Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“I am 83 years old, and I have come to realize that there is always more in life to learn.”

- Rosa Parks

“You always own the option of having no opinion. There is never any need to get worked up or to trouble your soul about things you can’t control. These things are not asking to be judged by you. Leave them alone.”

- Marcus Aurelius

“...this protracted war will pass through three stages. The first stage covers the period of the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic defensive. The second stage will be the period of the enemy's strategic consolidation and our preparation for the counter-offensive. The third stage will be the period of our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy's strategic retreat.”

- Mao Zedong, Selected Military Writings

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 17 (Putin's War)

2. Russia's War in Ukraine Is How the Soviet Union Finally Ends

3. Russia Is Training Drone Hobbyists to Fight in Ukraine

4. US to hold trade talks with Taiwan, island drills military

5. Americans are paying for slogans on bombs aimed at Russians

6. Deter China through Strength and Confidence

7. Ukraine says fighting 'deadlocked' ahead of visit by U.N. chief

8. The Armed Resistance Against the Taliban Is Still Here

9. Playing With Fire in Ukraine

10. The future world order will be decided by the war over semiconductors

11. FDD | US picks up pace of airstrikes in Somalia

12. Reporters in Gaza have never been free

13. The End of the War on Drugs? Reimagining the US-Colombia Relationship

14. Generation Killed: The Challenges of Routinizing Global Jihad

15. Russia says Ukraine planning 'provocation' at nuclear plant; Kyiv dismisses accusation

16. Estonia says it repelled major cyber attack after removing Soviet monuments

17. RedAlpha Conducts Multi-Year Credential Theft Campaign Targeting Global Humanitarian, Think Tank, and Government Organizations

18. Can think tanks be foreign agents?

19. Stricter social media rules for DoD officials aim to prevent snafus

20. Crimea attacks point to Ukraine’s newest strategy, official says

21. China’s New White Paper on Taiwan: We Ignore It at Our Peril

22. Full Text: The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era

23. How HIMARS and sanctions are choking Russia's weapons trade

24. Putin Is Angry and Thinks U.S. Trying to Prolong Ukraine War

25. US must arm Ukraine now, before it’s too late

26. Will They Fight? Washington Wants to Know.

27. In Ukraine, a Russian mercenary group steps out of the shadows

28. Ukraine seizes the battlefield initiative

29. How Social Justice Became a New Religion

30. Sleepy Greek Port Becomes U.S. Arms Hub, as Ukraine War Reshapes Region

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 17 (Putin's War)

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 17

Aug 17, 2022 - Press ISW

understandingwar.org

Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angela Howard, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 17, 8:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian military leadership is likely increasingly losing confidence in the security of Crimea following recent Ukrainian strikes on Russian military objects in Crimea. Russian sources reported on August 17 that Vice Admiral Viktor Sokolov had replaced Admiral Igor Osipov as the commander of the Crimean-based Black Sea Fleet (BSF).[1] The Russian information space, however, was evidently eager to maintain a high level of secrecy regarding Sokolov’s appointment due to the claimed threat of “terrorist danger” in Sevastopol.[2] Recent Ukrainian strikes (associated with Ukrainian partisans and Ukrainian Armed Forces) on Russian military assets in Crimea, including the headquarters of the BSF in Sevastopol, have likely placed Russian forces on high alert and led to the restructuring of force composition, logistics, and leadership of the Russian grouping in Crimea in order to mitigate the impact of further strikes. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate, for example, reported that Russian forces are relocating dozens of fixed and rotary wing aircraft stationed in forward airfields in Crimea to areas deeper in the Crimean Peninsula and in mainland Russia.[3]

Russian leadership and the Russian nationalist information space have become increasingly invested in framing recent Ukrainian strikes on Russian military assets in Crimea as acts of terrorism in order to shift the information narrative away from Russian violations of international law and calls on the West to designate Russia a state sponsor of terrorism. Russian sources inaccurately described the strikes on the BSF headquarters, an ammunition depot, and the Saki Airbase as acts of terrorism. The Russian-appointed head of occupied Crimea, Sergey Askenov, claimed on August 17 that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) in Crimea had neutralized cells of the Hizb ut-Tahrir organization (an Islamist fundamentalist political organization that has historically been active in Central Asia and in Crimea amongst the Crimean Tatar community and is banned in Russia) in Dzhankoi and Yalta.[4] Aksenov accused the Ukrainian government of coordinating Hizb ut-Tahrir's operations in Crimea without providing any evidence. Russian officials will likely increasingly link Ukrainian partisan attacks against occupied territories with operations conducted by organizations affiliated with Islamist extremism in an attempt to alienate the Ukrainian partisan movement from the international community and undermine Ukraine’s calls to officially designate Russia as a state-sponsor of terrorism. Attacks against legitimate Russian military targets fall well within the purview of legal use of force and are not acts of terrorism, nor is there any evidence to suggest that Islamist extremists conducted these attacks.[5]

Key Takeaways

Russian military leadership is falsely claiming that recent attacks on Russian military objects in Crimea are terrorist attacks to deflect calls to designate Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism.
Russian forces attempted several unsuccessful assaults near the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border in tactically challenging forest areas.
Russian forces continued to unsuccessfully attack settlements southeast of Siversk.
Russian forces launched several assaults northeast and south of Bakhmut, and are likely attempting to improve tactical positions near Horlivka.
Russian forces made limited gains northwest of Donetsk City and near the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast administrative border.
Russian forces are likely preparing to defend their ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Melitopol-Tokmak-Berdyansk triangle by mining settlements on the eastern Zaporizhia Oblast frontline.
Russian federal subjects are continuing to form new volunteer units and advertise contract service while facing recruitment challenges.
Russian occupation authorities are struggling to increase control measures in occupied territories amidst increased partisan activity.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian Troops in the Cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City
Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis
Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces conducted ground attacks northwest of Slovyansk near the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border on August 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attempted to advance near Bohorodychne, about 20km northwest of Slovyansk.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff also noted that Russian forces attempted advances in the vicinity of Mazanikva (22km northwest of Slovyansk) and Novo Dymytrivka (35km northwest of Slovyansk).[7] Russian milbloggers previously indicated that fighting on the Mazanivka-Bohorodychne line, which roughly runs along the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border, has been complicated by the densely forested terrain.[8] Russian forces in this area are likely to continue positional battles within tactically challenging forest areas in order to hold ground against Ukrainian counterattacks. Russian forces additionally continued artillery strikes along the Izyum-Slovyansk line and struck Ukrainian positions and civilian infrastructure in and around Slovyansk and Kramatorsk.[9]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks south of Siversk on August 17. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian troops attempted to advance towards Vesele, about 23km southeast of Siversk.[10] Russian troops also reportedly conducted a ground attack near Spirne, about 20km southeast of Siversk.[11] Russian forces continued air and artillery strikes in the vicinity of Siversk.[12]

Russian forces conducted a series of ground attacks northeast and south of Bakhmut on August 17. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Russian forces are fighting in the Soledar-Bakhmutske area (10km northeast of Bakhmut).[13] Units of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 6th Cossack Regiment continued attempts to consolidate control of the Knauf Gips Donbas gypsum factory on the outskirts of Soledar along the T1302 highway in order to advance southwestward on Bakhmut.[14] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian troops conducted ground assaults in Bilohorivka, about 18km northeast of Bakhmut along the T1302 highway.[15] Russian operations to the northeast of Bakhmut are likely focused on securing control of this segment of the T1302 in order to drive directly on Bakhmut.

Russian forces conducted ground assaults south of Bakhmut in order to improve their tactical positions in this area.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops stopped Russian ground attacks near Mayorsk, Zalizne, and Shumy, which all lie about 25km southwest of Bakhmut on the outskirts of Horlivka.[17] Russian forces are likely conducting limited ground attacks southwest of Bakhmut in order to gain access to the T0513 highway via the T0516 roadway, which runs westward through Horlivka. Russian forces additionally continued fighting near Kodema and Zaitseve, within 15km and 7km south of Bakhmut, respectively.[18]

Russian forces made marginal gains during ground attacks northwest of Donetsk City on August 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops had “partial success” in the direction of Optyne, about 6km northwest of the outskirts of Donetsk City.[19] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) troops reportedly attempted to advance on Nevelske (15km west of Donetsk City) under cover of artillery fire.[20] Russian forces continued to conduct artillery strikes along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline to support efforts to push west of this area.[21]

Russian forces secured incremental gains near the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border southwest of Donetsk City on August 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces had “partial success” in the direction of Novomykhailivka, about 25km southwest of Donetsk City.[22] Russian forces reportedly conducted a ground attack around Vuhledar (45km southwest of Donetsk City), likely in order to bypass the settlement and gain direct access to the local road that runs between Vuhledar and Marinka, which is on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City.[23]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the Kharkiv City axis on August 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces retreated following an attempt to break Ukrainian defensive lines in the direction of Lebyazhe and Bazaliivka, both about 40km southeast of Kharkiv City and further south than prior Russian offensives around Kharkiv City.[24] Ukrainian General Staff reports have not mentioned fighting in these directions in several weeks. Russian forces also conducted remote mining in the Lebyazhne district.[25] The decision to remotely mine Lebyazhne likely aims to disrupt Ukrainian use of the settlement as a base from which to fight Russian forces further east. A Russian outlet Readovka also claimed that Russian forces took control of Stohnii and Baranivka, both less than 10km from the Ukraine-Russia border.[26] Russian forces conducted airstrikes east and south of Kharkiv City, near Staryi Saltiv and Mospanove.[27] Russian forces launched five missiles at Kharkiv City and continued heavy shelling of settlements surrounding Kharkiv City.[28]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces are likely setting conditions to defend their ground lines of communication (GLOCs) between the Tokmak-Melitopol-Berdyansk area, prioritizing their positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast over those on the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces mined Inzhenerne and Ukrainske, both approximately 40km northeast of Tomak and on the T0815 highway to Polohy.[29] The T0815 supports Russian GLOCs from Polohy to Berdyansk and connects to the T0401 highway between Polohy-Tokmak-Melitopol. Russian mining in the northernmost occupied segment of the T0815 indicates that Russian forces are establishing defenses to protect vital GLOCs to Melitopol - a key logistics hub connecting Russian holdings in southern Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson Oblasts - and logistics routes along the Sea of Azov coastline. Russian forces need access to these routes to maintain operations in eastern Kherson Oblast and retain a direct road connection between Rostov-on-Don and occupied southern Ukrainian territories. Russian forces are unlikely to attack from the direction of Ukrainske and Inzhenerne in the near future given their reported mining of those villages.

Russian forces continued to conduct small-scale assaults in northwestern Kherson Oblast on August 17. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully conducted a platoon-size assault and a reconnaissance-in-force operation near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River.[30] Russian forces continued to use aviation to strike Ukrainian positions northwest of Kherson City and near the bridgehead, and fired artillery at 27 unspecified settlements along the Kherson Oblast border with Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts.[31] Satellite imagery shows barge movement on the Dnipro River near Kherson City and locals reportedly stated that Russian forces are working on the barges at a Kherson City shipyard.[32] Russian forces may be attempting to repair and use barges to transport equipment across the Dnipro River, although it is unclear whether the barges the Russians are using will be able to support the transit of heavy equipment across the Dnipro River or whether Ukrainian forces can damage or destroy them once they are in actual use.

Russian forces struck Mykolaiv City and a coastal settlement in Odesa Oblast on August 16 and August 17. The Ukrainian Southern Military Command reported that Russian forces struck Mykolaiv City with S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems.[33] Social media footage showed that Russian missiles hit the Petro Mohyla Black Sea National University, and Russian Telegram channels reposted images of minor damage to the pedestrian side of the Varvarivskyy Bridge in western Mykolaiv City.[34] Russian Tu-22M3 aircraft struck recreational and residential infrastructure in the coastal town of Zatoka, along the railway and road connection to Romania, with Kh-22 missiles.[35]

Ukrainian local officials reported that Russian forces fired tube artillery at Nikopol and 40 rockets from Grad MLRS at Chervonohryhorivka (northeast of Nikopol). Russian Telegram channels claimed that Ukrainian forces shelled near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, but the available social media footage only recorded the sound of an explosion in an unspecified area reportedly near Enerhodar.[36]

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian strongholds and ammunition warehouses in northwestern and northern Kherson Oblast on August 17.[37] Ukrainian officials also reported that partisans conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack near one of the Russian military occupation administration commandant offices in Melitopol.[38]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian regional authorities and security services are continuing to face challenges in recruiting volunteers for Russian operations in Ukraine. The Kurgan Oblast Federal Security Service (FSB) lowered requirements for service in the local border guard department by allowing residents aged 18 to 34 without higher education or military experience to seek employment.[39] The local FSB in Kurgan Oblast is recruiting personnel via the Russian social media platform VK and offering military pension payments as well as a three-million-ruble mortgage program if recruits sign a military contract.[40] Pskov Oblast’s Rosgvardia branch is recruiting personnel of any education level or military experience for military service in Grozny, Chechnya.[41] Russian security services are likely posting misleading advertisements for employment opportunities to recruit more forces for the Russian war in Ukraine, a tactic ISW has previously reported on.[42]

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russian military recruiters are abducting Chechen young men to staff four Chechen volunteer battalions, causing social tensions within the republic.[43] The GUR noted that Chechen residents are expressing discontent with Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov for impressing men into service and forcing Muslim Chechen men to fight a war between predominantly Christian states (Russia and Ukraine).

Local government organizations in Russia are increasing advertisement campaigns to address quota shortages in military service contracts. Residents of Yaroslavl Oblast’s Dzerzhinskiy District received utility bills with military contract service ads at the top of their payment statements.[44] The local utility company noted that local officials ordered the company to include the message at the top of the bill to share the ”prospects” of contract service. Residents of a small village in Tyumen Oblast also shared recruitment posters at a local supermarket, which heavily bolded the offered enlistment payment and benefits.[45] Russian local authorities are likely attempting to distribute recruitment ads in places with high civilian traffic and are targeting financially vulnerable populations in rural villages.

Another Russian federal subject (region) claimed to have formed new volunteer units to deploy to Donbas, but such volunteer units are drawing criticism from some Russian milbloggers. The Republic of Mordovia claimed that it has formed three new volunteer units – Sivazhar, Aralai, and Kaval - and held a farewell ceremony for the deployment of its seventh detachment of 20 volunteers to Donbas.[46] It is unclear at the time of this publication if these volunteer groups are operating in Ukraine, if the units have a significant number of recruits, or if they are undergoing a one-month training period.[47] VK-based milblogger Vasily Petrovich described regionally formed volunteer units as the best way to ”get into a hospital bed or into the grave,” as these units do not have financial support outside of what is provided by their unnamed sponsors.[48]

Russian forces are continuing covert mobilization practices in occupied Luhansk Oblast and are advertising contract services in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Social media video showed Russian servicemen physically restraining a civilian man in Luhansk City, likely in an attempt to force him into a car.[49] Ukrainian officials previously reported that Russian servicemen kidnap men off of the streets to commit them to the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) units.[50] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) held advertising events for contract service at local community centers in Pokrovsk.[51]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Russian forces are struggling to increase control of occupied territories amid fears of increased partisan activity. Several partisan attacks and reports of a Ukrainian counteroffensive have pushed occupation authorities to take more severe and highly visible measures to consolidate administrative control of occupied localities. Ukrainian officials in Kherson Oblast reported that Russian forces abducted Verkhnorohachytskyi District Head Svitlana Korotun on August 16 for refusing to collaborate with Russian occupation authorities.[52] This incident is part of a broader trend of Russian forces seeking to gain legitimacy by compelling collaboration from local authorities while “disappearing” those who refuse to comply. Occupation forces also seek to more closely monitor individual citizens. Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko reported that Russian occupation authorities opened a second filtration point on the eastern side of Mariupol and gathered over 1,300 residents for inspection on August 17.[53] Enerhodar Mayor Dmytro Orlov warned that plain-clothed FSB officers stationed at public, Russian Wi-fi access points monitor private conversations and steal personal data, sometimes leading to the detention of Ukrainian citizens.[54]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://crimea dot ria dot ru/20220817/novyy-komanduyuschiy-chf-predstavlen-v-sevastopole-1124184786.html

[3] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/pislia-ostannikh-podii-v-krymu-rashysty-terminovo-peremishchuiut-svoi-litaky-ta-helikoptery-v-hlyb-pivostrova-ta-na-aerodromy-rf.html

[38] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/08/17/u-melitopoli-prolunav-vybuh-bilya-ligva-okupantiv/; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/419

[39] https://ura dot news/news/1052579116

[40] https://ura dot news/news/1052579116

[41] https://pskov dot bezformata.com/listnews/predlagayut-sluzhbu-po-kontraktu-v-chechne/91601522/

[42] https://riapo dot ru/penza/obshchestvo/v-centre-penzy-otkryt-mobilnyj-punkt-otbora-na-voennuyu-sluzhbu-po-kontraktu; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[43] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/cherez-brak-okhochykh-voiuvaty-okupanty-namahaiutsia-zaluchyty-v-armiiu-hromadian-krain-tsentralnoi-azii.html

[44] https://76 dot ru/text/gorod/2022/08/17/71577989/

[45] https://72 dot ru/text/gorod/2022/08/16/71571950/

[46] https://izvmor dot ru/novosti/obshchestvo/eshhyo-dvadczat-dobrovolczev-iz-mordovii-otpravilis-na-donbass/

[47] https://izvmor dot ru/novosti/obshchestvo/eshhyo-dvadczat-dobrovolczev-iz-mordovii-otpravilis-na-donbass/

understandingwar.org

2. Russia's War in Ukraine Is How the Soviet Union Finally Ends

Excerpts:

Whenever the Russia-Ukraine conflict ends, the dividing line between the two armies may simply become another contested post-Soviet frontier where frequent tension causes periodic violence. Whether Russia wins or loses, the outcome will shift the balance of power within the former Soviet Union, perhaps causing a re-intensification of old disputes with Moldova, Georgia or other states.

The potential for violence in Central Asia remains high, as shown by an anti-government revolt in Kazakhstan, which precipitated Russian intervention earlier, this year. A change of government or a military mutiny in Belarus — neither of which can be excluded due to severe dissatisfaction with Aleksandr Lukashenko’s autocratic regime — could start a fight over that country’s place between Russia and the West.

In early 1992, one American newspaper warned that the troubles caused by the “still-fragmenting, nuclear-armed shards of the world’s last great empire” were only beginning. Even when the present war is over, that empire’s long, violent afterlife will persist.

Russia's War in Ukraine Is How the Soviet Union Finally Ends

Empires — especially the biggest ones — don’t end quickly or peacefully.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-08-17/russia-s-war-in-ukraine-is-how-the-soviet-union-finally-ends?sref=hhjZtX76

ByHal Brands

August 17, 2022 at 9:00 AM EDT

Wars that are caused by people can also be caused by deep historical processes. For proof, look at the fighting in Ukraine. That conflict is the doing of Russian President Vladimir Putin, a ruler determined to reassert Russia’s greatness by destroying an independent Ukraine. Yet it is also part of a bigger story about what happens when empires break up.

The fighting in Ukraine is the latest and worst of the wars fought over the remnants of the Soviet Union, an empire whose death throes continue some thirty years after the union itself ceased to exist. It will not, unfortunately, be the last.

Russia Is Training Drone Hobbyists to Fight in Ukraine

The effort to replenish depleted Russian forces blurs the line between civilians and military combatants.

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

Russia’s heavy losses in Ukraine have forced it to send conscripts and convicts to the front lines. A new center in occupied Ukraine is training Russian military and civilian drone operators for combat roles against Ukrainian forces.

Civilians trained at the three-month-old center in Donetsk do not formally join the military, the Russian news site Argumenty i Fakty reported on Aug. 12.

“It is important to understand that when training drone operators for use in war, a completely different approach is needed than when training a civilian pilot. Here, in addition to studying technical and tactical issues, it is necessary to train people in interaction within the unit, work with other attached forces, and coordinate work in combat crews,” an unnamed founder of the center told the Russian news site.

It’s not clear how “coordinated work in combat crews” differs from combat. And that blurs the line between civilians and troops and creates a new type of combatant, said Sam Bendett, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and an adviser at the CNA Corporation.

“We have to emphasize that this training effort blurs civilian and military lines. So at some point, this would have to be either folded into the [Ministry of Defense] officially, or be disbanded since it puts civilians in harm's way, even if they volunteer,” Bendett said.

Both sides have made heavy use of drones since the February invasion. The Russian side has lost at least 600 of its small, tactical drones, similar to the commercial drones that hobbyists use. Drone signals can be jammed or hijacked to reveal the location of the operator, turning him or her into an easy target.

Both sides have armed small drones to drop munitions. . This turns every airborne buzzing sound into a reason for terror, the center’s founder said.

“So the [Ukranians] dropped one grenade from a drone into positions and our soldiers are already in constant tension. They are waiting for a drone to appear now, which poses a threat. This is a serious psychological pressure. They alternate tactics. Once they throw off some kind of ammunition, and then they just fly in empty and this is an incredible stress for people. People get tired morally, they have phobias. It's exhausting,” he said. “We are not far behind them in this regard.”

Said Bendett: “This type of drone training will continue to grow in importance for both sides as the war continues, since both sides are now using large numbers of DJI and similar drones; and they are now starting to lose their drone operators to adversary counterstrike, adding to the importance of creating a pipeline of trained individuals capable of working in combat.”

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

4. US to hold trade talks with Taiwan, island drills military

Excerpts:

The U.S. Trade Representative’s announcement of the talks made no mention of tension with Beijing but said “formal negotiations” would develop trade and regulatory ties, a step that would entail closer official interaction.

Being allowed to export more to the United States might help Taiwan blunt China’s efforts to use its status as the island’s biggest trading partner as political leverage. The mainland blocked imports of Taiwanese citrus and other food in retaliation for Pelosi’s Aug. 2 visit.

Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry expressed “high welcome” for the trade talks, which it said will lead to a “new page” in relations with the United States.

US to hold trade talks with Taiwan, island drills military

AP · by JOHNSON LAI and JOE McDONALD · August 18, 2022

HUALIEN, Taiwan (AP) — The U.S. government will hold trade talks with Taiwan in a sign of support for the island democracy that China claims as its own territory, prompting Beijing to warn Thursday it will take action if necessary to “safeguard its sovereignty.”

The announcement of trade talks comes after Beijing fired missiles into the sea to intimidate Taiwan after U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi this month became the highest-ranking American official to visit the island in 25 years.

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s government criticized the planned talks as a violation of its stance that Taiwan has no right to foreign relations. It warned Washington not to encourage the island to try to make its de facto independence permanent, a step Beijing says would lead to war.

“China firmly opposes this,” Ministry of Commerce spokesperson Shu Jueting said. She called on Washington to “fully respect China’s core interests.”

Also Thursday, Taiwan’s military held a drill with missiles and cannons simulating a response to a Chinese missile attack.

Taiwan and China split in 1949 after a civil war and have no official relations but are bound by billions of dollars of trade and investment. The island never has been part of the People’s Republic of China, but the ruling Communist Party says it is obliged to unite with the mainland, by force if necessary.

Taiwan

China, Japan officials meet amid Taiwan tensions

US to hold trade talks with Taiwan in new show of support

Taiwan, China hold opposing military drills amid tensions

China sets sanctions on Taiwan figures to punish US, island

President Joe Biden’s coordinator for the Indo-Pacific region, Kurt Campbell, said last week that trade talks would “deepen our ties with Taiwan” but stressed policy wasn’t changing. The United States has no diplomatic relations with Taiwan, its ninth-largest trading partner, but maintains extensive informal ties.

The U.S. Trade Representative’s announcement of the talks made no mention of tension with Beijing but said “formal negotiations” would develop trade and regulatory ties, a step that would entail closer official interaction.

Being allowed to export more to the United States might help Taiwan blunt China’s efforts to use its status as the island’s biggest trading partner as political leverage. The mainland blocked imports of Taiwanese citrus and other food in retaliation for Pelosi’s Aug. 2 visit.

Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry expressed “high welcome” for the trade talks, which it said will lead to a “new page” in relations with the United States.

“As the situation across the Taiwan Strait has recently escalated, the U.S. government will continue to take concrete actions to maintain security and stability across the Taiwan Strait,” it said in a statement.

U.S.-Chinese relations are at their lowest level in decades amid disputes over trade, security, technology, and Beijing’s treatment of Muslim minorities and Hong Kong.

The U.S. Trade Representative said negotiations would be conducted under the auspices of Washington’s unofficial embassy, the American Institute in Taiwan.

“China always opposes any form of official exchanges between any country and the Taiwan region of China,” said Shu, the Chinese spokesperson. “China will take all necessary measures to resolutely safeguard its sovereignty.”

Washington says it takes no position on the status of China and Taiwan but wants their dispute settled peacefully. The U.S. government is obligated by federal law to see that the island has the means to defend itself.

“We will continue to take calm and resolute steps to uphold peace and stability in the face of Beijing’s ongoing efforts to undermine it, and to support Taiwan,” Campbell said during a conference call last Friday.

China takes more than twice as much of Taiwan’s exports as the United States, its No. 2 foreign market. Taiwan’s government says its companies have invested almost $200 billion in the mainland. Beijing says a 2020 census found some 158,000 Taiwanese entrepreneurs, professionals and others live on the mainland.

China’s ban on imports of citrus, fish and hundreds of other Taiwanese food products hurt rural areas seen as supporters of President Tsai Ing-wen, but those goods account for less than 0.5% of Taiwan’s exports to the mainland.

Beijing did nothing that might affect the flow of processor chips from Taiwan that are needed by Chinese factories that assemble the world’s smartphones and consumer electronics. The island is the world’s biggest chip supplier.

A second group of U.S. lawmakers led by Sen. Ed Markey, a Democrat from Massachusetts, arrived on Taiwan on Sunday and met with Tsai. Beijing announced a second round of military drills after their arrival.

Taiwan, with 23.6 million people, has launched its own military drills in response.

On Thursday, drills at Hualien Air Base on the east coast simulated a response to a Chinese missile attack. Military personnel practiced with Taiwanese-made Sky Bow 3 anti-aircraft missiles and 35mm anti-aircraft cannon but didn’t fire them.

“We didn’t panic” when China launched military drills, said air force Maj. Chen Teh-huan.

“Our usual training is to be on call 24 hours a day to prepare for missile launches,” Chen said. “We were ready.”

The U.S.-Taiwanese talks also will cover agriculture, labor, the environment, digital technology, the status of state-owned enterprises and “non-market policies,” the U.S. Trade Representative said.

Washington and Beijing are locked in a 3-year-old tariff war over many of the same issues.

They include China’s support for government companies that dominate many of its industries and complaints that Beijing steals foreign technology and limits access to an array of fields in violation of its market-opening commitments.

Then-President Donald Trump raised tariffs on Chinese goods in 2019 in response to complaints that its technology development tactics violate its free-trade commitments and threaten U.S. industrial leadership. Biden has left most of those tariff hikes in place.

___

McDonald reported from Beijing.

AP · by JOHNSON LAI and JOE McDONALD · August 18, 2022

5. Americans are paying for slogans on bombs aimed at Russians

Americans are paying for slogans on bombs aimed at Russians

The Washington Post · by John Hudson · August 17, 2022

KYIV, Ukraine — At a military position near the front line, members of a Ukrainian military unit snickered as a soldier with tattooed arms scrawled a phallic symbol on an artillery shell designed for an M777 howitzer cannon.

At a separate position, a Ukrainian soldier loaded a shell that read “Hello from Texas” into a medium-range cannon. Seconds before it fired with a loud boom, the operator announced, “from Texas” in a gleeful Slavic accent.

The emergence of slogans and symbols emblazoned on U.S.-made artillery — originally a creative outlet for Ukrainian soldiers serving in the country’s east — has become a growing and lucrative fundraising tactic for Ukrainians in the nearly six-month war.

Local crowdfunding websites have raised tens of thousands of dollars for the war effort since Russia invaded on Feb. 24. They offer people anywhere in the world the chance to commission a message on a growing menu of bombs and missiles before they are fired at advancing Russian forces.

The most prominent crowdfunding group — Sign My Rocket — started by selling messages on Soviet-made 82mm caliber mortar rounds for $30 each. But eventually, co-founder Anton Sokolenko realized that if they sold messages on more powerful weapons, benefactors from the United States, Britain, Germany, Canada, Switzerland and elsewhere would pay even more.

“We got bigger and bigger shells,” Sokolenko said in an interview from his home in Cherkasy, a city in central Ukraine. “Ninety-five percent of the orders are in English and most are from the United States.”

Sokolenko’s organization has now moved beyond mortar shells and is selling inscriptions on antitank mines, bomb-laden drones, VOG-17 hand grenades, 220mm rockets, 2S7 Pion heavy artillery and scores of other explosives, according to pictures and videos reviewed by The Washington Post. He says it has raised more than $150,000 for the Ukrainian military and facilitated scores of messages including “From NATO with love,” “London says hi” and “Remember the Alamo.”

The group recently branded a Buk surface-to-air missile with the message “Not for use on Malaysian Airlines” — a reference to the downing of a commercial airliner in 2014 by pro-Russian separatists armed with the same missile system, which killed 298 people.

The fundraising effort is not officially sanctioned by the Ukrainian military. Sokolenko’s organization relies on his informal connections to Ukrainian military units in the field. The proceeds go toward buying equipment for Ukraine’s military units, including camouflaged vehicles and auto parts.

After a donation is collected, a Ukrainian soldier scrawls the requested message on the munition and takes a picture of it. The picture is then sent to the donor.

“I’ve already donated $3,000,” said Colin Smith, a director at an e-commerce company in Dallas who has dedicated artillery shells to friends and relatives for birthdays, anniversaries and a job promotion.

Smith first discovered Sign My Rocket on a Reddit page earlier this year. He recently gave his wife a picture of an artillery shell for their anniversary, inscribed with their initials and wedding date: “C & Y. Est. 2021.”

“She loved it,” he said, “though she’s now kind of tired of me telling her about the war.”

The most expensive item on the website is the naming rights to a Russian-made T-72 tank for $3,000 — a topic of contention in the Smith household.

“I’m trying to get my family to go in on the tank,” said Smith, “but my wife said I’ve already spent too much.”

Ukrainians are far from alone in using bombs as a canvas for political or nationalist expression. European and U.S. soldiers have written messages on artillery in every conflict since at least the First World War. After a Russian attack in April that killed more than 50 people at a train station in Kramatorsk, a missile fragment was found wedged into the ground bearing a handwritten message: “For the children.” But the selling of customized messages as a fundraising tool is a novel innovation.

The success of Sokolenko’s efforts has already prompted the creation of other crowdfunding sites.

The website RevengeFor, launched three weeks ago by a Kyiv native and IT worker, Nazar Gulyk, appeals to foreigners with historical grievances against Moscow who would like to support Ukrainians as their proxy.

“What’s your reason for wishing to take revenge on Russia?” says a group fundraising video that displays a montage of Joseph Stalin, Vladimir Lenin and current Russian President Vladimir Putin. “Ukraine is already avenging everyone on the battlefield! Avenging you and avenging the suffering of your people too!”

In just three weeks, the group says it has raised $52,000 from an array of donors from the United States, Canada, Germany, Britain, Poland, Hong Kong, Belgium, Georgia, Czech Republic and Norway. The group sends its proceeds to Come Back Alive, a Ukrainian charity that has equipped troops with military vehicles and surveillance tools.

Gulyk says he is in negotiations with his military contacts for his most ambitious offering yet: naming rights on a munition for a U.S. High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, the weapon widely credited with slowing Russia’s military advance in the east and south.

“It’s our next milestone,” he said. “We want to make that more expensive: $10,000 or more.”

Another Ukrainian crowdfunding website, Drones for Ukraine Fund, raises money by selling parts of downed Russian aircraft.

U.S. officials are aware of the efforts but say the unauthorized defacement of U.S. weapons does not rank among their most pressing concerns in a conflict that has killed tens of thousands of people, increased food and energy prices, and shaken European security policy to its core.

Ukrainian soldiers involved in marking up the weapons are reluctant to comment about the process, given the unofficial nature of the effort. One soldier who has written on several weapons for Sign My Rocket described his experience on the condition of anonymity to avoid punishment from his superiors.

“I didn’t believe that it was real,” he said, recalling when the group first approached him.

It was only when the group donated used cars and spare tires to his military unit with the proceeds from the inscriptions that he believed the operation was legitimate, he said.

He said the project existed outside the oversight of commanding officers. “The superiors turn a blind eye,” he said.

When asked if senior military leaders were aware of the effort, a spokesperson for the Ukrainian armed forces declined to comment.

Many of the inscriptions include profanities directed at Putin or Russian troops that are unfit for print.

One foreign diplomat in Kyiv said the scene of Ukrainian forces drawing ever more irreverent slogans on munitions recalled the 19th-century oil painting “Reply of the Zaporozhian Cossacks.” In the painting, Cossacks from what is now modern-day Ukraine huddle around a table writing out a letter of ever more offensive insults toward the Ottoman sultan who sought their allegiance.

“The tradition of resistance is strong,” said Yaroslav Hrytsak, a Ukrainian historian and professor at the Ukrainian Catholic University.

He said “humor” and “obscenities” have long typified Ukraine’s response to foreign occupation.

“It could be a rough kind of humor,” he said.

The Washington Post · by John Hudson · August 17, 2022

6. Deter China through Strength and Confidence

NATIONAL REVIEW August 18, 2022

Deter China through Strength and Confidence

The U.S. is the dominant maritime power in the Pacific; let’s keep it that way.

by John Lehman and Bing West

https://www.nationalreview.com/2022/08/deter-china-through-strength-and-confidence/

American policy toward Taiwan is one of “strategic ambiguity.” If China attacks Taiwan, U.S. forces may fight or not fight. Chairman Xi’s bellicosity signals that he believes we wouldn’t fight. By seizing Taiwan, China would control $6 trillion in seaborne trade and cut us off from South Korea and Japan. Simply put, our own security depends upon a willingness to fight for Taiwan's freedom.

To ensure that Xi believes that the U.S. would fight, three actions are necessary. First, make it clear that America would defeat a Chinese invasion. A few years ago, a senior Pentagon official claimed that China defeated us in a series of war games. The Wall Street Journal recently reported on a war game conducted by a think tank. After “horrific [U.S.] losses,” one of its participants concluded, “Nobody won, but nobody lost either.” That is scarcely reassuring. The chairman of our Joint Chiefs, General Mark Milley, has said, “We’re witnessing one of the largest shifts in global geostrategic power that the world has witnessed.” Such lugubrious sentiments, coupled with the Afghanistan debacle, are demoralizing. In 2018, 70 percent of Americans had a great deal of confidence in our military; that has dropped to 45 percent. Our senior leaders must belay pessimism.

America’s defeat is not predestined. China must attack across one hundred miles of open ocean, while our Navy can detect the movement of any warship, submarine, or plane. Thousands of anti-ship missiles await the invasion craft. China has never fought a maritime war, whereas our command systems have been forged in continuous wars. Nor can China rationally expand a naval clash with America. Its entire economy depends on imports of oil and natural gas across oceans controlled by America’s attack submarines, aircraft, and surface forces. Our Navy must exude confidence in its lethal mission to sink the enemy, and visibly exercise and train to do it.

Here is the precedent. In the Carter years, in the 1970s, worry raged about a Soviet blitzkrieg against Germany, with our Navy shepherding convoys, as in World War II. Our Pentagon leaders believed that the Soviets would sink our fleet in the Mediterranean. Several of us believed that, after Vietnam, our officials had sought counsel in their fears and had lost sight of our huge geographical advantages and of our Navy’s immense global striking power. In war games at the Naval War College and under President Reagan in actual exercises, we sent our attack submarines and carriers a thousand miles north of England to demonstrate that we intended to sink the Soviet navy and attack its bases. The Soviet command was flummoxed. Gorbachev said the demands from his admirals for more money to defend the Kola Peninsula helped convince him of America's superiority.

As we did in the ’80s, we should display confidence in defeating a Chinese invasion or blockade. The Pentagon should hold ecumenical war games. Invite all services, Congress, and the White House to participate. But war games are theoretical. What’s really needed is to follow up with bold exercises. Start now in the South China Sea, where the Philippines has requested joint naval patrols because China is bullying their fishermen and ships. Alongside Filipino vessels, we should send our warships with U.S. Marine landing parties to protect defenseless vessels. That is how you encourage and strengthen alliances.

The second step is to do away with the current policy of ambiguity that places America’s response to an invasion in one man, the president. This contradicts our Constitution, which reposes war-making authority with the Congress. Independent of the administration, the American people and Congress will support a winner. Congress should pass a mutual-defense pact with Taiwan, the same as we have with the Philippines. That would be the strongest measure to dissuade Xi.

The third step is to safeguard the endurance of deterrence. President Biden requested a 5 percent increase in the Navy budget, not matching inflation. This prematurely retires 30 ships, further shrinking our too-small Navy. Congress must add ships. We are the dominant maritime power in the Pacific; let’s keep it that way and act with confidence.

In the Reagan administration, John Lehman served as secretary of the Navy and Bing West as assistant secretary of defense. Both have written several books about national security.

7. Ukraine says fighting 'deadlocked' ahead of visit by U.N. chief

Ukraine says fighting 'deadlocked' ahead of visit by U.N. chief

Reuters · by Natalia Zinets

Summary
U.N. chief to meet Zelenskiy in Lviv on Thursday
Seven die in Russia attack on Kharkiv - emergency service
Ukrainian forces rout Russian attack in Kherson

KYIV, Aug 18 (Reuters) - Ukrainian forces said on Thursday they had beaten back a Russian attack in the southern region of Kherson, while the death toll from Russian shelling of Kharkiv city in Ukraine's northeast climbed as the nearly six-month war grinds on without let-up.

U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres will meet Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan later on Thursday in the western Ukrainian city of Lviv.

They will discuss ways to find a political solution to the war and address the threat to global food supplies and risk of a disaster at Europe's largest nuclear power plant, which has been taken over by Russian forces. read more

The war has forced millions to flee, killed thousands and deepened a geopolitical rift between the West and Russia, which says the aim of its operation is to demilitarise its neighbour and protect Russian-speaking communities.

"Russian forces have achieved only minimal advances, and in some cases we have advanced, since last month," Ukrainian presidential adviser Oleksiy Arestovych said in a video.

"What we are seeing is a 'strategic deadlock'."

Russian bombardment of a residential area of Kharkiv, Ukraine's second-biggest city, on Wednesday evening killed seven people and wounded 16, the Ukrainian Emergencies Service said.

"This is a devious and cynical strike on civilians with no justification," Zelenskiy said on the Telegram messaging app.

One person was killed and 18 were wounded on Thursday in pre-dawn shelling of another residential area of Kharkiv, Oleh Synehubov, the regional governor said.

The south district of the Operational Command of the Ukrainian armed forces said Ukrainian forces killed 29 "occupiers" near the town of Bilohirka, northeast of Kherson, as well as destroying artillery, armoured vehicles and a military supply depot.

Reuters was not able to independently confirm the battlefield reports.

Fighting around the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant has raised fears of a catastrophe and Guterres has said he wants a demilitarised zone established.

Ukraine's foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, said he had spoken to the director general of the International Atomic Agency, who was ready to lead a delegation to the plant.

"I emphasised the mission's urgency to address nuclear security threats caused by Russia's hostilities," he said on Twitter.

Russia's defence ministry accused Ukraine of planning a "provocation" at the plant on Friday while Guterres is visiting Ukraine, Russian state-owned news agency RIA reported.

1/5

Rescuers work at the site of a residential building destroyed by a Russian missile strike, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kharkiv, Ukraine August 17, 2022. REUTERS/Vitalii Hnidyi

The two sides have exchanged accusations of shelling near the plant but the Russian ministry said its forces had no heavy weapons there or in nearby districts.

BLACK SEA FLEET CHIEF REPLACED

The United States, Albania, France, Ireland, Norway and Britain have asked the U.N. Security Council to meet on Aug. 24 to discuss the impact of the war in Ukraine, diplomats said, marking six months since Russia's invasion.

A series of blasts at military bases and ammunition depots in the past week in Crimea, the Black Sea peninsula annexed by Russia in 2014, has suggested a shift in the conflict, with Ukraine apparently capable of striking deeper into Russian-occupied territory.

Russia blamed saboteurs for the attacks, while Ukraine has not officially taken responsibility but has hinted at it.

Ukrainian military intelligence said in a statement that after the recent explosions in Crimea, Russian forces had urgently moved some of their planes and helicopters deeper into the peninsula and to airfields in Russia. Reuters could not independently verify the information.

On Wednesday, Russia's RIA news agency cited sources as saying the commander of its Black Sea fleet, Igor Osipov, had been replaced with a new chief, Viktor Sokolov. read more

If confirmed, it would mark one of the most prominent sackings of a military official in a war in which Russia has suffered heavy losses of men and equipment.

The Black Sea Fleet, which has a revered history, has suffered several humiliations since President Vladimir Putin launched the invasion of Ukraine - which Moscow calls a "special military operation" - on Feb. 24.

In April, Ukraine struck Russia's flagship the Moskva, a huge cruiser, with Neptune missiles. It became the biggest warship to be sunk in combat for 40 years.

MORE GRAIN SHIPS LEAVE

Crimea provides the main supply route for Russian forces in southern Ukraine, where Kyiv is expected to launch a counter-offensive in coming weeks.

The Black Sea Fleet has also blockaded Ukraine's ports since the beginning of the war, trapping vital grain exports that are only now starting to move again, and sending global food prices soaring. read more

Three more ships with exports left Ukraine's Black Sea ports on Wednesday, a monitoring group said, bringing the number of vessels to leave Ukraine under a U.N.-brokered grain export deal to 24.

The government in Kyiv has said it hoped to increase the monthly volume of sea exports to 3 million tonnes in the near future to clear a backlog of 18 million tonnes of grains left over from last year's harvest and start selling new crops.

(This story corrects paragraph 15 to remove erroneous reference to plans for Guterres to visit Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station. Russia's defence ministry referred to his visit to Ukraine, and did not say he planned to visit the plant.)

Reporting by Reuters bureaux; Writing by Lincoln Feast; Editing by Michael Perry, Robert Birsel

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Natalia Zinets

8. The Armed Resistance Against the Taliban Is Still Here

Who is assessing the resistance potential in Afghanistan?

Notional UW Standing “PIR” For Resistance

•Assessments – Special Forces Area Study/Area Assessment, PSYOP Target Audience Analysis, and Civil Affairs Civil Reconnaissance

•Who is the resistance?

–Leaders, groups, former military, in or out of government, etc.

•Why is there a resistance or the potential for resistance?

–What are the underlying causes/drivers?

•What are the objectives of the resistance?

–Do they align with the US and friends, partners, and allies? If not, who with?

•What is the resistance narrative?

–How is it shaping the information environment?

•Where is it operating?

–From where is it getting support?

•When did it begin?

–When will it/did it commence operations?

•How will it turn out?

–E.g., what is the assessment of success or failure of the resistance?

•Most important - An expert recommendation: Should the US support or counter the resistance and if so how?

The Armed Resistance Against the Taliban Is Still Here

vice.com · August 17, 2022

Resistance fighters in Afghanistan last September. PHOTO:AHMAD SAHEL ARMAN/AFP via Getty Images

VICE World News marks the first anniversary of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, from the devastating consequences that ensued to the millions of lives that were transformed.

See More →

Nestled in hideaways in remote valleys in Afghanistan and in safe houses outside the country, groups of armed militias are operating a growing resistance against the Taliban. These fighters, loyal to the previous Western-backed government, are running a sustained insurgency in areas already hostile to the Taliban.

Eleven months after the Taliban claimed to have neutralised the final resistance fighters in the Panjshir Valley, and a year since the Kabul government fell to the Islamists, resistance fighters are regrouping.

On Monday, the National Resistance Front – the biggest active anti-Taliban group – used the eve of the first anniversary of the fall of Kabul to announce a new wave of attacks on Taliban outposts in the north of the country.

World News

The ‘Unconquerable’ Valley That’s the Last Holdout Against the Taliban

Mohammed Rasool

09.03.21

Several hit-and-run attacks on Taliban militants in the outposts and checkpoints in Andrab and Panjshir have already been reported, also in parts Baghlan, Parwan and Kapisa provinces, all of which are north of Kabul. Other small groups have also emerged in the south and east of the country.

In a statement to mark the “fall of the regime” in Kabul, the NRF said the group would continue to “fight until the people of Afghanistan are liberated” from the Taliban.

The NRF and other loosely allied groups have carried out a limited series of clashes in areas with large populations of ethnic and religious minority groups, known for their hostility to the Islamists, who target them with impunity.

The Taliban seized the Panjshir valley in September 2021. PHOTO: Sayed Khodaiberdi Sadat/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images

The Taliban have claimed that they have a diverse interim cabinet set up, but in reality the group has made very little effort to include ethnic and religious minorities, such as Tajiks and Hazaras, which has prompted a rebellion from people in minority regions.

The Taliban dismiss the threat the few hundred armed men pose, and there is no doubt that the NRF has exaggerated its strength. But nevertheless, the number of propaganda posts by different insurgent groups has grown on social media. The groups include the Afghanistan Freedom Front in the north part of the country, and the Afghanistan Islamic National and Liberation Movement, which is made up of ex-security forces and has claimed responsibility for a dozen attacks in the south and east of the country since announcing itself in February.

Much of the NRF’s leadership is based outside the country, settled in neighbouring Tajikistan after fleeing the Taliban advance toward the provincial capital of the Panjshir valley last year, the last anti-Taliban stronghold during the group’s takeover last year. Somewhere between 4,000 to 8,000 former Afghan army soldiers, police officers, and people allied to the groups that were in charge of Afghanistan have taken up arms in the Hindu Kush mountains.

“Currently, there are many resistance groups. The National Resistance Front was the largest, most organised, and the first to emerge. However, in the following months and up to April 2022, numerous other fronts have emerged, mostly independent or based on ethnicity and geographical area,” said Daniele Garofalo, an expert in monitoring the propaganda of jihadist organisations, told VICE World News in an email.

The Taliban’s security forces are in control of every provincial capital across Afghanistan, and repeated reports show that they crack down harshly on any opposition in Tajik- and Hazara-majority areas. Most of the new resistance groups are made up of men in these persecuted ethnic minorities.

The NRF is led by Ahmad Massoud, the son of the legendary commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud who was known as the Lion of Panjshir. The young Massoud has repeatedly called for people to join in to fight against the Taliban despite being in Tajikistan. The group’s official website says that his front is fighting to “create a democratic system with elections, freedom of speech, human and women’s rights, inclusiveness of all ethnic groups in the government, fight corruption and terrorism.”

World News

‘They Can’t Overcome This’: Why The Taliban Can’t Agree On Anything

Mohammed Rasool

08.16.22

The resistance group claims to be a supporter of a “moderate Islam” and seek a “decentralised” system in Afghanistan that reflects the ethnic and religious components of the country.

“Massoud’s decision to organise a large council in which to unite the leaderships of all resistance groups and conduct a common, organised armed struggle with a single leadership could be decisive,” Garofalo said.

Last September, just weeks after the NRF was announced, the Taliban launched an offensive against the group. In 2021, for the first time in its history, the Taliban managed to take the capital of Panjshir – known for its ferocious anti-Taliban fighters – and announced the complete takeover of Afghanistan. The fighters, however, say they never surrendered.

The NRF has published a number of videos on social media with calls for Afghan people to join in the fight. They boast about their victories in media releases, but the Taliban outright deny any existence of any serious armed opposition.

The resistance groups are formed of supporters of the jihadi groups that fought the Soviets, and later allied with the US’s Nato-led campaign in Afghanistan. The ranks are also filled with former government security personnel laid off after the fall of Kabul, as the Taliban continue a harsh crackdown on any dissidents across the country.

The Western-backed government ran the country for two decades and was marred by overwhelming corruption, nepotism, and internal rivalries over lucrative contracts. Ultimately, it could not defend itself against the Taliban, which was emboldened by the sheer unpopularity of the official government.

The overall resistance to the Taliban since the Islamists has been disorganised, and their affiliations to the past Western-backed governments have not endeared them to all Afghans. The NRF leaders operate outside the country – mostly in neighbouring Tajikistan – and have not managed to create a united front. A number of other former prominent figures who fled the country have announced a Supreme Council for National Resistance for the Salvation of Afghanistan from Turkey, mainly made of high-profile former warlords like Abdul Rashid Dostum, Mohammad Mohaqeq, Yunus Qanoni, Atta Mohammad Noor, and Ismail Khan. But the group is yet to show any signs of active military presence inside Afghanistan.

World News

The Taliban Claim They Now Control the Whole of Afghanistan

Gavin Butler, Mohammed Rasool

09.06.21

When anti-Taliban attacks in Andarab and Panjshir provinces intensified during May this year, the Islamists sent thousands of soldiers to regain control. Under the guise of search-and-destroy operations, dozens of men were rounded up. In one village in Panjshir, 80 men were detained and beaten by the Taliban soldiers who accused them of cooperating with the resistance groups. They kept 10 people in custody, claiming they were associated with armed groups entrenched in the far mountain peaks.

The Taliban has promised a general amnesty for former security forces, but the United Nations reported 160 extrajudicial killings and even more detention and disappearance of former government personnel in the past year. With the fear of getting killed at the hands of the Taliban, tens of former army soldiers joined the ranks of budding resistance groups. In June, Human Rights Watch released a report which found that the Taliban was using collective punishment and torturing residents accused of association with armed opposition groups.

The limited number of clashes staged by resistance fighters is yet to prove a serious challenge to the Taliban’s authority, but the Taliban is struggling to keep up with a growing number of attacks on the outposts and checkpoints across the country.

The US and Western countries have so far distanced themselves from the resistance groups, even though they are led by their former allies.

“The military part [of these groups] is made up of highly trained soldiers who are perfectly familiar with the territory in which they operate. They have made considerable progress in the last year,” said Garofalo, the monitoring expert. “But they still need a lot of time.”

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vice.com · August 17, 2022

9. Playing With Fire in Ukraine

My counter-belief is that while I thinkI appreciate the risks, our fear of escalation is what may drive escalation.

Excerpts:

One might concede that although one of these catastrophic scenarios could theoretically happen, the chances are small and thus should be of little concern. After all, leaders on both sides have powerful incentives to keep the Americans out of the fighting and avoid even limited nuclear use, not to mention an actual nuclear war.

If only one could be so sanguine. In fact, the conventional view vastly understates the dangers of escalation in Ukraine. For starters, wars tend to have a logic of their own, which makes it difficult to predict their course. Anyone who says that they know with confidence what path the war in Ukraine will take is mistaken. The dynamics of escalation in wartime are similarly hard to predict or control, which should serve as a warning to those who are confident that events in Ukraine can be managed. Furthermore, as the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz recognized, nationalism encourages modern wars to escalate to their most extreme form, especially when the stakes are high for both sides. That is not to say that wars cannot be kept limited, but doing so is not easy. Finally, given the staggering costs of a great-power nuclear war, even a small chance of it occurring should make everyone think long and hard about where this conflict might be headed.

This perilous situation creates a powerful incentive to find a diplomatic solution to the war. Regrettably, however, there is no political settlement in sight, as both sides are firmly committed to war aims that make compromise almost impossible. The Biden administration should have worked with Russia to settle the Ukraine crisis before war broke out in February. It is too late now to strike a deal. Russia, Ukraine, and the West are stuck in a terrible situation with no obvious way out. One can only hope that leaders on both sides will manage the war in ways that avoid catastrophic escalation. For the tens of millions of people whose lives are at stake, however, that is cold comfort.

Playing With Fire in Ukraine

The Underappreciated Risks of Catastrophic Escalation

By John J. Mearsheimer

August 17, 2022

Foreign Affairs · by John J. Mearsheimer · August 17, 2022

Western policymakers appear to have reached a consensus about the war in Ukraine: the conflict will settle into a prolonged stalemate, and eventually a weakened Russia will accept a peace agreement that favors the United States and its NATO allies, as well as Ukraine. Although officials recognize that both Washington and Moscow may escalate to gain an advantage or to prevent defeat, they assume that catastrophic escalation can be avoided. Few imagine that U.S. forces will become directly involved in the fighting or that Russia will dare use nuclear weapons.

Washington and its allies are being much too cavalier. Although disastrous escalation may be avoided, the warring parties’ ability to manage that danger is far from certain. The risk of it is substantially greater than the conventional wisdom holds. And given that the consequences of escalation could include a major war in Europe and possibly even nuclear annihilation, there is good reason for extra concern.

To understand the dynamics of escalation in Ukraine, start with each side’s goals. Since the war began, both Moscow and Washington have raised their ambitions significantly, and both are now deeply committed to winning the war and achieving formidable political aims. As a result, each side has powerful incentives to find ways to prevail and, more important, to avoid losing. In practice, this means that the United States might join the fighting either if it is desperate to win or to prevent Ukraine from losing, while Russia might use nuclear weapons if it is desperate to win or faces imminent defeat, which would be likely if U.S. forces were drawn into the fighting.

Furthermore, given each side’s determination to achieve its goals, there is little chance of a meaningful compromise. The maximalist thinking that now prevails in both Washington and Moscow gives each side even more reason to win on the battlefield so that it can dictate the terms of the eventual peace. In effect, the absence of a possible diplomatic solution provides an added incentive for both sides to climb up the escalation ladder. What lies further up the rungs could be something truly catastrophic: a level of death and destruction exceeding that of World War II.

AIMING HIGH

The United States and its allies initially backed Ukraine to prevent a Russian victory and help negotiate a favorable end to the fighting. But once the Ukrainian military began hammering Russian forces, especially around Kyiv, the Biden administration shifted course and committed itself to helping Ukraine win the war against Russia. It also sought to severely damage Russia’s economy by imposing unprecedented sanctions. As Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin explained U.S. goals in April, “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.” In effect, the United States announced its intention to knock Russia out of the ranks of great powers.

What’s more, the United States has tied its own reputation to the outcome of the conflict. U.S. President Joe Biden has labelled Russia’s war in Ukraine a “genocide” and accused Russian President Vladimir Putin of being a “war criminal” who should face a “war crimes trial.” Presidential proclamations such as these make it hard to imagine Washington backing down; if Russia prevailed in Ukraine, the United States’ position in the world would suffer a serious blow.

Russian ambitions have also expanded. Contrary to the conventional wisdom in the West, Moscow did not invade Ukraine to conquer it and make it part of a Greater Russia. It was principally concerned with preventing Ukraine from becoming a Western bulwark on the Russian border. Putin and his advisers were especially concerned about Ukraine eventually joining NATO. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made the point succinctly in mid-January, saying at a press conference, “the key to everything is the guarantee that NATO will not expand eastward.” For Russian leaders, the prospect of Ukrainian membership in NATO is, as Putin himself put it before the invasion, “a direct threat to Russian security”—one that could be eliminated only by going to war and turning Ukraine into a neutral or failed state.

Moscow did not invade Ukraine to conquer it.

Toward that end, it appears that Russia’s territorial goals have expanded markedly since the war started. Until the eve of the invasion, Russia was committed to implementing the Minsk II agreement, which would have kept the Donbas as part of Ukraine. Over the course of the war, however, Russia has captured large swaths of territory in eastern and southern Ukraine, and there is growing evidence that Putin now intends to annex all or most of that land, which would effectively turn what is left of Ukraine into a dysfunctional rump state.

The threat to Russia today is even greater than it was before the war, mainly because the Biden administration is now determined to roll back Russia’s territorial gains and permanently cripple Russian power. Making matters even worse for Moscow, Finland and Sweden are joining NATO, and Ukraine is better armed and more closely allied with the West. Moscow cannot afford to lose in Ukraine, and it will use every means available to avoid defeat. Putin appears confident that Russia will ultimately prevail against Ukraine and its Western backers. “Today, we hear that they want to defeat us on the battlefield,” he said in early July. “What can you say? Let them try. The goals of the special military operation will be achieved. There are no doubts about that.”

Ukraine, for its part, has the same goals as the Biden administration. The Ukrainians are bent on recapturing territory lost to Russia—including Crimea—and a weaker Russia is certainly less threatening to Ukraine. Furthermore, they are confident that they can win, as Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov made clear in mid-July, when he said, “Russia can definitely be defeated, and Ukraine has already shown how.” His U.S. counterpart apparently agrees. “Our assistance is making a real difference on the ground,” Austin said in a late July speech. “Russia thinks that it can outlast Ukraine—and outlast us. But that’s just the latest in Russia’s string of miscalculations.”

The threat to Russia from NATO is even greater now than it was before the war.

In essence, Kyiv, Washington, and Moscow are all deeply committed to winning at the expense of their adversary, which leaves little room for compromise. Neither Ukraine nor the United States, for example, is likely to accept a neutral Ukraine; in fact, Ukraine is becoming more closely tied with the West by the day. Nor is Russia likely to return all or even most of the territory it has taken from Ukraine, especially since the animosities that have fueled the conflict in the Donbas between pro-Russian separatists and the Ukrainian government for the past eight years are more intense than ever.

These conflicting interests explain why so many observers believe that a negotiated settlement will not happen any time soon and thus foresee a bloody stalemate. They are right about that. But observers are underestimating the potential for catastrophic escalation that is built into a protracted war in Ukraine.

There are three basic routes to escalation inherent in the conduct of war: one or both sides deliberately escalate to win, one or both sides deliberately escalate to prevent defeat, or the fighting escalates not by deliberate choice but inadvertently. Each pathway holds the potential to bring the United States into the fighting or lead Russia to use nuclear weapons, and possibly both.

ENTER AMERICA

Once the Biden administration concluded that Russia could be beaten in Ukraine, it sent more (and more powerful) arms to Kyiv. The West began increasing Ukraine’s offensive capability by sending weapons such as the HIMARS multiple launch rocket system, in addition to “defensive” ones such as the Javelin antitank missile. Over time, both the lethality and quantity of the weaponry has increased. Consider that in March, Washington vetoed a plan to transfer Poland’s MiG-29 fighter jets to Ukraine on the grounds that doing so might escalate the fight, but in July it raised no objections when Slovakia announced that it was considering sending the same planes to Kyiv. The United States is also contemplating giving its own F-15s and F-16s to Ukraine.

The United States and its allies are also training the Ukrainian military and providing it with vital intelligence that it is using to destroy key Russian targets. Moreover, as The New York Times has reported, the West has “a stealthy network of commandos and spies” on the ground inside Ukraine. Washington may not be directly engaged in the fighting, but it is deeply involved in the war. And it is now just a short step away from having its own soldiers pulling triggers and its own pilots pressing buttons.

The U.S. military could get involved in the fighting in a variety of ways. Consider a situation where the war drags on for a year or more, and there is neither a diplomatic solution in sight nor a feasible path to a Ukrainian victory. At the same time, Washington is desperate to end the war—perhaps because it needs to focus on containing China or because the economic costs of backing Ukraine are causing political problems at home and in Europe. In those circumstances, U.S. policymakers would have every reason to consider taking riskier steps—such as imposing a no-fly zone over Ukraine or inserting small contingents of U.S. ground forces—to help Ukraine defeat Russia.

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv, April 2022

Ukrainian Presidential Press Service / Reuters

A more likely scenario for U.S. intervention would come about if the Ukrainian army began to collapse and Russia seemed likely to win a major victory. In that case, given the Biden administration’s deep commitment to preventing that outcome, the United States could try to turn the tide by getting directly involved in the fighting. One can easily imagine U.S. officials believing that their country’s credibility was at stake and convincing themselves that a limited use of force would save Ukraine without prompting Putin to use nuclear weapons. Alternatively, a desperate Ukraine might launch large-scale attacks against Russian towns and cities, hoping that such escalation would provoke a massive Russian response that would finally force the United States to join the fighting.

The final scenario for American involvement entails inadvertent escalation: without wanting to, Washington gets drawn into the war by an unforeseen event that spirals upward. Perhaps U.S. and Russian fighter jets, which have come into close contact over the Baltic Sea, accidentally collide. Such an incident could easily escalate, given the high levels of fear on both sides, the lack of communication, and the mutual demonization.

Or maybe Lithuania blocks the passage of sanctioned goods traveling through its territory as they make their way from Russia to Kaliningrad, the Russian enclave that is separated from the rest of the country. Lithuania did just that in mid-June, but it backed off in mid-July, after Moscow made it clear it was contemplating “harsh measures” to end what it considered an illegal blockade. The Lithuanian foreign ministry, however, has resisted lifting the blockade completely. Since Lithuania is a NATO member, the United States would almost certainly come to its defense if Russia attacked the country.

Russia, desperate to stop Western military to Ukraine, could strike NATO states.

Or perhaps Russia destroys a building in Kyiv or a training site somewhere in Ukraine and unintentionally kills a substantial number of Americans, such as aid workers, intelligence operatives, or military advisers. The Biden administration, facing a public uproar at home, decides it must retaliate and strikes Russian targets, which then leads to a tit-for-tat exchange between the two sides.

Lastly, there is a chance that the fighting in southern Ukraine will damage the Russian-controlled Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, the largest in Europe, to the point where it spews radiation around the region, leading Russia to respond in kind. Dmitry Medvedev, the former Russian president and prime minister, delivered an ominous response to that possibility, saying in August, “Don’t forget that there are nuclear sites in the European Union, too. And incidents are possible there as well.” Should Russia strike a European nuclear reactor, the United States would almost certainly enter the fighting.

Of course, Moscow, too, could instigate the escalation. One cannot discount the possibility that Russia, desperate to stop the flow of Western military aid into Ukraine, would strike the countries through which the bulk of it passes: Poland or Romania, both of which are NATO members. There is also a chance that Russia might launch a massive cyberattack against one or more European countries aiding Ukraine, causing great damage to its critical infrastructure. Such an attack could prompt the United States to launch a retaliatory cyberattack against Russia. If it succeeded, Moscow might respond militarily; if it failed, Washington might decide that the only way to punish Russia would be to hit it directly. Such scenarios sound far-fetched, but they are not impossible. And they are merely a few of the many pathways by which what is now a local war might morph into something much larger and more dangerous.

GOING NUCLEAR

Although Russia’s military has done enormous damage to Ukraine, Moscow has, so far, been reluctant to escalate to win the war. Putin has not expanded the size of his force through large-scale conscription. Nor has he targeted Ukraine’s electrical grid, which would be relatively easy to do and would inflict massive damage on that country. Indeed, many Russians have taken him to task for not waging the war more vigorously. Putin has acknowledged this criticism but has let it be known that he would escalate if necessary. “We haven’t even yet started anything in earnest,” he said in July, suggesting that Russia could and would do more if the military situation deteriorated.

What about the ultimate form of escalation? There are three circumstances in which Putin might use nuclear weapons. The first would be if the United States and its NATO allies entered the fight. Not only would that development markedly shift the military balance against Russia, greatly increasing the likelihood of its defeat, but it would also mean that Russia would be fighting a great-power war on its doorstep that could easily spill into its territory. Russian leaders would surely think their survival was at risk, giving them a powerful incentive to use nuclear weapons to rescue the situation. At a minimum, they would consider demonstration strikes intended to convince the West to back off. Whether such a step would end the war or lead it to escalate out of control is impossible to know in advance.

In his February 24 speech announcing the invasion, Putin strongly hinted that he would turn to nuclear weapons if the United States and its allies entered the war. Addressing “those who may be tempted to interfere,” he said, “they must know that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.” His warning was not lost on Avril Haines, the U.S. director of national intelligence, who predicted in May that Putin might use nuclear weapons if NATO “is either intervening or about to intervene,” in good part because that “would obviously contribute to a perception that he is about to lose the war in Ukraine.”

There are three circumstances in which Putin might use nuclear weapons.

In the second nuclear scenario, Ukraine turns the tide on the battlefield by itself, without direct U.S. involvement. If Ukrainian forces were poised to defeat the Russian army and take back their country’s lost territory, there is little doubt that Moscow could easily view this outcome as an existential threat that required a nuclear response. After all, Putin and his advisers were sufficiently alarmed by Kyiv’s growing alignment with the West that they deliberately chose to attack Ukraine, despite clear warnings from the United States and its allies about the grave consequences that Russia would face. Unlike in the first scenario, Moscow would be employing nuclear weapons not in the context of a war with the United States but against Ukraine. It would do so with little fear of nuclear retaliation, since Kyiv has no nuclear weapons and since Washington would have no interest in starting a nuclear war. The absence of a clear retaliatory threat would make it easier for Putin to contemplate nuclear use.

In the third scenario, the war settles into a protracted stalemate that has no diplomatic solution and becomes exceedingly costly for Moscow. Desperate to end the conflict on favorable terms, Putin might pursue nuclear escalation to win. As with the previous scenario, where he escalates to avoid defeat, U.S. nuclear retaliation would be highly unlikely. In both scenarios, Russia is likely to use tactical nuclear weapons against a small set of military targets, at least initially. It could strike towns and cities in later attacks if necessary. Gaining a military advantage would be one aim of the strategy, but the more important one would be to deal a game-changing blow—to create such fear in the West that the United States and its allies move quickly to end the conflict on terms favorable to Moscow. No wonder William Burns, the director of the CIA, remarked in April, “None of us can take lightly the threat posed by a potential resort to tactical nuclear weapons or low-yield nuclear weapons.”

COURTING CATASTROPHE

One might concede that although one of these catastrophic scenarios could theoretically happen, the chances are small and thus should be of little concern. After all, leaders on both sides have powerful incentives to keep the Americans out of the fighting and avoid even limited nuclear use, not to mention an actual nuclear war.

If only one could be so sanguine. In fact, the conventional view vastly understates the dangers of escalation in Ukraine. For starters, wars tend to have a logic of their own, which makes it difficult to predict their course. Anyone who says that they know with confidence what path the war in Ukraine will take is mistaken. The dynamics of escalation in wartime are similarly hard to predict or control, which should serve as a warning to those who are confident that events in Ukraine can be managed. Furthermore, as the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz recognized, nationalism encourages modern wars to escalate to their most extreme form, especially when the stakes are high for both sides. That is not to say that wars cannot be kept limited, but doing so is not easy. Finally, given the staggering costs of a great-power nuclear war, even a small chance of it occurring should make everyone think long and hard about where this conflict might be headed.

This perilous situation creates a powerful incentive to find a diplomatic solution to the war. Regrettably, however, there is no political settlement in sight, as both sides are firmly committed to war aims that make compromise almost impossible. The Biden administration should have worked with Russia to settle the Ukraine crisis before war broke out in February. It is too late now to strike a deal. Russia, Ukraine, and the West are stuck in a terrible situation with no obvious way out. One can only hope that leaders on both sides will manage the war in ways that avoid catastrophic escalation. For the tens of millions of people whose lives are at stake, however, that is cold comfort.

Foreign Affairs · by John J. Mearsheimer · August 17, 2022

10. The future world order will be decided by the war over semiconductors

Conclusion:

Chips are close to pure light and close to pure capital. With the best chips you can save energy and create market-beating technologies that no one can compete with. And while silicone is abundantly available, advanced chips are not. For a company to survive at the bleeding edge of the technological frontier, it needs capital and talent in ever-growing amounts. Few companies can keep up with the pace, so it is not surprising that the best chips have become difficult to procure, with only three companies able to corner the market.

The future world order will be decided by the war over semiconductors

Taiwan, as the global leader in microchip manufacture, will be its geopolitical battleground.

By Bruno Maçães

NewStatesman · by Bruno Maçães · August 16, 2022

A semiconductor manufacturing factory In Jiashan County, China. Photo by Wang Gang/China News Service via Getty Images

To produce the most advanced microchips, you vaporise droplets of molten tin with two successive blasts of a laser. The resulting plasma emits extreme ultraviolet radiation, light with very short wavelengths. Glass lenses absorb too much of the radiation, so mirrors are used instead to guide the light to a silicon wafer and use it to draw transistors with features measuring 5 nanometres or less, the size of just a few atoms.

The surface of those mirrors is smooth to the level of one atom. The extreme ultraviolet lithography machines are roughly the size of a city bus and cost $150m. Each contains 100,000 parts and many of those parts are complex machines in their own right.

After a layer of transistors has been drawn, many other layers are superimposed on top. Semiconductor chips are the skyscrapers of the infinitesimal. The more layers, the more complex and powerful the chip. The most advanced designs have nearly 200 layers, and they all need to align with nanometre precision. Some of these layers are just one atom thin. People sometimes say that building chips is like printing with light, but maybe it is more accurate to say that it is like printing light.

Chips are strange creations. If rockets – and rocket science – represent the human search for the infinitely large, chips show us what Blaise Pascal called the “abyss of nothingness”, the vanishingly small. “Let him see therein an infinity of worlds, each of which has its firmament, its planets, its earth.” And its skyscrapers.

Chips are close to pure light and close to pure capital. With the best chips you can save energy and create market-beating technologies that no one can compete with. And while silicone is abundantly available, advanced chips are not. For a company to survive at the bleeding edge of the technological frontier, it needs capital and talent in ever-growing amounts. Few companies can keep up with the pace, so it is not surprising that the best chips have become difficult to procure, with only three companies able to corner the market.

11. FDD | US picks up pace of airstrikes in Somalia

Excerpts:

On May 16, 2021, as the security situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate, the Biden administration ordered approximately 500 U.S. troops to return to Somalia to train Somali forces while aiding the SNA in its fight against Shabaab.

But since May, Shabaab continues to strike across much of southern and central Somalia, regularly attacking inside northeastern Kenya, where it is also controlling territory, all while feeling confident enough to also launch a major incursion into Ethiopia.

Despite some setbacks in recent years, Shabaab continues to be one of al Qaeda’s most effective branches. Though its fortunes have ebbed and flowed over the past decade, it has shown the capacity to weather numerous offensives from an array of local, regional, and international actors, including the United States.

FDD | US picks up pace of airstrikes in Somalia

Bill Roggio

Senior Fellow and Editor of FDD's Long War Journal

Caleb Weiss

Bridgeway Foundation

fdd.org · by Bill Roggio Senior Fellow and Editor of FDD's Long War Journal · August 17, 2022

Since resuming military activity inside Somalia earlier this year, the Biden Administration has ramped up the pace of airstrikes in the Horn of Africa country in recent weeks. Since June 3, the US has conducted at least six airstrikes against Shabaab, al Qaeda’s branch in East Africa.

Beginning with the most recent airstrike, the US military’s Africa Command (AFRICOM) reported earlier today that on Aug. 14 it conducted an airstrike on Shabaab militants near the locale of Teedan, a small village southeast of the central Somali city of Beledweyne in the Hiraan Region. The airstrike was conducted in support of Somali National Army (SNA) troops engaging Shabaab militants in the area, reportedly killing at least 13 jihadists.

Just last week, however, AFRICOM stated it conducted three airstrikes in support of the SNA also near Beledweyne, saying it killed four militants on Aug. 9. SNA troops have been conducting a large counter-offensive against Shabaab in Hiraan, primarily in the Maxaas area southeast of Beledweyne, over the last few weeks. SNA troops reportedly re-captured several towns and villages from Shabaab, though Hiraan is traditionally a strong-hold for Shabaab and territorial control in the region often vacillates.

The counter-offensive in Hiraan comes after Shabaab mounted one of its recent incursions into Ethiopian territory from the region late last month. While both Ethiopia and Somalia have stated they beat the militants back, clashes have continued in Hiraan and along the border. Ethiopian warplanes have also reportedly been involved in support of the SNA in its recent operations against Shabaab in Hiraan.

Meanwhile, on July 17, AFRICOM launched an airstrike on Shabaab militants near Libikus, a small village northwest of the southern city of Kismayo, reportedly killing 2 jihadists. And on June 3, AFRICOM said it killed 5 Shabaab militants in a strike close to Beer Xani, another town near Kismayo in Somalia’s Lower Juba region.

These recent airstrikes follow a strike in February that reportedly killed 3 Shabaab militants near Duduble in the Lower Shabelle region. That strike constituted the first air strike inside Somalia since Aug. 2021.

In all strikes conducted so far this year, the United States contends that no civilians were killed. FDD’s Long War Journal cannot independently corroborate that statement.

Since January 2007, the United States has launched at least 234 airstrikes inside Somalia targeting both al Qaeda and the Islamic State, according to data compiled by FDD’s Long War Journal. This number may actually be higher as FDD’s Long War Journal’s statistics are based on open-source reporting.

The most active year recorded was 2019 when the US conducted at least 59 strikes (51 targeting Shabaab and 8 targeted the Islamic State’s local branch) inside Somalia. The pace of strikes have greatly tapered off since 2021 when President Biden came into office. Strikes conducted in Somalia under the Trump Administration greatly outnumbered the strikes launched during the administrations of both President Bush and President Obama combined.

Based on the US military’s own reporting since 2007, it has also stated it has killed at least 1041 militants in the East African country. It is unclear, however, if this number accurately reflects the total number of people killed in the airstrikes.

The recent uptick in strikes against Shabaab takes place as the security situation has worsened following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the troubled country more than one year ago.

The Trump administration withdrew more than 700 U.S. troops from Somalia in early 2021 as part of its efforts to end the so-called ‘endless wars.’ These troops were training the SNA, accompanying Somali troops during operations designed to clear Shabaab from contested of Shabaab-controlled terrain, and collecting intelligence for drone strikes against the terror group’s leadership and military organization.

President Trump ordered the withdrawal against the recommendation of military advisors, who argued that Shabaab would benefit from the vacuum and the U.S. military would have a more difficult time hunting key Shabaab leaders and operatives.

On May 16, 2021, as the security situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate, the Biden administration ordered approximately 500 U.S. troops to return to Somalia to train Somali forces while aiding the SNA in its fight against Shabaab.

But since May, Shabaab continues to strike across much of southern and central Somalia, regularly attacking inside northeastern Kenya, where it is also controlling territory, all while feeling confident enough to also launch a major incursion into Ethiopia.

Despite some setbacks in recent years, Shabaab continues to be one of al Qaeda’s most effective branches. Though its fortunes have ebbed and flowed over the past decade, it has shown the capacity to weather numerous offensives from an array of local, regional, and international actors, including the United States.

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of The Long War Journal. Caleb Weiss is a research analyst at FDD’s Long War Journal and a senior analyst at the Bridgeway Foundation, where he focuses on the spread of the Islamic State in Central Africa. Follow Bill on Twitter @billroggio. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

fdd.org · by Bill Roggio Senior Fellow and Editor of FDD's Long War Journal · August 17, 2022

12. Reporters in Gaza have never been free

Excerpts:

While I see no cure for this situation, I can imagine treatment. It would entail reporters working under duress in Gaza — and elsewhere, e.g., Iran, Russia and China — acknowledging that to readers and viewers. And maybe media commentators at such high-visibility outlets as CNN and Fox might occasionally and honestly discuss this reality.

At the very least, they should stop propagating the falsehood that there is no significant difference between Hamas-ruled Gaza and Israel when it comes to “the freedom of the press” along with an extensive list of other human rights.

Reporters in Gaza have never been free

washingtontimes.com · by Clifford D. May

OPINION:

Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood branch that rules Gaza, sat out this month’s conflict between Israel and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a smaller Gaza-based terrorist group tied to Iran’s rulers. However, perhaps to show it still rules the roost, Hamas issued sweeping restrictions on foreign journalists working in Gaza.

Among them: a prohibition against reporting on Gazans killed by misfired Palestinian rockets and a requirement that Israel be blamed for the battle.

In addition, Hamas ordered all foreign correspondents to employ Palestinian “sponsors” who must submit full reports on where those correspondents go, what they do and any “illogical questions” they ask.

The new rules warned that sponsors must “demonstrate national spirit, defend the Palestinian narrative and reject the foreigner’s bias to the Israeli narrative.”

The Foreign Press Association protested these “severe, unacceptable and unjustified restrictions on the freedom of the press.” Discussions ensued and, before long, the FPA was happily announcing that Hamas officials had come around.

Salama Marouf, director of the government media office in Gaza, agreed. “There are no restrictions,” he said. “We welcome all foreign journalists and media into Gaza, and we call on them to come.”

A happy ending, right? Not exactly. The Associated Press, one of the media organizations represented by the FPA, pointed out: “Even if the rules are officially withdrawn, Hamas has still signaled its expectations, which could have a chilling effect on critical coverage.”

That, too, fails to reflect a reality which is this: Reporters in Gaza have never been free and are not now.

Since Hamas wrested control of Gaza from rival Fatah in 2007, foreign journalists have been unable to work in the territory without Palestinian sponsors (more commonly known as “minders,” “stringers” or “fixers”) answerable to Hamas. They endanger both themselves and these hires if Hamas disapproves of their reporting.

Matti Friedman, a former reporter and editor in the Jerusalem bureau of The Associated Press has revealed all this and more in articles he wrote for Tablet, The Atlantic and more recently Sapir (a journal covering Jewish issues).

His pieces exposed Hamas’ intimidation and censorship, as well as the limits most journalists covering the Palestinian-Israel conflict impose on themselves based on ideology, bias and the desire for acceptance within social circles dominated by U.N. officials and employees of nongovernmental organizations who ignore Palestinian terrorism and rejectionism while regarding Israeli Jews as oppressors who don’t sincerely want peace.

Within this milieu, dissent is not tolerated. Just last weekend, the U.N. removed the head of one of its offices serving Palestinians after she posted a tweet condemning Islamic Jihad’s “indiscriminate rocket fire” — even though she subsequently apologized for “my poor judgment.”

The media are usually obedient. For example, Mr. Friedman wrote that during the conflict with Israel in the summer of 2014, the AP staff in Gaza City could see that Hamas was launching missiles from “right beside their office endangering reporters and other civilians nearby — and the AP wouldn’t report it.”

Nor did they inform readers that Hamas fighters had “burst into the AP’s Gaza bureau” and threatened the staff. And cameramen “waiting outside Shifa Hospital in Gaza City would film the arrival of civilian casualties and then, at a signal from an official, turn off their cameras when wounded and dead fighters came in, helping Hamas maintain the illusion that only civilians were dying.”

The most recent conflict featured such headlines as “Israel strikes what it calls terrorist targets” (ABC News) and “Israel cheers its wins, Gaza mourns its dead as cease-fire holds” (Washington Post).

Toeing the Hamas line does not guarantee safety: In 2006, Fox News reporter Steve Centanni and cameraman Olaf Wiig were kidnapped, blindfolded, handcuffed and held in an abandoned garage in the Gaza Strip by “a previously unknown group” calling itself the Holy Jihad Brigades. The two men were forced at gunpoint to denounce American policies and convert to Islam.

Released after 13 days, they were escorted to a Gaza hotel to meet with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh who, The New York Times reported, “had called for their captors to free them.”

The Times added that “there was speculation” that the kidnapping was an attempt “to embarrass” Mr. Haniyeh.

Such embarrassment was not apparent. And Mr. Haniyeh was doubtless pleased when, at a press conference, Mr. Wiig said he hoped his experience would not prevent other foreign journalists from covering Gaza. “That would be a great tragedy for the people of Palestine and especially for the people of Gaza,” he said.

The kidnappers, as far as we know, were never arrested. Nor has there been any further reporting on the “Holy Jihad Brigades.”

Last week’s AP dispatch on the new restrictions added what we might call the requisite moral equivalence clause: “In the long-running Israeli-Palestinian conflict, both sides have attempted to impose their narratives and limit negative coverage.” How so? Israeli authorities restrict media access to some military activities as well as to the country’s nuclear program.

So, the AP considers concealing who is killing whom on par with Israelis not revealing military secrets and not lifting the veil on their last-resort deterrence capabilities. Really?

While I see no cure for this situation, I can imagine treatment. It would entail reporters working under duress in Gaza — and elsewhere, e.g., Iran, Russia and China — acknowledging that to readers and viewers. And maybe media commentators at such high-visibility outlets as CNN and Fox might occasionally and honestly discuss this reality.

At the very least, they should stop propagating the falsehood that there is no significant difference between Hamas-ruled Gaza and Israel when it comes to “the freedom of the press” along with an extensive list of other human rights.

• Clifford D. May is the founder and president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a columnist for The Washington Times.

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washingtontimes.com · by Clifford D. May

13. The End of the War on Drugs? Reimagining the US-Colombia Relationship

Excerpts:

Given the complexities of Petro’s agenda, subtlety will prove a useful ally for the United States over the next four years. If the United States truly wants to play a meaningful role in reducing cocaine production in the country, it would be far better served investing counternarcotics resources into producing viable alternatives for rural farmers whose only option is to grow coca—people who, in the absence of such alternatives, would welcome the cartel with open arms.

The production of cocaine in Colombia involves many actors: civilians just getting by, reconfigured paramilitary groups, FARC dissident factions, masquerading violence entrepreneurs, and international drug cartels, among others. This constellation of forces suggests that alternative livelihoods and effective crop substitution programs must be simultaneously combined with both security and market integration and backed by real political will to achieve the intended results. Without this three-pronged approach, the production and flow of cocaine through and out of Colombia will not abate. A great deal of military and aid spending in Colombia goes to destroying cocaine laboratories. But just as quickly as the jungle swallows the remnants of one, another sprouts nearby. Land reform, rural security, and development that connects rural citizens to the markets that will sustain them—these constitute the pillars of a sustainable counternarcotics strategy upon which both the United States and Colombia can agree.

The End of the War on Drugs? Reimagining the US-Colombia Relationship - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu · by Erin K. McFee · August 18, 2022

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On June 19, Colombia elected Gustavo Petro as its president. The election of the former mayor of Bogotá and ex-M-19 guerrilla fighter represents a historic break from a nearly uninterrupted two-hundred-year run of government by white mestizo elites. If implemented, the three pillars of his campaign platform—environmental reforms, women’s equality, and peace—would transform the Andean country, which has been plagued by more than half a century of internal armed conflict.

But his administration will face serious challenges, including strong political opposition, a faltering economy with rising inflation, and a Venezuelan migration crisis. Despite the 2016 peace deal with Colombia’s largest insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the country’s violence has spiked in recent years, largely due to the previous administration’s active opposition to full implementation of the peace accord’s provisions. And to make matters worse, Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel has expanded its presence in Colombia.

Petro has explicitly rejected the militarized elements of the war on drugs (largely implemented through Plan Colombia), a central feature of the US relationship with its strongest ally in the Western Hemisphere, raising concerns of a significant shift in the US-Colombia relationship. But there are still several opportunities to simultaneously strengthen the bilateral relationship and advance the three pillars of the US counternarcotics strategy in Colombia (drug supply reduction, comprehensive rural development, and environmental protection)—all while leaving space for Petro to advance his own national agenda.

The Expansion of the Mexican Sinaloa Cartel in Colombia

Reports of Sinaloa Cartel presence in Colombia have surfaced since at least 2013, although incidents (such as the Cartel exchanging arms for cocaine) in the Caquetá-Putumayo region have increased significantly since 2019. To better understand the implications of these dynamics for US-Colombia counternarcotics efforts, I recently took my research team to speak with residents in areas known for intensive nonstate armed group activity.

Our interlocutors noted that cartel presence in the area has resulted in an increase in murders and forced displacement to levels reminiscent of some of the worst years of the armed conflict. Though violence has declined at a national level over the years, there has been a worrying recent uptick, with organized political violence increasing by 70 percent from 2020 to 2021. The growth of the Sinaloa Cartel within the portfolio of ninety-three armed groups currently operating in the country will assuredly increase cocaine production, which has tripled since 2012 and remains at historic highs despite decades of concerted counternarcotics efforts by Colombia and the United States. Cartel presence alone, however, does not explain this increase.

The existing upward trend results in part from a combination of a failure to substantively implement the peace accord’s measures to tackle drug trafficking and rent-seeking actions by rural populations. In 2016, for example, I observed rural residents burning the hillsides to plant coca and become eligible for benefits attached to the illicit crop substitution provisions in the accord. When those provisions never materialized, residents simply continued to cultivate coca. Some who began state-sponsored programs fared even worse. One group of farmers who took part in the National Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of Illicit Crops let their coca plants die as part of the program’s requirements for participation. But the promised substitutions never arrived. Now, these residents endure hunger and a sense of hopelessness. Given the opportunity to earn a dignified livelihood, they told my research team they would “welcome the Sinaloa Cartel with open arms.”

These failings in rural development and the incomplete implementation of the peace accord have occurred alongside an increase in systematic violence against indigenous populations, demobilized guerrillas, social leaders, and human rights activists to create the perfect recipe for cartel expansion. Quite predictably, these armed actors are filling a vacuum left when the FARC laid down its arms and no (or meager) state-backed alternatives for citizen security took the group’s place. “The cartel” is increasingly invoked as the default perpetrator when citizens discuss local violence. A landowner in one town was recently assassinated. It was Sinaloa. Someone rode up on a scooter to a car with three men in it and shot them all. Sinaloa. While it is unlikely that every act of lethal violence is a direct result of cartel presence, the power that this group has amassed has significant implications for policy implementation. At the end of the day, these coca-growing communities must live the everyday realities of efforts to decrease production. Without contextually relevant programming and local capacities for sustaining outcomes, any initiatives will meet with lackluster outcomes at best.

Land, Development, Security: The De-narcification of Counternarcotics Strategies

The December 2020 report from the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission lays out several recommendations for this new chapter in bilateral relations between the United States and Colombia. It calls for the United States to support partner governments in countering transnational criminal organizations, support licit livelihood programs in coca-growing regions, support citizen security and human rights, develop law enforcement assistance programs, and rethink traditional coca-eradication methods. In Colombia, the incomplete implementation of the peace accord, lack of alternative livelihood options, and absence of security guarantees combine to present a significant threat to the Petro administration’s policy goals. Fortunately, early overtures between the US and Colombian presidents also suggest a willingness to find a way forward. There are several steps President Joe Biden’s administration can take to simultaneously improve its relationship with Petro and strengthen its counternarcotics strategy.

First, US policymakers should build on long-standing US relationships with Colombia’s historical political and economic elites who might oppose Petro but can facilitate dialogue that supports his efforts to implement the land-reform component of the peace accord. Latin America has the most unequal land distribution in the world, and Colombia is the worst of the region. Land reform represents a national priority for many reasons—it is the issue at the heart of the Colombian conflict—but the very landholders who have benefitted from these structures constitute some of the staunchest opposition forces to the Petro administration. The United States’ (generally) warm relationship with Colombia and its historical elite could provide leverage for advancing land reform under the Petro administration. Such efforts align well with several crucial elements of the “comprehensive rural security and development” pillar of the Biden administration’s counternarcotics strategy.

Second, US and Colombian policymakers should explicitly and permanently rule out any future aerial fumigation spraying. Aerial herbicide spraying has few long-term benefits (even if some short-term reductions in coca production do occur). The practice was banned in Colombia in 2015 due to concerns about adverse population health outcomes and little in the way of demonstrable gains. Former Colombian President Ivan Duque, however, had campaigned on a pledge to restart the practice, and at the end of 2019, the Colombian government announced that spraying would resume in early 2020. This was in part also a response to then US President Donald Trump’s assertion that “You’re going to have to spray,” (though the COVID pandemic complicated those plans). Furthermore, spraying is not cost effective: the United Nations and the Colombian government have reported that spraying a hectare of crops costs 80 percent more than complying with existing crop replacement plans. Announcing a joint agreement to foreclose future spraying in the country would provide Petro with an early win in environmental protection and bolster his image among his supporters—all with little cost to measurable outcomes for the United States. Both Petro’s and Biden’s administrations have also named advancing climate goals as political priorities; both can claim policy wins while freeing up funding for more urgent and effective domains.

Third, US policymakers should work with their Colombian counterparts to build military and law enforcement capacity through support for the direct implementation of the mandates of the Colombian agency dedicated to illegal crop substitution. That will entail making sure that long-term security provisions are in place in each implementation site so that the rural police, human rights defenders, and social leaders can work in concert to ensure sustainability once external supports have withdrawn. Adequate citizen security does not exist in large segments of Colombia, particularly rural areas. Stabilization and sustainable development pathways out of illicit economies will not succeed until this is adequately addressed. As noted above, targeted killings of civil society leaders, former guerrillas, and indigenous people have been on the rise. In 2021, one social leader was killed every sixty hours. Coupled with the growing violent displacement of independent landowners in the countryside, these dynamics form among the most significant threats to security for the incoming administration. Supporting the professionalization and expansion of the military and police would contribute to Petro’s dual goals of reducing targeted assassinations and disbanding the country’s notoriously brutal mobile anti-riot squad (ESMAD). It would also support the Biden administration’s strategy of supporting rural security. These efforts, coupled with a robust information operations campaign led by the Colombian military with US support, would positively impact tangible and intangible targets alike—from reduced coca production and fewer civilian deaths to a reduction in fear and increased ability to participate in crop substitution programs.

Maintaining close ties despite important policy disagreements will require creativity and political will. Cristina Hoyos Koerbel, a former official in the Colombian Ministry of the Environment, told me of the role that the ministry played in counternarcotics efforts at a time when relations between the United States and Colombia had cooled. In the 1990s, the leaders of both countries had ceased dialogue over US accusations that the drug cartels had funded Colombian President Ernesto Samper’s 1994 election campaign. Despite this, negotiators from the Colombian Ministry of the Environment opened a channel with the US State Department and Department of the Interior to end aerial spraying because of its devastating effects on biodiversity in the region. Unable to conduct direct security dialogues at the time, they decided to desnarcotizar relations—to remove the language of counternarcotics so that some degree of cooperation could still occur. The result was a successful set of negotiations on environmental issues that affected coca production despite official silence in other domains. Similar creativity may be required today to manage the US-Colombia relationship.

Given the complexities of Petro’s agenda, subtlety will prove a useful ally for the United States over the next four years. If the United States truly wants to play a meaningful role in reducing cocaine production in the country, it would be far better served investing counternarcotics resources into producing viable alternatives for rural farmers whose only option is to grow coca—people who, in the absence of such alternatives, would welcome the cartel with open arms.

The production of cocaine in Colombia involves many actors: civilians just getting by, reconfigured paramilitary groups, FARC dissident factions, masquerading violence entrepreneurs, and international drug cartels, among others. This constellation of forces suggests that alternative livelihoods and effective crop substitution programs must be simultaneously combined with both security and market integration and backed by real political will to achieve the intended results. Without this three-pronged approach, the production and flow of cocaine through and out of Colombia will not abate. A great deal of military and aid spending in Colombia goes to destroying cocaine laboratories. But just as quickly as the jungle swallows the remnants of one, another sprouts nearby. Land reform, rural security, and development that connects rural citizens to the markets that will sustain them—these constitute the pillars of a sustainable counternarcotics strategy upon which both the United States and Colombia can agree.

Dr. Erin K. McFee is a UKRI future leaders fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science Latin America and Caribbean Centre, a fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative, and a researcher at the Office for Military-Affiliated Communities at the University of Chicago. You can learn more about her work at erinmcfee.com and her UKRI-funded initiative at trustafterbetrayal.org, follow her on Twitter (@erinmcfee), and connect on LinkedIn.

The author would like to thank “Trust after Betrayal” research associates Connor Christensen and Arturo Gutierrez de Velasco for their contributions to this ongoing project.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or that of any organization the author is affiliated with, including the London School of Economics and Political Science and the Office for Military-Affiliated Communities at the University of Chicago.

Image credit: US Embassy Bogotá, via Wikimedia Commons

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mwi.usma.edu · by Erin K. McFee · August 18, 2022

14. Generation Killed: The Challenges of Routinizing Global Jihad

Excerpts:

Beyond succession itself, leadership and organizational practices must be synchronized and routinized. This is why, for example, then-caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the Islamic State’s media department organized an allegiance campaign after the collapse of the territorial caliphate with the goal of securing pledges of loyalty. The pledges were designed to publicly validate Abu Bakr’s position as leader despite the group’s territorial losses. This paid dividends when Abu Bakr was killed in 2019. Global affiliates pledged their loyalty to his new and anonymous successor — in an uncontested and rather anticlimactic process — and then reiterated them publicly as part of subsequent propaganda campaigns.

As we wait for al-Qaeda to announce a new leader, it is clear that the group has squandered its chance to develop and project an equally rigorous approach to leadership succession. It has failed to communicate a standard criterion for leaders of the group and will likely be left to simply select the best man available through a shura council vote. While the Islamic State presents its own leader as the ultimately religious authority, al-Qaeda remains haunted by having already elevated someone who is now dead.

After the collapse of the Islamic State’s caliphate, al-Qaeda remains a healthy competitor for the leadership of global jihad, with strong African franchises such as Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin in the Sahel and al-Shabaab in Somalia. But leadership succession remains an Achilles heel for the group and has previously had an erosive impact on its cohesion and resilience. The question now is whether its key rivals — from the Islamic State to counterterrorism officials around the world — will exploit these vulnerabilities.

Generation Killed: The Challenges of Routinizing Global Jihad - War on the Rocks

HARORO J. INGRAM AND CRAIG WHITESIDE

warontherocks.com · by Haroro J. Ingram · August 18, 2022

In the past year, U.S. forces killed the top leaders of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in bold over-the-horizon raids: Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul earlier this month and Islamic State leader Abu Ibrahim in Syria last February. In addition to their leadership roles, these men were also members of the founding generation of their respective groups. The killing of al-Zawahiri and Abu Ibrahim is an opportunity to contrast how two groups vying to direct the global jihad manage the leadership and organizational challenges that emerge when revolutionary groups lose their founding generation.

The inspirational and visionary contributions of charismatic founders are immense, and the loss of such leaders presents profound challenges for their organizations. In addition to serving as charismatic figureheads, the founding generation plays a crucial role in establishing plans for leadership succession. When such plans are well-laid and synchronized with broader organizational goals, leadership succession transforms from a singular, inherently disruptive event into a routine that can reinforce the new leader’s credibility. Routine succession, in turn, helps to ensure not just the survivability of a group but its resilience in pursuing its objectives over time.

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Al-Qaeda and Islamic State are a study in contrasts. Al-Qaeda approached its only succession to date in keeping with the loose character of its vanguard role: The charismatic founder, Osama bin Laden, selected his deputy, al-Zawahiri, as successor. It is unclear if al-Qaeda have a published doctrine to support the selection of al-Zawahiri’s successor. In contrast, the Islamic State tied its first succession after the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to the process of declaring and then building a proto-state structure. The Islamic State has since presented its leaders as the head of the caliphate to maximize their legitimacy. It is an approach that the movement has used to successfully manage three forced leadership transitions to date.

We argue that al-Qaeda’s al-Zawahiri-era epitomizes several trends that are crucial for understanding violent non-state groups and the impact of leadership strikes on them: the tendency for such groups to emerge with a charismatic founder, the challenges and opportunities that arise when the charismatic founder is removed, and the first generation’s responsibility to layout leadership and organizational plans. Al-Qaeda’s missed opportunities to routinize leadership succession will continue to have an outsized role in determining how it moves on from its current leadership crisis, and weaken it in the ongoing struggle with the Islamic State for jihadi prominence.

The Charismatic’s Curse

Charismatic leadership is perhaps the most cited and least understood form of authority. People need a reason to consent to the authority of a leader, to listen to what they have to say and to shape their behavior, attitudes, and even beliefs accordingly. In contrast to leaders that are followed due to satisfying tradition (birthright in a monarchy), a legal process (election in a democracy), or their position on an organizational chart (manager in a bureaucracy), charismatic leaders generate their influence from being seen as having extraordinary traits that uniquely imbue them with the ability to lead through extraordinary times. Charismatic leaders emerge during times of crisis, establishing their authority with visions for how to understand and solve them. Thus, charisma is an inherently volatile and potentially fickle form of leadership. It can also be extraordinarily strong and impactful, creating legacies in movements that future generations seek to emulate and revive. The blessing and curse of charismatic leadership is that it is temporary, subsequently requiring either the rise of a new charismatic figure or, more commonly, the implementation of a succession plan.

Almost inevitably, violent non-state revolutionary groups tend to be founded by charismatic figures. Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi epitomise this trend. Both men, in their own ways, presented themselves as the embodiment of their group’s values and purpose. People mobilised from different corners of the world inspired by their vision of global jihad. Moreover, both leaders relied on a close inner circle of minders and propagandists to help them construct and project their image and narrative to supporters.

Typically, inspirational leaders do not make effective strategists and managers. Yet it is the latter that are vital for not just the day-to-day running of a terrorist or insurgent organization but putting in place procedures for the future. After all, merely surviving through the first generation is an immense challenge for violent non-state political groups. But the group’s ability to maintain its purpose over time, what we call “resilience,” appears to be heavily reliant on the first-generation establishing leadership and organzsational routinization practices.

One of the first major tests of resiliency follows the death of the founding charismatic figure. In many important ways, the future fortunes of the Islamic State movement and al-Qaeda were fundamentally shaped by what happened in the aftermath of U.S. strikes. For the Islamic State, that moment came relatively early when al-Zarqawi was killed and, its succession plan in shambles, the group prepared to develop a more robust structure. Consequently, at the vital moment in which the charismatic founder was removed, the organization’s cadre of strategists, managers, and ideologues established succession plans in accordance with their political objectives. In the Islamic State movement, al-Zarqawi’s death was exploited as an opportunity to routinize the group’s structure and practices and provide for future stability.

Al-Qaeda’s 2011 transition was different. Bin Laden’s global charismatic appeal had been vital for cohering a diverse network of formal and aspiring affiliates, supportive groups, and individuals, for well over a decade. But as al-Qaeda’s charismatic founder went into hiding — emerging intermittently to inspire the faithful and, in the latter years, provide “proof of life” — the group’s senior leaders (including the indispensable Atiyah Abd al-Rahman) were being decimated by counterterrorism strikes. Put another way, as the group’s charismatic founder hid in Pakistan, its organizational strata were being eliminated. This in turn exacerbated the vacuum left when bin Laden was killed and created the backdrop for al-Zawahiri’s succession to the top spot.

A Tale of Two Successions: Al-Zawahiri’s Rise in Context

Ayman al-Zawahiri became the leader of al-Qaeda in the most consequential year in the modern jihadist struggle. In 2011, the United States devastated the group’s leadership, killing bin Laden, Anwar al-Awlaki, and Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, the Arab Spring protests threatened authoritarian regimes throughout the region, and the United States withdrew military forces from Iraq. Al-Zawahiri, who served as deputy for the group, succeeded bin Laden, who had struggled to maintain unity and cohesion in the final years of his life. These struggles continued under al-Zawahiri, who saw two major franchises in Iraq and Syria — critical battlefronts at the time — break away in very different manners to form independent groups. Al-Zawahiri’s mishandling of the Islamic State led to a splinter and the rise of a formidable rival. Despite these significant setbacks, al-Zawahiri held al-Qaeda’s global network together for another decade.

In the event of Osama bin Laden’s death, al-Qaeda’s succession plan was essentially that al-Zawahiri, as deputy, was predesignated by the charismatic founder to succeed him. Valid criticisms of al-Zawahiri’s tenure note his focus on ideological issues over operational details and his publicly hands-off management style, but criticisms of his boring speeches typically miss the point. In the aftermath of a charismatic figure, the successor does not need to be charismatic, but the rationale for their succession and authority does need to be explained. Not everyone can be the type of transformative figure Osama bin Laden was for al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda had organizationally routinized its structure into a functioning global enterprise with affiliates around the world but had not done the same with its succession plans. The group’s failure was not in selecting al-Zawahiri to follow a legend. It was in failing to establish a leadership succession doctrine that would appropriately present al-Zawahiri as a different type of leader who rose via a credible succession process that would become routine in the future. More than that, its leadership succession practices needed to complement and enable its broader organizational intent. Al-Zawahiri’s floundering in the wake of bin Laden’s death was not just a product of his personal flaws. It also reflected an ad-hoc approach to leadership and organizational routinization with little depth behind it.

The Islamic State’s predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq, also had a charismatic founder — Abu Musab al-Zarqawi — who led the group’s meteoric rise in occupied Iraq after he pledged to bin Laden in 2004. Al-Zarqawi was killed in an American air strike in June 2006, and al-Qaeda in Iraq elevated al-Zarqawi’s long-time deputy, the Egyptian Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, in a succession process reminiscent of the shift from bin Laden to his deputy al-Zawahiri. However, as a foreigner in Iraq’s contested Sunni militant milieu, al-Muhajir’s elevation was seen by the group as unlikely to solve its growing political problems. Heavy counter-terrorism pressure by American special operations forces led to a diminished leadership bench and forced the group to develop a new leadership succession doctrine that transformed its loose confederation of factions into a proto-state with shadow cabinets called the Islamic State of Iraq.

In accordance with this approach, the newly established Islamic State announced it had a new leader — Abu Umar al-Baghdadi — a descendent of Mohammad’s Quraysh tribe elected by a shura council made up of representatives of all constituent groups in October 2006. For good measure, it then had al-Muhajir pledge allegiance to Abu Umar and serve as his war minister.

To provide a legal justification for this dramatic shift, the group’s religious council released a publication called “Informing the People about the Birth of the Islamic State of Iraq.” In the document, the authors laid out both a justification for an Islamic State and its associated bureaucracy (like the Department of Agriculture) as well as its rationale for selecting a proto-caliph. The criterion was lifted from history and jurisprudence, aping the early caliphate’s reliance on a council of societal elites who selected a leader from the members of the Prophet Mohammad’s Quraysh tribe. The Islamic State followed this publication with announcements vouching for Abu Umar al-Baghdadi’s tribal lineage, his experience fighting their enemies, and his election by group leaders and tribal authorities. They asked fighters and supporters to trust them, as Abu Umar was a new kunya, or honorific, for a current high-level member of the shura council whose identity they wanted to remain anonymous. The group faced sharp critiques over the selection of an anonymous leader and the unilateral declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq. But through the persistent projection and repetition of this succession process, it was able to transition into a more stable politico-military movement with the goal of eventually establishing a caliphate.

The Islamic State’s leadership succession practice, both then and now, succeeded because its founding generation linked it to the creation of a “state” that emulated early Islamic practice to project legitimacy. Building a state, even a shadow state, facilitated an aggregation of other legitimacy sources: election by elites, service to the group, and traditional tribal ties. This approach, carefully created in crisis, has been relied on many times since to transition leaders after targeted killings. In contrast, the bin Laden-al-Zawahiri transition left al-Zawahiri without a robust rationale for his ascension and facing lingering uncertainties about future leadership succession.

Al-Qaeda’s Ambiguity Problem

Al-Qaeda has been dogged by jurisprudential and strategic ambiguity throughout its history, unlike the Islamic State’s single-minded focus on creating a caliphate originating in Iraq and Syria. This ambiguity is understandable in the nascent years of a militant group when it is still working out its capabilities and role. For al-Qaeda, ambiguity may even have been part of its appeal when it was led by bin Laden, when it served as the undisputed flagship of global jihad and when it was able to draw from a diverse set of ideological trends. Al-Qaeda presented itself as a vanguard for the global ummah that would deploy resources and experts to support local jihadist struggles. It championed a comparatively gradualist approach to establishing an Islamic state while subordinating ultimate jurisprudential authority to former Taliban leader Mullah Omar. In contrast, the Islamic State’s leaders argued that all measures should be taken to establish the global caliphate with ultimate authority resting in its leader as caliph — no qualifier, no caveats.

Al-Qaeda’s strategic evolution contributed to its ambiguities. For its first decade, al-Qaeda relied on the wealth of its figurehead to sustain and build its global networks. After the 1998 Tanzania and Kenya attacks, and all the more so after 9/11, bin Laden’s charismatic capital was more powerful than even his (dwindling personal) wealth and it fueled the unprecedented expansion of his al-Qaeda networks. Islamic State founder al-Zarqawi joined al-Qaeda for this reason, largely to compete with more powerful rivals in Iraq. In the final years of bin Laden’s era, it was mostly his legacy that sustained the al-Qaeda network.

This context is vital for understanding the predicament that faced his aging successor al-Zawahiri. The one point of clarity for al-Qaeda was the centrality of bin Laden and his charismatic appeal: It was the gravitational force that held al-Qaeda together. The succession process of a figurehead leader is vital for projecting credibility and authority. It is inherently different, or at least it should be, from succession practices in a bureaucracy whereby the inhabitants of cells in an organization chart merely shift up as leaders are removed or move on. Yet al-Qaeda adopted a chain of succession that, for all intents and purposes, was typical of a bureaucracy. The problem is that in the immense vacuum created in the wake of bin Laden’s killing (despite his years of solitude in Pakistan), al-Qaeda needed to provide clarity around its successor and the organization’s direction. Al-Zawahiri offered neither of these things.

Without a doctrine for succession, al-Zawahiri’s authority was limited to being the pick of bin Laden, a transfer of authority from charismatic founder to deputy. Al-Qaeda did not clearly explain the source of al-Zawahiri’s authority or how will it be passed on to his successor. Al-Zawahiri did not have the heroic battlefield reputation and oratory skills that tend to typify jihadi charismatic figures. He was not presented by al-Qaeda as a religious scholar, nor did he have the formal religious qualifications of a scholar, even if he acted in that role during his leadership of the group. Without these traits, he could never have that most revered of images in the jihadi milieu: the warrior-scholar. Given al-Zawahiri’s long history as a jihadist, al-Qaeda could have presented him as the elder statesman of jihad and his long meandering speeches may have been excused given his history and focus on working the backrooms as a negotiator and fundraiser. Al-Qaeda could have then elevated secondary leaders or those from across its affiliates to amplify their figurehead’s prestige and messaging while simultaneously projecting a global, dynamic image.

Analyzed in isolation, the challenges al-Zawahiri faced were significant — but these were exacerbated by the rise of the Islamic State, which exploited all these vulnerabilities. Indeed, it was almost as if the Islamic State, just as it had postured for U.S. withdrawal in 2011, had similarly positioned itself for the inevitable death of bin Laden and the opportunity this would create in the global jihadist milieu.

Whither Al-Qaeda?

The Islamic State has always elected anonymous leaders. It assures followers it is abiding by the accepted practice of electing the best among them, with the appropriate Qurayshi lineage and religious qualifications, then keeping their identities a secret for operational security. Once the Islamic State secured a territorial caliphate, it continued with this leadership practice, now with a self-proclaimed caliph. This process legitimated the election of Abu Umar as the first leader of the Islamic State as well as the transitions to Abu Bakr, Abu Ibrahim, and the current leader Abu al-Hassan al-Qurayshi. Today, no one knows the leader’s real identity, but the consistent emphasis on the importance of the position over personalities has been a key to the Islamic State’s resilience.

Beyond succession itself, leadership and organizational practices must be synchronized and routinized. This is why, for example, then-caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the Islamic State’s media department organized an allegiance campaign after the collapse of the territorial caliphate with the goal of securing pledges of loyalty. The pledges were designed to publicly validate Abu Bakr’s position as leader despite the group’s territorial losses. This paid dividends when Abu Bakr was killed in 2019. Global affiliates pledged their loyalty to his new and anonymous successor — in an uncontested and rather anticlimactic process — and then reiterated them publicly as part of subsequent propaganda campaigns.

As we wait for al-Qaeda to announce a new leader, it is clear that the group has squandered its chance to develop and project an equally rigorous approach to leadership succession. It has failed to communicate a standard criterion for leaders of the group and will likely be left to simply select the best man available through a shura council vote. While the Islamic State presents its own leader as the ultimately religious authority, al-Qaeda remains haunted by having already elevated someone who is now dead.

After the collapse of the Islamic State’s caliphate, al-Qaeda remains a healthy competitor for the leadership of global jihad, with strong African franchises such as Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin in the Sahel and al-Shabaab in Somalia. But leadership succession remains an Achilles heel for the group and has previously had an erosive impact on its cohesion and resilience. The question now is whether its key rivals — from the Islamic State to counterterrorism officials around the world — will exploit these vulnerabilities.

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Haroro J. Ingram is a senior research fellow at George Washington University’s Program on Extremism.

Craig Whiteside is a professor of national security affairs for the U.S. Naval War College resident program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

Both authors wrote The ISIS Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement (Hurst Publishers) with Charlie Winter. Thanks to Nadeem Khan (@neas_khan) and Cole Bunzel (@colebunzel) for some critical inputs.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

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warontherocks.com · by Haroro J. Ingram · August 18, 2022

15. Russia says Ukraine planning 'provocation' at nuclear plant; Kyiv dismisses accusation

Russia says Ukraine planning 'provocation' at nuclear plant; Kyiv dismisses accusation

Reuters · by Reuters

Summary
Kyiv says solution simple, Russia should exit from plant
Russia denies deploying weaponry at or around plant
UN chief Guterres visiting Ukraine

LONDON, Aug 18 (Reuters) - Russia said on Thursday there was a risk of a man-made disaster at Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and accused Kyiv and the West of planning "provocation" there on Friday during a visit to Ukraine by U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres.

A Ukrainian official dismissed what he depicted as a cynical assertion by Moscow and said Russian forces should leave the plant they captured soon after invading Ukraine nearly six months ago, demine it and remove any munitions stored there.

The Zaporizhzhia nuclear reactor complex (ZNPP), the largest in Europe, has come under repeated shelling, with both Moscow and Kyiv trading blame.

Russia says Ukrainian forces are recklessly firing at the plant, but Ukraine says Russia is deliberately using the reactor complex as a base to launch attacks against its population.

Russia's foreign ministry said at a news briefing that a proposal from Guterres to demilitarise the area around the plant was "unacceptable". read more

Russian defence ministry spokesman Igor Konashenkov told reporters Moscow was taking measures to ensure safety at the complex and denied it had deployed heavy weapons in and around the plant.

However, the ministry said a shutdown of the plant might be attempted if shelling continued. read more

Yevgeny Balitsky, head of the Russian-installed administration in Zaporizhzhia region, said earlier there was a risk that shelling could damage the cooling system of the reactor complex and was quoted as saying the plant was operating with only one unit.

It is not clear how the plant would be shut down, but the ministry said two of the plant's six units may be put into "cold reserve". The plant accounts for one-fifth of Ukraine's annual electricity production.

Ukrainian state nuclear energy company Energoatom said shutting down the plant would increase the risk of "a radiation disaster at the largest nuclear power plant in Europe". Disconnecting the complex's generators from Ukraine's power system would prevent them being used to keep nuclear fuel cool, in the event of a power outage at the plant, it said on the Telegram messaging app.

'PROVOCATION'

The Russian defence ministry accused Ukraine and what it called its "U.S. handlers" of trying to stage a "minor accident" at the plant in southern Ukraine to blame Russia.

It said the "provocation" was timed to coincide with a visit to Ukraine by U.N. chief Guterres, who arrived in Lviv or Wednesday and was due to visit the Black Sea port of Odesa on Friday, and that it may involve a radiation leak.

Reuters could not verify Russia's assertion.

Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, dismissed the Russian defence ministry's remarks, saying it "laughs cynically".

"There is a solution. You just need to take the (munitions)out of the halls, demine the buildings, release the plant's personnel from cells, stop shelling (the southern city of) Nikopol from (the plant's) territory and leave the station," he wrote on Twitter.

In a briefing, Igor Kirillov, head of Russia's radioactive, chemical and biological defence forces, said the plant's back-up support systems had been damaged as a result of shelling.

Kirillov presented a slide, showing that in the event of an accident at the plant, radioactive material would cover Germany, Poland and Slovakia.

Guterres, who is set to meet Zelenskiy later on Thursday, has called for a halt to all fighting near the plant.

Reporting by Reuters; editing by Mark Heinrich, Bernadette Baum and Alex Richardson

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Reuters

16. Estonia says it repelled major cyber attack after removing Soviet monuments

Excerpts:

In a DDoS attack, hackers try to flood a network with unusually high volumes of data traffic in order to paralyse it when it can no longer cope with the scale of data requested.

Estonia moved to boost cyber security in 2007 after suffering extensive attacks on public and private websites that it blamed on Russians angry at its removal of a Soviet-era statue.

The Red Army monument was moved from a Tallinn square, followed by two nights of riots by ethnic Russians.

The Estonian government on Tuesday ordered the swift removal of all public Soviet memorials in majority Russian-speaking Narva, citing rising tensions in the town and accusing Russia of trying to exploit the past to divide Estonian society. read more

Estonia says it repelled major cyber attack after removing Soviet monuments

Reuters · by Andrius Sytas

VILNIUS, Aug 18 (Reuters) - Estonia has repelled "the most extensive cyber attacks since 2007", it said on Thursday, shortly after removing Soviet monuments in a region with an ethnic Russian majority.

Russian hacker group Killnet claimed responsibility for the attack, stating on its Telegram account on Wednesday it had blocked access to more than 200 state and private Estonian institutions, such as an online citizen identification system.

However, an Estonian government official said on Thursday the impact of the attack was limited.

"Yesterday, Estonia was subject to the most extensive cyber attacks it has faced since 2007", tweeted Luukas Ilves, undersecretary for digital transformation at Estonia's Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications.

"With some brief and minor exceptions, websites remained fully available throughout the day. The attack has gone largely unnoticed in Estonia," he added.

Killnet, which claimed a similar attack against Lithuania in June, said it acted after a Soviet Tu-34 tank was removed from public display in the town of Narva to a museum on Tuesday. read more

In a DDoS attack, hackers try to flood a network with unusually high volumes of data traffic in order to paralyse it when it can no longer cope with the scale of data requested.

Estonia moved to boost cyber security in 2007 after suffering extensive attacks on public and private websites that it blamed on Russians angry at its removal of a Soviet-era statue.

The Red Army monument was moved from a Tallinn square, followed by two nights of riots by ethnic Russians.

The Estonian government on Tuesday ordered the swift removal of all public Soviet memorials in majority Russian-speaking Narva, citing rising tensions in the town and accusing Russia of trying to exploit the past to divide Estonian society. read more

Reporting by Andrius Sytas in Vilnius Editing by Mark Potter

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Andrius Sytas

17. RedAlpha Conducts Multi-Year Credential Theft Campaign Targeting Global Humanitarian, Think Tank, and Government Organizations

The 11 page report can be downloaded here: https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/ta-2022-0816.pdf

RedAlpha Conducts Multi-Year Credential Theft Campaign Targeting Global Humanitarian, Think Tank, and Government Organizations

recordedfuture.com

Editor’s Note: The following post is an excerpt of a full report. To read the entire analysis, click here to download the report as a PDF.

This report details multiple campaigns conducted by the likely Chinese state-sponsored threat activity group RedAlpha. The activity was identified through a combination of large-scale automated network traffic analytics and expert analysis. Data sources include the Recorded Future® Platform, SecurityTrails, PolySwarm, DomainTools Iris, urlscan, and common open-source tools and techniques. It will be of most interest to individuals and organizations with strategic and operational intelligence requirements relating to Chinese cyber threat activity, as well as global humanitarian, think tank, and government organizations. Prior to the publication of this report, Recorded Future notified all affected organizations of the identified activity to support incident response and remediation investigations.

Executive Summary

In parallel with regular reporting from humanitarian and media organizations regarding human rights abuses orchestrated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Recorded Future regularly observes Chinese state-sponsored cyber-espionage and surveillance campaigns likely intended to facilitate intelligence collection used in support of such abuses. Among these, we continue to track activity we attribute to the likely Chinese state-sponsored threat activity group RedAlpha (Deepcliff, Red Dev 3), as we previously reported in June 2018. Since this time, we have continued to observe the group engaging in mass credential theft activity primarily targeting humanitarian, think tank, and government organizations globally.

Over the past 3 years, we have observed RedAlpha registering and weaponizing hundreds of domains spoofing organizations such as the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Amnesty International, the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), Radio Free Asia (RFA), the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), and other global government, think tank, and humanitarian organizations that fall within the strategic interests of the Chinese government. Historically, the group has also engaged in direct targeting of ethnic and religious minorities, including individuals and organizations within Tibetan and Uyghur communities. As highlighted within this report, in recent years RedAlpha has also displayed a particular interest in spoofing political, government, and think tank organizations in Taiwan, likely in an effort to gather political intelligence.

Key Judgments

RedAlpha is likely attributable to contractors conducting cyber-espionage activity on behalf of the Chinese state. This assessment is based on the group’s consistent targeting in line with the strategic interests of the CCP, historical links to personas and a private company situated in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the wider regularly documented use of private contractors by Chinese intelligence agencies.
In this activity, RedAlpha very likely sought to gain access to email accounts and other online communications of targeted individuals and organizations.
RedAlpha’s humanitarian and human rights-linked targeting and spoofing of organizations such as Amnesty International and FIDH is particularly concerning given the CCP’s reported human rights abuses in relation to Uyghurs, Tibetans, and other ethnic and religious minority groups in China.

Background

Although it has been controlling large amounts of operational infrastructure and maintaining a high operational tempo since at least 2015, there has been minimal public reporting on RedAlpha activity over the past several years. First identified by CitizenLab in 2018, the group was observed conducting credential-phishing operations targeting the Tibetan community and other ethnic minorities, as well as social movements, a media group, and government agencies in South and Southeast Asia. In June 2018, we published activity linked to 2 RedAlpha campaigns that also targeted the Tibetan community to ultimately deploy the open-source malware family NjRAT. These 2 campaigns overlapped with the CitizenLab reporting based on matching WHOIS registrant data, common targeting of the Tibetan community, and hosting overlaps. RedAlpha activity explored in this report is also referenced in PWC’s 2021 year in review, in which they track the group under the name Red Dev 3.

Historical RedAlpha activity targeted multiple ethnic and religious minority communities that have been persecuted within China, including Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Falun Gong supporters. More generally, organizations and individuals associated with ethnic and religious minorities within the PRC, particularly those within the so-called “Five Poisons”, have been a frequent target for cyber threat activity groups linked to Chinese intelligence agencies over many years. This has included RedDelta (Mustang Panda, TA416) targeting the Vatican and organizations linked to Tibetan and Hong Kong Catholic communities; Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) contractors targeting emails belonging to Chinese Christian religious figures; APT41 (Barium) conducting reconnaissance on activists and other individuals associated with Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement; and the use of zero-day vulnerabilities to target members of the Uyghur community.

Threat Analysis

Over the past 3 years, Recorded Future has observed RedAlpha continuing to conduct credential-phishing activity using large clusters of operational infrastructure to support campaigns. Over this period, the group displayed a consistent set of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). In late 2019 and early 2020, the group likely shifted away from older infrastructure TTPs exhibited in public reporting, such as the registration of domains through GoDaddy and hosting on Choopa (Vultr) and Forewin Telecom infrastructure, and toward those described in the following section.

RedAlpha Infrastructure Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Since at least 2015, RedAlpha has consistently registered and weaponized large amounts of domains for use in credential-theft campaigns. These domains typically imitate well-known email service providers and spoof specific organizations that are either directly targeted in RedAlpha activity or that can be used to impersonate those organizations in activity targeting proximate organizations and individuals. In 2021, we noted a significant uptick in the volume of domains registered by the group, totaling over 350. Over this period, the group’s infrastructure TTPs were characterized by the following criteria that allowed us to cluster this activity together:

Use of *resellerclub[.]com nameservers
Use of the virtual private server (VPS) hosting provider Virtual Machine Solutions LLC (VirMach)
Consistent domain naming conventions, such as the use of “mydrive-”, “accounts-”, “mail-”, “drive-”, and “files-” strings across hundreds of domains
Overlapping WHOIS registrant names, email addresses, phone numbers, and organizations
The use of specific server-side technology components and fake HTTP 404 Not Found errors

Outside of generic spoofing of major email and storage service providers like Yahoo (135 typosquat domains), Google (91 typosquat domains), and Microsoft (70 typosquat domains), we observed the use of large numbers of domains typosquatting humanitarian, think tank, and government organizations including:

Radio Free Asia
Mercator Institute for China Studies
Amnesty International
International Federation for Human Rights
American Chamber of Commerce (including AmCham Taiwan)
Purdue University
India’s National Informatics Centre
Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party
American Institute in Taiwan
Ministries of foreign affairs in multiple countries globally

In many cases highlighted over the following sections, observed phishing pages mirrored legitimate email login portals for the specific organizations named above. We suspect that this means they were intended to target individuals directly affiliated with these organizations rather than simply imitating these organizations to target other third parties. In other cases, the phishing pages used generic login pages for popular mail providers and the intended targeting was ambiguous. The group has used basic PDF files containing links to the identified phishing sites, typically stating that a user needs to click the link to preview or download files.

Targeting of Humanitarian Organizations and Think Tanks

As noted, RedAlpha has regularly registered domains imitating humanitarian organizations and think tanks, including MERICS, FIDH, Amnesty International, RFA, and multiple Taiwanese think tanks. Of particular note, the registration of at least 16 domains spoofing MERICS from early to mid-2021 coincided with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) imposing sanctions on the Berlin-based think tank in March 2021.

RedAlpha’s Consistent Focus on Taiwan

Over the past 3 years, we observed RedAlpha consistently register domains spoofing Taiwanese or Taiwan-based government, think tank, and political organizations. Notably, this included the registration of multiple domains imitating the AIT, the de facto embassy of the United States of America in Taiwan, during a time of increasing US-China tension regarding Taiwan over the past year. Similar to wider activity, these domains were used in credential-phishing activity using fake login pages for popular email providers such as Outlook, as well as emulating other email software such as Zimbra used by these particular organizations (see Figure 6). A sample list of typosquat domains seen spoofing Taiwanese organizations is included in Table 1.

RedAlpha’s Targeting of Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Embassies

As noted in PWC’s 2021 year-in-review report, RedAlpha’s activity has expanded over the past several years to include credential-phishing campaigns spoofing ministries of foreign affairs in multiple countries. We observed phishing pages imitating webmail login portals for Taiwan and Portugal’s MOFAs (see Figures 7 and 8), as well as multiple domains spoofing Brazil and Vietnam’s MOFAs. The previous section also highlighted consistent use of domains imitating the AIT. The group has also consistently spoofed login pages for India’s National Informatics Centre (NIC), which manages wider IT infrastructure and services for the Indian government.

Editor’s Note: The following post is an excerpt of a full report. To read the entire analysis, click here to download the report as a PDF.

recordedfuture.com

18. Can think tanks be foreign agents?

Can think tanks be foreign agents?

New Justice Department guidance should serve as cautionary tale for those organizations doing other countries’ bidding.

August 17, 2022

Written by

Ben Freeman

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/08/17/can-think-tanks-be-foreign-agents/

Late Friday the Department of Justice’s Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) Unit issued guidance indicating that think tanks and non-profits doing work at the behest of a foreign government likely have an obligation to register under FARA.

In a new Advisory Opinion — the FARA Unit’s public, though heavily redacted, responses when organizations ask if they should register or not — the Chief of the FARA Unit argues that the unnamed organization in question should register under FARA as its work for foreign principals included outreach to policymakers in the defense community, facilitating “meetings and new partnerships in the United States, particularly with U.S. government officials,” and has agreed to prepare a study that would “foster bilateral exchange and cooperation between” a foreign government and the United States.

As the Chief argues, each of these actions constitutes “political activity” under the FARA statute, defined as attempts to “influence any agency or official of the United States or any section of the public within the United States with reference to . . . the domestic or foreign policy of the United States.”

All of this is also work that many foreign government funded think tanks do regularly. Outreach to policymakers — including those with sway over policies that would impact foreign funders — is an everyday occurrence for many think tanks. And, events and meetings in D.C. often feature officials from foreign governments that fund the think tank hosting the event. The United Arab Emirates, for example, is one of the top funders of U.S. think tanks and the UAE’s Ambassador in Washington regularly speaks at events, dinners, and on panels hosted by think tanks the UAE funds.

Perhaps the most notable aspect of this latest FARA Advisory Opinion is the contention that an organization preparing a foreign government funded study that would foster bilateral exchange and cooperation between the foreign government and the United States would require FARA registration as, “furthering bilateral exchange with the United States constitutes political activities,” according to the Opinion.

Josh Rosenstein, a partner at Sandler Reiff Lamb Rosenstein & Birkenstock, who advises clients on FARA, explained that “this provides some clarity on its face — that writing a paper for a foreign government advising them on engagement strategies with the U.S. government likely requires registration. But it’s hard to tell whether the [FARA] Unit is more focused on that work itself or the contemplated outreach that might result from the paper.”

If the FARA Unit is, in fact, viewing papers published at the behest of foreign governments as grounds for FARA registration, think tanks should most definitely take notice. As Eli Clifton and I wrote in the Quincy Institute brief “Restoring Trust in the Think Tank Sector,” it’s not unusual for think tanks to be paid by foreign governments to write specific policy papers. For example, as The Intercept first reported, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) was paid $250,000 by the UAE to write a report on the U.S. exporting military drones, which would, according to the UAE Ambassador, “help push the debate in the right direction.” CNAS then released a public report, recommending that the United States should export military drones to a number of countries, including the UAE. In November 2020 the Trump administration announced plans to sell $2.9 billion worth of armed drones to the UAE.

FARA unit Advisory Opinions do not have precedential value and are only intended as a response to the specific organization requesting the opinion, however. So, this new guidance does not automatically apply to CNAS, or any other think tank writing papers at the behest of a foreign government. At the very least though, this new Advisory Opinion should serve as a cautionary tale to think tanks doing the bidding of foreign governments and not registering under FARA.

19. Stricter social media rules for DoD officials aim to prevent snafus

I wonder if we are going about this in the wrong way. Rather the stricter controls perhaps we ought to loosen the restrictions. Rather than be risk averse and worry about embarrassing social media posts, why don't we encourage and empower social media warriors (let slip the social media "dogs of war)". I bet if we really considered how to empower them they will do more good than harm in the long run. - And we have to start with realizing that embarrassing posts do little to no harm except for about 24 hours or so of embarrassment. I think we need new thinking about the troops and social media, not stricter rules.

Stricter social media rules for DoD officials aim to prevent snafus

militarytimes.com · by Meghann Myers · August 16, 2022

For the first time ever, the Defense Department has put out social media guidance governing its widespread official accounts, as platforms like Twitter and Facebook are increasingly used to send out messages for both service members and the general public.

At the same time, some mishandling of accounts ― whether that was accidental use or inappropriate posting on an account affiliated with a command ― has gotten the services and DoD in hot water.

The new policy, released Monday, discourages military public affairs personnel from editorializing official social media posts. And even though it’s been common practice in the past, the new policy lets all spokespeople know that simply throwing “views do not reflect DoD” in a private account bio is not enough.

“If social media is mismanaged or mishandled, the U.S. Government’s reputation with the American public; relationships with interagency, international, State, local, and tribal entities; military operations; and reputation for a high ethical and professional standard may be compromised,” according to the policy. “DoD social media content can be consumed by any audience, intended or unintended, foreign or domestic.”

Public affairs personnel running official accounts are discouraged from posting or commenting anything that isn’t a vetted release, staying away from any flair.

Troops’ use of TikTok may be national security threat, FCC commissioner says

A U.S. regulator says troops' and families' use of TikTok on personal devices could pose a national security threat.

Posts must be accurate, appropriate, timely, written with appropriate tone and approved for public release, according to the guidance.

For public affairs officers who also post in a private capacity, their profiles can’t indicate what they do professionally, lest their private posts be misconstrued as endorsed by DoD.

“DoD personnel must ensure that their personal social media accounts avoid use of DoD titles, insignia, uniforms, or symbols in a way that could imply DoD sanction or endorsement of the content,” the policy reads. “Where confusion or doubt is likely to arise regarding the personal nature of social media activities, personnel are encouraged to include a disclaimer clarifying that their social media communications reflect only their personal views and do not necessarily represent the views of their agency or the United States.”

About Meghann Myers

Meghann Myers is the Pentagon bureau chief at Military Times. She covers operations, policy, personnel, leadership and other issues affecting service members.

20. Crimea attacks point to Ukraine’s newest strategy, official says

Excerpts:

Until last week, Russian troops — and even beach-going tourists — had assumed they were safe in Crimea, which was occupied and annexed by Russia in 2014, because it was out of range of Ukraine’s existing arsenal. Ukraine has been seeking longer-range weapons from the United States but U.S. officials have balked, citing fears that Ukraine could use them to attack Russian territory and perhaps trigger a wider war.

But Ukraine is not using U.S.-supplied weapons in the attacks, mitigating potential concerns in Washington that Ukrainian attacks on Crimea, which Russia regards as Russian territory, could lead to escalation.

“For our American partners it’s an absolutely convenient situation, because we didn’t use American weapons,” Reznikov said.

However, Ukraine’s Western allies have been involved in training the special forces that are responsible for the attacks, said Mikhail Podolyak, an adviser to the defense ministry. NATO partners have provided trainers to show the Ukrainians how to operate behind Russian lines, he said.

Crimea attacks point to Ukraine’s newest strategy, official says

By Liz Sly, John Hudson and David L. Stern

Updated August 18, 2022 at 9:24 a.m. EDT|Published August 17, 2022 at 4:37 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Liz Sly · August 17, 2022

KYIV — Ukraine is hoping that a new strategy of attacking key military targets deep inside Russian-occupied territory will undermine Moscow’s ability to hold the front lines ahead of an eventual Ukrainian counteroffensive to reclaim territory, Ukraine’s defense minister said Wednesday.

Ukraine’s conventional forces lack the weapons and ammunition needed to launch a full-scale ground offensive to retake territory from the Russians, Oleksii Reznikov said in an interview. He said he expects that sufficient quantities will eventually be delivered in line with commitments already made by Ukraine’s Western partners.

In the meantime, Ukraine is seeking to erode Russia’s military capabilities by attacking its most sensitive military installations from within.

“We’re using a strategy to ruin their stocks, to ruin their depots, to ruin their headquarters, commander quarters,” he said. “It’s our answer to their meat-grinder tactics.”

To that end, Ukraine is activating a “resistance force” under the command of Ukrainian special forces to carry out attacks far behind Russian lines, Reznikov said. The force was formed in January in accordance with a law passed last year, and in recent weeks has been activated in Ukrainian territory held by the Russians.

Some spectacular explosions in the Russian-occupied Crimean Peninsula over the past week have drawn attention to the emerging strategy, and to the role of Ukrainian special forces in implementing it. Ukrainian officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, have told The Washington Post that those forces were responsible for the Crimea blasts, at a Russian air base last week and at an ammunition depot and an air base on Tuesday.

Reznikov reiterated the Ukrainian government’s official position that it can neither confirm nor deny Ukrainian involvement in the Crimea attacks. But striking such targets does form a part of Ukraine’s current military’s strategy, and Ukraine lacks weapons systems with the range to reach targets in Crimea from Ukrainian-controlled territory, he said.

Crimea serves as Russia’s main supply route for weapons and ammunition reaching the front lines across the swath of southern Ukraine that was occupied by Russian troops in the first days of the invasion. It is also used as a base for war planes launching missile attacks on Ukrainian towns and cities, making it a valid military target, he said.

“They have their full depots of ammunition in Crimea and they deliver them to the south of Ukraine, the mainland. So we need to destroy them, like we did in the Kyiv campaign, to cut their logistics lines,” he said. He was referring to the way Ukrainian forces interrupted Russian supply lines and eventually forced a Russian retreat from the Kyiv area in the first weeks of the war.

Until last week, Russian troops — and even beach-going tourists — had assumed they were safe in Crimea, which was occupied and annexed by Russia in 2014, because it was out of range of Ukraine’s existing arsenal. Ukraine has been seeking longer-range weapons from the United States but U.S. officials have balked, citing fears that Ukraine could use them to attack Russian territory and perhaps trigger a wider war.

But Ukraine is not using U.S.-supplied weapons in the attacks, mitigating potential concerns in Washington that Ukrainian attacks on Crimea, which Russia regards as Russian territory, could lead to escalation.

“For our American partners it’s an absolutely convenient situation, because we didn’t use American weapons,” Reznikov said.

However, Ukraine’s Western allies have been involved in training the special forces that are responsible for the attacks, said Mikhail Podolyak, an adviser to the defense ministry. NATO partners have provided trainers to show the Ukrainians how to operate behind Russian lines, he said.

He and other officials call the new strategy “de-occupation.” Podolyak said its goal was to counter Russia’s “shock fist” strategy of slow advances on the ground, using artillery to pulverize towns and villages, then moving in only after soldiers and civilians have been forced to flee.

The main targets, he said, are ammunition and fuel warehouses and headquarters housing the Russian officers who command front-line troops. By hitting those, he said, “we break the active operational support and bleed the Russian army.”

Podolyak said the strategy also includes U.S. High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) delivered by the United States starting in late June. They are being used to strike similar targets but are confined by their maximum 50-mile reach.

They have nonetheless played a major role in recent weeks, blunting Russian advances in the eastern Donbas region that is the current focus of Russia’s military offensive. Since they arrived, the HIMARS have been used to destroy ammunition depots and command-and-control headquarters positioned behind Russian lines that had previously been out of range.

Taking the fight to Crimea will further impede Russia’s ability to sustain military operations in the south of the country, and notably the Kherson region, which Ukraine has indicated will be the first target of a counteroffensive, Reznikov said. The HIMARS have already succeeded in disrupting Russian supply lines to the city of Kherson, which depend on just three bridges across the Dnieper River that have been heavily bombarded by the high-precision rocket systems in recent weeks.

In Wednesday’s attack, Ukrainian media reports said at least 10 Russian soldiers were killed in a strike on a Russian command post in Nova Kakhovka, a town at one of the key bridges. The reports did not say what weapon had been used.

The Washington Post · by Liz Sly · August 17, 2022

21. China’s New White Paper on Taiwan: We Ignore It at Our Peril

See the white paper here: https://english.news.cn/20220810/df9d3b8702154b34bbf1d451b99bf64a/c.html

Conclusion:

Perhaps the most important takeaway from the new white paper is the lack of subtlety and the increased confidence of the CCP in its ability to bring about reunification with Taiwan peacefully or by force. China’s leaders are undoubtedly playing to a domestic audience with the white paper, but they also appear to have judged that the regional balance of power has shifted in their favor, just as the Soviet Union did after America’s loss in Vietnam and its subsequent global retreat under President Jimmy Carter. China may view President Joe Biden as a Carter-like president who has suffered from international debacles (Afghanistan) and appeared weak on the world stage. America and the West were fortunate that after Carter came President Ronald Reagan. The big question is will China wait until after Biden to make its move?

China’s New White Paper on Taiwan: We Ignore It at Our Peril - The American Spectator |

spectator.org · by Francis P. Sempa · August 18, 2022

China’s New White Paper on Taiwan: We Ignore It at Our Peril

The CCP has increased confidence in its ability to take over the country.

August 18, 2022, 12:49 AM

Chinese soldiers on July 3, 2019 (Sergei Prokhorov/Shutterstock)

A few days ago, China’s State Council issued a new white paper on Taiwan titled “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era.” It is no accident, as the Marxists say, that the Chinese Communist Party chose to publicly release the paper in the wake of the Chinese navy’s dangerous exercises surrounding the island of Taiwan. The paper’s table of contents leaves little doubt as to the CCP’s policy approach to Taiwan: “I. Taiwan Is Part of China – This Is an Indisputable Fact”; “II. Resolute Efforts of the CPC to Realize China’s Complete Reunification”; “III. China’s Complete Reunification Is a Process That Cannot Be Halted”; “IV. National Reunification in the New Era”; and “V. Bright Prospects for Peaceful Reunification.”

The State Council in China is “the executive body of the highest organ of state power” but it is completely staffed with members of, and is subservient to, the CCP and President Xi Jinping. It was formally established in 1954 under Mao Zedong. The council includes the Chinese premier, vice premiers, state councilors, ministry executives, the CCP’s general secretary (Xi), and others. The key positions on the council are nominated by Xi and confirmed by the National Party Congress. Under China’s 1982 Constitution, the council exercises broad administrative powers. It is “responsible for carrying out the principles and policies” of the CCP.

The preamble to the white paper states that reunification with Taiwan “is a shared aspiration of all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation” and “a historic mission of the Communist Party of China.” It accuses Taiwan’s political leaders of redoubling their efforts to “divide the country,” and notes that “some external forces have tried to exploit Taiwan to contain China, prevent the Chinese nation from achieving complete reunification, and halt the process of national rejuvenation.” And the paper notes that “national rejuvenation is driven by an unstoppable force.” (READ MORE: We Are Now in the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis)

After reciting their version of history which holds that Taiwan has been and always will be part of China, the authors of the white paper assert that “the sovereignty and territory of China never have been and will never be divided, and Taiwan’s status as part of China’s territory has never changed and will never be allowed to change.” The authors accuse the United States and a “small number” of other countries of colluding “with forces in Taiwan” regarding Taiwan’s legal status. China’s Constitution states that “Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People’s Republic of China,” and claims that it is the “inviolable duty of all Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland.”

The paper notes that China’s Anti-Secession Law of 2005 and the National Security Law of 2015 provide that Taiwan is part of China and that China will “brook no violation” of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Taiwan’s “status as part of China is unalterable.”

Distorting history, the white paper claims that the CCP under Mao Zedong promoted policies “for peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question” — a statement that obscures the fact that Mao’s plan in 1950 to invade and conquer Taiwan was foiled by the U.S. Seventh Fleet shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War and that Chinese forces initiated offensive operations against Taiwan twice in the mid-to-late 1950s but were ultimately deterred by the strong leadership and policies of President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Reunification with Taiwan, the authors state, “is the only way to avoid the risk of Taiwan being invaded and occupied again by foreign countries, to foil the attempts of external forces to contain China, and to safeguard the sovereignty, security, and development interests of our country.” China’s stated goal is “complete national reunification.” This is reminiscent of Adolf Hitler’s approach to a greater Germany that embraced, for example, the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia.

The white paper demonizes Taiwan’s leaders, accusing them of colluding with external forces to “divide the country.” Taiwan’s leaders are “radical separatists” who have taken “provocative actions” to undermine China’s sovereignty. Taiwan’s leaders, not the CCP, the paper states, have increased tensions in the South China Sea and endangered peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Then the authors demonize the United States for its “delusions of hegemony” resulting from being “trapped in a Cold War mindset.” The U.S. is inciting “separatist forces” in Taiwan in an effort to “create obstacles to China’s peaceful reunification.”

The authors of the white paper remind readers that China “won a resounding victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea” — otherwise known as the Korean War, which China’s ally North Korea started after being given the green light by Mao and Stalin. Remarkably, the white paper uses the example of Hong Kong to promote its version of the “peaceful reunification” of Taiwan and China. The crackdown in Hong Kong, in other words, is China’s version of the “One country, two systems” approach, which in reality is “One country, one system” — the system controlled by the CCP.

China warns outside powers — and specifically the United States — that it will decide its own affairs, and that “the Taiwan question is an internal affair that involves China’s core interests … and no external interference will be tolerated.” China, the paper states, “will not renounce the use of force” and will take “all necessary measures” to bring about reunification with Taiwan. “The historic goal of reuniting our motherland,” the paper concludes, “must be realized and will be realized.”

One of the world’s best China watchers, the Diplomat’s editor-in-chief, Shannon Tiezzi, notes that reunification will likely result in the harsh persecution of Taiwan’s current leadership and anyone on the island who opposes reunification. “[T]here have been clear signals,” she writes, “that any unification scenario on Taiwan would involve prosecution and jail time for Taiwan’s current leadership” for being “separatists” or “secessionists.” Tiezzi also notes that those who oppose reunification will be subject to “re-education” similar to the “massive re-education campaign” against the Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Muslims in Xinjiang. Indeed, she quotes China’s ambassador to France as saying, “It’s necessary to reeducate [Taiwan’s population] to eliminate the separatist thought and secessionist theory.” Tiezzi concludes that China’s white paper presents a “chilling prospect” for Taiwan’s 23 million people.

A few days after the white paper’s release, the Global Times, the CCP’s English-language mouthpiece, suggested that Americans read it if they don’t want war. “Americans still have time to read China’s White Paper … to change course … and extinguish the fuse they lit that otherwise will explode in war.”

And the Washington Times’ Bill Gertz reports that China is continuing its military exercises near Taiwan, with Taiwanese military officials stating that they detected five Chinese warships and 30 PLA aircraft in the Taiwan Strait.

Perhaps the most important takeaway from the new white paper is the lack of subtlety and the increased confidence of the CCP in its ability to bring about reunification with Taiwan peacefully or by force. China’s leaders are undoubtedly playing to a domestic audience with the white paper, but they also appear to have judged that the regional balance of power has shifted in their favor, just as the Soviet Union did after America’s loss in Vietnam and its subsequent global retreat under President Jimmy Carter. China may view President Joe Biden as a Carter-like president who has suffered from international debacles (Afghanistan) and appeared weak on the world stage. America and the West were fortunate that after Carter came President Ronald Reagan. The big question is will China wait until after Biden to make its move?

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spectator.org · by Francis P. Sempa · August 18, 2022

22. Full Text: The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era

My summary of China's strategy and objective: China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, and displace democratic institutions.

Full Text: The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era

english.news.cn

BEIJING, Aug. 10 (Xinhua) -- The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council and the State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China published a white paper titled "The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era" on Wednesday.

The following is the full text of the white paper:

The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era

The People's Republic of China

The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council and The State Council Information Office

August 2022

Contents

Preamble

I. Taiwan Is Part of China - This Is an Indisputable Fact

II. Resolute Efforts of the CPC to Realize China's Complete Reunification

III. China's Complete Reunification Is a Process That Cannot Be Halted

IV. National Reunification in the New Era

V. Bright Prospects for Peaceful Reunification

Conclusion

Preamble

Resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China's complete reunification is a shared aspiration of all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation. It is indispensable for the realization of China's rejuvenation. It is also a historic mission of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The CPC, the Chinese government, and the Chinese people have striven for decades to achieve this goal.

The 18th National Congress of the CPC in 2012 heralded a new era in building socialism with Chinese characteristics. Under the strong leadership of the CPC Central Committee with Xi Jinping at the core, the CPC and the Chinese government have adopted new and innovative measures in relation to Taiwan. They have continued to chart the course of cross-Straits relations, safeguard peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits, and promote progress towards national reunification. However, in recent years the Taiwan authorities, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), have redoubled their efforts to divide the country, and some external forces have tried to exploit Taiwan to contain China, prevent the Chinese nation from achieving complete reunification, and halt the process of national rejuvenation.

The CPC has united the Chinese people and led them in fulfilling the First Centenary Goal of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects as scheduled, and in embarking on a new journey towards the Second Centenary Goal of building China into a modern socialist country.

The Chinese nation has achieved a historic transformation from standing upright to becoming prosperous and growing in strength, and national rejuvenation is driven by an unstoppable force. This marks a new starting point for reunification.

The Chinese government has published two previous white papers on Taiwan. One was The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China in August 1993, and the other was The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue in February 2000. These two white papers provided a comprehensive and systematic elaboration of the basic principles and policies regarding the resolution of the Taiwan question. This new white paper is being released to reiterate the fact that Taiwan is part of China, to demonstrate the resolve of the CPC and the Chinese people and their commitment to national reunification, and to emphasize the position and policies of the CPC and the Chinese government in the new era.

I. Taiwan Is Part of China - This Is an Indisputable Fact

Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times. This statement has a sound basis in history and jurisprudence. New archeological discoveries and research findings regularly attest to the profound historical and cultural ties between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. A large number of historical records and annals document the development of Taiwan by the Chinese people in earlier periods.

The earliest references to this effect are to be found, among others, in Seaboard Geographic Gazetteer compiled in the year 230 by Shen Ying of the State of Wu during the Three Kingdoms Period. The royal court of the Sui Dynasty had on three occasions sent troops to Taiwan, called Liuqiu at that time. Starting from the Song and Yuan dynasties, the imperial central governments of China all set up administrative bodies to exercise jurisdiction over Penghu and Taiwan.

In 1624, Dutch colonialists invaded and occupied the southern part of Taiwan. In 1662, General Zheng Chenggong, hailed as a national hero, led an expedition and expelled them from the island. Subsequently, the Qing court gradually set up more administrative bodies in Taiwan. In 1684, a Taiwan prefecture administration was set up under the jurisdiction of Fujian Province. In 1885, Taiwan's status was upgraded and it became the 20th province of China.

In July 1894, Japan launched a war of aggression against China. In April 1895, the defeated Qing government was forced to cede Taiwan and the Penghu Islands to Japan. During the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1931-1945), China's Communists called for the recovery of Taiwan. Talking with American journalist Nym Wales on May 15, 1937, Mao Zedong said that China's goal was to achieve a final victory in the war - a victory that would recover the occupied Chinese territories in Northeast China and to the south of the Shanhai Pass, and secure the liberation of Taiwan.

On December 9, 1941, the Chinese government issued a declaration of war against Japan, and proclaimed that all treaties, conventions, agreements, and contracts regarding relations between China and Japan had been abrogated, and that China would recover Taiwan and the Penghu Islands.

The Cairo Declaration issued by China, the United States and the United Kingdom on December 1, 1943 stated that it was the purpose of the three allies that all the territories Japan had stolen from China, such as Northeast China, Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, should be restored to China.

The Potsdam Proclamation was signed by China, the United States and the United Kingdom on July 26, 1945, and subsequently recognized by the Soviet Union. It reiterated: "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out." In September of the same year, Japan signed the instrument of surrender, in which it promised that it would faithfully fulfill the obligations laid down in the Potsdam Proclamation. On October 25 the Chinese government announced that it was resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan, and the ceremony to accept Japan's surrender in Taiwan Province of the China war theater of the Allied powers was held in Taibei (Taipei). From that point forward, China had recovered Taiwan de jure and de facto through a host of documents with international legal effect.

On October 1, 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was founded, becoming the successor to the Republic of China (1912-1949), and the Central People's Government became the only legitimate government of the whole of China. The new government replaced the previous KMT regime in a situation where China, as a subject under international law, did not change and China's sovereignty and inherent territory did not change. As a natural result, the government of the PRC should enjoy and exercise China's full sovereignty, which includes its sovereignty over Taiwan.

As a result of the civil war in China in the late 1940s and the interference of external forces, the two sides of the Taiwan Straits have fallen into a state of protracted political confrontation. But the sovereignty and territory of China have never been divided and will never be divided, and Taiwan's status as part of China's territory has never changed and will never be allowed to change.

At its 26th session in October 1971, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758, which undertook "to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it". This resolution settled once and for all the political, legal and procedural issues of China's representation in the UN, and it covered the whole country, including Taiwan. It also spelled out that China has one single seat in the UN, so there is no such thing as "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan".

The specialized agencies of the UN later adopted further resolutions restoring to the PRC its lawful seat and expelling the representatives of the Taiwan authorities. One of these is Resolution 25.1 adopted at the 25th World Health Assembly in May 1972. It was clearly stated in the official legal opinions of the Office of Legal Affairs of the UN Secretariat that "the United Nations considers 'Taiwan' as a province of China with no separate status", and the "'authorities' in 'Taipei' are not considered to... enjoy any form of government status". At the UN the island is referred to as "Taiwan, Province of China"[1].

Resolution 2758 is a political document encapsulating the one-China principle whose legal authority leaves no room for doubt and has been acknowledged worldwide. Taiwan does not have any ground, reason, or right to join the UN, or any other international organization whose membership is confined to sovereign states.

In recent years some elements in a small number of countries, the US foremost among them, have colluded with forces in Taiwan, to falsely claim that the resolution did not conclusively resolve the issue of Taiwan's representation. Puffing up the illegal and invalid Treaty of San Francisco[2] and disregarding the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation and other international legal documents, they profess that the status of Taiwan has yet to be determined, and declare their support for "Taiwan's meaningful participation in the UN system". What they are actually attempting to do is to alter Taiwan's status as part of China and create "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" as part of a political ploy - using Taiwan to contain China. These actions in violation of Resolution 2758 and international law are a serious breach of political commitments made by these countries. They damage China's sovereignty and dignity, and treat the basic principles of international law with contempt. The Chinese government has condemned and expressed its resolute opposition to them.

The one-China principle represents the universal consensus of the international community; it is consistent with the basic norms of international relations. To date, 181 countries including the United States have established diplomatic relations with the PRC on the basis of the one-China principle. The China-US Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, published in December 1978, states: "The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." It also states: "The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan."

The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress (NPC) in December 1982, stipulates: "Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic of China. It is the inviolable duty of all Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland."

The Anti-Secession Law, adopted at the Third Session of the 10th NPC in March 2005, stipulates: "There is only one China in the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. China's sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division. Safeguarding China's sovereignty and territorial integrity is the common obligation of all Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included. Taiwan is part of China. The state shall never allow the 'Taiwan independence' secessionist forces to make Taiwan secede from China under any name or by any means."

The National Security Law, adopted at the 15th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 12th NPC in July 2015, stipulates: "The sovereignty and territorial integrity of China brook no violation or separation. Safeguarding national sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity is the common duty of all Chinese citizens, including Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan compatriots."

We are one China, and Taiwan is part of China. This is an indisputable fact supported by history and the law. Taiwan has never been a state; its status as part of China is unalterable. Any attempt to distort these facts and dispute or deny the one-China principle will end in failure.

II. Resolute Efforts of the CPC to Realize China's Complete Reunification

The CPC has always been dedicated to working for the wellbeing of the Chinese people and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Soon after its founding in 1921, the CPC set itself the goal of freeing Taiwan from colonial rule, reuniting it with the rest of the country and liberating the whole nation, including compatriots in Taiwan. It has made a tremendous effort to achieve this goal.

The CPC is committed to the historic mission of resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China's complete reunification. Under its resolute leadership, people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits have worked together to de-escalate tension across the Straits. They have set out on a path of peaceful development and made many breakthroughs in improving cross-Straits relations.

After the founding of the PRC in 1949, China's Communists, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, proposed the essential guideline, underlying principle, and basic policy for peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question. The CPC prepared and worked for the liberation of Taiwan, thwarted the Taiwan authorities' plans to attack the mainland, and foiled attempts to create "two Chinas" and "one China, one Taiwan". Through their efforts, the lawful seat and rights of the PRC in the United Nations were restored and the one-China principle was subscribed to by the majority of countries, laying important groundwork for peaceful reunification. The CPC central leadership established high-level contact with the Taiwan authorities through proper channels in pursuit of a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question.

Following the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee in 1978, with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the United States, China's Communists, led by Deng Xiaoping, defined the fundamental guideline for peaceful reunification in the vital interests of the country and the people and on the basis of the consensus for peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question. The CPC introduced the creative and well-conceived concept of One Country, Two Systems, and applied it first in resolving the questions of Hong Kong and Macao. It took action to ease military confrontation across the Taiwan Straits, restore contact, and open up people-to-people exchanges and cooperation, opening a new chapter in cross-Straits relations.

After the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th CPC Central Committee in 1989, China's Communists, led by Jiang Zemin, made eight proposals for the development of cross-Straits relations and the peaceful reunification of China[3]. The CPC facilitated agreement across the Straits on the 1992 Consensus, which embodies the one-China principle. It initiated cross-Straits consultations and negotiations, resulting in the first talks between heads of the non-governmental organizations authorized by the two sides of the Straits, and expanded cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation in various fields. The CPC took firm action against separatist activities led by Lee Teng-hui, and struck hard at the separatist forces seeking "Taiwan independence". It ensured the smooth return of Hong Kong and Macao to China, and applied the policy of One Country, Two Systems, which had a constructive impact on the settlement of the Taiwan question.

After the 16th CPC National Congress in 2002, China's Communists, led by Hu Jintao, highlighted the importance of peaceful development of cross-Straits relations. The CPC pushed for the enactment of the Anti-Secession Law to curb separatist activities in Taiwan, hosted the first talks between the leaders of the CPC and the Kuomintang in six decades since 1945, and defeated attempts by Chen Shui-bian to fabricate a legal basis for "independence". The CPC effected profound changes in moving the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations forward by promoting institutionalized consultations and negotiations that produced fruitful results, establishing overall direct two-way links in mail, business and transport, and facilitating the signing and implementation of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement.

After the 18th CPC National Congress in 2012, China's Communists, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, took a holistic approach to cross-Straits relations in keeping with changing circumstances, added substance to the theory on national reunification and the principles and policies concerning Taiwan, and worked to keep cross-Straits relations on the right track. The CPC developed its overall policy for resolving the Taiwan question in the new era, and set out the overarching guideline and a program of action.

At its 19th National Congress in October 2017, the CPC affirmed the basic policy of upholding One Country, Two Systems and promoting national reunification, and emphasized its resolve never to allow any person, any organization, or any political party, at any time or in any form, to separate any part of Chinese territory from China.

In January 2019, Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee and president of China, addressed a meeting marking the 40th anniversary of the release of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan. In his speech, Xi Jinping proposed major policies to advance the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and the peaceful reunification of China in the new era. These are: first, working together to promote China's rejuvenation and its peaceful reunification; second, seeking a Two Systems solution to the Taiwan question and making innovative efforts towards peaceful reunification; third, abiding by the one-China principle and safeguarding the prospects for peaceful reunification; fourth, further integrating development across the Straits and consolidating the foundations for peaceful reunification; fifth, forging closer bonds of heart and mind between people on both sides of the Straits and strengthening joint commitment to peaceful reunification.

The CPC and the Chinese government have thereby adopted a series of major measures for charting the course of cross-Straits relations and realizing China's peaceful reunification:

- The CPC and the Chinese government have facilitated the first meeting and direct dialogue between leaders of the two sides since 1949, raising exchanges and interactions to new heights, opening up a new chapter, and creating new space for cross-Straits relations. This is a new milestone. The departments in charge of cross-Straits affairs on both sides have established regular contact and communication mechanisms on a common political foundation, and the heads of the two departments have exchanged visits and set up hotlines.

- Upholding the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus, the CPC and the Chinese government have facilitated exchanges between political parties across the Straits, and conducted dialogues, consultations, and in-depth exchanges of views on cross-Straits relations and the future of the Chinese nation with relevant political parties, organizations, and individuals in Taiwan. These efforts have resulted in consensus on multiple issues, and promoted a number of joint initiatives exploring the Two Systems solution to the Taiwan question with all sectors of Taiwan society.

- Guided by the conviction that people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits are of the same family, the CPC and the Chinese government have promoted peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and integrated development of the two sides for the benefit of both the mainland and Taiwan. We have also refined the institutional arrangements, policies and measures to promote cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation, designed to advance the wellbeing of the people of Taiwan. These include the delivery of water from the coastal province of Fujian to Kinmen Island, electronic travel passes for Taiwan residents to enter or leave the mainland, residence permits for Taiwan residents, progressively ensuring that Taiwan compatriots have equal access to public services so as to facilitate their studying, starting businesses, working and living on the mainland, and an ongoing effort to pave the way for Taiwan to benefit first from the mainland's development opportunities.

- While countering interference and obstruction from separatist forces, the CPC and the Chinese government have called on the people of Taiwan to promote effective and in-depth cooperation and people-to-people exchanges in various fields across the Straits. Having overcome the impact of COVID-19, we have held a number of exchange events such as the Straits Forum, and maintained the momentum of cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation.

- Resolute in defending state sovereignty and territorial integrity and opposing separatist activities and external interference, the CPC and the Chinese government have safeguarded peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits and the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation. We have taken lawful action against and effectively deterred separatist forces. We have handled Taiwan's external exchanges in a sound manner, and consolidated the international community's commitment to the one-China principle.

Under the guidance of the CPC, great progress has been made in cross-Straits relations over the past seven decades, especially since the estrangement between the two sides was ended. Increased exchanges, broader cooperation and closer interactions have brought tangible benefits to people across the Straits, especially of Taiwan. This fully demonstrates that cross-Straits amity and cooperation are mutually beneficial.

The volume of cross-Straits trade was only US$46 million in 1978. It rose to US$328.34 billion in 2021, up by a factor of more than 7,000. The mainland has been Taiwan's largest export market for the last 21 years, generating a large annual surplus for the island. The mainland is also the largest destination for Taiwan's off-island investment. By the end of 2021 Taiwan businesses had invested in almost 124,000 projects on the mainland, to a total value of US$71.34 billion[4].

In 1987 less than 50,000 visits were made between the two sides; by 2019 this number had soared to about 9 million. In the past three years, affected by COVID-19, online communication has become the main form of people-to-people interactions across the Straits, and the numbers of people participating in and covered by online communication are reaching new highs.

The CPC has always been the spine of the Chinese nation, exercising strong leadership in realizing national rejuvenation and reunification. Its consistent efforts over the decades to resolve the Taiwan question and achieve complete national reunification are based on the following:

First, the one-China principle must be upheld, and no individual or force should be allowed to separate Taiwan from China.

Second, it is imperative to strive for the wellbeing of all Chinese people, including those in Taiwan, and to realize the aspirations of all Chinese people for a better life.

Third, we must follow the principles of freeing the mind, seeking truth from facts, maintaining the right political orientation, and breaking new ground, and defend the fundamental interests of the nation and the core interests of the state in formulating principles and policies on work related to Taiwan.

Fourth, it is necessary to have the courage and skill to fight against any force that attempts to undermine China's sovereignty and territorial integrity or stands in the way of its reunification.

Fifth, extensive unity and solidarity must be upheld to mobilize all factors to fight against any force that would divide the country, and pool strengths to advance national reunification.

III. China's Complete Reunification Is a Process That Cannot Be Halted

Against a backdrop of profound and complex changes in the domestic and international situation, our cause of complete national reunification is facing new challenges. The CPC and the Chinese government have the strength and the confidence to deal with complexities and overcome risks and threats, and the ability to take great strides forward on the path to national reunification.

1. Complete Reunification Is Critical to National Rejuvenation

Throughout China's 5,000-year history, national reunification and opposition to division have remained a common ideal and a shared tradition of the whole nation. In the modern era from the mid-19th century, due to the aggression of Western powers and the decadence of feudal rule, China was gradually reduced to a semi-feudal, semi-colonial society, and went through a period of suffering worse than anything it had previously known. The country endured intense humiliation, the people were subjected to great pain, and the Chinese civilization was plunged into darkness. Japan's 50-year occupation of Taiwan epitomized this humiliation and inflicted agony on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. Our two sides face each other just across a strip of water, yet we are still far apart. The fact that we have not yet been reunified is a scar left by history on the Chinese nation. We Chinese on both sides should work together to achieve reunification and heal this wound.

National rejuvenation has been the greatest dream of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation since the modern era began. Only by realizing complete national reunification can the Chinese people on both sides of the Straits cast aside the shadow of civil war and create and enjoy lasting peace. National reunification is the only way to avoid the risk of Taiwan being invaded and occupied again by foreign countries, to foil the attempts of external forces to contain China, and to safeguard the sovereignty, security, and development interests of our country. It is the most effective remedy to secessionist attempts to divide our country, and the best means to consolidate Taiwan's status as part of China and advance national rejuvenation. It will enable us to pool the strengths of the people on both sides, build our common home, safeguard our interests and wellbeing, and create a brighter future for the Chinese people and the Chinese nation. As Dr Sun Yat-sen, the great pioneer of China's revolution, once said, "Unification is the hope of all Chinese nationals. If China can be unified, all Chinese will enjoy a happy life; if it cannot, all will suffer."

In exploring the path to rejuvenation and prosperity, China has endured vicissitudes and hardships. "Unification brings strength while division leads to chaos." This is a law of history. The realization of complete national reunification is driven by the history and culture of the Chinese nation and determined by the momentum towards and circumstances surrounding our national rejuvenation. Never before have we been so close to, confident in, and capable of achieving the goal of national rejuvenation. The same is true when it comes to our goal of complete national reunification. The Taiwan question arose as a result of weakness and chaos in our nation, and it will be resolved as national rejuvenation becomes a reality. When all the Chinese people stick together and work together, we will surely succeed in realizing national reunification on our way to national rejuvenation.

2. National Development and Progress Set the Direction of Cross-Straits Relations

China's development and progress are a key factor determining the course of cross-Straits relations and the realization of complete national reunification. In particular, the great achievements over four decades of reform, opening up and modernization have had a profound impact on the historical process of resolving the Taiwan question and realizing complete national reunification. No matter which political party or group is in power in Taiwan, it cannot alter the course of progress in cross-Straits relations or the trend towards national reunification.

International Monetary Fund statistics show that in 1980 the GDP of the mainland was about US$303 billion, just over 7 times that of Taiwan, which was about US$42.3 billion; in 2021, the GDP of the mainland was about US$17.46 trillion, more than 22 times that of Taiwan, which was about US$790 billion.[5]

China's development and progress, and in particular the steady increases in its economic power, technological strength, and national defense capabilities, are an effective curb against separatist activities and interference from external forces. They also provide broad space and great opportunities for cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation. As more and more compatriots from Taiwan, especially young people, pursue their studies, start businesses, seek jobs, or go to live on the mainland, cross-Straits exchanges, interaction and integration are intensified in all sectors, the economic ties and personal bonds between the people on both sides run deeper, and our common cultural and national identities grow stronger, leading cross-Straits relations towards reunification.

The CPC has united the Chinese people and led them in embarking on the new journey of building China into a modern socialist country in all respects. Following the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the mainland has improved its governance and maintained long-term economic growth; it enjoys a solid material foundation, a wealth of human resources, a huge market, strong resilience in development, and social stability. It therefore has many strengths and favorable conditions for further development, and these have become the driving force for reunification.

Grounding its effort in the new development stage, the mainland is committed to applying the new development philosophy, creating a new development dynamic, and promoting high-quality development. As a result, the overall strength and international influence of the mainland will continue to increase, and its influence over and appeal to Taiwan society will keep growing. We will have a more solid foundation for resolving the Taiwan question and greater ability to do so. This will give a significant boost to national reunification.

3. Any Attempt by Separatist Forces to Prevent Reunification Is Bound to Fail

Taiwan has been an integral part of China's territory since ancient times. Moves to separate Taiwan from China represent the serious crime of secession, and undermine the common interests of compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits and the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation. They will lead nowhere.

The DPP authorities have adopted a separatist stance, and colluded with external forces in successive provocative actions designed to divide the country. They refuse to recognize the one-China principle, and distort and deny the 1992 Consensus. They assert that Taiwan and the mainland should not be subordinate to each other, and proclaim a new "two states" theory. On the island, they constantly press for "de-sinicization" and promote "incremental independence". They incite radical separatists in and outside the DPP to lobby for amendments to their "constitution" and "laws". They deceive the people of Taiwan, incite hostility against the mainland, and obstruct and undermine cross-Straits exchanges, cooperation and integrated development. They have steadily built up their military forces with the intention of pursuing "independence" and preventing reunification by force. They join with external forces in trying to sow the seeds of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan". The actions of the DPP authorities have resulted in tension in cross-Straits relations, endangering peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits, and undermining the prospects and restricting the space for peaceful reunification. These are obstacles that must be removed in advancing the process of peaceful reunification.

Taiwan belongs to all the Chinese people, including the 23 million Taiwan compatriots. The Chinese people are firm in their resolve and have a deep commitment to safeguarding China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation, and this resolve and commitment will frustrate any attempt to divide the country. When Taiwan was invaded by a foreign power more than 100 years ago, China was a poor and weak country. More than 70 years ago, China defeated the invaders and recovered Taiwan. Today, China has grown into the world's second largest economy. With significant growth in its political, economic, cultural, technological, and military strength, there is no likelihood that China will allow Taiwan to be separated again. Attempts to reject reunification and split the country are doomed, because they will founder against the history and culture of the Chinese nation as well as the resolve and commitment of more than 1.4 billion Chinese people.

4. External Forces Obstructing China's Complete Reunification Will Surely Be Defeated

External interference is a prominent obstacle to China's reunification. Still lost in delusions of hegemony and trapped in a Cold War mindset, some forces in the US insist on perceiving and portraying China as a major strategic adversary and a serious long-term threat. They do their utmost to undermine and pressurize China, exploiting Taiwan as a convenient tool. The US authorities have stated that they remain committed to the one-China policy and that they do not support "Taiwan independence". But their actions contradict their words. They are clouding the one-China principle in uncertainty and compromising its integrity. They are contriving "official" exchanges with Taiwan, increasing arms sales, and colluding in military provocation. To help Taiwan expand its "international space", they are inducing other countries to interfere in Taiwan affairs, and concocting Taiwan-related bills that infringe upon the sovereignty of China. They are creating confusion around what is black and white, right and wrong. On the one hand, they incite separatist forces to create tension and turmoil in cross-Straits relations. On the other hand, they accuse the mainland of coercion, pressurizing Taiwan, and unilaterally changing the status quo, in order to embolden these forces and create obstacles to China's peaceful reunification.

The important principles of respecting state sovereignty and territorial integrity as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations are the cornerstones of modern international law and basic norms of international relations. It is the sacred right of every sovereign state to safeguard national unity and territorial integrity. It goes without saying that the Chinese government is entitled to take all measures necessary to settle the Taiwan question and achieve national reunification, free of external interference.

Behind the smokescreens of "freedom, democracy, and human rights" and "upholding the rules-based international order", some anti-China forces in the US deliberately distort the nature of the Taiwan question - which is purely an internal matter for China - and try to deny the legitimacy and justification of the Chinese government in safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity. This clearly reveals their intention of using Taiwan to contain China and obstruct China's reunification, which should be thoroughly exposed and condemned.

These external forces are using Taiwan as a pawn to undermine China's development and progress, and obstruct the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. They are doing so at the cost of the interests, wellbeing and future of the people of Taiwan rather than for their benefit. They have encouraged and instigated provocative actions by the separatist forces; these have intensified cross-Straits tension and confrontation, and undermined peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. This runs counter to the underlying global trends of peace, development and win-win cooperation, and goes against the wishes of the international community and the aspiration of all peoples.

Shortly after the PRC was founded, even though the country itself had to be rebuilt on the ruins of decades of war, China and its people won a resounding victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea (1950-1953). We defeated a powerful and well-armed enemy through gallantry and tenacity. In doing so, we safeguarded the security of the newly founded People's Republic, reestablished the status of China as a major country in the world, and demonstrated our heroic spirit, our lack of fear, and our will to stand up against the abuse of the powerful.

China is firmly committed to peaceful development. At the same time, it will not flinch under any external interference, nor will it tolerate any infringement upon its sovereignty, security and development interests. Relying on external forces will achieve nothing for Taiwan's separatists, and using Taiwan to contain China is doomed to fail.

Tranquility, development and a decent life are the expectations of our Taiwan compatriots, and the common aspiration of those on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. Under the strong leadership of the CPC, the Chinese people and the Chinese nation have stood upright, won prosperity, and grown in strength. A moderately prosperous society in all respects has been built on the mainland, where a large population once lived in dire poverty. We now have better conditions, more confidence, and greater capabilities. We can complete the historic mission of national reunification, so that both sides of the Straits can enjoy a better life. The wheel of history rolls on towards national reunification, and it will not be stopped by any individual or any force.

IV. National Reunification in the New Era

Taking into consideration the overall goal of national rejuvenation in the context of global change on a scale unseen in a century, the CPC and the Chinese government have continued to follow the CPC's fundamental guidelines on the Taiwan question and implement its principles and policies towards Taiwan, and have made concrete efforts to promote peaceful cross-Straits relations, integrate the development of the two sides, and work towards national reunification.

1. Upholding the Basic Principles of Peaceful Reunification and One Country, Two Systems

National reunification by peaceful means is the first choice of the CPC and the Chinese government in resolving the Taiwan question, as it best serves the interests of the Chinese nation as a whole, including our compatriots in Taiwan, and it works best for the long-term stability and development of China. We have worked hard to overcome hardships and obstacles to peaceful reunification over the past decades, showing that we cherish and safeguard the greater good of the nation, the wellbeing of our compatriots in Taiwan, and peace on both sides.

The One Country, Two Systems principle is an important institutional instrument created by the CPC and the Chinese government to enable peaceful reunification. It represents a great achievement of Chinese socialism. Peaceful reunification and One Country, Two Systems are our basic principles for resolving the Taiwan question and the best approach to realizing national reunification. Embodying the Chinese wisdom - we thrive by embracing each other - they take full account of Taiwan's realities and are conducive to long-term stability in Taiwan after reunification.

We maintain that after peaceful reunification, Taiwan may continue its current social system and enjoy a high degree of autonomy in accordance with the law. The two social systems will develop side by side for a long time to come. One Country is the precondition and foundation of Two Systems; Two Systems is subordinate to and derives from One Country; and the two are integrated under the one-China principle.

We will continue working with our compatriots in Taiwan to explore a Two Systems solution to the Taiwan question and increase our efforts towards peaceful reunification. In designing the specifics for implementing One Country, Two Systems, we will give full consideration to the realities in Taiwan and the views and proposals from all walks of life on both sides, and fully accommodate the interests and sentiments of our compatriots in Taiwan.

Ever since the One Country, Two Systems principle was proposed, certain political forces have been misrepresenting and distorting its objectives. The DPP and the authorities under its leadership have done everything possible to target the principle with baseless criticisms, and this has led to misunderstandings about its aims in some quarters of Taiwan. It is a fact that since Hong Kong and Macao returned to the motherland and were reincorporated into national governance, they have embarked on a broad path of shared development together with the mainland, and each complements the others' strengths. The practice of One Country, Two Systems has been a resounding success.

For a time, Hong Kong faced a period of damaging social unrest caused by anti-China agitators both inside and outside the region. Based on a clear understanding of the situation there, the CPC and the Chinese government upheld the One Country, Two Systems principle, made some appropriate improvements, and took a series of measures that addressed both the symptoms and root causes of the unrest. Order was restored and prosperity returned to Hong Kong. This has laid a solid foundation for the law-based governance of Hong Kong and Macao and the long-term continuation of One Country, Two Systems.

To realize peaceful reunification, we must acknowledge that the mainland and Taiwan have their own distinct social systems and ideologies. The One Country, Two Systems principle is the most inclusive solution to this problem. It is an approach that is grounded in democratic principles, demonstrates good will, seeks peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question, and delivers mutual benefit. The differences in social system are neither an obstacle to reunification nor a justification for secessionism. We firmly believe that our compatriots in Taiwan will develop a better understanding of the principle, and that the Two Systems solution to the Taiwan question will play its full role while compatriots on both sides work together towards peaceful reunification.

Peaceful reunification can only be achieved through consultation and discussion as equals. The long-standing political differences between the two sides are the fundamental obstacles to the steady improvement of cross-Straits relations, but we should not allow this problem to be passed down from one generation to the next. We can phase in flexible forms of consultation and discussion. We are ready to engage with all parties, groups, or individuals in Taiwan in a broad exchange of views aimed at resolving the political differences between the two sides based on the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus. Representatives will be recommended by all political parties and all sectors of society on both sides, and they will engage in democratic consultations on peaceful development of cross-Straits relations, integrated development of the two sides, and the peaceful reunification of our country.

2. Promoting Peaceful Cross-Straits Relations and Integrated Development

Peaceful cross-Straits relations and integrated development pave the way for reunification and serve to benefit our people on both sides. Thus, both sides should work together towards this goal. We will extend integrated development, increase exchanges and cooperation, strengthen bonds, and expand common interests in the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations. In this way, we will all identify more closely with the Chinese culture and Chinese nation, and heighten the sense of our shared future. This lays solid foundations for peaceful reunification.

We will explore an innovative approach to integrated development and take the lead in setting up a pilot zone for integrated cross-Straits development in Fujian Province, advancing integration through better connectivity and more preferential policies, and based on mutual trust and understanding. Both sides should continue to promote connectivity in any area where it is beneficial, including trade and economic cooperation, infrastructure, energy and resources, and industrial standards. We should promote cooperation in culture, education, and health care, and the sharing of social security and public resources. We should support neighboring areas or areas with similar conditions on the two sides in providing equal, universal, and accessible public services. We should take active steps to institutionalize cross-Straits economic cooperation and create a common market for the two sides to strengthen the Chinese economy.

We will improve the systems and policies to guarantee the wellbeing of Taiwan compatriots and ensure that they are treated as equals on the mainland, and we will protect their legitimate rights and interests here in accordance with the law. We will support our fellow Chinese and enterprises from Taiwan in participating in the Belt and Road Initiative, major regional development strategies, and the strategy for coordinated regional development. We will help them integrate into the new development dynamic, participate in high-quality development, share in more development opportunities, and benefit from national socio-economic development.

We will expand cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation in various fields and overcome any obstacles and obstruction. We will encourage our people on both sides to pass on the best of traditional Chinese culture and ensure that it grows in new and creative ways. We will strengthen communication among the general public and the younger generations on both sides, and encourage more fellow Chinese in Taiwan - young people in particular - to pursue studies, start businesses, seek jobs, or live on the mainland. This will help people on both sides to expand mutual understanding, strengthen mutual trust, consolidate a shared sense of identity, and forge closer bonds of heart and mind.

3. Defeating Separatism and External Interference

Separatism will plunge Taiwan into the abyss and bring nothing but disaster to the island. To protect the interests of the Chinese nation as a whole, including our compatriots in Taiwan, we must resolutely oppose it and work for peaceful reunification. We are ready to create vast space for peaceful reunification; but we will leave no room for separatist activities in any form.

We Chinese will decide our own affairs. The Taiwan question is an internal affair that involves China's core interests and the Chinese people's national sentiments, and no external interference will be tolerated. Any attempt to use the Taiwan question as a pretext to interfere in China's internal affairs or obstruct China's reunification will meet with the resolute opposition of the Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan. No one should underestimate our resolve, will and ability to defend China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

We will work with the greatest sincerity and exert our utmost efforts to achieve peaceful reunification. But we will not renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all necessary measures. This is to guard against external interference and all separatist activities. In no way does it target our fellow Chinese in Taiwan. Use of force would be the last resort taken under compelling circumstances. We will only be forced to take drastic measures to respond to the provocation of separatist elements or external forces should they ever cross our red lines.

We will always be ready to respond with the use of force or other necessary means to interference by external forces or radical action by separatist elements. Our ultimate goal is to ensure the prospects of China's peaceful reunification and advance this process.

Some forces in the US are making every effort to incite groups inside Taiwan to stir up trouble and use Taiwan as a pawn against China. This has jeopardized peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits, obstructed the Chinese government's efforts towards peaceful reunification, and undermined the healthy and steady development of China-US relations. Left unchecked, it will continue to escalate tension across the Straits, further disrupt China-US relations, and severely damage the interests of the US itself. The US should abide by the one-China principle, deal with Taiwan-related issues in a prudent and proper manner, stand by its previous commitments, and stop supporting Taiwan separatists.

4. Working with Our Fellow Chinese in Taiwan Towards National Reunification and Rejuvenation

National reunification is an essential step towards national rejuvenation. The future of Taiwan lies in China's reunification, and the wellbeing of the people in Taiwan hinges on the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, an endeavor that bears on the future and destiny of the people on both sides. A united and prosperous China will be a blessing for all Chinese, while a weak and divided China will be a disaster. Only China's rejuvenation and prosperity can bring lives of plenty and happiness to both sides. But it requires the joint efforts of both sides, as does the complete reunification of the country.

Separatist propaganda and the unresolved political dispute between the two sides have created misconceptions over cross-Straits relations, problems with national identity, and misgivings over national reunification among some fellow Chinese in Taiwan. Blood is thicker than water, and people on both sides of the Straits share the bond of kinship. We have great patience and tolerance and we will create conditions for closer exchanges and communication between the two sides, and to increase our compatriots' knowledge of the mainland and reduce these misconceptions and misgivings, in order to help them resist the manipulation of separatists.

We will join hands with our fellow Chinese in Taiwan to strive for national reunification and rejuvenation. We hope they will stand on the right side of history, be proud of their Chinese identity, and fully consider the position and role of Taiwan in China's rejuvenation. We hope they will pursue the greater good of the nation, resolutely oppose separatism and any form of external interference, and make a positive contribution to the just cause of China's peaceful reunification.

V. Bright Prospects for Peaceful Reunification

Once peaceful reunification is achieved under One Country, Two Systems, it will lay new foundations for China to make further progress and achieve national rejuvenation. At the same time, it will create huge opportunities for social and economic development in Taiwan and bring tangible benefits to the people of Taiwan.

1. Taiwan Will Have a Vast Space for Development

Taiwan boasts a high level of economic growth, industries with distinctive local features, and robust foreign trade. Its economy is highly complementary with that of the mainland. After reunification, the systems and mechanisms for cross-Straits economic cooperation will be further improved. Backed up by the vast mainland market, Taiwan's economy will enjoy broader prospects, become more competitive, develop steadier and smoother industrial and supply chains, and display greater vitality in innovation-driven growth. Many problems that have long afflicted Taiwan's economy and its people can be resolved through integrated cross-Straits development with all possible connectivity between the two sides. Taiwan's fiscal revenues can be better employed to improve living standards, bringing real benefits to the people and resolving their difficulties.

Taiwan's cultural creativity will also enjoy a great boost. Both sides of the Taiwan Straits share the culture and ethos of the Chinese nation. Nourished by the Chinese civilization, Taiwan's regional culture will flourish and prosper.

2. The Rights and Interests of the People in Taiwan Will Be Fully Protected

Provided that China's sovereignty, security and development interests are guaranteed, after reunification Taiwan will enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region. Taiwan's social system and its way of life will be fully respected, and the private property, religious beliefs, and lawful rights and interests of the people in Taiwan will be fully protected. All Taiwan compatriots who support reunification of the country and rejuvenation of the nation will be the masters of the region, contributing to and benefitting from China's development. With a powerful motherland in support, the people of Taiwan will enjoy greater security and dignity and stand upright and rock-solid in the international community.

3. Both Sides of the Taiwan Straits Will Share the Triumph of National Rejuvenation

The people of Taiwan are brave, diligent and patriotic, and have made unremitting efforts to improve themselves. They revere their ancestry and love their homeland. Working together and applying their talents, people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits will create a promising future. After reunification, we Chinese will bridge gaps and differences caused by long-term separation, share a stronger sense of national identity, and stand together as one. After reunification, we can leverage complementary strengths in pursuit of mutual benefit and common development. After reunification, we can join hands to make the Chinese nation stronger and more prosperous, and stand taller among all the nations of the world.

The people separated by the Taiwan Straits share the same blood and a common destiny. After reunification, China will have greater international influence and appeal, and a stronger ability to shape international public opinion, and the Chinese people will enjoy greater self-esteem, self-confidence and national pride. In Taiwan and on the mainland the people will share the dignity and triumph of a united China and be proud of being Chinese. We will work together to refine and implement the Two Systems solution to the Taiwan question, to improve the institutional arrangements for implementing the One Country, Two Systems policy, and to ensure lasting peace and stability in Taiwan.

4. Peaceful Reunification of China Is Conducive to Peace and Development in the Asia-Pacific and the Wider World

Peaceful cross-Straits reunification is of benefit not only to the Chinese nation, but to all peoples and the international community as a whole. The reunification of China will not harm the legitimate interests of any other country, including any economic interests they might have in Taiwan. On the contrary, it will bring more development opportunities to all countries; it will create more positive momentum for prosperity and stability in the Asia-Pacific and the rest of the world; it will contribute more to building a global community of shared future, promoting world peace and development, and propelling human progress.

After reunification, foreign countries can continue to develop economic and cultural relations with Taiwan. With the approval of the central government of China, they may set up consulates or other official and quasi-official institutions in Taiwan, international organizations and agencies may establish offices, relevant international conventions can be applied, and relevant international conferences can be held there.

Conclusion

Over its 5,000-year history, China has created a splendid culture that has shone throughout the world from past times to present, and has made an enormous contribution to human society. After a century of suffering and hardship, the nation has overcome humiliation, emerged from backwardness, and embraced boundless development opportunities. Now, it is striding towards the goal of national rejuvenation.

Embarking on a new journey in a new era, the CPC and the Chinese government will continue to rally compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits, and lead the efforts to answer the call of the times, shoulder historic responsibilities, grasp our fate and our future in our own hands, and work hard to achieve national reunification and rejuvenation.

The journey ahead cannot be all smooth sailing. However, as long as we Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits devote our ingenuity and energy to the same goal, let there be no doubt - we will tolerate no foreign interference in Taiwan, we will thwart any attempt to divide our country, and we will combine as a mighty force for national reunification and rejuvenation. The historic goal of reuniting our motherland must be realized and will be realized.

Notes

[1] United Nations Juridical Yearbook 2010, p. 516.

[2] Between September 4 and 8, 1951, the United States gathered a number of countries in San Francisco for what they described as the San Francisco Peace Conference. Neither the PRC nor the Soviet Union received an invitation. The treaty signed at this meeting, commonly known as the Treaty of San Francisco, included an article under which Japan renounced all rights, title and claim to Taiwan and the Penghu Islands. This treaty contravened the provisions of the Declaration by United Nations signed by 26 countries - including the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China - in 1942, the fundamental principles of the UN Charter, and the basic norms of international law. The PRC was excluded from its preparation, drafting and signing, and its rulings on the territory and sovereign rights of China - including the sovereignty over Taiwan - are therefore illegal and invalid. The Chinese government has always refused to recognize the Treaty of San Francisco, and has never from the outset deviated from this stance. Other countries, including the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Mongolia, and Vietnam, have also refused to recognize the document's authority.

[3] In his speech titled "Continue to Promote the Reunification of the Motherland" on January 30, 1995, Jiang Zemin, then general secretary of the CPC Central Committee and president of China, made eight proposals for the development of cross-Straits relations and peaceful national reunification. He emphasized, "Adhering to the one-China principle is the basis and prerequisite for peaceful reunification", and "in not promising to renounce the use of force, we are in no way targeting our Taiwan compatriots, but rather foreign forces conspiring to interfere in China's peaceful reunification and bring about Taiwan independence". (See Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Vol. I, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 2009, pp. 407-412.)

[4] This figure does not include reinvestment by Taiwan investors through a third place.

[5] From the statistics of the April 2022 edition of the World Economic Outlook databases of the International Monetary Fund. ■

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23. Full Text: The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era