Quotes of the Day:
"A fanatic is one who can't change his mind and won't change the subject."
- Winston Churchill
"I, for one, know of no sweeter sight for a man's eyes than his own country."
- Homer
"Effort and courage are not enough without purpose and direction."
- President John F. Kennedy
1. US 'appears to have drawn a line' at South Korea's push for end-of-war declaration
2. U.S., S. Korea aligned on N. Korea, but may differ on sequence of steps: NSA Sullivan
3. S. Korea, U.S. to continue 'serious and in-depth' talks on end-of-war declaration: official
4. N. Korea orders military training camps into "No. 1 combat posture"
5. North Korea's Lazarus Group Turns to Supply Chain Attacks
6. Cash-Starved North Korea Eyed in Brazen Bank Hack
7. Time to Pursue Arms Control With North Korea
8. North Korea Has a Plan to Open “General Stores” But Its Citizens Are Skeptical
9. Inside North Korea's Secret World Of Organized Crime
10. North Korea Calls U.N. Rights Investigator Report 'Malicious Slander'
11. Explainer: S.Korea sees peace declaration as key to restarting N.Korea talks
12. US service members work with local orphanage, immerse in Korean culture
13. China can and should help denuclearize N. Korea: Pentagon spokesman
14. N. Korea calls for implementing five-year economic plan at Cabinet meeting
15. Late ex-President Roh asks democracy uprising victims for forgiveness in last will
16. Unification minister calls for inter-Korean climate cooperation
17. S. Korea to hold state funeral for late ex-President Roh
1. US 'appears to have drawn a line' at South Korea's push for end-of-war declaration
This could be the most important and complex issue and source of friction for the alliance between now and March (or May when the ROK administration changes).
We must ask how will an end of war declaration contribute to the security of the ROK?
US 'appears to have drawn a line' at South Korea's push for end-of-war declaration
National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan speaks during a press briefing at the White House in Washington, D.C., Tuesday. EPA-Yonhap
By Kang Seung-woo
Quickly developing discussions between South Korea and the United States on declaring a formal end to the Korean War appear to have hit a snag as Washington has made it clear that it cannot accept Seoul's proposal, at least at this time, according to diplomatic observers, Wednesday.
Since President Moon Jae-in once again floated the idea in a United Nations General Assembly speech in September, it has been gaining traction, as evidenced by six meetings occurring between South Korea's top nuclear envoy Noh Kyu-duk and his U.S. counterpart, Sung Kim, since August.
However, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan seems to have stepped on the brakes amid the Moon administration's push for an end-of-war declaration, Tuesday (local time).
"We may have somewhat different perspectives on the precise sequence or timing or conditions for different steps, but we are fundamentally aligned on the core strategic initiative here and on the belief that only through diplomacy are we going to really, truly be able to effectively make progress and that that diplomacy has to be effectively paired with deterrence," Sullivan said during a press briefing.
His remarks are in line with those of Kim following his latest meeting with Noh, Sunday.
At the time, the American envoy said that the U.S. will explore different ideas and initiatives, including Moon's end-of-war proposal, raising speculation that the two sides were not exactly on the same page.
"As South Korea is pushing to declare an end to the Korean War now, the U.S. appears to have drawn a line regarding signing a declaration right away," said Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.
"Considering the remarks by Sullivan and Kim, the allies remain apart over the end-of-war issue."
Park added, "The U.S. government is not opposed to ending the war, but their remarks indicate that the U.S. is not prepared to sign an end-of-war declaration at this time."
The U.S. stance is that North Korea should return to the negotiating table and in the process of nuclear talks, the end-of-war idea could be on the agenda, according to Park.
In response to Sullivan's remarks, a senior Korean government official said that South Korea and the U.S. will hold in-depth discussions on the issue, without elaborating on the U.S. national security adviser's comment.
While Seoul insists that the end-of-war declaration may help bring North Korea back to the dialogue table by offering some security assurances, some believe that it could undermine the legal basis for the stationing of U.S. forces in South Korea.
The U.S. currently maintains some 28,500 troops here.
North Korea has not responded to U.S. overtures since the Joe Biden administration took office in January, accusing the U.S. of harboring what it claims to be hostile intent toward Pyongyang. North Korea has also stayed away from direct, meaningful dialogue with the U.S. since early 2019.
2. U.S., S. Korea aligned on N. Korea, but may differ on sequence of steps: NSA Sullivan
We all want (or should want) peace on the Korean peninsula. But will a symbolic, non-legally binding end of war declaration, with no conventional forces reductions in the frontline areas of offensively postured troops actually ensure the security of the ROK and move us toward a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula?
(LEAD) U.S., S. Korea aligned on N. Korea, but may differ on sequence of steps: NSA Sullivan | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with more remarks, additional information from 4th para; ADDS photo)
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Oct. 26 (Yonhap) -- The United States and South Korea are aligned on the need to engage with North Korea diplomatically, but may differ when it comes to when and what steps should be taken to bring the recalcitrant North back to the dialogue table, U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said Tuesday.
His remarks come amid a South Korean push for a declaration of the end of the Korean War that it insists can be a catalyst to restart dialogue with North Korea.
"We may have somewhat different perspectives on the precise sequence or timing or conditions for different steps. but we are fundamentally aligned on the core strategic initiative here and on the belief that only through diplomacy are we going to really, truly be able to effectively make progress," Sullivan said in a press briefing at the White House.
Sullivan's remarks also come after a Seoul meeting between U.S. special envoy for North Korea, Sung Kim, and his South Korean counterpart, Noh Kyu-duk, in which Kim said the countries will continue to discuss ways to bring North Korea back to the dialogue table, including the Seoul-proposed end of war declaration.
Sullivan said Kim's recent discussions with his South Korean counterpart have been "very productive and constructive," but declined to comment publicly when asked if the U.S. supported declaring the war's end as a catalyst to resume dialogue with the North.
"So on the specific issue you raised, I don't want to get into it publicly. I will only say we're going to continue the intensive conversations," he said.
South and North Korea remain technically at war as the 1950-53 war ended with an armistice and a peace treaty was never signed.
While Seoul insists an end of war declaration may help bring North Korea back to the dialogue table by offering some security assurances, some believe it could undermine the legal basis for the stationing of U.S. forces in South Korea.
The U.S. currently maintains some 28,500 troops in South Korea.
North Korea has ignored U.S. overtures since the Joe Biden administration took office in January, accusing the U.S. of harboring what it claims to be a hostile intent toward Pyongyang. North Korea has also stayed away from any meaningful dialogue with the U.S. since early 2019.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
3. S. Korea, U.S. to continue 'serious and in-depth' talks on end-of-war declaration: official
The real problem with the end of war declaration is the assumption by proponents that such a declaration will bring Kim Jong-un to the negotiating table. This seems like another example of negotiating with ourselves. We think this should be a logical step in removing the perception of hostile policies on "both sides." But conventional international "logic" does not apply to Kim Jong-un and the Kim family regime. We must understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the KFR.
S. Korea, U.S. to continue 'serious and in-depth' talks on end-of-war declaration: official | Yonhap News Agency
By Chae Yun-hwan
SEOUL, Oct. 27 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States will continue "serious and in-depth" bilateral discussions on the proposed declaration of a formal end to the 1950-53 Korean War, Seoul's foreign ministry said Wednesday, after a top U.S. official indicated that the allies may have some differences on the issue.
National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan told reporters in Washington D.C. Tuesday (local time) that the two sides are aligned on engaging with North Korea, but could have "different perspectives" on the approach.
"We may have somewhat different perspectives on the precise sequence or timing or conditions for different steps," Sullivan said in response to a question as to whether Washington is considering accepting Seoul's offer of the declaration in a bid to help resume stalled talks with Pyongyang.
His remarks came amid concern that Seoul and Washington may have divergent views on the details of how to bring Pyongyang back to the negotiating table and reward its denuclearization steps.
South Korea regards the envisioned declaration as a catalyst to begin the denuclearization process in earnest. While the Joe Biden administration publicly admitted that relevant consultations with South Korea are under way, it has remained rather vague on its specific position on the diplomatically and politically sensitive matter.
A foreign ministry official here said in a press statement that the allies are united in prioritizing diplomacy and dialogue with North Korea for the complete denuclearization of the peninsula and establishment of lasting peace, as they have continued close consultations to that end.
The two sides will continue "serious and in-depth consultations under close coordination," the official said.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
4. N. Korea orders military training camps into "No. 1 combat posture"
This is from the Daily NK so we have to take this with a grain of salt as its reporting is not always reliable and cannot often be properly vetted and validated by other sources.
However, if this is accurate this seems like unusual timing because it is in between the Summer and Winter Training Cycles. Is this. a"rel world" alert? Is the regime anticipating something or is it planning something?
This bears watching.
Excerpts:
In fact, the order from the Operations Bureau of the General Staff Department calls on training camps to adopt a state of “No. 1 combat readiness,” dividing them into “east” and “west” armies. That is to say, the training armies of east and west are to be composed of mechanized units from three training camps in their respective zones, said the source.
These units will train to attack targets selected in accordance with General Staff Department orders delivered to their respective headquarters, which will be conducting underground drills.
Meanwhile, the training camps will reportedly have a tough time completely focusing on the drill due to usual winter training preparations, winter preparations and other “external” activities, though the circumstances of individual camps slightly differ.
However, the source says the mood within the military is that 95% or more of the personnel tasked with the underground command drills – the focus of this military exercise – must take part if units are to avoid punishment.
N. Korea orders military training camps into "No. 1 combat posture" - Daily NK
Daily NK has learned that the North Korean military recently ordered training camps in all branches into “No. 1 combat posture.” The order also announced impending “mock attack drills” by mechanized units.
According to a Daily NK source in the North Korean military on Tuesday, the Operations Bureau of the General Staff Department issued the order by cable on Oct. 22.
More specifically, the order called on training camps in all services to hold underground command exercises for 15 days from Oct. 23 to Nov. 6. The camps’ forces should maintain top readiness to move to a designated mobile strike location at a moment’s notice and destroy a target selected by the General Staff Department.
The order seems to be a response to South Korea’s “Hoguk Exercise 2021” from Oct. 25 to Nov. 5. The mobile field exercise aims to bolster the joint strategic operational capabilities of the South Korean army, navy, air force and marines.
However, the order is highly extraordinary for the North Korean military, which is currently preparing for upcoming operational and “combat politics” training for 2021-2022.
The source said, “October and November are when the military is preparing for winter and training, so an order from the General Staff calling for 15 days of underground command drills, mobile strikes and training camps going on No. 1 combat readiness is very rare.
“The command, which recognized the training camps as a leading ‘Makhno Unit’ [referring to the 20th century Ukrainian anarchist], apparently believes they need to get a hold of discipline,” he added.
The order is also believed to be part of prior preparations for the upcoming winter training (December to March of next year), which will focus on operations with mechanized units. This means military authorities believe they need to verify the readiness of training camps, which are primarily mechanized units.
In fact, the order from the Operations Bureau of the General Staff Department calls on training camps to adopt a state of “No. 1 combat readiness,” dividing them into “east” and “west” armies. That is to say, the training armies of east and west are to be composed of mechanized units from three training camps in their respective zones, said the source.
These units will train to attack targets selected in accordance with General Staff Department orders delivered to their respective headquarters, which will be conducting underground drills.
Meanwhile, the training camps will reportedly have a tough time completely focusing on the drill due to usual winter training preparations, winter preparations and other “external” activities, though the circumstances of individual camps slightly differ.
However, the source says the mood within the military is that 95% or more of the personnel tasked with the underground command drills – the focus of this military exercise – must take part if units are to avoid punishment.
No. 1 Combat Readiness: This is a state of readiness in which units can immediately shift to wartime footing whenever a war breaks out.
The “No. 1” here means maintaining a state of readiness no less than actual war, embodying the strong will of the supreme commander, Kim Jong Un. It is reportedly used when Kim or the General Staff Department issues orders, too.
Because of this, a distinction is made with “wartime readiness” or “semi-wartime readiness,” which can be ordered only by Kim himself. As we can ascertain from above, No. 1 Combat Readiness appears to be the highest level of peacetime readiness the General Staff Department can order.
The General Staff Department previously ordered the East and West Sea fleets into a state of “No. 1 combat readiness” following the shooting of a South Korean civil servant in the West Sea in September of last year.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
5. North Korea's Lazarus Group Turns to Supply Chain Attacks
More examples of the malign activity of the regime and its "all purpose sword." Why should the regime be allowed sanctions relief when it continues these types of activities?
North Korea's Lazarus Group Turns to Supply Chain Attacks
State-backed group is among a growing number of threat actors looking at supply chain companies as an entry point into enterprise networks.
Recent activity by North Korea's infamous Lazarus Group provides fresh evidence of the growing threat actor interest in using trusted IT supply chain vendors as entry points to enterprise networks.
Security researchers from Kaspersky recently discovered two separate campaigns where the Lazarus Group infiltrated the network of an IT company — likely as part of a broader strategy to compromise its downstream customers.
In one of the incidents, Lazarus Group gained access to a South Korean security software vendor's network and abused the company's software to deploy two remote access Trojans (RATs) called Blindingcan and Copperhedge on a South Korean think tank's network. The US Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) last year had issued separate alerts — one in August and the other in May — warning of the Lazarus Group using the two RATs to maintain a presence on compromised networks.
The second Lazarus supply chain attack recently observed by Kaspersky researchers involved an IT asset-monitoring product vendor based in Latvia. In this attack, the Lazarus Group once again deployed the Copperhedge backdoor on the technology provider's network.
"This was done in a careful multistage process using two layers of multiple [command and control] servers," says Ariel Jungheit, senior security researcher at Kaspersky. The attack resulted in the threat actors loading and executing the Copperhedge malware in-memory only.
But Jungheit says Kaspersky has been unable to confirm if Lazarus managed to compromise the asset management technology vendor's software products itself. Similarly, Kaspersky has not been able to determine if the Lazarus Group leveraged its access on the asset management software vendor's network to compromise any further victims.
"We did not have visibility into how Lazarus compromised the South Korean security software company nor the asset monitoring technology provider in Latvia," Jungheit says. "We take our findings at face value as an indicator of Lazarus' interest in developing supply chain capabilities."
The Lazarus Group — responsible for the WannaCry ransomware attack and numerous other malicious campaigns — is among a growing number of threat actors that have begun developing capabilities for exploiting vulnerabilities in the IT supply chain to target enterprises.
Just this week, for instance, Microsoft warned about Nobelium — the threat actor behind the SolarWinds breach — targeting trusted cloud and IT service providers in a dangerous new campaign to gain a foothold on their customer networks. Microsoft described the threat actor as having attacked more than 140 service provides since May and breaching 14 of them.
Growing Attacker Interest
Over the last quarter, Kaspersky observed at least two other threat actors — HoneyMyte and BountyGlad — adopting the same tack. HoneyMyte basically injected a backdoor into an installer package of a fingerprint scanner product that central government employees of a South Asian country are required to use to record attendance.
Kurt Baumgartner, principal security researcher at Kaspersky, says that it is very likely the threat actor did not directly target a specific vendor in this attack. "Instead, the attackers compromised the distribution server for the software itself, which was not run by the vendor" to distribute the Trojanized installer, he says.
In the case of BountyGlad, the attackers replaced the installer for a digital certificate management software client on the vendor's distribution server with a malicious downloader. When executed on a victim system, the downloader executed the legitimate installer as well as additional malicious code, Baumgartner says.
History of Supply Chain Hacks
Supply chain attacks such as these are certainly not new. In 2019, a threat actor called Barium broke into an automated software updated system at hardware maker Asus and used the access to distribute malware to customers of Asus systems. The malware — distributed as part of an operation referred to as ShadowHammer — ended up being executed on over 400,000 systems. In 2017, attackers compromised a software build system at Avast and used the company's CCleaner software to distribute malware.
While these attacks garnered considerable attention, it was the breach that SolarWinds disclosed last December that really focused attention on supply chain security as an issue of critical concern.
"If you consider the impact of supply chain attacks we’ve seen in recent years, it’s not hard to see why an APT threat actor might find it an attractive approach," says David Emm, principal security researcher at Kaspersky. "Supply chain attacks constitute a breach in trust relationship between a supplier and companies downstream."
An attack that leverages a compromised supplier is effectively an insider attack, he says.
Emm says supply chain attacks are within the range of most threat actors because pulling off one involves the same modus operandi used in other attacks — including the use of social engineering or exploiting vulnerabilities in software.
"The key difference, of course," he adds, "is that the target company then becomes a stepping stone into their customers' networks."
6. Cash-Starved North Korea Eyed in Brazen Bank Hack
Desperate innovation?
Cash-Starved North Korea Eyed in Brazen Bank Hack
Hackers who stole tens of millions of dollars to fund North Korea’s nuclear weapons program in 2016 tried hitting another bank last year, The Daily Beast has learned.
Photo Illustration by Kristen Hazzard/The Daily Beast/Getty
Think Ocean’s 11—only the robbers are cash-starved, nuke-thirsty North Koreans and their weapons are keyboards, not explosives and guns.
In the latest efforts to fund Kim Jong-Un’s nuclear ambitions, hackers suspected of working for the North Korean government appear to have slithered their way into the computer networks of an Indonesian bank in an apparent attempt to pull off a megaheist to fund regime goals, The Daily Beast has learned.
It was around February of 2020 when the hackers, suspected of working for North Korea’s military intelligence agency—the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB)—are believed to have targeted the networks of Bank Rakyat Indonesia, cybersecurity researchers that have studied the malware culprit told The Daily Beast.
The hackers appear to have gone after the bank’s networks with custom-made North Korean malware, according to a technical report on the apparent breach obtained by The Daily Beast. It remains unclear whether the North Korean hackers were successful in stealing any money—the report doesn’t confirm with 100 percent certainty that the hackers were successful in hitting the bank and making off with the cash—but the report indicates the hackers were likely successful in running the final parts of their hacking campaign against the bank, said Adrian Nish, the head of threat intelligence at BAE Systems.
Nish added that the particular malware believed to have hit Bank Rakyat Indonesia was a “late-stage tool,” typically used after hackers have already gained access to the network and done reconnaissance on its systems.
That malware, known as “BEEFEATER,” also links the campaign to the same malware that the North Korean hackers used in another heist, in which they successfully stole millions of dollars from Bangladesh Bank, Nish told The Daily Beast.
In 2016, North Korean hackers broke into Bangladesh Bank, stealing $81 million by sending fraudulent payment orders through the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), a messaging system that makes bank transfers.
“The North Koreans are [realizing] it’s so much more lucrative to go after the cryptocurrency exchanges.They get so much more out of it. It’s pure business.”
— Vikram Thakur, a technical director at Symantec
A person familiar with the work of the United Nations’ Panel of Experts on North Korea—which is tasked with investigating North Korean efforts to evade sanctions, including cyber-operations—told The Daily Beast that Kim’s regime would be smart to try building on the success of that attack.
”If you can hack a ‘Bangladesh Bank’ and make millions… that’s an awful lot of barges filled with coal and the cash actually is much more readily exploitable,” this person said, referencing one of North Korea’s other favorite ways to fund the government: exporting coal. This sort of hacking, the person added, “is much lower-risk than other forms of sanction evasion and it’s much higher-reward, so why wouldn’t you do it?”
Vitaly Kamluk, the head of the Asia-Pacific Research and Analysis Team at Kaspersky, told The Daily Beast the North Korean hackers that work for the Reconnaissance General Bureau, also known as Lazarus Group or APT38, are believed to produce multiple versions of their malware so that if one version is burned—as it was in Bangladesh—they can rely on variants to run the same hacks again but without being detected.
The malware in the Indonesian campaign appears to be similar—like the latest update—to the malware used in the Bangladesh robbery.
It’s quite common for North Korean hackers to go after banks. North Korean cyber-operations teams have searched high and low for money, going after financial institutions around the world, including in Brazil, Ecuador, Japan, Peru, Singapore, South Korea, and several other countries, according to U.S. intelligence community alerts.
But the apparent bank heist attempt in Indonesia stands out from the way North Korea has been hacking over the past year or so. North Korean government hackers have increasingly favored popping cryptocurrency entities over banks, likely because the cryptocurrency hacks are prone to yield more money, North Korea analysts say.
But ever since the hacking gang hit the Bangladesh Bank by exploiting SWIFT protocol, the banking sector has been beefing up protections against SWIFT heists—actions that might be preventing robberies from going off without a hitch, says Priscilla Moriuchi, the former head of the National Security Agency’s East Asia and Pacific cyberthreats office.
”SWIFT hardened their systems and did a lot of work with member organizations and DPRK expertise really was in the SWIFT system itself,” Moriuchi said. ”Their techniques and the element of surprise was useful for a few years, but that has essentially evaporated now.”
The North Korean hackers began turning more attention to cryptocurrencies right after the Bangladesh incident, at times targeting both mainstream financial entities and cryptocurrency organizations side-by-side, according to Kaspersky.
“Tracking this group—it’s like shadows in the dark. They just delete the evidence.”
— Adrian Nish, head of threat intelligence at BAE Systems
Since then, however, with their eyes on getting more bang for their buck, they have switched almost 100 percent of their operations to cryptocurrency-related hacks, which would make the apparent attempt in Indonesia stand out, Vikram Thakur, a technical director at Symantec, tells The Daily Beast.
“The North Koreans are [realizing] it’s so much more lucrative to go after the cryptocurrency exchanges,” Thakur said. “They get so much more out of it. It’s pure business.”
Other hacking teams are catching on as well; globally cryptocurrency hacking is on the rise and so far this past year criminals have been stealing more assets than the year prior, Kim Grauer, director of research at Chainalysis, a crypto-forensics firm, told The Daily Beast in an interview.
Whatever their funding, there’s some evidence—namely shows of North Korean military might in recent days—that cyber-enabled heists in recent months might be paying off. As Moriuchi said, “There’s clearly revenue coming into DPRK from cyber-operations.”
From 2019 to November 2020, the time that encompasses the Indonesia incident, Kim’s regime hacked into financial institutions and cryptocurrency exchanges both to bolster the regime’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs, according to a report published this year from the UN’s North Korea Panel of Experts. They stole approximately $316.4 million worth of virtual assets, the report states.
While it’s unclear whether Bank Rakyat Indonesia yielded any money for North Korea, the malware indicates the regime’s hacking team was far along in their campaign, according to Nish.
“The attackers don’t want to give up their most precious tools at the first stage,” Nish said, noting that this particular malware is a rare find, in part because the North Koreans “only choose to put them into the networks they’re very interested in.”
The trail the hackers left behind is minuscule—the North Koreans typically clean up their tracks to avoid setting off alarm bells—making it difficult to trace exactly what they did, security researchers that have examined this case tell The Daily Beast.
“Tracking this group—it’s like shadows in the dark,” Nish said, noting those kinds of whispers of evidence of North Korean hacking are typical of Lazarus Group. “They just delete the evidence.”
It wouldn’t be the first time North Korea has turned its attention to Indonesia. Just last year, the U.S. intelligence community called out a group of North Korean government hackers for their operations targeting banks, including likely victims in Indonesia.
“You can be confident it was them.”
— Adrian Nish, head of threat intelligence at BAE Systems
Bank Rakyat Indonesia acknowledged The Daily Beast’s request for comment, but did not offer a response. Indonesian police, the U.S. Secret Service, the FBI, the Department of Justice, the IRS, and U.S. Cyber Command did not return requests for comment. The Treasury Department declined to comment. The Department of Homeland Security’s cybersecurity agency, CISA, deferred comment to the FBI.
While it’s difficult for these agencies to nail down the bank hacks and their culprits—one hacker behind the Bangladesh Bank heist was charged years after the fact—analysts who reviewed technical details of the campaign seem rather satisfied by the evidence.
“You can be confident it was them,” said Nish, the head of threat intelligence at BAE Systems.
The director of cyber-espionage at FireEye’s Mandiant, Ben Read, also told The Daily Beast that the tools in question suggest the hackers involved are almost certainly part of the military intelligence hacking gang APT38.
“It’s definitely North Korea. The malware they used we’ve seen primarily used by APT38,” Read said, though he added that, “without doing the [incident response] ourselves, we can’t say with 100% confidence.”
The UN reports published this year on the hundreds of millions of dollars worth of North Korea’s revenue-generating hacks don’t mention any victims in Indonesia.
But the report doesn’t include all of the hacking that took place in those months, a person familiar with the investigations of the United Nations’ Panel of Experts on North Korea told The Daily Beast.
“Our current report has a couple of paragraphs on cyber and there’s nothing very specific in it—but that doesn’t mean that the processes have stopped,” the person said, declining to comment specifically on the attempted heists in Indonesia.
“They’re still very interested in hacking for financial gain,” this person added.
7. Time to Pursue Arms Control With North Korea
This is becoming a popular view among some pundits. But if we shift to an arms control process Kim Jong-un will assess his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy a success. Instead of negotiating in good faith as a responsible member of the international community, KJU will double down on his strategy and contribute to maintain pressure to get further concessions. And arms control negotiation will achieve one of the regime's objectives and that is for north Korea to be known as a nuclear power and to keep its nuclear weapons.
How will an arms control process ensure security of the ROK and prevent conflict if the answer to the following questions is "no?"
Do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure the survival of the mafia like crime family cult known as Kim family regime?
In support of that strategy do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the objective to split the ROK/US Alliance and get US forces off the peninsula? Has KJU given up his divide to conquer strategy - divide the alliance to conquer the ROK?
Time to Pursue Arms Control With North Korea
While it has risks, implementing an arms control process would be the most promising way to guard against conflict on the Korean Peninsula.
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Nearly 20 years have passed since Victor Cha and David Kang conducted their seminal study on the North Korean nuclear problem through a social science lens. Although the overall situation has changed somewhat during that time, their central argument remains valid – that is, as long as mutual deterrence is working, engagement represents a better strategy for achieving peace than unnecessary arms competition.
The key difference between now and 20 years ago is that in the early 2000s the probability of a preemptive attack by North Korea was considered acceptably low due to its military inferiority. Today, as North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have swiftly expanded, Pyongyang could resort to increasingly reckless behavior, such as a preemptive or preventive nuclear strike, if it feels politically cornered and believes it will be placed in a disadvantageous position in the future. In particular, North Korea is currently concentrating its efforts on the development of tactical nuclear weapons capable of successfully destroying critical South Korean air bases and ports, which would both prevent the reinforcement of U.S. forces during wartime and isolate South Korea from its allies.
The situation is made more serious by the fact that South Korea might also be tempted to engage in preemptive or preventive attacks. In particular, non-nuclear-armed South Korea is more vulnerable than ever to preemptive nuclear strikes by North Korea. Therefore, the best strategy for South Korea is to detect imminent North Korean nuclear attacks and destroy its missiles and launchers preemptively. Indeed, South Korea’s counter-nuclear strategy includes the concept of preemptive attack. In addition, if North Korea continues its unrestrained nuclear development, South Korea might seriously consider a preventive war before the situation worsens. In fact, some in South Korea regret that the United States and South Korea did not carry out a preventive attack during the early 1990s, before North Korea completed its nuclear arsenal.
Reducing the Threat: The Case for Arms Control
Now is the time to engage in an uncomfortable but realistic debate concerning the management of North Korea’s nuclear threats and the reduction of the risk of inadvertent war on the Korean Peninsula. There are two distinct options in this regard. The first is to allow South Korea to acquire its own nuclear weapons. This option offers strategic advantages to South Korea because, proponents argue, “such a move would protect South Korea against the North Korean threat and help the country manage its other long-term security problem: how to retain political independence in a region where China wields ever-greater power and influence.” However, there is always a risk that North Korea would launch a preventive attack while South Korea was arming itself with nuclear weapons. Moreover, this option would likely prompt China’s participation in the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, which would increase instability across East Asia. In sum, this nuclear option might address some problems, but it could also make others far worse.
The second option is arms control between the United States and North Korea. As seen in the U.S.-USSR/Russia experience, if mutual deterrence is operational, arms control represents an effective way of restraining an adversary’s uncontrolled arms buildup, increasing transparency, and thereby reducing the risk of unwanted war.
Yet this option has not been actively discussed as a policy alternative due to the risks associated with a North Korea-U.S. arms control regime. In particular, pursuing arms control with North Korea may imply that the United States recognizes North Korea as a nuclear power, which would leave U.S. allies in East Asia exposed to the dangers of North Korea’s nuclear missiles. As a result, as some analysts posit, those allies could seek to acquire nuclear weapons as a self-protection measure. Furthermore, if North Korea were recognized as a nuclear-armed state, such recognition would shake the foundations of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. This might encourage other potential proliferators to believe that even if they undermine international norms, they will get to keep their nuclear weapons if they are able to withstand sanctions for a certain period of time.
However, North Korea-U.S. arms control should be recognized as a significant subject for discussion because the benefits that it could offer arguably outweigh the above-mentioned risks. For instance, it could serve to prevent North Korea from continuing to increase its nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, achieving increased transparency on both sides through a verification regime would have a significant positive impact on the predictability of each side’s intentions and capabilities. The improvement in relations between Washington and Pyongyang likely to result from arms control would have a positive effect on the geopolitics of U.S. involvement in East Asia.
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Arms control is also a highly feasible policy alternative because North Korea appears to be strongly in favor of it, both politically and strategically. To date, North Korea has insisted that the United States be its counterpart in arms control talks rather than South Korea. There are two reasons for this insistence. First, through engaging in arms control with the U.S., Pyongyang hopes to leverage its existing capabilities to establish itself as an official nuclear power and force an end to Washington’s “hostile policy.” The major North Korean objectives during any arms control negotiations with Washington include a moratorium on South Korean-U.S. joint military exercises and a reduction in the U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula, measures that would help the Kim regime’s long-term survival.
Second, from an ideational perspective, North Korea wants to achieve equal status with the United States. North Korea portrays itself as an anti-imperialist nation surrounded by the U.S. and its followers. Being recognized as a nuclear power through arms control with the U.S., building an equal relationship with Washington, and reducing the U.S. threat to North Korea are all imperative steps with regard to realizing North Korea’s identity and achieving its ideological goal of “the complete victory of socialism in the northern half of Korea.”
Planning Ahead
This being the case, how can the United States leverage the impact of arms control to achieve strategic stability on the Korean Peninsula while mitigating risks?
First, any attempts to achieve arms control between the two sides should begin with less comprehensive measures. In the context of North Korea-U.S. arms control, the level of confidence with regard to each side’s intentions is particularly low due to North Korea’s repeated failure to fulfill its promises stemming from prior arms control negotiations (from the U.S. perspective) and due to the potential impact of a deep nuclear reduction on North Korea’s deterrence capability (from the North Korean perspective). To alleviate such concerns, moderate arms control measures – such as capping further development rather than deep arms reduction – should be implemented first in order to mitigate the impacts of either side’s violations.
Second, a low-level verification regime could be considered a good first step for both sides. To date, all attempts at arms control negotiations with North Korea have ultimately failed due to the issue of verification. An intrusive verification regime would reduce the likelihood of potential cheating on the part of North Korea, although it would also increase the security costs for North Korea due to creating a security-transparency dilemma. In addition, Pyongyang may be concerned that nuclear weapons inspections may inadvertently reveal information about the North Korean nuclear force’s bureaucratic incompetence and organizational weaknesses. Fortunately, if the two sides opt for less comprehensive arms control, the introduction of less intrusive verification measures is possible. In this case, an arms control agreement could be more easily reached.
Third, the United States should control the speed with which incentives are provided so as to ensure that North Korea remains both politically and strategically motivated to continue the process. Indeed, in the past, North Korea has consistently applied the tactic of failing to implement the outcomes of negotiations after collecting the incentives it desires. In light of this, it seems likely that Pyongyang may once again seek to exploit the extremely complex nature of the arms control process and could renege on its commitments at some point in the arms control process. Therefore, the United States should carefully assess the form and timing of any incentive provision in order to ensure that Pyongyang remains motivated to comply with the deal. In this respect, former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Jacob Lew’s point regarding the nuclear deal with Iran is worth noting: “If Iran does not keep its word, we have preserved all our options, including economic and military tools, to make sure that Iran can never acquire a nuclear weapon.”
Fourth, Washington needs to draw a clear red line regarding the issue of U.S. forces stationed on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea has consistently sought the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula. Yet, if U.S. forces were to withdraw from the Korean Peninsula after an arms control agreement was reached, South Korea and Japan would both be strongly motivated to build their own independent nuclear forces. Furthermore, on the Korean Peninsula, either South Korea or North Korea could be incentivized to engage in preemptive or preventive actions due to the resultant power vacuum in order to achieve a strategic upper hand. Therefore, the United States must persuade North Korea that the presence of its forces helps to maintain regional stability and security in Northeast Asia, and further, that North Korea-U.S. arms control will only be possible if U.S. forces remain on South Korean soil.
Conclusion
For the last three decades, all efforts to achieve the denuclearization of North Korea have proven ineffective. Unfortunately, the longer North Korea’s nuclear capabilities are allowed to grow, the greater the risk of war becomes. As an alternative to letting the present situation continue unimpeded, the arms control approach is worth considering, as it could cap North Korea’s nuclear development and also lay the groundwork for the gradual denuclearization of North Korea. Furthermore, the United States can provide Pyongyang with strong political and strategic motivation to participate in arms control negotiations and fulfill its promises in good faith. If the U.S. carefully prepares for the risks that may be associated with arms control, it will be able to significantly reduce North Korea’s nuclear threat and so take an important first step toward denuclearization.
8. North Korea Has a Plan to Open “General Stores” But Its Citizens Are Skeptical
Perhaps recognition of how important and effective "capitalism." But centrally controlled "general stores" will not result in capitalism that will benefit the regime.
North Korea Has a Plan to Open “General Stores” But Its Citizens Are Skeptical
North Korea isn't without commerce, but a new plan to bolster commerce may make it harder for North Koreans to do business.
North Korea is, needless to say, not a capitalist country. But that doesn’t mean that it’s completely without commerce.
The Central Committee of the North Korean regime recently announced plans to build out “a new commercial network.” A new article looks at what that might look like in one part of North Korea.
According to Daily NK, North Hamgyong Province is planning to build “general stores,” in order to comply with the regime’s recent edict.
The story, which cited a source in that province, said that the committee’s order has “called on authorities to draw up a basic design plan by the end of November and begin operations of the new network by the end of the year.”
The province, located in North Korea’s northern area and sharing a border with China, is “conceptualizing a plan that would operate provincial markets in accordance with current conditions while inviting private investment to build new general stores of various sizes in densely populated areas, or to expand existing stores.”
Goods at the stores will be sold at lower-than-market prices, the report said, “as the new commercial network is being built under state guidance.” North Koreans can apply to manage the stores.
Daily NK also reported on skepticism about the general store plan.
“So the locals who have heard the news don’t know whether the new commercial network will be managed properly, and are at a loss as to whether to accept the province’s propaganda,” the source told Daily NK. At the same time, existing merchants are beginning to see the new stores as a threat to their position.
“It could grow even tougher to do business,” a source told the site.
Last week, Daily NK likewise reported that North Hamgyong Province’s party committee had turned over several workers at an area food distributor to a prosecutor’s office for the crime of “failing to properly carry out party policy on recycling.”
“The provincial party detained the workers and subjected them to investigation for failing to salvage waste and for throwing out usable items in contradiction to party policy,” the report said. "Amid resource shortages, the party has demanded that companies conserve even the smallest of items and reuse them following approval by ‘experts.’”
This happened after the province reportedly finished “dead last” in a provincial ranking of implementation of the party’s recycling policy. The regime is making an example of those workers, critics told the news outlet.
Workers at the distributor consider the punishment unfair, the report said, arguing that “recycling is based on the waste from production processes, but grain distributors produce no such waste”—a situation not being taken into account so far by prosecutors.
Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist, and film critic, who is also a contributor to The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.
Image: Reuters
9. Inside North Korea's Secret World Of Organized Crime
A key contribution to the survival of the Kim family regime, otherwise known as the mafia-like crime family cult.
Inside North Korea's Secret World Of Organized Crime
grunge.com · by Nicholas Vrchoticky · October 26, 2021
Tatohra/Shutterstock
By /Oct. 26, 2021 12:46 pm EDT
The modern world seems to have a romantic fascination with organized crime. "The Godfather" probably had a lot to do with that, and isn't that how we usually think of organized crime syndicates? We imagine the Italian mobsters that ruled New York and Chicago, charming the locals with a smile while extorting business down the block for "protection" money. On occasion, we get the Eastern European and Russian mobsters as bad guys or side characters in movies, but even then, it's rare to see a film featuring this type of mobster in the forefront. Even rarer still is to see an Asian mafia brought into a story that isn't part of the "Rush Hour" franchise, and when they do get the highlight, it's almost always the Yakuza from Japan or the Triad out of China. You've likely heard of those organizations, at least in passing. But have you ever heard of a North Korean mafia?
According to a report from the Congressional Research Service, North Korea has been a big player in the organized crime world for a while, and the activities are believed to earn at least a $500 million paycheck each year. That's a hefty chunk of change for a secret world of organized crime you've probably never heard of. They have skills, they have cunning, and they're not quite what you'd expect of an organized crime syndicate.
The government is the criminal organization
Alexander Khitrov/Shutterstock
We know the world of organized crime often has ties with government entities. We've seen it in every fictional crime film and read about it in every fictional crime novel, so we expect the real-life versions of these mobsters to have some of those similar ties. What we don't necessarily expect is for a nation's government to actually be the criminal organization itself, but if the evidence that's presented by media reports, the United States government, and defecting North Korean nationals is to be believed, that's exactly what's going on in the country.
In 2018, an upper-level North Korean official turned on his country and like so many others, defected. Defectors seem to be one of the most valuable sources of information on the topic of North Korean organized crime. As Australian Broadcasting Corporation explains, the defector worked in "Office 39," which gave him a front-row seat to the criminal action. Office 39 is responsible for making sure North Korea's Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un (above) and other top tier officials are stocked with cash, specifically a stockpile of foreign currency. This stockpile is known as the "revolutionary fund," though it operates more as a slush fund for the dictator, which was the intention behind Office 39's dealings when Kim Il-sung set it up in the '70s. Office 39 is about as shady as they come, since much of the money they stockpile comes from international organized crime of differing varieties.
Maybe the best counterfeiters around
Bloomberg/Getty Images
You'd be pretty hard pressed to create a functional counterfeit US $100 bill with the printing gear you have at home, and even if you were one of the best street-level counterfeiters around, you probably aren't going to get your fake money into banks or even most grocery stores. Most cashiers these days are armed with those fancy highlighters that turn colors when they mark a counterfeit. As Atlanta Gold & Coin explains, there are several things that make American bills so hard to counterfeit well, from the color-shifting ink down to microprinting, watermarks, and a special security thread woven into the paper of the bills. But some fakes are better than others, and, according to Insider, the U.S. government thinks North Korea is behind the best.
The website says North Korea has produced counterfeit $100 bills for decades, injecting them into the economies of several foreign countries, which the Congressional Research Service accounted for a profit of up to $25 million per year. After the arrest of a counterfeit smuggler and president of the Irish Workers Party in 2005, as Vice notes, and the subsequent accusations about North Korea providing the fake bills, the counterfeits disappeared until a new, almost perfect fake popped up in South Korea in 2017.
Both the United States government and the United Nations accused North Korea of producing counterfeit currency, and if the country was doing so, it could've been an attempt to destabilize the U.S. economy.
They play a major role in the drug trade
Devenorr/Shutterstock
We've heard rumors of governments getting involved in the drug trade before, like the alleged activity between the CIA and the South American drug cartels (per the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector General). North Korea seems to have its own role in this illicit global enterprise. They also don't seem to be very picky about where their money comes from, as long as it's flowing to the head of state.
According to a high-level defector interviewed by BBC, the drug trade is a major part of North Korea's secret income, reaching its peak when Kim Jong-il's "revolutionary fund" went broke during a major famine in 1991. The product of choice for the North Korean government? Methamphetamines, or "ICE" as it was popularly referred to in the '80s and early '90s. The defector said he was the one who set up the facility that made it all happen, and it could've easily made for a season plot arc of "Breaking Bad." The defector, whose real name is unknown, said he snuck in three foreign drug makers to produce the stuff in a secret lab at the Workers' Party's liaison office.
As The New York Times points out, diplomats from North Korea have been arrested several times in various places around the globe for smuggling the country's drugs, and these incidents date back over 40 years. It's probably fair to say North Korea had the "Breaking Bad" market covered long before the show came around.
Insurance fraud and the hacker army
ozrimoz/Shutterstock
The North Korean government's involvement in organized crime seems to grow so much bigger every time you look at it. They've been involved with everything from terror to weapons trade, to more white-collar crimes like insurance fraud, to stealing money electronically via their hacker army.
According to another high-level North Korean defector (via UPI), his country of origin had been scamming about $10 million per year from the insurance market for roughly 30 years, and they're able to continue this practice because there's only one state-owned insurance company. That means when they fake an accident, they're the only ones who can say whether the claim is real or a scam. It's easy to see which way that goes.
Another defector tells Bloomberg of the hacker army North Korea has sent across the world in secret to steal or scam global citizens of at least "$100,000 a year" per hacker, per year, minimum — the hackers got to keep less than 10% — and these black hats are very good at their jobs. They were responsible for the WannaCry ransom attack in 2017 that wreaked serious havoc on hard-drives if the victims didn't cough up $300 in Bitcoin, for example. The attack, according to Kaspersky, caused $4 billion in total damages, courtesy of the North Korean government's organized crime syndicate.
grunge.com · by Nicholas Vrchoticky · October 26, 2021
10. North Korea Calls U.N. Rights Investigator Report 'Malicious Slander'
The ROK/US Alliance must take a human rights upfront approach because human rights is not only a moral imperative, but it is also a national security issue. Kim Jong-un denies the human rights of the Korean people living in the north so that he can remain in power. Human rights cannot be sacrificed for the pursuit of denuclearization negotiations. We should also remember that when we talk about the north’s nuclear program it reinforces regime legitimacy. However, when we expose human rights abuses and crimes against humanity and inform the Korean people about their basic human rights it is an existential threat to the regime.
Whn you select text while you’re reading, it'llappear here.
North Korea Calls U.N. Rights Investigator Report 'Malicious Slander'
By U.S. News & World Report2 min
A group of people bow at the base of the giant bronze statue of the state founder and 'Great Leader' Kim-Il Sung in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang February 26, 2008. REUTERS/David Gray/FilesReuters
SEOUL (Reuters) - A report this month by a United Nations rights investigator expressing concern about the human rights and humanitarian situation in North Korea is "malicious slander", a North Korean organisation said on Tuesday.
In his latest report, Tomas Ojea Quintana, U.N. special rapporteur on human rights in North Korea, said the country's most vulnerable people risk starvation after it slipped deeper into isolation during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Ojea Quintana said international sanctions imposed over North Korea's nuclear weapons programme should be eased to provide more aid, but he also criticized abuses such as political prison camps and said self-imposed border lockdowns to prevent a COVID-19 outbreak had worsened conditions.
"The 'special rapporteur', not being content with distorting our reality, has pointed a finger at our 'people's livelihood' and viciously picked on the most realistic and appropriate anti-epidemic measures taken by our state for our own specific need in order to cope with the global epidemic," an unidentified spokesperson for the Korea Association for Human Rights Studies said in a statement carried by state news agency KCNA.
The statement said North Korea does not recognise Ojea Quintana's mandate, and accused him of being part of a U.S.-backed scheme to interfere with the internal affairs of other countries.
"Our state takes full responsibility for the life security and livelihood of our people, and we have never asked anyone to worry about the living conditions of our people," the statement said.
Leader Kim Jong Un said in June the food situation was “tense” because of natural disasters last year, and acknowledged that citizens had faced sacrifices during the pandemic.
North Korea has not reported any COVID-19 cases and has imposed strict anti-virus measures, including border closures and domestic travel curbs.
(Reporting by Josh Smith; Editing by Peter Graff)
Copyright 2021 Thomson Reuters.
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11. Explainer: S.Korea sees peace declaration as key to restarting N.Korea talks
Again, this effort is based on the assumption that this will influence Kim Jong-un to come to the negotiating table. It will not, unless Kim assesses that he can exploit this to serve his objectives and strategy.
To repeat what I have previously written: The most important question concerning an end of war declaration and peace agreement is how they will ensure the security of the ROK. Assuming the regime continues executing its seven decades old strategy it will seek to exploit such an agreement to try to drive U.S. troops off the peninsula and undermine the ROK/U.S. alliance. Most importantly the existential threat will still be present across the DMZ. There is no piece of paper that can defend against an attack from the North.
Explainer: S.Korea sees peace declaration as key to restarting N.Korea talks
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A general view of Panmunjom is seen ahead of a ceremony to mark the first anniversary of Panmunjom declaration between South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un which was held in April 27, 2018, at the southern side of Panmunjom in the Demilitarized Zone, South Korea, April 27, 2019. Lee Jin-man/Pool via REUTERS/Files
SEOUL, Oct 27 (Reuters) - In a last-ditch attempt to restart talks with North Korea before his term ends next year, South Korean President Moon Jae-in is calling for a declaration that could eventually end a state of war that has technically lasted since the 1950s.
South Korea and a U.S.-led U.N. force are technically still at war with North Korea since the 1950-1953 Korean War ended in an armistice rather than a peace treaty, and Seoul sees an "end of war declaration" as a way to build trust, restart stalled denuclearisation talks, and eventually secure a lasting peace agreement.
Such a declaration is seen as a less politically fraught issue than other points of contention, such as North Korea's nuclear weapons.
But critics fear a declaration could undermine the U.S.-South Korea alliance or weaken international pressure over the North's weapons programmes, and both Koreas have failed to follow through on previous efforts to end the war.
UNENDED WAR
In 1953, South Korean leaders opposed the idea of a truce that left the peninsula divided, and were not signatories to the armistice, which was officially signed by the commander of North Korea’s army, the U.S. commander of the U.N. Command, and the commander of the “Chinese people’s volunteers”, who were not officially claimed by Beijing at the time.
The idea of ending the war gained renewed attention in 2018 during a flurry of diplomacy between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, then-U.S. President Donald Trump, and South Korea's Moon.
The two Koreas agreed to declare the Korean War over by the end of that year, and Trump said the effort had his blessing if North Korea agreed to give up its nuclear arsenal.
But as disagreements over North Korea's nuclear weapons and international sanctions dragged on, Washington and Pyongyang showed less interest and the idea stalled along with nearly all talks.
PROSPECTS FOR A DEAL
In a speech at the United Nations last month, Moon again raised the idea. North Korean officials responded that Moon's proposals were of interest, but premature without a change in what they deemed to be hostile policies.
U.S. President Joe Biden's administration has said it is open to negotiations without preconditions.
North Korea has rebuffed those overtures, however, saying that U.S. support for sanctions and military moves in the region suggest its talk of diplomacy hides hostile intent.
"To be effective, (a declaration) needs to be embedded in a broader process," said John Delury, a professor at South Korea's Yonsei University. "But signalling readiness for an end of war declaration is, at minimum, a way for the Biden administration to signal they are serious about ending the so-called hostile policy."
When asked about the South's proposals, White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan this week declined to comment on specifics. He said that the United States agreed with South Korea on the need for diplomacy, but may have a different perspective when it comes to the timing, conditions, or sequence of different steps.
Some analysts note that a deal could have implications for the roughly 28,500 U.S. troops and the U.N. command stationed in South Korea as a legacy of the war, which help secure the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between the two Koreas.
South Korea's plan calls for a political declaration that the Korean War is over, then a peace treaty that replaces the armistice, and finally the establishment of a broader peace regime, said Duyeon Kim, with the U.S.-based Center for a New American Security.
The Biden administration may support raising the idea of a declaration as a way to gauge North Korean attitudes but is unlikely to support anything that alters the armistice, she said.
North Korea, meanwhile, has made it clear it is not interested in a symbolic declaration.
"It would likely be interested if a declaration alters or promises to change the armistice and U.N. Command," Kim said.
Reporting by Josh Smith
12. US service members work with local orphanage, immerse in Korean culture
Kudos to SOCKOR.
US service members work with local orphanage, immerse in Korean culture
Photo by Cpl. Dae Hyeon Choi
by Cpl. Dae Hyeon Choi
Special Operations Command Korea
October 26, 2021
PYEONGTAEK, South Korea - In partnership with United States Forces Korea, U.S. Special Operations Command-Korea served a local orphanage as part of the Good Neighbor Program. The command was able to donate food, snacks, fresh fruit and approximately 1,400 pounds of rice to Jacob’s House on September 17th, 2021.
The donation was collected by the Preservation of the Force and Family, Chaplain Jesse McCullough, LTC Brian Revell, Monica Menser, and Dr. Richard Sohn. It was an opportunity for SOCKOR’s U.S. service members to learn more about the Korean national holiday, Chuseok.
Founded on May 20th, 1985, the orphanage served as an infant nursery that continues today in the care of children under the age of 3. Concern then focused on food insecurity and children orphaned through various situations. In 1989, it assisted 120 children and today serves 30 residents.
The partnership between the theater special operations command and local orphanage was developed in coordination with “The Eastern Pyeongtaek Welfare Town.” The Eastern Pyeongtaek Welfare Town is an organization that secures appropriate living accommodations and overall quality of life initiatives through supporting five social service agencies, including Jacob’s House. SOCKOR has partnered with both programs for about three years.
It has SOCKOR service members and families meeting and interacting with children in the program. “Normally [the service members and children] play on a small field and interact together,” said Kim, Ah Ra, TEPWT planner. “However, with health and safety in mind, this year SOCKOR focused more on providing goods.”
In anticipation of the donation, SOCKOR members participated in a 9.11-mile ruck march that carried the 1,400 pounds of rice that was later donated. Apart from food, donations assisted in purchasing Han-Bok, a traditional, colorful Korean garment, for every child in the program.
This was not just the act of donating but also a cultural immersion between the Korean children and U.S. service members. While many SOCKOR members are key in planning training on the peninsula, this provided a unique opportunity for them to participate in seasonal activities as part of the local community.
Photo Caption:
U.S. Special Operations Command-Korea, in coordination with their Preservation of the Force and Family team and the Good Neighbor Program, donated food, snacks and fresh fruits to a local orphanage on September 17th, 2021. The command completed a ruck march in which SOCKOR service members carried approximately 1,400 lbs. of rice, which was included as part of the food donation. The 3-year relationship between SOCKOR and the local children’s organization has helped develop opportunities for U.S. service members to learn more about Korean culture as they interact with the 30 children who are a part of the program.
13. China can and should help denuclearize N. Korea: Pentagon spokesman
But it won't. China will not help solve ROK and US security issues.
China can and should help denuclearize N. Korea: Pentagon spokesman | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Oct. 25 (Yonhap) -- China should help denuclearize North Korea if it wishes to see stability on the Korean Peninsula, a Pentagon spokesman said Monday.
John Kirby also insisted that Beijing has a great amount of influence over Pyongyang that he said can be used to help the North make the right decision.
"What I can tell you is that we know China has influence in Pyongyang and that influence could be important to helping us all achieve the denuclearization of the peninsula," the Department of Defense press secretary said in a press briefing.
"And we certainly would like to see China be more cooperative and more helpful in what one would imagine would be a mutually shared interest -- that the peninsula be denuclearized for security and for throughout the region," he added.
His remarks come after a series of North Korean missile tests that included the test launch of a self-claimed hypersonic missile and a new submarine launched ballistic missile.
Kirby said he did not have any information with regard to weapons development cooperation between North Korea and China when asked, but reiterated that China could help bring the North back to the dialogue table if it chose to do so.
"China can help by enforcing the sanctions that have been in place. China can help by using their influence in Pyongyang to help the regime make the right decisions with respect to security on the peninsula," said Kirby.
"What we want to see is security and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and we believe that a big way to achieve that is the denuclearization of the North and China can play a positive role in that if it chooses to do so because they do have influence," he added.
North Korea is ignoring U.S. overtures for dialogue, accusing the U.S. of harboring a hostile intentions toward it. North Korea has also stayed away from any significant talks with the U.S. since early 2019.
U.S. special envoy for North Korea, Sung Kim, reached out again to North Korea on Sunday (Seoul time).
""We remain ready to meet with the DPRK without preconditions, and we have made clear that the United States harbors no hostile intent towards the DPRK," Kim said after his meeting with his South Korean counterpart, Noh Kyu-duk, in Seoul.
"We hope the DPRK will respond positively to our outreach," he added, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
14. N. Korea calls for implementing five-year economic plan at Cabinet meeting
The regime cannot help itself. It will always revert to socialist/communist economics based on central control.
N. Korea calls for implementing five-year economic plan at Cabinet meeting | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Oct. 27 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has held a Cabinet meeting and urged officials to put utmost efforts to accomplish the country's five-year economic development plan, state media reported Wednesday.
The enlarged plenary meeting of the Cabinet took place via video links the previous day, chaired by Premier Kim Tok-hun, with Vice Premier Pak Jong-gun making a report on the country's economic performance, according to the North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
During the meeting, Pak analyzed deficiencies found in carrying out economic projects in the third quarter and pointed out some officials' "irresponsible attitude."
"The report stressed aggressively pushing forward with the five-year plan at the year-end to accomplish its goals, to bring tangible outcomes and changes long waited and welcomed by the people," the KCNA said.
At the country's eighth party congress in January, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un admitted to a failure in his previous development plan and unveiled a new scheme focusing on self-reliance amid a protracted border closure due to COVID-19 and global sanctions on its economy.
scaaet@yna.co.kr
(END)
15. Late ex-President Roh asks democracy uprising victims for forgiveness in last will
(LEAD) Late ex-President Roh asks democracy uprising victims for forgiveness in last will | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: ADDS more info from 3rd para, photos)
By Joo Kyung-don
SEOUL, Oct. 27 (Yonhap) -- Former President Roh Tae-woo used his last will to ask for forgiveness from victims of the military's brutal crackdown on a pro-democracy uprising in the southwestern city of Gwangju in 1980, his son said Wednesday.
Roh Jae-heon unveiled the will of his father, who died Tuesday of chronic illness at age 88, to reporters at a funeral altar for the late president in Seoul.
"He thought he had infinite responsibility for all things that happened, whether it is good or bad, because he cared a lot about the country and his duty," Roh Jae-heon said. "He was looking for forgiveness for his faults and responsibility, particularly related to the pain of the May 18 democratic movement victims and also various events that happened during his tenure."
Roh Tae-woo, who served as president from 1988 to 1993, rose to prominence after helping former President Chun Doo-hwan seize power through the 1979 military coup in the wake of a political vacuum created by the death of former authoritarian President Park Chung-hee.
He was considered the No. 2 man in Chun's junta that was accused of ruthlessly cracking on the 1980 uprising in Gwangju, leaving more than 200 dead and 1,800 others wounded, according to conservative official data.
"He made his efforts for reconciliation and tried to heal the scars of the May 18 democratic movement victims during his tenure, even enacting a law related to that issue," Roh Jae-heon said. "But then he received punishment regarding the crackdown of the May 18 democratic movement and various political situations did not really allow him to deliver such a message."
In 1996, Roh and Chun were convicted of corruption and mutiny for their role in the 1979 military coup and in the brutal crackdown on the 1980 Gwangju Democratic Uprising.
Roh was pardoned a year later and belatedly paid his massive fines in full in 2013.
"It's a pity that he could not express those words by himself as he was hospitalized for more than 10 years, while having difficulties to communicate with others," the son said.
The former president received surgery for prostate cancer in 2002 and was frequently admitted to hospitals while living at his residence in Seoul. He also suffered from cerebellar atrophy and asthma, which together kept him largely out of the public eye.
Roh Jae-heon, currently working as a lawyer, has often expressed apology over the brutal crackdown in Gwangju on behalf of his father.
In 2019, he visited the May 18th National Cemetery in Gwangju and expressed an apology. Last year, he offered a flower wreath under his father's name.
kdon@yna.co.kr
(END)
16. Unification minister calls for inter-Korean climate cooperation
Unification minister calls for inter-Korean climate cooperation | Yonhap News Agency
By Choi Soo-hyang
SEOUL, Oct. 27 (Yonhap) -- Unification Minister Lee In-young said Wednesday climate change is the most timely, as well as feasible, area for inter-Korean cooperation, vowing to make efforts to kick-start cross-border talks in the field.
Lee also stressed in a congratulatory message at a climate seminar in Seoul that the two Koreas' joint efforts are crucial to reduce carbon emissions and build more carbon sinks, such as forests, on the peninsula.
"Dealing with the Korean peninsula's climate crisis is the most timely issue for inter-Korean cooperation, as well as a field where more possibilities and opportunities can be found," Lee said.
Exchanging weather information and establishing a joint response system against natural disasters are among the most important tasks, he said.
South Korean President Moon Jae-in plans to attend a U.N. climate summit, known as COP26, in Glasgow next week.
A North Korean delegation is also expected to attend the conference, a Seoul official earlier said.
According to a recent U.S. intelligence report, North Korea was listed as one of 11 countries most vulnerable to climate change due to its inability to adapt to such changes.
"I hope South and North Korea will promptly resume dialogue and cooperation, and join hands with the international community to tackle the climate crisis faced by the Korean Peninsula and the world," the minister said.
scaaet@yna.co.kr
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17. S. Korea to hold state funeral for late ex-President Roh
(4th LD) S. Korea to hold state funeral for late ex-President Roh | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with latest developments; ADDS new photo; TRIMS)
By Kim Deok-hyun and Joo Kyung-don
SEOUL, Oct. 27 (Yonhap) -- South Korea decided Wednesday to hold a five-day state funeral for late former President Roh Tae-woo, the country's last general-turned-leader credited for foreign policy achievements but also blamed for his involvement in a military coup and the brutal crackdown on a pro-democracy uprising.
President Moon Jae-in expressed condolences over Roh's death but noted the deceased made "not a few historical faults." Moon will not visit Roh's funeral altar in person due to his busy schedule and decided to send his chief of staff instead, officials said.
Moon's measured message, which came a day after Roh died at age 88, suggested that soul-searching had taken place to determine the right balance between paying respect to a late predecessor and public sentiment critical of Roh's dark legacy.
Prime Minister Kim Boo-kyum unveiled the state funeral decision during a Cabinet meeting earlier in the day, saying that Roh made significant contributions to the nation's development as the 13th-term president.
"With Cabinet members, I express my deep condolences on the passing of former president Roh Tae-woo and give my sympathy to his family members," Kim said. "The government will hold a state funeral and thoroughly prepare it with respect so that people can pay tribute to his contribution."
Kim, who will head the state funeral committee, and other Cabinet members will visit the funeral altar of Roh later Wednesday.
The interior ministry said the state funeral will run for five days through Saturday, with a burial site soon to be determined after consulting with Roh's family.
"Although Roh has historic faults regarding the Dec. 12 coup and the May 18 Democratic Uprising, we considered that he made a contribution with his Northward Policy after being elected through a direct vote and made efforts to pay his fine," the ministry said in a statement.
Under law, a state funeral will be held if a former, an incumbent or a president-elect dies. The law, however, does not specify whether a state funeral will be possible if they commit a grave crime, like a military coup.
But the ministry said Roh will not be buried in a national cemetary as he does not qualify under a law which stipulates that those convicted of a crime and who served a prison sentence are not eligible for burial in a national cemetary.
Roh's family earlier said they are looking to bury the deceased in the border town of Paju, north of Seoul.
For a state funeral, the government pays expenses for running Roh's memorial altar as well as send-off and burial ceremonies.
Roh rose to prominence after helping former President Chun Doo-hwan seize power through the 1979 military coup in the wake of a political vacuum created by the death of former authoritarian President Park Chung-hee.
Chun's junta was accused of ruthlessly cracking on the 1980 uprising in Gwangju, leaving more than 200 dead and 1,800 others wounded, according to conservative official data.
Some lawmakers of the ruling Democratic Party (DP) and civic groups voiced opposition to a state funeral for Roh, citing his role in the military coup.
"If the Republic of Korea holds a state funeral for a main culprit of mutiny, it will be self-denial of the Republic of Korea," said Oh Gi-hyoung, a DP lawmaker, in a Facebook post.
However, some officials from the conservative main opposition People Power Party (PPP) supported the state funeral for Roh.
"There may be a heated debate over a historical figure, but I hope this can be an opportunity to have a culture of respecting former leaders of the country with a way that can signify dignity matching the country's status," said PPP floor leader Kim Gi-hyeon.
The city of Gwangju said it will not hoist a flag at half-mast and install a memorial altar for Roh during the state funeral period for the sake of its citizens and those deceased from the May 18 Democratic Uprising.
Meanwhile, Roh Jae-heon, the late president's son, on Wednesday unveiled the will of his father, saying the former Army general asked for forgiveness from victims of the military's brutal crackdown in the May 18 Democratic Uprising in his last will.
kdh@yna.co.kr
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V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
