Quotes of the Day:
"The Revolution... was the result of a mature and reflecting preference for freedom, and not of a vague or ill-defined craving for independence."
- Alexis De Tocqueville
“A social movement that only moves people is merely a revolt. A movement that changes both people and institutions is a revolution.”
- Martin Luther King Jr., Why We Can't Wait
“There will be no curiosity, no enjoyment of the process of life. All competing pleasures will be destroyed. But always— do not forget this, Winston— always there will be the intoxication of power, constantly increasing and constantly growing subtler. Always, at every moment, there will be the thrill of victory, the sensation of trampling on an enemy who is helpless.
If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face— forever. ”
- George Orwell, 1984
1. North Korea boasts of 'shaking the world' by testing missiles that can strike the US
2. Anti-China sentiment emerges as new variable in presidential election (South Korea)
3. N. Korean leader calls for development of construction sector
4. National security policy should be based on one thing: Facts (South Korea)
5. North Korea's Isolation Will Likely Lead to More Missile Tests
6. North Korea Builds ICBM Base Near China as Fears of New Test Loom
7. North holds national gathering without leader Kim Jong-un
8. North agrees to increase 'strategic cooperation' with Russia
9. Chinese Embassy rebuts public criticism over 'hanbok' at Beijing Olympics ceremony
10. North Korea No Longer Wants America's Attention
11. Is Korea Heading Toward a Political Crossroads?
12. South Korea’s Nuclear Future is a New Election Battleground
1. North Korea boasts of 'shaking the world' by testing missiles that can strike the US
Political warfare continues.
Excerpts:
A statement from North Korea's Foreign Ministry said a series of tests since New Year represented "remarkable achievements" that strengthened North Korea's "war deterrence."
It also cited the Hwasong-15, the longest-range intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) ever launched by North Korea, which hasn't been fired since its first test in 2017, and is believed to have the range to deliver a nuclear warhead anywhere in the US.
North Korea boasts of 'shaking the world' by testing missiles that can strike the US
CNN · by Story by Reuters
Seoul, South Korea
North Korea boasted on Tuesday that it is one of only a handful of countries in the world to field nuclear weapons and advanced missiles and the only one standing up to the United States by "shaking the world" with missile tests.
International tension has been rising over a recent series of North Korean ballistic missile tests, actions long banned by the United Nations Security Council. January was a record month of such tests, with at least seven launches, including a new type of "hypersonic missile" able to maneuver at high speed.
Also among the tests was the first firing since 2017 of a Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missile, capable of striking US territories in the Pacific Ocean.
A statement from North Korea's Foreign Ministry said a series of tests since New Year represented "remarkable achievements" that strengthened North Korea's "war deterrence."
It also cited the Hwasong-15, the longest-range intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) ever launched by North Korea, which hasn't been fired since its first test in 2017, and is believed to have the range to deliver a nuclear warhead anywhere in the US.
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"In today's world where many countries waste time dealing with the United States with submission and blind obedience, there's only our country on this planet that can shake the world by firing a missile with the US mainland in its range," it said.
"There are more than 200 countries in the world, but only a few have hydrogen bombs, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and hypersonic missiles," it said.
Asked to comment, the US State Department repeated past statements that it harbored no hostile intent towards North Korea and urging a return to dialog, calls Pyongyang has persistently ignored.
Author on what Kim Jong Un's series of missile tests may mean 02:31
A State Department spokesperson also called North Korea a threat to international peace and security and global nonproliferation efforts.
"The United States has a vital interest in deterring (North Korea), defending against its provocations or uses of force, limiting the reach of its most dangerous weapons programs, and above all keeping the American people, our deployed forces, and our allies safe," the spokesperson said.
Jenny Town, director of 38 North, a Washington-based North Korea program, said the fact that North Korea's statement came from its Foreign Ministry probably made the statement less threatening than if might appear. "The formulation is very passive. Not that they will do it, but that they can," she said.
North Korea celebrated the anniversary of the founding of its army on Tuesday, a holiday that has occasionally featured major military parades with missiles and other weapons in previous years.
North Korea tests a missile on January 27 in photo released by state media.
There were no reports of a parade this year, however, and state media said the day was marked by senior military leaders visiting the mausoleum of the country's former rulers, among other events.
US and South Korean officials have said they fear the launch of the Hwasong-12 on January 30 could be a step toward fully resuming tests of North Korea's ICBMs or nuclear weapons. North Korea has not conducted a nuclear test or fired an ICBM since 2017.
The United States called on North Korea on Monday to defund its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and prioritize the needs of its own people.
A Washington think tank said on Monday it has identified a military base close to North Korea's border with China that is likely intended for stationing ICBMs.
Talks to persuade Pyongyang to give up or limit its arsenal in return for sanctions relief have been stalled since 2019.
CNN · by Story by Reuters
2. Anti-China sentiment emerges as new variable in presidential election (South Korea)
Anti-China sentiment emerges as new variable in presidential election
Members of civic organizations hold a protest against China, accusing the country of violating basic human rights and calling for a boycott against the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, near the Chinese embassy in central Seoul, Wednesday. Yonhap
Experts say situation may affect neck-and-neck race
By Jung Da-min
Anti-China sentiment, which erupted suddenly due to controversial decisions by judges at the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, has become an unexpected variable swaying the upcoming presidential election, with swing voters in their 20s and 30s responding emotionally to the incidents. Rival political parties are scrambling to take a dig at China in order to appeal to those voters.
Many Koreans, ranging from presidential candidates to the general public, have expressed anger toward China after the disqualification of two of their 1000m short track speedskaters, calling the refereeing decisions "biased and unacceptable."
Anti-China sentiment among Koreans was stoked by China's economic retaliation against Korea's deployment of a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system and Beijing's nationalism initiative known as the Northeast Project aimed at incorporating the histories of other East Asian countries into China's own history.
But the recent controversies surrounding the judgments at the Bejing Olympics coincide with Korea's next presidential election which is just about a month away.
Resentment against China has especially been growing in online communities after short track speedskaters Hwang Dae-heon and Lee June-seo were disqualified in the men's 1,000m semifinals, Monday, for violating regulations during their races. But most Koreans believe such judgments were intentionally made in favor of China and cannot be tolerated.
Hwang Dae-heon of Korea goes past China's Ren Ziwei and Li Wenlong during the men's 1,000m semifinal 1 short track speedskating event at the Winter Olympics Capital Indoor Stadium on Monday. Newsis
The two mainstream rival candidates, Lee Jae-myung of the ruling Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) and Yoon Suk-yeol of the main opposition conservative People Power Party (PPP), swiftly issued strong messages to condemn what they referred to as "unfair" judgments in the Olympics.
Political watchers said the situation surrounding growing anti-China sentiment among Koreans can affect the presidential competition, especially when the two rivals, Lee and Yoon, have been in a neck-and-neck race in recent opinion polls.
They said the situation could be favorable to Yoon, who had already been using anti-China sentiment in his presidential campaign. For example, Yoon has vowed to deploy additional U.S. THAAD systems if he becomes the next president.
Park Chang-hwan, a political commentator and a professor at Jangan University, said the ruling liberal bloc led by President Moon Jae-in and the DPK have focused on keeping good relations and issued neutral messages when dealing with China-related controversies. But he said such diplomatic efforts of the ruling bloc have fueled anti-China sentiment among members of the public.
"For example, when controversies rose over China's alleged appropriation of the Korean traditional dress known as hanbok during last week's opening ceremony, the Korean government issued statements with a neutral tone. Culture Minister Hwang Hee belatedly issued a statement of protest but it was only after controversies grew bigger," Park said.
"For the PPP's Yoon, who has already been using anti-China sentiment in his campaigning, this could offer a good opportunity to win more support from voters. But Yoon, at the same time, is also being careful not to issue overly strong messages to avoid a situation where the controversies develop into diplomatic issues. . . . The DPK and Lee swiftly issued statements to condemn China's 'unfair' intervention in the Olympics to minimize negative effects from the issue, when the ruling bloc is often associated with its China-friendly policies," Park said.
Lee June-seo of Korea, fourth from left, skates among other athletes during the men's 1,000m semifinal 2 short track speedskating event at the Winter Olympics Capital Indoor Stadium on Feb. 7. Newsis
Another political commentator, Choi Young-il, said the political parties and the government should deal with the issue based on international rules and reasonable standards, while also meeting expectations of the members of the public by protesting against unjust situations.
"It is desirable that political parties are trying to understand the public sentiment and issuing diplomatic responses to China based on it. But they should not be instigating people with inappropriate messages to win more votes," Choi said.
3. N. Korean leader calls for development of construction sector
N. Korean leader calls for development of construction sector | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Feb. 9 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has ordered officials to address urgent defects in the field of construction, stressing its importance in building a strong country and improving people's lives, according to Pyongyang's state media Wednesday.
In a letter sent to participants of a construction workshop held in Pyongyang the previous day, Kim pointed out mistakes made in the field, and said it was the right time for them to "rearm" with the ruling party's ideologies and policies, the North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported.
"He stressed the importance of the position and role of the field of construction in the current struggle for bringing about a new victory in the socialist construction," the KCNA said.
Kim also thanked workers who took part in the project to develop the northwestern city of Samjiyon, touting the city as a model for rural buildup.
"It is the success to be reviewed with special pride that the work of sprucing up Samjiyon City was victoriously concluded as a gift of loyalty to the 80th birth anniversary of Chairman Kim Jong-il," he was quoted as saying.
Located at the foot of Mount Paekdu, the highest peak on the Korean Peninsula, Samjiyon is known to be the birthplace of Kim's late father and former leader Kim Jong-il, whose 80th birthday falls on Feb. 16.
scaaet@yna.co.kr
(END)
4. National security policy should be based on one thing: Facts (South Korea)
Moon Chung-in spinning the Moon administration's policies for election purposes.
[Column] National security policy should be based on one thing: Facts
Posted on : Feb.7,2022 16:00 KST Modified on : Feb.7,2022 16:00 KST
By Moon Chung-in, chairman of the Sejong Institute In both South Korea and elsewhere in recent years, subjective speculation appears to be prevailing over facts as the boundary between objective truth and public opinion blurs. In the US, for example, conspiracy theories such as climate denial, the “anti-vax” movement, and claims about election rigging have had a bigger political impact than judicial decisions and pronouncements by the government and credible research institutions. Such trends impede healthy discussion of policy and make it harder to craft reasonable policies.This phenomenon is becoming more noticeable as political disputes inevitably heat up in Korea’s current presidential campaign. One example is the foreign policy and national security platform that Yoon Suk-yeol, presidential candidate for the People Power Party, announced on Jan. 24.We need not criticize Yoon’s platform itself, since campaign platforms have always expressed a candidate’s subjective will. But the “facts” that undergird Yoon’s platform are debatable — including the assumptions that the Korean Peninsula peace process has been a “complete failure” under the rule of the Democratic Party, that Korea’s “three-axis” national defense program has been “stripped of its substance,” and that the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) alliance with the US has “collapsed” over the past five years. A fact check is needed here.There’s no doubt that President Moon Jae-in’s Korean Peninsula peace process has failed to achieve its intended results. Regardless of the reasons, the goal of achieving a peace regime and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula has not been realized. The detonation of the inter-Korean liaison office in Kaesong, the shooting of an official from the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries in the water, and the seven missile test launches that North Korea carried out last month alone are major blots on Moon’s initiative.But can the peace process really be written off as a “complete failure”? The North Koreans carried out 27 incursions and 237 local provocations in the years before the Moon administration, from 2010 to 2017. But aside from a shooting at a guard post in 2020, there have been no incursions or local provocations at the Demilitarized Zone, or DMZ, since South and North Korea signed the Comprehensive Military Agreement on Sept. 19, 2018. That suggests the agreement has helped manage or prevent the kind of armed clashes and loss of life that would represent a decisive rupture between the two sides.I also take issue with Yoon’s criticism that the three-axis system has been stripped of substance. Following Pyongyang’s bellicose behavior in 2017, the Moon administration has taken active steps to counter the threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles. Moon has spent a total of 8.28 trillion won on acquiring the Cheongung II, L-SAM and long-range artillery as well as on upgrading Patriot batteries so as to improve Korea’s interception capability — that is, missile defense — a critical component of the three-axis system.Korea has also greatly expanded its strategic strike assets, which are a key element of an “offensive defense.” The defense budget allocated 18.11 trillion won for acquiring F-35A stealth fighters, the Hyunmoo-2 and Hyunmoo-3 ship-to-ground ballistic and cruise missiles, the Taurus air-to-ground guided missile and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or SLBMs.The Moon administration has also markedly improved Korea’s surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Another 4.47 trillion won went to acquiring military spy satellites and the Global Hawk high-altitude unmanned surveillance aircraft and to strengthening the capabilities of the Baekdu signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection aircraft. What evidence does Yoon have for declaring the three-axis system void of substance when the Moon administration has invested 30.86 trillion won on defense against nuclear weapons and missiles while cooperating closely with the US?Similar observations can be made about the alliance between South Korea and the US. There have been some areas of disagreement between the two sides about the sequence of steps needed to address the North Korean nuclear issue or the degree of cooperation in countering China. But it wouldn’t be a normal relationship between sovereign states if there were no daylight between them on such sensitive matters. In contrast, it’s undeniable that the basic framework of the ROK-US alliance was upgraded during the two countries’ summit last May from a military alliance to a comprehensive alliance covering technological and economic matters.Yoon has disparaged the coalition’s defense readiness, claiming the two sides aren’t holding drills or exercises. But aside from skipping the Ulchi-Freedom Guardian exercise in the second half of 2018 — around when the inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang took place — the South Korean and American militaries haven’t called off a single exercise or drill in the past five years. In fact, the Foal Eagle exercise went ahead even in 2018, the year of the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, despite being delayed until April.It’s true that the field mobility exercises that had been concentrated in a single period were scaled back and distributed throughout the year, but that was initiated by the unilateral decision of former US President Donald Trump and maintained subsequently because of COVID-19. Given these considerations, is it really possible to claim that the alliance has crumbled?Indeed, there was no reason for the Moon administration to proactively refuse joint military exercises or drills, considering that Moon’s goal was to acquire wartime operational control (OPCON) of coalition forces before leaving office. If anything, I would say that the Moon administration’s obsession with relations with the US limited its ability to make good on its agreements with the North.The political winds are raging, and there’s nothing unusual about the presidential candidate of the leading opposition party criticizing the ruling party.But criticism ought to be based on objective facts and a minimum sense of responsibility for governance. Extreme distortions of reality not only goad North Korea into miscalculations and further polarize domestic politics, but they also serve as shackles that limit reasonable policy-making, regardless of who wins the presidential election.Interpretations may differ, but facts are the facts. Acknowledging that is the true beginning of solid national security.Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]
5. North Korea's Isolation Will Likely Lead to More Missile Tests
In actuality it is not the pandemic or sanctions but the regime's deliberate responses to them and the deliberate policy decisions that are the cause of the suffering.
North Korea's Isolation Will Likely Lead to More Missile Tests
The pandemic has only deepened North Korea's isolation, leading to a famine in the country and difficulty for the Kim regime.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un continues to focus inward. The widespread expectation is that he will eventually return to negotiations with inflated demands. However, isolation might be the new normal. That would mean a less prosperous, less worldly North Korea. It would also mean a stronger military, and likely a more dangerous one.
The year began with a striking run of seven missile tests. The final test, of an intermediate-range missile (IRBM), was particularly notable. It was the longest launch since 2017, when President Donald Trump spoke of “fire and fury” in response to North Korean threats.
South Korean President Moon Jae-in said the recent test “means that North Korea has come close to abandoning its moratorium” on nuclear and long-range missile tests. The launch may also end Moon’s hope for diplomatic progress with the North before he leaves office. Moon seemed irritated with Kim, telling North Korea to “stop raising tensions and pressure” and return to negotiations.
The latest test also puts Washington on notice to expect another round of brinkmanship by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The Biden administration added new sanctions in response to the North’s short-range tests, causing Pyongyang to warn: “If the U.S. adopts such a confrontational stance, the DPRK will be forced to take stronger and certain reaction to it.” The IRBM test came just two weeks later.
More ominously, Kim has suggested previously that he is prepared to test intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). At the December party plenum he declared: “The military environment of the Korean peninsula and the trend of the international situation getting instable day after day demand that bolstering the state defense capability be further powerfully propelled without a moment's delay.”
The North Korean Politburo said in January it would “strengthen and develop without delay more powerful physical means to definitely overpower the daily intensifying hostile moves of the United States.” How better to do so than test nuclear weapons or missiles capable of hitting America? The party leadership also instructed “the field concerned to reconsider all the confidence-building measures previously and voluntarily taken by our state and rapidly examine the issue on resuming all actions which had been temporarily suspended.” This is assumed to mean long-range missile and nuclear tests.
The North Korean people are surely expected to glory in these grand military achievements. Yet they might find that hard to do on less-than-full stomachs. Kim publicly addressed the food situation in the country last year, calling it “tense.” He also referred to an “arduous march,” a term used to describe the deadly famine of the late 1990s.
The regime has also acknowledged a “food crisis” cited in a new propaganda film entitled “2021, A Great Victorious Year.” According to NK News, the video’s narrator said that “Kim presented ‘important policy ideas in order to urgently stabilize the people’s lives and the tense food distribution situation and overcome the current food crisis with an emergency policy’.”
But these expressions of concern won’t relieve hunger pangs of the North Korean people. The regime has put forth some unusual propaganda themes to buttress the Kim dynasty after two years of near-total isolation in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. One such theme is that Kim is suffering greatly for the people, evidenced by his recent weight loss.
Kim is believed to have shed around forty-four pounds. Some have suggested this was the result of an illness, came from doctor’s orders, or was done for political purposes. The latter theory is the most interesting, suggesting that with the steady economic tightening, Kim’s access to abundant calories posed a political problem. It may have even undermined support among less fortunate party loyalists. Dropping weight was supposed to reduce evidence of this glaring inequity.
The new propaganda film implies that his weight loss reflects suffering on behalf of the people. For instance, as Kim struggled down makeshift stairs at a construction site, NK News reported that the narrator explained Kim “showed us his fatherly side by doggedly braving snow, rain and wind while taking on the fate of the nation and people like his own children.” Moreover, “His body completely withered away, and he showed his motherly side by greatly suffering and worrying to realize the dreams of the people.”
The film included footage of Kim galloping on his white horse and leading North Korean officials on a ride. The snippets are dramatic but may not resonate with the North Korean people as in the past. Regime mythmaking has grown stale and is incongruous with popular awareness of the state’s limitations. Too many North Koreans have seen too much of South Korea via smuggled media.
This awareness increases the importance of Pyongyang’s attempt to eradicate foreign cultural influences. Kim’s shift has been dramatic. He went to school in Switzerland and demonstrated a surprising interest in foreign characters and celebrities, such as Disney characters and Dennis Rodman. The DPRK hosted a gaggle of South Korean musicians four years ago that included K-pop group Red Velvet. Kim and his wife attended their concert.
However, much has changed. Kim and Trump were exchanging “love letters,” and the North treated the South with a modicum of respect. After the collapse of the February 2019 summit, Kim largely ended contact with the United States and South Korea. Other nations reported that the DPRK halted or restricted diplomatic engagement.
The isolation deepened in 2020 as Kim sought to battle the COVID-19 pandemic. Two years later, the process is almost complete. North Korea has no meaningful contacts with either Washington or Seoul, no embassies operating in Pyongyang, no NGOs doing humanitarian work in the DPRK, and virtually no trade with anyone, though commerce may resume with China soon.
Perhaps the most important impact of the North’s self-quarantine was to make possible a return to the past policy of highly limited access to foreign, and especially South Korean, culture. After expanding international contact, Kim appeared to worry that his regime had lost the young, or at least the offspring of urban elites. While it is possible that he saw COVID-induced isolation as an opportunity to toughen ideological controls, a temporary campaign doesn’t seem worth the effort. Limits on foreign contact, including diplomatic, humanitarian, and economic connections, will have to be permanent to be effective.
That would complement an aggressive campaign to enhance the North’s deterrent capabilities. The Carnegie Endowment’s Ankit Panda argued that Kim “doesn’t just want more missiles, he wants better missiles.” To do this, however, Kim appears to have accepted the continuation, at least in the near- to mid-term, of sanctions. To accomplish Kim’s military objectives, sanctions will not be lifted, the economy will be hobbled, and the people will be hungry. This means greater ideological controls are required to preserve the regime.
The prospect of accelerated North Korean arms development, including renewed testing of ICBMs and nukes, should move Northeast Asia onto the Biden administration’s priority list. But Washington faces a world of trouble, starting with Russia and Iran. Relations with China appear to have stabilized in a difficult place, but most policymakers agree that great power competition in Asia remains the primary challenge today.
It will be only too easy for the Biden administration to largely ignore North Korea, much like the Obama administration did. However, neglect is no solution. Pyongyang will continue expanding its arsenal. The United States will have to face this fact eventually. The likely result is the de facto acceptance of North Korea as a mid-level nuclear power.
Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is author of several books, including Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World and co-author of The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations with North and South Korea.
Image: Reuters.
6. North Korea Builds ICBM Base Near China as Fears of New Test Loom
Political warfare and warfighting capabilities. And proximity to the Chinese border for "protection" is not new.
North Korea Builds ICBM Base Near China as Fears of New Test Loom
The location is meant to protect its most powerful weapons from pre-emptive strikes, allowing the military to expand an already rapidly growing arsenal.
An image from North Korean state media of a missile test conducted in January at an undisclosed location.
By
Feb. 8, 2022, 4:23 a.m. ET
SEOUL — North Korea began this year with a record-breaking spate of missile launches, but stopped short of a truly provocative step: ending its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests.
Kim Jong-un, the country’s leader, has already threatened to end the moratorium, saying at a party meeting in January that his country would consider “restarting all temporarily suspended activities” and switching to “more powerful physical means” to deter the United States. He has spent several months unveiling new weapon technology. And, according to new research, his military has been building a base strategically located for future ICBM launches.
In a report published Monday, a team of analysts at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies said they had located an underground, regiment-size military base used for housing North Korean ICBMs just 15 miles from the border with China.
The location, the analysts say, was chosen to deter pre-emptive strikes from the United States against North Korea’s most important weapons as the country to continues to expand and modernize its arsenal.
“As best as can be determined from satellite imagery, informed sources, and what little data is available, the base is ready to receive an operational ICBM unit,” said the report.
Hoejung-ni missile operating base in January.Credit...CSIS/Beyond Parallel/Maxar 2022
North Korea is not expected to do any new missile tests in February, possibly out of deference to its ally China, which is hosting the Winter Olympics in Beijing this month. But observers fear the provocations will intensify once the Games are over and North Korea seeks to prod the Biden administration to resume stalled negotiations.
“North Korea will likely escalate pressure on the United States by taking a series of steps toward an ICBM test,” said Cheon Seong-whun, a former head of the Korea Institute for National Unification, a government-funded research institute in Seoul.
North Korea conducted its last ICBM test in November 2017, after which it claimed that its nuclear-tipped ICBM could strike any part of the continental United States. Should Mr. Kim launch an ICBM this year, it would most likely be from vehicles housed in a base such as Hoejung-ni, the facility identified in the report published on Monday.
Though it is unclear if Hoejung-ni is fully operational, most analysts believe a North Korean ICBM would be launched from a similarly concealed military installation.
Watching a news program showing an image of a recent North Korean missile launch, at Seoul Station in South Korea on Jan. 31.Credit...Ahn Young-Joon/Associated Press
Hoejung-ni is the second possible ICBM base in North Korea that CSIS analysts have identified. Yusang-ni, a base 39 miles northeast of Pyongyang, the capital, was identified in 2019.
North Korea has long hidden its vital military assets in caves, underground bunkers and tunnels. But the country has spent recent years making it even harder for the United States and its allies to find and target its most dangerous weapons — by keeping them not only deep underground but also near the border with China.
“The position near the Chinese border acts as a potential deterrent to a pre-emptive strike that might impinge on Chinese security equities,” said Victor Cha, a senior vice president and North Korea expert at the CSIS.
The location also allows Pyongyang to keep its most prized weapons far from South Korea’s stealth jets and conventional missiles, the range and destructive power of which have increased in recent years to target the underground facilities.
Building activities at Hoejung-ni and the nearby Yeongjeo-dong facility were first reported in 2018. But the new report claims to be the first to confirm Hoejung-ni as an ICBM base. The researchers also used new satellite imagery to provide updated details on entrances to the underground facilities, support buildings and hardened drive-through concrete shelters where missiles are armed and fueled.
Satellite views of the Hoejung-ni missile operating base, here in February 2010.Credit...CSIS/Beyond Parallel/Maxar 2022
The same missile operating base in October 2020.Credit...CSIS/Beyond Parallel/Maxar 2022
And finally, the Hoejung-ni missile operating base as it looked last month.Credit...CSIS/Beyond Parallel/Maxar 2022
“North Korea doesn’t have a strong air force or air defense system, so the best way for the country to protect its missiles is to conceal them in underground facilities,” said Shin Jong-woo, a senior analyst at the Korea Defense Security Forum in Seoul. “When it launches missiles, its launcher vehicles will spread out from these bases to their launching positions.”
The Significance of North Korea’s Missile Tests
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U.N. resolutions. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula started rising in 2017, when North Korea tested three intercontinental ballistic missiles and conducted a nuclear test. The United Nations imposed sanctions, and Pyongyang stopped testing nuclear and long-range missiles for a time.
North Korea began taking its military assets deep underground in 1962 after it suffered devastating losses from superior American air power during the 1950-53 Korean War. U.S. and South Korean officials estimate there are now 6,000 to 8,000 underground facilities in North Korea, enhancing the country’s ability to endure surprise attacks.
Some have been dug under the northern slopes of the rugged mountains facing China, making it harder for American and South Korean warplanes to target their entrances without provoking Beijing. During the Korean War, when the American-led United Nations forces pushed their way up the Korean Peninsula toward China, Mao Zedong sent troops streaming across the border to turn the tide of the conflict.
South Korea said the North’s Strategic Force command has added four regiments since 2018, for a total of 13. All four — including one based in Hoejung-ni — were reported to be located near the border with China.
The location of Pyongyang’s nuclear missiles is among the most tightly guarded secrets within the North Korean military. In 2017, the Pentagon told Congress that the only way to “locate and destroy — with complete certainty — all components of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs” would be through a ground invasion.
Finding the underground facilities has been a key challenge for American and South Korean military planners for decades, because they are hard to spot by satellite. Some are built as decoys. Others may be hidden under ordinary houses.
An image provided by North Korean state media of Kim Jong-un watching the launch of a Hwasong-15 missile at an undisclosed location in November 2017.
“An underground facility in North Korea is so tightly guarded that soldiers who work there can have access to their assigned area only, so it’s extremely hard to get a blueprint of the place,” Maj. Park Sung-man, an officer at the South Korean Army’s Special Warfare Command, said in a paper published in 2015.
What little data that is available on North Korea’s weapons development can come from unexpected sources.
In April 2019, a pro-North Korean website boasted that nuclear missiles launched from train cars rolling out of tunnels — like in the old Soviet Union — would be another potent addition to the North’s growing arsenal. In a first, the country launched two missiles from a train car last September and another pair last month.
North Korea is crisscrossed with rail lines going through numerous tunnels that provide cover from spy satellites. While most of the country’s rail lines are electric, its military railways run diesel locomotives.
The country recently switched from electricity to diesel engines to power the Haesan-Manpo railway, a 156-mile rail line that runs near the border with China, according to the pro-North Korean website. The Haesan-Manpo line goes straight through Hoejung-ni.
7. North holds national gathering without leader Kim Jong-un
Wednesday
February 9, 2022
North holds national gathering without leader Kim Jong-un
The 6th session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) takes place from Sunday to Monday at the Mansudae Assembly Hall in Pyongyang, attended by senior ruling Workers’ Party and Cabinet officials, the North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported. [YONHAP]
North Korea convened a rare gathering of its national legislature on Sunday and Monday to decide on a budget and national projects for the year without the country’s leader Kim Jong-un present, according to state media Tuesday.
The 6th session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) took place over two days at the Mansudae Assembly Hall in Pyongyang and was attended by senior ruling Workers’ Party and Cabinet officials, the North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported.
However, contrary to earlier anticipation, the meeting did not result in any messages directed at the United States or South Korea.
State media reports of the gathering, which was scheduled at a plenary session of the standing committee of the SPA held in December last year, were awaited by observers of the secretive regime to see if it might use the occasion to hint at the direction of its foreign and military policy amid a slew of seven cruise and ballistic missile tests since early January.
While the body largely functions as a rubber-stamp legislature for decisions already made by the Workers’ Party Politburo, its sessions have been used as a platform for messages to the North’s foreign foes.
At the first meeting of the 14th SPA in April 2019, Kim said he was willing to hold the third U.S.-North Korea summit and then delivered a speech on the second day of the 5th meeting where he declared his intention to restore communication channels with Seoul.
He has also used the SPA platform to express his distrust of the United States and showed readiness to continue pursuing nuclear and missile development.
However, the 6th session of the legislature appears to have focused on more mundane matters.
According to the KCNA, delegates at the SPA session decided to increase the 2022 budget for “emergency epidemic preventative projects” by 33 percent compared to that for 2021, while vowing to ramp up efforts to prevent the spread of Covid-19 and to treat it as a “top priority of state affairs.”
“The SPA session appears to have mainly dealt with adopting budgetary and legal measures to support projects in 2022, which were announced at the country's party plenary meeting last year,” an official at the South Korean Unification Ministry told reporters.
Delegates at the SPA session also approved a budget that earmarks 15.9 percent of the total state expenditure to bolster the country’s military capabilities.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
8. North agrees to increase 'strategic cooperation' with Russia
Wednesday
February 9, 2022
North agrees to increase 'strategic cooperation' with Russia
A photo released by the Korean Central News Agency of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un shaking hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Vladivostok in the Russian Far East on April 25, 2019, during their summit. [YONHAP]
North Korea has agreed to increase "strategic cooperation" with Russia, raising the specter of the formation of an anti-U.S. bloc at a time of increased tensions between Washington and Moscow over Ukraine.
According to the North Korean Foreign Ministry, Rim Chon-il, the vice foreign minister in charge of relations with Moscow, met with Russian Ambassador Aleksandr Matsegora on Monday to discuss bilateral relations and common interests.
“The two sides exchanged opinions on [North] Korea-Russia relations and regional and international affairs, which are of great interest, and have decided to further strengthen strategic cooperation between the two countries in the future,” the North’s Foreign Ministry said on Wednesday.
While the ministry did not specify the exact topics discussed between Rim and Matsegora, it is likely that their conversation touched on the revival of trade between Russia and the North, which until recently maintained an almost complete self-imposed blockade on overland trade since it closed its borders in January 2020 in response to the first reported outbreak of Covid-19 in China.
The meeting follows on a Feb. 3 meeting between Shin Hong-chol, the North Korean ambassador to Moscow, and Aleksey Chekunkov, minister for the development of the Russian Far East and Arctic, where the two sides also discussed bilateral trade relations, according to the Russian ministry.
After a near-decade of deteriorating relations between the Soviet Union — later the Russian Federation — and the North, beginning with the premiership of the last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and continuing with first Russian President Boris Yelstin, relations between Moscow and Pyongyang improved after current President Vladimir Putin first took office in 1999.
Although Russia joined the other four permanent members of the United Nations Security Council — the United States, China, Britain and France — in imposing sanctions on North Korea for conducting its first nuclear test in May 2009, the country has also opposed the use of force against the recalcitrant regime and more recent sanctions proposals forwarded by the United States.
Dmitry Polyanskiy, Russia’s deputy ambassador to the United Nations, on Tuesday slammed additional sanctions against Pyongyang as creating a “toxic atmosphere” and impeding dialogue with Pyongyang, while also linking them with the threat of U.S. sanctions against his own country for its military build-up along the border with Ukraine.
While Polyanskiy did not directly mention tensions over Ukraine, he denounced "unilateral" measures that hurt peace efforts and interfere with the sovereignty of nations, such as in Syria, Belarus, Cuba, Venezuela, Iran, Afghanistan, Burma and Mali.
The Russian envoy was joined in his opposition to additional sanctions by China's ambassador to the United Nations Zhang Jun, who said that such measures have "serious humanitarian consequences."
That argument was disputed by Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, who said that North Korea's dire economic situation was the country's own fault.
“The number one barrier to sending humanitarian assistance into the DPRK is the DPRK self-imposed border closures, not international sanctions," Thomas-Greenfield said, referring to the North by the acronym of its official name, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
9. Chinese Embassy rebuts public criticism over 'hanbok' at Beijing Olympics ceremony
Chinese Embassy rebuts public criticism over 'hanbok' at Beijing Olympics ceremony | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Feb. 9 (Yonhap) -- The Chinese Embassy here issued a rare public statement in response to fury among South Koreans over the "appropriation" of "hanbok," the traditional Korean attire, and deepening anti-China sentiment.
A woman, dressed in hanbok, appeared during last week's opening ceremony of the Beijing Winter Olympics, representing an ethnic minority of China, called "joseonjok." She was part of those representing 56 ethnic groups of China carrying the Chinese national flag into the stadium.
The scene, broadcast worldwide, sparked uproar among many South Koreans who view it as demonstrating China's longtime attempts to distort shared history and steal Korean culture, including their signature dish, kimchi, as well as hanbok. Local online sites often used by the younger generation, in particular, have been flooded with messages criticizing China for trying to "loot" Korean culture.
The embassy rebutted the latest hanbok-related accusations and defended the depiction of hanbok during the Olympic event. It described such accusations as nonsense.
"It is their desire and right for representatives of each ethnic group in China to attend an international sports competition and the major national event of the Beijing Winter Olympics, wearing their traditional costumes," the embassy's spokesperson said in a statement Tuesday.
The official stressed that the joseonjok in China and Koreans, both in the South and the North, have the same "lineage" and common traditional culture, including clothing.
China respects Korea's historical and cultural traditions, the official added, expressing hope that "The South Korean side will also respect the emotions of China's ethnic minorities, including joseokjok." In Korean, joseon means an ancient Korean dynasty and jok means tribe.
Meanwhile, a top U.S. Embassy official expressed his own view on hanbok in public.
"What comes to mind when you think of Korea? Kimchi, K-Pop, K-dramas…and of course Hanbok," Christopher Del Corso, charge d'affaires ad interim at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, tweeted Tuesday under the hashtag of #OriginalHanbokFromKorea, coupled with photos of himself wearing hanbok.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
10. North Korea No Longer Wants America's Attention
We should all take these words to heart. But is north Korea an intelligence failure, a policy failure, or a strategy failure?
Excerpt:
North Korea continues to humble the intellects of those who study it. Donald Gregg, who served as CIA station chief in South Korea, called North Korea “the longest-running intelligence failure in the history of the U.S.
Is this really the decision Kim made and does it point the regime's way forward?
Excerpts:
But while the outside world was enthralled by the usual North Korean intrigue, Kim Jong-un made an important foreign policy decision.
Kim Jong-un said during a parliamentary meeting in September, “The international relations have been reduced to the structure of ‘neo-Cold War.’” The wording, embedded in a long diatribe blaming the United States for its “hostile policy,” didn’t get much notice. But it was a significant statement. It indicates North Korea’s designation of the current state of world affairs as a new “Cold War.” And that designation came directly from the regime’s highest leader. Period.
North Korea No Longer Wants America's Attention
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People walk past a television screen showing a news broadcast with footage of a North Korean missile test in Seoul in January, after North Korea fired an "unidentified projectile" in the country's sixth apparent weapons test this year.
Jung Yeon-je / AFP / Getty Images
About the author: Seong-Hyon Lee is a senior fellow at the George H. W. Bush Foundation for U.S.-China Relations and a visiting scholar at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies.
It’s easy to think of North Korea’s latest raft of missile tests as another attempt to get the attention of the United States. That’s not the case. The usual frame of analysis on North Korea’s behavior needs an update as North Korea now has a new foreign policy strategy.
North Korea has conducted seven missile tests in the new year, including an intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of reaching U.S. territory Guam and the U.S. military base in Okinawa, Japan. Guam is home to U.S. military posts hosting long-range bombers and submarine squadrons.
North Korea continues to humble the intellects of those who study it. Donald Gregg, who served as CIA station chief in South Korea, called North Korea “the longest-running intelligence failure in the history of the U.S.
North Korea has become dinner-table topic that fascinates popular imagination with a cartoonish depiction of its obese leader in an impoverished nation, who rides on nuclear warheads. Stories of North Korean spies, money-laundering, a “pleasure squad” of young females to satisfy Dear Leader’s libido, not to mention, murder, abduction, gulags, and even the state-of-the-art cyber-hacking, have since grabbed Hollywood’s attention.
But while the outside world was enthralled by the usual North Korean intrigue, Kim Jong-un made an important foreign policy decision.
Kim Jong-un said during a parliamentary meeting in September, “The international relations have been reduced to the structure of ‘neo-Cold War.’” The wording, embedded in a long diatribe blaming the United States for its “hostile policy,” didn’t get much notice. But it was a significant statement. It indicates North Korea’s designation of the current state of world affairs as a new “Cold War.” And that designation came directly from the regime’s highest leader. Period.
Just like in China, where the top leader’s words such as “Chinese Dream” or “Common Prosperity” carry national significance, the North Korean leader’s phrasing is meaningful. Kim’s diagnosis of the state of the world means a new direction in Pyongyang’s foreign policy. If he sees the current state of the world as a new Cold War, he needs a new strategy that fits new circumstances. And North Korea already had such a strategy, one that proved successful during the previous Cold War period: It became close to China. China’s coaxing played a role too.
Kim Jong-un and Chinese leader Xi Jinping held five rounds of summits in the 2018-2019 period, during which Xi characterized the two socialist countries’ relationship as “sealed in blood,” and as close as the “lips and teeth”—the two most iconic phrases from the Cold War era to denote the China-North Korea relationship.
Importantly, with its new Cold War playbook, North Korea no longer sees the U.S. as its primary strategic focus. In the past, North Korea’s foreign policy behaviors, including its various provocations, were understood as an attempt to get the attention of the world’s sole superpower, the United States. Bluntly put, Washington was North Korea’s Plan A, of utmost strategic priority, while China, North Korea’s Cold War neighbor, was relegated to North Korea’s Plan B, of lesser significance.
The table has been turned around. China is now North Korea’s Plan A. China can meet North Korea’s needs. China’s formidable economic rise guarantees North Korea’s economic survival. The U.S.-China rivalry, which has now expanded into ideological territory, will make the socialist regime in Pyongyang feel more secure by leaning toward Beijing. So will China’s tectonic military advance. By aligning itself closely with China, North Korea has much to gain in its economic, security, ideological survival. China is North Korea’s new darling. It has money. It has power. It has the same ideological pedigree.
Contrary to the popular imagination, North Korea, now with its new strategic line, expects little from the U.S., in any formulation of nuclear negotiation vs. economic aid. That’s a page from yesterday’s strategy. Rather, North Korea is going its own way, according to its new long-term strategic plan script. North Korea is one of the few countries in the world that stand to gain significantly from the Cold War. It’s like a virus that is optimally designed for these conditions. North Korea welcomes the new Cold War. And it wants it to last long.
Looking ahead, as the U.S.-China rivalry deepens, China will shield North Korea from international economic sanctions and will tolerate North Korea’s nuclear and missile improvement, as long as North Korea’s armament is aimed at the United States and its allies. With the Cold War set in, Pyongyang and Beijing have resolved any strategic ambiguity.
The new situation today should provoke soul-searching in a Biden administration that has been neglecting the North Korean issue since the Inauguration.
Guest commentaries like this one are written by authors outside the Barron’s and MarketWatch newsroom. They reflect the perspective and opinions of the authors. Submit commentary proposals and other feedback to ideas@barrons.com.
11. Is Korea Heading Toward a Political Crossroads?
The author's bias is obvious with his use of "American militarism."
Excerpts:
A lot may ride on the next presidential election in South Korea. A conservative victory would automatically give the Biden administration everything it wants. Yoon has explicitly stated his intention to ally closely with U.S. militarism. A win by Lee Jae-myung offers more hope.
Lee promises to chart a more independent path than Moon. It remains to be seen if he can follow through, given the certainty of fierce opposition by Washington. Progressives in South Korea face a twofold struggle in the months ahead: pressing their government to improve inter-Korean relations and blocking being dragooned into the U.S. anti-China military machine. At the heart of both issues is resistance to U.S. encroachment upon South Korean sovereignty. It will not be an easy struggle, but it is a necessary one.
:
Is Korea Heading Toward a Political Crossroads?
South Koreans go to the polls on March 9 to elect a new president, who will assume office two months later. At a time when U.S.-North Korean relations are at an impasse, and the Biden administration is building an aggressive anti-China alliance, much may rest on the outcome.
The two candidates, who are currently running neck-and-neck in opinion polls, present a stark contrast. Lee Jae-myung of the ruling Democratic Party advocates South Korea taking the lead on inter-Korean relations, in contrast to President Moon Jae-in’s unwillingness to adopt any measure that would elicit Washington’s disapproval. “In succeeding the Moon Jae-in administration, the Lee Jae-myung government should act as a more independent and active mediator and problem solver,” Lee announced late last year. [1] That will come as a welcome change in direction if it comes to fruition.
Lee is also disinclined to accede to U.S. demands to join the anti-China campaign, questioning why South Korea should be forced to choose between China, its leading trading partner, and the U.S., with whom it has a military alliance. “I think the situation is coming where we can make decisions independently, putting our national interests first. Any thinking that we have to choose between the two is a very disgraceful approach,” Lee argues. [2]
If Lee is serious about changing course, he will be steering into strong headwinds. South Korea is such a politically polarized society that Lee cannot count on broad-based domestic support. Furthermore, his party will need to win a substantial majority in the National Assembly for Lee to adopt a more independent policy. In addition, the nation’s security and military establishments are hardly likely to countenance a change in the relationship with Washington. The United States, for its part, has an arsenal of economic and diplomatic weapons at its disposal to keep a wayward nation in line. Only time will tell if Lee has the inclination and determination to try and overcome such obstacles.
Lee’s conservative opponent, Yoon Seok-youl of the inaptly-named People Power Party, takes a hardline position on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK – the official name for North Korea), including talking about the option of launching a preemptive strike. [3] Yoon also prioritizes the military alliance with the United States and favors joining Washington’s “global coalition” confronting China. [4] “The U.S. is our ally,” Yoon asserts, “while China is a partner. And a partnership is based on mutual respect. China is North Korea’s key ally. Isn’t North Korea our main enemy? We cannot make an alliance with a country that is allied with our main enemy.” [5]
It is no mystery which candidate the Biden administration would prefer to deal with. Yoon’s stated policies align perfectly with those of Washington.
President Moon Jae-in missed opportunities to improve inter-Korean relations by continually deferring to the United States. In regard to reducing U.S.-DPRK tensions, Moon advocates an end-of-war declaration. Combat in the Korean War came to a halt in 1953 with an armistice agreement, so technically speaking, a state of war still exists. Moon regards that unfinished business as a destabilizing situation that can be resolved by all parties signing an end-of-war declaration to “mark a pivotal point of departure,” which would lead to “irreversible progress in denuclearization and usher in an era of complete peace.” [6]
South Korean officials have been engaged in talks with their counterparts in the United States, China, and North Korea on the subject of a peace declaration for some time now. Moon believes “in principle” that “everybody agrees to the declaration,” although he noted that the DPRK needs to see the U.S. withdraw its hostile policy. [7] In other words, no party has explicitly rejected the proposal outright, although South Korea has yet to come to an agreement with the United States on its wording.
According to Moon, “If North Korea takes certain measures, the end-of-war declaration would be a political statement that would announce that the longstanding hostile relations between Pyongyang and Washington had ended.” [8] Note that action is required from only one side, while no change in behavior is asked of the United States.
Moon has also stated that an end-of-war declaration would be “the starting point to discuss the peace treaty.” [9]However, a peace treaty is a nonstarter in the current U.S. political environment, as it would require approval by a two-thirds majority in the Senate and ratification by President Biden.
The protracted wrangling over the declaration’s wording suggests that American officials have taken note of Yoon’s strong showing in the South Korean opinion polls and concluded that they need only drag their feet until getting a partner more to their liking. At the very least, it indicates that the Biden administration is intensely focused on wordsmithing to ensure that nothing in the final draft of a peace declaration could be misconstrued to suggest that anything should change.
Too much can be made of the claim that a technical state of war is automatically destabilizing. Failure to sign a peace treaty is not a unique historical phenomenon. In a more recent example, the Soviet Union and Japan never signed a peace treaty after World War II. However, a peace declaration was agreed to in 1956 as an interim measure. Technically, then, Russia and Japan remain in a state of war yet are hardly likely to engage in combat. Talks are currently underway regarding a peace treaty. [10]
Conversely, there is nothing inherently transformative in being officially at peace with a hostile party. Cuba and Venezuela, for example, are formally at peace with the United States yet are subjected to unrelenting sanctions, economic blockade, and destabilization campaigns aimed at regime change.
The risk in placing so much emphasis on an end-of-war declaration alone is that Moon may inadvertently be reinforcing the already entrenched U.S. view that it need not offer North Korea anything substantive in exchange for denuclearization.
It is difficult to imagine what mechanism could metamorphose a piece of paper acknowledging that combat ended in 1953 into Moon’s envisioned “era of complete peace.” Moreover, U.S. hostility toward the DPRK is driven by regional geopolitical objectives, which a peace declaration cannot alter.
As a purely symbolic measure, a peace declaration is not worthless, but it would need to be accompanied by a change in U.S. attitude to hold any value. Otherwise, a symbol at variance with action is drained of any meaning. Indeed, what significance would such a symbol have as the United States continues to wage siege warfare against North Korea in the form of sanctions designed to impose economic ruin, hardship, and hunger?
Asia specialist Tim Beal believes the number one problem with an end-of-war declaration is “that the U.S. is still waging war – sanctions, military exercises, practicing invasion, and so forth. And it gives no indication of actually wanting to stop any of these.” [11]
The sustained effort that Moon has invested in promoting a peace declaration may have been better spent on advocating real change as a path to peace. However, it must be noted how so much of the Washington elite recoils at the prospect of granting North Korea even a symbolic diplomatic crumb. There is a deeply ingrained belief that the only acceptable formula for negotiations is for the DPRK to surrender everything while getting nothing in return. Perhaps Moon’s devotion to a peace declaration is based partly on the realization that the United States is unwilling to offer North Korea anything meaningful in exchange for denuclearization, so more cannot be expected.
While South Korean officials have discussed the subject of a peace declaration with their counterparts in the north, the impetus and enthusiasm for the proposal essentially come from the former side. Indeed, Moon’s narrow focus on a peace declaration resolutely ignores what North Koreans say they need.
The DPRK is under siege, and consequently, its officials are looking for something more concrete from the United States. They certainly have not minced words on the subject. Kim Myong Gil, North Korea’s chief negotiator during talks with Trump administration officials, was quite direct: “If the U.S. believes that it can lure us to the table with secondary issues, such as an end-of-war declaration – which can instantly end up as garbage depending on the political situation – and the establishment of a liaison office, instead of presenting fundamental solutions to withdraw its hostile policy against North Korea, which interferes with our right to survival and development, there will never be any hope for a solution.” [12]
Last September, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Ri Thae Song reiterated that position when he termed an end-of-war declaration premature. “Nothing will change as long as the political circumstances around the DPRK remain unchanged and the U.S. hostile policy is not shifted, although the termination of the war is declared hundreds of times.” Ri added, “We have already clarified our official stand that the declaration of the termination of the war is not a ‘present’ and it can become a mere scrap of paper in a moment upon changes in situations.” [13]
Biden administration officials repeatedly announce that the U.S. has no hostile intent toward the DPRK while showering that nation with invective and strangling it economically. U.S. State Department spokesperson Ned Price says that “specific proposals” have been made to North Korea. [14] Although nothing is publicly known about the nature of the proposals, the lack of response from the North Koreans would seem to reveal that the U.S. is sticking to its customary approach of offering diplomatic trinkets in exchange for demanding unilateral disarmament.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying advocates a more viable approach to resuming talks. “We believe under the current circumstances, the key to breaking the stalemate and restarting dialogue is taking seriously the DPRK’s legitimate concerns. The U.S. should avoid repeating empty slogans, but rather show its sincerity by presenting an appealing plan for dialogue. It is imperative to invoke the rollback terms of the Security Council’s DPRK-related resolutions as soon as possible and make necessary adjustments to relevant sanctions, especially those relating to provisions on the humanitarian and livelihood aspects.” [15]
In October, China and Russia submitted a draft resolution at the United Nations to drop economic sanctions that target North Korea’s population, in recognition of the nation’s continued adherence to its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range ballistic missile tests. [16] Chinese U.N. envoy Wang Qun explained, “Obviously, the crux of the deadlock in the DPRK-U.S. dialogue is that the denuclearization measures taken by the DPRK have not received due attention and the legitimate and reasonable concerns of the DPRK have not been properly addressed.” [17] Predictably, the U.S. side reacted with outrage, and U.S. Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield instead called upon U.N. member states to “ramp up the implementation of the sanctions.” [18]
Rather than signal a softer attitude, on December 10, the Biden administration piled on more sanctions, targeting several individuals and North Korea’s animation firm SEK Studio. Also sanctioned was a Chinese animation company for doing business with SEK Studio. [19] According to Go Myong-hyun, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, the Biden administration “is sending a very strong message to North Korea and the rest of the world that the U.S. government is going to really not leave any stone unturned and make sure that the North Koreans don’t get even a single cent of profit by trading with the outside world.” [20]
The Biden administration followed that action by naming Philip Goldberg as ambassador to South Korea. His selection appears to indicate that Washington remains wedded to the punishment approach. During the Obama administration, Goldberg served as coordinator for implementing sanctions on North Korea. That position led him to travel abroad and meet with foreign political and banking officials to eliminate trade and financial operations with North Korea. Philosophically, he aligns well with an aggressive foreign policy. As ambassador to Bolivia, he was expelled from the country for meeting with the right-wing opposition. [21] In his nomination hearing for ambassador to Colombia at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2019, Goldberg promised to support the U.S. campaign to overthrow the government of Venezuela: “If confirmed, I will work with Colombia on efforts to restore democracy to Venezuela.” He added that “the United States government has made clear that all options remain on the table while it continues to engage on all diplomatic and economic fronts to support Interim Venezuelan President Juan Guaido and the Venezuelan people’s pursuit of freedom.” [22] The new ambassador is not a man who can be expected to challenge conventional thinking regarding the DPRK.
The DPRK has evidently concluded that the United States is unwilling to abandon its hostile policy and has recently stepped up weapons testing. Its demolition of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site and a self-imposed moratorium on long-range ballistic missile testing yielded no corresponding measure from the United States, aside from a temporary reduction in the size of military exercises that rehearse the bombing and invasion of the DPRK and infiltration of commando teams to assassinate North Korean officials.
Meanwhile, the South Korean military is accelerating technological upgrades and has seen its budget increase by an average of 7.4 percent each year of the Moon administration. [23] The United States, for its part, is expanding its military presence in the Asia-Pacific, and regularly launches intercontinental ballistic missiles, most recently on two occasions last year. [24]
The North Koreans feel compelled to modernize their military capability in response to U.S. and South Korean arms advancements. As a result, an arms race is underway, in which the targeted side’s efforts are deemed illegitimate. DPRK leader Kim Jong Un emphasizes that “recourse to arms against the fellow countrymen must not be repeated on this land.” He adds, “We are not talking about a war with someone,” but “are building up war deterrent…to prevent the war itself and to safeguard the sovereignty of our state.” [25] And that is the crux of U.S. concern. A small targeted nation able to defend itself sets a bad precedent and limits options.
Western media and officials habitually characterize each North Korean missile test as a “threat” or “provocation,” uniquely so, in that other nations performing similar tests prompt no condemnation. India, like North Korea, is a non-member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and its launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile on October 27 last year was greeted by silence. [26] No doubt, the Times of India’s description of the launch as “a stern signal to China” came as a welcome development in Washington. [27] The two other nuclear powers that are non-NPT members are Israel and Pakistan, both of which have ballistic missile programs that are deemed of no concern by U.S. officials and media. [28]
There is a double standard at play. Only North Korea is forbidden by the United Nations from testing and is punished by economic sanctions so crushing as to amount to a war on the entire population. Even military tests that are not prohibited, such as the recent cruise missile and hypersonic missile launches, are denounced. Using inflammatory language, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield recently described North Korea’s tests as “attacks” and promised to “continue to ramp up the pressure on the North Koreans.” [29] U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres rebuked the DPRK for its recent launch of a Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missile, charging that it not only violated U.N. sanctions but also “the DPRK’s announced moratorium.” [30] That was an outright falsehood, as North Korea’s self-imposed moratorium on testing applies only to long-range ballistic missiles.
Why is North Korea singled out for punishment? According to Thomas-Greenfield, it is because that nation is “a serious threat to our peace and security and to the globe.” [31] That language is echoed by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who called the DPRK “a source of danger and obviously a threat to us and our partners.” [32] That American officials can make such pronouncements without being met by derision is a tribute to the efficacy of U.S. propaganda. Since the Korean War came to a halt nearly seven decades ago, the DPRK has been at peace. Yet, in the decades that followed the Second World War, the United States has bombed and invaded numerous countries, undermined and toppled foreign governments, spread its military bases across the globe to threaten other nations, and performed drone strike murders of thousands of civilians. And the U.S. is currently trying to stoke war fever against Russia. Yet, the common perception in the West turns reality on its head.
Regardless of whether or not a peaceful end to the Korean War is declared, the United States has broader plans for South Korea. The Biden administration’s central foreign policy objective is to build alliances with Asian nations to ensure U.S. domination over China.
South Korea’s geographical location places it on the frontline of the Biden administration’s fanatical anti-China project, and the Koreans are assigned the role of “force multiplier” in that effort. The South Koreans are not regarded as having a choice in the matter. Koreans are expected to support the U.S. confrontation with China and any military adventure in the Asia-Pacific that the U.S. may choose to undertake. According to an American military official, the Republic of Korea (ROK) will act as “a net provider of security not just on the peninsula but across the region.” [33]
Last May, Biden and Moon issued a joint statement, which pledged that “the U.S.-ROK alliance will play an increasingly global role” and claimed that the two nations’ relationship “extends far beyond the Korean Peninsula.” Moon also promised to align his country’s policy with “the United States’ vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific.” [34]
In December, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin met in Seoul with his South Korean counterpart, Suh Wook. Austin announced that “we discussed ways to broaden our alliance’s focus to address issues of regional concern.” Using the familiar code words for anti-China hostility, Austin stated that “we emphasize our shared commitment to the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.” In addition, Austin reported that he and Suh “agreed to explore ways to expand and enhance regional security cooperation and capacity building.” [35]
If an end-of-war declaration is made the vehicle for bringing peace to the peninsula, the main roadblock, as Korea specialist Simone Chun sees it, is U.S. containment policy and the practice of “pressuring allies for U.S. strategic interests.” Under the Moon administration, “South Korea’s security policy has been subordinated to the United States” and “South Korea does not have strategic insight to properly respond to the U.S. policy of containment with respect to China.” Chun proposes supplementing an end-of-war declaration with a revival of the Sunshine Policy as offering a potentially more promising path to reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. [36] The Sunshine Policy, launched during the presidential term of Kim Dae-jung and continued by his successor Roh Moo-hyun, redirected inter-Korean relations from confrontation to cooperation. However, since Roh’s term ended in 2008, no subsequent South Korean president has followed suit. In Chun’s proposal, South Korea does not need to play a passive role and defer to U.S. intransigence. Instead, it can initiate its own program.
It cannot be overlooked that South Korean progressives and U.S. imperialism have divergent goals. Their class and national interests are at opposite poles. If positive change comes, it will be driven by Koreans. As Tim Beal points out, “Peace undercuts the rationale for U.S. forward position in East Asia. It undercuts the rationale for all those bases, the bases in South Korea, the bases in Japan, and so forth. And it undercuts the rationale for their utilization of [South Korean] military power.” The problem is “that peace in Korea would hamper the containment of China. That’s how they look at it.” [37]
A lot may ride on the next presidential election in South Korea. A conservative victory would automatically give the Biden administration everything it wants. Yoon has explicitly stated his intention to ally closely with U.S. militarism. A win by Lee Jae-myung offers more hope.
Lee promises to chart a more independent path than Moon. It remains to be seen if he can follow through, given the certainty of fierce opposition by Washington. Progressives in South Korea face a twofold struggle in the months ahead: pressing their government to improve inter-Korean relations and blocking being dragooned into the U.S. anti-China military machine. At the heart of both issues is resistance to U.S. encroachment upon South Korean sovereignty. It will not be an easy struggle, but it is a necessary one.
Notes.
[1] Thomas Maresca, “South Korea Presidential Hopeful Seeks Closer Ties with Pyongyang,” UPI, November 25, 2021.
[2] Kang Seung-woo, “’Choosing Between US, China is Disgraceful,’ Ruling Party’s Presidential Candidate Says,” Korea Times, December 30, 2021.
[3] Jung Da-min, “Controversy Rises Over Yoon’s Preemptive Strike Remarks,” Korea Times, January 13, 2022.
[4] Lee Haye-ah, “Yoon Says Firm S. Korea-U.S. Alliance Ever More Important,” Yonhap, November 12, 2021.
[5] Lee Ji-yoon, “Yoon Seok-youl Hints at Possibility of Ditching Inter-Korean Military Agreement,” Korea Herald, November 18, 2021.
[8] “South Korea’s Moon Optimistic About End to Korean War,” BBC News, October 12, 2018.
[9] Lee Ji-yoon, “Moon Holds Rare Inflight News Briefing,” Korea Herald, September 24, 2021.
[10] “Future Russia-Japan Peace Treaty Must Reflect Outlook for Cooperation – Lavrov,” TASS, January 14, 2022.
[11] “A Geopolitical Perspective of Biden’s North Korea Policy,” JNC TV, January 2, 2022.
[12] Jeong Je-hyug, “NK Kim Myong-gil, “Beigun Conveyed Wish to Meet for Talks in December. Willing to Sit with the U.S.,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, November 15, 2019.
[13] “Press Statement of Vice Foreign Minister Ri Thae Song,” KCNA, September 24, 2021.
[14] Chaewon Chung, “US Made ‘Specific Proposals’ to the DPRK in Latest Attempt to Engage Regime,” NK News, October 14, 23021.
[15] “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on September 30, 2021,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, September 30, 2021.
[16] Chad O’Carroll, “China and Russia Submit Proposal to Ease UN Sanctions on North Korea: Sources,” NK News, October 30, 2021.
Michelle Nichols, “China, Russia Revive Push to Lift U.N. Sanctions on North Korea,” Reuters, November 1, 2021.
[17] “Invoking Rollback Terms of DPRK-related Resolutions at Early Date Effective to Break Deadlock: Chinese Envoy,” Xinhua, September 25, 2021.
[20] Chad O’Carroll, “US to Impose New Sanctions Against North Korea for First Time Under Biden,” NK News, December 10, 2021.
[21] “Bolivian Leader Doesn’t Regret Expelling U.S. Ambassador,” CNN, April 22, 2009.
[23] Lami Kim, “A Hawkish Dove? President Moon Jae-in and South Korea’s Military Buildup,” War on the Rocks, September 15, 2021.
Sang-Min Kim, “South Korea Boosts Military,” Arms Control Association, September 21.
Hiroshi Minegishi, “South Korea Beefs Up Military Muscle to Counter Threat from North,” Nikkei Asia, September 14, 2021.
[24] “Minuteman III Test Launch Demonstrates Safe, Reliable Deterrent,” United States Air Force (Air Force Global Strike Command Public Affairs), February 24, 2021.
“Minuteman III Test Launch Showcases Readiness of U.S. Nuclear Force’s Safe, Effective Deterrent,” United States Air Force (Air Force Global Strike Command Public Affairs), August 11, 2021.
[25] “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Commemorative Speech at Defence Development Exhibition,” KCNA, October 12, 2021.
[26] Kelsey Davenport, “India Tests Missile Capable of Reaching China,” Arms Control Association, December 2021.
[27] Rajat Pandit, “In Stern Signal to China, India Tests 5,000-km Range Agni-V”, Times of India, October 28, 2021.
[29] “Transcript: ‘Capehart’ with Linda Thomas-Greenfield, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations,” Washington Post Live, January 18, 2022.
[30] “DPR Korea, UN Chief Condemns Missile Launch as ‘Clear Violation,’ UN News, February 1, 2022.
[31] “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a Press Conference on the March Program of Work and the U.S. Presidency of the UN Security Council,” United States Mission to the United Nations, March 1, 2021.
[32] Hyung-jin Kim and Kim Tong-hyung, “Blinken Urges China to Convince North Korea to Denuclearize,” Associated Press, March 18, 2021.
[33] Jeff Seldin, “US, South Korea Updating War Plans for North Korea,” Voice of America, December 1, 2021.
[36] “A Geopolitical Perspective of Biden’s North Korea Policy,” JNC TV, January 2, 2022.
[37] “A Geopolitical Perspective of Biden’s North Korea Policy,” JNC TV, January 2, 2022.
12. South Korea’s Nuclear Future is a New Election Battleground
The current administration's intent to end ROK reliance on nuclear power has been a big mistake.
South Korea’s Nuclear Future is a New Election Battleground
- Moon’s anti-nuclear policy is being re-evaluated by candidates
- South Korean presidential election is scheduled for March 9
February 8, 2022, 9:47 PM EST
South Korea’s leading presidential candidates are offering diverging visions on the future for nuclear power, though both agree the nation must soften its plans to phase out the power source to meet climate targets.
The front-runner Lee Jae-myung from the ruling Democratic Party doesn’t want any new atomic plants, but is open to operating reactors that are currently under construction. Lee’s top contender Yoon Seok-yeol from the opposition People Power Party, on the other hand, wants nuclear to account for 30% of total energy generation, reversing President Moon Jae-in’s plans to gradually ditch reactors.
Lee Jae-myungPhotographer: SeongJoon Cho/Bloomberg
The candidates are reassessing policies on nuclear power at a time when nations from China to France are moving forward with new plants in the quest for more reliable and less-polluting forms of energy. Since Moon took the reins in 2017, South Korea has adopted a phase-out policy on nuclear energy because of concerns over safety in the wake of Japan’s Fukushima disaster in 2011.
The election is set for March 9. Term restrictions prevent Moon from running again, paving the way for Lee’s candidacy. While the race is too close to call, any outcome could reshape the country’s decarbonization strategy.
The two leading candidates’ varying views “will have more long-term implications on Korea’s nuclear capacity than short term,” said David Kang, a BloombergNEF analyst. “Long-term views on nuclear, however, strongly affect the level of near-term support needed for other zero-carbon technologies such as renewables.”
South Korea aims to reach climate neutrality by 2050 under the Green New Deal, along with its bolstered plans to cut emissions by 40% from 2018 levels by 2030. Still, the Asian nation has been struggling to boost the share of renewable sources, which accounted for less than 8% of total electricity generation in 2020.
Nuclear makes up about 29% of South Korea’s power generation. Under the Moon administration, the installed capacity for nuclear is projected to fall to 19.4 gigawatts by 2034, from the current 23.3 gigawatts.
Besides permanently turning off the nation’s two oldest reactors without extending their planned lifespan, Moon also scrapped projects to build new units, including Shin Hanul No. 3 and 4 reactors. Whether to resume the construction of those units has been a contentious issue, as the project was already under way, costing the nation about 780 billion won ($650 million).
In December, Yoon visited the site where the new Shin Hanul units were supposed to be built during his campaign, following his pledge to push for carbon neutrality by integrating nuclear and renewable energy. Lee also left the door open for resuming the construction of those units, saying the decision should be reconsidered, reflecting public opinion.
Ahn Cheol-sooPhotographer: SeongJoon Cho/Bloomberg
Another presidential candidate, Ahn Cheol-soo, is taking a more aggressive stance on nuclear, supporting small modular reactors, which are expected to be faster, easier, and cheaper to build than conventional nuclear plants.
HERE IS A DETAILED LOOK AT THE TOP TWO CANDIDATES’ ENERGY POLICIES: Lee Jae-myung
- On nuclear, his policies are mostly in line with Moon’s, though Lee takes a more moderate stance toward a reduction, rather than a full phase-out
- Advocates a more ambitious climate target, known as the Nationally Determined Contribution, for 2030, and wants to achieve carbon neutrality faster, by 2040
- Proposes an earlier-than-planned suspension of coal plants and a plan to build an energy highway that utilizes renewable energy
Yoon Seok-yeol
- Pledges to overhaul the current anti-nuclear policy and make the country a major exporter of nuclear equipment and technology, as well as creating jobs through a stronger Korea-U.S. nuclear alliance
- Promises to lower pollution through reducing fossil fuel-based generators by more than 30%, and increase the share of renewables and nuclear during his term
- Says the current climate target should be achieved as planned but the detailed roadmap should be reconsidered, as meeting net-zero is not possible while completely phasing out nuclear
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
