Quotes of the Day:
"You will never win if you never begin."
- Helen Rowland
"Nothing of real importance changes: modern history is not modern."
- Colin Gray
"The great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie — deliberate, contrived, and dishonest — but the myth — persistent, persuasive, and unrealistic. Too often, we hold fast to the cliches of our forebears. We subject all facts to a prefabricated set of interpretations. We enjoy the comfort of opinion without the discomfort of thought."
- John F. Kennedy
1. Allies lobby Biden to prevent shift to ‘no first use’ of nuclear arms
2. Xi Hasn’t Left China in 21 Months. Covid May Be Only Part of the Reason.
3. Opinion | What We Did the Last Time We Broke America
4. How to Fix Social Media
5. As machine learning becomes standard in military and politics, it needs moral safeguards
6. Global Democracy Under Attack Despite Biden Push
7. To Save Democracy, America Needs a Mandatory Public Service Program
8. Afghans Accuse The Taliban Of Misappropriating Foreign Aid
9. US develops game-changing nuclear sensors for warheads
10. Filipino Special Forces Take Out Key Islamist Militant Leader
11. Reimagining the Peace Corps for the next 60 years
12. Chinese Enterprise: Contracting Security Abroad
13. Women: Terrorism’s Secret Weapon
14. A Navy admiral bids farewell to Southcom as it welcomes the first woman to hold the top post
15. Pentagon Will Add a Climate-Policy Czar
16. The second Cold War has already begun
17. Blinken raised concerns about Taiwan with China
18. China’s ‘Battle at Lake Changjin’ Becomes 2021’s Highest-Grossing Film Worldwide, Preps Sequel
19. Breathtaking collection of war stories from MAX HASTINGS that put YOU at the heart of the battle
1. Allies lobby Biden to prevent shift to ‘no first use’ of nuclear arms
I do not think this policy shift, if it happens, will have a positive effect on US national security. It will not have the intended effect that the advocates hope for. It will very likely undermine deterrence. But of course we will never be able to make a definitive judgment on the effects until deterrence fails. As SIr Lawrence Freedman says: "Deterrence works. Until it doesn't."
Allies lobby Biden to prevent shift to ‘no first use’ of nuclear arms
European and Asian capitals intensify behind-the-scenes pressure amid fears US will change doctrine
US allies are lobbying Joe Biden not to change American policy on the use of nuclear weapons amid concern the president is considering a “no first use” declaration that could undermine long-established deterrence strategies aimed at Russia and China.
The lobbying — by treaty allies including Britain, France and Germany in Europe, and Japan and Australia in the Indo-Pacific — comes as the Biden administration is in the middle of a “nuclear posture review”, a congressionally-mandated inter-agency process that sets US policy on nuclear weapons.
Although some allies believe Biden will refrain from setting a “no first use” policy in the review, most remain concerned he is considering a policy known as “sole purpose”, which would make clear the US would use nuclear weapons only in a narrowly-prescribed set of circumstances — such as to deter a direct attack on the US, or to retaliate after a strike.
“This would be a huge gift to China and Russia,” one European official said.
American policy towards the use of nuclear weapons has, since the cold war, remained intentionally vague, suggesting the US could use them preemptively and allowing allies in both Europe and Asia a clear sense of protection under the American “nuclear umbrella”.
While some non-proliferation advocates argue that “sole purpose” or “no first use” declarations increase stability by clarifying circumstances when nuclear weapons would be used, critics counter that it would embolden Russia and China.
They also fear it could prompt allies such as Japan and South Korea to develop their own nuclear weapons, triggering a regional arms race. Biden supported a shift to “sole purpose” as US vice-president and during the 2020 election campaign.
“The problem with ‘sole purpose’ and ‘no first use’ is that the allies believe it, and adversaries do not,” said Michael Green, an Asia security expert.
Earlier this year the US sent a questionnaire to allies who provided an overwhelmingly negative response to any changes in nuclear policy, according to two people familiar with the correspondence.
But some allies remain worried that US officials have not conveyed the extent of their opposition directly to the president, fears exacerbated by the administration’s failure to heed allied concerns over the withdrawal from Afghanistan and a nuclear submarine agreement with Australia.
Sitting with President Emmanuel Macron on Friday, Biden said he had not been aware France was not told in advance about the submarine deal. Paris lost its existing submarine contract with Canberra as a result of the agreement.
More than a dozen European and Asian officials and critics on Capitol Hill told the Financial Times that allied fears have risen as the posture review nears its conclusion, which is expected by the end of the year. Some are hoping Biden will outline his views when he meets his counterparts at the G20 summit in Rome at the weekend.
In a sign of the rising allied concern, a commitment to “a credible and united nuclear alliance” was included in a joint statement following Friday’s Biden-Macron meeting, as was a promise of “close consultations” on nuclear issues.
The lobbying was particularly intense during a visit by Lloyd Austin, US defence secretary, to Nato headquarters in Brussels earlier this month. “Allies are extremely concerned and in no uncertain terms have made clear what they thought,” one Nato diplomat said.
John Kirby, Pentagon spokesperson, said consultations with allies were “essential and ongoing” as the administration concluded the nuclear posture review, adding that keeping “our US extended deterrence commitments remain strong and credible” was central to the process.
This is not the first time the US has considered changing its policy towards the use of nuclear weapons. Barack Obama weighed a similar shift, but opted against the move after opposition from allies and the US military. But some experts worry Biden has shown a tendency to ignore allies and his military advisers in recent security policy decisions, including Afghanistan.
“‘Sole purpose’ nuclear policy is just ‘no first use’ by another name, and to even consider adopting either is a complete betrayal of our allies,” James Risch, the top Republican on the Senate foreign relations committee, told the Financial Times.
Richard Fontaine, president of The Center for a New American Security, argued that threats from Russia, China and North Korea have only increased since the Obama administration, meaning it was “not the time for a US ‘no first use’ pledge”.
2. Xi Hasn’t Left China in 21 Months. Covid May Be Only Part of the Reason.
This is an interesting factoid. I was unaware that it has been this long since he has traveled.
Excerpts:
Mr. Xi has not left China in 21 months — and counting.
The ostensible reason for Mr. Xi’s lack of foreign travel is Covid-19, though officials have not said so explicitly. It is also a calculation that has reinforced a deeper shift in China’s foreign and domestic policy.
China, under Mr. Xi, no longer feels compelled to cooperate — or at least be seen as cooperating — with the United States and its allies on anything other than its own terms.
Still, Mr. Xi’s recent absence from the global stage has complicated China’s ambition to position itself as an alternative to American leadership. And it has coincided with, some say contributed to, a sharp deterioration in the country’s relations with much of the rest of the world.
Instead, China has turned inward, with officials preoccupied with protecting Mr. Xi’s health and internal political machinations, including a Communist Party congress next year where he is expected to claim another five years as the country’s leader. As a result, face-to-face diplomacy is a lower priority than it was in Mr. Xi’s first years in office.
Xi Hasn’t Left China in 21 Months. Covid May Be Only Part of the Reason.
Xi Jinping’s lack of face time with world leaders signals a turn inward on domestic issues and a reluctance to compromise on the global stage.
Xi Jinping, China’s leader, has not left the country in nearly two years, and has yet to meet President Biden in person, possible signals of a deeper shift in China’s foreign and domestic policy.Credit...Carlos Garcia Rawlins/Reuters
Oct. 30, 2021
When the presidents and prime ministers of the Group of 20 nations meet in Rome this weekend, China’s leader, Xi Jinping, won’t be among them. Nor is he expected at the climate talks next week in Glasgow, where China’s commitment to curbing carbon emissions is seen as crucial to helping blunt the dire consequences of climate change. He has yet to meet President Biden in person and seems unlikely to any time soon.
Mr. Xi has not left China in 21 months — and counting.
The ostensible reason for Mr. Xi’s lack of foreign travel is Covid-19, though officials have not said so explicitly. It is also a calculation that has reinforced a deeper shift in China’s foreign and domestic policy.
China, under Mr. Xi, no longer feels compelled to cooperate — or at least be seen as cooperating — with the United States and its allies on anything other than its own terms.
Still, Mr. Xi’s recent absence from the global stage has complicated China’s ambition to position itself as an alternative to American leadership. And it has coincided with, some say contributed to, a sharp deterioration in the country’s relations with much of the rest of the world.
Instead, China has turned inward, with officials preoccupied with protecting Mr. Xi’s health and internal political machinations, including a Communist Party congress next year where he is expected to claim another five years as the country’s leader. As a result, face-to-face diplomacy is a lower priority than it was in Mr. Xi’s first years in office.
A Beijing neighborhood under lockdown. Covid-19 is the ostensible reason Mr. Xi hasn’t traveled abroad in nearly two years, though officials have not explicitly said so.Credit...EPA, via Shutterstock
“There is a bunker mentality in China right now,” said Noah Barkin, who follows China for the research firm Rhodium Group.
Mr. Xi’s retreat has deprived him of the chance to personally counter a steady decline in the country’s reputation, even as it faces rising tensions on trade, Taiwan and other issues.
Less than a year ago, Mr. Xi made concessions to seal an investment agreement with the European Union, partly to blunt the United States, only to have the deal scuttled by frictions over political sanctions. Since then, Beijing has not taken up an invitation for Mr. Xi to meet E.U. leaders in Europe this year.
“It eliminates or reduces opportunities for engagements at the top leadership level,” Helena Legarda, a senior analyst with the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin, said of Mr. Xi’s lack of travels. “Diplomatically speaking,” she added, in-person meetings are “very often fundamental to try and overcome leftover obstacles in any sort of agreement or to try to reduce tensions.”
Mr. Xi’s absence has also dampened hopes that the gatherings in Rome and Glasgow can make meaningful progress on two of the most pressing issues facing the world today: the post-pandemic recovery and the fight against global warming.
A video conference call last year between Mr. Xi and leaders of the European Union to discuss an investment deal that was scuttled by frictions over sanctions.Credit...Pool photo by Johanna Geron
President Biden, who is attending both, had sought to meet Mr. Xi on the sidelines, in keeping with his strategy to work with China on issues like climate change, even as the two countries clash on others. Instead, the two leaders have agreed to hold a “virtual summit” before the end of the year, though no date has been announced yet.
“The inability of President Biden and President Xi to meet in person does carry costs,” said Ryan Hass, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution who was the director for China at the National Security Council under President Barack Obama.
Only five years ago, in a speech at the annual World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Mr. Xi cast himself as a guardian of a multinational order, while President Donald J. Trump pulled the United States into an “America first” retreat. It is difficult to play that role while hunkered down within China’s borders, which remain largely closed as protection against the pandemic.
“If Xi were to leave China, he would either need to adhere to Covid protocols upon return to Beijing or risk criticism for placing himself above the rules that apply to everyone else,” Mr. Hass said.
Mr. Xi’s government has not abandoned diplomacy. China, along with Russia, has taken a leading role in negotiating with the Taliban after its return to power in Afghanistan. Mr. Xi has also held several conference calls with European leaders, including Germany’s departing chancellor, Angela Merkel; and, this week, President Emmanuel Macron of France and Prime Minister Boris Johnson of Britain. China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, will attend the meetings in Rome, and Mr. Xi will dial in and deliver what a spokeswoman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hua Chunying, said on Friday would be an “important speech.”
President Biden has sought to meet Mr. Xi on the sidelines to discuss issues like climate change. Credit...Stefani Reynolds for The New York Times
While President Biden has spoke of forging an “alliance of democracies” to counter China’s challenge, Mr. Xi has sought to build his own partnerships, including with Russia and developing countries, to oppose what he views as Western sanctimony.
“In terms of diplomacy with the developing world — most countries in the world — I think Xi Jinping’s lack of travel has not been a great disadvantage,” said Neil Thomas, an analyst with the Eurasia Group. He noted Mr. Xi’s phone diplomacy this week with the prime minister of Papua New Guinea, James Marape.
“That’s a whole lot more face time than the prime minister of Papua New Guinea is getting with Joe Biden,” Mr. Thomas said.
Still, Mr. Xi’s halt in international travel has been conspicuous, especially compared with the frenetic pace he once maintained. The last time he left China was January 2020, on a visit to Myanmar only days before he ordered the lockdown of Wuhan, the city where the coronavirus emerged.
Nor has Mr. Xi played host to many foreign officials. In the weeks after the lockdown, he met with the director of the World Health Organization and the leaders of Cambodia and Mongolia, but his last known meeting with a foreign official took place in Beijing in March 2020, with President Arif Alvi of Pakistan.
Chinese leaders have long made a selling point of their busy schedule of trips abroad, especially their willingness to visit poorer countries. Before Covid, Mr. Xi became the first to outpace his American counterpart in the annual average number of visits to foreign countries, according to research by Mr. Thomas.
China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, right, with Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, center, in September. Mr. Xi has sought to build partnerships to oppose what he views as Western sanctimony.Credit...Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry
In the years before Covid, Mr. Xi visited an average of 14 countries annually, spending around 34 days abroad, Mr. Thomas estimated. That notably surpassed Mr. Obama’s average (25 days of foreign travel), and Mr. Trump’s (23).
“President Xi’s diplomatic footsteps cover every part of the world,” said an article shared by Communist Party media outlets in late 2019.
Mr. Xi has made his mark on the world by jettisoning the idea that China should be a modest player on the international stage — “hiding our strength and biding our time,” in the dictum of his predecessor Deng Xiaoping. Now, though, he finds himself trying to project China’s new image of confident ambition over video meetings.
He is doing so while facing international scrutiny over many of China’s policies, the origins of the coronavirus, mounting rights abuses in Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang, and its increasingly ominous warnings to Taiwan.
Surveys have shown that views of China have deteriorated sharply in many major countries over the last two years.
Mr. Xi in Myanmar with Aung San Suu Kyi, right, then the country’s top civilian leader, in January 2020. He has not traveled abroad since.Credit...Myanmar President Office
Victor Shih, professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego, said that Mr. Xi’s limited travel coincided with an increasingly nationalist tone at home that seems to preclude significant cooperation or compromise.
“He no longer feels that he needs international support because he has so much domestic support, or domestic control,” Mr. Shih said. “This general effort to court America and also the European countries is less today than it was during his first term.”
The timing of the meetings in Rome and Glasgow also conflicted with preparations for a meeting at home that has clearly taken precedence. From Nov. 8 to 11, the country’s Communist elite will gather in Beijing for a behind-closed-doors session that will be a major step toward Mr. Xi’s next phase in power.
Mr. Xi’s absence in Rome and Glasgow could be a missed opportunity for countries to unite around a stronger, unified global effort on climate or economic recovery. It seems unlikely that the Chinese delegations will have the authority on their own to negotiate significant compromises.
“These are issue areas where there was some hope for cooperation and some hope for positive outcomes,” Ms. Legarda, the China analyst at the Mercator Institute, said of the climate summit in Glasgow. “With Xi Jinping not attending, it is, first of all, unclear if they will manage to get there. Second, I guess the question is, is this not a priority for Beijing, in many leaders’ minds?”
Claire Fu contributed research.
3. Opinion | What We Did the Last Time We Broke America
I strongly recommend this essay. We should all reflect on this history.
We should ask whether the two parties are the cause of or the solution to our problems?
Opinion | What We Did the Last Time We Broke America
Guest Essay
What We Did the Last Time We Broke America
Oct. 29, 2021
Credit...Roman Muradov
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Dr. Grinspan is a curator of political history at the Smithsonian’s National Museum of American History.
What happened to normal politics? I’ve spent the past five years commuting between two centuries, trying to find out.
As a curator of political history at the Smithsonian, I have attended protests and primaries, talked politics at Bernie Sanders rallies and with armed Ohio militiamen. Again and again, 21st-century Americans wonder at a democracy that looks nothing like the one they grew up with.
I’ve asked the 19th century the same question. Heading into the Smithsonian’s secure collections, past recently collected riot shields and tiki torches, I’ve dug into the evidence of a similar crisis in the late 1800s. Ballots from stolen elections. Paramilitary uniforms from midnight rallies. Diaries and letters, stored elsewhere, of senators and saloonkeepers and seamstresses, all asking: Is democracy a failure?
These artifacts suggest that we’re not posing the right question today. If we want to understand what happened to 20th-century politics, we need to stop considering it standard. We need to look deeper into our past and ask how we got normal politics to begin with.
The answer is that we had to fight for them. From the 1860s through 1900, America was embroiled in a generation-long, culturewide war over democracy, fought through the loudest, roughest, closest elections in our history. An age of acrimony when engaged, enraged participation came to seem less like a “perversion of traditional American institutions,” as one memoirist observed, and more like “their normal operation.”
The partisan combat of that era politicized race, class and religion but often came down to a fundamental debate about behavior. How should Americans participate in their democracy? What was out of bounds? Were fraud, violence and voter suppression the result of bad actors, or were there certain dangerous tendencies inherent in the very idea of self-government? Was reform even possible?
Ultimately, Americans decided to simmer down. After 1900, a movement of well-to-do reformers invented a style of politics, a Great Quieting aiming for what The Los Angeles Times called “more thinking and less shouting.” But “less shouting” also meant less turnout, less participation, less of a voice for working people. “Normal” politics was invented to calm our democracy the last time it broke.
Over a century of relative peace, politically speaking, this model came to seem standard, but our embattled norms are really the cease-fire terms of a forgotten war.
This period from the Civil War to World War I is often quickly explained with history textbook abstractions like “industrialization,” “urbanization” and “immigration,” but those big social forces had intimate effects on Americans. Living in a time of incredible disruption, instability and inequality pushed unsteady citizens into partisan combat. Nervous people make nasty politics, and the churn of Gilded Age life left millions feeling cut loose and unprotected. During this era, Americans saw weaker family ties, had fewer communal institutions and spent more time alone. Though we associate the Gilded Age with packed factories and tenements, loneliness and isolation were driving social and political forces in this shaken nation. Americans “had to cling to something,” observed the writer Walter Weyl, and in the absence of their old folk customs or local institutions, “the temptation to cling to party became ruthless.”
The parties were willing to oblige. The only thing Gilded Age life seemed to want from struggling Americans was their hard labor. But the Democratic and Republican Parties wanted their voices at rallies, their boots on the cobblestones, their stomachs at barbecues, their fists at riots and their votes on Election Day. Richard Croker, a Tammany Hall boss — once jailed for an Election Day stabbing — called his machine America’s “great digestive apparatus,” capable of converting lonely immigrants into active citizens.
Likewise, people needed the parties. Some had concrete goals, like the Black politician and Philadelphia barber Isaiah C. Wears, who explained that he did not love the Republican Party — it was merely the most useful tool in his community, the “knife which has the sharpest edge and does my cutting.” Others needed something more emotional. Many sought the community that came from marching together or sharing the party’s lager or guffawing at the same political cartoons. And because participation was so social and so saturating, even the women, young people and minorities denied the right to vote could still feel palpably engaged without ever casting a ballot.
But their efforts resolved little. Voter turnouts climbed higher than in any other period in American history, and the results were closer than ever, too, but neither party won lasting mandates or addressed systemic problems. Every few years, some bold new movement pointed to the issues Americans were not addressing — inequality, immigration, white supremacy, monopoly — only to be laughed off as cranks by swelling multitudes that preferred parties that, as one Tammany operative said, did not “trouble them with political arguments.”
Even those on the front lines of the era’s violent politics wondered what it was all for. One African American reverend pointedly asked Black Republicans fighting to hold on to voting rights, “With all your speaking, organizing, parading in the streets, ballyhooing, voting and sometimes fighting, what do you get?”
The more demands Americans put on their democracy, the less they got. By centering politics on what The Atlantic Monthly called “the theater, the opera, the baseball game, the intellectual gymnasium, almost the church of the people,” by making it the locus for a culture war, a race war and a class war, by asking it to provide public entertainment and small talk and family bonding, progress became impossible. Little changed because so many were participating, not in spite of that.
“Government by party is not a means of settling things,” as the muckraker Henry Demarest Lloyd said. “It is the best of devices for keeping them unsettled.”
Over the years, politics alienated widening circles. On the right, America’s old aristocrats — like the revered Boston historian Francis Parkman — hissed that the very idea of majority rule was a scheme to steal power from “superior to inferior types of men.” On the left, Populists and socialists denounced political machines that had hoodwinked working-class voters. These populations would never agree on what should come next but had a consensus on what had to end.
After 1890 or so, a new alliance began working toward the secret cause of making politics so dry and quiet that fewer of those “inferior types” wanted to participate, often explicitly viewing mass turnout as harmful. Many cities, scarred by the rising labor movement, banned public rallies without permits, hoping to shove public political expressions back into “the private home,” as the Republican National Convention chairman put it. They closed saloons on Election Day, shuttering those key working-class political hubs. And they replaced public ballot boxes with private voting booths, turning polling places from vibrant, violent gatherings into a confessional box.
Though each change felt small, taken together, they amounted to a revolution in political labor. Campaign work once done in the streets by many ordinary volunteers was now done in private by a few paid professionals.
What came next was predictable. Voter turnout crashed by nearly a third in presidential elections from the 1890s through the 1920s, falling from roughly 80 percent to under 50 percent. Voting decreased most among working-class, young, immigrant and Black citizens (even in Northern states where African Americans maintained the ability to vote). For the first time, wealth and education correlated with turnout. To this day, class remains the largest determiner of participation, above race or age.
There were some benefits to these quieter elections. Political violence became rare and shocking. Between 1859 and 1905, one congressman was murdered every seven years, and three presidents were killed in just 36 years. In the subsequent century, the nation suffered one presidential assassination and the murder of a congressman every 25 years. In this cooler political environment, lawmakers were finally able to pass long-delayed Progressive reforms. Women’s suffrage, federal protections for workers, direct elections of senators, progressive income taxes and regulations on industry, transportation, food and drugs all finally passed — after decades of failure — once electoral politics quieted. American lives improved more in this period than in any other, and yet it all coincided with a crash in participation.
But this early-20th-century democracy was also more distant from ordinary life. These are the years when it became impolite to talk politics at the dinner table, when growing numbers struggled to distinguish between the parties, when incumbent politicians began to hold on to office for decades. The number of seats in the House of Representatives, which had always expanded with the population, permanently froze in 1911 at 435, even though our population has tripled since then.
And this is the same ugly era when Southern states began an onslaught on the million Black voters who participated in many elections during Reconstruction. States from Mississippi to Virginia passed repressive new constitutions between 1890 and 1910, essentially killing democratic participation in much of the South. Though that was far more extreme, all these changes grew from a new climate of restraint that quieted politics nationwide in the new century.
Political objects can tell the story of this change. From 1860 to 1900, parties held torch-lit midnight marches to rally the faithful. In 1900, after a sweltering Republican convention in Philadelphia where participants wore straw hats, the jaunty boater became the new icon of a cooler approach to politics. A glance at political cartoons from 1920 or 1960 or even 2000 finds caricatures still wearing boaters — a style far removed from the torch-lit democracy of the 1800s.
The Smithsonian has steel drawers full of such boaters (made from straw, plastic and Wisconsin cheesehead foam). My colleagues and I have spent the past few years shuttling between these collections and contemporary political events, trying to identify objects that might embody the change we’ve witnessed in our democracy, that might go behind museum glass in a century to help explain 2016 or 2021. And wondering what these eras might say to each other. When it comes to electoral politics, our problems are different from those Americans dealt with 150 years ago, but the 19th century does have a surprisingly hopeful takeaway to offer the 21st.
We’re not the first generation to worry about the death of our democracy. Grappling with this demanding system of government is, well, normal. It’s partly because we’re following the unusually calmed 20th century that we don’t feel up to the task today. Our deep history shows that reform is possible, that previous generations identified flaws in their politics and made deliberate changes to correct them. We’re not just helplessly hurtling toward inevitable civil war; we can be actors in this story. The first step is acknowledging the dangers inherent in democracy. To move forward, we should look backward and see that we’re struggling not with a collapse but with a relapse.
Jon Grinspan, a curator of political history at the Smithsonian’s National Museum of American History, is the author of “The Age of Acrimony: How Americans Fought to Fix Their Democracy, 1865-1915.”
4. How to Fix Social Media
Is social media another opioid, alcohol, or nicotine "product." Is it addictive? I rationalize my use of social media in that it provides me with access to news and information I cannot find in other places. but I admit that I am addicted to it. How do I know? It upsets my wife when I check my phone too much. And I suffer her wrath.
I don't think there are external fixes. We have to have self discipline and think critically.
How to Fix Social Media
Revelations about Facebook, Instagram and TikTok have highlighted the problems posed by the biggest social media sites. What would it take to reform the platforms and limit their harm?
WSJ · by Oct. 29, 2021 1:02 pm ET
It’s not just Facebook’s use of personal data that makes it dangerous, it’s the lengths to which the company will go to keep users online. Frances Haugen, the Facebook whistleblower, showed us how its algorithms are designed to promote content that incites the most reaction. Facebook knows that the more time users spend on its platforms, the more data it can collect and monetize. Time and time again, it has put profits over people.
For too long, social media companies essentially have been saying “trust us, we’ve got this,” but that time of blind trust is coming to an end.
“We need transparency—and action—on the algorithms that govern so much of our lives.”
While my colleagues on both sides of the aisle are committed to reform, these are complicated problems. We have to come at this from multiple angles—starting with data privacy. We need to make sure that Americans can control how their data gets collected and used. When Apple gave its users the option to have their data tracked or not, more than 75 percent declined to opt in. That says something. We need a national privacy law now.
We also know that one-third of kids age 7 to 9 use social media apps, so we need stronger laws to protect them online. Right now, American kids are being overwhelmed by harmful content—and we don’t have nearly enough information about what social media companies are doing with their data. We can’t let companies put their profits above the well-being of children.
One reason Facebook can get away with this behavior is because it knows consumers don’t have alternatives. In CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s own words in a 2008 email, “It is better to buy than compete.” Who knows what user-friendly privacy protections competitors like Instagram could have developed if Facebook hadn’t purchased them? To protect competition in the digital marketplace, we have to update our antitrust and competition laws and make sure the enforcement agencies have the resources to do their jobs.
Finally, we need transparency—and action—on the algorithms that govern so much of our lives. Between Facebook’s role in promoting health misinformation during the pandemic and Instagram’s directing kids to accounts that glorify eating disorders, it’s clear that online algorithms can lead to real-world harm. Congress has to look at how harmful content is amplified.
We know from experience that these companies will keep milking users for profits until Congress steps in. Now is the time to act, and we have bipartisan momentum to stop just admiring the problem and finally do something about it.
Ms. Klobuchar, a Democrat, is a U.S. Senator from Minnesota.
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg testifies before Congress on April 10.
Photo: Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
Nick Clegg: Facebook Can’t Do It Alone
The debate around social media has changed dramatically in a short time. These technologies were once hailed as a liberating force: a means for people to express themselves, to keep in touch without the barriers of time and distance, and to build communities with like-minded souls.
The pendulum has now swung from utopianism to pessimism. There is increasing anxiety about social media’s impact on everything from privacy and well-being to politics and competition. This is understandable. We’re living through a period of division and disruption. It is natural to ask if social media is the cause of society’s ills or a mirror reflecting them.
Social media turns traditional top-down control of information on its head. People can make themselves heard directly, which is both empowering and disruptive. While some paint social media, and Facebook in particular, as bad for society, I believe the reverse is true. Giving people tools to express themselves remains a huge net benefit, because empowered individuals sustain vibrant societies.
Of course, with billions of people using our apps, all the good, bad and ugly of life is on display, which brings difficult dilemmas for social media companies—like where to draw the line between free expression and unsavory content, or between privacy and public safety.
“If Facebook didn’t exist, these issues wouldn’t magically disappear.”
Undoubtedly, we have a heavy responsibility to design products in a way that is mindful of their impact on society. But this is a young industry, and that impact isn’t always clear. That is why Facebook, now called Meta, conducts the sort of research reported on in The Wall Street Journal’s Facebook Files series. We want to better understand how our services affect people, so we can improve them. But if companies that conduct this sort of research—whether internally or with external researchers—are condemned for doing so, the natural response will be to stop. Do we want to incentivize companies to retreat from their responsibilities?
I think most reasonable people would acknowledge that social media is being held responsible for issues that run much deeper in society. Many of the dilemmas Facebook and Instagram face are too important to be left to private companies to resolve alone. That is why we’ve been advocating for new regulations for several years.
If one good thing comes out of this, I hope it is that lawmakers take this opportunity to act. Congress could start by creating a new digital regulator. It could write a comprehensive federal privacy law. It could reform Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and require large companies like Meta to show that they comply with best practices for countering illegal content. It could clarify how platforms can or should share data for research purposes. And it could bring greater transparency to algorithmic systems.
Social media isn’t going to go away. If Facebook didn’t exist, these issues wouldn’t magically disappear. We need to bring the pendulum to rest and find consensus. Both tech companies and lawmakers need to do their part to preserve the best of the internet and protect against the worst.
Mr. Clegg is the Vice President for Global Affairs at Meta.
Frances Haugen, former Facebook employee and whistleblower, testifies to a Senate committee on Oct. 5
Photo: Drew Angerer/POOL/AFP/Getty Images
Clay Shirky: Slow It Down and Make It Smaller
We know how to fix social media. We’ve always known. We were complaining about it when it got worse, so we remember what it was like when it was better. We need to make it smaller and slow it down.
The spread of social media vastly increased how many people any of us can reach with a single photo, video or bit of writing. When we look at who people connect to on social networks—mostly friends, unsurprisingly—the scale of immediate connections seems manageable. But the imperative to turn individual offerings, mostly shared with friends, into viral sensations creates an incentive for social media platforms, and especially Facebook, to amplify bits of content well beyond any friend group.
We’re all potential celebrities now, where anything we say could spread well beyond the group we said it to, an effect that the social media scholar Danah Boyd has called “context collapse.” And once we’re all potential celebrities, some people will respond to the incentives to reach that audience—hot takes, dangerous stunts, fake news, miracle cures, the whole panoply of lies and grift we now behold.
“The faster content moves, the likelier it is to be borne on the winds of emotional reaction.”
The inhuman scale at which the internet assembles audiences for casually produced material is made worse by the rising speed of viral content. As the behavioral economist Daniel Kahneman observed, human thinking comes in two flavors: fast and slow. Emotions are fast, and deliberation is slow.
The obvious corollary is that the faster content moves, the likelier it is to be borne on the winds of emotional reaction, with any deliberation coming after it has spread, if at all. The spread of smartphones and push notifications has created a whole ecosystem of URGENT! messages, things we are exhorted to amplify by passing them along: Like if you agree, share if you very much agree.
Social media is better, for individuals and for the social fabric, if the groups it assembles are smaller, and if the speed at which content moves through it is slower. Some of this is already happening, as people vote with their feet (well, fingers) to join various group chats, whether via SMS, Slack or Discord.
We know that scale and speed make people crazy. We’ve known this since before the web was invented. Users are increasingly aware that our largest social media platforms are harmful and that their addictive nature makes some sort of coordinated action imperative.
It’s just not clear where that action might come from. Self-regulation is ineffective, and the political arena is too polarized to agree on any such restrictions. There are only two remaining scenarios: regulation from the executive branch or a continuation of the status quo, with only minor changes. Neither of those responses is ideal, but given that even a global pandemic does not seem to have galvanized bipartisanship, it’s hard to see any other set of practical options.
Mr. Shirky is Vice Provost for Educational Technologies at New York University and the author of “Cognitive Surplus: Creativity and Generosity in a Connected Age.”
Nicholas Carr: Social Media Should Be Treated Like Broadcasting
The problems unleashed by social media, and the country’s inability to address them, point to something deeper: Americans’ loss of a sense of the common good. Lacking any shared standard for assessing social media content, we’ve ceded control over that content to social media companies. Which is like asking pimps to regulate prostitution.
We weren’t always so paralyzed. A hundred years ago, the arrival of radio broadcasting brought an upheaval similar to the one we face today. Suddenly, a single voice could speak to all Americans at once, in their kitchens and living rooms. Recognizing the new medium’s power to shape thoughts and stir emotions, people worried about misinformation, media bias, information monopolies, and an erosion of civility and prudence.
The government responded by convening conferences, under the auspices of the Commerce Department, that brought together lawmakers, engineers, radio executives and representatives of the listening public. The wide-ranging discussions led to landmark legislation: the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934.
These laws defined broadcasting as a privilege, not a right. They required radio stations (and, later, television stations) to operate in ways that furthered not just their own private interests but also “the public interest, convenience, and necessity.” Broadcasters that ignored the strictures risked losing their licenses.
“Like radio and TV stations before them, social media companies have a civic responsibility.”
Applying the public interest standard was always messy and contentious, as democratic processes tend to be, and it raised hard questions about freedom of speech and government overreach. But the courts, recognizing broadcasting’s “uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans,” as the Supreme Court put it in a 1978 ruling, repeatedly backed up the people’s right to have a say in what was beamed into their homes.
If we’re to solve today’s problems with social media, we first need to acknowledge that companies like Facebook, Google, and Twitter are not technology companies, as they like to present themselves. They’re broadcasters. Indeed, thanks to the omnipresence of smartphones and media apps, they’re probably the most influential broadcasters the world has ever known.
Like radio and TV stations before them, social media companies have a civic responsibility and should be required to serve the public interest. They need to be accountable, ethically and legally, for the information they broadcast, whatever its source.
The Communications Decency Act of 1996 included a provision, known as Section 230, that has up to now prevented social media companies from being held liable for the material they circulate. When that law passed, no one knew that a small number of big companies would come to wield control over much of the news and information that flows through online channels. It wasn’t clear that the internet would become a broadcasting medium.
Now that that is clear, often painfully so, Section 230 needs to be repealed. Then a new regulatory framework, based on the venerable public interest standard, can be put into place.
The past offers a path forward. But unless Americans can rise above their disagreements and recognize their shared stake in a common good, it will remain a path untaken.
Mr. Carr is an author and a visiting professor of sociology at Williams. His article “How to Fix Social Media” appears in the current issue of The New Atlantis.
In the early days of radio, Congress passed laws requiring broadcasters to serve the public interest.
Photo: H. Armstrong Roberts/ClassicStock/Getty Images
Sherry Turkle: We Also Need to Change Ourselves
Recent revelations by The Wall Street Journal and a whistleblower before Congress showed that Facebook is fully aware of the damaging effects of its services. The company’s algorithms put the highest value on keeping people on the system, which is most easily accomplished by engaging users with inflammatory content and keeping them siloed with those who share their views. As for Instagram, it encourages users (with the most devastating effect on adolescent girls) to curate online versions of themselves that are happier, sexier and more self-confident than who they really are, often at a high cost to their mental health.
But none of this was a surprise. We’ve known about these harms for over a decade. Facebook simply seemed too big to fail. We accepted the obvious damage it was doing with a certain passivity. Americans suffered from a fallacy in reasoning: Since many of us grew up with the internet, we thought that the internet was all grown up. In fact, it was in its early adolescence, ready for us to shape. We didn’t step up to that challenge. Now we have our chance.
In the aftermath of the pandemic, Americans are asking new questions about what is important and what we want to change. This much is certain: Social media is broken. It should charge us for its services so that it doesn’t have to sell user data or titillate and deceive to stay in business. It needs to accept responsibility as a news delivery system and be held accountable if it disseminates lies. That engagement algorithm is dangerous for democracy: It’s not good to keep people hooked with anger.
“We lose out when we don’t take the time to listen to each other, especially to those who are not like us.”
But changing social media is not enough. We need to change ourselves. Facebook knows how to keep us glued to our phones; now we need to learn how to be comfortable with solitude. If we can’t find meaning within ourselves, we are more likely to turn to Facebook’s siloed worlds to bolster our fragile sense of self. But good citizenship requires practice with disagreement. We lose out when we don’t take the time to listen to each other, especially to those who are not like us. We need to learn again to tolerate difference and disagreement.
We also need to change our image of what disagreement can look like. It isn’t online bullying. Go instead to the idea of slowing down to hear someone else’s point of view. Go to images of empathy. Begin a conversation, not with the assumption that you know how someone feels but with radical humility: I don’t know how you feel, but I’m listening. I’m committed to learning.
Empathy accepts that there may be profound disagreement among family, friends and neighbors. Empathy is difficult. It’s not about being conflict-averse. It implies a willingness to get in there, own the conflict and learn how to fight fair. We need to change social media to change ourselves.
Ms. Turkle is the Abby Rockefeller Mauzé Professor of the Social Studies of Science and Technology at MIT and the author, most recently, of “The Empathy Diaries.”
Josh Hawley: Too Much Power in Too Few Hands
What’s wrong with social media? One thing above all—hyper-concentration. Big Tech companies have no accountability. They harm kids and design their data-hungry services to be addictive. They censor speech with abandon and almost always without explanation. Unlike phone companies, they can kick you off for any reason or none at all. The world would be a better place without Facebook and Twitter.
All these pathologies are designed and enabled by one principal problem: centralized control. Take Facebook. Three billion people use the Facebook suite of apps, yet just one person wields final authority over everything. Google, ultimately controlled by just two people, is no better.
Concentrated control of social media aggravates all other problems because it deprives users of the competition that could provide solutions. Consider content moderation and privacy. As Dina Srinivasan has shown in her influential research, social media companies used to have to compete on these metrics. Then Facebook got big. Now, switching from Facebook to Instagram still leaves you under Mark Zuckerberg’s control. There is no other social media option with comparable reach.
No single person should control that much speech. We ought to retain the benefits of a large communications network but dismantle centralized control over it. Imagine a Facebook where you can use an algorithm other than the one that Mr. Zuckerberg designs. Everybody gets the benefit of the large network, but nobody suffers the harm of centralized control. Or imagine a world where Mr. Zuckerberg can’t unilaterally kick you off the largest digital communications platform on the planet. Phone companies don’t get to deny service to law-abiding Americans. Neither should Big Tech.
“There’s no accountability for bad algorithms, excessive data collection or addictive features”
Decentralizing social media can be accomplished in a few steps. First, social media companies must become interoperable. Just as you can call somebody who uses a different wireless carrier, you should be able to contact people on Facebook by using a different social media provider.
Second, as Justice Clarence Thomas recently pointed out, courts have grossly distorted Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act to protect tech companies from their own bad acts. There’s no accountability for bad algorithms, excessive data collection or addictive features. There’s no accountability for harming kids.
In all other industries, the prospect of liability helps to hold the powerful responsible and makes obtaining concentrated market power more difficult, but Section 230 now is a perpetual get-out-of-jail-free card. Today’s robber barons, in a company motto coined by Mr. Zuckerberg, get to “move fast and break things”—reaping the profits and footing us with the bill.
Finally, we must update antitrust laws to prevent platforms from throttling innovation by buying and killing potential competitors. A world in which Facebook never acquired Instagram would look very different.
To fix social media, break up centralized authority and help regular Americans take back control over their lives.
Mr. Hawley, a Republican, is a U.S. Senator from Missouri.
YouTube, Facebook and Instagram are the social media apps that Americans use most.
Photo: Photo illustration: Chesnot/Getty Images
David French: Government Control of Speech? No Thanks
The government should leave social media alone. For any problem of social media you name, a government solution is more likely to exacerbate it than to solve it, with secondary effects that we will not like.
Take the challenge of online misinformation and censorship. Broadly speaking, the American left desires a greater degree of government censorship to protect Americans from themselves. The American right also wants a greater degree of government intervention—but to protect conservatives from Big Tech progressives. They want to force companies to give conservatives a platform.
But adopting either approach is a bad idea. It would not only involve granting the government more power over private political speech—crossing a traditional red line in First Amendment jurisprudence—it would also re-create all the flaws of current moderation regimes, but at governmental scale.
Instead of one powerful person running Facebook, another powerful person running Twitter and other powerful people running Google, Reddit, TikTok and other big sites and apps, we’d have one powerful public entity in charge—at a moment when government is among the least-trusted institutions in American life.
“How many tech panics must we endure before we understand that the problem is less our technology than our flawed humanity?”
American history teaches us that we do not want the government defining “misinformation.” Our national story is replete with chapters where the government used its awesome power to distort, suppress and twist the truth—and that’s when it knows what’s true.
Our history also teaches us that the government is never free of partisanship and that if those in office have the power to suppress their political opponents, they will. Grant the Biden administration the power to regulate social media moderation and you hand that same power to the next presidential administration—one you may not like.
How many tech panics must we endure before we understand that the problem with society is less our technology than our flawed humanity? Social media did not exist in April 1861 when a Confederate cannonade opened the Civil War. Does social media truly divide us, or do we divide ourselves? Does social media truly deceive us, or do we deceive ourselves?
Social media is a two-edged sword. The same technology that connects old classmates and helps raise funds for gravely ill friends also provides angry Americans with instant access to public platforms to vent, rage and lie. Social media puts human nature on blast. It amplifies who we are.
But so did the printing press—and radio and television. Each of these expressive technologies was disruptive in its own way, and none of those disruptions were “solved” by government action. In fact, none of them were solved at all. And thank goodness for that. Our nation has become greater and better by extending the sphere of liberty, not by contracting it. It’s the task of a free people to exercise that liberty responsibly, not to beg the government to save us from ourselves.
Mr. French is senior editor of the Dispatch and the author of “Divided We Fall: America’s Secession Threat and How to Restore Our Nation.”
A supporter of then-President Donald Trump at a rally in Beverly Hills Gardens, Calif., on January 9, after he was banned from Twitter and suspended from Facebook.
Photo: Ringo Chiu/REUTERS
Renee DiResta: Circuit Breakers to Encourage Reflection
Social media is frictionless. It has been designed to remove as many barriers to creation and participation as possible. It delivers stories to us when they “trend” and recommends communities to us without our searching for them. Ordinary users help to shape narratives that reach millions simply by engaging with what is curated for them—sharing, liking and retweeting content into the feeds of others. These signals communicate back to the platform what we’re interested in, and the cycle continues: We shape the system, and it shapes us.
The curation algorithms that drive this experience were not originally designed to filter out false or misleading content. Recently, platforms have begun to recognize that algorithms can nudge users in harmful directions—toward inflammatory conspiracy theories, for instance, or anti-vaccination campaigns. The platforms have begun to take action to reduce the visibility of harmful content in recommendations. But they have run up against the networked communities that have formed around that content and continue to demand and amplify it. With little transparency and no oversight of the platforms’ interventions, outsiders can’t really determine how effective they have been, which is why regulation is needed.
The problem with social media, however, is not solely the algorithms. As users, we participate in amplifying what is curated for us, clicking a button to propel it along—often more by reflex than reflection, because a headline or snippet resonates with our pre-existing biases. And while many people use the platforms’ features in beneficial ways, small numbers of malign actors have a disproportionate effect in spreading disinformation or organizing harassment mobs.
“Nudges could be programmed to pop up in response to keywords commonly used in harassing speech.”
What if the design for sharing features were reworked to put users into a more reflective frame of mind? One way to accomplish this is to add friction to the system. Twitter, for instance, found positive effects when it asked users if they’d like to read an article before retweeting it. WhatsApp restricted the ability to mass-forward messages, and Facebook recently did the same for sharing to multiple groups at once.
Small tweaks of this nature could make a big difference. Nudges could be programmed to pop up in response to keywords commonly used in harassing speech, for example. And instead of attempting to fact-check viral stories long after they’ve broken loose, circuit breakers within the curation algorithm could slow down certain categories of content that showed early signs of going viral. This would buy time for a quick check to determine what the content is, whether it’s reputable or malicious and—for certain narrow categories in which false information has high potential to cause harm—if it is accurate.
Circuit breakers are commonplace in other fields, such as finance and journalism. Reputable newsrooms don’t simply get a tip and tweet out a story. They take the time to follow a reporting process to ensure accuracy. Adding friction to social media has the potential to slow the spread of content that is manipulative and harmful, even as regulators sort out more substantive oversight.
Ms. DiResta is the technical research manager of the Stanford Internet Observatory.
Jaron Lanier: Topple the New Gods of Data
When we speak of social media, what are we talking about? Is it the broad idea of people connecting over the internet, keeping track of old friends or sharing funny videos? Or is it the business model that has come to dominate those activities, as implemented by Facebook and a few other companies?
Tech companies have dominated the definition because of the phenomenon known as network effects: The more connected a system is, the more likely it is to produce winner-take-all outcomes. Facebook took all.
The domination is so great that we forget alternatives are possible. There is a wonderful new generation of researchers and critics concerned with problems like damage to teen girls and incitement of racist violence, and their work is indispensable. If all we had to talk about was the more general idea of possible forms of social media, then their work would be what’s needed to improve things.
Unfortunately, what we need to talk about is the dominant business model. This model spews out horrible incentives to make people meaner and crazier. Incentives run the world more than laws, regulations, critiques or the ideas of researchers.
The current incentives are to “engage” people as much as possible, which means triggering the “lizard brain” and fight-or-flight responses. People have always been a little paranoid, xenophobic, racist, neurotically vain, irritable, selfish and afraid. And yet putting people under the influence of engagement algorithms has managed to bring out even more of the worst of us.
“The current incentives are to ‘engage’ people as much as possible, which means triggering the ‘lizard brain.’”
Can we survive being under the ambient influence of behavior modification algorithms that make us stupider?
The business model that makes life worse is based on a particular ideology. This ideology holds that humans as we know ourselves are being replaced by something better that will be brought about by tech companies. Either we’ll become part of a giant collective organism run through algorithms, or artificial intelligence will soon be able to do most jobs, including running society, better than people. The overwhelming imperative is to create something like a universally Facebook-connected society or a giant artificial intelligence.
These “new gods” run on data, so as much data as possible must be gathered, and getting in the middle of human interactions is how you gather that data. If the process makes people crazy, that’s an acceptable price to pay.
The business model, not the algorithms, is also why people have to fear being put out of work by technology. If people were paid fairly for their contributions to algorithms and robots, then more tech would mean more jobs, but the ideology demands that people accept a creeping feeling of human obsolescence. After all, if data coming from people were valued, then it might seem like the big computation gods, like AI, were really just collaborations of people instead of new life forms. That would be a devastating blow to the tech ideology.
Facebook now proposes to change its name and to primarily pursue the “metaverse” instead of “social media,” but the only changes that fundamentally matter are in the business model, ideology and resulting incentives.
Mr. Lanier is a computer scientist and the author, most recently, of “Ten Arguments for Deleting Your Social Media Accounts Right Now.”
Clive Thompson: Online Communities That Actually Work
Are there any digital communities that aren’t plagued by trolling, posturing and terrible behavior? Sure there are. In fact, there are quite a lot of online hubs where strangers talk all day long in a very civil fashion. But these aren’t the sites that we typically think of as social media, like Twitter, Facebook or YouTube. No, I’m thinking of the countless discussion boards and Discord servers devoted to hobbies or passions like fly fishing, cuisine, art, long-distance cycling or niche videogames.
I visit places like this pretty often in reporting on how people use digital tools, and whenever I check one out, I’m often struck by how un-toxic they are. These days, we wonder a lot about why social networks go bad. But it’s equally illuminating to ask about the ones that work well. These communities share one characteristic: They’re small. Generally they have only a few hundred members, or maybe a couple thousand if they’re really popular.
And smallness makes all the difference. First, these groups have a sense of cohesion. The members have joined specifically to talk to people with whom they share an enthusiasm. That creates a type of social glue, a context and a mutual respect that can’t exist on a highly public site like Twitter, where anyone can crash any public conversation.
“Smallness makes all the difference. These groups have a sense of cohesion.”
Even more important, small groups typically have people who work to keep interactions civil. Sometimes this will be the forum organizer or an active, long-term participant. They’ll greet newcomers to make them feel welcome, draw out quiet people and defuse conflict when they see it emerge. Sometimes they’ll ban serious trolls. But what’s crucial is that these key members model good behavior, illustrating by example the community’s best standards. The internet thinkers Heather Gold, Kevin Marks and Deb Schultz put a name to this: “tummeling,” after the Yiddish “tummeler,” who keeps a party going.
None of these positive elements can exist in a massive, public social network, where millions of people can barge into each other’s spaces—as they do on Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. The single biggest problem facing social media is that our dominant networks are obsessed with scale. They want to utterly dominate their fields, so they can kill or absorb rivals and have the ad dollars to themselves. But scale breaks social relations.
Is there any way to mitigate this problem? I’ve never heard of any simple solution. Strong antitrust enforcement for the big networks would be useful, to encourage a greater array of rivals that truly compete with one another. But this likely wouldn’t fully solve the problem of scale, since many users crave scale too. Lusting after massive, global audiences, they will flock to whichever site offers the hugest. Many of the proposed remedies for social media, like increased moderation or modifications to legal liability, might help, but all leave intact the biggest problem of all: Bigness itself.
Mr. Thompson is a journalist who covers science and technology. He is the author, most recently, of “Coders: The Making of a New Tribe and the Remaking of the World.”
Research has increasingly shown that social media has negative effects on children and teenagers.
Photo: Gallery Stock
Chris Hughes: Controlled Competition Is the Way Forward
Frances Haugen’s testimony to Congress about Facebook earlier this month shook the world because she conveyed a simple message: The company knows its products can be deeply harmful to people and to democracy. Yet Facebook’s leadership charges right along. As if on cue, the same week, Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp went completely dark for over five hours, illustrating how concentration creates single points of failure that jeopardize essential communications services.
At the root of Ms. Haugen’s testimony and the service interruption that hundreds of millions experienced is the question of power. We cannot expect Facebook—or any private, corporate actor—just to do the right thing. Creating a single company with this much concentrated power makes our systems and society more vulnerable in the long-term.
The good news is that we don’t have to reinvent the wheel to “fix” social media. We have a structure of controlled competition in place for other essential industries, and we need the same for social media.
“A single company with this much concentrated power makes our systems and society more vulnerable in the long-term.”
Our approach should be grounded in the American antimonopoly tradition, which dates back to the start of our republic. Antimonopoly is bigger than just antitrust; it is a range of policy tools to rein in private power and create the kind of fair competition that meets public and private ends simultaneously. These can include break up, interoperability requirements, agreements not to enter ancillary markets or pursue further integration, and public utility regulation, among others.
The most talked-about antimonopoly effort—break up—is already under way. In one of his last major actions, Joe Simons, President Trump’s chair of the Federal Trade Commission, sued to force Facebook to spin off Instagram and WhatsApp. But breaking up large tech companies isn’t enough on its own. Requiring Facebook to split into three could make for a more toxically competitive environment with deeper levels of misinformation and emotional pain.
For social media in particular, competition needs to be structured and controlled to create safe environments for users. Antitrust action needs to be paired with a regulatory framework for social media that prevents a race to the bottom to attract more attention and controversy with a high social cost. Calls to ban targeted advertising or to get rid of algorithmic feeds are growing, including from former Facebook employees. These would go to the root problem of the attention economy and are consistent with the kind of public utility regulation we have done for some time.
At the core of this approach is a belief that private, corporate power, if left to its own devices, will cause unnecessary harm to Americans. We have agreed as a country that this is unacceptable. We structure many of our most essential industries—banking and finance, air transportation, and increasingly, health care—to ensure that they meet both public and private ends. We must do the same with social media.
Mr. Hughes, a co-founder of Facebook, is co-founder of the Economic Security Project and a senior advisor at the Roosevelt Institute.
Photo: Michael Kirkham
Siva Vaidhyanathan: A Social Network That’s Too Big To Govern
Facebook and WhatsApp, the company’s instant messaging service, have been used to amplify sectarian violence in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, India and the U.S. Facebook’s irresponsible data-sharing policies enabled the Cambridge Analytica political scandal, and many teenage girls in the U.S. report that Instagram encourages self-harm and eating disorders. As bad as these phenomena are, they are really just severe weather events caused by a dangerous climate, which is Facebook itself.
Facebook is the most pervasive global media system the world has ever known. It will soon connect and surveil 3 billion of the 7.8 billion humans on earth, communicating in more than 100 languages. Those members all get some value from the service; some are dependent on it to run business or maintain family ties across oceans. But Facebook’s sheer scale should convince us that complaining that the company removed or did not remove a particular account or post is folly. The social network is too big to govern, and governing it effectively would mean unwinding what makes Facebook Facebook—the commitment to data-driven, exploitative, unrelenting, algorithmically guided growth.
As Facebook executive Andrew Bosworth declared in a 2018 internal memo, “The ugly truth is that we believe in connecting people so deeply that anything that allows us to connect more people more often is de facto good.” In another section of the memo, Mr. Bosworth acknowledged that growth can have negative effects: “Maybe it costs someone a life by exposing someone to bullies. Maybe someone dies in a terrorist attack coordinated on our tools.”
“Facebook lacks the incentive to change, and we lack methods to make it change.”
But to Facebook’s executives, the company’s growth appears to matter more than public relations, the overall quality of human life and even the loss of life. Those are all just externalities that flow from the commitment to growth. Even profit is a secondary concern: Make Facebook grow and the money will take care of itself. Mark Zuckerberg truly seems to believe, against all evidence, that the more people use Facebook for more hours of the day, the better most of us will live.
Facebook lacks the incentive to change, and we lack methods to make it change. The scale of the threat is so far beyond anything we faced in the 19th and 20th centuries that reaching for the rusty tools through which we addressed corporate excess in the past—such as antitrust law and civil liability—is another sort of folly. Reforming Facebook requires restricting what feeds Facebook: The unregulated harvesting of our personal data and the ways the company leverages it.
Short of that, we are just chasing tornadoes and hurricanes, patching up the damage already done and praying another storm waits long enough to return. The problem with Facebook, after all, is Facebook.
Mr. Vaidhyanathan is a professor of media studies at the University of Virginia and the author of “Antisocial Media: How Facebook Disconnects Us and Undermines Democracy.”
WSJ · by Oct. 29, 2021 1:02 pm ET
5. As machine learning becomes standard in military and politics, it needs moral safeguards
Excerpts:
In the short term, this is fine because there aren’t entire armies made of robots, but the competitive advantage offered by mechanized fighting not limited by frail human bodies will make intelligent machines essential to the future of war. Moreover, these terminators will need an entire infrastructure of satellites, sensors, and information platforms powered by ML to coordinate responses to battlefield advances and setbacks, further reducing the role of humans. This will only amplify the power governments have to oppress their societies.
The risk that democratic societies might create tools that lead to this pessimistic outcome is high. The United States is engaged in an ML arms race with China and Russia, both of which are developing and exporting their own ML tools to help dictatorships remain in power and freeze history.
There is space for civil society to insert itself into ML, however. ML succeeds and fails based on the training data used for algorithms, and civil society can collaborate with governments to choose training data that optimizes the warfighting enterprise while balancing the need to sustain dissent and reform.
By giving machines moral safeguards, the United States can create tools that instead strengthen democracy’s prospects. Fukuyama’s thesis is only valid in a world where humans can exert their agency and reform their governments through discussion, debate and elections. The U.S., in the course of confronting its authoritarian rivals, shouldn’t create tools that hasten democracy’s end.
As machine learning becomes standard in military and politics, it needs moral safeguards
The Hill · by Christopher Wall, Opinion Contributor · October 30, 2021
Over the past decade, the world has experienced a technological revolution powered by machine learning (ML). Algorithms remove the decision fatigue of purchasing books and choosing music, and the work of turning on lights and driving, allowing humans to focus on activities more likely to optimize their sense of happiness. Futurists are now looking to bring ML platforms to more complex aspects of human society, specifically warfighting and policing.
Technology moralists and skeptics aside, this move is inevitable, given the need for rapid security decisions in a world with information overload. But as ML-powered weapons platforms replace human soldiers, the risk of governments misusing ML increases. Citizens of liberal democracies can and should demand that governments pushing for the creation of intelligent machines for warfighting include provisions maintaining the moral frameworks that guide their militaries.
In his popular book “The End of History,” Francis Fukuyama summarized debates about the ideal political system for achieving human freedom and dignity. From his perspective in the middle of 1989, months before the unexpected fall of the Berlin Wall, no other systems like democracy and capitalism could generate wealth, pull people out of poverty and defend human rights; both communism and fascism had failed, creating cruel autocracies that oppressed people. Without realizing it, Fukuyama prophesied democracy’s proliferation across the world. Democratization soon occurred through grassroots efforts in Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America.
These transitions, however, wouldn’t have been possible unless the military acquiesced to these reforms. In Spain and Russia, the military attempted a coup before recognizing the dominant political desire for change. China instead opted to annihilate reformers.
The idea that the military has veto power might seem incongruous to citizens of consolidated democracies. But in transitioning societies, the military often has the final say on reform due to its symbiotic relationship with the government. In contrast, consolidated democracies benefit from the logic of Clausewitz’s trinity, where there is a clear division of labor between the people, the government and the military. In this model, the people elect governments to make decisions for the overall good of society while furnishing the recruits for the military tasked with executing government policy and safeguarding public liberty. The trinity, though, is premised on a human military with a moral character that flows from its origins among the people. The military can refuse orders that harm the public or represent bad policy that might lead to the creation of a dictatorship.
ML risks destabilizing the trinity by removing the human element of the armed forces and subsuming them directly into the government. Developments in ML have created new weapons platforms that rely less and less on humans, as new warfighting machines are capable of provisioning security or assassinating targets with only perfunctory human supervision. The framework of machines acting without human involvement risks creating a dystopian future where political reform will become improbable, because governments will no longer have human militaries restraining them from opening fire on reformers. These dangers are evident in China, where the government lacks compunction in deploying ML platforms to monitor and control its population while also committing genocide.
In the public domain, there is some recognition of these dangers on the misuses of ML for national security. But there hasn’t been a substantive debate about how ML might shape democratic governance and reform. There isn’t a nefarious reason for this. Rather it’s that many of those who develop ML tools have STEM backgrounds and lack an understanding of broader social issues. From the government side, leaders in agencies funding ML research often don’t know how to consume ML outputs, relying instead on developers to explain what they’re seeing for them. The government’s measure for success is whether it keeps society safe. Throughout this process, civilians operate as bystanders, unable to interrogate the design process for ML tools used for war.
In the short term, this is fine because there aren’t entire armies made of robots, but the competitive advantage offered by mechanized fighting not limited by frail human bodies will make intelligent machines essential to the future of war. Moreover, these terminators will need an entire infrastructure of satellites, sensors, and information platforms powered by ML to coordinate responses to battlefield advances and setbacks, further reducing the role of humans. This will only amplify the power governments have to oppress their societies.
The risk that democratic societies might create tools that lead to this pessimistic outcome is high. The United States is engaged in an ML arms race with China and Russia, both of which are developing and exporting their own ML tools to help dictatorships remain in power and freeze history.
There is space for civil society to insert itself into ML, however. ML succeeds and fails based on the training data used for algorithms, and civil society can collaborate with governments to choose training data that optimizes the warfighting enterprise while balancing the need to sustain dissent and reform.
By giving machines moral safeguards, the United States can create tools that instead strengthen democracy’s prospects. Fukuyama’s thesis is only valid in a world where humans can exert their agency and reform their governments through discussion, debate and elections. The U.S., in the course of confronting its authoritarian rivals, shouldn’t create tools that hasten democracy’s end.
Christopher Wall is a social scientist for Giant Oak, a counterterrorism instructor for Naval Special Warfare, a lecturer on statistics for national security at Georgetown University and the co-author of the recent book, “The Future of Terrorism: ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the Alt-Right.” Views of the author do not necessarily reflect the views of Giant Oak.
The Hill · by Christopher Wall, Opinion Contributor · October 30, 2021
6. Global Democracy Under Attack Despite Biden Push
It takes more than a "push" to protect democracy. it is not something that can be "fixed" in 9 months.
And I think this is one of the many challenges we face: China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, and displace democratic institutions.
Global Democracy Under Attack Despite Biden Push
Youths in Khartoum confront security forces firing tear gas following a military coup
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US President Joe Biden has vowed a major push to promote democracy worldwide. But since he took office, democracy has faced repeated setbacks.
Among three nations whose democratic transitions had inspired the most hope, Myanmar and Sudan have seen generals roar back, sacking civilian leaders and suppressing street protests, while in Tunisia, the birthplace of the Arab Spring a decade ago, the president seized wide-ranging powers.
Military juntas have also grabbed power in the West African nations of Guinea, Mali and Chad, while in Afghanistan, Taliban insurgents seized power after a US troop withdrawal brought the quick collapse of the Western-backed government.
While local factors are at play in each country, experts see common trends including economic insecurities exacerbated by Covid-19 and climate change, ruling elites who failed to meet aspirations and the growing role of China, which can support nations shunned by the West.
"There is an increase in attacks on democracy around the world -- and not in the demand for democracy," said Derek Mitchell, the first US ambassador to Myanmar after its transition a decade ago.
"It's a matter of old mindsets dying hard, particularly in militaries where people don't give up power and privilege easily," said Mitchell, now president of the National Democratic Institute, which promotes democracy worldwide.
Fulfilling a campaign promise, Biden has announced a two-part summit of democracies starting in December.
Protesters hold signs against the Myanmar military coup in Bagan on February 10, 2021
STR
He is drawing a sharp contrast with his predecessor Donald Trump, who openly embraced authoritarian leaders seen as useful and who inspired a violent mob that on January 6 attacked the US Capitol as it certified Biden's victory.
With the possible exception of Afghanistan, where Biden's decision to end the two-decade US war has been hotly debated, few link democracy's woes to the current occupant of the White House.
"Democracy takes literally decades to consolidate and it takes years to erode. So I think there's very little that any administration could do in the first nine months tangibly moving the needle on global democracy," said Frances Z. Brown, who worked on supporting democracies in Barack Obama's White House.
Crucially, Biden responded quickly to the coups in Myanmar and Sudan including suspending aid, said Brown, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
"It shows the United States is watching and it cares. There's no one magic bullet but I think it all matters," she said.
Biden has also taken a distance with Trump allies, halting some military support for Saudi Arabia and leveraging part of its aid to Egypt on human rights progress, although activists say he should go further.
Scott Warren, a visiting fellow at Johns Hopkins University's Agora Institute, said that Biden inviting leaders to a summit was insufficient and that he should prioritize civil society and youth.
"Sometimes the US strategy toward democracies can be very reactive. I think having a more proactive strategy -- what conditions are going to be necessary in the long-term -- is really important," he said.
State Department spokesman Ned Price acknowledged there have been "setbacks in certain countries" on democracy but added, "We will continue to lead that charge."
A member of the special forces of Colonel Mamady Doumbouya, who seized power in Guinea, arrives for a September 2021 meeting in Conakry with representatives from the Economic Community of West African States
JOHN WESSELS
The Economist Democracy Index rated the global state of democracy in 2020 at its lowest since its survey began in 2006, fueled not only by coups but by the rise of right-wing populists in democracies.
Jonathan Powell, an expert in civil-military relations at the University of Central Florida, said the economic blow from Covid-19 has hastened the democratic decay.
"When you have countries that are already dealing with a very delicate balance between authoritarianism and attempting to maintain some form of democratic stability, when you have some sort of a shock to the system, even if it doesn't necessarily seem as bad as what some other countries are dealing with, it can really have a critical impact," he said.
The rise of China has also offered an alternative, he said.
"It's not on the scale that we would have had during the Cold War with the Soviet Union," Powell said.
"But it is a similar dynamic where if you do have one side cut off military or economic assistance, there is a foregone conclusion that you can go to the other side," he said.
Mitchell, the former ambassador, acknowledged the Beijing factor but called it overemphasized, saying Chinese leaders acted opportunistically.
But he said that the United States, with its intense polarization and the January 6 violence, no longer offered the same powerful model.
"Certainly those who are fighting for their own democratic rights are not giving up because the United States can't get its act together," Mitchell said.
"But I think we'd rather have the United States demonstrating how democracy can deliver."
sct/md
7. To Save Democracy, America Needs a Mandatory Public Service Program
With all due respect to the Ambassador, I do not think mandatory programs will teach civic responsibility and patriotism. As much as I would like everyone to experience national service I fear mandatory programs will backfire. It takes education, family influence, examples, and relevant role models. A question we should ask is why don't more young people opt for national service opportunities from the military to the Peace Corps, AmeriCorps, Teach for America, and the myriad programs that are forms of national service? Are there insufficient opportunities? Are people turned away from these programs?
To Save Democracy, America Needs a Mandatory Public Service Program
An ambitious program for young Americans could help heal the country’s divides.
By David L. Carden, the first resident U.S. ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
Polarization in the United States is well-trodden ground. As the media reminds us every day, the nation has become deeply divided and politically dysfunctional: People in blue states don’t talk to those in red states or even live in the same reality; social classes rarely mix; and social, political, and academic tribalism reign supreme. But no one has seriously considered what could be a genuinely transformative solution: a mandatory national service program.
It’s become increasingly apparent that something visionary and ambitious will be required for Americans to heal their democracy and transcend their divides. A program of mandatory national service, if designed effectively, would bring together young Americans from across the country and all socioeconomic groups to work on public interest projects and accomplish common goals for the good of the country. The public services a program along these lines could provide are virtually limitless: They could include tutoring and mentoring; participating in after-school enrichment programs; improving environmental conservation; building public housing; organizing youth networks; providing real-time information during natural disasters; assisting small businesses through outreach to young consumers; and helping in the construction, rehabilitation, and maintenance of public parks and facilities.
Essentially, participants would provide much-needed public services and, in return, receive significant benefits, including covered college or trade school tuition and living expenses, that would lessen the country’s socioeconomic divide. In doing so, they would interact with Americans from other communities, gain life skills, and transform their own futures—and that of the country itself. There is a precedent for a similarly visionary, transformative, and generous program: the GI Bill passed near the end of World War II that gave millions of Americans returning from the war a free education and a ticket to the middle class. If the U.S. Congress did it then, it can do it now.
Polarization in the United States is well-trodden ground. As the media reminds us every day, the nation has become deeply divided and politically dysfunctional: People in blue states don’t talk to those in red states or even live in the same reality; social classes rarely mix; and social, political, and academic tribalism reign supreme. But no one has seriously considered what could be a genuinely transformative solution: a mandatory national service program.
It’s become increasingly apparent that something visionary and ambitious will be required for Americans to heal their democracy and transcend their divides. A program of mandatory national service, if designed effectively, would bring together young Americans from across the country and all socioeconomic groups to work on public interest projects and accomplish common goals for the good of the country. The public services a program along these lines could provide are virtually limitless: They could include tutoring and mentoring; participating in after-school enrichment programs; improving environmental conservation; building public housing; organizing youth networks; providing real-time information during natural disasters; assisting small businesses through outreach to young consumers; and helping in the construction, rehabilitation, and maintenance of public parks and facilities.
Essentially, participants would provide much-needed public services and, in return, receive significant benefits, including covered college or trade school tuition and living expenses, that would lessen the country’s socioeconomic divide. In doing so, they would interact with Americans from other communities, gain life skills, and transform their own futures—and that of the country itself. There is a precedent for a similarly visionary, transformative, and generous program: the GI Bill passed near the end of World War II that gave millions of Americans returning from the war a free education and a ticket to the middle class. If the U.S. Congress did it then, it can do it now.
Although some may think this idea is unrealistic, public service programs have been gaining serious attention in Washington in recent years. In 2016, Congress passed a National Defense Authorization Act that called for the creation of a temporary federal agency—the National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service—to conduct a review of the military selective service process and “consider methods to increase participation in military, national, and public service to address national security and other public needs of the United States.” The commission’s final report, issued in March 2020, observed that “the current moment requires a collective effort to build upon America’s spirit of service to cultivate a widespread culture of service.”
The commission focused its proposals on existing programs of voluntary public service, such as AmeriCorps and the Peace Corps. It recommended expanding these and other existing programs, which historically have not attracted many volunteers. For example, AmeriCorps has approximately 75,000 volunteers and the Peace Corps has 7,300. The commission recommended making Americans more aware of opportunities to serve and increasing the “value, flexibility, and use of service incentives.” Current incentives include Segal AmeriCorps Education Awards, which provide some education benefits for those who participate in certain programs. But these awards are modest, taxable to the beneficiaries, and paid directly to educational institutions, so the commission recommended Congress increase benefits to participants.
The issue also came up in the 2020 Democratic presidential primaries. When now-Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg was running for the nomination in 2019, he proposed expanding volunteerism, observing that young Americans shouldn’t have to enter the military to serve their country. He recommended adding new programs, increasing volunteers to 1 million people by 2026, and providing services in predominantly minority and rural communities. In return, participants would be eligible for debt relief under the existing Public Service Loan Forgiveness program. The estimated cost of the program was $20 billion over 10 years.
Neither the commission nor Buttigieg proposed that programs be mandatory, perhaps believing it was politically unrealistic. Perhaps many more Americans would indeed serve if current proposals were adopted, but the stakes are too high to take this chance. Instead, the country needs a mandatory service program.
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Nations have always mobilized young people when facing existential crises like war. The case for national service has never been clearer.
The idea of mandatory civilian service is not unprecedented. Countries such as Denmark, Nigeria, and Germany have had such programs at various points over the past few decades. French President Emmanuel Macron has also called for the creation of such a program. Then there is military conscription, which the United States has relied on to protect its national security six times in history. Since every male U.S. citizen between the ages of 18 and 25 must register with the Selective Service System, the system for a military or other draft is still in place.
Despite these precedents, it admittedly would be a great challenge to design and sell a mandatory public service program due to the United States’ current political environment. An essential first step is to remind Americans of the precedents for such service and to sell the program as a solution to the country’s greatest challenges: partisan divides, alienation, lack of public services, economic inequality, dwindling economic opportunity, and the threat polarization poses to national security. To achieve this, the program would need to have several characteristics.
First, it would have to be mandatory for all Americans between the ages of 18 and 24. A voluntary program likely wouldn’t achieve the geographic and socioeconomic intermingling necessary to bridge the country’s partisan and other divides. (Privileged Americans, in particular, would likely opt out.) The program could be phased in over a defined period of time, perhaps by beginning with a robust voluntary approach, but it ultimately should be mandatory.
Second, the work opportunities should be designed to help inform and facilitate participants’ career goals as much as possible. This would allow participants to develop real-life skills in their areas of interest. The objective would be balancing this with the need to push participants outside of their comfort zones: That might look like, for instance, letting a participant choose their area of focus but not their geographic location or vice versa.
Third, post-program educational benefits, including tuition and living expenses for trade schools and universities, must be substantial. This would not only make education more accessible but also provide assistance to struggling colleges and universities, which will be facing future enrollment challenges due to declining birth rates and the COVID-19 pandemic. The drop off has already begun, according to a recent report, which cites a 5 percentage point reduction in enrollment from 2014-2015 to 2018-2019, including 200,000 fewer Black students. (Those who have not completed high school could also be placed in programs where they earn a GED during their service.)
Whatever the costs would prove to be, the country cannot afford not to pay them.
Fourth, the program should be designed to minimize disruption in participants’ lives. Service could begin after high school graduation (or earlier for those who wish), and individuals could be allowed deferrals for good causes. Importantly, participants could be allowed to work or go to school while fulfilling the program requirements as long as the programs’ principle objectives were achieved. Service would be for a fixed period of one or two years, which allows personal lives to resume without great sacrifice.
Of course, opposition to a mandatory program can be expected. Some would argue Americans should have the right to decide what’s in their own self-interest without government interference—and thus should not be required to participate. But this line of thinking, of prioritizing the rights of citizenship over its obligations, is one of the main reasons the program is needed in the first place. Washington can’t allow past to be prologue if it’s to lessen the country’s divides.
Opposition by fiscal conservatives in particular can be expected, as they would likely claim that such a program is unaffordable. Although the program’s exact costs would need to be assessed, a rough estimate can be made based on Buttigieg’s proposed program of 1 million participants, whose price tag was $20 billion over 10 years, including some loan forgiveness. There are around 30 million Americans ages 18 to 24. Assuming 1 in 7 people would enter the program in any given year, the annual total participation for a one-year program would be around 4 million individuals, four times the number in Buttigieg’s proposed program. Thus, a mandatory program would be approximately $80 billion over the same 10-year period. By comparison, over that 10-year period, the Head Start Program—the federal program that provides child development services for low-income families—will cost approximately $100 billion at the rate it’s currently funded. Of course, educational expenses would add to a mandatory public service program’s price tag.
But whatever the costs would prove to be, the country cannot afford not to pay them. And the government doesn’t have to do it alone. Although Buttigieg was right to see the nation’s divisions as a national security issue when he called for a National Security Council position to oversee his proposed program, the private sector also has a role to play. Indeed, the private sector has contributed greatly to the country’s divisions as many businesses have failed to share the economic benefits of their recent growth with their workers. This has resulted in income inequality and wage stagnation that ironically also threaten to harm businesses in the future by reducing the size of their markets. Thus, the private sector has much to gain from a mandatory public service program. It should join hands with the government to ensure its success by developing projects that would satisfy the program’s objectives and provide job training for tomorrow’s workforce. This would also have the effect of helping to sell the program to more fiscally conservative legislators.
Designed along the above lines, a mandatory public service program would go far to reducing divides between red and blue states and those grounded in political orientation, race, ethnicity, and gender as well as help assimilate new citizens and immigrants. It also would provide educational benefits to more young Americans, expose them to places with greater economic opportunity and diversity, and position them for future success.
Meanwhile, the program would contribute to the country’s future by building and maintaining public housing, infrastructure, and amenities. It would bring much-needed projects to urban and rural America, much as the Works Progress Administration did during the Great Depression, when it built airports, post offices, court houses, dams, parks, and other public facilities across the country. These projects changed the face of the United States and remain some of the country’s most cherished and visited sites. Today’s participants could provide similar services that support the efforts undertaken by federal, state, and local governments, including those under the Biden administration’s proposed infrastructure bill, which has bipartisan support and is on the doorstep of passage.
Given the domestic and international challenges ahead, the American people will need to collaborate to build a safe, prosperous, and sustainable future. The current partisan divide threatens to make such collective action difficult. It’s time for the United States to create a mandatory national service program to help Americans build the future they want—together.
8. Afghans Accuse The Taliban Of Misappropriating Foreign Aid
The nature of the Taliban regime?
Afghans Accuse The Taliban Of Misappropriating Foreign Aid
October 27, 2021
With Afghanistan in the grips of economic collapse and a devastating humanitarian crisis, many Afghans are pinning their hopes on international aid to stave off soaring hunger and poverty.
But Afghans say the limited assistance that is arriving in the war-torn country is being misappropriated by the Taliban, the militant Islamist group that forcibly seized power in Afghanistan in August.
“The only people who have received any aid are those who belong to the Taliban, particularly relatives of those Taliban members who were killed or injured while fighting for them,” Wali Mohammad, who lives in the southern province of Kandahar, told RFE/RL’s Radio Azadi.
“The poor, widows, orphans, and those who worked or fought for the previous government can’t access aid,” Mohammad added.
Observers say the Taliban’s actions threaten to deprive tens of thousands of Afghans of life-saving assistance. Afghans are suffering from the combined impacts of drought, war, the coronavirus pandemic, and an economic crisis exacerbated by turmoil after the Taliban takeover.
We're 'Left Out'
When the Taliban seized control of Kabul on August 15, Western donors immediately suspended aid to Afghanistan, wary of giving hundreds of millions of dollars to a militant group that is notorious for oppressing women, targeting ethnic and religious minorities, and implementing an extremist form of Islamic Shari’a law.
The Taliban has also been deprived of some $9 billion in Afghanistan’s foreign assets. The holdings, most of it kept in the United States, were frozen after the militants’ takeover.
Earlier this month, the international community pledged more than $1.2 billion in humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. But it is unclear how and when the assistance will be delivered to the millions of Afghans who are in urgent need of help.
The Taliban has received direct humanitarian aid, including cash, basic food items, and medicine, from only some countries. The biggest donors have been China and Pakistan, the Taliban’s main foreign ally.
But Afghans say the modest levels of aid reaching the country are not going to the neediest.
“Only people with influence and access are getting aid while the rest of us are being left out,” says Abdullah, a resident of the southern province of Helmand.
Abdullah, speaking to RFE/RL, says the Taliban is funneling aid to powerful tribal leaders who contributed to their 20-year war effort against international and Afghan government forces.
Risk Of Mass Starvation
Afghanistan faced drought, displacement, and a humanitarian crisis even before the Taliban toppled the Western-backed government in Kabul in mid-August, with half the population dependent on aid, according to the United Nations.
The loss of international funding and assistance has exacerbated the dire situation in the country, observers say.
Almost 23 million Afghans, or two-thirds of the population of some 35 million, will suffer “acute food insecurity” this winter, the World Food Program (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) warned in a joint statement on October 25.
Last month, a United Nations Development Program (UNDP) study warned that as much as 97 percent of Afghanistan’s population was at risk of sinking below the poverty line “unless a response to the country’s political and economic crises is urgently launched.”
In recent weeks, reports have emerged of children dying from hunger on the streets or being sold by desperate parents.
'Completely Impossible'
Despite pledging hundreds of millions of dollars in aid to Afghanistan, Western donors face a difficult task of delivering assistance to ordinary Afghans.
Many international organizations and foreign governments evacuated their staff after the Taliban takeover and subsequent withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. Foreign aid projects, which were run through Afghan government ministries, have collapsed.
“It is completely impossible for United Nations agencies and NGOs to fill the vacuum of a collapsing state infrastructure,” says Anders Fange, a veteran aid worker and board member of the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA), which leads one of the largest international aid operations in the country.
Aid worker Anders Fange (file photo)
Fange says UN and U.S. sanctions against Taliban leaders and the reluctance of the international community to deal with the Taliban-led government are creating hurdles for the delivery of aid.
“You can talk to [the Taliban], but you can’t channel money through them because you will be violating the sanctions regime from the UN itself and from the United States,” he said.
At least half of the Taliban’s cabinet members are on UN sanctions lists. Some prominent Taliban ministers are U.S.-designated terrorists.
Even Afghans who are trying to help their local communities have come up against Taliban bureaucracy. Locals say charities or individuals trying to help must get prior approval from the Taliban.
“The Taliban are distributing aid to those who contributed to their war effort, are part of their organization, or who now support their government,” says a Kabul resident who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of Taliban reprisals.
“They are in no mood to support those who fought against them or have remained neutral during the past two decades,” he adds.
'Deserving People'
Only a few countries have given the Taliban direct foreign aid.
China and Pakistan have pledged more than $60 million, in total, in cash to the Taliban government. They have also donated coronavirus vaccines, food, and medicines.
Neighbors Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, collectively, have donated some 6,400 metric tons of wheat flour to Afghanistan since September.
The Taliban has denied claims that it is only distributing aid to its supporters. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid told RFE/RL that the group is distributing medical aid and food through relevant government ministries and departments.
“These government organs distribute all the aid, and they have established procedures to distribute aid to deserving people,” he said.
But that is rejected by Afghans who accuse the Taliban of misusing foreign aid.
Alizai, a resident of Helmand Province, says the Taliban is only distributing aid to the families of slain or living Taliban fighters.
“They got everything,” says Alizai. “How long will this continue?”
9. US develops game-changing nuclear sensors for warheads
This seems like a very significant capability. This would be one reason why I would not establish a no first use policy.
Excerpts:
The sensors have been buried in hundreds of the most powerful American warheads, which experts say gives them an improved ability to destroy Russian and Chinese nuclear-tipped missiles.
The technology will also allow them to hit some of the world’s most challenging targets, such as hardened silos or mountain sanctuaries, and storage bunkers in North Korea.
The new components - which determine and set the best height for a nuclear blast - cost the US some billions of dollars and were completed in July for installation on missiles aboard navy submarines.
Experts have estimated that the fuzes have roughly doubled the destructive power of the US submarine fleet alone.
US develops game-changing nuclear sensors for warheads
Experts have estimated that the fuzes have roughly doubled the destructive power of the US submarine fleet alone
The US has developed sophisticated electronic sensors for its ballistic nuclear missiles which allows them to better time detonations, in a major advancement in the global arms race.
The sensors have been buried in hundreds of the most powerful American warheads, which experts say gives them an improved ability to destroy Russian and Chinese nuclear-tipped missiles.
The technology will also allow them to hit some of the world’s most challenging targets, such as hardened silos or mountain sanctuaries, and storage bunkers in North Korea.
The new components - which determine and set the best height for a nuclear blast - cost the US some billions of dollars and were completed in July for installation on missiles aboard navy submarines.
Experts have estimated that the fuzes have roughly doubled the destructive power of the US submarine fleet alone.
A passerby watches a TV screen showing a news program reporting about North Korea's missile launch with file footage, in Tokyo Credit: AP
The Defense Department has publicly described the components as a routine engineering improvement to the W88 series of warheads that provides no substantial new military capabilities.
Air Force budget documents provided to Congress describe it as a “form, fit, and functionally equivalent replacement” for existing nuclear warhead fuzes. But those familiar with highly it will make the warheads significantly more damaging than previous weapons.
“It’s an astounding piece of technology,” said mechanical engineer Paul Hommert, who used to direct the government-owned Sandia National Laboratories. He said that while existing US weapons are highly accurate, the sensors the lab created are even better at computing the best moment for a blast to be ignited to produce the highest pressures on targets.
The US’s nuclear arsenal has shrunk by roughly a third because of arms agreements struck in the past two decades.
Administrations involved in the development have sought to depict it as simply a slight modernisation of a single component that they say does not violate a 2010 promise by President Barack Obama to forswear the development of new nuclear weapons or their modification to support new military missions.
Arms reduction agreements between the US and Russia have typically measured the relative military might of both nations by the numbers of nuclear weapons they held, not how destructive the weapons were.
But Navy Admiral Charles Richard, who commands the US Strategic Command that stewards the nuclear arsenal, told the House Armed Services Committee in April that “the size of a nation’s weapons stockpile is a crude measure of its overall strategic capability. It is necessary to consider the capability, range and accuracy of the associated delivery systems.”
Some experts express concern that leaders of nuclear countries hostile to Washington might be more prone to strike first in any future conflict, knowing the new destructive force of the US arsenal.
“If China or Russia believe in a conflict or a crisis that we are going to attack or destroy their nuclear forces and command posts, that gives them an incentive to use nuclear weapons first, or to threaten their use,” physicist James Acton, who co-directs the nuclear policy program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told The Post.
10. Filipino Special Forces Take Out Key Islamist Militant Leader
Good work by our AFP SF brethren.
Filipino Special Forces Take Out Key Islamist Militant Leader | SOFREP
1 day ago
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U.S. and Filipino special operation troops during counter-insurgency training. (U.S. Embassy in the Philippines)
Philippine military forces on Friday killed one of the country’s most-wanted Islamist militant leaders and his wife. The pair was blamed for a long series of deadly bombings, killings, extortion, and terror attacks in the provinces of Maguindanao, North Cotabato, and Sultan Kudarat in the southern area of Mindanao for more than a decade, the military said in a statement.
Police forces and Army Special Operations Forces from the Army’s 6ID raided a hideout of the militant group Daulah Islamiya- Hassan Group (DIHG) in a remote area of Talayan town in Maguindanao province and killed its leader, Salahuddin Hassan, and his wife in a 30-minute gunbattle before dawn. Despite more than two dozen other gunmen escaping, Filipino military officials called it a possible death knell for the group.
“With the death of their leader, we are certain that the group will crumble,” said Major General Alfredo Rosario Jr., commander of the military’s Western Mindanao Command. “This is a significant breakthrough in our campaign against terrorism in central Mindanao.”
R4 Assault rifles, ammunition, and rebel documents were seized by troops at the scene of the battle, the military said.
The bodies of Hassan and his wife lay covered with sheets after they were killed in a shootout with military forces. (Filipino military)
“The AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) leadership commends the operating units from the Army’s 6th Infantry Division (6ID) for the successful operations that led to the demise of wanted terrorist leader Salahuddin Hassan,” AFP chief of staff General Jose Faustino Jr., said in a statement on Friday.
The bloody firefight saw Hassan’s group try to flee while other rebel forces engaged the 6th ID troops. During the exchange, Hassan was seriously wounded. The other rebels then abandoned Hassan and his wife, who served as the group’s finance officer, according to Colonel Pedro Balisi, the commander of the 1st Mechanized Brigade.
Salahuddin Hassan was considered the “overall emir” of the group. The group pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS), in April 2015. One of its most prominent attacks was the 2016 bombing of a night market that left 15 people dead and dozens wounded in Davao city, President Rodrigo Duterte’s hometown.
Daulah Islamiya was also blamed for the 2014 bombing of a bus in the country’s south. That attack killed 11 people and wounded 15 others. In June, Hassan’s men attacked and burned a bus in M’lang town in southern Cotabato province in an attack that killed four people and injured several others, the military added.
Hassan founded the extortion group Al-Khobar, which was blamed for bombings, extortion, and other attacks from 2007 to 2015. He was trained by and considered a protege of Malaysian militant, Zulkifli bin Hir, also known as Marwan, military officials said. Bin Hir was among Southeast Asia’s most-wanted militants before being killed by government forces.
Daulah Islamiya group with former leader Maute, who was killed by Filipino troops. (File photo)
Marwan was killed in the bloody 2015 battle in Mamasapano that resulted in 44 elite policemen being killed.
Hasan, who was also known as Orak, Salah, and Tulea also led a faction of the Dawla Islamiya terrorist group in south-central Mindanao.
Daulah Islamiya is one of several small but violent groups which pledged allegiance to the Islamic State group after rejecting a 2014 peace deal by the government that granted some autonomy to the largest Muslim rebel group the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).
Salahuddin Hassan had also long been rumored to allegedly been providing bomb-making training to militants of the Abu Sayyaf group.
Abu Sayyaf has been blamed for bombings, ransom kidnappings, and beheadings and is listed as a terrorist organization by the United States and the Philippines,
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11. Reimagining the Peace Corps for the next 60 years
I have known many great Peace Corps volunteers over the years. This is a path of national service that young people should pursue (and every American regardless of age or service should read the Ugly American (as well as the Quiet American)).
But as the author notes, the world has changed. How should the Peace Corps adapt? I would be careful about tying it to any other government agencies. The Peace Corps is an organization that does the right thing because it is the right thing to do. Tying it to other government agencies could undermine its legitimacy and put its members at risk. There have long been rumors that Peace Corps members collect intelligence. While I think the idea of great synergy in strategic competition (replacing great power competition) is a good thing I think the Peace Corps standing alone might bring great benefits as an example that America is doing good because it is America and it is not doing anything other than what it claims to be doing. It will contribute best to strategic competition by not trying to tie it to strategic competition (if that paradox can be understood).
And please do not call Spacial Forces a Peace Corps with guns.
Reimagining the Peace Corps for the next 60 years
The Hill · by Daniel F. Runde, opinion contributor · October 30, 2021
The Peace Corps celebrates its 60th anniversary this year, but due to the COVID-19 pandemic there are currently no Peace Corps volunteers serving abroad. As the Peace Corps program practices resiliency and adapts to a post-COVID landscape, it should also use this moment to answer long-existing questions that can redirect the Peace Corps to a more impactful and relevant future.
About the Peace Corps
The book “The Ugly American” caused a sensation in foreign policy and national security circles when it was released in 1958. It painted Americans as arrogant, out of touch, and insensitive to the needs of the rapidly de-colonizing developing world. It was so influential that then-Senator John F. Kennedy bought 99 copies of the book and gave it to every other Senator to read. “The Ugly American” was the impetus for major foreign policy changes in how we engage with the world. As president, Kennedy signed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 creating USAID, initiated the Alliance for Progress in Latin America, and launched the Peace Corps.
The Peace Corps was envisioned to “promote world peace and friendship” by sending Americans to work on a grassroots level in developing countries. Over the years, the Peace Corps has sent over 240,000 Americans to 143 countries. Numerous volunteers have gone on to have successful careers across the U.S. government. There are several dozen countries where country expertise comes from former Peace Corps volunteers.
The Peace Corps is a good thing. Having volunteers commit to two years of service in another country contributes to international understanding and diplomacy.
At the same time, the world has significantly changed. Before 1991, there were no Peace Corps volunteers in Central Asia or Eastern Europe. Some countries have become too dangerous to have volunteers (I.e., El Salvador, Mali). Because of globalization, there has been a proliferation of shorter-term volunteer initiatives also trying to leverage American volunteerism (I.e., International Executive Service Corps, Farmer to Farmer). Unlike 1961, English is now the global lingua franca, and 40 percent of Peace Corps volunteers teach English, math, and science.
Questions for the Peace Corps
There have been several revisions to the Peace Corps over the decades. On the 60th anniversary of the Peace Corps, we need to answer long-standing questions about it and consider its direction for the next 60 years.
One question is: Where should we deploy volunteers in the age of great power competition? We could continue to deploy Peace Corps volunteers where we have traditionally deployed volunteers: where volunteers can make a difference. Or, we might consider geopolitical considerations more heavily than we have in the past to optimize engagement. The Peace Corps has slowly trended in that direction, narrowing its scope from 69 countries in 2009 to 61 countries in 2020, and terminating some country-specific technical programs. There is also a reasonable argument to increase volunteers to population growth centers in Africa, the Indo-Pacific, Central Asia, and South Asia.
Another question we should ask is: What kinds of Peace Corps volunteers should we send? The quintessential Peace Corps volunteer is a college graduate. However, the Peace Corps has worked at trying to tap into a cohort of older volunteers with specific technical expertise, which is a welcome change. There is potential to do more with military veterans who could enter the Peace Corps after completing their active-duty service. Veterans might get preferential treatment to encourage more veterans in the Peace Corps. The Peace Corps has been a historic feeder to USAID and other development and diplomatic agencies. In the developing world of the future, we will need government officials who are comfortable in security-ambiguous locales.
Peace Corps service could be an excellent additional training opportunity for veterans who want to stay in international affairs. One step might be to vet potential Peace Corps volunteers for a lower-level federal government security clearance. Such a clearance process would signal to the volunteer the seriousness of going overseas as a volunteer and might prune out the small percentage of potential Peace Corps volunteers who might see their service as an extension of spending time at a college fraternity or sorority.
Can we bring in more technical and skilled volunteers? Peace Corps Response is a more technical program that sends professionals and returned volunteers with specialized certifications to work in a developing country for a shorter time frame, 3 to 12 months. However, even that commitment may be too long for many working professionals, who are more likely and willing to invest in a few weeks to two months to make a rapid social impact.
Peace Corps Response might consider adopting some of the practices of the “Volunteers for Prosperity” program, started by President George W. Bush in 2003, that partnered with nonprofit organizations and companies to recruit skilled workers. Doing so might help to better manage the schedules and technical niches of professionals hoping to volunteer abroad. Peace Corps Response might also think about pairing skilled professionals with longer-term Peace Corps volunteers to give them rapid technical training that they can implement into their multi-year service.
Can we encourage the Peace Corps to have a more permanent presence in the countries they work in? A 27-month service sounds like a long commitment, but the length of service and high turnover rate of Peace Corps volunteers, 21 percent in FY2015, means that the work and agenda in a community change every two years. We ought to find ways to encourage volunteers to remain in a country, should they wish to do so. This is especially applicable in countries with American cohorts who are fluent in lesser-known languages, like Bahasa Indonesian, Ukrainian, or even Portuguese. For example, the Peace Corps could arrange for a 5-year residency visa in the country where the former Peace Corps Volunteer has done service, offer former volunteers a 30-day “entrepreneurship boot camp” and a $20,000 loan to start a small business in the country they worked in. For the global future, we need Americans who seek their fortunes in emerging markets to deepen ties with countries and encourage greater prosperity.
The Peace Corps has long been an independent agency, separate from USAID or the State Department. Would tying Peace Corps to one of the other international affairs agencies overseas create synergies? For example, there could be value in joining the Peace Corps’ work with USAID for the purpose of measurement and evaluation functions, merging HR and accounting with another international affairs agency.
Political capital for moving organizational boxes around has waned due to the significant difficulty and time spent in merging agencies, and it is very unlikely something like a merger would happen in a Biden administration.
The Peace Corps has lasted for 60 years and continues to be much beloved by former Peace Corps volunteers. It is part public diplomacy, part global development, and part self-discovery for volunteers. In the new world that we live in, post-COVID 19 — and in an era of great power competition — the Peace Corps should adapt and evolve.
Daniel F. Runde is a senior vice president and William A. Schreyer chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He previously worked for the U.S. Agency for International Development, the World Bank Group, and in investment banking, with experience in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East.
The Hill · by Daniel F. Runde, opinion contributor · October 30, 2021
12. Chinese Enterprise: Contracting Security Abroad
Long read with a lot of detail.
Conclusion:
While the United States employs between 400,000 and 500,000 contractors every year, and the Russian government deploys roughly 100,000 to 150,000 of its own contractors annually, the Chinese government’s use of PSCs remains modest in comparison. As time goes on, however, these numbers may increase as BRI projects are formalized and domestic training and recruitment improves. In addition, with security now a “standard line item in the SOE budgeting process,” PSCs are an intrinsic element of BRI operations. Contractors not only “close the gap between the PLA’s limited expeditionary capacity and the country’s need for security abroad,” they do so in a cost-effective and plausibly unofficial manner.
The Belt and Road Initiative provides a useful framework for Chinese activity abroad, but it by no means represents the extent of Beijing’s international footprint. As case studies in Africa and Central Asia increasingly show, where Chinese business goes, private security contractors follow. Currently an underdeveloped industry, the Chinese private security market shows no signs of slowing down. The ability to deploy personnel, that maintain a relatively subdued presence, that ensure security on their own, or through the training and equipment of locally available forces, enables Chinese business to operate far beyond what would be possible under government protection. As nations around the world continue to fail, civil wars ensue, and political strife persists, Chinese enterprise will continue to expand. And therefore, so too will contractors, and their ability to navigate this murky terrain.
Chinese Enterprise: Contracting Security Abroad » Wavell Room
Experimental Feature: Audio Read Version
For many years, China’s national security strategy could be summarized by Deng Xiaoping’s “24-Character Strategy,” which translates to “Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.” Although certain characteristics of this strategy remain, modern-day China has an overwhelmingly different view of its position in the world. With interests already spanning the globe, the 2013 announcement by President Xi Jinping for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provides an idea for the scope of China’s desired global economic position. Projected to involve over $1 trillion USD in more than 60 countries, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) must sort out not only funding and logistics, but also security if it is to reap the benefits of this massive undertaking.
While the maritime trade routes are more easily defensible through military escort and international counter-piracy measures, inland projects present unique problem sets for Chinese enterprise. Depending on the host nation in question, Beijing may rely on internal security forces to ensure business operations and personnel are protected. In more precarious regions, however, the PRC is increasingly relying on private security contractors to manage operations. As a lower visibility option than the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), there are several positive factors in using contractors within the BRI framework. Beyond the ability to secure business operations, these firms are able to provide training to local personnel and carry out the sale of weapons and equipment, while acting as points of contact for both state and non-state actors on the ground. Although contractors today play a quantitatively small role within the overall structure of the BRI, it is a growing industry that is quickly revealing itself to be a useful option for Chinese companies operating in dangerous regions around the world. It will, therefore, likely occupy a more decisive position as operations continue.
Security Abroad
Until recent years, the security of Chinese citizens and assets abroad was of secondary concern for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Although China first announced the “Go Out Policy” in 1999, wherein there was the promotion of foreign investment and business partnerships, activity remained subdued for many years. In 2012, however, the concept of “protecting nationals abroad” appeared in the CCP’s 18th Party Congress. The following year, in alignment with Xi’s announcement of the BRI, the PLA followed suit with a white paper involving language around the protection of citizens and interests abroad for the first time in the military’s history. While these kinds of statements have been made at the policy level but dealing with the issues in practice has proven more difficult for three main reasons: China’s principle of non-interference, complicated operating environments, and limited ability to use official forces.
For over sixty years, China has maintained what are known as its “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,”
For over sixty years, China has maintained what are known as its “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” through which it claims to promote “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, mutual non-interference, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.” The principle of non-interference, in particular, is frequently referenced by Chinese leadership. According to President Xi, China “neither interferes in other countries’ internal affairs nor imposes its will on others.” An additional component to this concept is the practice of only working with official representatives of the host country’s government. However, both the Chinese government and its businesses operating abroad are increasingly finding the need to not only become involved where it is operating abroad, but also to often work with local non-state actors. These local groups, whether tribal leaders or militias, are in many cases the key interlocutors with which the Chinese must broker deals to function within the region unencumbered by violence. In practice, this often involves the Chinese government, or its state-owned enterprises (SOEs), providing financial or material support, as well as mediating between warring parties. While Beijing attempts to avoid the appearance of choosing sides in a given conflict, this level of involvement is far removed from the traditionally strict approach it used to take to non-interference. Somewhere in the middle of isolation and intervention, is what Peking University researcher Wang Yizhou has termed “creative involvement.”
The need for this approach has become apparent as China has expanded work abroad. Given the fragile nature of many states and regions along the BRI, Chinese companies are presented with differing levels of volatility in each area they operate. While a considerable share of BRI-affiliated projects involves the construction of basic infrastructure, nations requiring assistance in these areas may likely suffer problems of instability in association with inadequacies of governance and rule of law, in addition to political infighting or civil war. Navigating these environments is a necessity, therefore, if China’s SOEs are to successfully do business. While potentially high returns on investment are what attracts Chinese enterprise, novel strategies in security and risk management are what allow it to stay.
Concerning this practical application of securing the BRI, China has had to grapple with the type of personnel available for deployment. Much of the initial thinking regarding these problems has occurred within the PLA. Yet experts at the Academy of Military Sciences have pointed out an apparent mismatch between the official documents, such as its white papers, calling for the defense of assets abroad, and limitations due to the principle of non-interference. The overt presence of Chinese military forces in support of conceivably mercantilist goals is in direct contradiction to this philosophy, through which China has ostensibly conducted itself for over half a century. The PLA understands this issue, as described in an interview with one former Chinese military officer that, “the need for security protection overseas is quite significant and the army is clearly not suitable for this job due to the potential problems it might cause for foreign relations.”
To address this problem, others have highlighted possible solutions to properly safeguard Chinese activity and interests, while abiding by its own constraint of non-interference. Shanghai University researcher, Su Changhe, has pointed to “participation in multilateral security initiatives led by the UN” in order to achieve this. The reality, however, is that participation in UN peacekeeping will bring very little value to Chinese enterprise and its security requirements. To begin with, Chinese businesses seek to operate beyond the bounds of where the UN may choose to deploy peacekeepers, of which only roughly 2,500 are Chinese. Furthermore, the utility of these peacekeepers is fairly low given the often-stringent rules of engagement provided by the UN.
there are still over 30,000 Chinese businesses and roughly one million Chinese citizens currently operating and living abroad.
Issues with official forces notwithstanding, there are still over 30,000 Chinese businesses and roughly one million Chinese citizens currently operating and living abroad. That is why China’s approach is closer to Thomas Kane’s description where it “relies on a network of host-nation security forces and civilian contractors to protect key assets and citizens abroad.” This network is often negotiated at the state level, where Beijing tries to secure protection agreements as part of the greater economic benefit promised through the BRI. In many other cases, however, SOEs are operating more independently and must secure operations without any diplomatic intermediary.
Contracting Security
Quickly becoming a staple resource for SOEs abroad, Chinese private security contractors (PSCs) are fulfilling many of the requirements these companies have to successfully conduct business. With no official linkages to Beijing, they serve as a layer of deniability in circumventing claims of interference in foreign affairs. Unlike the PLA, they are also easily deployable to conflict zones where they may work with both state and non-state actors once in the country.
While these characteristics prove PSCs to be a valuable asset for China’s SOEs, there are certain limitations on the industry as a whole. Although China has thousands of PSCs domestically, offering services such as close protection and facility security, less than 30 are able to operate internationally. Among the firms deploying approximately 3,000 contractors abroad are Shandong Huawei Security Group and DeWe Security Service Group. Beyond the size of the industry, though, the greatest restriction is through the “Law of the PRC on Control of Guns,” which stipulates that all Chinese citizens except members of the PLA, the police, and militia, are prohibited from carrying weapons at home or abroad. Nevertheless, Chinese PSCs are finding a role when local actors are unable, or unwilling, to provide the proper level of protection for Chinese projects. Among a wide range of services, SOEs are able to bring contractors to collaborate with host nation forces and, if needed, organize, train, and equip personnel.
These contractors – although unarmed – can work independently to keep watch and liaise with local security forces when necessary. A well-documented example occurred in 2016 when 330 Chinese nationals living in Juba, South Sudan were caught in a firefight between South Sudanese government forces and a rebel militia. Chinese peacekeepers stationed in Juba as part of the UN mission remained in their bases despite the fact that “protecting oil workers and assets” is included in the peacekeepers’ UN mandate. DeWe, which was contracted in the state by the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was left to evacuate the Chinese nationals. The contractors were able to organize, and direct locals forces to then assist with the rescue operation.
Chinese peacekeepers in Juba 2017. Credit: UNMISS
The training capabilities offered by PSCs are an additional way that security is ensured for Chinese projects. As one of China’s most active firms, DeWe advertises to have delivered over 3,000 in-country trainings. With many former PLA and PAP (People’s Armed Police) personnel among its ranks, these firms are able to provide specialized unit-level instruction for military operations, static security, and counterterrorism. A couple of its higher-profile contracts have included stationing personnel for training and overwatch on the $4 USD billion natural gas project in Ethiopia and the $3.8 USD billion Standard Gauge Railway, projected to run from Naivasha, Kenya to Mombasa, Nairobi.
More than anywhere else, DeWe is the main player in Sudan and South Sudan, with a regional office and plans to build a “security camp” in the latter. This would be “the first overseas private security facility of its kind established by a Chinese company”. Should the PRC reconsider restrictions on firearms abroad, this model may one day evolve into forward deployed locales for armed contractors, somewhat resolving the ongoing issues within the PLA regarding foreign basing.
As has been mentioned, many business operations require more security than unarmed Chinese contractors can provide. In these situations, PSCs serve to augment local forces through training and management services and, importantly, the sale of weaponry. Although China has long sold weapons abroad, the profits were largely used to finance its growing defense industry. Today, the practice is less about financial profit, and more so to ensure its own security in the region, to garner political influence, and to maintain access to resource-rich areas. Moreover, these sales are geographically aligned to SOE interest and often carried out by these private security firms.
From 2012-2016, China’s exportation of major arms rose by 74 percent, as compared to the 2007-2011 time period, according to a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report. The correlation drawn between arms sales and Chinese economic activity can be most clearly seen on the African continent; a region where over 10,000 Chinese businesses operate, and where weapons exports grew by 122 percent during that same time period.
Assistance goes far beyond the sale of small arms and light weapons, with eleven countries thus far purchasing armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Included among them are Egypt, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan, the latter of which uses them to bolster its protection of the China—Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Satellite imagery and other shared intelligence capabilities are additional means exported to partner nations. As Chinese PSCs increasingly recruit individuals from organizations like the Ministry of State Security, the industry’s ability to deliver these types of services will continue to grow. The PRC has given this type of assistance to the Nigerian government, for example, in its war against Boko Haram. This likely bought it the political capital required to ensure the Nigerian government allows, and secures, Chinese business operations into the future. This can be seen throughout the continent with initiatives such as the China-Africa Cooperation Action Plan (2016-2018), which “called for a deepening of exchanges of intelligence with African militaries and governments and the provision of Chinese training.” This initiative was renewed more recently through the China-Africa Cooperation Action Plan (2019-2021).
As development along the BRI continues, China is necessarily becoming more overtly involved in international affairs. Despite this shift toward higher-visibility activity, PSCs may serve to reduce the amount of attention accumulated given the reduced footprint and ability to lead from behind, training and equipping local forces. As one expert has noted, the utility of Chinese PSCs is the ability to “fill a gap in the provision of high-security services, provide on-demand force that is not already available locally, transfer security technologies and capabilities, [and] add a layer of plausible deniability to the BRI win-win narrative.” To what extent this industry will develop, however, largely depends on the trajectory of Chinese foreign direct investment, international business operations, and the riskiness of those locations. To better estimate these trends, a couple of underlying variables provide some insight. The first is the Chinese view on energy security and the second is the growing influence of SOEs in Beijing’s foreign policy calculus.
Driving Factors of Chinese Activity Abroad
As China’s economy and population grow, and military capabilities develop, greater energy requirements will continue to undergird its strategy. To ensure those requirements are met, Beijing’s national energy strategy stipulates the need for “strategic reserve accumulation, global access to multiple energy sources, and increased efficiency in distribution and consumption.” With so many BRI-affiliated projects occurring in the oil and gas sectors, there is a clear linkage to Chinese national security priorities. For example, since 2015, China has imported over half of its petroleum. Roughly 85 percent of these shipments pass through the Malacca Straits. Although dependence on key trade routes will likely continue, Beijing is nonetheless attempting to alleviate this reliance through projects like pipeline construction in Central Asia.
The leading entities charged with ensuring these opportunities are identified, scoped, and completed, are China’s state-owned enterprises. These partially state-led organizations, while key players in Chinese business, are growing influences in Chinese foreign policy as well. The Chinese Communist Party has been traditionally risk-averse regarding its involvement abroad and while this hesitancy is slowly fading SOEs may be accelerating the process. Although the leadership of SOEs is put in place by the Organization Department of the CCP, these enterprises conduct themselves in large part through commercially driven decision-making, rather than purely in line with the political sensibilities characteristic of the PRC. While there is a large push toward more stringently regulating SOE operations, and ensuring proper precautions are in place prior to mobilizing business and security units, they will nonetheless venture farther than the Chinese government would have likely gone. This often pulls it into diplomatically uncomfortable situations.
According to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, over 80 percent of BRI projects are in medium to high-risk countries. The majority of which are located in Africa, where SOEs generated $51 billion USD in revenue in 2017 alone. To ensure those profits continue, large sums of money are set aside for security. To illustrate this point, China’s “three sisters” (China National Petroleum Corporation, Sinopec Group, and China National Offshore Oil Corporation_ collectively spend around $2 USD billion dollars per year on security. Other industries such as mining and construction are following suit. Many of them would initially be under the assumption that the Chinese government would secure protection from the host country, only to realize they must hire contractors to either augment or replace local security personnel.
Domestic political factors are aiding in this shift toward the “corporatization” of PRC affairs as well. In the last few years, President Xi Jinping has purged several purportedly corrupt PLA officials in order “to detach the PLA from the entrepreneurial side of the Chinese development.” In terms of SOEs, since 2016 Beijing has been attempting to carry out a restructuring program to better regulate operations and improve government control and oversight. However, with over 150,000 Chinese SOEs in total, and over 10,000 operating in Africa alone, they will not only prove difficult to fully regulate, but will likely continue along the same trendline. In turn this pulls the PRC into high-risk areas abroad.
Although Chinese SOEs are apt to break into new markets, preexisting areas of coverage such as the Middle East are becoming more hazardous with the drawdown of U.S. military forces in recent years. Chinese security firms are capitalizing on this surge in demand, however. Shandong Huawei Security Group’s website, for example, specifically cites U.S. troops leaving Iraq as a primary reason to enter the market. Afghanistan presents a similar situation, in which Chinese companies had long been able to conduct business under the incidental protection of the U.S. Army’s 10th Mountain Division, whereas now they are more reliant on their own security measures.
Given the combined effect of these trends, China’s interest, and ability to operate abroad will likely continue to increase. The Chinese private security industry’s position within these developments remains uncertain for many, however. Some researchers have claimed that because Chinese PSCs often lack local language expertise, and other functional specialties, that they will “remain a passive spectator in the overall BRI global development.” They might, therefore, be stuck working behind the walls of gated compounds and will depend “on external armed protection from local militia or international contractors.” This is certainly true in many instances, but as the Chinese private security industry develops, this will become less common. The ban on Chinese citizens having firearms abroad will likely stay in place for the foreseeable future. However, the effect that China’s PSCs will have, for better or worse, as conduits for training, arms sales, intelligence gathering, and risk management writ large will become commensurate with the amount of money SOEs are spending on security. Furthermore, the dependence on local actors is a benefit for the industry, considering the Chinese wish to keep as low of a profile as possible wherever they conduct business.
Additionally, many Chinese SOEs prefer to exclusively work with Chinese PSCs. In part this is because of the shared language, but also because of certain secretive aspects of their operations that they would not feel comfortable with foreign, particularly Western contractors, becoming privy to. As one DeWe official explained, “For Chinese firms, especially with security work, they…want to speak with another Chinese person. We can also one hundred percent reflect their thinking when we work.” As is the case throughout Africa, there are also suspicions that local contractors that are often underpaid and poorly equipped will only compound the preexisting security concerns given potentially subpar performance, or entanglements within the ongoing tribal or regional disputes of the country in question. For these reasons, SOEs often see the need to bring Chinese firms to properly train, equip, and organize local forces.
While still in its nascent stage, the Chinese private security industry is undeniably gaining traction, both domestically and internationally. Although the sector is still more domestically focused, as these companies develop the requisite capabilities, they are beginning to turn outward in greater number for the service of Chinese SOEs and private Chinese companies. Anytime they are able to use Chinese firms they likely will, as they “provide the advantage of a low political profile, generally lower cost, the ability to carry out work deemed too sensitive for PLA forces, and some assurance of political reliability.”
In 2017, a managing director for the Chinese Overseas Security Group stated that, “In eight years’ time, we want to run a business that can cover 50-60 countries, which fits with the One Belt One Road coverage.” While the statement applies to one company, in particular, all the data available thus far points to an industry-wide trajectory conducive to this estimation.
Risk Environment
To further explore risk management for Chinese PSCs and the SOEs that employ them, Africa and Central Asia provide examples of threats both inherent to the operating environment, as well as those contrived, or exacerbated, by China’s presence in the region.
By Lommes – Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=58884083
Africa
Discussions regarding the BRI often overlook the extent to which the continent of Africa is involved. Beyond some high-profile oil pipeline or port infrastructure projects, over 40 of 55 African countries have signed BRI-affiliated agreements. While many of these countries are not yet deeply involved, as China develops the BRI it will increasingly widen the scope of its work on the continent. To date, more than 200,000 Chinese workers, and over 10,000 Chinese companies are active in Africa. In terms of the security threat this presents, more than sixty percent of all attacks on Chinese nationals abroad occur there.
More than most other states on the continent, Sudan and South Sudan provide for a detailed experience regarding Chinese business operations. Involvement in the region goes back to the 1990s, during the Second Sudanese Civil War but prior to South Sudan’s independence. Over the years, China has garnered control of over 75 percent of the Sudanese oil industry – intertwining the region so heavily with the PRC that the Sudanese government has even announced that it “aims to turn Port Sudan into a free trade zone to support BRI. ” Today, China is the largest trading partner for both Sudan and South Sudan. During the initial decades of involvement in the region, government forces were largely capable of ensuring protection for Chinese business. Over the years, however, the situation has worsened and, so too, have the threats to Chinese personnel. This reality came to the forefront in 2008, when nine China National Petroleum Corporation employees were kidnapped, four of whom were killed. Since this incident, China has proven more capable over time to ensure the security of its citizenry in the region. The efficacy of private security contractors, in particular, was made apparent in South Sudan through their juxtaposition with the PLA peacekeepers remaining in garrison during the fighting throughout Juba in 2016.
All through somewhat unofficial means, Chinese PSCs provide a litany of security options throughout the continent. In low-risk zones, they are able to independently post security when unarmed guards are sufficient. While in higher-risk environments they can train and equip local forces, as well as easily work with whatever interlocutors are required, be it state- or non-state actors.
Central Asia
While Africa is in many respects the most dangerous region within which Chinese SOEs operate, Central Asia is quickly becoming a case study in security threats that have arisen exactly because of operations in the region. Although positioned as a way to alleviate Central Asia of its landlocked condition, opening it up as a “trans-Eurasian corridor,” the enormous scope of the BRI is instead seen by many as intrusive and, in some cases, a threat to their political agency. In addition, China is experiencing instances of terrorism in the region in response to its treatment of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. For example, Syria-based Uyghurs were connected to the 2016 suicide bombing attack on China’s embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Although the stabilization of the Xinjiang region is an underlying objective of the BRI, domestic activity there may prove counterproductive through the difficulties it raises abroad.
While most of the focus is around high-profile infrastructure development and energy projects, China has also been exporting products to the region which are more affordable than Western, Russian, Turkish, or Iranian suppliers. This influx of cheap products, however, has also been cited as a source of antagonism given negative popular opinion and instances of media manipulation framing these products as very low in quality. Narratives are now forming that the end result of the BRI will simply be a more suitable environment for the exportation of Chinese products, rather than any discernably positive changes in the region. In addition, many worry that the Chinese will replace many basic sectors involved in food production and construction, furthering Central Asian dependency on the Chinese economy. The situation is further complicated with the Chinese practice of “whole chain industry export,” wherein all facets of the operation are completed by Chinese workers, denying the local populace of potential wages. Statistical data show similar sentiments. Large portions of respondents believe that “[Chinese] migration will have a direct or indirect negative impact on the domestic labor market.”
Likely in an effort to combat this negative sentiment, in recent years it has begun to change the characteristics of its business deals within the region. There is an overarching change from mostly infrastructure projects to manufacturing. China is largely doing this as a response to host nations demanding projects that provide labor for the local population. This is an indication that the Chinese government and its state-owned enterprises are still beholden to the realities on the ground in each country that it operates. From an economic perspective as well, SOEs may be diversifying to hedge against financial fallout in a narrow set of industries.
Any reconfigurations regarding Chinese FDI notwithstanding, risk management in the region will remain critical for the PRC as the overall optics of the situation involve a threatening encroachment from the east. The armed assault on the Chinese consulate in Karachi, Pakistan displays the violent result of this view. The attackers left a note that claimed it was in protest against the “rise of Chinese imperialism.” While unconfirmed, responsibility for the attack was claimed by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), an Afghanistan-based terrorist organization. In the past, there have been unsubstantiated claims from Pakistan that the BLA is secretly funded by India. As one example of many, despite China’s insistence on its “win-win” narrative, attacks of this sort will continue in many areas along the BRI. Managing these threats will involve an admixture of those aforementioned protective measures, such as security overwatch, weapons sales, and training. Chinese PSCs can additionally network with Central Asian government forces to provide surveillance and counterterrorism operations. For more tightly guarded projects, SOEs may even turn to Russian-speaking contractors, which are familiar with not only the terrain, language, and culture of the region, but will also be useful in areas that may become particularly unwelcoming to an ethnic Chinese presence.
Cost-Benefit Analysis
With these risks taken into consideration, China and its SOEs continue to move forward at a rapid pace. Although there is a heightened awareness regarding the need for proper risk management and security practices, in many ways these threats are self-fulfilling prophecies. Although many of these areas have preexisting security concerns, the often-accompanying debt burden, opportunities for corruption, and perceived loss of work when projects are completed with mostly Chinese labor can all exacerbate the situation.
Politicians in these host countries have also entangled the Chinese presence through their activities. In countries such as Kenya, Zambia, and South Sudan, China is often used as a scapegoat to explain, or detract from, the graft and abuse of power that is occurring. For example, in both Africa and Central Asia, there have been numerous accusations from governments and NGOs that the Chinese are “offloading excess population” to these areas by “actively supporting emigration by request.” In many instances, the specifics included workers entering the countries with “fake qualifications in order to obtain work visas and take jobs.” True or not, these ideas within the popular discourse will only heighten tensions. Increasingly viewed as a “neocolonial” power making profits at the expense of the host country, China’s ability to maintain a low profile through its non-interference policy is waning.
In terms of arms sales, China has largely been able to fly under the radar. In recent years, though, the practice is becoming more recognized. These types of deals threaten to dispel any notion that China is an objective mediator within regions undergoing political turmoil and armed conflict. They additionally run the risk of creating targets out of Chinese citizens working in the region. For example, after Norinco, a Chinese state-owned enterprise, sold Sudan weapons, there were attacks on Chinese nationals.
While threats pervade, China’s continued ambition displays the overwhelming beneficial nature of the BRI. In relation to the immense economic and political dividends which the framework will garner for Beijing, the risks it runs are minor in comparison. In addition, there are several potential benefits derived more specifically through the SOE- and PSC-led operations abroad. One subsequent advantage for the Chinese military could be increased access for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Should an SOE be allowed control over a country’s port, there could be “follow-on requests for port calls by PLAN ships.” Similarly, the inability to secure operations by host-nation forces could also lead to requests for PLA troop access to certain areas of a country. Fledgling support for such a notion can be seen in certain Central Asian countries’ involvement in Chinese counterterrorism operations, as well as those proximate to China preferring the PLA’s coverage of the border as Central Asia customs officers are often heavily involved in bribes, smuggling, or other drug-related activity.
An additional benefit to China’s growing involvement in Central Asia will be its enhanced positioning vis-à-vis Afghanistan. With the PRC’s reclassification of Tajikistan as a “zone of special interest,” there has been an uptick of not only economic and political dealings between Beijing and Dushanbe, but also the construction of nearby airbases and other military installations near the China-Tajikistan border, close to Afghanistan.
The possibility of increased Chinese involvement in Afghanistan has become more concrete with the recent announcement by U.S. President Joe Biden to withdraw troops and the subsequent evacuation from Kabul. Before the Taliban regained control of the country, one Chinese security analyst, Sun Qi, offered that the PRC “may deploy peacekeeping forces to prevent security threats in Afghanistan from spilling over into its western Xinjiang province.” Although these cross-border concerns are legitimate, the added benefit of peacekeepers within the state would be the coverage provided to Chinese SOEs currently operating there.
Conclusion
While the United States employs between 400,000 and 500,000 contractors every year, and the Russian government deploys roughly 100,000 to 150,000 of its own contractors annually, the Chinese government’s use of PSCs remains modest in comparison. As time goes on, however, these numbers may increase as BRI projects are formalized and domestic training and recruitment improves. In addition, with security now a “standard line item in the SOE budgeting process,” PSCs are an intrinsic element of BRI operations. Contractors not only “close the gap between the PLA’s limited expeditionary capacity and the country’s need for security abroad,” they do so in a cost-effective and plausibly unofficial manner.
The Belt and Road Initiative provides a useful framework for Chinese activity abroad, but it by no means represents the extent of Beijing’s international footprint. As case studies in Africa and Central Asia increasingly show, where Chinese business goes, private security contractors follow. Currently an underdeveloped industry, the Chinese private security market shows no signs of slowing down. The ability to deploy personnel, that maintain a relatively subdued presence, that ensure security on their own, or through the training and equipment of locally available forces, enables Chinese business to operate far beyond what would be possible under government protection. As nations around the world continue to fail, civil wars ensue, and political strife persists, Chinese enterprise will continue to expand. And therefore, so too will contractors, and their ability to navigate this murky terrain.
Author Bio Other Articles
Jonathan Hall
Jonathan Hall is a Washington D.C.-based intelligence consultant and doctoral candidate. His research focuses primarily on Chinese and Russian political-military strategy, private military contractors, and cyber operations. He can be found on Twitter @_JonathanPHall
13. Women: Terrorism’s Secret Weapon
Conclusion:
In the ever-changing political climate of U.S. – Afghan relations, it is imperative that we, the United States, learn from the past to better prepare for the future. ‘Women’ must not be seen as a homogeneous entity, and counter-narratives should address directly the various push and pull factors that lead Western women to join ISIS. With the Taliban now in control of Afghanistan, we must prepare for the possibility that the country becomes a safe-haven to terrorist groups yet again. Should this happen, we must do everything in our power to weaken these organizations so that their stated goal of violence does not reach American borders or threaten innocent lives. America and the West must invest in counter-messaging campaigns and pro-social interventions directed at young women at risk of joining ISIS. In doing so, we can deny ISIS one of their most undervalued and yet most powerful weapons for propaganda and recruitment: Women.
Women: Terrorism’s Secret Weapon
Photo Credit: The Institute for Security Studies
Recent studies of women’s roles in jihadi terrorism debunk the widely held belief that women are either passive victims or fanatical jihadi brides. Women participate – both willingly and unwillingly – in terrorist activities for a variety of reasons.[1] Women’s participation in jihadi terrorism is not binary, it is a spectrum of motivations, grievances, and agency – or the lack thereof. More importantly, terrorist groups have begun to see the advantages of incorporating women into their tactics and operations. Women not only mother the next generation of fighters, they attract less attention at security checkpoints, their deaths garner more media attention, and the violence perpetrated by women is exploited to shame men into more violent and drastic acts.
Boko Haram‘s strategy to exploit women can be traced back to 2014,[2] a full year before the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) began doing the same.[3] Women can access soft, urban targets – such as markets and schools – more easily and inconspicuously than men. Women can also bypass detection and searches, since a male security agent cannot search a woman.[4] Once discovered, Boko Haram used this tactic to its full advantage, dressing male fighters as women to avoid suspicion.[5] As the group soon realized, female suicide bombers carry with them an element of surprise that suicide attacks carried out by men could not rival. Additionally, female deaths evoke more sympathy from the international community, which in turn garners more media attention for the group and their narrative.[6] In addition to suicide bombings, Boko Haram kidnapped women and young girls – such as the Chibok school girls[7] – and systematically used rape to destroy trust and unravel the social fabric of local communities.[8] Seen in many cultures as carrying the honor of the family, men are seen as a failure if they are unable to protect their female family members. In many of these situations, these violated women are ostracized from their families and communities. This ostracism leads to mental health challenges, high rates of abortion and suicide, as well as the lack of freedom of movement, which denies women the ability to earn a living on their own.[9] Boko Haram’s actions not only cripple the local communities, but they also instill fear, thereby assuring the complacency of the locals and their submission to Boko Haram’s rule.[10]
ISIS also quickly saw the advantages associated with recruiting women. Besides serving as wives to fighters and as mothers to the next generation of jihadi fighters – passing on the radical ideology to their children – ISIS has also capitalized on the usefulness of women for recruitment and propaganda, specifically through online methods and social media.[11] Both willingly and unwillingly, women in ISIS recruit other women to join the caliphate, serving as a huge boon to ISIS’s organization. Female converts to Islam from Europe, the Americas, Australia and New Zealand are especially valuable to ISIS as suicide bombers because this keeps ISIS from having to use local girls and women for such missions which would negatively impact their recruitment and messaging of upholding Sharia Law.[12] These women from the Global North can feel pushed from their Western homes because they feel isolated in their own Western communities, or because they see the suffering of the international Muslim community and are angered by the lack of response to such injustices.[13] Conversely, they can feel drawn to ISIS because of ideological goals of building the Caliphate, the allure of sisterhood, or the thrill and romanticism of the experience.[14]
Practically, Zarqawi needed wives and mothers in order to build his caliphate.[15] But even more importantly, women joining ISIS of their own volition – especially well-off, highly educated Western women – legitimized ISIS’s struggle.[16] Suddenly, women were no longer seen simply as the ‘makers of men,’[17] they were also included in spectacular terrorist attacks which garnered international media attention, thereby compelling competing terrorist organizations to ramp up the frequency and intensity of their own attacks.[18] But perhaps the most impactful repercussion of women joining the fight and contributing to the violence was women’s superior ability to avoid detection, carry out successful attacks, and then shame men into action – something that Zarqawi readily capitalized on.[19] If the situation is so bad, if society has grown so corrupt and immoral that women must throw themselves into the fight, must die for the cause – Zarqawi could argue – then clearly men are not doing enough to fulfill their moral duty of waging jihad.
In the ever-changing political climate of U.S. – Afghan relations, it is imperative that we, the United States, learn from the past to better prepare for the future. ‘Women’ must not be seen as a homogeneous entity, and counter-narratives should address directly the various push and pull factors that lead Western women to join ISIS. With the Taliban now in control of Afghanistan, we must prepare for the possibility that the country becomes a safe-haven to terrorist groups yet again. Should this happen, we must do everything in our power to weaken these organizations so that their stated goal of violence does not reach American borders or threaten innocent lives. America and the West must invest in counter-messaging campaigns and pro-social interventions directed at young women at risk of joining ISIS. In doing so, we can deny ISIS one of their most undervalued and yet most powerful weapons for propaganda and recruitment: Women.
[2] Mia Bloom and Hilary Matfess, “Women as Symbols and Swords in Boko Haram’s Terror,” Prism, 6, No. 1, women, peace & inclusive security (2016), pp. 104-121
[3] Jennifer Philippa Eggert, “Women Fighters in the “Islamic State” and Al-Qaida in Iraq: A Comparative Analysis (Links to an external site.),” Die Friedens-Warte,
[4] Mia Bloom and Hilary Matfess, “Women as Symbols and Swords in Boko Haram’s Terror,” Prism, 6, No. 1, women, peace & inclusive security (2016), pp. 104-121
[6] Mia Bloom and Hilary Matfess, “Women as Symbols and Swords in Boko Haram’s Terror,” Prism, 6, No. 1, women, peace & inclusive security (2016), pp. 104-121
[12] Jennifer Philippa Eggert, “Women Fighters in the “Islamic State” and Al-Qaida in Iraq: A Comparative Analysis (Links to an external site.),” Die Friedens-Warte,
[15] Jennifer Philippa Eggert, “Women Fighters in the “Islamic State” and Al-Qaida in Iraq: A Comparative Analysis (Links to an external site.),” Die Friedens-Warte,
[17] Devorah Margolin, “Neither Feminists nor Victims: How Women’s Agency Has Shaped Palestinian Violence,” Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, September 17, 2018,
[18] Jennifer Philippa Eggert, “Women Fighters in the “Islamic State” and Al-Qaida in Iraq: A Comparative Analysis (Links to an external site.),” Die Friedens-Warte,
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14. A Navy admiral bids farewell to Southcom as it welcomes the first woman to hold the top post
A Navy admiral bids farewell to Southcom as it welcomes the first woman to hold the top post
An emotional Navy admiral bid farewell to the U.S. Southern Command on Friday as he ended his tenure at its helm, and a nearly four-decade military career, in a change-of-command ceremony filled with tributes and accolades — and a history-making moment:
After retiring his colors, Navy Adm. Craig Faller, 60, welcomed four-star Army Gen. Laura Richardson, 57, as his successor at Southcom, which is headquartered in Doral and has responsibility for the Latin American and Caribbean region. Richardson last commanded the U.S. Army North and became the first woman to head Southcom — and only the second woman four-star U.S. military general to head a U.S. geographic combatant command.
Army Gen. Laura Richardson AMANDA ANDRADE-RHOADES, AP
“It’s been a rewarding and humbling journey,” said Faller, who is retiring after 38 years in the Navy.
Reflecting on his nearly three years at Southcom after being tapped by President Donald Trump, Faller noted that democracies in the Western Hemisphere have been under assault from a vicious circle of threats. They include corruption, climate change, COVID-19, major hurricanes, earthquakes and volcanoes, and transnational criminal organizations as well as “the corrosive, malign influence of the People’s Republic of China.”
“Under this assault of threats, security forces, represented by the leaders you see here today, remained professional. We remained professional,” he said to applause. “Apolitical, combat ethical forces. That’s the foundation of winning and that’s what we have focused on building.”
Outgoing commander of U.S. Southern Command Adm. Craig S. Faller salutes alongside his wife Martha Faller during a change-of-command ceremony at Southcom in Doral, Florida, on Friday, Oct. 29, 2021. MATIAS J. OCNER MOCNER@MIAMIHERALD.COM
Southcom covers over 16 million square miles, which is five times the size of the contiguous United States, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III said at the ceremony. While some might find that daunting, to Faller “it was just another day’s work,” the secretary added.
“Time and again, you stepped up after disasters. You also helped disrupt criminal organizations and you helped keep illicit drugs away from our shores and you’ve never let up even during a global pandemic, and even across a huge region with major security challenges,” Austin said.
As an example of Southcom’s commitment and Faller’s leadership, Austin opened by revisiting the response to the 7.2-magnitude earthquake that devastated Haiti’s southern peninsula on Aug. 14, leaving over 2,200 dead and some 800,000 people in need. Faller and his team had just returned from a visit to Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados the day before.
“Churches and schools and homes were destroyed. Boulders blocked the roads. One of America’s main neighbors needed help and so you raced to respond,” Austin said. “You sent aircraft to survey the damage; helicopters from Joint-Task Force Bravo and Puerto Rico’s National Guard to deliver food and aid. Working together with USAID, you saved hundreds of lives. What a massive effort.”
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NOVEMBER 07, 2019 9:20 PM
The transfer of power took place inside Southcom’s transformed gymnasium before representatives of the armed services from across South and Central America, and the Caribbean along with Austin and Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Both lauded Faller and his wife Martha, who opened by singing “God Bless America.”
They also welcomed Richardson, who along with her husband, Army Lt. Gen. James Richardson, have been a dual military family for more than three decades. Their daughter Lauren is also in the military and serves as an analyst at the U.S. Coast Guard headquarters in Washington, D.C.
“Laura is exactly the right person at the right time,” Milley said. “I’m certain that she will build upon the work and accomplishments Craig’s entire team here has done.”
The United States, Milley reminded the audience, which included nearly two dozen representatives from the 47 partner nations, is a great power. “But we don’t do anything alone. We are doing it with our friends and partners,” he said.
“Deterrents against our potential adversaries, such as China or Russia, or Iran, or terrorists or drug cartels or human traffickers or any other threat will be met with the unified level of resistance by every single country in this hemisphere.”
Richardson said she was honored to be leading Southcom at a time of great change, in which the U.S. is seeing rapid advances in technology that requires it to make decisions and act more quickly in land, sea, air, space and cyberspace during potential conflicts.
“We’re dealing with cross-cutting threats that know no borders, pandemics, corruption and transnational criminal organizations, irregular migration and climate change,” she said. “We’re now in an era of long-term strategic competition and it’s a competition between democracy and authoritarianism.”
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OCTOBER 28, 2021 7:00 AM
Richardson said Friday’s turnout was a sign of the strong relationships and a testament to the strong partnerships the U.S. shares across the hemisphere.
“It is really a special day and we are so honored to have you with us in person. Your presence here reinforces our shared commitment to a secure, free and prosperous Western Hemisphere,” she said, peppering her speech with Spanish and French greetings.
She noted that she was following behind “her fellow shipmate Admiral Faller, who has been an incredible combatant commander.”
“I would like to thank you for your 38 years of loyal and dedicated service to our nation,” she said.
Faller was then presented with a flag to represent the young men and women he had trained and inspired, and his service. To recognize his time at sea, the flag had been flown over the USS John C. Stennis, and in recognition of his time ashore it was flown over the U.S. Naval Academy where he started his military career.
After being presented with it, he asked the secretary of defense for permission to go ashore one last time.
A bell rang eight times before Faller left the room alongside his wife as a retired U.S. Navy Admiral.
This story was originally published October 29, 2021 6:41 PM.
15. Pentagon Will Add a Climate-Policy Czar
Excerpts:
Asked about the lack of a presence at COP, Kahl said the military is skipping the conference because the gathering is not focused on the national-security implications of climate change.
“You can expect the Department of Defense to be there when the agenda suits the topics where our expertise I think can be most brought to bear,” Kahl said. “You can also expect that in our bilateral and multilateral defense engagements, that climate will be on the table in a way it hasn’t previously been before.”
Even with the increased focus on climate change, he said, the military is not losing sight of competition with China, which he said is the “pacing challenge” for the Pentagon.
“There is zero risk that the Department of Defense isn’t going to take China seriously,” he said. But “these issues are more intertwined than I think the skeptics or critics may think.”
Pentagon Will Add a Climate-Policy Czar
New post is intended to champion climate considerations inside and beyond the Department, Kahl says.
The Pentagon will reorganize its policy shop to elevate the mission of combating and responding to climate change, the department’s policy chief said Friday.
While the Defense Department has done a lot to prioritize climate change throughout the organization, including at the service secretary level, Colin Kahl, the defense undersecretary for policy, said that the organization he oversees is “one place where we haven't done enough frankly.”
“If we’re going to say that this is a national priority and it’s a priority for the department, then it needs to be a priority for my organization too. So we’re going to be making some organizational changes in the coming weeks and months to make sure we have an organization that champions these issues and that it is resourced to champion these issues, to make sure it gets integrated into all the various documents we oversee,” Kahl said at an event hosted by New America.
Asked if that means the department is going to create a new policy position focused on climate change and the Arctic, Kahl declined to give more details.
“We will have a senior person who deals with the whole range of these issues, and we’ll probably announce that in the next few weeks,” he said.
The Defense Department released a climate risk analysis this month that says the warming climate poses an “existential threat” to America’s security. Climate change affects many facets of the military including bases being at risk in increasingly dangerous storms, the national guard being stretched thin responding to more frequent natural disasters and overall global instability driven by a warming climate that could require more military response.
Despite these dire warnings about the wide-reading effects of climate change on national defense, the Pentagon is not sending any officials to the Conference of the Parties, an annual global climate change conference beginning on Sunday in Glasgow.
Asked about the lack of a presence at COP, Kahl said the military is skipping the conference because the gathering is not focused on the national-security implications of climate change.
“You can expect the Department of Defense to be there when the agenda suits the topics where our expertise I think can be most brought to bear,” Kahl said. “You can also expect that in our bilateral and multilateral defense engagements, that climate will be on the table in a way it hasn’t previously been before.”
Even with the increased focus on climate change, he said, the military is not losing sight of competition with China, which he said is the “pacing challenge” for the Pentagon.
“There is zero risk that the Department of Defense isn’t going to take China seriously,” he said. But “these issues are more intertwined than I think the skeptics or critics may think.”
16. The second Cold War has already begun
Better a cold war than a hot one. Maybe we should ask the question of how do we keep it a cold one?
The second Cold War has already begun
Solemn passage of military hardware on Red Square (Credit: ID1974 via Shutterstock)
The Chinese tests of new state-of-the-art hypersonic missiles has spread panic throughout the West of a new arms race, one we might well be losing. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has now called for stepped up efforts against threats emanating from the People’s Republic. Whilst this is a vitally important step, we must also look beyond NATO’s borders to win new allies and shore up existing partnerships, and we must do so with the disadvantage of a significant head-start for our rivals.
The West has stood by whilst authoritarian regimes such as China, Russia, Iran and Turkey have been midwifing a new world order, premised not on freedom and democracy, but on the whims of strong men. The tendrils of this project stretch broad and deep, from the property market of London, to the copper mines of Zambia, manipulating political systems, laundering dirty money, and seizing strategic control of the world’s critical resources. Many in the West see this as simple commerce, the natural business of globalised free markets, but that is not how it is seen from the Kremlin or Zhongnanhai, and our often-wilful blindness to the pressure points being squeezed has rendered us unable to recognise that we are in a chokehold. We are already at war, whether we choose to acknowledge this simple fact or not.
Chinese military thought particularly emphasises the importance of broadening the scope of conflict, to include theatres outside of the traditional battlefield, where they would risk being crushed by overwhelming American superiority. Instead, China emphasises forms of warfare that we would not even recognise as such – drug warfare, financial warfare, legal warfare, informational warfare, and above all political warfare. Russia of course also has a long history of deception warfare, and is still building on its successful annexation of Crimea from Ukraine.
Authoritarian political warfare threatens to undo the very foundation of NATO: Article V. The musketeer principle, that an attack on one NATO state represents an attack on all has only been invoked once, by the US against al Qaeda and the Taliban following 9/11. However, this requires a unanimous vote of the North Atlantic Council and both Russia and China have been cultivating ties that could lead to crucial holdouts in the event of an Article V vote. Russia has been supporting NATO members such as Hungary who also risk becoming pariahs in the European Union, whilst China has the leverage of debt against a number of member states.
Amidst the scramble for allies, NATO must build solidarity among its members. However, it cannot use Article V as a comfort blanket and assume that will keep us safe. There are serious question marks hanging over a number of members, not least that Ankara is an active participant in the project to roll back the frontiers of the free world. Voices in Budapest defend stronger ties with Vladimir Putin, whilst decrying the European Union. Meanwhile, Montenegro, a NATO member and EU candidate state, is mortgaged to the hilt with Chinese debt, and has been forced to turn to European partners for help.
NATO must do more to counter these influences, which pose such a potent threat to the international rules-based order, by building broad bases of support further afield with partners that can be trusted. In the Gulf we must work with the Iraqi government, reliable security partners in the Emiratis, and, of course, the Israelis to address Iranian mischief-making. In this arena the Abraham Accords offer a powerful pushback against Tehran. In Africa, described by Howard French as China’s Second Continent, we have much ground to make up to liberate its people from debt-trap diplomacy and should be reinvigorating our alliances there, particularly with Kenya and Nigeria as continental wealth-makers with strong ties to NATO members. In Asia, the threats are the most acute, for obvious reasons, and above all we must stand behind India and South Korea as the beacons of democracy in the region, and make clear our commitments to protect Taiwan from invasion.
The Second Cold War has already begun, at least as far as the Russians and Chinese are concerned. We can choose to accept that and begin to make arrangements to defend our people, interests, and values, or we can opt for sleepwalking into crisis after crisis.
Simon Schofield is Deputy Director of the Human Security Centre, an independent, London-based think tank.
17. Blinken raised concerns about Taiwan with China
Blinken raised concerns about Taiwan with China
AP · by ZEKE MILLER and JOSH BOAK · October 31, 2021
ROME (AP) — U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi as part of the Group of 20 summit on Sunday — an outreach designed to ensure that the intensely competitive relationship between the world’s two largest economies doesn’t veer into open conflicts.
Senior State Department officials described the conversations as candid, constructive and productive, saying that Blinken was clear about U.S. concerns during the roughly hourlong meeting. The officials insisted on anonymity to discuss the exchanges.
One of the U.S. goals is to maintain an open line of communication with China and set a virtual meeting later this year between U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Blinken said at the meeting that China has increased tensions with regard to Taiwan and that America wants to continue its “one-China policy,” which recognizes Beijing but allows informal relations and defense ties with Taipei. During China’s National Day weekend in early October, China dispatched 149 military aircraft southwest of Taiwan in strike group formations, causing Taiwan to scramble aircraft and activate its air defense missile systems. Biden alarmed China shortly after by saying that the U.S. has a firm commitment to help Taiwan defend itself in the event of a Chinese attack.
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Asked in a CNN town hall whether the U.S. would come to Taiwan’s defense, Biden said, “Yes, we have a commitment to do that.” U.S. officials immediately moved to clarify that there had been no change to U.S. posture toward Taiwan.
China and Taiwan separated during a civil war in 1949. The U.S. cut formal diplomatic relations with Taipei in 1979 in order to recognize Beijing. The U.S. does not openly contest China’s claim to Taiwan, but is committed by law to ensure the island can defend itself and to treat all threats toward it as matters of grave concern.
Blinken noted that the G-20 summit is being followed by the United Nations climate summit in Scotland, saying that the U.S. expects China to curbs its greenhouse gas emissions as a responsible global power for the good of the world.
Trade issues did not come up in any detail, as the conversation largely stayed in the political realm. Nor was China’s recent test launching of a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile discussed by the two leaders.
AP · by ZEKE MILLER and JOSH BOAK · October 31, 2021
18. China’s ‘Battle at Lake Changjin’ Becomes 2021’s Highest-Grossing Film Worldwide, Preps Sequel
Propaganda pays.
And here is what the sequel will be about:
A sequel entitled “Water Gate Bridge” is already in the works. Stars Wu Jing, Jackson Yee and other main players will return to continue the story of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army during a different maneuver of the same campaign at North Korea’s Lake Changjin, also known as the Chosin Reservoir, in the lead-up to the U.N. troops’ complete withdrawal from the North.
Specifically, it will center on a maneuver to blow up the Water Gate Bridge that was the only path of retreat for a U.S. troop division. According to Chinese state media reports, the Chinese forces had to bomb the bridge three times after the U.S. side rebuilt it after each attempt, succeeding at last only when soldiers strapped explosives to their bodies and embarked on a suicide attack.
China’s ‘Battle at Lake Changjin’ Becomes 2021’s Highest-Grossing Film Worldwide, Preps Sequel
Variety · by Rebecca Davis · October 29, 2021
On Friday, China’s Korean War epic “The Battle at Lake Changjin” became the highest-grossing film in the world for 2021, surpassing the Chinese New Year breakout comedy hit “Hi, Mom.”
The gritty war film co-directed by Chen Kaige, Tsui Hark and Dante Lam has grossed $845 million (RMB5.41 billion) in 29 days, marching past “Hi, Mom,” which earned $821 million at the beginning of the year over a 90-day period. Films are typically given a month-long release window in China, but they can be extended to a two-month run for successful titles. Decisions to allow an even longer run are rarer, and often due to political concerns or a dearth of other strong content.
“Lake Changjin” is currently China’s second highest-grossing film in history behind local title “Wolf Warrior 2″ ($854 million), which also features star Wu Jing and a jingoistic military theme.
The former has more or less dominated the China market since its Sept. 30 National Day release. On Friday, it was unseated from its top spot by the debut of James Bond film “No Time to Die,” which opened to $8 million.
Unlike its foreign competitors, however, “Lake Changjin” has been given a boost by measures such as local governments requiring cadres of employees to go on group outings to see the film in theaters as a patriotic education measure.
A sequel entitled “Water Gate Bridge” is already in the works. Stars Wu Jing, Jackson Yee and other main players will return to continue the story of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army during a different maneuver of the same campaign at North Korea’s Lake Changjin, also known as the Chosin Reservoir, in the lead-up to the U.N. troops’ complete withdrawal from the North.
Specifically, it will center on a maneuver to blow up the Water Gate Bridge that was the only path of retreat for a U.S. troop division. According to Chinese state media reports, the Chinese forces had to bomb the bridge three times after the U.S. side rebuilt it after each attempt, succeeding at last only when soldiers strapped explosives to their bodies and embarked on a suicide attack.
Like its predecessor, “Water Gate Bridge” will also be co-produced by Bona Film Group and August First Film Studio, with Chen, Hark and Lam returning to co-direct. Lan Xiaolong and Huang Xin will remain on as screenwriters as well.
Reuniting the original team will be little trouble since most of the footage will actually be cut from material shot at the beginning of this year for “Lake Changjin” and re-edited to form the sequel, said Bona Film head and “Water Gate Bridge” producer Yu Dong. Some additional winter weather shoots will also take place in the coming months.
“This next battle will be even fiercer and the mission even more arduous,” he said. “The film will present all of this and let viewers see what…is the great spirit of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea.” The latter term is China’s name for the Korean War.
Huang Jianxin, executive producer of both “Lake Changjin” and “Water Gate Bridge,” said, “The entire company made a huge sacrifice just to win a few seconds in which to bomb the bridge. These are the realities of war, and the film’s story is very touching.”
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Variety · by Rebecca Davis · October 29, 2021
19. Breathtaking collection of war stories from MAX HASTINGS that put YOU at the heart of the battle
Breathtaking collection of war stories from MAX HASTINGS that put YOU at the heart of the battle
The day Hitler's henchmen showed up at Rommel's door and gave him ten minutes to commit suicide: Just one story of breathtaking derring-do in a gripping new collection from MAX HASTINGS that puts YOU at the heart of the battle
PUBLISHED: 19:22 EDT, 29 October 2021 | UPDATED: 04:28 EDT, 30 October 2021
Daily Mail · by Max Hastings For The Daily Mail · October 30, 2021
Top historian Max Hastings has spent a lifetime studying war.
In his powerful new book, Soldiers: Great Stories Of War And Peace, he has collected first-person accounts that illustrate in searing detail and immediacy all the violence, grief, pathos, black humour and courage of conflict.
In these compelling extracts, a young officer agonises over his decision to leave a dying comrade, a badly wounded Gurkha gets back into battle, and a legendary field marshal is executed by his own side …
The German reached for his gun... so I cut off his head with my kukri
The British cherish the army's Gurkha regiments — Nepalese fighters who have 'taken the Queen's shilling' for more than two centuries. This is the account by one Gurkha, Jemadar Sing Basnet, of an exploit in Tunisia in April 1943, when he led a night patrol to the capture of German-held high ground, demonstrating the courage for which he and his comrades were famous.
I was challenged in a language I knew was not British or I'd have recognised it. To make sure, I crept up and found myself looking into the face of a German — I recognised him by his helmet. He was fumbling with his weapon, so I cut off his head with my kukri.
Another appeared from a slit trench and I cut him down also. I did the same to two others, but one made a great deal of noise, which raised the alarm. I had a cut at a fifth, but I am afraid I only wounded him.
The British cherish the army's Gurkha regiments — Nepalese fighters who have 'taken the Queen's shilling' for more than two centuries (Pictured: Gurkhas on the attack in North Africa during World War Two)
I was now involved in a struggle with a number of Germans, and eventually, after my hands had become cut and slippery with blood, they managed to wrest my kukri from me.
One German beat me over the head with it, inflicting a number of wounds. They beat me to the ground, where I lay pretending to be dead.
I could not see anything, for my eyes were full of blood. I wiped my eyes and quite near I saw a German machine gun. It was getting light and as I lay thinking of a plan to reach the gun, my platoon advanced and started to hurl grenades. I thought that if I did not move I would be dead.
I managed to get to my feet and ran towards my platoon. They recognised my voice and let me come in. My hands being cut about and bloody, and having lost my kukri, I had to ask one of my platoon to take my pistol out of my holster and put it in my hand. I then took command again.
I left a dying comrade to save my own life
As a young officer, historian Michael Howard experienced a tragic outcome on a night patrol in no man's land, accompanied by a single Guardsman.
This was fear — the sudden stop of the rhythm of breath and heartbeat, followed by agonised butterflies in the breast. I stopped. The voices stopped. Then came the challenge 'Halt! Wer da?'
We got down, and all was still. After a while we cautiously stood up and began to walk. We had gone only a few steps before I felt a stinging blow in the back of my legs and heard a little explosion just behind me.
'Are you all right, Terry?' I whispered. 'No, sir — it's got my foot.'
Pressed to the ground, I heard the bullets swish overhead. Poor Terry began to scream in fear and pain.
This is the end, I thought. I am in the open and in the middle of a minefield. I can't get Terry away — he is almost twice my size. Seriously I thought of surrendering, but that would have been stupid.
This is the hardest part to write. Deliberately, and fully aware of what I was doing, I left Terry and crawled away.
As a young officer, historian Michael Howard (pictured) experienced a tragic outcome on a night patrol in no man's land, accompanied by a single Guardsman
The Germans were only yards away. I told myself they would find him at daybreak and bring him in. I shouted that there was a badly injured British soldier here, but the only answer was a flurry of grenades.
I found that I had been lightly wounded in the legs by Terry's mine, and could only move with difficulty. Terrified of more mines, I crawled, feeling ahead among the tufted grass as I went. The mist was thick, and I had now lost all sense of direction.
I thought of that warm room at battalion headquarters with its fire. It seemed the summit of all earthly desire. Pressed into a hollow as the machine guns rattled, I wondered whether I would ever see it again.
Eventually, forcing my way through briars and brambles, I found the right track and stumbled back as quickly as I could. My mind was a series of layers of feeling: a layer of relief, a layer of shame, a layer of anxiety . . .
I learnt a great deal — too much — about myself; not least that I did not deserve a Military Cross [which he was awarded at Salerno, Italy, almost a year earlier]. It is easy to be brave when the spotlight is on you and there is an audience. It is when you are alone that the real test comes.
Everyone at battalion headquarters was kind. I offered rather unconvincingly to take a party back to find Terry, an offer which Colonel Billy Steele sensibly refused. I was sent back for another spell in hospital.
And Terry? He did not survive. Whether he bled to death before the Germans found him, or died in their care, I do not know. Years later I sought out his grave, and sat beside it, wondering what else I could have done. I still wonder.
I have told your mother I shall be dead in 15 minutes
Field Marshal Erwin Rommel (1891–1944), Nazi commander of the North African campaign, had been devotedly loyal to Hitler in his years of victory, but turned against him when he saw that Germany's defeat was inevitable. On October 14, 1944, two senior generals arrived at his home to discuss his 'future employment'. His son, then 15, describes his final hours.
At about 12 o'clock a dark-green car with a Berlin numberplate stopped in front of our garden gate. Two generals — Burgdorf, a powerful florid man, and Maisel, small and slender — alighted from the car and entered the house. They were respectful and courteous and asked my father's permission to speak to him alone. My father's aide, Captain Aldinger, and I left the room.
A few minutes later I heard my father come upstairs and go into my mother's room. Anxious to know what was afoot, I followed him. He was standing in the middle of the room, his face pale.
'Come outside with me,' he said in a tight voice. We went into my room. 'I have just had to tell your mother,' he began slowly, 'that I shall be dead in a quarter of an hour.' He was calm as he continued: 'The house is surrounded and Hitler is charging me with high treason.
'I am to have the chance of dying by poison. The two generals have brought it with them. It's fatal in three seconds. If I accept, none of the usual steps will be taken against my family. They will also leave my staff alone.'
I interrupted: 'Can't we defend ourselves …' He cut me off short.
Field Marshal Erwin Rommel (1891–1944), Nazi commander of the North African campaign (pictured centre with his son Manfred and wife Lucie), had been devotedly loyal to Hitler in his years of victory, but turned against him when he saw that Germany's defeat was inevitable.
'There's no point,' he said. 'It's better for one to die than for all of us to be killed in a shooting affray. Anyway, we've practically no ammunition.'
We briefly took leave of each other. 'Call Aldinger, please,' he said. At my call, Aldinger came running upstairs. He, too, was struck cold when he heard what was happening.
My father now spoke more quickly. 'It's all been prepared to the last detail. I'm to be given a state funeral. In a quarter of an hour, you, Aldinger, will receive a telephone call from the hospital to say that I've had a brain seizure on the way to a conference.'
He looked at his watch. 'I must go, they've only given me ten minutes.'
We went downstairs, where we helped my father into his leather coat and walked out of the house together. The two generals were standing at the garden gate. We walked slowly down the path, the crunch of the gravel sounding unusually loud.
As we approached the generals they raised their right hands in salute. 'Herr Feldmarschall,' Burgdorf said and stood aside for my father to pass through.
The car stood ready. The SS driver swung the door open and stood to attention. My father pushed his marshal's baton under his left arm and, with his face calm, gave Aldinger and me his hand once more before getting in the car. The two generals climbed quickly into their seats and the doors were slammed. My father did not turn again as the car drove quickly off up the hill and disappeared round a bend in the road.
Aldinger and I turned and walked back into the house. 'I'd better go and see your mother,' Aldinger said. I went upstairs again to await the promised telephone call. An agonising depression excluded all thought.
Twenty minutes later the telephone rang. Aldinger lifted the receiver and my father's death was duly reported. That evening we drove to the hospital where he lay. The doctors who received us were obviously ill at ease, no doubt suspecting the true cause of my father's death. One of them opened the door of a small room. My father lay on a camp-bed in his brown Africa uniform, a look of contempt on his face.
Later we learnt that the car had halted a few hundred yards up the hill from our house at the edge of the wood. Gestapo men, who appeared in force from Berlin that morning, were watching the area with instructions to shoot my father if he resisted.
Maisel and the driver got out of the car, leaving my father and Burgdorf inside. When the driver was permitted to return ten minutes or so later, he saw my father sunk forward with his cap off and the marshal's baton fallen from his hand.
They drove off at top speed to the hospital; afterwards General Burgdorf drove on to headquarters where he telephoned to Hitler to report my father's death.
Perhaps the most despicable parts of the story were the expressions of sympathy we received from members of the German government, men who could not fail to have known the true cause of my father's death and in some cases had no doubt themselves contributed to it. I quote an example:
October 16, 1944: 'Accept my sincerest sympathy for the heavy loss you have suffered with the death of your husband.
'The name of Field Marshal Rommel will be forever linked with the heroic battles in North Africa.'
The enemy was my old teacher
British tank officer Douglas Sutherland camps overnight with his men in Germany, in the closing weeks of the war.
Joe, Wally and I backed into the trees and heaved a sigh of relief. A tot or two of the blessed rum and so to bed.
The following morning, as Briggsy reversed the tank back into business, there rose from under the left-hand track, with hands held above his head, as dishevelled, grimy and miserable a figure as anyone could imagine. His grey German uniform was scarcely recognisable under its coating of mud and oil.
As we stared in amazement at this apparition, he grimaced and pointed to a narrow slit trench in which he had been trapped under the tank track all night.
There was something about that gesture which rang the faintest of bells. I signalled to him to climb on to the turret. Sitting on top of the tank, we stared at each other in disbelief.
In those long-ago days of the 1930s, when God was in his heaven and all was well with the world, my father decreed that my brother and I should have a German tutor. His name was Willie Schiller. Now the same Willie Schiller was facing me.
There was nothing much either of us could do about it. He may have said 'Gott in Himmel,' (God in heaven) but I can't remember. We had a rum or two and smoked a cigarette.
After the war I was telling my mother about this affair. 'Nonsense,' she said firmly. 'It could not have been him. You must have been drunk.'
'I was not drunk,' I responded indignantly. 'Why do you say it could not have been Willie?'
'Because,' she said firmly, 'Willie was always so perfectly turned out.'
Back into gunfire
The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was commanded during the last stages of the evacuation from Dunkirk by its senior commander, Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Alexander (1891–1969).
Told here by Nigel Nicolson, as the drama drew to a close Alexander set off to ensure every possible man had been taken off the beaches.
As soon as it was dark on June 2nd, the remnants of the BEF began to embark. The arrangements worked without a hitch. All the men were aboard by 11.40pm.
As the destroyers sailed for Dover, Alexander and six others boarded a motor boat, ordering one destroyer to await them.
There was no shelter from the gunfire.
They zig-zagged out of the harbour, then turned parallel to the beaches, as close inshore as possible.
The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was commanded during the last stages of the evacuation from Dunkirk by its senior commander, Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Alexander (1891–1969) (pictured)
The sea was covered with oil, in which corpses were floating. Alexander took a megaphone and shouted repeatedly, in English and French, 'Is anyone there?' There was no reply.
They shouted the same question round the quays, then boarded the destroyer.
They reached Dover as dawn broke. Alexander went immediately to Anthony Eden at the War Office.
Eden wrote, 'I congratulated him, and he replied, with modesty, 'We were not pressed, you know.' '
Foxed by poor memory
When he was stationed in Basra in 1941, novelist John Masters encountered the Yeomanry — a British regiment of amateur cavalrymen who were, in peacetime, rural neighbours and keen foxhunters.
They were delightful people. My favourite story about them concerns an early inspection, by the general, of one of the regiments.
The Yeomanry colonel, going down the line introducing his officers, stopped before one captain, and said, 'This is Captain . . . Captain . . .' He shook his head, snapped his fingers and cried, 'Memory like a sieve! I'll be forgetting the names of me hounds next.'
Adapted from Soldiers: Great Stories Of War And Peace edited by Max Hastings, published this week by William Collins at £25. © Max Hastings 2021. To order a copy for £22.50 (offer valid until 13/11/21; UK P&P free), visit mailshop.co.uk/books or call 020 3176 2937.
Daily Mail · by Max Hastings For The Daily Mail · October 30, 2021
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
