Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"The true measure of all our actions is how long the good in them lasts... everything we do, we do for the young."

– Elizabeth II

“I’m asked hundreds of times: would you do it over again? In my 25 years in the military, I feel I’ve been overpaid for my service to my country. There will never be enough paper to print the money nor enough gold in Fort Knox for me to have to keep me from doing what I did. I’m proud to be an American; even prouder – – and I’m even prouder that I’ve earned the privilege to wear the Green Beret. I live by the motto of ‘Duty, Honor, Country.’”

– Medal of Honor Recipient MSG Roy Benavidez, U.S. Army

"Let us remember: One book, one pen, one child, and one teacher can change the world."

– Malala Yousafzai

1. #KOREAS: Million man Army for rent to the Kremlin

2. North Korea: Scenarios for Leveraging Nuclear Weapons through 2030

3. North Korea’s Entry into the Ukraine War by Mick Ryan

4. North Korean troops in Russia pose challenge to U.S., allies from ‘axis of authoritarianism’

5. Seoul weighing ‘various’ responses to North Korea sending troops to Ukraine

6. Why some experts think North Korea faked evidence of ROK drone intrusion

7. Kim Yo Jong threatens ‘fatal’ retaliation against Seoul, while slamming Ukraine

8. Seoul warns it could arm Ukraine to counter North Korean troop deployment

9. North Korea denies it has deployed troops to support Russia’s war in Ukraine

10. Kim Jong Un calls out problems rebuilding flood-hit villages near weapons plants

11. 76 North Korean escapees arrive in South Korea in third quarter

12. What Ukraine should expect from North Korean special forces on the battlefield

13. US consults allies about North Korea troops in Ukraine

14. The making of a North Korea expert: Smoke, mirrors, and speculation

15. Does North Korea’s Kim know about his country’s dark Vietnam War past?

1. #KOREAS: Million man Army for rent to the Kremlin

My latest interview with John Batchelor and Gordon Chang.

https://audioboom.com/posts/8593304-koreas-million-man-army-for-rent-to-the-kremlin-david-maxwell-vice-president-of-the-center

#KOREAS: Million man Army for rent to the Kremlin. David Maxwell, vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy, @GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill

#KOREAS: Million man Army for rent to the Kremlin.

David Maxwell, vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy,

@GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill

https://apnews.com/article/north-south-korea-drones-c923535e6f414674593d74ff935adf41

https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/19/asia/north-korea-ukraine-russia-troops-uniform-intl/index.html

1951 Korean War, USS Boxer

2. North Korea: Scenarios for Leveraging Nuclear Weapons through 2030

Excerpts:

For now, North Korea is emboldened but not yet fully postured for more dangerous revisionist actions. However, as North Korea grows its nuclear arsenal qualitatively and quantitatively well beyond mere minimal deterrence, aligns closely with Russia—a nuclear power justifying force for revisionist purposes—and watches whether China goes forward to use force to redefine the status quo with Taiwan and other hot spots in Asia, it would be negligent not to consider a similar threat posed by North Korea.

When North Korea sunk the ROK, Pohang-class Corvette Cheonan in 2010 and then subsequently shelled YeonpyeongIsland later that year, the author was the deputy mission manager for North Korea at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The challenges posed by both incidents to restoring peace on the peninsula in the aftermath of North Korean provocations were significant. When encountering such surprise attacks, thoughts immediately turn to “What’s next, and how can the armistice be quickly restored?” There have been over 70 years of armistice during which there has been notable success in preventing dangerous escalation.

Today, North Korea is literally hundreds of missile launches, four nuclear tests, and deployment of large numbers of weapons beyond where it was in 2010. A 2025 island shelling, ship sinking, or other military attack on South Korea is a sufficiently possible scenario for which planning needs to take place today. A scenario in which a robust, even proportionate ROK response generates threats of nuclear use is not beyond the imagination. While such discussions and planning are already underway, this will clearly be a critical topic for discussion between U.S. and ROK policymakers and military planners, particularly once the election passes.

North Korea: Scenarios for Leveraging Nuclear Weapons through 2030

Commentary by Sydney Seiler

Published October 21, 2024

csis.org · by Commentary by Sydney Seiler Published October 21, 2024

The Non-Surprising Surprise

October is here, the U.S. presidential election is just around the corner, and tensions on the Korean Peninsula appear moving in the direction of the “October surprise,” about which many, including CSIS, prognosticated and warned. Unlike missile launches and nuclear tests, which are strategically worrisome for how they demonstrate the growth of North Korea (DPRK)’s weapon of mass destruction (WMD) program, kinetic and lethal provocations put lives at risk both in the initial action and any follow-up responses. Recent repeated launches of waste material into South Korea (ROK) by North Korea and DPRK’s recent threats warning of military responses to alleged ROK drones sending pamphlets into Pyongyang have resulted in an exchange of threats between the two Koreas that has drawn international attention. Could this be the escalation on the eve of the U.S. presidential election that has been a concern? Or is this the harbinger of something much more serious, even if a few years down the road?

Distinguishing Among Provocations

To understand and respond to recent DPRK actions, it’s important to distinguish between rhetorical, coercive, and revisionist actions. On October 11, 2024, the DPRK Foreign Ministry issued a “Crucial Statement,” accusing South Korea of flying drones over Pyongyang to distribute leaflets. Notably, the statement was harsh in its accusation but restrained in saying North Korea’s “response” would only occur “if” additional drone flights from South Korea took place. Amplification of the warning came in a statement warning of a “horrible disaster” if another drone is found in the sky over Pyongyang issued in the name of Kim Jong-un’s sister, Kim Yo-jong. The subsequent DPRK destruction of mostly symbolic transportation routes connecting the two Koreas moved closer to coercive action rather than mere rhetorical, but it still did not involve any threat to human life.

Balloons and Drones: Actions With a History

The accusation of ROK drones penetrating North Korean air spaces comes amid a seemingly relentless stream of ballons launched southward by North Korea containing trash, animal and human feces, wastepaper, and, of course, the small explosive devices used to blow up the balloon at the appropriate coordinates and altitude. Repeated penetrations of South Korean airspace by North Korean drones going as far south as Seoul and the sensitive THAAD (Thermal High Altitude Area Defense) missile defense site in the southern half of the ROK have been reported. In other words, North Korea is not the innocent victim and is more likely angry that persuasive propaganda consumed by the North Korean population can so easily be distributed in the capital city.

Debates about causality or who moved first aside, there is no reason to believe either side desires a significant escalation. There have been threats and intimidation on Pyongyang’s part, but as with similar spats over the past 70 years of armistice, this is most likely a de-escalatable event. At the same time, this does not seem to qualify as an “October surprise” deliberately designed to exploit or influence the upcoming November U.S. presidential election. De-escalation to an armistice status quo ante is easily within North Korea’s reach if it desires.

Containable Coercion or Revisionist Escalation?

Even though these tensions between North and South Korea do not seem to directly target the U.S. presidential elections, the United States now faces a new provocation environment on the peninsula. What was once seen as dangerous but ultimately containable North Korean coercive diplomacy could evolve into something more dangerous and fundamentally threatening to the status quo. Although higher-end provocation options may have been seen by Kim Jong-un as unnecessarily risky in the past, backed by a growing nuclear arsenal and support of Russia, Kim may feel more comfortable in taking chances. Overconfidence in his nuclear deterrent may lead Kim Jong-un to coercive actions not seen in the recent past.

Pyongyang’s growing nuclear-backed coercive options and the possibility for more offensive nuclear use to achieve limited (short of reunification) but important revisionist objectives were addressed in a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) published last year reflecting the U.S. Intelligence Community’s view of North Korea’s options for nuclear use through at least 2030. The key judgments and a helpful graphic provided below were declassified by the Director of National Intelligence and have proven useful over the past year in feeding discussions on the strategic threat posed by North Korea’s WMD program.

Remote Visualization

Source: National Intelligence Estimate from the National Intelligence Council, North Korea: Scenarios for Leveraging Nuclear Weapons Through 2030, January 2023, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NIC-Declassified-NIE-North-Korea-Scenarios-For-Leveraging-Nuclear-Weapons-June2023.pdf.

Concerns about DPRK’s revisionist nature and options were also recently reflected in the way U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken described North Korea in his recent submission to Foreign Affairs looking at major threats faced by the United States. He described North Korea as a revisionist power that, like Russia, China, and Iran, seeks to “entrench autocratic rule at home and assert spheres of influence abroad,” which in North Korea’s case is South Korea. These powers, Secretary Blinken added, “all wish to resolve territorial disputes by coercion or force.”

The similarity between the secretary of state’s words and the NIE is noteworthy. The NIE defines a coercive North Korea as one that “employs threats—including nuclear threats—and possibly limited use of military force to achieve some political objectives while maintaining escalation control and trying to minimize the risk of regime-threatening retaliation.” A revisionist North Korea, meanwhile, “seeks to fundamentally shift the balance of power on the peninsula through the use of force. Nuclear weapons serve as an offensive option through use or the threat of use to dominate the South, achieve a decisive advantage in determining the future of the Korean Peninsula, or compel other desired outcomes.” The secretary’s depiction of North Korea in this context reveals the attention the United States is paying to this possibility.

What Is Pyongyang Seeking This Time?

Looking back at the history of North Korea’s armed provocations, no two are exactly alike in their nature or objectives. There can be immediate causes or longer-term shaping objectives. Messaging objectives—both external and—can be tailored for both near-term and strategic goals.

In his most recent actions, Kim Jong-un is likely driven by a number of factors in his provocation calculus:

Punish ROK president Yoon Suk Yeol politically while undermining his North Korea policy.
Foment a debate in South Korea over the value of a deterrence-centric hardline policy toward North Korea versus a détente-seeking, softer engagement policy.
Undermine confidence in ROK conservates by instilling fears of U.S. entanglement, given that Pyongyang has already stated it will hold the United States accountable for ROK actions.
Beyond near-term tensions in the U.S.-ROK relationship, build support for a softer approach toward North Korea by the next U.S. administration.
Reinforce Pyongyang’s commitment to fighting external efforts to transmit information, focusing on ROK-produced leaflets both balloon and drone delivered.

What About the United States?

CSIS warned at the beginning of the year that given the U.S. election, it was likely the United States would see provocative North Korea actions sometime around October, the classic “October surprise” option. This is a particularly challenging year for North Korea’s messaging strategy toward the United States: the peculiarities of the election itself, the conflict in Ukraine and the Middle East, and now the major natural disasters in the United States all provide obstacles for the DPRK. North Korea itself has turned more introspective, saving its bellicose threats for South Korea and President Yoon. It’s possible that if North Korea had something significant planned to capture U.S. attention, influence the election in a way favorable to DPRK policy objectives, and weaken the U.S.-ROK alliance, it would have decided to wait until after the election and subsequent inauguration. Such an approach, similar to the transition from President Bush to President Obama, has a more “welcome to the reality of the DPRK issue” effect, custom-tailored to the new U.S. president, likely shaping and possibly expediting the policy review process in Washington.

What Would Kim Be Seeking Further Down the Line?

Recent DPRK actions may help answer the longer-term strategic question of how Kim Jong-un plans to use his nuclear capability going forward. It’s not so much that the United States needs to be worried about an imminent war, but rather that Kim may see advances over the past few years in his nuclear and missile capabilities enabling a tougher and more aggressive stance toward South Korea. This would open up a new menu of escalatory options for Pyongyang that has not been observed yet.

For now, North Korea is emboldened but not yet fully postured for more dangerous revisionist actions. However, as North Korea grows its nuclear arsenal qualitatively and quantitatively well beyond mere minimal deterrence, aligns closely with Russia—a nuclear power justifying force for revisionist purposes—and watches whether China goes forward to use force to redefine the status quo with Taiwan and other hot spots in Asia, it would be negligent not to consider a similar threat posed by North Korea.

When North Korea sunk the ROK, Pohang-class Corvette Cheonan in 2010 and then subsequently shelled YeonpyeongIsland later that year, the author was the deputy mission manager for North Korea at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The challenges posed by both incidents to restoring peace on the peninsula in the aftermath of North Korean provocations were significant. When encountering such surprise attacks, thoughts immediately turn to “What’s next, and how can the armistice be quickly restored?” There have been over 70 years of armistice during which there has been notable success in preventing dangerous escalation.

Today, North Korea is literally hundreds of missile launches, four nuclear tests, and deployment of large numbers of weapons beyond where it was in 2010. A 2025 island shelling, ship sinking, or other military attack on South Korea is a sufficiently possible scenario for which planning needs to take place today. A scenario in which a robust, even proportionate ROK response generates threats of nuclear use is not beyond the imagination. While such discussions and planning are already underway, this will clearly be a critical topic for discussion between U.S. and ROK policymakers and military planners, particularly once the election passes.

Sydney Seiler is a senior adviser (non-resident) with the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Views expressed in this paper are the author’s own and do not imply endorsement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Intelligence Community, or any other U.S. government agency.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

North Korea’s Entry into the Ukraine War

An assessment of the tactical, strategic and political implications and the trajectory of the war.

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/north-koreas-entry-into-the-ukraine?utm

Mick Ryan

Oct 22, 2024

∙ Paid

Source: Japan Times

It has become increasingly likely that North Korean combat troops will appear in Ukraine soon. According to Ukrainian and South Korean government sources, around 1500 North Korean special operations troops are currently preparing in Russia to deploy to Ukraine.

On 13 October, President Zelenskyy announced the anticipated deployment of North Korea troops to Ukraine. In the past 48 hours, the head of NATO, Mark Rutte, described how “North Korea sending troops to fight alongside Russia in Ukraine would mark a significant escalation.”

While there remain many unknowns on this subject, the deployment of North Korean troops raises many different potential issues for Russia, Ukraine and NATO.

Challenges and Opportunities for Russia

The first issue for the Russians will be how and where to deploy the North Koreans. How will Russia employ them - on the battlefield, or along border, in rear areas for security, occupation duties and that then allows Russian troops to be released and sent to front line?

If the North Koreans are to be employed in combat operations, which looks increasingly possible, there are numerous challenges.

The most obvious challenge for Russia in the deployment of North Korean troops for combat operations will be at the tactical level. There will be a communication gap between soldiers and commanders who speak two different languages. It is very unlikely that most North Korean troops speak Russian - and vice versa. While translators will be helpful, this kind of communication gap can, and will, be a problem during combat operations.

Also at the tactical level, how will North Korean tactical training and doctrine mesh with Russian tactics. This will be an issue in the Russian Brigade the North Koreans are allocated to, particularly in building combined arms groups. Further, if North Koreans have to call for air support and artillery fire, language and procedural differences will be a challenge.

There will be an array of logistical challenges. Will the North Koreans use their own weapons, protective ensemble (body armour, helmets, etc) and equipment or rely on Russia to provide these? If the North Koreans are to use Russian kit, there may be a training liability. Although this is only a problem if you are a professional and care about the lives of your soldiers. The Russians – not so much. And of course, there will be the ongoing issue of transporting North Korean soldiers to the Ukrainian theatre. This is thousands of kilometres from the Korean peninsula and may be an ongoing liability for Russia.

Finally, the status of command of the North Koreans will be interesting. Will they operate fully integrated within Russian formations and be subject to the full command of Russian commanders? Or will they be under a form of operational command or control with caveats on their employment, such as not being used as meat troops? The initial employment of North Koreans will provide insights into this issue of command and control.

There are also opportunities for Russia in the deployment of the North Koreans. While the numbers being deployed – potentially up to ten thousand – is relatively small compared to the overall size of Russian forces in Ukraine, they do take a small amount of pressure off Putin. If the initial deployment of North Koreans can be turned into an enduring commitment with a constant flow of troops, Putin may not have to undertake another mobilization effort with his own population.

The North Korean deployment might be indicative of Russian manpower challenges. However, ten thousand North Koreans represents less than ten days combat losses for Russia at current rates. If Russia is having manpower issues, it will require far more North Koreans to address these challenges.

North Korea: It is (almost) all upside

North Korea has previously dispatched troops to a foreign war, but this was decades ago. Its participation in the Vietnam War – mainly pilots, psyops and intelligence officers, although ground troops were offered and declined by North Vietnam - demonstrates that North Korean leaders are willing and able to deploy troops in support of its fellow travellers if it perceives that the stakes are significant enough.

The Russia-North Korea defence pact describes the possibility of mutual assistance in case of armed invasion of either party. Given that Ukrainian troops are currently undertaking a campaign inside the Russian oblast of Kursk, the North Koreans might view this as a key rationale for deploying their troops.

For North Korea, the deployment of its troops to Ukraine has many advantages.

First, its ensures that it has a grateful client in Russia. North Korea has already dispatched large quantities of munitions to Russia for its war effort against Ukraine, and has allegedly provided reconstruction assistance in Eastern Ukraine and Siberia. These provide valuable foreign currency for the isolated and sanctioned North Korea. Putin, while a pretty dastardly and manipulative character, will appreciate the additional support in the form of soldiers from the North Koreans.

Secondly, North Korea might assess that prolonging the war in Ukraine – even if it plays a small role in doing so – is in its strategic interests because it distracts the U.S. administration from focussing too much on the Western Pacific (and North Korea).

Third, Russia could be potentially providing additional technical assistance to the North Koreans. This could encompass multiple areas. The most dangerous would be helping the North Koreans improve the targeting and reliability of their nuclear weapon delivery systems. But as Daniel Sneider has recently written:

Any Russian aid that effectively helps North Korea perfect its nuclear delivery systems would mark a sharp departure from past Russian policy, which not only opposed nuclear proliferation in principle but actively tried to prevent any leakage of technology.

While the Russians might need the assistance of North Korea now, even they probably understand that the North Koreans are too unreliable and unpredictable to be trusted with sensitive nuclear technology. Let’s hope that is the case. Because if not, it would be a major shift in the international regime against nuclear proliferation and a significant capability enhancement for the North Koreans.

But, in other areas, it probably stands to reason that the Russians will provide assistance to North Korea. There may be financial assistance for the North Korean budget. Sharing lessons on modern combat, particularly on the integrated use of drones, cruise and ballistic missiles will be of great interest to North Korea which likes to keep the South Korean capital and U.S. bases in Korea permanently at threat. Lessons about electronic warfare, countering air defences, and insights gleaned from captured western weapons in Ukraine may also be high on the agenda for sharing with North Korea.

Ultimately, the North Korean decision to assist Russia in Ukraine will help the North Koreans to modernise their large yet antiquated military. It will provide an infusion of intelligence and information about modern weapons, tactics, equipment and combat organisations. For the price of a few thousand troops, this might be seen as a bargain by the North Korean leadership

The Impact on the Ukrainians

Given the small size (relatively) of the North Korean commitment, it is unlikely to have a decisive impact on the frontline or on the trajectory of the war in the short term. North Korean troops could appear on the eastern front or in Kursk, with Kursk being a higher probability given the terms of the Russia-North Korea defence pact.

Should the North Koreans be employed in rear areas and on occupation duties in Ukraine territory, they will probably be at least as brutal as the Russians. The North Koreans are well practiced in suppressing civilian society; they will bring this skill with them to occupied Ukraine unfortunately.

If Ukrainian and North Korean troops are to meet on the battlefield, it is likely that Ukrainian forces will have little trouble with the green, inexperienced North Koreans. Indeed, the North Koreans for some time may be the weak link in any Russian operation. Thus, there is an opportunity for Ukraine to exploit the differences between Russian and North Korean troops on battlefield.

But gradually the North Koreans, if they sustain their deployment for any length of time, will learn and adapt. The Russians have, and so too will their Korean allies. This will pose a problem for the Ukrainians in the future – and for South Korea as well.

Finally, Ukraine may see this North Korean intervention as further justification for an immediate invitation to join NATO, even as the war continues. This is a key element of the Victory Plan recently announced by President Zelenskyy. Bringing in a co-belligerent in this war is a major escalation by Russia.

From the start of the war, NATO has studiously avoided ‘boots on the ground’ to avoid provoking Russia. Now that Russia has ‘gone there’, Ukraine will feel justified in demanding an invitation to NATO and asking for additional support from NATO. But will that happen?

NATO: Probably Unwilling to do More

For some time now, I have been writing about the failing NATO strategy for Ukraine. Back in August 2023 I wrote the following:

The United States and NATO need to make clear that their explicit goal is for Ukraine to defeat Russia’s forces in Ukraine—and to silence Russia’s global narrative. They then need to provide Ukraine with standardized equipment and enhanced individual and collective training.

The lack of a real strategy, beyond the ‘for as long as it takes’ slogan and avoiding World War Three, is resulting in the slow strangulation of Ukraine. Will the entry of North Korea into the war change NATO’s strategy and resourcing for the war?

Unfortunately, that is unlikely. As a consensus organization, any shift in NATO’s strategy for the war requires agreement by all members of the alliance. In the current environment, with the problematic members of Hungary and Turkey, there is almost no chance of this. The leadership of NATO at the moment appears to be adopting a ‘wait and see’ approach in the hope that North Korean troops do not appear in Ukraine, and if they do, have some more meetings (such as the briefing from South Korea).

Ultimately, the unwillingness of the American administration to take any significant risk in this conflict has seen their default approach essentially being that they are more worried about a Russian defeat than a Ukrainian defeat. Therefore, as the Biden administration counts down the clock, it is unlikely to demonstrate the kind of resolve needed to address this major Russian escalation when they have not done so for the past 971 days since the Russian large-scale invasion. And this lack of resolve means that NATO will be able to do little about the North Korean intervention.

Assessment

The entry of the North Koreans in their current size and with their existing capabilities is unlikely to significantly shift the trajectory of the war in the short term. It comes at a time when the muddy season is about to begin and therefore offensive operations will begin to subside.

However, should the North Koreans decide to step up the size and duration of their commitment (they do have a million plus person military), this could be a more decisive contribution in 2025.

The experience gained by the North Koreans in Ukraine will force the South Koreans and Americans to reassess the correlation of forces on the Korean Peninsula. The exposure to new modes of warfighting and new technologies may see the North Koreans become a more modern and capable adversary there. This will be very unwelcome news for South Korea in particular and will represent a destabilising influence on the Korean peninsula.

The North Korean deployment occurs at a time where there is also increased tensions along the Korean border. In January, North Korea declared it was formally rejecting the goal of peaceful unification. More recently, North Korea has blown up border crossings bridges that connect it with the Republic of Korea. While the deployment of forces to Ukraine adds to the disquiet felt in Seoul about their northern neighbours, there are no indications of any serious North Korean attempts to attack the RoK. Yet.

North Korea is still technically at war with the U.S. and other countries that support Ukraine such as the United Kingdom and Australia. The legal interpretation of North Korea’s entry into a war will be interesting. However, this alone is unlikely to result in any significant shift in U.S. policy.

An interesting issue is the manner in which South Korea reacts. While it has provided some aid to Ukraine, it has largely eschewed provision of lethal (ie. military) aid throughout the period since Russia’s large-scale invasion in early 2022. Will North Korea’s entry as a co-belligerent in the war change the policy of the South Korean government with regards to military aid to Ukraine? That is possible, as some have speculated, but remains to be seen.

At heart, North Korea’s leader has assessed that without the U.S. making any significant policy change about the war, no one else is likely to. And, with the Biden administration in its dying weeks, Kim believes that America’s government lacks the will and the capacity to intervene and respond to the Russian escalation.

Unfortunately, he is probably right.

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4. North Korean troops in Russia pose challenge to U.S., allies from ‘axis of authoritarianism’

Perpetuating the fear narrative that KJU desires us to have. And no mention of opportunities for the ROK/US alliance.

Robert Collins provides a most useful assessment that does not play into the perpetuating of the fear of this malign activity or that the nKPA troops are 10 feet tall - (they are barely 5 feet tall - just watch the videos).

Excerpts:

“Russia uses disposable units to attack, then heavy weapons take out Ukrainian defenses before assault troops — airborne or naval infantry — break through, and line units follow up,” Mr. Yang said. “These tactics will apply to the North Koreans.”

North Korea has zero experience in overseas warfare beyond the company, or 120-man, level.

“East coming to West, rather than West going East, is new,” said Robert Collins, a civilian specialist who advises U.S. officers on North Korean affairs. “North Koreans ranked colonel and above have no experience on Western battlefields.”

Though U.S. and South Korean troops have been training jointly for more than 70 years, he said, language barriers pose difficulties. For North Koreans and Russians, the interoperability problems will be magnified.

“I think they are going to end up being easy targets,” he said. “If 10,000 North Koreans fail miserably, is Kim Jong-un going to send 10,000 more? That’s problematic.”

North Korean troops in Russia pose challenge to U.S., allies from ‘axis of authoritarianism’

South Korea summons Moscow ambassador to protest reported North Korean troop deployment

washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon

By - The Washington Times - Monday, October 21, 2024

SEOUL, South Korea — Mounting reports that North Korea is set to be the first outside power to directly intervene in the Russia-Ukraine conflict are posing perhaps the most serious challenge yet to the U.S. and its allies from the “axis” of authoritarian states looking to overturn the global security order.

The tension escalated again Monday when the South Korean government summoned the Russian ambassador in Seoul to protest “in the strongest possible terms” the reports that thousands of North Korean troops are deploying to a Russian military base for training and potentially to the front lines in Ukraine.

The Russian Embassy insisted that warming relations between Moscow and Pyongyang are not “directed against South Korean security interests.”

South Korea’s lead spy agency on Friday said it had hard proof that the regime of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un sent 1,500 special operations forces to Russia this month to support Moscow’s war against Ukraine. That followed claims from Ukrainian intelligence analysts that 11,000 North Koreans were training in Russia before a battlefield deployment.

South Korean intelligence agencies now estimate that 12,000 North Korean troops, enough to man an infantry division and a special forces brigade, are being dispatched.

For months, multiple intelligence sources have shown that Pyongyang is massively arming Russia, but the troop deployment would mark a new level of commitment and coordination.

In a surprise visit, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin traveled to Kyiv on Monday to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and express support for the country’s war with Russia. North Korea was expected to be on the agenda.

“A new threat has emerged — the malign alliance between Russia and North Korea,” Mr. Zelenskyy said via video on Sunday evening. “If the world remains silent now, and if we face North Korean soldiers on the front lines … it will benefit no one in this world and will only prolong this war.”

The North Korean deployment could shatter several precedents in the global security order.

Geopolitically, any combat alliance between the two continental authoritarian powers would far outstrip the modest, nonbinding security links forged between Atlantic and Pacific democracies in recent years. It also would alter the dynamics within the emerging “axis of authoritarianism,” demonstrating that heavily sanctioned North Korea, which is exporting weapons and munitions to heavily sanctioned Russia, is more risk-tolerant than China or Iran.

Tactically, the deployment could provide the Kremlin with fresh forces along the 600 miles of front lines in eastern and southern Ukraine.

The move marks North Korea’s first-ever overseas expeditionary force. Other overseas adventures were limited to tiny and deniable presences: pilots, military advisers, special forces.

“It would be serious and push the conflict into a new stage, an additional escalatory stage,” French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barron warned on a visit to Kyiv over the weekend.

His Ukrainian counterpart, Andrii Sybiha, called it “a huge threat” and said a risk exists of the war “growing out of its current scale and borders.”

Military historian Gastone Breccia of the University of Pavia warned that the deployment marked “another step towards world war.”

Indicators escalate

Despite the backlash, the timing looks fortuitous for Russian President Vladimir Putin.

European and U.S. diplomatic and military assets are focused heavily on preventing a new Middle East war, while political leadership in the U.S. and elsewhere are consumed with domestic matters and upcoming votes.

The United States is preoccupied with a close, divisive presidential election on Nov. 5. The Japanese elect a new parliament on Sunday, though that election is predicted to be neither close nor especially divisive.

Indications of North Korean troop movements to Russia are increasing.

South Korean intelligence released satellite images on Friday and said 1,500 special forces had been sent to Vladivostok. Two film clips shot in Russia’s Far East have leaked online.

In one, supplied by Kyiv, Asian troops are seen in a depot receiving uniform items. CNN posted a related document detailing clothing sizes in Russian and Korean.

In another, armed Asian troops in combat gear are seen on a training ground. Russian voices can be heard speaking of larger numbers soon to arrive.

A leaflet circulating on Russian social media features an image of a North Korean soldier and Korean translations of how to order Ukrainians to surrender. Unconfirmed images show the North Korean flag on arm patches.

North Koreans would add greater weight to the odds already swinging against Kyiv.

Russia has been steadily advancing across eastern and southeastern Ukraine since seizing Bakhmut in June 2023.

Ukraine’s August incursion into Russia’s Kursk oblast won ground but failed to stem the tide. The Kursk incursion, where some believe North Korean troops may deploy, is itself under heavy pressure.

If used en masse, 12,000 highly trained troops — every North Korean male serves 10 years — could generate a decisive breakthrough, reckons Yang Uk, a security analyst at Seoul’s Asan Institute. He said he thinks Pyongyang is deploying a heavy infantry division of three brigades plus a light infantry brigade of special forces.

“Russia uses disposable units to attack, then heavy weapons take out Ukrainian defenses before assault troops — airborne or naval infantry — break through, and line units follow up,” Mr. Yang said. “These tactics will apply to the North Koreans.”

North Korea has zero experience in overseas warfare beyond the company, or 120-man, level.

“East coming to West, rather than West going East, is new,” said Robert Collins, a civilian specialist who advises U.S. officers on North Korean affairs. “North Koreans ranked colonel and above have no experience on Western battlefields.”

Though U.S. and South Korean troops have been training jointly for more than 70 years, he said, language barriers pose difficulties. For North Koreans and Russians, the interoperability problems will be magnified.

“I think they are going to end up being easy targets,” he said. “If 10,000 North Koreans fail miserably, is Kim Jong-un going to send 10,000 more? That’s problematic.”

How to respond

With donor nations fretting even over Kyiv’s use of long-range weapons, Mr. Yang said the U.S. and Ukraine’s other backers must rethink their approach.

“Global democracies are really afraid of World War III,” Mr. Yang said. “But compare the manufacturing capacity of global democracies: We can outproduce Russia and North Korea.”

As well as accelerating arms shipments, Ukraine’s allies could directly deploy long-range, unmanned weapons in Ukraine, guided by nations such as Germany, South Korea, Britain and the U.S., he said.

While North Korea massively arms Russia, South Korea, a defense manufacturing powerhouse, declines to directly arm Ukraine. That policy may face new pressure in light of recent events.

“We’ll be fanning those flames,” said a Western officer in Seoul, speaking anonymously.

Jeff Roberson, who teaches diplomatic relations at Seoul’s Yonsei University, cautioned that the reports of North Korean aid and troops to Russia should be closely examined. Kyiv, he noted, has every reason to talk up threats — particularly from countries as toxic as Pyongyang.

“A lot of information regarding boots on ground, and on numbers, is coming from Ukrainian sources,” Mr. Robertson said. “There are lots of things North Koreans can be doing in Russia, including construction work and filling in roles that allow more Russians to go to the front.”

• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.

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5. Seoul weighing ‘various’ responses to North Korea sending troops to Ukraine

One of the best responses is to provide substantial lethal aid to Ukraine perhaps on a scale that can support a decisive victory by Ukraine.

The other response must be in the realm of a superior political warfare strategy to exploit the Kim familyregime's malign activities and expose weaknesses.

The common talking points for borth north Korea and China is that their relationship and activities are based on fear, weakness, separation, and envy.

Seoul weighing ‘various’ responses to North Korea sending troops to Ukraine

Defense ministry declines to state whether ROK will provide lethal aid to Kyiv amid questions about extent of deployment

https://www.nknews.org/2024/10/seoul-weighing-various-responses-to-north-korea-sending-troops-to-ukraine/?t=1729593596

Jeongmin Kim October 21, 2024

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol with Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy | Image: ROK Presidential Office (May 2023)

South Korea is considering “various” ways to respond to North Korea’s deployment of troops to support Russia’s war in Ukraine, Seoul’s defense ministry said Monday, while declining to state whether the ROK will provide direct military aid to Kyiv.

The statement comes after South Korea’s presidential office confirmed the DPRK deployment last week, with Seoul’s spy agency releasing satellite imagery that it said showed Russian naval vessels transporting North Korean special forces to the Russian Far East.

“The government is keeping a close eye on the situation, staying open to various possibilities,” defense ministry spokesperson Jeon Ha-kyu said on Monday, when asked about how South Korea will respond. “Necessary follow-up measures will be reviewed and implemented.”

Jeon repeatedly maintained that he could not disclose details of these potential measures, while declining to comment directly on whether South Korea will retaliate by sending lethal weapons to Ukraine. Seoul has sold arms to Poland and the U.S. in recent years but has only provided non-lethal aid to Kyiv since Russia launched its invasion.

Later in the afternoon, Vice Foreign Minister Kim Hong-kyun summoned Russian Ambassador Georgiy Zinoviev to “strongly urge the immediate withdrawal of North Korean troops and cessation of related cooperation,” the ROK foreign ministry said in a release.

Kim emphasized that the deployment poses a “significant security threat not only to South Korea but also to the international community,” condemning the “illegal military cooperation in the strongest terms.” He warned Zinoviev that “all available means will be mobilized” to actions that threaten Seoul’s “core security interests.”

Shortly after, the Russian Embassy said in a statement that the ambassador told Kim that Moscow’s cooperation with Pyongyang falls within the framework of international law and does not violate Seoul’s security interests.

South Korean vice foreign minister (right) with Russian ambassador to ROK on Oct. 21, 2024 | Image: ROK MOFA

RED LINE CROSSED?

Earlier this year, Seoul’s national security adviser floated the possibility of providing lethal weapons to Ukraine shortly after North Korea signed a new mutual defense treaty with Russia, warning of a “red line” Pyongyang and Moscow must not cross.

But the defense ministry avoided stating on Monday whether the DPRK’s apparent deployment of troops breached Seoul’s threshold.

“It’s difficult to assess whether the red line has been crossed or not. Our basic stance is that North Korea’s participation in Russia’s war of aggression violates U.N. resolutions,” Jeon said, adding it threatens ROK national security and “citizen safety.”

Ban Kil-joo, a professor at the Ilmin International Relations Institute at Korea University, told NK News that Seoul faces a tricky situation in responding to DPRK troop deployments since Russia could retaliate by aiding North Korea.

“Seoul needs a mechanism to increase leverage over Russia again — and that’s done through red line management. That’s why it needs to be carefully crafted.”

He argued that Seoul should now declare the deployment a breach of its red line and back up its past warnings.

“To accurately convey that Russia has crossed the red line, simply increasing the financial and humanitarian support we’re currently providing for Ukraine won’t be considered punishment,” he said.

“Ultimately Seoul will have to consider the lethal weapons card that Russia fears, but even with lethal weapons support, the level of warning can vary depending on the degree.”

The expert explained that South Korea’s options range from simply increasing its supply of shells to Ukraine’s allies, thus allowing them to provide more arms to Kyiv, to stronger measures like sending different types of ground-to-ground missiles directly to Ukraine.

Seoul will need to strategize what kind to provide at which time, he said, suggesting that higher-level officials are likely still formulating this “important” strategy.

Footage showing what appear to be DPRK-made 122mm Grad MLRS rockets being used by Russian forces in Ukraine | Image: Russian defense ministry Telegram (Dec. 5, 2023)

THE SILENCE

North Korean state media has yet to confirm the deployment of its soldiers to Ukraine, but the ROK military reportedly included the news in one of its propaganda loudspeaker broadcasts on Monday.

During Monday’s briefing, journalists asked the defense ministry why the U.S. or NATO have not officially confirmed what the ROK National Intelligence Service (NIS) or the presidential office announced last week.

“As far as I know, before the NIS and the presidential office disclosed the information on Oct. 18, they shared and coordinated these facts with the U.S.,” spokesperson Jeon said.

But Cho Han-bum, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, told NK News that the U.S. is likely not yet officially confirming the North Korean deployment because it is too early to tell the unit involved and scale.

“The situation is not yet definitive,” the expert said, explaining that it is difficult to know the nature of the deployment despite the NIS and presidential office’s claims.

He said South Korea will likely need to wait until there are confirmed North Korean casualties or prisoners in Ukraine to justify the provision of lethal weapons to Ukraine.

However, Cho expressed doubt that North Korea will send a significant number of special ops troops at a time of intense escalation with South Korea, especially when those troops will serve in a “war of attrition” with many expected casualties.

Meanwhile, the South Korean outlet Newspim reported that ROK military authorities are planning to dispatch “military agents” to Ukraine in light of the DPRK deployment.

“We don’t have any specific details to confirm regarding that matter. Our overall position is that we will review necessary aspects while keeping possibilities open,” Jeon said, when asked about the report at the briefing.

Joon Ha Park contributed reporting to this article. Edited by Bryan Betts

6. Why some experts think North Korea faked evidence of ROK drone intrusion

Also because it is the most likely explanation and is in keeping with the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.

Why some experts think North Korea faked evidence of ROK drone intrusion

State media photos appear to show South Korean UAV, but analysts say it would be easy to replicate such commercial tech

https://www.nknews.org/2024/10/why-some-experts-think-north-korea-faked-evidence-of-rok-drone-intrusion/?

Shreyas Reddy October 21, 2024

South Korean S-BAT drones on display during a military parade in downtown Seoul | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Oct. 19, 2024)

South Korea has neither confirmed nor denied North Korea’s allegations that an ROK military drone scattered anti-regime leaflets over Pyongyang several times this month, but some experts have backed a lawmaker’s claim that the DPRK may have faked the apparent infiltration amid escalating inter-Korean tensions.

North Korea’s ruling party newspaper Rodong Sinmun published photos over the weekend of what it claimed to be the South Korean “long-range reconnaissance” drone discovered in Pyongyang, with the images appearing to show an S-BAT unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that Seoul has displayed at military parades.

At a press briefing on Monday, a spokesperson for Seoul’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said that North Korea’s “unilateral claims … are not worth verifying or responding to.” However, the spokesperson declined to confirm a local media report that cited unnamed military authorities as stating that no drone crossed the border from South Korean airspace.

He also did not confirm whether Seoul believes the DPRK could have fabricated its supposed evidence, adding further ambiguity after the JCS’ previous statement that it “cannot verify the authenticity of North Korea’s claims” of a South Korean drone infiltration.

By contrast, lawmaker Yoo Yong-won of South Korea’s ruling People Power Party issued a press release highlighting its visual similarities to Sungwoo Engineering’s S-BAT long-range reconnaissance UAV, which the South Korean military contracted in 2020 for an order of 100 drones.

The S-BAT has a top speed of roughly 87 miles per hour (140 km/h) and can fly for up to four hours, according to Sungwoo Engineering.

However, despite the resemblance to the South Korean drone, Yoo’s office said Pyongyang likely copied the S-BAT’s design, as it has previously done with drones mimicking U.S. and Israeli models.

The South Korean drone allegedly recovered by the DPRK military in Pyongyang | Image: KCNA (Oct. 19, 2024)

Yang Uk, a military analyst at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, backed the lawmaker’s assertion that the design, similar to Boeing’s ScanEagle drone, is widely used worldwide.

He told NK News that the drone is manufactured by a private company rather than the ROK military, making it easy for North Korea to copy the design from publicly available information.

Following previous DPRK drone incursions, the expert viewed the attempt to replicate Seoul’s hardware as a move to deceive South Korea’s expanding anti-UAV capabilities.

“It’s very much possible [that they copied the design] so that they can penetrate into South Korea, posing as the South Korean drone so that it cannot be intercepted,” he said.

Yang also agreed with Yoo’s conclusion that the drone would be unlikely to fly all the way to Pyongyang with a heavy canister containing leaflets, stating that it is designed to carry only built-in sensors and cameras.

North Korea’s track record of producing copycat drones makes it hard to rule out the possibility it mimicked the South Korean model for a false flag operation, according to Shin Seung-ki, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

“If North Korea did replicate the drone, it is presumed that they would use it to highlight the military threat posed by South Korea, suppress internal discontent, and strengthen regime solidarity,” he told NK News.

READ MORE: What to make of North Korean claims about ROK aerial ‘intrusions’

However, South Korea’s ambiguous statements make it hard to completely rule out the possibility that Pyongyang has captured an actual ROK drone containing weapons technologies prohibited by U.N. sanctions against the DPRK.

“If North Korea acquires more reliable and sophisticated drone design and components than North Korea, this could increase the likelihood that North Korea will learn and develop more advanced drones than before,” Shin warned.

Yang agreed that North Korea could reverse-engineer a captured drone to acquire crucial data, technical specifications and knowledge to manufacture more advanced models of its own, but said this was already a risk as the drone is commercially available.

He added that the generic drone is not particularly sophisticated technology, so the threat level is largely unchanged beyond the possibility of using it as a decoy to fool South Korean defenses.

North Korean state media showed former ROK defense minister Shin Won-sik inspecting S-BAT drones in January. | Image: KCNA (Oct. 19, 2024)

Not all experts thought that the DPRK photos showed a copycat drone, however.

Hong Min, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), told NK News that the North Korean images appear to match the Sunwoo Engineering drone, codenamed “Argos.”

The expert noted that the drone has a range of approximately 250 miles (400 km), well above the roughly 130-mile distance to Pyongyang from the inter-Korean border, although this does not account for the added weight of a leaflet canister.

Pyongyang previously warned that it would regard ROK incursions as an act of war and threatened to respond with an “immediate retaliation strike” in case of further incidents, and has since ordered frontline troops to be ready to “open fire” against South Korean drones.

Despite North Korea’s threats, its emphasis that it does not care whether its adversaries are military or private actors suggests it favors border reinforcement over conflict, according to Hong.

“Their response includes strengthening anti-aircraft surveillance and maintaining a ‘full combat readiness posture’ for units along the ceasefire line to immediately retaliate against future incidents,” he said.

If there are no further incursions, the issue may settle down after the U.N. Command overseeing the inter-Korean armistice carries out its investigation into North Korea’s accusations, Hong added.

Edited by Alannah Hill

7. Kim Yo Jong threatens ‘fatal’ retaliation against Seoul, while slamming Ukraine

The evil sister is threatening us.

Kim Yo Jong threatens ‘fatal’ retaliation against Seoul, while slamming Ukraine

North Korean leader’s statement appears to be response to claims DPRK is sending troops to aid Russia’s invasion

https://www.nknews.org/2024/10/kim-yo-jong-threatens-fatal-retaliation-against-seoul-while-slamming-ukraine/

Shreyas Reddy October 22, 2024

Kim Yo Jong speaking at a national meeting in Pyongyang | Image: KCTV (Aug. 11, 2022)

The North Korean leader’s influential sister threatened “terrible and fatal” retaliation against Seoul on Tuesday, following South Korea and Ukraine’s recent allegations that Pyongyang has dispatched troops to support Russia’s invasion.

In a statement released through the state-owned Korean Central News Agency on Tuesday evening, Kim Yo Jong accused the two countries of provoking “nuclear weapons states,” without specifying what actions have drawn Pyongyang’s ire.

“A military provocation against a nuclear weapons state may lead to a horrible situation, unimaginable for politicians and military experts in any big or small country in the world with their normal thinking to experience,” she warned.

“Seoul and Kyiv are exact counterparts in going about begging and letting loose reckless remarks against nuclear weapons states at random without follow-up capability.”

Kim’s condemnation of the two countries as “bad dogs bred by the U.S.” comes after the two accused the DPRK of deploying thousands of troops to support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in recent weeks.

South Korea’s National Intelligence Service claimed on Friday that North Korea already dispatched over 1,500 special forces troops to Russia between Oct. 8 and 13, with more deployments expected in the near future.

A senior Ukrainian military official subsequently called on Seoul to take advantage of North Korea sending its “most powerful troops” and seize the “chance to permanently end the division” between the two Koreas.

“It is also a chance for the whole of East Asia to safeguard itself from a neighbor with a nuclear button,” Bohdan Krotevch, acting commander of the National Guard of Ukraine’s Azov Brigade, said on social media on Saturday.

Although Kim’s meandering statement did not specifically reference the ROK spy agency’s claims, her focus on both Seoul and Kyiv appears to be a response to the allegations, which Pyongyang has denied.

The North Korean ruling party vice department director also condemned South Korea for allegedly dropping leaflets critical of the Kim Jong Un regime north of the border using drones.

Pyongyang previously accused Seoul’s military of scattering the propaganda leaflets in North Korea on Oct. 3, 9 and 10, and Kim said DPRK authorities discovered more “political motivational rubbish sent by the ROK scum” on Monday.

North Korean state media has published photos of an alleged ROK military drone found in Pyongyang, though experts have suggested Pyongyang could have faked the evidence.

Kim stated that North Korean investigators are continuing to look into the alleged drone incursions, and threatened to retaliate against South Korea for its “hideous military provocation.”

“Seoul will have to experience firsthand so as to know properly how dangerous an act it committed and how terrible and fatal the consequences it brought on itself are.”

She added: “No one knows how our retaliation and revenge will be completed.”

Edited by Alannah Hill

8. Seoul warns it could arm Ukraine to counter North Korean troop deployment

Let's get on with it. Provide lethal aid.

And yes, deploy observers and collect on the nKPA activities in support of Putin's War so they can highlight how nK soldiers are dying for Putin.

Seoul warns it could arm Ukraine to counter North Korean troop deployment

Remarks by top official come amid reports that ROK is considering sending team to Ukraine to monitor DPRK soldiers

https://www.nknews.org/2024/10/seoul-warns-it-could-arm-ukraine-to-counter-north-korean-troop-deployment/

Jeongmin Kim October 22, 2024

Missile defense systems on display during South Korea's Armed Forces Day parade | Image: NK News (Oct. 1, 2024)

South Korea says it is considering whether to send “offensive weapons” to Ukraine as a warning to North Korea and Russia, after accusing Pyongyang of deploying troops to aid Moscow’s war effort.

A high-level presidential official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said Seoul “can consider supporting defensive weapons, and if a threshold is exceeded, we could ultimately consider offensive weapons as well,” without defining what that threshold is.

South Korea’s intelligence agency released satellite imagery on Friday that it said shows Russian ships transporting North Korean soldiers to the Far East, a claim that Pyongyang has dismissed as a “groundless” accusation.

Seoul has provided humanitarian military supplies to Ukraine and indirectly supported the provision of arms to Kyiv by exporting artillery shells to the U.S., but it has declined to send lethal weapons directly to Ukraine, in part due to concerns about how Russia will respond.

After North Korea and Russia signed a mutual defense pact in July, South Korea’s national security adviser warned that Seoul could provide lethal weapons to Kyiv if they cross a “red line,” and Tuesday’s statement by the presidential official marks the first time since then that the ROK has threatened to take such steps.

“Many people asked me, ‘Is this breaking your principle of restraint regarding lethal weapons support?’ In fact, all weapons can either cause casualties or destroy facilities depending on their intended use. The term ‘lethal’ is an emotionally charged word,” the official said.

The official’s remarks came shortly after South Korea held an emergency National Security Council meeting, where members condemned the “grave security threat” posed by North Korean troop deployments and discussed follow-up measures.

“They pointed out that the North Korean regime, which has thoroughly ignored the livelihoods and human rights of its citizens while solely focusing on nuclear and missile development, is now forcing North Korean youth onto a war battlefield without justification as mercenaries for Russia, which amounts to an act of self-admission that they are a criminal organization,” the Presidential Office stated in a press release.

Ban Kil-joo, a professor at the Ilmin International Relations Institute at Korea University, told NK News that South Korea has many options when it comes to deciding what to provide to Ukraine.

“For example, there’s the question of whether we’ll provide offensive weapons like the state-of-the-art ground-to-ground missiles that our country emphasizes. These also come in many varieties, from low-intensity to medium-intensity to high-intensity warheads,” he said.

Defensive weapons that South Korea could provide include Cheongung surface-to-air guided missiles capable of intercepting fighter jets.

“So the question is whether we’ll provide support with the latest new weapons our country has developed, or just provide artillery shells either indirectly or directly. The discussion will now focus on what level of support to provide and when,” Ban said.

Kim Jong Un watches soldiers train | Image: KCTV (March 7, 2024)

MONITORING TEAM

The presidential official told journalists at the briefing Tuesday that the NSC meeting discussed “diplomatic, economic and military” measures that will depend on how Russia-North Korea cooperation progresses.

The official also pushed back on concerns that the U.S. has not officially acknowledged North Korea’s troop deployment, saying it would take “more time” for the U.S. to state its official position and measures.

The official raised the possibility that, in return for troops, Russia is helping to upgrade and modernize North Korea’s aging conventional weapons and providing assistance to successfully launch reconnaissance satellites. “This would expand North Korea’s surveillance capabilities against us,” they said.

“Furthermore, if North Korean combat troops currently stationed in the east move west to participate in combat, it could cultivate their actual combat capabilities. They could also acquire weapon performance data from the war. These factors could pose threats to South Korea’s security.”

An anonymous government source told local media outlets Tuesday that it’s also possible that the ROK will “dispatch personnel to Ukraine to monitor the tactics and combat capabilities of the special forces that North Korea has deployed to assist Russia.”

According to an exclusive report published by Newspim on Monday, this monitoring team could include military personnel who study enemy tactics.

This also comes after Ruling People Power Party lawmaker Han Ki-ho said Monday that the monitoring team should include personnel capable of interrogating North Korean soldiers who might be captured or defect.

South Korean media outlets, citing anonymous sources, have reported that North Korea will deploy around 12,000 troops from the 11th Corps, an elite special forces unit, to the Ukraine war, although experts told NK News that it is too early to tell which units are involved in the deployment.

Joon Ha Park contributed reporting to this article. Edited by Alannah Hill

9. North Korea denies it has deployed troops to support Russia’s war in Ukraine

Admit nothing, deny everything, make counter accusations. Straight from the nK playbook.

North Korea denies it has deployed troops to support Russia’s war in Ukraine

DPRK representative tells UN claims are ‘groundless’ as Seoul calls deployment an ‘attack’ on UN sanctions regime

https://www.nknews.org/2024/10/north-korea-denies-it-has-deployed-troops-to-support-russias-war-in-ukraine/

Shreyas Reddy October 22, 2024

Alleged North Korean soldiers at a Russian training base and a DPRK diplomat to the U.N. | Images: Center for Strategic Communication and Information Security and U.N. Web TV (Oct. 21, 2024), edited by NK News

North Korea has denied allegations that it is deploying troops to support Russia’s war in Ukraine, dismissing the claims as “groundless” rumors aimed at damaging its image and bilateral relations with Russia.

Addressing a meeting of the U.N. General Assembly’s First Committee on disarmament on Monday, a DPRK representative rejected concerns raised by other countries after South Korea reported last week that it observed North Korean troops being sent to Russia.

“My delegation does not feel any need to comment on groundless, stereotyped rumors aimed at smearing the image of the DPRK and undermining the legitimate, friendly and cooperative relations between sovereign states,” he stated.

The diplomat also questioned other member states’ claims that “so-called arms transfers” to Russia constitute a violation of U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. Pyongyang has previously denied that it is shipping weapons for use in Ukraine and framed the allegations as a U.S.-led effort to target the DPRK.

The North Korean official dismissed sanctions as “defective products” of a “heinous anti-DPRK policy” and argued that they violate the U.N. Charter’s principles of sovereignty, non-interference and North Korea’s right to self-defense.

Monday’s denial represents Pyongyang’s first official response to the ROK National Intelligence Service’s (NIS) claim that North Korea sent over 1,500 special forces troops aboard Russian naval vessels between Oct. 8 and 13, with more deployments expected in the near future.

The North Korean soldiers were issued Russian military uniforms and Russian-made weapons along with “fake identification cards” to disguise them as residents of Siberian regions, according to the spy agency on Friday.

The NIS also alleged that Pyongyang has shipped over 13,000 containers of military equipment, including artillery shells, missiles and anti-tank rockets, to Russia since Aug. 2023.

During a UNSC meeting on Monday focused on the situation in Ukraine, South Korea’s U.N. Ambassador Hwang Joon-kook repeated the NIS claims regarding the deployment of DPRK soldiers to Russia’s Far East and weapons shipments.

Hwang warned that North Korea’s involvement represents a “qualitative change” in the Ukraine war, potentially making it “an active belligerent in warfare,” and condemned Moscow for partnering with a “notorious rogue state.”

He added that Pyongyang likely expects a “generous payoff” from Moscow in return, possibly in the form of military or financial assistance or nuclear weapons-related technology.

“This is not merely an attack on the very integrity of the Security Council sanctions regime, it is a blatant attempt to undermine peace and security, not only in Europe and in Northeast Asia, but also across the entire globe,” he said.

Hwang called on Russia and North Korea to immediately cease violating international restrictions and reaffirmed Seoul’s intent to work with the international community to counter sanctions evasion through the new Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team.

RESPONDING TO COMBINED THREATS

Since last week’s NIS press release, the ROK government has stated that it is considering “various” ways to respond to DPRK-Russia military cooperation and summoned Russia’s ambassador to South Korea to “strongly urge the immediate withdrawal of North Korean troops and cessation of related cooperation.”

In response, the ambassador emphasized that Moscow’s cooperation with Pyongyang falls within the framework of international law and is not aimed against South Korea’s security interests, the Russian Embassy said in a statement later on Monday.

However, experts have warned that Seoul will face challenges in responding to the alleged deployments without angering Russia, which could retaliate by increasing its support for the DPRK.

Ban Kil-joo, a professor at the Ilmin International Relations Institute at Korea University, told NK News on Monday that Seoul will eventually have to consider sending lethal weapons to Ukraine to send a message to Russia, but the impact could vary depending on the level of military assistance.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky again highlighted the need for international support to deter the growing threat posed by North Korean assistance to Russia on Monday.

“We need decisive actions from our partners, especially in light of reports about North Korea’s new role in supporting Russia,” he said in an address after Washington announced a $400 million defense support package.

“It is obvious that Putin fears peace, which is why he is looking for ways to escalate the aggression and involve North Korea on the frontline.”

Despite South Korean and Ukrainian allegations regarding North Korean troops’ deployment to Russia, the U.S. has avoided confirming its allies’ claims so far.

Pressed on the issue on Monday, a State Department spokesperson said during a briefing that Washington is “not yet at a point where we’re able to confirm those reports and whether they are accurate.”

However, he added that if the allegations are true, it would show Moscow’s “desperation” about the current state of the war as well as its increasingly close ties with the DPRK, and reaffirmed Washington’s support for Kyiv against the combined threat.

“When we have seen the Russian Federation closen relations with another country or rely on another country for its efforts in Ukraine … you certainly have seen the United States take appropriate action,” he said.

Edited by Alannah Hill

10. Kim Jong Un calls out problems rebuilding flood-hit villages near weapons plants

The regime just cannot get up to (Chollima) speed.

Kim Jong Un calls out problems rebuilding flood-hit villages near weapons plants

Satellite imagery shows progress repairing broken bridges in Jagang as North Korean leader pushes back project deadline

https://www.nknews.org/2024/10/kim-jong-un-calls-out-problems-rebuilding-flood-hit-villages-near-weapons-plants/

Colin Zwirko October 22, 2024

Kim Jong Un at the new village in central Songgan County, Jagang Province | Image: KCNA (Oct. 22, 2024)

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visited the site of this summer’s devastating floods in the northern Jagang Province for the first time on Monday, according to state media, where he called out problems with constructing new homes and extended his completion deadline.

The villages Kim visited are mostly for workers from a series of important weapons factories, including one rapidly rebuilt earlier this year to improve domestic capabilities and possibly increase production of arms for export to Russia.

Major landslides during a late July storm completely destroyed the entire village of Kwangmyong-ri in Songgan County, which Kim appeared to refer to Monday by saying it was “reduced into ruin in an instant due to unexpected natural disaster.”

However, Kim did not mention or offer condolences for the victims who likely died in the event, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) report on Tuesday.

Kim Jong Un at the new village in central Songgan | Image: KCNA (Oct. 22, 2024)

The No. 8 Ironworks, a factory related to the munitions industry in decades past, and other small homes at Unjong Station nearby Kwangmyong-ri were also damaged or destroyed by the landslides.

The banks of the Jangja River running through Songgan appeared to overflow and damage homes, as well as the February General Steel Enterprise further north at the Songryong Workers’ District. This is a munitions plant colocated with the Jagang Machine Factory that produced artillery systems in the past.

Exterior photos published with the KCNA report only showed Kim inspecting homes at a third village in the Songgan county seat center, close to the newly rebuilt Songgan Light Electrical Appliances Factory that produces “ultramodern precision munitions.”

It is likely that Kim inspected the weapons factories in the area despite no mention in state media.

While KCNA reported that Kim expressed overall “satisfaction” with progress on building new homes for flood victims, he also said there were “some deviations underrating the structural quality” of the buildings.

He dismissed and replaced the “chief and the political chief of the field headquarters for rehabilitating the flood-hit areas in Jagang Province,” according to the report.

Kim Jong Un inspects the interiors of new homes, likely at the central Songgan location | Image: KCNA (Oct. 22, 2024)

The DPRK leader also pushed the deadline for completing new homes in Jagang as well as North Phyongan and Ryanggang Provinces back from “early November to early December” and gave instructions on ensuring flood victims who he previously invited to stay in Pyongyang continue to receive care.

“This gigantic work is not confined to the practical issue for housing construction but a crucial political issue of defending the character of our style socialist system based on the people-first principle and demonstrating its advantages,” he reportedly said Monday, framing the project as a litmus test of his regime’s capabilities.

The military, party members and young “volunteers” mobilized by the state are carrying out the flood reconstruction projects in the three northwestern provinces.

SATELLITE IMAGERY OF JAGANG RECONSTRUCTION

A comparison of Planet Labs satellite images and computer renders seen in the KCNA photos of the three villages of Kwangmyong-ri, Songryong Workers’ District and central Songgan reveals that most planned apartments have been built, but work hasn’t started yet on some public buildings in Kwangmyong-ri.

Project information displays seen outside at the central Songgan project site say the Songryong project includes 14 buildings and 205 households and that the Kwangmyong-ri project includes 17 buildings.

It appears to say a “munitions factory sector shock brigade” (군수공장부문 돌격대) is in charge of the Kwangmyong-ri project and that party members from North Hwanghae Province are in charge of the Songryong project.

This information board on display at the central Songgan new home construction site shows plans for three villages | Image: KCTV (Oct. 22, 2024), edited by NK News

Following the complete destruction of the village of Kwangmyong-ri in a flash landslide in July, new homes for victims are being built closer to the Jangja River | Image: Planet Labs (June 6, 2023), edited by NK News

The KCNA images are slightly obscured and low quality so it is difficult to determine the precise number of homes slated to be built in Kwangmyong and central Songgan villages, but they may similarly be around or under 200 each. Satellite imagery suggests nine buildings are under construction in central Songgan.

In addition to these three villages, satellite imagery shows that a smaller cluster of new apartment buildings is also under construction across the river from the Songgan precision weapons plant.

The completely wiped-out Kwangmyong-ri village originally consisted of about 160 homes or duplexes, all now gone, while the number of new homes being built suggest the July floods damaged hundreds more around the county.

A sports field in central Songgan near the precisions weapons plant has appeared covered with tents in recent months, suggesting it is being used as one of the main staging areas for the reconstruction project in the county, just as it was during the factory’s reconstruction earlier this year.

205 new homes are under construction along the Jangja River in the Songryong Workers’ District, near munitions factories that once produced artillery launchers | Image: Planet Labs (Oct. 19, 2023), edited by NK News

Kim Jong Un appeared to visit the new village construction in central Songgan near a precision munitions factory he inspected multiple times already in the last year, pointing to its importance to the leader | Image: Planet Labs (June 6, 2023), edited by NK News

BROKEN BRIDGES AND ARMS TRANSPORT

Another major project that state media did not mention in detail on Tuesday has been restoring broken road and rail bridges in the area that have likely disrupted shipments out of weapons factories since late July.

KCNA only said Kim Jong Un instructed project officials to ensure “timely and responsible transport and supply of materials.”

NK Pro previously reported that the storm broke apart two large road bridges and two small rail bridges between Songgan and Jonchon County to the south, as well as a major rail bridge in the middle of the provincial capital Kanggye to the north.

This meant the transport of heavy items to and from Pyongyang would require complicated efforts like shifting packages between trucks and rail cars along the way.

Work to restore two large bridges near the border of Songgan County and Jonchon County to the south appears to be nearing completion around three months after they were broken apart in the flooding | Image: Planet Labs (Oct. 19, 2023), edited by NK News

A high-resolution Planet Labs image taken on Sept. 25 showed a train crossing a newly rebuilt small rail bridge in Kwangmyong-ri, while other small road and rail bridges nearby also appeared restored.

The two 300-meter long (985 feet) road bridges to the south were still not rebuilt by Oct. 20, the imagery showed, though they appear to be getting close.

Restoration of the large rail bridge in the center of Kanggye also remains incomplete.

This likely means that shipments by train from Kanggye south toward Pyongyang had resumed by September, though vehicles likely had to move out of the Kanggye Tractor Plant before freight could be loaded on trains elsewhere. The factory produces large-caliber rockets, some likely for Russia.

Rail shipments of weapons or electrical components from the Songgan “ultramodern precision munitions” factory or of rifles and small arms from the February 8 Machine Factory further south in Jonchon have also likely resumed.

Edited by Bryan Betts

11. 76 North Korean escapees arrive in South Korea in third quarter

Graphic at the link.

Border escapees are an indication of weakness in the nKPA as well as desperation (and motivation) among escapees.

We should keep in mind this is an indicator of the internal problems KJU faces which is driving some of his external actions.

76 North Korean escapees arrive in South Korea in third quarter

Numbers remain far below pre-COVID levels but include rare direct defections over inter-Korean border

https://www.nknews.org/2024/10/76-north-korean-escapees-arrive-in-south-korea-in-third-quarter/

Ifang Bremer October 22, 2024

Pedestrians in Pyongyang | Image: NK News (Sept. 2015)

Seventy-six North Korean escapees arrived in South Korea between July and September, according to Seoul, bringing the total number of new arrivals this year to 181.

As in the first half, the vast majority of those who resettled in the South in the third quarter were women, with 64 versus just 12 men, unification ministry data shows.

The latest figures mean that the total number of new arrivals in 2024 is likely to exceed last year, when 196 escapees reached the South.

But while North Korean defector numbers have recovered somewhat from the all-time low of 63 in 2021, they remain far below the pre-pandemic figure of over 1,000 escapees in 2019 and the record high of nearly 3,000 in 2009.

Most of the escapees who have arrived in Seoul in 2024 did not recently escape North Korea but resided in third countries like China for a significant time before arriving in South Korea, the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB) previously told NK News.

Historically, most escapees have arrived in South Korea through third countries after crossing the DPRK’s northern border into China.

But North Korea’s near total border closure since the outbreak of COVID-19 has driven a major drop in defections in recent years.

Both the DPRK and China have also added fencing on both sides of their border and expanded their network of security cameras, watchtowers and other infrastructure to monitor activity in the area and prevent border crossings.

In recent months, North Korea has started building more fencing along its southern border as well, in what experts have described as an effort to prevent more defections.

There have been several cases of North Koreans directly crossing into the South in recent years, mainly by boat, a trend that may be driven by increased security along the northern border and food insecurity in the country.

Notably, North Koreans escaped directly over the border into South Korea on at least three separate occasions in the third quarter. One escapee crossed by foot on the eastern side of the peninsula, while two defectors entered South Korea from the west — one by boat and one by crossing the Han river.

Before that, a group of North Koreans crossed the maritime border in a wooden boat in the Yellow Sea In May 2023, while four more defected via the East Sea (Sea of Japan) in October the same year.

A cumulative total of 34,259 North Korean escapees — 9,564 men and 24,695 women — have now escaped to the South since Seoul began keeping records in 1998.

Edited by Bryan Betts

12. What Ukraine should expect from North Korean special forces on the battlefield

Is there a willingness by nKPA soldiers to fight and die for Putin?

What Ukraine should expect from North Korean special forces on the battlefield

The Telegraph · by James Rothwell

Pyongyang’s top force is far from the SAS – but it should not be underestimated, analysts say

Berlin Correspondent

19 October 2024 5:20pm BST

Video released on Friday showed North Korean troops arriving at Russian military bases Credit: Para Pax

James Rothwell Berlin Correspondent

19 October 2024 5:20pm BST

Ukraine warned of a “huge” escalation risk on Saturday as hundreds of elite North Korean troops were predicted to enter the battlefield within days in support of Russia.

Around 10,000 of Pyongyang’s soldiers are preparing to join Moscow’s army, according to Volodymyr Zelensky, the Ukrainian president, and South Korean intelligence.

Video released on Friday showed North Korean troops arriving at Russian bases in the country’s far east, picking up military equipment in long queues.

Some 1,500 special forces were transferred to the port city of Vladivostok, with further deployments expected in the near future, the NIS, Seoul’s intelligence service, reported.

Kyrlo Budanov, Ukraine’s military intelligence chief, said around 2,600 soldiers will be sent to fight in Kursk by Nov 1.

North Korea’s Special Operations Forces [SOF] is one of the most secretive units of its kind in the world and an enigma to Western powers, appearing loyal and highly trained but lacking in advanced military equipment.

The personnel reportedly sent to Vladivostok are presumed to have been sourced from the 200,000-strong ranks of the SOF, which is primarily used to probe and test South Korean defences.

According to the NIS, the troops were issued Russian military uniforms, weapons and fake IDs, and are expected to be deployed to Ukraine once they have completed acclimatisation training.

“This seems to be an effort to disguise the fact that they are North Korean troops by making them appear as Russian soldiers,” the spy agency said.

Andriy Sybiga, the Ukrainian foreign minister, said North Korean soldiers fighting for Russia carried a “huge threat of further escalation” on Saturday.

Though fiercely loyal to Pyongyang, it is unclear what role the non-Russian-speaking special forces will fulfil on Ukraine’s eastern front, which has slowly become a war of attrition – hardly a traditional arena for covert missions.

Mike Turner, a Republican member of the House of Representatives and chairman of its intelligence committee, wrote to Joe Biden complaining about the lack of further detail from the White House on North Korean troop movements.

“The administration has not briefed the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence...of any assessments by US intelligence agencies or the department of defence regarding these troop movements,” he wrote, calling for an immediate briefing on the matter.

Founded around 1968, the SOF is perhaps best known for a disastrous attempt at raiding the Blue House, South Korea’s presidential residence, that year, which ended in the death of 29 out of the 31 operatives involved.

Unlike the SAS or Israeli Mossad, little else is known about the intelligence service’s exploits, though some of its troops took part in a rare public event in 2017 that involved marching in formation alongside regular army soldiers.

In images broadcast by North Korean state TV, SOF troops were seen wearing black camouflage paint and dark sunglasses. They also carried what state media described as a new rifle fitted with a grenade launcher, and were clad in helmets with night vision goggles.

Several news reports at the time noted a distinct similarity to the uniforms of South Korean special forces – known as the Black Berets – suggesting they may have been modelled directly after them.

A report by Maxwell Goldstein, an analyst at Grey Dynamics, the London-based intelligence consultancy, in July described the SOF as aspiring to be “highly trained troops equipped with the best gear available for dangerous but essential missions”.

He said the SOF possesses 12 light infantry brigades, three reconnaissance units for operating behind enemy lines, three airborne divisions and three general sniper units, in addition to sniper brigades attached to air force and naval forces.

The SOF’s estimated size of 200,000 men is unusual in comparison to other international special forces units. The British SAS is believed to have as few as 500 active soldiers at any given time, while the US Delta Force contains some 2,000 operating members.

A 2021 report by the US Defence Intelligence Agency described the SOF as highly trained, highly motivated and fitted with the best equipment available to a pariah state such as North Korea, including chemical and biological agents.

However, it also observed: “Compared with the equipment of other worldwide SOF units, North Korea’s equipment is rudimentary and North Korean SOF probably lacks such sophisticated items as burst communications equipment, advanced signal-processing equipment, and specialised explosives.”

Ahmed Hassan, the CEO of Grey Dynamics, stressed that SOF were deemed “special” by North Korean army standards and not the criteria for Nato or Russian special forces.

“If there is a ranking between one and ten, and let’s say one is a basic soldier and ten is let’s say Delta Force or the SAS, then the NK force sits at 5,” Mr Hassan told The Telegraph. “The North Koreans don’t have a similar indication of what special operations mean, such as Nato standards. In North Korean parlance it’s more like, anything outside of a normal soldier.”

The SOF is rumoured to have been deployed to Syria in support of Bashar al-Assad, the country’s dictator, but some evidence suggested the troops were merely North Korean mercenaries.

People are evacuated from the Kharkiv region of Ukraine close to the front line Credit: Sergey Kozov/Shutterstock

Prof Hazel Smith, a leading UK expert on North Korea at SOAS University, advised caution over Seoul’s claim that special forces could soon be deployed to Ukraine. She noted that some of its previous intelligence assessments had turned out to be “spectacularly wrong.”

“It is very difficult to ascertain the validity of the South Korean intelligence statement,” she said.

“If there are soldiers, the only reason they are likely to be special operations soldiers is that North Korea can’t risk sending conscripts as they don’t trust conscripts; their priority would be to defect or disappear. Special operations soldiers are considered to be more loyal to the North Korean government.”

Prof Smith also pointed out that the eastern front in Ukraine was primarily being used as a “meat-grinder” battlefield by Vladimir Putin, where the role of special operations soldiers would be unclear – especially ones who do not speak any Russian.

Bruce W Bennett, an analyst at the RAND think tank, called on the US to begin information campaigns to convince North Korean soldiers sent to Russia to defect to the West.

“It has been reported that six officers from [North Korea] were killed in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine, a message that will likely anger their families in Pyongyang and thus should also be broadcast into North Korea,” he wrote this week.

Ukraine’s President Zelensky speaks at a joint press conference with Mark Rutte, NATO secretary general Credit: Dursun Aydemir/Anadolu

North Korea’s greatest ally – the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) – is “currently not that bothered by support for Russia,” according to Ian Garner, a historian and analyst of Russian culture.

On Saturday, the US announced sanctions against Chinese firms linked to the production of suicide drones being used against Ukraine.

But Beijing, which regards North Korea as a buffer zone between itself and the US-allied South Korea, has historically opposed any decisions by Pyongyang that are deemed risky or destabilising to Chinese foreign affairs, notably its trade relations with the West.

“If China does say no [to the final deployment of troops], it won’t happen,” Mr Garner told The Telegraph.

“Russia has very little to offer North Korea compared to what China offers, so if Beijing puts the dampeners on the plan, then those troops may never materialise at the front.”

US consults allies about North Korea troops in Ukraine

https://www.reuters.com/world/us-says-dangerous-move-north-korea-send-troops-ukraine-2024-10-21/

By Michelle Nichols

October 21, 20245:51 PM EDTUpdated 3 hours ago

U.S. Alternate Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) for Special Political Affairs Robert Wood speaks during a United Nations Security Council meeting addressing the continuing war between Russia and Ukraine at the U.N. headquarters in New York City, U.S., August 30, 2024. REUTERS/David 'Dee' Delgado/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

Summary

South Korea and Britain warn of high price Moscow would pay PyongyangUkraine accuses North Korea of preparing to send 10,000 soldiersRussia accuses West of "scare mongering with Iranian, Chinese and Korean bogeymen"

NEW YORK, Oct 21 (Reuters) - It would be a "dangerous and highly concerning development" if North Korea was sending troops to help Russia in Ukraine, the United States said on Monday as South Korea and Britain warned of the high price Moscow would likely have to pay Pyongyang.

"We are consulting with our allies and partners on the implications of such a dramatic move," deputy U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Robert Wood told the 15-member United Nations Security Council. Russia invaded neighboring Ukraine in February 2022.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has accused Pyongyang of preparing to send 10,000 soldiers to Russia. Ukraine's U.N. Ambassador Sergiy Kyslytsya told the Security Council on Monday: "These troops are expected to be ready for war against Ukraine by November 1."

South Korea's spy agency said last week that North Korea had shipped 1,500 special forces troops to Russia's Far East for training and acclimatising at military bases and that they were likely to be deployed for combat in Ukraine.

"If true, this marks a dangerous and highly concerning development and an obvious deepening of the DPRK, Russia military relationship," Wood said of the reports, using North Korea's formal name - the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The Kremlin earlier on Monday declined to directly answer a query on whether North Korean troops were going to fight in Ukraine, but spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Moscow's cooperation with Pyongyang was not directed against third countries.

Russia's U.N. Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia accused Western countries of becoming "distracted by circulating scare mongering with Iranian, Chinese and Korean bogeymen, each one of which is more absurd than the one before."

Britain's U.N. Ambassador Barbara Woodward said it was "highly likely" that North Korea was sending troops.

"It seems that the harder (Russian President Vladimir) Putin finds it to recruit Russians to be cannon fodder, the more willing he is to rely on DPRK in his illegal war," she said. "We can be certain that the DPRK leadership will ask a high price from Russia in return."

South Korea's U.N. Ambassador Joonkook Hwang also warned the council of the implications of such a move.

"North Korea will expect a generous payoff from Moscow in return for its troop contribution. It could be either military or financial assistance. It could be nuclear weapons-related technology," he said.

North Korea has been under U.N. sanctions since 2006 for its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and those measures have been strengthened over the years - with Russia's support.

Get the latest news and expert analysis about the state of the global economy with the Reuters Econ World newsletter. Sign up here.

Reporting by Michelle Nichols; editing by Costas Pitas and Sephen Coates

14. The making of a North Korea expert: Smoke, mirrors, and speculation

And now for some comic relief from an apparent disgruntled professor who must have been bullied by some Korea watcher at some time in his life. He must not have been admitted to the Korean watcher club.

On a more serious note I have always said there are no real north Korea experts because north Korea is one of the hardest targets in the world. That is why I consider myself a student trying to understand the Korean problem (and specifically how to solve the "Korea question").

The making of a North Korea expert: Smoke, mirrors, and speculation

Want to become a North Korea expert? Here's the seven steps to follow.

https://www.junotane.com/p/the-making-of-a-north-korea-expert?utm

Oct 21, 2024

In the wild world of international affairs, few titles sound as alluring and mysterious as “North Korea expert.” But peel back the layers, and you’ll find that expertise in this niche space isn’t necessarily built on the hard labor of professional experience, solid education, or in-country experience. It doesn’t even depend on groundbreaking revelations.

Instead, it often thrives on a cocktail of guesswork, recycled talking points, and a sprinkle of doom-and-gloom predictions. And I’m not talking about the sudden pop-up North Korea experts - I mean the “this is my life” North Korea experts. So, what does it really take to become a North Korea expert? Spoiler: It’s not as complicated—or as credible—as you might think. Here’s the steps to follow:

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Step one: Master the art of speculation

If there’s one skill that separates the wheat from the chaff in the North Korea business, it’s speculation. In the absence of reliable information, you’ll need to make some bold claims.

“Kim Jong-un is dead.”
“Pyongyang is collapsing.”
“The latest missile launch is a prelude to war.”
“We are closer to war than ever before.”

None of these statements need to be true—just plausible enough to spark media frenzy. Since no one can verify what happens inside the hermit kingdom, few will call you out when your predictions flop. And if, by some miracle, one of your wild guesses happens to align with future events? Congratulations, you're now a “visionary.”

Step two: Attend the conference circuit (and repackage old news)

If there’s a more reliable gig than being a North Korea expert, it’s being a North Korea expert at a think tank. You’ll find yourself flying to international conferences—held in places far more luxurious than Pyongyang—where your task is to repackage last year’s analysis for this year’s audience.

Same sanctions complaints. Same missile talk. Same “internal instability” theories. Just rearrange the PowerPoint slides and slap on a more alarming title: “Kim’s Nuclear Brinkmanship: The World on Edge?” Throw in a photo of Kim Jong-un looking serious, and you’re good to go.

The beauty of the conference circuit is that it reinforces the illusion of expertise without requiring much in the way of actual insight. As long as you use phrases like “maximum pressure,” “strategic patience,” and “denuclearization goals,” no one will question your authority. If your predictions don’t come true, don’t sweat it—just blame the opacity of the regime.

Pro tip: It pays to throw in a name or two in every conversation with an interlocutor at a think-tank conference. Like “A Chinese General told me…” or “A friend in the State Department…” or even better “Secretary Blinken said…”. I’ve actually heard two people talking to each other, both talking about what someone else said.

Step three: Leak some satellite images (preferably of trucks)

The gold standard of North Korea expertise is the satellite image. Can’t get actual eyes on the ground? No problem. Just show a grainy, high-resolution image of something—a truck convoy, an empty stadium, or smoke rising from a building. Now you’re in business.

“New construction detected at missile site,” you declare, even if it’s just another storage shed. The beauty of satellite analysis is that no one outside the geo-intel bubble knows exactly what they’re looking at. Could be a parade rehearsal. Could be a missile test. Who knows? Just call it “worrisome activity.” The more ambiguous the image, the better—it leaves room for interpretation, which is the lifeblood of North Korea expertise.

Step four: Play the defector lottery

Few things will boost your credibility faster than quoting a defector, preferably with a story that confirms the worst assumptions about the regime. The wilder, the better: secret executions, cannibalism, or plans to nuke Guam on New Year’s Eve. Even if the story is later debunked, it’s served its purpose—headlines were made, interviews were given, and you got to look concerned on camera.

It’s not that all defectors lie, of course, but verifying their stories is next to impossible. North Korea’s iron grip on information makes it the perfect environment for truth to mix with embellishment. A good expert knows how to harness these stories strategically—repeating the most sensational parts to Western media while sprinkling just enough caveats to dodge accountability when the facts fall apart.

Step five: Be scary (but not too scary)

To truly cement your status as a North Korea expert, you need to strike the right balance between fear and restraint. Be scary, but not so apocalyptic that people stop believing you. For example, don’t say, “The world will end next month.” Instead, try something like, “If we don’t act now, we could face devastating consequences in the near future.” It’s vague enough to be alarming, but just ambiguous enough to allow for wiggle room if things don’t pan out.

Punditry is all about riding the fine line between alarm and reassurance. Kim Jong-un needs to remain just dangerous enough to keep the funding flowing for think tanks and military contractors, but not so threatening that the public demands immediate war. A North Korea expert knows that the sweet spot is somewhere between, “They’ll never denuclearize” and “Diplomacy is still our best hope.”

Step six: Write a book with a menacing title

Sooner or later, every self-respecting North Korea expert writes a book. It doesn’t need to contain any groundbreaking revelations—just a few recycled interviews, some historical context, and the obligatory dramatic subtitle: “Inside the Kim Dynasty: Nuclear Nightmares and the Future of Global Security.” You’re not writing for posterity, after all—you’re writing to get on television. A book with a foreboding title guarantees you’ll be invited on news programs as tensions inevitably rise again.

Pro tip: Make sure the cover features a missile launch; a scowling portrait of Kim Jong Un; or rows of marching soldiers. Even if the contents are lukewarm, the imagery alone will sell the fear.

Step seven: Embrace the perpetual cycle of crisis and calm

The final lesson is simple: North Korea operates in cycles, and so do you. Crisis builds, missile tests happen, sanctions are tightened, talks begin, hopes rise, and then everything falls apart. Rinse and repeat. Your job is not to explain the cycle but to ride it, providing a steady stream of commentary with just enough gravitas to keep people listening.

The beauty of this cycle is that it ensures your job security. No matter how many peace summits are held or agreements are signed, North Korea will always be “on the brink” of something terrible. And as long as Pyongyang keeps launching missiles—or even just threatening to—you’ll never run out of material.

In truth, becoming a North Korea expert is less about expertise and more about performance. It’s about selling the illusion of knowledge in a space where genuine information is scarce. You don’t need insider access or on-the-ground experience—just the right mix of fear, speculation, and authority.

And the best part? You’ll never run out of an audience. The world is always ready to listen to the next grim prediction about the regime nobody understands. Because when it comes to North Korea, it’s not really about what we know—it’s about what we think we know, and the anxiety that fills the gap in between.

15. Does North Korea’s Kim know about his country’s dark Vietnam War past?

We need more of this. This should be just one part of the information campaign to attack the Kim family regime strategy.

Does North Korea’s Kim know about his country’s dark Vietnam War past?

Stars and Stripes · by James Zumwalt · October 20, 2024

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un poses with troops in this image released by the state-run Korean Central News Agency, March 7, 2024. (KCNA)

The older advisers of North Korea’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un may be keeping quiet about a dark part of their country’s past combat history — shared below — if reports are true he has now deployed troops to assist the Russian war effort in Ukraine.

On June 19, 2024, during a visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin to Pyongyang, the two leaders signed a mutual defense pact committing their countries to provide military assistance to each other without delay should either be invaded. It upgrades their relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.”

Less than two months later, on Aug. 6, in a surprise attack, a large Ukrainian force entered western Russia, occupying villages in the Kursk region. Ironically, Putin, who had initiated the conflict in February 2022 by invading Ukraine, called the attack a “large-scale provocation.” Apparently the Russian dictator believes invasions are only allowed to go one way.

However, it may well have been this Ukrainian invasion that triggered North Korea’s obligation under its defense treaty with Russia to send troops to assist Moscow. While Ukraine reports that North Korean soldiers are now fighting alongside Russians, the Kremlin denies it.

Meanwhile, South Korean news reports say that at least six North Koreans have already died as a result of a Ukrainian missile attack on Russian-occupied territory near Donetsk during the first week of October. What should concern Kim at this point as well, if it has even been reported to him by his commanders, is the fact that as soon as the North Koreans were on Russian territory, at least 18 deserted their units.

South Korean satellite photographs support the claim of a North Korean presence. They reveal at least 1,500 North Korean special forces in Najin Port, boarding Russian transport ships in mid-August, who are then taken to Vladivostok, Russia. Photos also show more North Korean troops on a parade ground in Khabarovsk in southeast Russia.

While experts question just how effective the North Koreans will be due to their outdated equipment and limited battlefield expertise, history supports their skepticism.

If Kim sent troops to Russia to provide them with combat experience as some experts believe, one wonders if the North Korean despot — who at age 40 was born well after the Vietnam War — was informed about an embarrassingly dark, disastrous, and short-lived experience suffered by a squadron of North Korean jet fighter pilots sent to assist Hanoi by Kim’s grandfather in that conflict. For long it was probably one of the best kept secrets of the Vietnam War that, for a brief period in 1967 and without knowing it, American fighter pilots were engaging North Korean fighter pilots.

The experience was disastrous for the North Koreans as every pilot who went airborne to engage a U.S. aircraft was shot down. At least 14 North Korean pilots died, seemingly unable to adapt to that day’s aerial fighting tactics, instead relying on those used during the Korean War years earlier. And, since they were flying North Vietnamese aircraft, Hanoi was losing planes at an incredible rate. It resulted in Hanoi politely telling Pyongyang “thanks but no thanks” as it sent the remaining pilots back home after only serving in Vietnam for a few months.

Today, in Vietnam’s Bac Giang province, there is a cemetery containing the graves of those North Korean pilots whose bodies were recovered.

One of the greatest warriors and diplomats of the 20th century — Winston Churchill — gave a speech in 1948 in which he said, “Those that fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it.” North Korea’s Kim has failed to learn from his country’s Vietnam War experience the result of taking on a better trained foreign force. It is his warriors who will suffer the consequences of his ignorance.

James Zumwalt is a retired Marine infantry officer (lieutenant colonel) who served in the Vietnam War, Panama and Operation Desert Storm. He is the author of three books and hundreds of opinion pieces in online and print publications.

Stars and Stripes · by James Zumwalt · October 20, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE