Quotes of the Day:
“It is a truism that almost any sect, cult, or religion will legislate its creed into law if it acquires the political power to do so.”
― Robert A. Heinlein
"Disciplining yourself to do what you know is right and important, although difficult, is the highroad to pride, self-esteem, and personal satisfaction."
– Margaret Thatcher
"I don't believe you have to be better than everybody else. I believe you have to be better than you ever thought you could be."
– Ken Venturi
1. Media reports of N. Korean leader's sister staging coup not true at all: spy agency
2. Seoul, Washington remain apart on North Korea policy
3. U.S. to continue talks with S. Korea on end-of-war declaration, other options for N. Korea diplomacy: envoy
4. America's war in Afghanistan is over, but the country's true longest war with North Korea continues
5. U.S. to continue talks with S. Korea on end-of-war declaration, other options for N. Korea diplomacy: envoy
6. U.S. envoy welcomes discussion about ending war
7. N. Korean media decries proposed S. Korea-U.S. defense dialogue
8. 70% of Korea vaccinated, key threshold crossed
9. Coast Guard seizes Chinese boat for fishing in South Korea's EEZ without permit
10. ‘It Was Like Having the Chinese Government in the Room With Us’
11. S. Korean defense firms clinch deals worth US$128 mln at ADEX: organizers
12. S. Korea to hold annual Hoguk defense exercise next week
1. Media reports of N. Korean leader's sister staging coup not true at all: spy agency
I think this would be highly unlikely.
Media reports of N. Korean leader's sister staging coup not true at all: spy agency
Published : Oct 24, 2021 - 20:42 Updated : Oct 24, 2021 - 20:42
North Korean leader`s sister Kim Yo-jong (Yonhap)
South Korea's spy agency said Sunday media reports of North Korean leader's sister succeeding coup against her brother are not true at all.
The National Intelligence Service (NIS) dismissed reports that claimed Kim Yo-jong ousted North Korean leader Kim Jong-un after a coup. A separate government official also said such reports are not true.
Citing a report from US-based tabloid "Globe," some news outlets here said Kim Yo-jong staged a coup between May 6 and June 5, and removed Kim Jong-un from the post.
The report claimed Kim Jong-un at recent events is actually an impostor, pointing out that his appearance is different than the past, with substantial weight loss.
Speculations about Kim Jong-un's well-being have been brought up by media regularly since last year. In July, the NIS dismissed rumors over Kim Jong-un's health problems as "groundless."
The North Korean leader earlier this month attended a defense development exhibition in Pyongyang and called for boosting military capabilities. He was also seen smoking cigarettes with officials at the event, according to photos released by the North. (Yonhap)
2. Seoul, Washington remain apart on North Korea policy
The key issue to developing a comprehensive and holistic alliance policy and strategy toward north Korea is sufficient alignment of assumptions about the nature, objectives, and strategy of Kim family regime. Here are two comments I wrote at the beginning of the Biden Administration in response to a request from a VOA journalist. And I have been making these comments pretty consistently for the past 10 months (and before!)
1. In the beginning phase of the Biden administration, what kind of North Korea policy should the administration adopt in order to be able to maintain the dialogue’s momentum and better manage the North Korean threat? (i.e. humanitarian assistance, end of war declaration, the moratorium on the US-ROK joint military exercises, etc.?)
The bottom line is a new strategy must be built on deterrence, defense, denuclearization, and resolution of the "Korea question" (para 60 of the Armistice Agreement) by employing a superior form of political warfare. It should consist of 5 lines of effort: comprehensive diplomacy, resolute alliance military strength, pressure through enforced sanctions, cyber defense and offensive operations and information and influence activities to target the regime elite , the second-tier leadership, and the population to undermine the legitimacy of the regime and separate the Kim family regime from the elite and the 2d tier leadership as well as to prepare the population for unification.
As part of this strategy the Alliance must take a human rights upfront approach because human rights are not only a moral imperative, they are a national security issue. Kim Jong-un denies the human rights of the Korean people living in the north so that he can remain in power. Human rights cannot be sacrificed for the pursuit of denuclearization negotiations. We should also remember that when we talk about the north’s nuclear program it reinforces regime legitimacy. However, we expose human rights abuses and crimes against humanity and inform the Korean people in the north about their basic human rights it is an existential threat to the regime.
A political strategy alone will not defeat the Kim family regime's political warfare strategy. We need a superior form of political warfare.
A wise Korea hand once said to me that just about everything that could be tried with north Korea has been tried and all we can do is keep repackaging previous actions in new ways to try to achieve some kind of progress.
But we need to thoroughly assess the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. and then develop a new strategy that will result in a new acceptable, durable political arrangement that will protect, serve, and advance US and ROK/US alliance interests.
A key initial effort of the Biden administration should be a convening of the MOFA-State strategy working group and a review of alliance strategies should be conducted with a focus on assessing the fundamental assumptions upon which ROK and US policies and strategies are based. The Moon Administration has been laboring under the erroneous assumption that Kim Jong-un supports President Moon’s vision of peace and reconciliation and that there can be north-South engagement on reciprocal terms. A thorough analysis and understanding of the Kim family regime will reveal the Kim family regimes’ strategy is to use political warfare to subvert the South Korea nation and when conditions are right to use force to unify the peninsula under northern rule. Basing policy and strategy on the Moon administration’s assumptions is the path to failure on the Korean peninsula.
We should never forget this point: The root of all problems in Korea is the existence of the mafia- like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime that has the objective of dominating the Korean Peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.
2. To what extent do you think the Biden administration will tolerate North Korea’s provocation? (Do you think the Biden administration will respond to provocations that were perceived ‘small’ in the previous administration, i.e. short-range missiles, or SLBM launches?)
The Biden administration will take a measured approach. The key to responding to the north’s provocations is demonstrating strategic reassurance and strategic resolve. The Alliance must act in synchronized manner. The vulnerable period is during the transition and immediately following inauguration when the regime has traditionally conducted provocations to “welcome” a new US president. The Biden administration’s reaction should be that this was expected and not a surprise and that any military action against the ROK/US alliance will be met with swift and decision action. An immediate strategic show of force is necessary to demonstrate the alliance is ready and has the will to act. It is imperative the Alliance shows no sign of hesitation or weakness in combined actions.
I concur with this statement: "Specialists argue that North Korea’s propensity to revert to provocations is so deeply embedded that it is part of the country’s DNA."
However, this does not mean Kim might conduct a provocation immediately - either before or after the inauguration (though eventually he will revert to them because it is in the regime's nature). He may be receiving wise counsel from China. He may begin its own "strategic patience" to see what a new administration may offer. And of course he could be consumed with domestic issues (COVID, humanitarian disasters, a crushed economy, potential unrest, etc.). Sanctions relief would likely be helpful. However, given the complex conditions and Kim's long history of failed policy decisions and priorities, sanctions relief will not be enough to dig the regime out of the domestic hole it has dug for itself.
In addition to the potential for provocations, we must also observe for signs of internal instability and regime collapse. The internal situation due to COVID, the natural disasters, the food shortage, and the failed economy is putting enormous stress on the regime and the Korean people.
We have to observe for the indicators of instability. The conditions in north Korea could be brewing the perfect storm.
As an example, there are reports north Korea has 24 COVID-19 quarantine facilities for the military. This is a very important indicator. I think we can assess the regime is very concerned about a COVID outbreak within the military (as am I). I hope we are surveilling and assessing the activity at these facilities.
It may be time to begin to review plans for north Korea instability and regime collapse. Recall the definition of regime collapse that Bob Collins and I developed for the original CONPLAN 5029 planning: "Loss of central governing effectiveness of the regime/party combined with loss of coherency and support of the military."
The regime will collapse when the regime/party can no longer govern across the north from Pyongyang combined with the breakdown of the military (and its three chains of control - military, political, and security) so that the military can no longer support the regime. This leads to uncertainty and complexity about what can happen next
Let me reprise this article in which Bob Collins and I discuss north Korean contingencies to include regime collapse (and Bob lays out the 7 phases of regime collapse).
“When North Korea Falls
The furor over Kim Jong Il’s missile tests and nuclear brinksmanship obscures the real threat: the prospect of North Korea’s catastrophic collapse. How the regime ends could determine the balance of power in Asia for decades. The likely winner? China”
ROBERT D. KAPLAN
OCTOBER 2006 ISSUE
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/10/when-north-korea-falls/305228/
Here is a link to my 1996 Monograph following the Arduous March of the great famine of 1994-1996
“The Catastrophic Collapse of North Korea: Implications for the U.S. Military”
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a314274.pdf
Beyond the Nuclear Crisis: A Strategy for the Korean Peninsula
National Defense University
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B513_sp6wSItQldmdVZ4cWFudWM/view?usp=sharing
3. It seems that especially in South Korea, the ‘Perry Process,’ introduced during the Clinton administration is being discussed frequently these days. (which essentially includes the 3 steps approach to stop North Korea’s missile launches: sanctions relief, halt of North Korea’s missile and nuclear development, and normalizing the US-DPRK, DPRK-Japan relations).
-Do you think such processes like the ‘Perry Process’ could be a suitable option for the Biden administration in near future? (What would you say is the chance of the US proceeding negotiations on the reduction of nuclear armaments instead with North Korea?)
I am sure the “Korea hands” of the Biden national security team have done a comprehensive policy review and have developed a Biden policy and US strategy. If a new “Perry Process” were to be initiated I would base it on these 5 questions:
1. What do we want to achieve in Korea?
2. What is the acceptable durable political arrangement that will protect, serve, and advance US and ROK/US Alliance interests on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia?
3. Who does Kim fear more: The US or the Korean people in the north? (Note it is the Korean people armed with information knowledge of life in South Korea)
4. Do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure the survival of the mafia like crime family cult known as Kim family regime?
5. In support of that strategy do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the objective to split the ROK/US Alliance and get US forces off the peninsula? Has KJU given up his divide to conquer strategy - divide the alliance to conquer the ROK?
The answers to these questions should guide us to the strategy to solve the "Korea question" (para 60 of the Armistice) and lead to the only acceptable durable political arrangement: A secure, stable, economically vibrant, non-nuclear Korean peninsula unified under a liberal constitutional form of government with respect for individual liberty, the rule of law, and human rights, determined by the Korean people. In short, a United Republic of Korea (UROK)
Again, there is no silver bullet to the north Korea problem. This is why we need to focus on the long-term solution to the security and prosperity challenges on the Korean peninsula. That is to focus on resolving the Korean question,' the unnatural division of the peninsula.” Solve that and the nuclear issues and the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity will be fixed. The question to ask is not what worked and what did not, but whether our action advanced our interests and moved us closer to the acceptable, durable political arrangement that will protect, serve, and advance US and ROK/US alliance interests?
The way ahead is deterrence, defense, denuclearization and solving the “Korea question” (e.g., unification) with the understanding that denuclearization of the north will only happen when we resolve the Korea question.
My thoughts on supporting Korean unification and resistance in north Korea are here.
Should The United States Support Korean Unification And If So, How?
International Journal of Korean Studies ·Vol. XVIII, No. 1
http://icks.org/n/data/ijks/1482467285_add_file_7.pdf
Unification Options and Scenarios: Assisting A Resistance
International Journal of Korean Unification Studies
Vol. 24, No. 2, 2015, 127–152
https://www.kinu.or.kr/pyxis-api/1/digital-files/d3f8fb63-4f8c-49c9-a4fa-901d3120bd5a
4. Can we expect a high interest in North Korean human rights by the Biden administration? Do you think the North Korean human rights and nuclear negotiations can move forward simultaneously?
Human rights are a national security issue and there must be a human rights up front approach by the ROK/US alliance. The Biden and Moon administration must get on the same sheet of music with regard to the human rights of the Korean people living in the north.
It is a huge mistake to assume that by avoiding human rights we can engender cooperation with north Korea. A lack of focus on human rights is another indicator to Kim Jong-un that his political warfare strategy is working.
The reason the Korean people are suffering in the north is not because of sanctions. It is because of the deliberate policy decisions made by Kim Jong-un to prioritize nuclear and missile development, proliferation, global illicit activities, cyber-attacks, overseas slave labor and the denial of human rights to keep the Kim family regime in power. These are all prioritized over the welfare of the Korean people. The latest example of the October 10th parade of the advanced military capabilities it showed off to the world. It is a deliberate decision to prioritize resources for the military over the welfare of the Korean people in the north.
Again, let's please stop blaming sanctions for the suffering of the Korean people living in the north. The people are suffering because of Kim Jong-un's deliberate policy decisions to prioritize nuclear weapons, the military, and the survival of the regime over the health and welfare of the Korean people living in the north.
I would also expect if we lifted sanctions altogether it would not result in any reduction in suffering of the people because the regime will not prioritize their welfare.
But Kim can get sanctions relief. All he must do is comply with the requirements of the sanctions. And for those who advocate for relief without compliance what malign behavior by the regime do you wish to condone? The nuclear and missile programs? Global illicit activities? Weapons proliferation? Cyber-attacks? Overseas slave labor? Human Rights abuses and crimes against humanity of the Korean people living in the north? Just tell me which behavior you wish to condone.
And do not fall for the lie that sanctions relief will lead to negotiations and denuclearization. Sanctions relief will lead to the regime doubling down on blackmail diplomacy. political warfare, and the long con.
I think the ROK government wants to prevent the Biden administration with a fait accompli that it can execute its engagement plans. Unfortunately it won't stop with humanitarian aid (which I of course do support even if escapee/defectors disagree and believe humanitarian aid will only be exploited by and help the regime). The ROK government (and specifically the Ministry of Unification) wants to engage in widespread economic development: tourism, transportation, infrastructure, manufacturing (Kaesong industrial Complex) , and trade. But if we are talking about exemptions for humanitarian aid I would recommend disapproval unless the South commits to allowing organizations to send information into north Korea. That is a humanitarian "aid" as well.
The irony of this is that even with fast tracking or blanket exemptions it is unlikely the regime will accept such aid except with the tightest of restrictions because with aid comes engagement and with engagement comes information. Information is an existential threat to the regime.
5. While the US has many priority issues besides North Korea, South Korea’s Moon administration has about a year left on the term. How should South Korea make efforts to improve US-North Korea and inter-Korean relations in the meantime?
The Moon administration is going to pursue its engagement strategy and peace and reconciliation strategy at any cost. Some of those bearing the highest cost are the Korean people living in the north, but the Koreans in the South will suffer as well if this strategy leads to the north using force especially if it is successful in driving a wedge in the ROK/US Alliance.
Also, touting the “Vietnam model” is a grave mistake. I think north Korea would love to adopt a "Vietnam model." Unfortunately, we are all focused on the post 1975 economic "Vietnam Model." The regime is likely unwilling to adopt that model given the current conditions, to include the regime's assessment of security conditions.
But there is a "Vietnam model" that we overlook but one that the regime is actually pursuing. Like north Vietnam it would like to broker a peace treaty with the US that would cause the withdrawal of US troops. It would like to see the US become overly focused on domestic issues. Once troops are fully withdrawn the regime will redouble its efforts to dominate the entire peninsula and if necessary it will use force to do so because it will believe it has created the conditions to be successful. it will attack the South, assuming the US has lost the will to come to the aid of the South because there is no longer a US force presence, and seek to unify the peninsula under the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State just as north Vietnam did with the South. That is the "Vietnam model" the Kim family regime would like to copy. We need to understand the regime's political warfare strategy as well as its military strategy. They are mutually supporting.
Once we lower the goal post below denuclearization and begin offering sanctions and concessions as South Korea wants to do, Kim Jong-un will double down on his successful political warfare strategy. Rather than give up the goal of denuclearization we need to expand our strategy and objectives and cope with, contain, and manage the situation until the "Korean question" can be resolved as that is the only way we will see an end to the nuclear threat and the regime's crimes against humanity. We must base our strategy on the four pillars of deterrence, defense, denuclearization, and unification (D3U)
I cannot emphasize this enough: The Moon administration continues to base its policy and strategy on erroneous assumptions about the nature of the Kim family regime and its objectives and strategies. Kim does not share the Moon administration's vision of peace, reconciliation, and engagement. Kim seeks the domination of the Korean peninsula by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.
The MOFA-State strategy working group should be tasked to conduct a complete strategic review and reassess assumptions and then come to an alliance agreement on the fundamental assumptions about north Korea upon which alliance policy and strategy should be based.
Some advocate the Biden administration should return the ROK/US alliance to a state of “normalcy.” "Normalcy?" What is the normal alliance relationship? The hallmark of our ROK/US alliance is that there has always been friction and differences and that we have always worked through them. While some issues are likely to be resolved with the new administration there will continue to be issues and points of friction. We might solve the SMA stalemate relatively quickly, but the OPCON transition process friction will continue. But the most challenging point of friction will be the alignment of assumptions about north Korea. It is imperative that Biden and Moon have their national security professionals re-evaluate the assumptions and come to a sufficient alignment of assumptions. This is key to developing a combined alliance policy and strategy toward north Korea. We must understand Kim's strategy is based on subversion, coercion/extortion (blackmail diplomacy) and use of force to dominate the peninsula and unify it under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State to ensure the survival of the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime.
The only way we are going to see an end to the nuclear program and threats as well as the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people living in the north is through achievement of unification and the establishment of a United Republic of Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, and human rights as determined by the Korean people. In short, a United Republic of Korea (UROK).
We will achieve "normalcy" when we embrace this: Deterrence, defense, denuclearization, the Korea questions (unification), using a superior form of political warfare based on a rock-solid ROK/US alliance and realistic assumptions of the nature of the Kim family regime and its strategy and objectives.
Seoul, Washington remain apart on North Korea policy
Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs Noh Kyu-duk, left, and U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Sung Kim hold a press briefing after their meeting at a hotel in central Seoul, Sunday. Joint Press Corps
By Jung Da-min
The top envoys from South Korea and the United States charged with negotiations regarding the denuclearization of North Korea still remain poles apart over the details of any engagement policy toward Pyongyang.
Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs Noh Kyu-duk and U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Sung Kim met in Seoul, Sunday, to discuss how to bring North Korea back to negotiations. They also reviewed Seoul's proposal for a declaration officially ending the Korean War in their second meeting within a week after they met in Washington, Oct. 18 (local time).
However, diplomatic experts said the two envoys only reaffirmed the differences in approach between Seoul and Washington without reaching any further agreement on President Moon Jae-in's proposal to formally declare an end to the war. They also said Washington has virtually rejected this, with Kim saying the U.S. would "explore different ideas and initiatives, including the Republic of Korea's end-of-war proposal."
After their meeting at a hotel in central Seoul, Noh said: "In particular, I had in-depth discussions with Special Representative Kim over Seoul's proposal to end the war in an extension of talks we had in Washington. We also reaffirmed our shared stance that we could discuss every possible idea including those involving the North's interests, once we resume talks with North Korea."
Noh said the two agreed to continue to push ahead with various engagement policies toward North Korea including providing humanitarian aid and confidence building, based on the shared perception that dialogue and diplomacy are urgently needed for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the establishment of a permanent peace on it.
Regarding proposal to end the war, Kim said: "I look forward to continuing to work with special representative Noh to explore different ideas and initiatives, including the Republic of Korea's end-of-war proposal as we continue to pursue our shared objectives on the peninsula."
Kim also reaffirmed Washington's previous stance that it was "ready to meet with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea without preconditions," adding the U.S. harbors no hostile intent toward the North and was waiting for a positive response to its call for dialogue.
However, Kim's statement differed from that of Noh in the details, such as him mentioning the importance of trilateral cooperation between the U.S., the Republic of Korea and Japan, and calling North Korea's recent ballistic missile tests "concerning and counterproductive to making progress towards a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula," both of which were not included in Noh's remarks.
Noh Kyu-duk, left, South Korea's special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, poses for a photo with Sung Kim, center, U.S. special envoy for North Korea, and Takehiro Funakoshi, head of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, prior to their talks in Washington Oct. 19 (local time). Courtesy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Kim Jun-seok, a politics and diplomacy professor at Dongguk University, said among other points where the two countries differed after the latest meeting between the two special envoys was Washington making it clear that it would raise human rights issues when holding a meeting with the North, a clear message that it would pressure Pyongyang.
"The most worrying thing about the different statements of the U.S. and South Korea is that North Korea might get the impression that the South is unable to play a role in bridging the U.S. and the North, when the South itself faces challenges of narrowing down its gap with the U.S," Kim said.
He added that the domestic political situation in the U.S. was also adding to difficulties in any U.S.-North Korea dialogue as the Joe Biden administration does not want to make conciliatory gestures toward North Korea when its support rate has been dropping because of its diplomatic policies, especially after the withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University, said it was natural that the U.S. and South Korea have remained apart over Seoul's end of war proposal as their needs differ considering the domestic political situations in each country, also referring to the Biden administration's loss of popularity because of its diplomatic policies.
"People were looking to see whether there would be a new initiative from the U.S. regarding South Korea's end-of-war proposal, but Kim only repeated Washington's previous stance that it would meet with the North without preconditions, and is committed to address humanitarian concerns in the North," Park said. "Kim said Washington would explore different ideas and initiatives including Seoul's end-of-war proposal, but he said the U.S. side would consult on the matter with the South Korean side, not the North."
3. U.S. to continue talks with S. Korea on end-of-war declaration, other options for N. Korea diplomacy: envoy
Some varied reporting on the positions of the ROK and US.
U.S. to continue talks with S. Korea on end-of-war declaration, other options for N. Korea diplomacy: envoy | Yonhap News Agency
By Song Sang-ho and Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Oct. 24 (Yonhap) -- The U.S. special representative for North Korea said Sunday that he looks forward to continuing exploring different options with South Korea to resume dialogue with North Korea, including the proposed declaration of a formal end to the 1950-53 Korean War.
Sung Kim also reiterated Washington's willingness to help address the North's humanitarian concerns for its people in need, while urging Pyongyang to stop missile launches, which he cast as "concerning and counterproductive."
Kim made the remarks soon after he held talks with his South Korean counterpart, Noh Kyu-duk, to discuss joint efforts to resume stalled nuclear diplomacy.
"I look forward to continuing to work with special representative Noh to explore different ideas and initiatives, including the ROK's end-of-war proposal as we continue to pursue our shared objectives on the peninsula," Kim said, referring to South Korea's official name, Republic of Korea.
Kim called Pyongyang's latest missile test a "provocation" and a breach of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions.
"We hope the DPRK will respond positively to our outreach." the U.S. diplomat said, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
"We'll also prepare to work cooperative with the DPRK to address areas of humanitarian concern to help the most vulnerable North Koreans," he added.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
4. America's war in Afghanistan is over, but the country's true longest war with North Korea continues
An interesting overview of the Korea problem.
Excerpts:
The wars of Iraq and Afghanistan have come and gone but America cannot extract itself from the Korean Peninsula. It is crucial for the security of Japan and South Korea. The US provides a nuclear umbrella for its two allies as they confront the threat from a nuclear-armed North Korea.
And if anyone thinks this is a war in name only, they are wrong. Hostilities have continued. In 1976, two US army officers were killed by North Korean soldiers along the DMZ in what is known as the "axe murder incident".
In 2010, 46 South Korean sailors were killed in a North Korean submarine attack. In the same year, North Korea shelled Yeonpyeong Island killing four people — two service personnel and two civilians.
These attacks are deadly reminders that North Korea remains on a war footing.
It has the fourth largest army in the world — more than a million strong — and possesses chemical and biological weapons. US intelligence believes North Korea has amassed as many as 60 nuclear weapons and has developed long-range missile capability that could strike as far away as mainland US or Australia.
...
As Biden tries to marshal the forces of democracy against what he sees as an authoritarian challenge, North Korea is critical.
The US knows Pyongyang cannot be ignored. It has offered the rogue state a new round of talks without conditions. Kim knows how this works. His father and grandfather have been here before.
Pyongyang may come back to the negotiating table — it may even offer some concessions — but it will not give up its nuclear weapons. For Kim, survival is all. He will play the same game of bait-and-switch that has kept the regime alive.
...
And there can be no meaningful talks without China. Before Kim sat down with Donald Trump he first visited Beijing.
China and North Korea, it has been said, are as close as lips and teeth. China intervened to defend North Korea in the Korean War and it remains a powerful narrative of Chinese might.
China uses America's longest war as a source of patriotism and propaganda. The most popular film in the world right now — breaking all box office records, bigger even than the latest James Bond — celebrates China's victory over the American army in Korea 70 years ago.
A reminder of an old war that will not end and threatens to erupt again.
America's war in Afghanistan is over, but the country's true longest war with North Korea continues
The war in Afghanistan is over but America's true longest war continues. This enemy is more powerful than the Taliban. This is not some ethnic-religious insurgency but a nuclear-armed nation that has withstood the might of the American army and is still standing.
This is a nation that for the past half-century has been predicted to collapse. It has endured mass starvation from famine. It remains largely hidden from the world, its people kept in a state of suspended reality.
It is ruled by a despotic family that has carefully curated a cult of personality. For all its apparent weakness and paranoia, it remains impregnable.
This, of course, is North Korea — a country that remains in a state of war with the US and its allies. The Korean war has never ended. An armistice was signed in 1953 but, nearly 70 years later, there is still no peace treaty.
North Korea may be a “hermit kingdom” sealed off from the world, but its reach extends much farther.(AP: Korea News Service)
A war in name only?
Nearly 30,000 US troops remain in South Korea to enforce a demilitarised zone (DMZ) dividing the Korean Peninsula. Another 50,000 troops are stationed in Japan, a nation that sits in Pyongyang's sights. North Korea aims missiles at Tokyo.
Together the US presence in South Korea and Japan is the largest forward-deployed American force in the world.
The wars of Iraq and Afghanistan have come and gone but America cannot extract itself from the Korean Peninsula. It is crucial for the security of Japan and South Korea. The US provides a nuclear umbrella for its two allies as they confront the threat from a nuclear-armed North Korea.
And if anyone thinks this is a war in name only, they are wrong. Hostilities have continued. In 1976, two US army officers were killed by North Korean soldiers along the DMZ in what is known as the "axe murder incident".
In 2010, 46 South Korean sailors were killed in a North Korean submarine attack. In the same year, North Korea shelled Yeonpyeong Island killing four people — two service personnel and two civilians.
Poised to act
These attacks are deadly reminders that North Korea remains on a war footing.
It has the fourth largest army in the world — more than a million strong — and possesses chemical and biological weapons. US intelligence believes North Korea has amassed as many as 60 nuclear weapons and has developed long-range missile capability that could strike as far away as mainland US or Australia.
A television broadcast shows North Korea firing a ballistic missile off its east coast.(Reuters: Kim Hong-Ji)
It is also a deliberately calibrated message: North Korea doesn't like to be ignored.
The Kim regime — now in its third generation — plays the long game. It has armed itself and it has survived where others have been overturned. The post-mortems of the fall of Kabul are still being written, yet North Korea is reminding the world that it is a threat that dwarfs Afghanistan and the Taliban.
China's role
The Korean Peninsula sits at the crossroads of history — a relic of the Cold War, a continuing nuclear flashpoint, and at the tip of the escalating great power rivalry between China and the US.
Afghanistan won't define Joe Biden's presidency, the Indo-Pacific will. Biden has already made it clear that China is a strategic threat. He talks of a contest between autocracy and democracy.
And North Korea is crucial. The Kim regime survives because China backs it. Yes, the relationship ebbs and flows but Kim Jong Un and China's President Xi Jinping have held a series of summits in recent years.
Earlier this year, on the 60th anniversary of a defence treaty between the two nations, Xi said China and North Korea "unswervingly supported each other".
While North Korea has endured international sanctions, China has kept the flow of back door trade going. China supplies North Korea with the bulk of its power supply and is its biggest trading partner.
North Korea may be a "hermit kingdom" sealed off from the world, but its reach extends much farther.
It runs a flourishing black market of counterfeit goods, human trafficking and arms sales. North Korea has been dubbed a state of "criminal sovereignty".
North Korea forms a strategic buffer between China and the tens of thousands of American troops on the South Korean side of the border.
China also straddles a nuclear network connecting its closest friends — Pakistan and North Korea.
Two weeks ago the scientist dubbed the "father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb", Abdul Qadeer Khan, died. Khan was remembered as a national hero who stole nuclear secrets from his base in the Netherlands to build the bomb.
But he was also linked to a nuclear smuggling network that extended to Iran, Libya and, yes, North Korea.
A challenge for the US
As Biden tries to marshal the forces of democracy against what he sees as an authoritarian challenge, North Korea is critical.
The US knows Pyongyang cannot be ignored. It has offered the rogue state a new round of talks without conditions. Kim knows how this works. His father and grandfather have been here before.
Pyongyang may come back to the negotiating table — it may even offer some concessions — but it will not give up its nuclear weapons. For Kim, survival is all. He will play the same game of bait-and-switch that has kept the regime alive.
Space to play or pause, M to mute, left and right arrows to seek, up and down arrows for volume.
Why is North Korea launching missiles again?
And there can be no meaningful talks without China. Before Kim sat down with Donald Trump he first visited Beijing.
China and North Korea, it has been said, are as close as lips and teeth. China intervened to defend North Korea in the Korean War and it remains a powerful narrative of Chinese might.
China uses America's longest war as a source of patriotism and propaganda. The most popular film in the world right now — breaking all box office records, bigger even than the latest James Bond — celebrates China's victory over the American army in Korea 70 years ago.
A reminder of an old war that will not end and threatens to erupt again.
Stan Grant presents China Tonight on Monday at 9.35pm on ABC TV, and Tuesday at 8pm on ABC News Channel.
5. U.S. to continue talks with S. Korea on end-of-war declaration, other options for N. Korea diplomacy: envoy.
Excerpts:
Sung Kim also reiterated Washington's willingness to help address the North's humanitarian concerns for its people in need, while urging Pyongyang to stop missile launches, which he cast as "concerning and counterproductive."
Kim made the remarks soon after he held talks with his South Korean counterpart, Noh Kyu-duk, to discuss joint efforts to resume stalled nuclear diplomacy.
"I look forward to continuing to work with special representative Noh to explore different ideas and initiatives, including the ROK's end-of-war proposal as we continue to pursue our shared objectives on the peninsula," Kim said, referring to South Korea's official name, Republic of Korea.
U.S. to continue talks with S. Korea on end-of-war declaration, other options for N. Korea diplomacy: envoy | Yonhap News Agency
By Song Sang-ho and Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Oct. 24 (Yonhap) -- The U.S. special representative for North Korea said Sunday that he looks forward to continuing exploring different options with South Korea to resume dialogue with North Korea, including the proposed declaration of a formal end to the 1950-53 Korean War.
Sung Kim also reiterated Washington's willingness to help address the North's humanitarian concerns for its people in need, while urging Pyongyang to stop missile launches, which he cast as "concerning and counterproductive."
Kim made the remarks soon after he held talks with his South Korean counterpart, Noh Kyu-duk, to discuss joint efforts to resume stalled nuclear diplomacy.
"I look forward to continuing to work with special representative Noh to explore different ideas and initiatives, including the ROK's end-of-war proposal as we continue to pursue our shared objectives on the peninsula," Kim said, referring to South Korea's official name, Republic of Korea.
Kim called Pyongyang's latest missile test a "provocation" and a breach of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions.
"We hope the DPRK will respond positively to our outreach." the U.S. diplomat said, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
"We'll also prepare to work cooperative with the DPRK to address areas of humanitarian concern to help the most vulnerable North Koreans," he added.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
6. U.S. envoy welcomes discussion about ending war
Again, reporting from various viewpoints of recent ROK-US talks.
Sunday
October 24, 2021
U.S. envoy welcomes discussion about ending war
South Korea's top nuclear envoy Noh Kyu-duk, left, and Sung Kim, U.S. special representative for North Korea, speak during a press briefing after their talks on Pyongyang issues at Lotte Hotel in Sogong-dong, central Seoul, Sunday. [NEWS1]
The chief U.S. nuclear negotiator said Sunday that he looks forward to exploring initiatives including Seoul’s proposal for an end-of-war declaration and humanitarian support for North Korea.
Sung Kim, U.S. special representative for North Korea, told reporters after talks with his South Korean counterpart Noh Kyu-duk, “I look forward to continuing to work with Special Representative Noh to explore different ideas and initiatives, including the ROK's end of war proposal as we continue to pursue our shared objectives on the peninsula.” ROK stands for the South’s official name, Republic of Korea.
Seoul officials have called for efforts to formally declare an end to the 1950-53 Korean War, which ended with an armistice agreement, to encourage Pyongyang to return to the dialogue table.
“We'll also prepare to work cooperatively with the DPRK to address areas of humanitarian concern to help the most vulnerable North Koreans,” said Kim, referring to the acronym for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Kim’s visit to Seoul comes on the heels of a four-day visit by Noh, the South Korean Foreign Ministry's special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, to Washington which included trilateral talks with their Japanese counterpart, Takehiro Funakoshi, Tuesday.
In an address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York last month, President Moon Jae-in proposed a formal end-of-war declaration involving the two Koreas, the United States, and possibly China.
This issue was discussed in Noh and Kim’s meeting at the U.S. State Department on Oct. 18 and in further follow-up talks between the top nuclear envoys that took place Sunday in Seoul.
“We remain ready to meet with the DPRK without preconditions, and we have made clear that the United States harbors no hostile intent towards the DPRK,” said Kim in the joint briefing after the talks. “We hope the DPRK will respond positively to our outreach.”
“As an extension of the consultations we had in Washington, I had serious and in-depth discussions today with Representative Kim on the proposal for an end-of-war declaration,” Noh told reporters, speaking alongside Kim. “Based on this, the ROK and the United States decided to continue promoting various measures to engage North Korea, including meaningful confidence-building measures and humanitarian cooperation.”
Noh said the two countries “reaffirmed the shared position that when we resume dialogue with North Korea in the future, we can discuss all matters, including those of concern to the North.”
He added, “As the U.S. government continues to express its willingness for dialogue at all levels, we look forward to the North to respond promptly.”
Pyongyang has been calling on Washington and Seoul to withdraw their “hostile policy,” seen as referring to sanctions and joint South Korea-U.S. military exercises. However, the U.S. President Joe Biden has been adamant on enforcing the strict sanctions regime on the North to curb its nuclear and ballistic missiles programs.
Despite offers for dialogue without conditions, Washington has yet to offer any fundamental changes in its position to help lure Pyongyang back to the negotiation table after denuclearization talks fizzled in 2019.
Seoul and Washington are reportedly discussing the content of a possible end-of-war declaration, and the recent frequent back-and-forth has led analysts to speculate that the United States might be ready to take a more flexible attitude on this matter. Kim’s remarks to the press didn’t further elaborate on the details of the in-depth discussions.
Last Tuesday, North Korea test-fired a “new type” submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) into the East Sea, the first such test in two years, the same day the nuclear envoys of South Korea, the United States and Japan were meeting in Washington and intelligence chiefs of the three countries gathered in Seoul to discuss Pyongyang issues.
Addressing North Korea’s latest SLBM launch, Kim said, “Pyongyang's recent ballistic missile test, one of several in the past six weeks, is concerning and counterproductive to making progress towards a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.”
Noting that the launch violates multiple UN Security Council resolutions, Kim called on the North to “cease these provocations and other destabilizing activities, and instead, engage in dialogue.”
The goal of the United States “remains the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” said Kim, reiterating its “strong commitment” to the defense of South Korea and to “exploring sustained and substantive diplomacy with the DPRK.”
He said that Washington is “strongest when we work in partnership with our allies and the U.S.-ROK alliance is at the forefront.”
Possibly addressing the Sino-U.S. tensions in the area, Kim added, “There is no challenge too great for our nations to overcome together, and we will work towards an Indo-Pacific region that is open, free and secure.”
Kim, who doubles as U.S. ambassador to Indonesia, wrapped up his two-day visit to Seoul Sunday, and returned later in the day to Jakarta.
BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]
7. N. Korean media decries proposed S. Korea-U.S. defense dialogue
I wonder what they are referring to? We have the Korean Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) and the Security Consultative Meeting/Military Consultative Meeting (SMC/MCM), we have extended deterrence talks and many other military to military talks at various levels. I guess the Propaganda and Agitation Department had nothing new to report or perhaps they have a new "reporter" who is just observing these "talks" for the first time.
(LEAD) N. Korean media decries proposed S. Korea-U.S. defense dialogue | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: ADDS additional N.K. media report in last 3 paras)
SEOUL, Oct. 24 (Yonhap) -- A North Korean media outlet on Sunday slammed the United States for its recent proposal to create a new working-level defense dialogue with South Korea, accusing Washington of seeking to raise military pressure on Pyongyang.
The U.S. floated the idea of instituting the unofficial dialogue platform during the allies' regular defense talks in Seoul last month, sources have said, as Washington is pushing to rally its democratic allies to counter China's growing assertiveness.
Meari, a North Korean propaganda website, claimed that the proposed dialogue is yet another attempt by the U.S. to add pressure on the North and reinforce its regional policy initiative.
"The United States can be seen as seeking to usefully capitalize on the (proposed) defense working group to tighten its grab on South Korea's defense sector, pressure North Korea militarily and by extension, strengthen the realization of its Indo-Pacific strategy," the website said in an article.
It also rebuked the South for considering the proposed launch of such a defense dialogue based on a "sense of subservience" to the U.S.
Washington has reportedly proposed the dialogue to help find common ground between its Indo-Pacific strategy and Seoul's New Southern Policy aimed at deepening relations with Southeast Asian countries.
The two sides were expected to discuss the issue during their annual defense ministerial talks, called the Security Consultative Meeting, slated to take place in Seoul in December.
Meanwhile, another North Korean outlet, DPRK Today, denounced South Korea's upcoming Ulchi Taeguk exercise, calling it part of Seoul's "hostile policy" toward Pyongyang. DPRK stands for the North's official name, Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Slated to take place from Wednesday to Friday this week, the exercise aims to enhance the country's capabilities to respond to large national disasters.
"The world knows that the Ulchi Taeguk exercise will proceed, targeting the people of the same ethnicity in the name of preparing against threats from somebody," the outlet said in an article.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
8. 70% of Korea vaccinated, key threshold crossed
As of today in the US 57% of the population is fully vaccinated.
70% of Korea vaccinated, key threshold crossed
Spectators watch a baseball game between the LG Twins and the Doosan Bears at Jamsil Baseball Stadium in southern Seoul on Sunday afternoon, the first weekend the ban on attending sporting events in the Seoul Metropolitan area was lifted for those fully vaccinated. Open-air venues can admit up to 30 percent of their capacity, while indoor facilities can have up to 20 percent. [NEWS1]
Over 70 percent of Korea is vaccinated against Covid-19, the inoculation campaign crossing a key threshold that should lead to a return to normal in early November.
According to the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA), more than 36 million of the country’s 52 million people have completed vaccinations at 2 p.m. Saturday. As of Saturday midnight, 70.1 percent of the population was fully inoculated, while 79.4 percent had received one dose, the agency said.
“Korea’s fully-vaccinated rate exceeded 70 percent yesterday,” Interior and Safety Minister Jeon Hae-cheol said in a Covid-19 response meeting on Sunday, adding, “the vaccination pace is the third fastest among OECD countries.”
Out of 38 countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Iceland achieved the 70 percent milestone in 199 days, Portugal in 236 days and Korea in 240 days.
Jeon added that recent Covid-19 daily new case numbers have decreased to the levels of the early days of the fourth wave, when the daily totals were around 1,000.
“The average daily number of Covid-19 cases over the past week [from Oct. 18 to 24] was 1,357, which has been on the decline for three consecutive weeks since the fifth week of September, falling to the level of the early days of the fourth wave [from July 11 to 17],” he said.
On Sunday, the country added 1,423 new Covid-19 cases, including 1,395 local infections, raising the total caseload to 351,899. Twenty-one more deaths were added, bringing the death toll to 2,766.
The government has said at least 70 percent of the general public, or 80 percent of adults and 90 percent of the elderly, must be fully vaccinated before adopting a new set of rules under the “With Corona" policy, much like “living with Covid” measures elsewhere. The country is to treat the coronavirus as an infectious respiratory disease like seasonal influenza — gradually easing the current social-distancing measures and focusing more on managing critically ill patients rather than all new infections.
Seoul said Sunday that it will normalize nighttime bus and subway operations from Monday ahead of the “With Corona” initiative. Seoul’s buses and subways runs were reduced by up to 20 percent after 10 p.m. on weekdays from July 9 to contain the spread of the virus.
While the authorities are pushing for an expansion of Covid-19 home treatment to reduce stress on the medical system, a need to review on the system has emerged as a Covid patient treated at home died while being transferred to hospital.
Home treatment in Korea is available for asymptomatic and mildly symptomatic individuals under the age of 70 who tested positive but don't need hospitalization. If a home-care patient’s symptoms worsen, they can have remote consultations and prescriptions from a doctor, or be transported to a medical facility in case of emergency. As of Oct. 22, 2,280 Covid-19 patients are being treated at home, including 2,176 in the greater Seoul area and 104 in other parts of the country.
According to the Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasure Headquarters and Seoul’s Seodaemun District Office, a 68-year-old Covid-19 patient who was being treated at home died of cardiac arrest while being transferred to a hospital last Friday. It marked the first fatality since the country rolled out at-home treatment in January.
The man, who tested positive last Thursday, did not have any Covid-19 symptoms or underlying diseases, and thus opted to receive treatment at home. According to health authorities, the man wasn’t vaccinated, and had symptoms such as shortness of breath seven days before getting tested, but was asymptomatic at the time of the epidemiological investigation.
His condition suddenly deteriorated the next day and his family called 119 at 6:51 a.m., but it was found that his personal information wasn’t shared among the health authorities, resulting in delays in the assignment to an available hospital.
Foreigners wait to receive a vaccine at a visiting vaccination center in the Busan Foreign Residents Center in Sasang District, Busan, on Sunday. [SONG BONG-GEUN]
Generally, when a patient chooses to receive treatment at home, a hospital is designated in case of emergency. When the emergency relief personnel first arrived at 7:05 a.m., they thought he was in quarantine and not a home-treated patient — and delayed in assigning him to an available hospital bed while observing his condition.
It was also found that there was a delay in dispatching a Covid-19 ambulance as it wasn’t prepared.
According to the Seoul Metropolitan Fire and Disaster Headquarters, negative pressure ambulances for Covid-19 patients are required to wrap the inside with special film to prevent contamination, but the ambulance couldn’t be dispatched immediately as this wasn’t done. The wrapping process takes about 20 minutes.
A Covid-19 ambulance arrived at 7:30 a.m. and tried to transfer the patient, but he was already going into cardiac arrest and was taken to the hospital 20 minutes later after undergoing CPR. He arrived at the hospital at 8:05 a.m. but died.
Experts pointed out the classification of home-treated patient should be reorganized.
“Although Covid-19 symptoms may seem normal on the outside, it is difficult to predict the clinical progress as CT scans show lung injuries,” said Kim Woo-joo, a professor of infectious diseases at Korea University Guro Hospital.
“Only vaccinated people under the age of 50 are treated at home for Covid overseas,” Kim added. “If the patient is 68 years old, he should have been transferred to a Covid-19 hospital as soon as possible even if he wanted [home treatment], considering his previous symptoms.”
“In the case of older patients, symptoms progress slowly and they are classified as asymptomatic, which appears to be why the man died within a day [after testing positive],” Chun Eun-mi, a professor of respiratory medicine at Ewha Womans University Mokdong Hospital, said at an expert forum on “With Corona” last Friday.
Regarding the case, health authorities said they will review the classification, monitoring and transfer system of home treatment once again along with the fire department and city and provincial offices across the country.
BY SEO JI-EUN, HWANG SU-YEON [seo.jieun1@joongang.co.kr]
9. Coast Guard seizes Chinese boat for fishing in South Korea's EEZ without permit
Coast Guard seizes Chinese boat for fishing in South Korea's EEZ without permit
This photo, released Oct. 24 by South Korea's Coast Guard, shows a Chinese boat seized by Coast Guard officials for fishing without a permit in the country's exclusive economic zone a day earlier. Yonhap
South Korea's Coast Guard has seized a Chinese boat for fishing without a permit in the country's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) off the southern resort island of Jeju, its officials said Sunday.
The 272-ton vessel carrying 11 crew members is suspected of conducting fishing activities in waters 116 kilometers south of the city of Seogwipo on the island at 12:00 p.m. on Saturday without any authorization.
The vessel is also alleged to have attempted to flee despite the Coast Guard's repeated calls to stop moving.
The Coast Guard plans to investigate the vessel's captain and other shipmates after they take COVID-19 tests, officials said. (Yonhap)
10. ‘It Was Like Having the Chinese Government in the Room With Us’
Key point:
In recent months, the Chinese panel expert—sometimes with the backing of his Russian counterpart—has sought to remove, question, or downplay information that could prove embarrassing to the Chinese government. The Chinese and Russian experts challenged a section of the report, based on information from an unnamed U.N. member state saying 4.8 million metric tons of coal and other sanctioned materials had been exported from North Korea to China, arguing the information “requires verification.”
A series of internal U.N. accounts of meetings between Chinese officials and expert panels reveal constant interrogation of the experts’ tactics and their reliance on foreign intelligence sources to make their case. In a typical exchange in the delegates’ lounge in January 2017, Sun Lei, a diplomat from the Chinese Mission to the United Nations, urged a group of panel members to not name several Chinese banks, which were being scrutinized for their facilitation of North Korean sanctions evasion.
“Counsellor Sun stated that China preferred these banks and cases not be disclosed in the Panel’s report,” according to a note of the meeting. “He also stated that if [North Korea] is antagonized, it will react strongly, which may impact any sort of cooperation in the future in the long run.”
He also expressed irritation with the frequent information requests related to potential sanctions violations involving Chinese nationals or entities. “China does not want to be bothered with so many cases, letters, and etc.,” he told the experts.
‘It Was Like Having the Chinese Government in the Room With Us’
China’s method for blocking sanctions regimes.
In the summer, U.S. authorities provided the U.N. panel of experts for North Korea with a satellite photograph of a North Korean ship transferring coal to a Chinese-flagged vessel, a clear violation of a U.N. embargo aimed at cutting off Pyongyang’s ability to finance its illicit development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. But what grabbed the U.N. sanctions experts’ attention was the presence of a Chinese coast guard ship passively watching the transaction play out.
The photograph proved highly embarrassing to Chinese authorities in Beijing and prompted the panel’s Chinese expert to mount a vigorous effort to block the photo from appearing in the panel’s latest report documenting U.N. sanction violations. In a written response, China chided the expert panel, saying it is “completely normal” for Chinese coast guard vessels to patrol in the region and asked the panel “not to include in its report unverified information” about the Chinese ship, saying it was a matter of national security.
Sanctions have never been more popular, but the system for enforcing them at the United Nations is breaking down. In this two-week series, FP looks at why that is and what can still be done to fix it.
Foreign Policy illustration/Getty Images and Reuters photos
In the summer, U.S. authorities provided the U.N. panel of experts for North Korea with a satellite photograph of a North Korean ship transferring coal to a Chinese-flagged vessel, a clear violation of a U.N. embargo aimed at cutting off Pyongyang’s ability to finance its illicit development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. But what grabbed the U.N. sanctions experts’ attention was the presence of a Chinese coast guard ship passively watching the transaction play out.
The photograph proved highly embarrassing to Chinese authorities in Beijing and prompted the panel’s Chinese expert to mount a vigorous effort to block the photo from appearing in the panel’s latest report documenting U.N. sanction violations. In a written response, China chided the expert panel, saying it is “completely normal” for Chinese coast guard vessels to patrol in the region and asked the panel “not to include in its report unverified information” about the Chinese ship, saying it was a matter of national security.
Sanctions have never been more popular, but the system for enforcing them at the United Nations is breaking down. In this two-week series, FP looks at why that is and what can still be done to fix it.
Next week: U.N. sanctions enforcers face threats of violence, detention, and even murder.
In the end, the panel reached a compromise: It would limit the photo to a confidential annex of the report that would not be released to the public. But the panel report included a written description of the photograph, plus a footnote indicating one of the panel experts objected to the inclusion of any reference to the Chinese patrols.
This episode provides the latest snapshot in a decadeslong drama featuring China and the United States over the enforcement of sanctions against North Korea and other rogue countries. More than a decade of sanctions has deepened Pyongyang’s isolation and stunted its economy, but they have failed to achieve their primary objective: halting North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, which the country continues to fund through a maze of illicit enterprises, including the sale of weapons technology, cyber-extortion, and coal exports.
It also underscores the contradiction between Beijing’s attempt to assert itself as a champion of multilateralism while it persistently seeks to air brush out the record of its failure to live up to those commitments. Debate over China’s commitment to sanctions comes at a particularly fraught moment in U.S.-Chinese relations, as Beijing seeks to more forcefully assert its role as a global leader and the Biden administration increasingly seeks to portray China as a lawless and irresponsible world power.
In recent months, the United States has expressed increasing concern about China’s failure to enforce sanctions. In an April letter to Congress, Naz Durakoglu, the acting U.S. assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of Legislative Affairs, said since August 2018, the United States proposed sanctioning 50 individuals, entities, and vessels allegedly violating North Korea sanctions, including 26 individuals and vessels between May 2020 and April 2021. The vast majority involved Chinese entities or entities linked to China, according to a diplomatic source familiar with the matter.
In February, the United States and other G-7 countries delivered a formal diplomatic démarche to Beijing and the Chinese mission to the United Nations documenting China’s “failures to implement and enforce sanctions relating to [North Korea],” according to the April letter. The démarche included specific examples of North Korea-related maritime activities occurring in Chinese territorial waters or involving Chinese-flagged vessels.
“The work of the [North Korea] Panel of Experts is fundamental to the implementation of international sanctions against North Korea,” it added. “The semi-annual reports of the Panel are some of the most objective and influential sources of information on sanctions violations and serve as a touchstone for international cooperation on sanctions implementation.”
“China and Russia have gotten better at putting pressure on the panel members to take stuff out of the reports.”
But some former panel members feel the council’s chief champions on the Security Council—Britain, France, and the United States, known informally as the P3—have not responded forcefully enough to China and Russia’s efforts.
“There are the twin forces of a weakening of resolve among the P3 to fight this stuff and the determination and efficacy of the Chinese and Russians to undermine it,” said Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, the former U.S. representative on the panel. “China and Russia have gotten better at putting pressure on the panel members to take stuff out of the reports.”
“One problem is the U.S. was constrained by the interagency process and declassification process,” she added. “The panel needs actual evidence. The U.S. government is not upping its game fast enough.”
The North Korea panel is distinct from most other U.N. sanctions panels, which employ independent experts on arms trafficking, financial crimes, and regional politics to investigate sanction violations. It is comprised of representatives handpicked by the Security Council’s five major powers—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and other governments, such as South Korea and Japan, that have a direct interest in curtailing North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. But big-power confrontations over North Korea extend to many other parts of the world, where China and Russia have worked closely together to check other expert panels’ authorities.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (left) shakes hands with North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho in Pyongyang, North Korea, on May 2, 2018. KIM WON-JIN/AFP via Getty Images
China has made no secret of its ambivalence toward U.N. sanctions, which it views as a tool of Western hegemony. But for decades, it has gone along with sanctions, withholding its veto and, in some cases, openly backing the imposition of punitive measures, including in North Korea, where it hoped sanctions could get the United States and North Korea back to political talks aimed at ending the peninsula’s decadeslong state of war.
But behind the scenes, China has sought to use its growing influence at the United Nations to whittle away such sanction regimes’ power and efficacy. Much of that influence involves checking the authority of U.N. sanctions enforcers on the U.N. panel of experts for North Korea, but it has also targeted expert panels in Africa, where it recently blocked the appointment of a new slate of sanctions experts for the mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a move that effectively ground investigations to a halt. Moscow joined Beijing in holding up the panel.
Beijing’s strategy has largely focused on sanitizing investigations that have shed light on Chinese sanctions violations and blocking the reappointment of panel experts that have uncovered evidence of Chinese weaponry in territory subject to U.N. sanctions.
China’s hardball strategy isn’t new. Nearly a decade ago, China blocked the release of a panel report detailing armed groups’ use of Chinese ammunition in Darfur, Sudan, in violation of the U.N. arms embargo. The panel never accused China of violating the sanctions, considering it more likely that ammunition was exported legally to Sudan, where it was then sold to armed groups in Darfur. But China refused to cooperate with the investigation and subsequently blocked the German expert who uncovered the Chinese shells from having his contract renewed, effectively kicking him off the panel.
But China has gradually pursued new means of constraining the inspectors. For instance, it has prohibited expert panels from seeking information on sanctions from Taiwan, which has extensive business, intelligence, and security interests in the region; China’s representative has insisted that any reference to Taiwan include a clause saying it is a province of China. Beijing has also required all requests for information from Hong Kong-based entities to be channeled through China’s mission to the U.N., slowing down the panel’s investigations. China, along with Russia, also used its position on the U.N. budget committee to limit the financial resources available to sanctions experts.
Read More
U.S. sanctions are in tatters, and China doesn’t want the United Nations imposing more.
Biden opened the door for talks with Kim Jong Un, but Pyongyang is playing hard to get.
The long-range weapon could strike South Korea, Japan, and U.S. bases in the region.
“It was difficult to get satellite imagery, particularly the latest images, because of the amount of money required to purchase it, and China and Russia were active on the [U.N.] Fifth Committee that allocates the money,” said Neil Watts, a South African who served on the North Korea panel from 2013 to 2018. “I got the impression that China would view it as an intrusion of their territorial sovereignty.”
China’s efforts to contain U.N.’s sanctions panels have been particularly strenuous and successful over North Korea, which shares a border with China—its biggest trading partner. In contrast to other sanctions panels—which are composed of independent experts—the U.N. panel of experts on North Korea draws its experts from China, Russia, and the United States, who exhibit varying degrees of independence. China’s representative on the panel acts as a surrogate for the Chinese foreign ministry and would routinely seek instructions from the Chinese mission as the panel debated on what to include in its reports. “The Chinese member of the panel would call the mission during our report negotiations,” said Kleine-Ahlbrandt. “It was like having the Chinese government in the room with us.”
The Chinese panel expert, sometimes with the backing of his Russian counterpart, has sought to remove, question, or downplay information that could prove embarrassing to the Chinese government.
In recent months, the Chinese panel expert—sometimes with the backing of his Russian counterpart—has sought to remove, question, or downplay information that could prove embarrassing to the Chinese government. The Chinese and Russian experts challenged a section of the report, based on information from an unnamed U.N. member state saying 4.8 million metric tons of coal and other sanctioned materials had been exported from North Korea to China, arguing the information “requires verification.”
A series of internal U.N. accounts of meetings between Chinese officials and expert panels reveal constant interrogation of the experts’ tactics and their reliance on foreign intelligence sources to make their case. In a typical exchange in the delegates’ lounge in January 2017, Sun Lei, a diplomat from the Chinese Mission to the United Nations, urged a group of panel members to not name several Chinese banks, which were being scrutinized for their facilitation of North Korean sanctions evasion.
“Counsellor Sun stated that China preferred these banks and cases not be disclosed in the Panel’s report,” according to a note of the meeting. “He also stated that if [North Korea] is antagonized, it will react strongly, which may impact any sort of cooperation in the future in the long run.”
He also expressed irritation with the frequent information requests related to potential sanctions violations involving Chinese nationals or entities. “China does not want to be bothered with so many cases, letters, and etc.,” he told the experts.
11. S. Korean defense firms clinch deals worth US$128 mln at ADEX: organizers
I wonder how many deals were made at north Korea's defense expo? But the regime still remains a master at proliferation of military equipment and training to conflict zones to make money for its nuclear program.
S. Korean defense firms clinch deals worth US$128 mln at ADEX: organizers | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Oct. 24 (Yonhap) -- South Korean defense companies have signed business contracts worth US$128 million in total during a biennial arms exhibition held south of Seoul last week, its organizers said Sunday.
More than 250 local companies joined the five-day Seoul International Aerospace & Defense Exhibition (ADEX), which ended Saturday. The event marked a rare opportunity for the companies to explore new opportunities in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic.
In addition to the finalized contracts, local companies had consultations with their foreign clients over potential contracts, which could amount to a combined $22.5 billion if signed, organizers said.
During the exhibition, organizers arranged more than 700 meetings between local firms and foreign governments at the ADEX venue, Seoul Air Base, they said.
The 2021 exhibition involved 440 companies from 28 countries. It marks the largest number of participating firms since the exhibition was launched in 1996.
colin@yna.co.kr
(END)
12. S. Korea to hold annual Hoguk defense exercise next week
S. Korea to hold annual Hoguk defense exercise next week
The large scale ROK joint exercises do ont get the notoriety of ROK/US combined exercises. But these are very important to the defense of the ROK.
Note that we used to conduct Foal Eagle in this fall time frame. It was a ROK/US combined exercise focused on defending the rear area and conducting special operations. Now a field exercise formerly known as Foal Eagle is conducted in March and it is the field component of the bi-annual Dong Meng exercises.
S. Korea to hold annual Hoguk defense exercise next week
(Yonhap)
South Korea will kick off an annual military exercise next week to strengthen defense readiness, officials said Friday, amid lingering tensions over North Korea's recent submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test.
The Hoguk exercise will run from Monday to Nov. 5 across the country, involving the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps., to enhance interservice cooperation, according to the officials at the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The North has often responded angrily to such an exercise, calling it a provocation against the reclusive regime.
On Tuesday, Pyongyang test-fired a new type of submarine-launched ballistic missile, which marked the eighth known missile test by the North this year.
Launched in 1996, the annual drill is held in the second half of each year. (Yonhap)
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
