motion for summary judgment. They sought: (a) a declaration that they held a 50% interest in the property; (b) an order listing the property for sale; (c) an order that from the net proceeds of the property the plaintiffs be reimbursed for their contribution to the purchase price and the amounts they paid for improvements to the property, together with a proportionate amount for the increase in value; (d) an order for an accounting of the amounts contributed by both parties; and (e) an order striking the defendants’ counterclaim.

Justice Mitchell J first discussed the law on summary judgment. She concluded that in the circumstances summary judgment was the most expeditious, timely, and cost effective the resolve the dispute. Then she turned to the question whether the moneys contributed by the plaintiffs to acquire the property were a gift or whether they were impressed with a resulting trust. Since the transfer was to an adult child, the presumption of resulting trust arose and therefore the defendants, as transferees, bore the burden of rebutting the presumption. Her Honour concluded that they failed to do so. They were inconsistent in their pleadings and the versions of events they presented to the court on the motion, so her Honour did not accept their evidence. The fact that the plaintiffs signed the mortgagee’s form letter of gift did not prove that their contribution was a gift. The defendants did not demand the letter, the mortgage lender did as a condition of financing. Moreover, the plaintiffs proved that they did not intend to make a gift of the $100,000 but to acquire an interest in the property; they invested further moneys to renovate the property; and they contributed another $30,000 that was used to improve the property.

Further, the plaintiffs paid their share of the utilities, and property taxes. It would be illogical to conclude that the plaintiffs at age 68 would give $165,000 of their $209,000 net worth to only one of their three children. Her Honour also inferred from the evidence that the parties intended that the plaintiffs would hold a 50% interest in the property.

Because the relationship between the parties had broken down and they were no longer able to live together, and because the defendants were not able to repay the moneys contributed by the plaintiffs, her Honour directed that the property be sold and the proceeds of sale distributed between the parties. She further struck the defendants’ counterclaim since it disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The moral of the story is twofold. First, people who think of doing this sort of thing should be advised strongly not to do it. In most cases it leads to acrimony and broken families. And second, if they still wish to go ahead, they should seek legal advice and document the agreement between the family members, so that recourse to the courts, and in particular to the presumption of resulting trust can be avoided. People who want to turn a bank account into a joint account with an adult child should also be advised to document their intentions. In Canada this also attracts the presumption of resulting trust.[2] To prevent that, they need to state whether the money in the joint account is a gift to the child or whether she is supposed to hold it in trust for all (or some) of the children.

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[1] 2022 ONSC 438.
[2] For an excellent article in which the authors compare how the courts in Canada and the Commonwealth determine beneficial title in joint accounts, see Calvin Hancock and Ryan Mulders, ‘Determining Beneficial Title to Joint Bank Accounts “Whitlock, Stock & Barrel?” A Comparative Analysis of the Treatment of Bank Account Agreements & Survivorship Clauses in Canadian & Commonwealth Estates Law’ (2022), 41 ETPJ 293.
(iii) SCJ UPDATED CHANGES TO ELECTRIC FILING
By Brett Book, Articling Student
 
Electronic Updates at the Superior Court of Justice

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice (“SCJ”) released a consolidated Notice to the Profession, Parties, Public and Media on August 2, 2022. At first glance, the updates appear to mirror many of the procedures already in existence at the Ontario Court of Appeal and deal with the proper format and procedure for submitting electronic documents to the Court. This is a helpful and timely guide as many of these changes came about during the height of the pandemic. In taking the important step of clarifying what the Court requires from parties appearing before it, this Notice to the Profession, Parties, Public and Media should be carefully reviewed.

Effective August 2, 2022, the Superior Court of Justice (“SCJ”) has released a Notice to the Profession, Parties, Public and the Media. These changes consolidate and supersede all previous Province-wide Provincial Notices.

There are some noteworthy changes that may impact your electronic submissions to the Court.

Document naming protocol

As a helpful reminder, when documents are submitted to the court in electronic format, the document name must be saved as follows:

  1. Document type (including the form number in family cases),
  2. Type of party submitting the document,
  3. Name of the party submitting the document (including initials if the name is not unique to the case), and
  4. Date on which the document was created or signed, in the format DD-MMM-YYYY (e.g. 12-JAN-2021).
 
For example, documents should be saved as follows:

  • Expert Report – Defendant – Loblaws Inc. – 13-MAR-2021
  • Financial Statement Form 13.1 – Respondent – A. Wong – 21-NOV-2021
  • 11b Application – Defence – Nathanson – 12-JAN-2021
 
Document names shall not include firm-specific naming conventions, abbreviations, or file numbers. Form numbers are only to be included in the names of documents submitted in family cases.

Electronic filing of Material for Court

For Civil and Family matters, the Court expects counsel and parties to issue and file their documents electronically by using the Ministry’s Justice Services Online (JSO) platform. The same applies for fees. These submissions must be done through the appropriate Civil online filing portals.

Filing at the court office does remain available for parties unable to file documents electronically or for documents that must be filed urgently. The

Court will also accept limited e-mail filings on the following matters:

  • Urgent matters, including requests for an urgent hearing
  • Documents that must be filed for a deadline that is no more than five business days away.
 
Unless the court directs otherwise, where materials are delivered by email, they must:

  1. Retain any documents that were originally signed, certified or commissioned in paper format until the day on which the case is finally disposed of or, if no notice of appeal is served in the case, the time for serving the notice has expired, subject to any requirement in the Family Law Rules to give the document to the clerk before that day; and
  2. Promptly make the original document available for inspection and copying on the request of the court or of any party to the case.
 
Any questions on electronic filing can be directed towards the Ministry’s Contact Centre which can provide assistance with the Justice Services Online portal.

JSO Contact Centre information:

 
Uploading materials for Court: CaseLines

CaseLines is now being used for many Superior Court of Justice events. When in use, after materials have been accepted for filing by the court, parties shall upload electronic copies of their documents into CaseLines for review by all participants before and during a court hearing.

If you have received an email from CaseLines inviting you to a case, click the link provided and upload the documents you will rely on for your hearing.

These documents must be uploaded at least 5 days in advance of the hearing, or at the same time as any filing deadlines that are less than 5 days as set out by a rule of court or a Regional Notice.

To facilitate the effective use of CaseLines, the Court reminds counsel and self-represented parties of the following:

  1. Include your current email addresses on all documents that are filed with the court.
  2. Make CaseLines a trusted sender by saving com in your contacts list, or regularly check your junk folder for emails from CaseLines.
  3. Upon receipt of an email from CaseLines, click the link for one-time registration or register in advance. https://ontariocourts.caselines.com/
  4. Abide by the page limits set out in the rules of court, practice directions and Notices to the Profession. Documents exceeding 500 pages should be split into multiple documents.
  5. After your documents have been accepted for filing by the court office, upload them into the sub-bundle created for the hearing (e.g. Motion sub-bundle, Pre-trial sub-bundle, Trial sub-bundle) at least 5 days in advance of the hearing, or as soon as possible for any filing dead-lines that are less than 5 days, unless directed otherwise by Regional Notice. Do not upload documents into the Master Bundle.
  6. Use the Court’s Standard Document Naming Protocol when submitting documents to the court in electronic format. Documents are organized in each sub-bundle numerically, so you can control the order in which your documents appear by adding a number at the beginning of the file name (i.e. 1 Factum – Respondent Smith – 01-JAN-2021).
  7. Upload affidavits of service to CaseLines in all family cases. In civil cases, only if service is contested or proof of service is necessary for determining the motion.
  8. Do Not Upload Sealed Documents. Unredacted versions of documents that are of, are proposed to be, the subject of a sealing order should NOT be uploaded into CaseLines.
  9. In motions for removal as lawyer of record under rule 15.04(1.2) and (1.3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, unredacted motion materials should not be uploaded into CaseLines.
  10. It is counsel’s obligation to upload Exhibits into CaseLines. These documents should be uploaded separately, as the Registar can only add one electronic exhibit stamp per document.
  11. Prior to each hearing, upload into the hearing sub-bundle a completed Participant Information Form.
  12. Parties must ensure that all previous orders and endorsements in a case that are relevant at the hearing have been uploaded into the Orders and Endorsements sub-bundle in CaseLines so they can be accessed by the judiciary at future hearings.
  13. Parties must also ensure that all pleadings have been uploaded into the Pleadings bundle in CaseLines.
  14. Parties should identify any documents that have been improperly uploaded by opposing parties by making a note in CaseLines specifying the document(s) and why it/they should not have been uploaded.
 
In a recent application, Attorney General of Ontario v. Contents of TD Bank Account #1175-6485516, 2021 ONSC 6386, the court had to reschedule a one-day hearing after improper use of CaseLines led to unserviceable delays in the proceeding. In that case, the Application Record uploaded by the AG to CaseLines totaled 112,998 pages. Of this, 110,436 pages of material were incapable of being used in the hearing in their current form. The court went on to conclude that “Materials uploaded as exhibits must be identified accordingly in the CaseLines folder. The uploading of inadequately described and unorganized material meant that the documents could not be accessed in any efficient manner.”[1]

Access and Use of CaseLines in Criminal

In criminal matters, CaseLines access will be limited to the judiciary, court staff, lawyers and their necessary Crown and defense staff requiring access.

Counsel are prohibited from inviting their clients/accused persons to access CaseLines. Counsel are also required to make other arrangements to share documents, as appropriate, with their clients.

No Criminal matters involving self-represented persons will use CaseLines.

There are also a number of items that should not be uploaded onto CaseLines in Criminal:

  1. No materials related to child pornography.
  2. No document referring to a confidential informant.
  3. Unless specifically directed by the court to do otherwise, Crown and defence counsel will not upload the following documents into CaseLines:
  • A sealed document
  • A document for which a sealing order is sought
  • A privileged document, or a document where privilege is being asserted
  • Any other document where counsel have concerns, until judicial direction is given. If counsel have concerns about uploading any specific item, they should seek the direction of the Court at a judicial pretrial. Counsel should ensure that this direction is placed on the record at the subsequent court appearance to be endorsed on the indictment or other written record by the Registrar.
 
Providing Accurate Estimates of Required Hearing Time

As inaccurate estimates for the time required for hearings may result in a case being adjourned and rescheduled for a realistic time estimate with no expedition of the rescheduling, parties are reminded that they must give careful consideration to what is to be covered in the hearing time, the pace at which documents and authorities can be reasonably reviewed, and the time needed for oral arguments on the issues raised.

Compendium Required

In accordance with rule 4.05.3(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, each party must upload to CaseLines a compendium containing key materials that will be referred to in oral argument. The compendium must only include those material that will be referred to in argument and must have a table of contents hyperlinked to the sections within it and hyperlinks to authorities cited.

Bring attention to material uploaded into CaseLines

Materials that are not brought to the attention of the judicial officer at the hearing may not be considered. Parties must therefore bring to the attention of the court, all relevant material facts and the authorities that establish the legal proposition relied upon.

Books of Authorities and Facta

No book of authorities containing the full text of all authorities to be relied on shall be filed with the court in paper or electronic format, unless the court orders otherwise.

Each party’s factum shall hyperlink authorities to a publicly available, free website such as CanLII, whenever they are available.

The factum must include paragraph references each time a case is cited in the factum, with the applicable paragraph also hyperlinked.

If an authority is not available on a free website, it shall be included in an abbreviated book of authorities and filed electronically in PDF format. This abbreviated book of authorities shall include a table of contents that has internal hyperlinks to the cases and textbook excepts included within it.

Email Processes for Estate Certificates (Probate)

Where email is used to file documents in probate application, the following requirements must be met:

  1. Applicants must complete an Information Form and email it to the court together with the probate application. The application form and supporting documents (affidavits, consents, proof of death, renunciations, draft certificates, motions) should be submitted by email only.
  2. The subject line of the email sent to the court must indicate the acronym for the court, the area of law, court file number (if any), and type of document, as set out in the following example: a) SCJ – ESTATES – ES-1234567 – Application for Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee; b) SCJ – ESTATES – new file – Application for Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee
  3. Each email sent to the court, including attachments, must not exceed 35 MB.
  4. Document attachments must be in PDF format.
  5. Each PDF attachment must contain only one court form and must be saved with the name that specifies the court form number and type of document (e.g. Form 74.10 Affidavit of Condition of Will)
  6. Original documents filed in support of the application (e.g. wills, codicils, bonds, ancillary certificates) and certified copies must be filed in hard copy by mail or courier to the Superior Court of Justice location where the application was filed or provided at the court office.
  7. Estate administration tax payments must also be sent by mail or courier to the court office or provided at the court office.
  8. Probate certificates will be electronically issued and delivered by email to the address provided by the applicant.
 
The above process for emailing documents to the court does not apply to documents filed in estate litigation cases. Estate litigation documents should continue to be filed through the Civil online filing portals.

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[1] Attorney General of Ontario v. Contents of TD Bank Account #1175-6485516, 2021 ONSC 6386 at para. 14.
(iv) TANTI V. TANTI, 2022 ONSC 4419
By Brett Book, Articling Student

Tanti v. Tanti, 2022 ONSC 4419 https://canlii.ca/t/jr3cw

Recently, the latest in a series of decisions regarding the capacity of Paul Tanti (“Paul”) was released. In previous proceedings, the insular issue to be decided was Paul’s capacity to marry his companion, the respondent. You can read about these decisions in our previous blog entries: a) Yet Another May-December Marriage, b) First Comes Love, Then Comes Marriage: Capacity to Marry, Separate and Divorce.
 
Background

The recent decision of the Honourable Mr. Justice Conlan concerns the September 12, 2019, Order (the “Guardianship Order”) of Mr. Justice Harris and whether it should be set aside. At the heart of that Order was a finding that Paul is incapable of managing his personal care, and, incapable of managing his property. As a result, Paul’s son, the applicant, was appointed sole guardian of property for Paul and sole guardian of the person of Paul.
 
On September 12, the applicant’s counsel made strong allegations; that $600,000 he formerly had control over as an attorney, under a Power of Attorney “was no longer available to him,” and that the respondent left for Trinidad for “two weeks without having made arrangements for Paul’s dialysis or his care.”
 
Positions of the Parties

Counsel for the respondent, Ms. Nwawe argued that the Order should be set aside because:

  1.    It was improperly before Justice Harris as an unconfirmed matter, and
  2.    It was based on false, misleading, and incomplete information.[1]
 
Mr. Gilmour, counsel for the applicant, argued that if the Order was set aside, it would create a vacuum because “there has been no judicial determination of the validity of the alleged power(s) of attorney document purported to be granted by Paul to Sharon.”[2] He also argued that in such an event, an untenable situation would be created: “there would be two powers of attorney in existence, appointing two different persons as attorneys, both of which are disputed in terms of their validity by the other side.” This brings into question the validity of a 2019 Continuing Power of Attorney for Property, appointing the respondent and the impugned Power of Attorney for Personal Care granted by Paul, appointing the applicant on November 14, 2017 (subsequently revoking the October 2017 power of attorney for personal care granted by Paul to Sharon).[3]
 
Ms. Jones, counsel at the Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee (“OPGT”) confirmed that section 22 of the Substitute Decisions Act “makes clear that there is a general preference for resort to a valid power of attorney over that of the more restrictive guardianship order.”[4]
 
Because of Paul’s capacity issues, Ms. Kinch was appointed his section 3 counsel pursuant to Section 3 of the Substitute Decisions Act. And while the OPGT took no position on whether the Order should be set aside. Ms. Kinch argued that the Court should be concerned with the lack of planning outlined by Sharon to deal with Paul’s continuing need for constant care and supervision.[5] The Court concurred with the submissions and conclusions[6] of Ms. Kinch whose dedication to Paul was not overlooked by the Court.[7]
 
Analysis

Justice Conlan did not mince words when describing how “the parties have wasted a great deal of time and money to get to this stage; and, the Order should have been set aside on consent.” Conlan J. opined that the Order was never intended to be in place for nearly three years and that within those years, a proper guardianship hearing never took place. In fact, Conlan J. took issue with the fact that the respondent has never had at an opportunity to be heard.
 
In the September 12 hearing before Harris J., Conlan J. held that his honour had no opportunity to read the file before the matter was heard. In the absence of the respondent and her counsel, the applicant advised the court that a Notice of Appearance had been delivered to Sharon but that her and her counsel left the courthouse before the case was called, leading to the matter being dealt with ex parte. Conlan J. held “that is not in the interests of justice, nor, is it in the best interests of Paul, who deserved to have both of his loved ones, Raymond and Sharon, heard before an order was made that we now know would be in place for three years.”[8]
 
Justice Conlan held that it didn’t matter why or when Sharon and counsel left the Brampton courthouse on September 12, 2019. The court found little to no reason to believe Sharon’s intentions were to abandon opposition to Raymond’s request.[9] On a procedural fairness basis alone, Conlan J. held that the Guardianship Order must be set aside.
 
The decision of Conlan J. also highlighted crucial admissions that came out during Raymond’s cross-examination. Raymond admitted that he now knows that the allegations made against Sharon, which were the underpinning of the Guardianship Order, were not true.
 
In light of these revelations, Conlan J. ruled the Court had resort to only one Rule, 59.06(2)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside the Guardianship Order on the basis of “facts arising or discovered after it was made.”[10]
 
Rule 59.06(2)(a) provides:

  • A party who seeks to, (a) have an order set aside or varied on the ground of fraud or of facts arising or discovered after it was made; … may make a motion in the proceeding for the relief claimed.
  • For a thorough analysis of this rule, you can read our previous article found here.
 
The Court cited the decision of Justice Doherty of the Court of Appeal of Ontario in Mujagic v. Kamps, 2015 ONCA 360 (CanLII) where the language of that rule was interpreted to include that “[f]acts come from evidence, including new testimony and exhibits.”[11]
 
Temporary Stay of the Decision

While the Court had no problem setting aside the order, Conlan J. did struggle with the fact that there was no plan in place for Paul. The respondent advanced no guardianship request and no evidentiary foundation existed to determine the validity of the competing powers of attorney. For these reasons, the court temporarily stayed the decision to set aside the Order for 90 calendar days.
 
What’s next for the parties?

They were given 20 days to file written submissions on costs with 10 days for the other side to respond. Ms. Kinch was ordered to stay on as section 3 counsel for Paul.
 
The applicant was given 30 calendar days to deliver to the respondent, Ms. Kinch, and the OPGT, and file with the court, an updated or amended management plan.
 
In holding that the Court orders on a final basis, that Paul is incapable of managing both his person and property, Conlan J. concluded that “[a]bsent a consent order that finally disposes of the entire matter, either the parties have a further hearing to determine the validity of the competing powers of attorney, or the parties have a fresh hearing to determine guardianship on a final basis. Not both.”[12]
 
Conclusion
The decision which held that Paul has the requisite capacity to marry was ultimately upheld on appeal at the Ontario Court of Appeal. On April 7, 2022, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the application for leave to appeal with costs to the respondent.
 
The question of planning for Paul’s care needs remain, to be addressed. The issue of Paul’s capacity to marry was an expensive exercise for all parties. With that in mind, one hopes that, for the sake of an older adult experiencing significant health issues, this legal saga will come to a conclusion shortly.   
 
---
[1] Tanti 2022, supra note 1 at para. 14.
[2] Ibid, at para. 15.
[3] Ibid, at para. 25.
[4] Ibid, at para. 26.
[5] Ibid, at para. 16.
[6] Ms. Kinch argued that evidence of Paul’s incapacity was overwhelming and that there were no details regarding Sharon’s plan on where her and Paul will live and the suitability of the Dalegrove residence to Paul’s medical needs or how Sharon will attend to medical services such as Paul’s dialysis. What’s more, she argued that the competing power of attorney documents contained very different end-of-life provisions and highlighted the fact that both the applicant and respondent cannot cooperate with each other and as such, one cannot control Paul’s personal care while the other controls his property.
[7] Ms. Kinch was observed crying at times during her closing address to the Court.
[8] Ibid, at para. 38.
[9] Conlan J. went further in finding that “Sharon and her lawyer never would have left the Brampton courthouse that day if they thought that the matter would be dealt with and an order made.”
[10] Ibid, at para. 46.
[11] Mujagic, at paras. 9 and 10.
[1] Tanti 2022, supra note 1 at para. 58.
(v) PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AT THE CONSENT AND CAPACITY BOARD: FAIRNESS IN THE EXERCISE OF STATUTORY POWERS
By Nima Hojjati

In Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 , the majority of the SCC held that the duty of procedural fairness in administrative law is “eminently variable”, inherently flexible, and context-specific.[1] Where an administrative decision gives rise to a duty of procedural fairness, the specific requirements of that duty are determined with reference to all of the circumstances.[2] In Baker v. Canada, 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC) (“Baker”), the SCC set out a non-exhaustive list of factors that inform the content of this duty, including:

  1. the nature of the decision being made and the process followed in making it;
  2. the nature of the statutory scheme;
  3. the importance of the decision to the individual or individuals affected;
  4. the legitimate expectations of the person challenging the decision; and
  5. the choices of procedure made by the administrative decision maker itself.[3]

In a powerful decision in [K.] v. Weinroth, 2022 ONSC 2748, Justice Myers granted an appeal from the Consent and Capacity Board (“CCB” or the “Board”) by an applicant on the basis of procedural fairness in the exercise of statutory power by the physician.[4] Justice Myers held:

There cannot be indifference to patient’s autonomybodily integrity, and legal rights. From start to finish the health care team ignored [the applicant’s] rights. The mandatory processes of the statute and the constitutional and administrative law requirements of natural justice and procedural fairness cannot be ignored or swept away by a discretionary decision that the result was not egregious. The process for an assessment of a patient’s capacity must be fair.[5]

Justice Myers held that a proceeding is either fair or it is not, there is no other standard of review.[6]

In applying K. v. Weinroth, a panel of the CCB in MC (Re), 2022 CanLII 64964, held that Justice Myers added a fourth ground to be considered on a review of a Form 3, Certificate of Admission (as an involuntary patient): fairness. In GL (Re), 2022 CanLII 65040, a panel of the CCB held that following Justice Myers’ decision, there is a third way of challenging a CTO: whether it was unfair.

There is no question that CCB hearings themselves ought to be procedurally fair. These recent decisions demonstrate that an exercise of statutory power under the Mental Health Act, RSO 1990, c M.7 (“MHA”) by physicians gives rise to a duty of procedural fairness. As such, the CCB can consider a procedural fairness criterion on review which can be described as: fairness in the statutory process.

This fairness criterion can consider a patient’s autonomybodily integrity, and legal rights. If the manner which state power was exercised by a physician was not fair, a panel can consider this on a preliminary basis, in accordance with Charter values and principles of natural justice, without recourse to the exercise of discretionary powers under the MHA after a full hearing on the substantive issues (such as s. 39.1 (7) for a CTO or s. 41(2) for a Form 3). Procedurally, MHA forms can be challenged on the grounds of fairness in the statutory process on a preliminary basis following notice of a motion as required by Rule 18 of the CCB Rules of Practice.
 
The Decision in K. v. Weinroth

Background

The applicant in K. v. Weinroth was on a Community Treatment Order (CTO) that had expired “without being renewed in advance due to a SNAFU in the health care team administration”.[7] Without being told that the CTO had lapsed or that the applicant was being subject to a new capacity assessment, the applicant was brought in for an assessment at a doctor’s appointment.[8] The applicant was not actually required to attend this appointment due to the expiry of the CTO.[9]

The physician conducted an assessment, made a finding that the applicant lacked capacity, and prepared a new CTO.[10] The physician also did not give the applicant the new CTO or any of the forms required by the statutory scheme under the MHA.[11] At the CCB hearing, the applicant gave evidence that they did not want to remain on the CTO and they would not have attended the appointment if they knew they didn’t have to.[12]

Decision of the CCB Panel

The majority of the three-member CCB panel upheld the physician’s findings of incapacity and found that the procedural failures did not prejudice the applicant.[13] The presiding lawyer member agreed that the applicant lacked capacity, but dissented from the outcome, and would have refused to uphold the finding of incapacity due to the manner in which the capacity assessment had been made.[14]

The CCB panel analyzed the decision before them under s. 39.1 (7) of the MHA which provides a residual discretion to decline to confirm a CTO even if all of the substantive criteria for its issuance have been proven.[15] The case law provides that this discretionary power is to be exercised sparingly and cautiously.[16]

The majority of the panel held that the procedural issues were not a sufficient basis to exercise discretion to refuse to confirm the CTO.[17] They held that the applicant’s decision to remain at the capacity assessment “amounted to a voluntary waiver of [their] right to due notice of the proceeding” and that once the applicant was told of the purpose of the appointment (during the appointment), they could have left.[18] The majority further held that any prejudice due to the failure to provide the required forms was mitigated by the fact that the hearing had proceeded.[19]

Justice Myers rejected this analysis and noted that “a person cannot escape the results of making a misrepresentation by saying that the victim should have known better”, and that is “doubly the case where the victim is a vulnerable person whose statutory rights have been ignored”.[20]

Justice Myers did agree with the majority that the failure to provide the applicant with the required forms caused little prejudice ahead of the scheduled hearing and that on its own, this may not have made the process unfair.[21]

The dissenting lawyer member found that in the specific circumstances, the physician had an overriding obligation to conduct a new assessment fairly and “in accordance with Charter values and the principles of natural justice”.[22] The dissenting member concluded that the “principle of fairness” required the physician to explain that the previous CTO was no longer in effect and that the applicant was under no legal obligation to attend the appointment.[23] The dissenting member found that the overall approach to the development and issuance of the new CTO was indifferent to the applicant’s involvement.[24] Citing Saunders v. Bridgepoint Hospital2005 CanLII 47735 (ON SC) (paras 106 and 118), the dissenting member noted that “the Board is obliged to consider the procedural fairness of a capacity assessment when reviewing the finding of incapacity”.[25] Quoting the Court of Appeal’s decision in Fleming v. Reid1991 CanLII 2728 (ON CA), the dissenting member further noted that "few medical procedures are more intrusive than the forcible injection of powerful mind-altering drugs which are often accompanied by severe and sometimes irreversible adverse side effects”.[26]

The surreptitious manner of the appointment, in combination with the additional failure to provide any of the required MHA forms, resulted in the dissenting member’s decision to invoke the CCB’s discretionary powers and revoke the CTO.[27]

Decision on Appeal

Justice Myers began by noting that “procedural safeguards are really not relevant to the substantive issues” (even if a patient was subject to a horribly unfair process, they might still need treatment)[28] but fair process matters:

The government or well-meaning doctors cannot just sweep people up off the street and start injecting them with antipsychotic drugs against their will. That is an extreme example to make a point and is not nearly the case here. The point is that people are entitled to notice and a fair process to ensure that their rights of autonomy and security of the person are protected from both government actors and doctors whether well-meaning or ill-motivated.[29] [emphasis added]

Justice Myers held that a fair process is necessary to ensuring that government power is exercised in a fair, reasonable, and lawful manner.[30]

Justice Myers further noted that “fairness in legal proceedings is especially important when dealing with vulnerable people who are in need of protection”.[31] The consideration of procedural fairness as an exercise of a discretionary power was also found to be an error of law:

… if this order is allowed to stand, the procedural rights of patients in [the applicant’s] circumstances will be diluted or dilutable to meaninglessness. The board treated the question of procedural fairness as one to be considered under its general discretion to decline to make an order. It thereby converted its obligation to ensure doctors provide a fair process into a discretionary decision ostensibly subject to the board’s own weighing of factors and judgment and then deference from this court. This was an error of law.[32]

Justice Myers noted that setting aside the CTO might not be the best outcome for the applicant’s health “but it is necessary to protect all of us and to maintain the rule of law”.[33] It was a necessary outcome “if we are to respect peoples’ rights to fair treatment before their substantive rights are subject to adjudication and restriction”.[34]

Justice Myers noted that not every capacity assessment will require a physician to tell a patient anything in particular in advance, “there are several applicable statutes and each says what it says”.[35] In this specific case, the assessment “took on a surreptitious quality that was not fair” to the applicant.[36] The systemic failure to respect procedural obligations and “the specific confluence of multiple failures in this case resulted in an unfair assessment and review process”.[37] However, not every possible procedural error leads automatically to a setting aside of an order under the statute and “the decision to leave a patient who lacks capacity untreated is not one that should be reached readily”.[38]

Justice Myers noted that “people are entitled to notice so that they can prepare for and seek advice on their rights before attending a hearing or assessment that may have legal consequences”.[39] The requirement for notice of upcoming legal proceedings was recognized as “the most basic element of natural justice and procedural fairness”.[40] This was not an issue for discretion and the “surreptitiousness of the process, whether intentional, circumstantial, or caused by systemic failure” left the applicant misled and uninformed.[41]

Although Justice Myers would have characterized the circumstances as egregious, egregiousness is not the test at law and procedural fairness is not just a discretionary matter under s. 39.1 (7) of the MHA, “if the assessment process was procedurally unfair, then it cannot stand”.[42]

Citing Baker, Justice Myers noted that procedural fairness is contextual, not every possible procedural error leads automatically to setting aside an order under the MHA.[43] On the particular facts of the case, the complete failure of the physician and the medical team to respect the applicant’s procedural rights, led to an unfair process, and breach of the principles of natural justice.[44]
Justice Myers would not have readily invaded the doctor-patient relationship but here the physician was asserting the power of the state under a statute to compel an applicant to be injected with a drug against their will.[45] To do that, the physician and the medical team had to be “scrupulously fair” to ensure that the applicant and “all patients know the nature of the decision to be made in advance so that they can understand and assert their rights if so advised”.[46]

Fairness in Involuntary Detentions

In MC (Re), 2022 CanLII 64964 (ON CCB), a panel of the CCB revoked a Form 3 on a preliminary basis on the grounds of fairness. The physician had allowed a Form 3 to expire solely because they did not have time to prepare for a scheduled CCB hearing. The physician did not tell the applicant that their lawful detention had ended but the next day, the physician issued a new Form 1 Application for Psychiatric Assessment, leading to a new Form 3, and a new CCB hearing at a later date. 

By using the statutory regime in this manner for the purpose of securing an adjournment, the panel held: “We cannot overstate how offended we are by what [the physician] did”. 

The panel noted that a core ethical principle of the medical profession is respect for the dignity and autonomy of patients and the law “holds physicians to the highest standard of honourable dealings with patients”; it is a fiduciary relationship.

The panel held that the applicant was entitled to a remedy and the only one available was a revocation of the Form 3. Until recently, the panel noted that there were 3 reasons available to rescind a Form 3 or a Form 4:

1) the prerequisites for involuntary detention were not proven at a hearing. 

2) there was a fatal procedural defect, such as failure to ensure the patient received prompt rights advice.

3) the exercise of the Board’s residual discretion to revoke a Form. 

Following Justice Myers’ decision in K. v. Weinroth, the panel considered a fourth fairness justification which can be described as:

4) Fairness in the statutory process.

The panel further noted that the exercise of discretion (s. 41(2) in the case of a Form 3) “required hearing all the evidence, deciding if the prerequisites were met and if so, deciding whether the delict justified revocation even though the prerequisites were met”. However, the physician had not respected the applicant’s “personal integrity, legal rights and autonomy as an adult in Canadian society”. As such, without addressing the substantive criteria or invoking discretion, the panel revoked the Form 3.

Fairness in CTOs

In GL (Re), 2022 CanLII 65040, a panel of the CCB confirmed a finding of incapacity and a CTO but considered an additional criterion for review: fairness. 

The panel noted that on review of a CTO, the Board’s job pursuant to s. 39.1(6) is to review whether or not the criteria for issuing or renewing the community treatment order set out in subsection 33.1 (4) are met at the time of the hearing of the application.
 
Pursuant to s. 39.1(7), the Board may confirm the issuance or renewal of the community treatment order if it determines that the criteria mentioned in subsection (6) are met at the time of the hearing, but, if the Board determines that those criteria are not met, it shall revoke the CTO.

The panel noted:

Exercising discretion requires, first, a determination of whether the s. 33.1(4) criteria are met, then an examination of each preliminary challenge (and when appropriate, to consider them collectively even if individually they would not justify an exercise of discretion), to consider the extent of overbreadth, vagueness or other fault and balance that against depriving the Applicant of the benefits of the CTO.

In applying Justice Myers’ decision in K. v. Weinroth, the panel noted that there are now three ways to challenge a CTO, whether:

1)  The s. 33.1(4) criteria were not met;

2)  Something else about the CTO, such as the “overbreadth” of the community treatment plan (“CTP”), justified exercising discretion to revoke the CTP; or

3)  It was unfair.

This additional third criteria can similarly be described as fairness in the statutory process.

Ultimately, the panel in GL (Re) heard the evidence, considered the preliminary challenges, and “concluded that the s. 33.1(4) criteria were met, saw no flaw in the CTP meriting exercising discretion to revoke the CTO and saw nothing unfair about the process or the CTP”.

Conclusion

The exercise of state power by physicians gives rise to a duty of procedural fairness and this fairness in the statutory process can be considered by the CCB on review and on a preliminary basis. Although physicians are often not represented by legal counsel before the CCB and any unfairness may be inadvertent rather than intended, the exercise of the statutory powers set out by the MHA must be fair. The rule of law demands it.

---
[1] Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para 77 (Vavilov).
[2] Vavilov at para 77.
[3] Vavilov at para 77; Baker v. Canada, 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC) at paras 23-27.
[4] [K.] v. Weinroth, 2022 ONSC 2748 at paras 15 and 39 (K. v. Weinroth).
[5] K. v. Weinroth at para 40.
[6] K. v. Weinroth at para 11
[7] K. v. Weinroth at para 1.
[8] K. v. Weinroth at paras 1-2.
[9] K. v. Weinroth at para 2.
[10] K. v. Weinroth at para 3.
[11] K. v. Weinroth at paras 3 and 17
[12] K. v. Weinroth at para 16.
[13] K. v. Weinroth at para 4.
[14] K. v. Weinroth at para 5.
[15] K. v. Weinroth at para 19.
[16] K. v. Weinroth at para 19.
[17] K. v. Weinroth at para 20.
[18] K. v. Weinroth at para 21.
[19] K. v. Weinroth at para 22.
[20] K. v. Weinroth at para 27.
[21] K. v. Weinroth at para 30.
[22] K. v. Weinroth at para 23.
[23] K. v. Weinroth at para 23.
[24] K. v. Weinroth at para 23.
[25] K. v. Weinroth at para 23.
[26] K. v. Weinroth at para 23.
[27] K. v. Weinroth at para 23.
[28] K. v. Weinroth at para 6.
[29] K. v. Weinroth at para 7.
[30] K. v. Weinroth at para 8.
[31] K. v. Weinroth at para 9.
[32] K. v. Weinroth at para 10.
[33] K. v. Weinroth at para 13.
[34] K. v. Weinroth at para 13.
[35] K. v. Weinroth at para 26.
[36] K. v. Weinroth at para 26.
[37] K. v. Weinroth at para 14.
[38] K. v. Weinroth at para 36.
[39] K. v. Weinroth at para 33.
[40] K. v. Weinroth at para 34.
[41] K. v. Weinroth at para 34.
[42] K. v. Weinroth at paras 34-35.
[43] K. v. Weinroth at paras 36-37.
[44] K. v. Weinroth at para 39.
[45] K. v. Weinroth at para 38.
[46] K. v. Weinroth at para 38.
IV. UPCOMING PROGRAMS
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ILCO ANNUAL CONFERENCE
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TORONTO LAWYERS ASSOCIATION
November 24, 2022
Intersection of Family and Estates Law
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CANADIAN LAWYER WEBINAR
November 24, 2022
Avoiding Traps and Claims When Drafting Wills
Speakers: Kimberly Whaley and Ian Hull 
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WEL NEWSLETTER August 2022, Vol. 12, No. 5