Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“The analysis of war shows that while the nominal strength of a country is represented by its numbers and resources, this muscular development is dependent on the state of its internal organs and nerve system – upon its stability of control, morale and supply.”

- B.H. Liddell Hart

“The essence of strategy is choosing what not to do.”

- Michael Porter, What Is Strategy?

“It is the responsibility of leadership to work intelligently with what is given, and not waste time fantasizing about a world of flawless people and perfect choices.”

–Marcus Aurelius

1. National Airborne Day,

2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 15 (Putin's War)

3. Surprise, kill, vanish: ‘Jedburghs’ led way for US cyber, special ops

4. How Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan Gambit Backfired

5. State Department spokesman: US ‘in a stronger position as a country’ because of Afghanistan withdrawal

6. U.S. And India To Hold Military Drills Close To Tense Border With China

7. Afghan Women, Trained By U.S. Special Forces, Are Still In Peril

8. PH, US elite army units train together

9. Recounting the U.S. Failure in Afghanistan

10. Ukraine-Born Green Beret Raises Money to Send Supplies to War-Torn Homeland

11. A victorious Taliban is inspiring a new generation of Islamic extremists

12. What Qatar Owes Afghanistan’s Refugees

13. FDD | Despite Growth, Inflation Surges in Iran Under Raisi

14. Can the Taliban Be Contained?

15. Ukraine Defies Russia With Attacks on Crimea, a ‘Holy Land’ to Putin

16. Strategic Outpost’s Seventh Annual Summer Vacation Reading List

17. 'A post-retirement sweetener for military brass'? Pentagon defends mentor program amid fresh scrutiny

18. Proliferation Security Initiative Asia-Pacific Exercise Rotation Joint Statement - United States Department of State

19. How Beijing’s belligerence over Taiwan is connected to a Belt and Road Initiative in distress

20. IntelBrief: Unprecedented Number of Threats Facing U.S. Federal Law Enforcement

21. Why No One Was in Charge in Afghanistan

22. CIA sued over alleged spying on lawyers, journalists who met Assange

1. National Airborne Day

National Airborne Day, 2002

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

The history of Airborne forces began after World War I, when Brigadier General William Mitchell first conceived the idea of parachuting troops into combat. Eventually, under the leadership of Major William Lee at Fort Benning, Georgia, members of the Parachute Test Platoon pioneered methods of combat jumping in 1940. In November 1942, members of the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, conducted America's first combat jump, leaping from a C-47 aircraft behind enemy lines in North Africa. This strategy revolutionized combat and established Airborne forces as a key component of our military.

During World War II, Airborne tactics were critical to the success of important missions, including the D-Day invasion at Normandy, the Battle of the Bulge, the invasion of Southern France, and many others. In Korea and Vietnam, Airborne soldiers played a critical combat role, as well as in later conflicts and peacekeeping operations, including Panama, Grenada, Desert Storm, Haiti, Somalia, and the Balkans. Most recently, Airborne forces were vital to liberating the people of Afghanistan from the repressive and violent Taliban regime; and these soldiers con-tinue to serve proudly around the world in the global coalition against terrorism.

The elite Airborne ranks include prestigious groups such as the 82nd Airborne Division, "America's Guard of Honor," and the "Screaming Eagles" of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Airborne forces have also been represented in the former 11th, 13th, and 17th Airborne Divisions and numerous other Airborne, glider and air assault units and regiments. Paratroopers in the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps, the 75th Infantry (Ranger) Regiment and other Special Forces units conduct swift and effective operations in defense of peace and freedom.

Airborne combat continues to be driven by the bravery and daring spirit of sky soldiers. Often called into action with little notice, these forces have earned an enduring reputation for dedication, excellence, and honor. As we face the challenges of a new era, I encourage all people to recognize the contributions of these courageous soldiers to our Nation and the world.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, do hereby proclaim August 16, 2002, as National Airborne Day. As we commemorate the first official Army parachute jump on August 16, 1940, I encourage all Americans to join me in honoring the thousands of soldiers, past and present, who have served in an Airborne capacity. I call upon all citizens to observe this day with appropriate programs, ceremonies, and activities.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this fourteenth day of August, in the year of our Lord two thousand two, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and twenty-seventh.

GEORGE W. BUSH

2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 15 (Putin's War)

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 15

Aug 15, 2022 - Press ISW

understandingwar.org

Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Layne Philipson, Angela Howard, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 15, 8:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Elements of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) militia reportedly refused to continue fighting in Donetsk Oblast and complained about the grueling pace of offensives outside of Luhansk Oblast. The emotional significance of recent Russian targets in Donetsk Oblast resonates with audiences in the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR), but not with LNR audiences tired of grueling offensives beyond their claimed borders. Several Ukrainian channels shared a video on August 15 of soldiers from LNR Battalion 2740 refusing to fight for the DNR.[1] The soldiers claim that they celebrated victory on July 3, when LNR forces reached the borders of Luhansk Oblast, and that their work is done. At least one Russian milblogger has criticized the LNR servicemembers for desiring Russian support for their own ”liberation” and then refusing to fight in Donetsk Oblast.[2] ISW cannot independently verify the origin or authenticity of this particular video. Its message reflects a larger trend of diminished LNR investment in and morale to support the Russian war in Ukraine, however. This trend is particularly dangerous to Russian forces seeking to recruit still more new soldiers from Luhansk Oblast to make up for recent losses. Further division within Russian-led forces also threatens to further impede the efficiency of the Russian war effort.

DNR units have previously recorded similar appeals when operating in Luhansk, Kharkiv, and Kherson Oblasts, which may indicate that proxy troops might not fully support the Kremlin’s expansive invasion plans. ISW has previously reported that servicemen of the 3rd Infantry Battalion of the DNR’s 105th Infantry Regiment complained when the unit was redeployed from Mariupol to Luhansk Oblast in late May.[3] The 113th Regiment of the DNR also published a similar appeal from the Kherson Oblast frontlines in early June.[4] Another serviceman of an unspecified DNR battalion complained that Russian border guards held the unit at the Belgorod Oblast border after the unit fought around Kharkiv City in mid-May to allow Russian units to withdraw first.[5] DNR-based war correspondents have been boasting about the DNR progress around Avdiivka, but such attitudes may sour again if the DNR units are recommitted to another axis.

Russia’s annual Technical Forum and Army Games which began in Moscow on August 13 do not represent any immediate military threat to Ukraine. The forum and army games are not military exercises. The forum is the Kremlin’s premier annual military-industrial complex exposition and generates reliable arms sale revenue, which the Kremlin uses to supplement income lost due to sanctions.[6] The Army Games are a complementary series of competitive military sporting events that the Kremlin uses to demonstrate Russian weapons systems in the field and develop relationships with foreign militaries. This year’s Army Technical Forum will be held from August 15 to August 21 and the Army Games will run from August 13 to August 27.[7]

Key Takeaways

A reported video of LNR servicemen refusing to fight in Donetsk Oblast suggests further division among Russian-led forces.
Russian forces attempted several limited ground assaults northwest of Slovyansk.
Russian forces conducted multiple offensive operations east and southeast of Siversk and northeast and southeast of Bakhmut.
Russian forces continued conducting offensive operations northwest, west, and southwest of Donetsk City.
Russian forces conducted a limited ground assault north of Kharkiv City.
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued to trade accusations of shelling the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant.
St. Petersburg authorities officially denied summoning local men to military recruitment and enlistment centers for discussions of contract service.
Russian occupation authorities continued preparations for the integration of occupied territories of Ukraine into Russia.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian Troops in the Cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City
Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis
Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces attempted limited ground attacks northwest of Slovyansk on August 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces withdrew following unsuccessful assaults in the Mazanivka direction (24km northwest of Slovyansk) and the Dolyna direction (20km northwest of Slovyansk).[8] Russian forces also failed in their attempts to dislodge Ukrainian forces with concentrated artillery fire in Krasnopillya and Mazanivka (both about 24km northwest of Slovyansk), Hrushuvakha (30km west of Izyum), and Asiivka (45km northwest of Izyum).[9] Russian artillery also continued routine shelling and strikes on Slovyansk, northwest of Izyum, and along the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border, including near Zalyman, Bohorodychne, Brazhkivka, and Virnopillya.[10]

Russian forces conducted multiple offensive operations east and southeast of Siversk on August 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian attempts to advance toward settlements east and southeast of Siversk were all unsuccessful.[11] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Chechen “Akhmat” special forces (SPETSNAZ) gained unspecified strategically important grounds around Siversk, confirming that Chechen units are still operating on the Siversk-Lysychansk axis.[12] Russian aviation operated near Spirne and Pryshyb.[13] Russian media additionally shared footage of Russians using loitering munitions to strike Ukrainian positions near Siversk.[14] Russian forces continued routine shelling of the Siversk area on August 15.[15]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast and southeast of Bakhmut on August 15, and made limited territorial gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces withdrew to their original positions after conducting unsuccessful offensives in the directions of Soledar (10km northeast of Bakhmut), Kodema (20km southeast of Bakhmut), and Vershyna (15km southeast of Bakhmut).[16] Geolocated footage showed that unspecified Russian Cossack units advanced to the Knauf Gips Donbas gypsum factory southeast of Soledar, and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Ambassador to Russia Rodion Miroshnik claimed that Russian forces are “clearing out” Soledar.[17] Proxy officials have claimed control over the Knauf factory since August 5, and it is likely that they are exaggerating the extent of Russian advances in Soledar.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff also stated that Russian forces intensified reconnaissance in the Bakhmut direction and conducted airstrikes near Soledar and Yakolivka (16km northeast of Bakhmut).[19] Russian forces also continued shelling settlements in the Bakhmut direction, including the city itself.[20]

Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations around Avdiivka on August 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces retreated after launching unsuccessful offensive operations to improve tactical positions around Pisky, Pervomaiske, Nevelske, and Staromykhailivka, all situated southwest of Avdiivka.[21] Russian Telegram channels claimed that the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 100th Brigade pushed Ukrainian forces towards Pervomaiske using infantry assault groups and MLRS support, but geolocated footage shows that both Ukrainian and Russian forces are engaged in heavy artillery combat around Avdiivka.[22]

Russian forces launched ground assaults in an effort to break Ukrainian defenses southwest of Donetsk City on August 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully launched assaults in the directions of Novomykhaylivka, Volodymyrivka, Pavlivka, and Vodyane, all situated southwest of Donetsk City and near the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border. DNR Deputy Information Minister Daniil Bezsonov claimed that Russian forces have broken Ukrainian defenses around Vuhledar (about 50km southwest of Donetsk City) but did not provide concrete details of the advance.[23] Russian forces likely intensified their attacks in the area in an effort to gain control over the T0524 highway to Donetsk City.[24] The DNR claimed that the DNR 107th Battalion is advancing in Mariinka, approximately 22km west of Donetsk City.[25] Russian forces continued to target Ukrainian-held territories west of Donetsk City using airstrikes and tank, tube, and rocket artillery.[26]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations along the Kharkiv City axis on August 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces from Kozacha Lopan again unsuccessfully attempted to break Ukrainian lines of defense near Udy.[27] Russian sources have claimed control of Udy since August 13 but have yet to produce evidence of any reported gains.[28] Russian forces also targeted settlements approximately 40 km north, east, and southeast from Kharkiv City with airstrikes.[29] Russian forces continued to target Kharkiv City and surrounding settlements with unspecified missiles and tube, tank, and rocket artillery.[30]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian and Ukrainian forces again exchanged accusations of shelling the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) in Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast on August 15. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces fired Western-provided M777 rounds at Enerhodar, but provided no evidence for these claims.[31] Russian sources also rejected the August 14 international call for Russian forces to leave the territory of the Zaporizhzhia NPP and doubled down on accusing Ukrainian forces of shelling the NPP and Western states of overinvolvement and misplaced blame.[32] Russian forces shelled Nikopol and Marhanets (across the Dnipro River from Enerhodar) with MLRS systems.[33]

Russian forces did not conduct any reported ground assaults on the Southern Axis on August 15 but continued shelling across the entire southern front line.[34] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces on the Southern Axis have not changed their troop composition or position as of August 15.[35] Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Khlan stated on August 15 that Ukrainian strikes on the bridges leading to upper Kherson Oblast have rendered the bridges inoperable to heavy equipment.[36] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted airstrikes on Andriivka, Bilohirka, and Lozove near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River in northwestern Kherson Oblast, and near Myrne and Blahodatne, northwest of Kherson City.[37] Russian forces also conducted airstrikes on Shcherbaky on the T0812 highway, and Charivne south of Tavriiske, Zaporizhia Oblast.[38] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command also reported that Russian forces launched missiles from S-300 air defense systems on educational and civilian infrastructure in Mykolaiv City.[39] Russian forces continued shelling along the line of contact.[40]

Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian ammunition depots in Blahodativka near the bridgehead at Lozove, and Novopetrivka in northern Kherson Oblast.[41] Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian partisans blew up a rail bridge on the southwestern outskirts of Melitopol on August 13 that Russian forces frequently used to transport military equipment between the south and the east.[42]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

St. Petersburg officials denied sending local men letters summoning them to military recruitment and enlistment centers on August 15, after local media outlet Fontanka reported that men received calls and letters from military recruitment centers on August 13.[43] The local officials claimed that unknown provocateurs distributed the fake letters asking men to immediately appear at the military recruitment center. Local officials also denied distributing any conscription notices. ISW reported on August 14 that a St. Petersburg military recruitment center confirmed to Fontanka that its staff distributed the letters and called men into the office to advertise contract service.[44]

These letters and calls are not conscription notices and do not indicate that Russia has instituted general conscription, as men who have responded to the summonses discussed prospects for contract service with military recruiters. Russian law also requires conscripts to receive written notice of conscription.[45] Russian lawyers have previously warned that military recruitment centers illegally mimic conscription notices left at the mailbox or via spam calls to lure men to sign military contracts upon arrival to the center, but such deception is not a part of Russia’s biannual conscription drive.[46] Russian Telegram channels previously featured reports of men receiving similar misleading summonses in Moscow, Rostov-on-Don, Tyumen, Perm, and Tolyatti cities the week of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24.[47]

St. Petersburg officials’ denial of the distribution of summonses is a microcosm of the Kremlin’s fear of public pushback should Russia attempt to conduct a full-scale mobilization. Social media comments under the Fontanka article discounted the letters as another attempt to scare men into signing military contracts on their own terms (with high pay and benefits) rather than waiting until general mobilization.[48] These commenters also expressed their knowledge of their rights and Russian conscription laws, which indicates that St. Petersburg residents are prepared to oppose illegal efforts at coercive mobilization. St. Petersburg is home to many conscription lawyers and human rights organizations, such as the Soldiers’ Mothers of St. Petersburg, which could explain the unsurprised reaction of local social media users.[49] The distribution of the summonses also indicates that the Kremlin is continuing its pre-war attempts to mislead and coerce men who are unaware of their rights into signing military contracts to reinforce Russian war efforts in Ukraine.

Russian occupation authorities continued covert mobilization efforts in Mariupol by offering residents non-military related jobs in occupied Donetsk Oblast territories. The Mariupol City Council reported that Russian occupation authorities are sending Mariupol residents text messages offering jobs in a “paramilitary mining rescue service” or as drivers before deploying the recruits to Donetsk City, Horlivka, and Makiivka.[50] Advisor to the Mariupol Mayor Petro Andryushenko reposted an advertisement urging Mariupol men to seek employment with the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) police forces without any required prior experience.[51] Andryushenko noted that the DNR is likely attempting to reinforce its troops rather than recruiting additional police forces.[52]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Russian occupation authorities continued setting conditions for long-term Russian control of occupied territories in Ukraine. The UK Ministry of Defense reported on August 15 that Russian occupation officials are likely in the “advanced planning stages” for a referendum to join Russia but that it is unclear if they have determined to proceed with a vote.[53] Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan reported on August 14 that Russian occupation authorities are planning a seminar for educators in occupied territories and Russian officials, including Russian Minister of Education Sergey Kravtsov, in Henichesk on August 26-27.[54] The aim of this seminar is likely to coordinate education integration with Russia.[55] Khlan also stated that Russian officials plan to launch the propaganda TV company “Tavria” on August 15, emphasizing that “Tavria” newspapers previously spread in Kakhovka, Kherson Oblast, presenting Ukrainian authorities as “fascists.”[56] The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) reported that Kherson car owners received the first batch of Russian-model license plates and driver’s licenses on August 12.[57]

Russian authorities continued incentivizing Russian citizens to work in occupied territories in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 15 that the Russian government is offering Belgorod Oblast administration employees and employees of Russian state institutions double their salaries to work in the Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples’ Republics (DNR and LNR).[58] GUR also stated that Belgorod Oblast leadership is responsible for supporting occupation efforts in Bilokurakyne and Troitske, Luhansk Oblast, and that Belgorod Oblast teachers will start working in these areas in September.[59]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1558997616003895298; https://t.me/stranaua/57912; https://www.unian dot net/war/den-pobedy-byl-3-iyulya-mobilizovannye-iz-lnr-ne-hotyat-voevat-za-dnr-video-novosti-vtorzheniya-rossii-na-ukrainu-11941770.html; https://t dot me/kazansky2017/3668; https://tsn dot ua/ato/ne-hochut-vmirati-na-chuzhini-boyoviki-lnr-zayavili-scho-voni-ne-hochut-voyuvati-za-dnr-2134306.html

[6] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/12194589

[7] https://tvzvezda dot ru/news/20228151457-WB4XC.html; https://tvzvezda dot ru/news/2022815155-rWY6M.html

[32] https://ria dot ru/20220815/aes-1809586326.html; https://tass dot ru/politika/15474549; https://t.me/kommunist/8436; https://t.me/rybar/37237; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/6046

[42] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/08/15/ukrayinske-pidpillya-pidirvalo-zaliznychnyj-mist-poblyzu-melitopolya/; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/407

[43] https://forpost-sz dot ru/a/2022-08-15/v-smolnom-nazvali-razoslannye-peterburzhcam-povestki-v-voenkomat-provokaciej; https://www dot fontanka.ru/2022/08/13/71568242/

[45] https://soldiersmothers dot ru/news/kogo-i-kak-prizyvayut-na-voennye-sbory-instruktsiya-o-poryadke-dejstvij-2

[46] https://t dot me/istories_media/928; http://www dot consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_18260/89c4b6f3cfb74e2fe8a1c3c7c523591031444778/

[48] https://www dot fontanka.ru/2022/08/13/71568242/all.comments.html/#comment_id_79900585

[49] https://soldiersmothers dot ru/news/kogo-i-kak-prizyvayut-na-voennye-sbory-instruktsiya-o-poryadke-dejstvij-2; https://t.me/istories_media/928

[57] https://t.me/kommunist/8407; https://t.me/denazi_UA/18193; https://mvdmedia dot ru/news/official/segodnya-v-khersone-avtovladeltsam-vydany-pervye-gosnomera-i-voditelskie-udostovereniya-rossiyskogo-/; https://ria dot ru/20220812/kherson-1809185997.html

[58] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/okupanty-namahaiutsia-zaokhotyty-chynovnykiv-rf-iaki-pohodiatsia-pratsiuvaty-v-ukraini-velykymy-vyplatamy-v-tomu-chysli-v-hryvniakh.html

[59] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/okupanty-namahaiutsia-zaokhotyty-chynovnykiv-rf-iaki-pohodiatsia-pratsiuvaty-v-ukraini-velykymy-vyplatamy-v-tomu-chysli-v-hryvniakh.html

understandingwar.org

3. Surprise, kill, vanish: ‘Jedburghs’ led way for US cyber, special ops

Excerpts:

The Jedburgh legacy lives on within 1st Special Forces Command who recently revamped the concept as four-person operational detachments. Today’s Jedburgh program should serve as the model for a new type of multi-domain collaboration: the pairing of the Cyber Mission Force and Special Operations Forces, or the integration of lethal and non-lethal assets, to tackle some of the most vexing challenges associated with strategic competition.

While CMF and SOF capabilities are already employed together in the military’s Special Mission Unit concept, integrated Cyber-SOF assets are needed at scale if the US wants to compete with the persistent threat of Russia and the pacing threat of China.

Surprise, kill, vanish: ‘Jedburghs’ led way for US cyber, special ops

c4isrnet.com · by Nicholas Dockery · August 15, 2022

On military bases during World War II, the loudspeaker system often blared a curious message:

Wanted: Volunteers for immediate overseas assignment. Knowledge of French or another European language preferred; Willingness and ability to qualify as a parachutist necessary; Likelihood of a dangerous mission guaranteed.

Without any further instructions, the messages attracted a mix of individuals some of the the most creative and dangerous missions of WWII. Known as the Jedburghs, the small special purpose teams were a WWII phenomenon born out of the British Army and Sir Winston Churchill’s affinity for “ungentlemanly warfare.”

The multi-national teams were trained in irregular warfare, maintained extensive foreign language skills, and excelled at subterfuge, sabotage and surveillance. Jedburghs were sent deep into Nazi-held territory to disrupt the German war effort by waging unconventional warfare. As a concept, they provide an example of how an unconventional take on cross-functional partnerships can affect a war zone and operate effectively in politically sensitive environments.

The Jedburgh legacy lives on within 1st Special Forces Command who recently revamped the concept as four-person operational detachments. Today’s Jedburgh program should serve as the model for a new type of multi-domain collaboration: the pairing of the Cyber Mission Force and Special Operations Forces, or the integration of lethal and non-lethal assets, to tackle some of the most vexing challenges associated with strategic competition.

While CMF and SOF capabilities are already employed together in the military’s Special Mission Unit concept, integrated Cyber-SOF assets are needed at scale if the US wants to compete with the persistent threat of Russia and the pacing threat of China.

Getting Out in Front of Conflict

In 2018, U.S. cyber strategy shifted from one of restraint to engagement when U.S. Cyber Command obtained additional authorities under the National Defense Authorization Act. A cornerstone of the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy (the next update is expected soon) is the 2018 Defend Forward policy and USCYBERCOM’s hunt forward initiative

Hunt Forward Operations are executed by teams from the Cyber National Mission Force, the offensive arm of USCYBERCOM, who engage with allies at their invitation to identify malicious cyber activity and observe adversary tradecraft and tools “in the wild.” Hunt Forward teams are therefore proactive measures that protect partner and U.S. networks. However, in addition to being a geographic concept, Hunt Forward is also temporal, as a teams’ activity enables an understanding of malicious cyber activity before it reaches US networks – much like the presence of SOF teams around the globe.

As a policy, Defend Forward is similarly temporal – it bridges short term tactical goals with over-the-horizon capabilities, as defined in ongoing counter-terrorism efforts – or capabilities and accesses developed in and through cyberspace today, that will enable the US to maintain the initiative and security of tomorrow. General Paul A. Nakasone, the commander of USCYBERCOM, describes the policy’s enabling activities as those that force an adversary to focus on defending their own assets, thereby inhibiting the adversary’s ability to go on the offensive.

The concept should sound familiar – especially after two decades of counter-terrorism operations – as it mirrors SOF activities: engage with the enemy, far from the US homeland, and constantly apply pressure to prevent the conditions necessary for an attack on the homeland – or strategic insecurity – from occurring.

In other words, the best defense is the continuous and relentless application of offense or, what some researchers call, “initiative persistence.” Thus far, HFOs have paid off, with a few dozen successfully completed missions across at least 14 countries.

Collaboration for Multi-Domain Operations

As Nakasone recently explained, Hunt Forward missions include sharing threat indicators, providing warning, sharing personnel, and providing insight with a host nation’s forces. In this sense, the CNMF teams serve a function much like that of the SOF teams tasked with Security Force Assistance, where training between the host nation and US service members is designed as a skill and information exchange.

However, Hunt Forward could expand to include more components of the Irregular Warfare portfolio, including Stability Operations. Cross-functional teams are used in a variety of military contexts, and the integration of SOF operators into elements of the CNMF, or vice versa, should be considered a crucial next step for the strategy of integrated deterrence.

Within the joint force, the concept of integrating operational skill sets is used to counter irregular threats through a balanced approach for strategic advantage. And integration also brings a premier skill to a team that would otherwise lack the capability. For example, SOF teams consistently embed Air Force Close Combat Controllers to support small units of action because of their exquisite Joint Terminal Attack Controllers capabilities.

The Air Force JTACs are revered among SOF as the premier enabler for controlling terminal attacks – ground force commanders consider them to be both a force multiplier, by providing critical fire control measures, and a risk mitigator for coordinating airstrikes. While the other services encourage their own small units to organically develop the JTAC capability internally, the skill is often assigned as a secondary job or additional duty and therefore fails to deliver the same performance as a fully qualified Air Force CCT.

Working Smarter, Not Harder

Similarly, cyber work role qualification and certification, much like the JTACs, is something SOF doesn’t have to develop or provide internally and, conversely, the CNMF doesn’t have to develop or provide its own version of special warfare training. Instead, creating the concept for Cyber-SOF tactical teams is – like the Jedburghs and embedded JTACs – a joint solution to the joint problem of an increasingly hostile cyberspace.

Without question, the cultures of SOF and CMF units may seem wildly different but, in reality, they are quite similar: both hold expertise in high regard, train consistently for ongoing and continuous global operations, and understand the strategic and cumulative effect of their teams’ operations. Additionally, CNMF and SOF units are postured to respond quickly to shifting global priorities and to an attack on the homeland or allied nation.

While an integrated concept will take time to develop and implement, there are areas in which immediate coordination is needed and possible: 1) close-access requirements for high sensitivity network and infrastructure access, 2) language and cultural fluency in forward deployed regions, and 3) foreign partner training.

Because the Cyber Mission Force and Special Operations Forces are two of the most exquisite tools of national power the US has, there is bound to be resistance to coordination but, failing to collaborate and integrate will produce redundant efforts instead of a unified strategy that efficiently leverages US assets to affect global and national security.

Using the blueprint of the multi-functional Jedburghs and the lessons learned from the embedded JTACs – models known to work effectively – a joint Cyber-SOF effort could better thwart attacks from peer adversaries like China, and provide another layer of proactive defense to the strategy of integrated deterrence.

Nicholas Dockery is a Special Forces Officer and a General Wayne Downing Scholar. He is pursuing a Masters in Public Policy at the Jackson School for Global Affairs, Yale University. Captain Maggie Smith, PhD, is a US Army cyber officer assigned to the Army Cyber Institute at the U.S. Military Academy where she is a scientific researcher, an assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences, and an affiliated faculty of the Modern War Institute. She is also the director of the Competition in Cyberspace Project.

c4isrnet.com · by Nicholas Dockery · August 15, 2022

4. How Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan Gambit Backfired

Excerpts:

Going forward under these new and less stable conditions, Washington and its allies must develop more intelligent, less risky ways to aid Taipei. Translation: fewer symbolic visits and more strategic substance. U.S. policymakers must also recognize that forcefully responding to each and every Chinese provocation is a fool’s errand that could lead to war—one that the pro-Taiwan bloc may well lose. Refraining from taking Beijing’s bait is not a sign of “passivity,” as some charge, but pragmatism as the balance of power temporarily shifts in Beijing’s favor. Look no further than former U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s example in occasionally pulling punches while remaining steadfastly committed to undermining the Soviet Union.

The same practical mindset should also be applied to urgently establish a de-escalation ladder between Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, much like the channel employed by then-U.S. President John F. Kennedy and then-Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Granted, those exchanges largely took place in secret, which shielded both leaders from charges of capitulating to their countries’ sworn enemy. Ultimately though, both sides ceded some ground, a calamitous war was averted, and a useful precedent was established for subsequent U.S. leaders to dial down tensions without sacrificing their values or strategic goals.

Today’s leaders may not benefit from the privacy enjoyed by Kennedy and Khrushchev. But regardless, the next photo op involving U.S. and Chinese politicians should be one focused on instilling confidence rather than needlessly undermining it.

How Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan Gambit Backfired

Foreign Policy · by Craig Singleton · August 16, 2022

Analysis

Beijing’s shock-and-awe military response has created a new normal in East Asia.

By Craig Singleton, a senior China fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

A pro-China protester steps on a defaced photo of U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi during a demonstration against her visit to Taiwan in Hong Kong on Aug. 3.

A pro-China protester steps on a defaced photo of U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi during a demonstration against her visit to Taiwan in Hong Kong on Aug. 3. Anthony Kwan/Getty Images

History is replete with unintended consequences, few of which mattered much. Not so in the case of U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s recent layover in Taipei, Taiwan’s capital. The trip, which garnered rare bipartisan support in Washington, aimed to demonstrate U.S. confidence in Taiwan’s leadership. Instead, the visit and China’s reaction to it left the region reeling, with Beijing apparently more confident than ever that it could retake the self-governed island nation by force if necessary.

Simply put, Pelosi’s ill-timed gambit backfired—and badly. Worse yet, its destabilizing effect was entirely predictable and completely preventable, which explains why White House and U.S. Defense Department officials repeatedly requested that she postpone, not cancel, her travel to Taipei. Sure, Pelosi faced political pressure not to back down once her plans became public. But it was always clear that China would exact a high price for her meeting with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, which need not have taken place in Taiwan or coincided with the 95th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to achieve its stated objective.

For all her good intentions, picking up the pieces after Pelosi’s tactical misstep will not be easy. Understandably, the Biden administration has downplayed the trip’s significance and reaffirmed its commitment to the United States’ long-standing “One China” policy, which recognizes Beijing as “the sole legal government of China” while ignoring its claims to rule Taiwan. Although “nothing has changed” per se in Washington, the same cannot be said for the Taiwan Strait, where China’s dramatic, expertly orchestrated show of military force was no mere aberration.

Welcome, instead, to the next normal in East Asia.

China cannot veto if, when, or how foreign governments, companies, or other entities engage Taiwan. But make no mistake: Beijing certainly gets a vote, which it wielded hours after Pelosi left Taipei. China has long sought to erode the status quo in the strait, aiming to coerce Taipei into accepting that the path to peace and prosperity runs through Beijing, not Washington. Nevertheless, the military spectacle that followed Pelosi’s trip was without precedent in scope and scale. Think less salami tactics and more shock and awe. Nor did these maneuvers appear out of thin air. They were likely devised in recent years by PLA planners with the understanding that Beijing would one day enjoy, however briefly, the political cover to justify such provocations.

Whereas Russia’s foolhardy invasion of Ukraine stalled, in part, because of Moscow’s third-rate planning and faulty assumptions, Beijing may not be condemned to the same fate.

To be fair, Pelosi’s trip did not occur in a vacuum. Beijing and Washington have been talking past each other on the Taiwan issue since U.S. President Joe Biden assumed office, with each side believing that the other is unilaterally seeking to alter the status quo. Unquestionably, China has endeavored to find a reason—any reason—to justify its increasing belligerence toward Taiwan. But Beijing’s growing skepticism about Washington’s adherence to the “One China” policy can, in large part, be attributed to Biden’s repeated mischaracterization of the United States’ security commitments as outlined in the Taiwan Relations Act, including his claim that the United States has a “commitment” to aid Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion—whereas the act only requires Washington “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defense character” without any guarantee the United States will intervene militarily. Certainly, these gaffes do not excuse Beijing’s behavior. But the regime’s response to Pelosi’s trip—coming just months before a major Chinese Communist Party leadership shake-up—was hardly surprising.

What is surprising is just how far the PLA’s capabilities have evolved since its second-rate performance during the 1996 Taiwan missile crisis. This time, the PLA put on a nearly flawless four-act play as its air and sea assets crisscrossed Taiwan’s sovereign territory with impunity. First, China clearly defined its areas of operation, after which civilian aircraft and commercial shipping quickly obliged by vacating these zones. Next, in waves, the PLA launched 11 Dongfeng ballistic missiles into the waters surrounding northern, southern, and eastern Taiwan. Four flew directly over Taipei, marking one of many firsts for China during these exercises. More than 120 Chinese aircraft also crossed the informal maritime border that exists down the median line of the Taiwan Strait.

Encountering no resistance, a PLA joint force then conducted, also for the first time, simulated attacks on Taiwan in the actual airspace and territorial waters where such an attack would likely begin. Finally, for good measure, China announced additional drills in the Yellow Sea north of Taiwan. The goal: to demonstrate that the PLA could prevent U.S. forces stationed in Japan’s Okinawa Island or Seoul from coming to Taiwan’s aid during a crisis. In all, it was a master class in strategy and tactics—one that involved thousands of personnel who will spend the next few years refining their operational assumptions, calculating down to the decimal how much fuel, food, and other supplies might be needed to pull off an actual attack in the future. Whereas Russia’s foolhardy invasion of Ukraine stalled, in part, because of Moscow’s third-rate planning and faulty prewar assumptions, Beijing, it appears, may not be condemned to the same fate.

Of course, these drills paid psychological dividends too. China confirmed that it could, at a time and place of its choosing, severely disrupt—if not outright block—critical global air and sea trade routes, including those involving Taiwanese-produced semiconductors. The drills also served to shake Taiwan’s confidence in the very sources of its political and economic survival by raising the stakes for friendly governments that might be considering whether or how to deepen their ties to Taipei. Already, some U.S. firms are reportedly eyeing a Taiwan exit, and others will likely follow. The region’s mixed response was also telling, with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations issuing a post-drill communique that managed to omit the words “Taiwan” and “China.” Just as deafening was the silence out of New Delhi to Beijing’s drills.

But China’s greatest triumph by far is that its leaders likely believe, rightly or wrongly, that an invasion may now be practical, not purely theoretical. That does not imply that an invasion is imminent or that Beijing intends to accelerate its reunification timetable. Rather, it simply suggests that China is on its way to overcoming what is arguably the greatest psychological barrier to any invasion: internal doubts about its will and disposition to fight, keep fighting, and win.

Regrettably, the U.S. intelligence community has proven incapable of accurately assessing this most human fundamental of war, similar to its flawed predictions that Russia would quickly overrun Ukraine and the U.S.-equipped Afghan military could hold off the Taliban. These analytical shortcomings increase the potential for serious miscalculations from here on out, compounded by China’s reckless decision to sever key communications channels with the West. Adding to the danger, the PLA will now almost certainly operate closer to Taiwan’s shores, in effect shrinking the buffer zone and the corresponding margin of error that previously existed in the strait.

Still, Beijing may prove unable to translate recent successes in its envisioned battlefield into a new and lasting status quo. Instead, the post-Pelosi era can be described, at best, as the next normal. There will be no going back to the way things were before her visit, but the road to a possible invasion is hardly a straight line. Although China capitalized on Pelosi’s bad timing, there remain myriad opportunities for Taiwan and its friends to shape the lasting legacy of today’s crisis in ways that benefit Taipei’s cause. Washington’s biggest hurdle lies in its rapidly dwindling set of military options to deter China as the latter approaches near-peer status. Of course, efforts must be made to speed up deliveries of defensive weapons to Taiwan—but those investments alone will likely prove insufficient in the long run. What should trouble Taiwan’s supporters is the lack of evidence that the U.S. military is augmenting its regional force or rapidly fielding new capabilities to maintain its edge.

Going forward under these new and less stable conditions, Washington and its allies must develop more intelligent, less risky ways to aid Taipei. Translation: fewer symbolic visits and more strategic substance. U.S. policymakers must also recognize that forcefully responding to each and every Chinese provocation is a fool’s errand that could lead to war—one that the pro-Taiwan bloc may well lose. Refraining from taking Beijing’s bait is not a sign of “passivity,” as some charge, but pragmatism as the balance of power temporarily shifts in Beijing’s favor. Look no further than former U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s example in occasionally pulling punches while remaining steadfastly committed to undermining the Soviet Union.

The same practical mindset should also be applied to urgently establish a de-escalation ladder between Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, much like the channel employed by then-U.S. President John F. Kennedy and then-Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Granted, those exchanges largely took place in secret, which shielded both leaders from charges of capitulating to their countries’ sworn enemy. Ultimately though, both sides ceded some ground, a calamitous war was averted, and a useful precedent was established for subsequent U.S. leaders to dial down tensions without sacrificing their values or strategic goals.

Today’s leaders may not benefit from the privacy enjoyed by Kennedy and Khrushchev. But regardless, the next photo op involving U.S. and Chinese politicians should be one focused on instilling confidence rather than needlessly undermining it.

Craig Singleton is a senior China fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former U.S. diplomat. Twitter: @CraigMSingleton

5. State Department spokesman: US ‘in a stronger position as a country’ because of Afghanistan withdrawal

State Department spokesman: US ‘in a stronger position as a country’ because of Afghanistan withdrawal

foxnews.com · by Lindsay Kornick , Alexa Moutevelis | Fox News

Video

State Department Spokesman Ned Price says U.S. is "in a stronger position as a country" because of Afghanistan withdrawal

State Department Spokesman Ned Price says U.S. is "in a stronger position as a country" because of President Biden's Afghanistan withdrawal.

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State Department spokesperson Ned Price claimed on Monday that the U.S. is "in a stronger position as a country" today because of President Biden’s decision to pull out of Afghanistan one year ago.

Many have considered the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan to be a disaster after the nation’s capital quickly fell to the Taliban despite Biden's reassurance, and thousands of American citizens and allies were left stranded or scrambling to safely get out of the country. Still, Price continued to claim the effort was a success in a press conference.

"Many of us here at the Department and across the government, and millions of Americans and Afghans alike, are mindful of today’s meaning as the 20-year-long U.S. military mission in Afghanistan ended nearly one year ago," Price said.

He continued, "Ending the longest war in American history was never going to be easy, but one year later we are in a stronger position as a country because of the President’s decision, better able to focus on the threats and challenges, but also the opportunities of today."

President Biden withdrew troops from Afghanistan in August 2021. (AP/Reuters)

WAPO REPORTER TELLS MSNBC THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION ‘OWNS THE FAILURES’ OF THE AFGHANISTAN WITHDRAWAL

Price further asserted that the recent assassination of al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahri in Afghanistan proves that the pullout was beneficial and that the U.S. is properly helping its Middle Eastern allies.

He pledged the U.S. will "stand by our Afghan allies and their families by resettling tens of thousands of them here in the United States, demonstrating the very best of the American people’s generosity, and we will continue to welcome our Afghan allies over the weeks and months ahead. We’ll also keep supporting the Afghan people during the dire economic times as the largest donor of humanitarian aid to the people of Afghanistan."

"We have demonstrated that we are able to fulfill our enduring commitments to the Afghan people using the various diplomatic tools at our disposal and with exceptional help from our partners like Qatar, the UAE and our European allies and others," he said.

Afghan women wait to receive food rations distributed by a Saudi humanitarian aid group, in Kabul, Afghanistan, Monday, April 25, 2022. Afghanistan's Taliban leadership has ordered all Afghan women to wear the all-covering burqa in public. The decree Saturday evoked similar restrictions on women during the Taliban's previous hard-line rule between 1996 and 2001. ((AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi))

AFGHANISTAN WITHDRAWAL, 1 YEAR LATER: TALIBAN TAKEOVER OF KABUL THAT PRESIDENT BIDEN NEVER SAW COMING

"Of course, the international community will continue to expect that the Taliban meet the commitments they have made to the Afghan people in key areas," Price said.

He emphasized that with soldiers out of Afghanistan, the U.S. is now free to focus on the threats of Russia, China and climate change.

"We can take on all of these challenges without putting our service members at risk in an open-ended military commitment. The same is true for our partners, including NATO, which is now more purposeful than ever in the face of Russian aggression against Ukraine," he said. "As a result, we are able to focus our resources to face new global challenges, confronting Russian aggression, managing the competition with PRC, addressing shared challenges like Covid-19 and climate change, and seizing opportunities in the Indo-Pacific among other regions."

"For the first time in nearly 20 years, our forces are not in harm’s way in Afghanistan and we are fully focused on the challenges and opportunities that define the 21st century," Price concluded before taking questions.

Afghan people climb atop a plane as they wait at the Kabul airport in Kabul on August 16, 2021, after a stunningly swift end to Afghanistan's 20-year war, as thousands of people mobbed the city's airport trying to flee the group's feared hardline brand of Islamist rule. ((Photo by Wakil Kohsar / AFP) (Photo by WAKIL KOHSAR/AFP via Getty Images))

On the U.S.'s final day in Afghanistan, August 31, 2021, Biden called the withdrawal, which saw 13 U.S. service members killed in a bombing and untold numbers of civilians dead in the chaos, "an extraordinary success."

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Biden’s poll numbers quickly fell after the Afghanistan pullout and have yet to recover.

Lindsay Kornick is an associate editor for Fox News Digital. Story tips can be sent to lindsay.kornick@fox.com and on Twitter: @lmkornick.

foxnews.com · by Lindsay Kornick , Alexa Moutevelis | Fox News

6. U.S. And India To Hold Military Drills Close To Tense Border With China

Will China respond, and if so, how?

Excerpts:

On top of that, a smaller special operations forces exercise is also now underway at the Special Forces Training School in Bakloh, Himachal Pradesh. Himachal Pradesh is about 260 miles north of Uttarakhand where Yudh Abhyas drills are being held. These exercises, called Ex Vajra Prahar 2022, will consist of the United States and Indian forces jointly training, planning, and executing “a series of special operations, counter-terrorist operations, and airborne operations in simulated conventional and unconventional scenarios in mountainous terrain,” according to Adda247.

Regardless, the exercises will send China some kind of message. That message may prove to simply be one of achieving a strengthened partnership with India, but it will be interesting to see how China perceives it considering their recent reactions to the United States’ diplomatic activities.

U.S. And India To Hold Military Drills Close To Tense Border With China

The joint exercises will be conducted exactly 60 years after China and India waged a war over the territories surrounding the shared border.

EMMA HELFRICH

AUG 15, 2022 10:11 PM

thedrive.com · by Emma Helfrich · August 15, 2022

An upcoming iteration of a longstanding series of military drills held in partnership with U.S. and Indian armies will take place near a hotly disputed area of the Chinese-Indian border. The exercises will also occur at a time when relations between the United States and China are at a low point following Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s (D-CA) high-profile trip to Taiwan in the first week of August.

Also known as ‘Yudh Abhyas’, or ‘War Practice’ in English, this year’s bilateral exercise is the 18th to occur since it first began in 2002. It will be carried out in the Indian state of Uttarakhand in the Himalayan mountain range at an altitude of over 9,000 feet near the city of Auli. Its geographical disposition makes the locale ideal for the joint high-altitude, cold-climate warfare training exercises that Overt Defense first confirmed would be conducted from October 18-31. Overt Defense also spoke with Maj. Jonathon M. Lewis of U.S. Army Pacific Public Affairs who offered additional details in terms of what’s to be expected.

Indian Army soldiers assigned to the 7th Battalion, the Madras Regiment, and U.S. Army paratroopers from the 1st Squadron, 40th Cavalry Regiment (Airborne), 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division, advance to a rally point while conducting a joint field training exercise for Yudh Abhyas 2021. Credit: Alejandro Peña/U.S. Air Force

“At this time, we expect the main element will come from the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 11th Airborne Division, based at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska,” Lewis told the outlet. “This unit was formerly 4th Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division, but reflagged to 2nd BCT, 11th Airborne Division in June 2022 when the 11th Airborne Division was activated. This is the same unit that conducted Yudh Abhyas 2021 in Alaska. The 11th Airborne Division paratroopers will be joined by elements from the California National Guard, Washington National Guard, and U.S. Army Special Forces.”

In last year’s drills, a total of 300 U.S. Army soldiers and 350 Indian Army soldiers participated. However, this year’s numbers have yet to be disclosed. As far as the specific operations that the exercises will consist of, 2021’s joint training exercise included counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism activities, as well as medical evacuation by air, mountaineer training, and small-arms marksmanship drills. Although, both the timing and location this time around are particularly noteworthy for a few reasons.

Indian Army soldiers assigned to the 7th Battalion, the Madras Regiment, and U.S. Army paratroopers from the 1st Squadron, 40th Cavalry Regiment (Airborne), 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division, patrol to their objective while conducting a joint field training exercise for Yudh Abhyas 2021. Credit: Alejandro Peña/U.S. Air Force

While India has certainly hosted Yudh Abhyas in the state of Uttarakhand in the past — in 2007, 2014, 2016, and 2018 — those particular exercises were carried out a little under 200 miles from the Chinese-Indian border in the mountain range’s foothills, according to Hindustan Times. In this case, the city of Auli is located approximately 62 miles from what China and India have since identified as the 2,100-mile-long Line of Actual Control (LAC).

The LAC was first loosely established following the Sino-Indian Border War that started on October 20, 1962 (meaning October’s drills are occurring over the 60th anniversary) when a dispute concerning the Himalayan dividing line between India and China boiled over into a full-blown conflict. India believed that the area belonged to the Indian-controlled portion of Kashmir, while China insisted it belonged to Xinjiang.

Indian Army soldiers assigned to the 7th Battalion, the Madras Regiment, advance on their objective while conducting a joint field training exercise for Yudh Abhyas 2021. Credit: Alejandro Peña/U.S. Air Force

Last year’s drills, which were also reportedly focused on high-altitude training in colder climates, were instead held at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska as mentioned by Overt Defense. This is worth noting because, if the primary purpose of the exercise is to familiarize troops from India and the United States with certain climates and geography, it's at least intriguing that both countries would decide to do so in such close relation to a historically contested area rather than hosting it in more neutral territory as was done last year. However, the move would certainly line up with the United States’ efforts in recent years to strengthen its ties with India as a counter to China, which is becoming increasingly important in the current geopolitical climate.

In regards to the LAC dispute, even now China and India can’t seem to come to an agreement on whose control key areas of the border fall under, which has turned these areas into dangerous and inhospitable pieces of land. In fact, hostilities once again mounted in June 2020 when Indian and Chinese forces resorted to not only hand-to-hand combat but the utilization of poles and stones to defend the territory as well, resulting in the violent deaths of multiple Indian and Chinese soldiers, although China has never released a confirmed number of casualties. This particular brawl occurred in the Galwan Valley near Aksai Chin, which both countries claim as their own even though China controls it.

The western portion of the Line of Actual Control, separating Eastern Ladakh and Aksai Chin. Credit: Map by the CIA via Wikimedia Commons

In May of this year, The War Zone published an article detailing China’s quiet victory in this area after its forces executed an intense military buildup around Aksai Chin following India’s limited withdrawals after the 2020 melee battle. Chinese forces moved quickly and forcefully to set up tent camps in the Galwan Valley, occupy control points in the area, station units atop nearby mountains, and erect new bases in the plains near the border area. What were once temporary encampments then morphed into durable infrastructure. Even though certain negotiations held over the years after the border crisis did result in Chinese forces deserting a small number of improvised positions, the rapid military and dual-use infrastructure developments in the area nonetheless limit India’s chances of regaining any control over the disputed region.

A map showing major Chinese military infrastructure developments in the region from our previous piece.

Throughout the past year, The War Zone has also shared ominous satellite imagery revealing a number of major efforts made by Chinese forces to expand its airpower on the country’s western border. All of these regional force projections being carried out by China underscore an overarching initiative to bolster the country’s ability to quickly and effectively deploy massed military power toward the border on short notice.

Just this year, relations between the two countries were further challenged when China began building a bridge across the Pangong Tso lake, an area along the LAC that was the epicenter of yet another bloody territorial brawl between the two powers in 2017 when both sides were blamed for violating attempted negotiations. China started construction on the bridge in May, months after it had begun erecting an initial crossing intended to transport heavier military equipment. The Indian government condemns these actions as an “illegal occupation” of their territory.

At this point, it's difficult not to see how Beijing may consider the U.S. Army's participation in this year's drills so close to such a historically troubled area to at least be a calculated signaling decision. In fact, Nikkei Asia, a Japanese and English media outlet, spoke with Pankaj Jha, a professor of defense and strategic studies at O.P. Jindal Global University, who affirmed that the drills could concern China citing that Washington may try to showcase that they are "looking at another front for [tackling] China" if it continues threatening Taiwan.

A panoramic view of Pangong Lake in Ladakh Valley on September 13, 2018. Credit: Muzamil Mattoo/NurPhoto via Getty Images

On top of that, a smaller special operations forces exercise is also now underway at the Special Forces Training School in Bakloh, Himachal Pradesh. Himachal Pradesh is about 260 miles north of Uttarakhand where Yudh Abhyas drills are being held. These exercises, called Ex Vajra Prahar 2022, will consist of the United States and Indian forces jointly training, planning, and executing “a series of special operations, counter-terrorist operations, and airborne operations in simulated conventional and unconventional scenarios in mountainous terrain,” according to Adda247.

Regardless, the exercises will send China some kind of message. That message may prove to simply be one of achieving a strengthened partnership with India, but it will be interesting to see how China perceives it considering their recent reactions to the United States’ diplomatic activities.

Contact the author: Emma@thewarzone.com

thedrive.com · by Emma Helfrich · August 15, 2022

7. Afghan Women, Trained By U.S. Special Forces, Are Still In Peril

Afghan Women, Trained By U.S. Special Forces, Are Still In Peril

newsy.com · by Sasha Ingber

One year after the U.S. pullout, these women who served in Afghanistan's security units are among the most endangered — even outside of Afghanistan.

Meet a woman we're calling "Fatima" for her security. She was part of a covert unit inside the Afghan National Army. It's called the Female Tactical Platoon. These so-called "FTPs" fought the Taliban, alongside male commandos.

U.S. Army Special Operations trained Fatima on assault rifles, machine guns, and rocket launchers. She says her job was to recruit female forces and help the families of Afghan soldiers who died in the line of duty.

In early August, after a year of hiding and living in fear in Afghanistan, she quietly fled to Turkey on foot. She says she didn't get help from Americans; her family sold all their possessions to pay for a smuggler. They walked for 11 days. But when they crossed into Iran, her parents and two siblings couldn't run fast enough to escape soldiers. They were sent back to Afghanistan.

She was in pain when we spoke, saying she broke her finger and lost her toenails on the journey. But she can't see a doctor, or find a job, because she's living in Turkey illegally.

A source familiar with rescue operations for this covert group says about 26 women remain in Afghanistan. They don't have exact numbers. They lost track of some, and one woman died a few days before her evacuation began; that woman, Mahjabin Hakimi, was found hanged. For those who made it to the U.S., there was talk of transferring them into the U.S. Army and one day putting them in special operations forces. But that plan has been delayed.

We also found a former intelligence and security officer, living in a secret like Fatima. This time, in Pakistan. Nahid let Newsy use her real name because she was already featured in documentaries and recruitment videos.

She says she lost contact with U.S. intelligence forces. They taught her how to fire glock pistols and interrogate prisoners. She also learned to read the faces of female relatives of Taliban fighters during dangerous night raids. But she still gets regular text messages from the Taliban, and fellow officers who have switched sides.

But even in Pakistan, Nahid worries. She fears the police or military will conspire with the Taliban against her. And she has good reason. She says a distant friend who worked with her vanished when she tried to pick up her immigrant card.

Nahid says she would fight the Taliban again, if she ever gets the chance. But Afghanistan cannot depend on other countries to solve its problems.

8. PH, US elite army units train together

PH, US elite army units train together

mb.com.ph · by Martin Sadongdong · August 16, 2022

Elite forces of the Philippine Army (PA) and United States Army kicked off a month-long bilateral training drills in Palawan on Monday, August 15.

Members of the Philippine Army’s Special Forces Regiment (Airborne) [SFR(A)] and U.S. Army Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) pose for a token photo during the start of the month-long Balance Piston 22-3 geared at enhancing interoperability between the two elite units in Palawan on August 15, 2022. (Photo by Philippine Army)

The Balance Piston 22-3 was geared at enhancing the interoperability of the PA’s Special Forces Regiment (Airborne) [SFR(A)] and the US Army’s Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC), according to Colonel Xerxes Trinidad, PA spokesperson.

The SFR(A) and SOCPAC teams will conduct bilateral training drills until September 16 at the Joint Maritime Law Enforcement Training Center in Honda Bay, Puerto Princesa and at the headquarters of the 18th Special Forces “Riverine” Company in Punta Baja in Rizal town.

Lt. Col. Paulo Baylon, SFR(A) assistant chief of staff for education and training, said the bilateral exercise will focus on long range marksmanship, combat marksmanship, close quarter combat, small unit tactics, unconventional warfare, maritime operations, and full mission profile or culmination exercise.

“We are certain that this will enable us to exchange tactics, techniques and procedures to enhance interoperability between Filipino and U.S. Special Forces,” Baylon stated.

The Balance Piston is a regular bilateral training exercise between the special operation forces of the Philippines and the United States. It started in the early 2000s.

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mb.com.ph · by Martin Sadongdong · August 16, 2022

9. Recounting the U.S. Failure in Afghanistan

Brutal critique:

Once the evacuation was underway, the U.S. government offered conflicting information to those seeking to leave, per the report. Members of Congress who hoped to help constituents and Afghan allies escape had to contend with State Department websites that didn’t work and out-of-office email replies from staff who would have been expected to be involved in the effort.

Particularly damning is the fact that U.S. military assets required to carry out an evacuation had been in place a month prior to the evacuation, according to the report. But American officials chose not to use them until it was too late.

“There are many sins, if you will,” McCaul said of the report during an interview with CBS over the weekend. “There was a complete lack of, and a failure to plan. There was no plan, and there was no plan executed.”

Recounting the U.S. Failure in Afghanistan

A new congressional report spells out how the Biden administration bungled last year’s withdrawal.

Haley Byrd Wilt

5 hr ago

uphill.thedispatch.com · by Haley Byrd Wilt

A father holds his child outside the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, Afghanistan, on August 19, 2021. (Marcus Yam / Los Angeles Times via Getty Images)

Good morning. We’re thinking about the people of Afghanistan this week.

House Republicans Push Accountability for Afghanistan Withdrawal Failures

Republicans on the House Foreign Affairs Committee will release a report today on the Biden administration’s withdrawal from Afghanistan last year, outlining poor planning and its sweeping ramifications for the people of Afghanistan and for American strategic security.

Frustration over unheeded warnings—and a lack of accountability for top officials in the aftermath—underpin the report. A copy obtained by The Dispatch in advance of publication also unveils new information about the withdrawal.

Far more American citizens were left in Afghanistan after the Taliban took control than the 100 to 200 citizens the White House earlier estimated were still in the country, according to the report. The State Department confirmed it has evacuated more than 800 Americans from Afghanistan since the end of August 2021.

The report also raises alarms about the locations of thousands of former Afghan military personnel privy to sensitive American information and U.S. training. Many of those personnel fled to Iran after the Taliban took power, posing risks to information security.

Republicans on the committee describe the publication as an interim report. If their party wins the House in November, they are likely to issue subpoenas to compel testimony and more information from the executive branch.

The report also serves as a reminder of one of the most egregious aspects of the withdrawal: the failure to evacuate many Afghan allies who are entitled by law to live in the United States. About 77,200 Afghans who have applied for SIV acceptance remain in Afghanistan today with their families, facing danger amid Taliban rule. And the tens of thousands of Afghans who were able to come to the United States amid a chaotic, last-minute evacuation last year are facing legal uncertainty and massive delays in seeking permanent legal residency, as we wrote to you last week.

The State Department, in particular, receives much of the House GOP’s withering criticism in the report. It walks through the Biden administration’s failure to prioritize the evacuation of SIV applicants despite months of advocacy from veterans groups, human rights activists, and lawmakers in advance of the withdrawal.

During the spring and summer of 2021, after President Joe Biden made it clear he planned to follow a deal former President Donald Trump had struck with the Taliban and bring American troops out of Afghanistan, lawmakers called on the White House in letters and in conversations with senior officials to quickly evacuate tens of thousands of Afghan allies who assisted American troops during the 20-year war.

Those who had not completed the lengthy screening process could complete it on Guam, an American island in the western Pacific, before entering the United States, a bipartisan group of lawmakers told the administration in June. There was historic precedent for it, including after the fall of Saigon in 1975. The impending departure of American troops from Afghanistan would put Afghans who helped coalition troops in severe danger of Taliban reprisals, they emphasized.

But the White House ignored their calls for evacuations, and top officials were complacent when senior lawmakers questioned them.

“The clock is ticking and the Taliban are on the march,” Rep. Michael McCaul, the top Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said during a hearing with Secretary of State Antony Blinken in June 2021.

McCaul pressed Blinken on his department’s plans to get Afghan allies to safety through the Special Immigrant Visa program, which offers residency to those who worked with coalition troops as translators, among other roles. The program has been backlogged for years; advocates said at the time that no amount of red-tape cutting could expedite the process enough to get everyone entitled safety in the United States out of Afghanistan before the withdrawal. More drastic steps—such as evacuation to Guam—were needed.

But top officials resisted those arguments. During the hearing, Blinken assured lawmakers the embassy in Kabul would be able to continue approving SIV applications even after American troops had departed.

“Whatever happens in Afghanistan, if there is a significant deterioration in security—that could well happen, we’ve discussed this before—I don’t think it’s going to be something that happens from a Friday to a Monday,” Blinken told the committee. “So I wouldn’t necessarily equate the departure of our forces in July, August, or by early September, with some kind of immediate deterioration in the situation.”

Those words couldn’t have been more wrong: The Taliban took Kabul in a day, on Sunday, August 15, after making major gains around the country over that weekend.

Not only did the administration not take seriously the need to evacuate allies in advance, but officials were also late to act once it was evident their rosy predictions about the withdrawal weren’t going to pan out, the GOP report shows.

The committee Republicans write that the Biden administration “waited until August 14, 2021, just hours before the Taliban seized Kabul, to begin making key decisions about evacuations, including the establishment of transit centers in third countries.”

“This delay led to capacity issues during the evacuation which resulted in flights being suspended at various points and people being stranded in deteriorating humanitarian conditions,” the report reads. “Military commanders have clearly stated there was an utter lack of urgency on the part of the White House, the National Security Council (NSC), and the State Department as it pertained to an evacuation, despite repeated dire warnings.”

Once the evacuation was underway, the U.S. government offered conflicting information to those seeking to leave, per the report. Members of Congress who hoped to help constituents and Afghan allies escape had to contend with State Department websites that didn’t work and out-of-office email replies from staff who would have been expected to be involved in the effort.

Particularly damning is the fact that U.S. military assets required to carry out an evacuation had been in place a month prior to the evacuation, according to the report. But American officials chose not to use them until it was too late.

“There are many sins, if you will,” McCaul said of the report during an interview with CBS over the weekend. “There was a complete lack of, and a failure to plan. There was no plan, and there was no plan executed.”

uphill.thedispatch.com · by Haley Byrd Wilt

10. Ukraine-Born Green Beret Raises Money to Send Supplies to War-Torn Homeland

Ukraine-Born Green Beret Raises Money to Send Supplies to War-Torn Homeland

coffeeordie.com · by Jenna Biter · August 12, 2022

Coffee or Die Magazine has obscured the faces and withheld the last names of active-duty Special Forces soldiers.

Dmitry, a Green Beret stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, never intended to work in Special Forces by day and run a charity by night.

“I was not planning to do a fund or a nonprofit organization at all,” Dmitry told Coffee or Die Magazine. “I just wanted to get the stuff to the Ukrainians because they need it.”

Since late February, Dmitry figures he’s sent roughly 10 huge shipments of medical supplies and other aid to Ukraine. He estimated the value of the gear so far was probably close to $300,000, ranging from IV kits and surgical tools to crates of baby formula.

The medical equipment is almost all donated, collected, and packaged by Dmitry and his Special Forces colleagues at Fort Bragg. But he’s had to raise money to buy some gear and — the more costly part — to ship it all.

To do that, Dmitry and his wife, Alena, founded Ukrainian Efforts Humanitarian Fund out of their home in Fayetteville. The Ukrainian couple grew up together in Ukraine. Alena’s parents immigrated to the US in 2000 as religious refugees, while Dmitry’s mother won a spot in the US immigration green card lottery. He joined the Army in 2009.

Dmitry’s Special Forces colleagues have chipped in hours to help package supplies. Photo via Ukrainian Efforts/Facebook.

“We both have a lot of family still in Ukraine,” Alena said.

Since the Russian invasion, they have spent much of their spare time raising funds, arranging shipments, and coordinating the 20-odd volunteers who help out, including several of Dmitry’s Green Beret teammates.

Along with the work of collecting, packaging, and shipping supplies, the two attend gatherings like farmers’ markets and sporting events to collect cash donations.

“I like to think of us as force multipliers just because that’s what I do in Special Forces,” Dmitry said. “When people give us cash, even though it’s not a lot — I mean, so far, we got close to about $20,000 in donations — we’re able to take that $20,000 and basically multiply that by three times, if not more. Ten times, I would say.”

The group uses donations to purchase some supplies and pay for shipping costs. All who work on the shipments are volunteers — even if the hours can feel like full time, Dmitry said.

Boxes of medical supplies headed to Ukraine, tagged with Ukraine Effort’s “Kalishnikitty” logo. Photo via Ukraine Efforts/Facebook.

“It is a second job, a little bit more than I thought I was going to do, but it is what it is,” Dmitry said. “We just started, you know, us two and some soldiers from my unit.”

They even created a logo: a Ukraine-colored, Punisher-shirt-wearing “Kalashnikitty.” The group puts the logo on all their shipments and sends stickers. Ukrainians have sent back pictures of the stickers on vehicles and gear in combat zones.

Dmitry and Alena started shipping supplies shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine. At the time, Dmitry was an instructor in the Special Forces Qualification Course, or Q Course, the grueling 18-month pipeline that all would-be Green Berets must pass.

When the invasion began, Dmitry said, a few Ukrainians were attending the Q Course.

“When the war started, obviously, [the Ukrainian soldiers] decided they wanted to go back and fight in their homeland,” Dmitry said. “I wish I would be able to go, but obviously I can’t — I’m still active [duty]. So, I figured, you know what? Let me see what I can do.”

Dmitry did not want the two going home empty-handed.

Ukrainian Efforts raises money at local events such as farmers’ markets. Photo via Ukrainian Efforts/Facebook.

“We decided to fill up [the Ukrainian soldiers’] carry-on bags and checked luggage basically full of tourniquets and blood transfusion kits and all high-value items that people are really just donating because they had that laying in the garage,” Dmitry said.

Many of the supplies were older, nearing their expiration dates, but they were still usable. With some help, Dmitry packed the supplies into duffel bags and paid for the Ukrainians to take the extra bags on their flight home.

“We ended up with roughly 20 duffel bags of additional items [the soldiers] were not able to take with them because it was just too much,” Dmitry said.

With that, he hit up teammates to help pay to ship what the Ukrainians could not carry.

“If you have some money, give it to me, basically,” Dmitry said.

Friends and co-workers regularly gather at Dmitry’s Fayetteville home to pack supplies. Photo via Ukrainian Efforts/Facebook.

Photo via Ukrainian Efforts/Facebook.

And they did.

Dmitry and a friend drove the extra bags to New Jersey and paid a few thousand dollars to ship them to Lviv, a city in western Ukraine.

“I was happy about it, but, we figured, I wanted to feel that I’m doing something, and that’s probably helped me dealing with all of our issues because obviously we were all struggling because we have family there,” Dmitry said.

While Ukrainian Efforts waits for the IRS to approve its nonprofit status, Dmitry said, the group has been sending aid under the umbrella of the Special Forces Foundation, a nonprofit serving Green Berets and their families.

Four of Dmitry and Alena’s family members live with them in North Carolina, and seven more are on their way, but Dmitry said his brother-in-law and nephew are fighting in the war.

“Obviously, this is all close to my heart,” Dmitry said.

coffeeordie.com · by Jenna Biter · August 12, 2022

11. A victorious Taliban is inspiring a new generation of Islamic extremists

Excerpts:

The Biden administration’s aim last year was to end what some Democrats and Republicans have called America’s “forever war” against jihadist groups in the Middle East. Washington’s herd mentality decided it was better to “pivot to Asia,” where a great power competition with China looms.

What these neo-isolationists didn’t realize: Jihadists have become emboldened by America’s ignominious defeat in Afghanistan. And they appear to be mounting a global offensive. Just like they did back in 1989.

A victorious Taliban is inspiring a new generation of Islamic extremists

New York Post · by Jonathan Schanzer · August 15, 2022

On May 15, 1989, the Soviet army withdrew from Afghanistan. The Soviets, who had been slugging it out for 10 years with Islamist fighters, finally threw in the towel. The withdrawal was immediately hailed as a significant victory by Afghanistan’s mujahideen.

The impact of the Soviet withdrawal was immediate. The Taliban soon emerged from the chaos of Afghanistan, forging an Islamist state. The nation became a safe haven for a number of extremist groups, include one forged by a mujahideen fighter named Osama bin Laden.

But the shockwaves were not limited to Afghanistan.

The Taliban marked the first-year anniversary of their takeover after the country’s western-backed government fled and the Afghan military crumbled.

AP/Ebrahim Noroozi

A month later, a coup d’état brought to power a Muslim Brotherhood government in Sudan. Khartoum became a safe haven for terrorist groups around the world.

Nearby, Islamists organized themselves and secured electoral victories in Tunisia. Jordan experienced similar convulsions when the Islamic Action Front, a Muslim Brotherhood splinter faction, made significant electoral gains.

The Palestinian organization Hamas evolved alarmingly from a popular protest movement to a terrorist group dedicated to Israel’s destruction. A suicide bombing campaign soon followed. Meanwhile, violent protests and firebombing attacks inspired by an Iranian fatwa against author Salman Rushdie rocked Australia, Norway, India, France, Pakistan and the United States.

Iran-backed Islamic Jihad launched 1,000 rockets on Israel this month.

AP/Adel Hana

Could President Biden administration’s disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan last year create a similar domino effect? Could the propaganda victory the Taliban achieved in 2021 encourage Islamic extremism in other nations just like it did 32 years ago?

More On: taliban

More than $7B in US military equipment seized by Taliban: Pentagon watchdog

After one year of Taliban rule, Afghans suffer hunger and economic collapse

Biden rules out returning $7B to Afghanistan after al-Zawahiri strike: report

GOPers demand Biden answer for Afghan collapse on Kabul fall anniversary

It appears so.

Afghanistan is once again a safe haven for Al Qaeda, as evidenced by the American operation that killed Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the group’s commander. Just after the withdrawal last year, the Middle East was rocked by yet another Gaza war, with Hamas showering more than 4,500 rockets on Israel. Earlier this month, the Iran-backed Islamic Jihad picked another fight with Israel, raining down another 1,000 rockets on the Jewish state.

The Islamic State may be weakened in Syria and Iraq, but a faction in Congo is active. The jihadist group has conducted two prison raids in the last year.

Elsewhere in Africa, the Al Qaeda affiliate group Al Shabaab attempted an incursion into Ethiopia. The group remains active in Somalia. Here at home, Salman Rushdie was attacked on stage last week as he prepared to deliver a lecture. That stabbing, reportedly encouraged by Iranian agents, came on the heels of foiled Iranian plots against former national security advisor John Bolton and former secretary of state Mike Pompeo.

Hundreds of newly trained Shabaab fighters perform military exercises in the Lafofe area.

AP/Farah Abdi Warsameh

Elsewhere, Iran continues to foment unrest through the use of violent proxies. This includes attacks by Ansar Allah (also known as the Houthis) in Yemen, and a panoply of Shi’ite militias operating in war-torn Syria and Iraq.

The Biden administration’s aim last year was to end what some Democrats and Republicans have called America’s “forever war” against jihadist groups in the Middle East. Washington’s herd mentality decided it was better to “pivot to Asia,” where a great power competition with China looms.

What these neo-isolationists didn’t realize: Jihadists have become emboldened by America’s ignominious defeat in Afghanistan. And they appear to be mounting a global offensive. Just like they did back in 1989.

Jonathan Schanzer is senior vice president for research at Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

New York Post · by Jonathan Schanzer · August 15, 2022

12. What Qatar Owes Afghanistan’s Refugees

Excerpts:

Qatar, however, has something more valuable to offer: homes. The country will soon host soccer’s World Cup and has built lodging for thousands of fans expected to soon flood the tiny emirate. According to one official’s comments to Reuters, Qatar has built more than 100,000 rooms. These include hotels, apartments, cabins on cruise ships and Bedouin-style tents. All of them are set to be dismantled after the games, but they could easily be offered to the Afghan refugees and asylum seekers for whose plight Doha is in part responsible.

Qatar would almost certainly balk at this proposal. One can imagine the emirate’s leaders citing a lack of capacity to absorb so many refugees. Yet the country currently hosts more than two million foreign workers, mostly from South Asia. Why are they suitable for temporary stay in Qatar, but not Afghans?

A year after America’s shambolic withdrawal, Washington should do more to atone for its mistakes. So should Doha. Qatar should provide Afghans shelter until a permanent solution is found.

What Qatar Owes Afghanistan’s Refugees

Doha was instrumental in the Taliban’s return to power. It has the means to house many who fled.

By Jonathan Schanzer and Bill Roggio

Aug. 15, 2022 6:40 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-qatar-owes-afghanistans-refugees-doha-taliban-hamas-al-qaeda-middle-east-the-muslim-brotherhood-11660600610

A year after the Biden administration’s disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, the refugee crisis is only worsening. By the end of last year, 3.5 million people had been displaced within Afghanistan’s borders, and more than two million had fled the country, according to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Washington bears significant responsibility for this, and it should do more to help.

OPINION: POTOMAC WATCH

The Lessons of the Afghanistan Exit, One Year Later

00:00

But so should another American ally: Qatar. The tiny desert kingdom played a key role in facilitating the Taliban’s conquest of Afghanistan last year. In the early 2010s, senior Taliban leaders, with the support of the Qatari government, moved to the country’s capital, Doha, to establish an office to conduct talks with the Obama administration. Qatar’s acceptance of the Taliban was hardly a shock. The country has served as a haven for members of many extremists groups, including Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and al Qaeda affiliate groups. This makes Qatar a de facto state sponsor of terrorism, but also affords it significant geopolitical power. A country smaller in area than Connecticut with fewer than 300,000 citizens, Qatar has a seat at the negotiating table in multiple Middle Eastern conflicts.

In this case, it got to lead talks with a global superpower. As the U.S. surge in Afghanistan faltered, the Obama administration sought a political settlement with the Taliban and ultimately to withdraw from the country. By January 2012, several Taliban negotiators moved to Qatar and initiated secret talks with U.S. and European officials under Qatari auspices. The Taliban were waging war against the U.S., and their partnership with al Qaeda was still in place. However bad it looked, the Obama administration wanted out. The Qataris were eager to make that happen.

The arrangement had stumbling blocks. In 2013 the Taliban raised their banner over its Doha headquarters and a sign calling it the “political office of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.” When U.S. and Afghan officials objected, a Taliban spokesman said “the raising of the flag and the use of the name of Islamic Emirate were done with the agreement of the Qatari government.”

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The Qatar-led negotiations stalled. But in late 2013, Doha initiated a new round of discussions, using a prisoner swap to generate momentum. The Taliban exchanged Bowe Bergdahl, a U.S. soldier who deserted his post in eastern Afghanistan, for five notorious Taliban leaders held at Guantanamo Bay. The Taliban Five, as they were known, were all allies of al Qaeda. Two were responsible for terrorist attacks, and one was a founding member of the Taliban. When the deal was struck, the Taliban immediately celebrated it as a victory. The Taliban Five were subsequently involved in the negotiations with Washington.

Talks with the Taliban continued into the Trump years. The desire to end the “endless war” in Afghanistan found support among Democrats and Republicans. The Taliban’s Doha office continued to serve as the hub for talks with American officials. With the help of the Qataris, the Taliban somehow burnished the image of a responsible government, as opposed to the terrorist group the world knew them to be.

On Feb. 29, 2020, the Trump administration signed a Qatar-brokered deal. The Taliban weren’t required to denounce al Qaeda. They made only vague promises not to allow terror groups to operate in Afghanistan (a promise they had also made before 9/11). The agreement ignored the interests of the Afghan people. The Taliban weren’t required to share power, or to recognize the Afghan constitution. There was no mention of women’s rights.

On April 13, 2022, President Biden sealed Afghanistan’s fate by announcing a full withdrawal, starting immediately. Mr. Biden made the inexplicable error of removing military assets before evacuating American civilians. Four months later, on Aug. 15, 2022, the Taliban entered Kabul and the Afghan government collapsed. Millions have fled as the Islamist regime has repressed citizens and hunted dissidents.

One year later, Washington is still seeking solutions to this displacement, but not with nearly enough gusto. America is the top donor to the U.N. refugee commission, with $1.8 billion in aid, but has done little else. Doha, among the world’s wealthiest countries per capita, has touted its $25 million donation in support of refugees, along with 700 tons of food and medicine. That is simply not enough.

Qatar, however, has something more valuable to offer: homes. The country will soon host soccer’s World Cup and has built lodging for thousands of fans expected to soon flood the tiny emirate. According to one official’s comments to Reuters, Qatar has built more than 100,000 rooms. These include hotels, apartments, cabins on cruise ships and Bedouin-style tents. All of them are set to be dismantled after the games, but they could easily be offered to the Afghan refugees and asylum seekers for whose plight Doha is in part responsible.

Qatar would almost certainly balk at this proposal. One can imagine the emirate’s leaders citing a lack of capacity to absorb so many refugees. Yet the country currently hosts more than two million foreign workers, mostly from South Asia. Why are they suitable for temporary stay in Qatar, but not Afghans?

A year after America’s shambolic withdrawal, Washington should do more to atone for its mistakes. So should Doha. Qatar should provide Afghans shelter until a permanent solution is found.

Mr. Schanzer is senior vice president for research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Mr. Roggio is a senior fellow at FDD and editor of its Long War Journal.

13. FDD | Despite Growth, Inflation Surges in Iran Under Raisi

Excerpt:

A year after Raisi entered the presidential palace, Tehran is selling more oil and has more money. Iranians, however, have found fewer jobs, while prices are skyrocketing. Regardless of Raisi’s economic policy, Tehran’s decision on whether to revive the JCPOA will likely determine the path of Iran’s economy in the near future. If the Biden administration revives its predecessor’s maximum pressure campaign, the Iranian economy will return to stagflation.

FDD | Despite Growth, Inflation Surges in Iran Under Raisi

fdd.org · by Saeed Ghasseminejad Senior Iran and Financial Economics Advisor · August 15, 2022

This month marks the first anniversary of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s assumption of power, but he has failed to fulfill one of his key campaign pledges: to relieve Iran’s economic plight. Over the past year, Iran’s economy did grow faster and increase export revenue, yet this has primarily benefited the regime, failing to generate jobs, lower inflation, or raise the quality of life for ordinary Iranians.

In the Persian calendar year 1400 (March 2021 to March 2022), Iran’s economy grew by 4.3 percent, much higher than the previous year’s 1 percent growth. The latest data from the Central Bank of Iran show the bank’s net foreign assets in July were $130 billion, $16 billion more than a year earlier.

Tehran’s minister of petroleum, Javad Owji, said in late July that Iran has produced 27 percent more oil over the past year — up from 3 million barrels per day to 3.8 million — than it did when the Rouhani administration left office in August 2021. Iran, he added, now exports 40 percent more oil and 25 percent more gas. The change is mainly driven by higher prices and the Biden administration’s lax enforcement of sanctions during nuclear negotiations.

The modest expansion of the services sector — Iran’s largest — constituted another key engine behind the Islamic Republic’s economic growth. The sector grew by 4.5 percent in the Persian calendar year 1400, after shrinking by 1.3 percent the previous year. This growth largely resulted from the waning of the COVID-19 pandemic.

In fact, quarterly data from Iran’s Statistics Center show that the country’s economic growth as a whole is now decelerating. The Raisi administration has put a cap on Iran’s economic development by refusing the Biden administration’s offer of extensive sanctions relief in exchange for the temporary limits on Tehran’s nuclear program prescribed by the 2015 nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Washington’s offer would deliver a $275 billion benefits package in its first year and allow Iran to generate more than $1 trillion in trade revenue by 2030.

While growth is up, Tehran’s economic policies have not improved the lives of most Iranians. Rather, the regime has presided over a dramatic rise in inflation. The average 12-month inflation rate over the past year was 40.5 percent. According to the Statistics Center, the 12-month point-to-point inflation rate was 54 percent in July; it was even higher for food and beverages, at 87 percent.

The massive inflation in the food and beverage industry is partly the result of Raisi’s decision earlier this year to cut subsidies for flour. The regime had previously subsidized flour imports by allowing them to be conducted using the central bank’s low exchange rate, which is one-seventh of the price that importers of other goods pay in Iran’s NIMA market, a currency exchange market for importers and exporters. The subsidy cuts caused protests across the country, but the regime suppressed them with force.

A year into Raisi’s presidency, the labor-force participation rate is lower, and the unemployment rate is higher. Fewer people are actively seeking a job, and a higher number of those who seek employment cannot find it. According to the Statistics Center, the labor-force participation and unemployment rates were 40.9 percent and 9.2 percent, respectively, in spring 2022. A year earlier, in spring 2021, they were 41.4 and 8.8 percent. In other words, the Raisi administration has lost almost 100,000 jobs to date.

A year after Raisi entered the presidential palace, Tehran is selling more oil and has more money. Iranians, however, have found fewer jobs, while prices are skyrocketing. Regardless of Raisi’s economic policy, Tehran’s decision on whether to revive the JCPOA will likely determine the path of Iran’s economy in the near future. If the Biden administration revives its predecessor’s maximum pressure campaign, the Iranian economy will return to stagflation.

Saeed Ghasseminejad is a senior advisor on Iran and financial economics at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he contributes to FDD’s Iran Program and Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP). For more analysis from Saeed, the Iran Program, and CEFP, please subscribe HERE. Follow Saeed on Twitter @SGhasseminejad. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_Iran and @FDD_CEFP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, non-partisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

fdd.org · by Saeed Ghasseminejad Senior Iran and Financial Economics Advisor · August 15, 2022

14. Can the Taliban Be Contained?

Conclusion:

Many continue to view the Taliban leadership as intransigent, recalcitrant, and unyielding. A year in office has helped some Taliban leaders recognize the need for compromise, even though they have mostly not acted on that impulse. But the cement is not yet dry. As has been shown in the case of past regime changes such as those in Cuba and Iran, the window for change, once passed, can remain closed for a very long time. By nurturing and encouraging moderating tendencies in Afghanistan and by allowing more pragmatic leaders to form new domestic alliances, the West can help empower the realist elements of the Taliban. This will not be easy, and for the moment, the country seems to be on a trajectory that does not bode well for compromise. But Washington ignores Afghanistan at its own peril: by failing to support the Afghan people or engage with the Taliban, the West may be consigning the country to a future as a humanitarian catastrophe and terrorist haven.

Can the Taliban Be Contained?

Why the West Needs to Nurture the Movement’s Realists

By Saad Mohseni

August 16, 2022

Foreign Affairs · by Saad Mohseni · August 16, 2022

It is difficult to overstate the multiple crises facing Afghanistan. With severe shortages and sky-high food prices, the World Food Program has reported that more than half the population is “marching to starvation”; an astonishing 97 percent of the population are at risk of falling below the poverty line by the end of 2022. Meanwhile, the Afghan government, with its profound disenfranchisement of women—girls older than 12 have been banned from school—has become the most gender repressive in the world. Western intelligence experts are also concerned that the country is once again becoming a haven for terrorist groups, as was made clear by the recent U.S. assassination of the al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in the center of Kabul.

One year into Taliban rule, it is easy to blame these problems on the country’s new leaders. After the group captured Kabul, it was presented with an extraordinary opportunity to renounce some of its most extreme policies in exchange for some degree of international support. But it squandered a number of overtures by refusing to lift the ban on girls’ secondary education, for example, or taking steps to govern in a more inclusive manner. The regime’s failure to decisively deal with international terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda has further frustrated both Western leaders and Afghanistan’s own neighbors, which have demanded that the Taliban government match its words with action.

But Afghanistan’s woes go far beyond the mere fact of Taliban control. The economic situation has been made exceedingly worse by the international community’s decision to disengage from all development projects and to freeze $9 billion worth of assets that belong to Afghanistan and its citizens, regardless of who rules the country. Moreover, many of the country’s problems began long before the U.S. withdrawal in August 2021. Driving the country’s desperate situation are a confluence of disasters arising from over four decades of conflict, bad governance, and economic mismanagement, compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic and the worsening effects of climate change.

The urgent challenge now is to prevent the country from a broader collapse. Although international efforts to provide basic humanitarian aid helped Afghanistan avoid the most dire outcomes last winter, the country is expected to face a similarly grim predicament later this year. Nor is there yet a global consensus about how to deal with the regime in Kabul. What has become apparent over the last 12 months is that the Taliban are not a monolithic political movement. Rescuing the country will require not only greater clarity about the roots of the current mess but also creative new approaches to dealing with its poorly understood rulers and the region.

Preachers and Pragmatists

Contrary to common assumptions, the Taliban leadership holds a broad range of views. During the years in which it fought the U.S.-backed government in Kabul, the movement remained focused on defeating the Afghan National Army and outlasting the government’s international backers. The quick disintegration of the army and the Biden administration’s decision to pull out U.S. forces allowed the Taliban to quickly attain their ultimate goal of reconquering the entire country. Since then, however, they have often been unsure how to govern it.

Although different factions—led by various charismatic leaders—remain committed to the Taliban leadership and to reaching major decisions through consensus, cracks have started to emerge. The slightly older and more conservative wing of the party remains intent on implementing the Taliban’s mid-1990s credo, word for word. Members of this group include the Taliban’s secretive leader, Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhunzada, and his inner circle, made up mostly of village mullahs and a handful of conservative cabinet ministers. Based in the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar, in the south, Mawlawi Haibatullah and his followers have shown an inclination to take a more conservative position on all major policy decisions, including on women’s rights and girls’ secondary education.

But leaders such as Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the deputy prime minister and one of the founding members of the movement, along with younger Taliban leaders including the “princelings” Siraj Haqqani, the acting interior minister, and Mullah Yaqoob Mujahid, the acting defense minister and the son of the movement’s founder, have begun to challenge this approach, albeit privately. Increasingly, these more pragmatic leaders—in and outside Kabul—approach their positions as long term and view engagement with the world as paramount to achieving their ambitions. It is understood that they tend to be more focused on “God and country” than on just “God.”

Although most of these figures have remained silent on their policy differences with the conservative leadership, their supporters and proxies from across the country—second-tier leaders as well as religious leaders—have come forward and challenged decisions such as the ban on girls’ education. Furthermore, many local leaders—buoyed by the stance of these leaders—have continued to quietly allow for secondary girls’ education in almost a third of the country, directly challenging the edict coming out of Kandahar.

Some Taliban leaders see engagement with the world as important to their long-term ambitions.

Of course, referring to leaders such as Haqqani and Yaqoob as pragmatic may seem naive, given the Haqqani network’s historic ties to extremist groups and the recent assassination of Zawahiri in central Kabul. But such is politics in Afghanistan: there are many shades of gray. Moreover, the most urgent question facing the West and other international allies is not who rules Afghanistan—a question over which they now have very little control—but rather how to deal most effectively with the rulers it has.

Within the Taliban, the pragmatists also diverge from the ideologues on the matter of inclusivity and form of government. The pragmatists realize that survival will depend not only on international recognition and engagement but also on domestic support. Some of this group recognize that although the Taliban are rooted in the most extreme conservative populations of the largely Pashtun regions of Afghanistan, neglecting the interests of Afghanistan’s other minorities and the country’s urban populations will only weaken the movement over time. Nonetheless, the Taliban leadership does not endorse this urgent need to engage and to accommodate. Mawlawi Haibatullah, in his address to the loya jirga in Kabul on July 1, 2022, made clear that although he endorsed a general amnesty for officials of the previous Afghan government, he does not see a formal role for them in the new political order.

It is not yet clear how these differences will play out. Alliances—whether loose or formal—will allow the Kabul-based leaders to further consolidate their power at the expense of their more conservative colleagues. But given the movement’s extraordinary unity and resilience, the ascendance by the pragmatists over the conservatives will likely happen through an evolution rather than a coup. Still, as the Kabul leadership gains clout, the voices of the more traditional elements could be diminished or at least confined to specific areas, as they were under past governments.

Consensus governing has also meant that local leaders and the Taliban cabinet have not been able to govern in a decisive manner in a country that requires enormous leadership given the challenges it faces daily. The diversity of views within the movement, however,—along with the inability of China, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia to moderate the Taliban regime—could present new opportunities for the United States and its allies to build a more constructive approach to Afghanistan.

Dead On Arrival

In order to develop a better Taliban strategy, the United States will first have to come to terms with the political dynamics that gave rise to the movement’s return in 2021. It would be a mistake to assume that Afghanistan fell apart in the weeks preceding the U.S. withdrawal one year ago. The foundations for this collapse were laid more than a decade earlier, soon after the inauguration of Afghan President Hamid Karzai in 2004.

The rise of a violent insurgency, abetted by safe havens in Pakistan and the legacy of decades of war, meant that Afghanistan was ill suited to rapid change. In addition, the corruption and ineptitude of the Kabul government and its inability to take advantage of billions of dollars of Western aid and thousands of Western troops meant that Karzai and his successors were unable to build a viable, secure, and stable nation. But there is little doubt that the international community—led by the Americans, who soon became distracted by the war in Iraq—enabled successive, corrupt governments in Kabul that were bound to fail.

For nearly two decades, the United States addressed the Afghan dilemma without ever adopting a larger vision for the country. Instead, Afghanistan’s management was tackled one year at a time, with a new plan every time a new U.S. ambassador or commander took over or new presidential administration came to office. Washington often contradicted its own policies. An aversion to nation building gave way to nation building “light” and then nation building “on steroids.” The Pentagon determined that Afghan forces should remain small but then decided to double them. The idea of an Afghan air force was ignored initially but revived later with a limited range of aircraft. Training was originally outsourced to Germany but then taken back by the U.S. military.

Established in Bonn in 2001 amid much hope, the post-Taliban government was already on life support by 2014, following the deeply flawed presidential elections that year. Ignoring vote rigging on a massive scale, the international community opted to go along with the results, dismissing millions of votes in the process. Not only did the United States and its allies fail to hold any individual or institution to account, but by forcing the two leading contenders, Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani, into an unworkable marriage—a “national unity” government—they left the Afghan political leadership deeply weakened at a time of critical urgency.

Meanwhile, Washington ignored—or worse, encouraged—corruption and predatory behavior on the part of Afghan officials and authorities. And amid a worsening security situation, the United States increasingly relied on night raids and indiscriminate bombing attacks in which civilians were often killed. In this environment, it was not difficult for the Taliban to gain new support. Policymakers understood this early but failed to act on it; then they opted to bail out when it was too late.

Too Little, Too Late

Again and again, the United States failed to prepare for or engage with the Taliban. Already in 2003, when the newly established Afghan government tried to engage with the Taliban, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld decided to veto the initiative. Further discussions during the Obama years, which culminated in the opening of a Taliban office in Doha, were abandoned far too quickly in 2013, when Karzai protested.

When U.S. President Donald Trump took office in 2017, his initial instinct was simply to walk away from Afghanistan. But the arrival of H. R. McMaster as the national security adviser postponed the inevitable for almost 18 months; McMaster argued that engaging with the Taliban was a futile endeavor and that the movement could still be defeated on the battlefield. In the fall of 2018, however, Trump made it clear to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo that he wanted out. His determination to withdraw culminated in the appointment of a seasoned diplomat, Zalmay Khalilzad, as special envoy for Afghan Reconciliation. Khalilzad’s task was two-fold: first, he was to secure a deal with the Taliban that would allow for a gradual drawdown of U.S. troops and an agreement on terrorism so that there would be no repeat of 9/11. Second, he was to forge an intra-Afghan peace deal to ensure a peaceful transition to a new government.

The flawed February 2020 deal that emerged from this effort was the beginning of the end for Afghanistan. In reality, the agreement brought no progress on peace. It required little of the Taliban apart from an unenforceable pledge to break with al Qaeda, and it seemed mostly designed to allow U.S. troops to leave without being attacked by the group—an astonishingly low bar for the world’s most powerful military. Khalilzad’s oft-quoted remark—“nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”—reflected the hollowness of U.S. policy. With Washington renouncing the troops and assistance to the Afghan National Army that constituted its most important leverage, the Taliban could simply wait for the United States to leave.

Again and again, the United States failed to prepare for the Taliban.

The Ghani government’s inability to understand the significance of the Trump decision ensured that it was unable to operate in a post-American environment. During a trip to Washington in June 2021, Ghani opted to praise President Joe Biden and assured him repeatedly of the Afghan forces’ preparedness. Despite the fact that the Taliban were already rapidly advancing, Ghani failed to secure additional assistance, including the air support and maintenance required to operate the Afghan military’s equipment and hardware.

Biden’s decision to complete the U.S. drawdown, meanwhile, triggered a rush for the exit by U.S. contractors who were in Afghanistan to offer logistics, service, and upkeep to the Afghan troops. This all happened many weeks before anyone bothered raising the consequences of a rapid drawdown in Washington. The Afghan military was deprived not only of basic functional support but also of planning and strategy. What followed was a slow-motion train wreck.

Now, even Iran and Pakistan have buyer’s remorse with the Taliban. Having backed or supported the group in various ways during the insurgency, the two countries have discovered that the Taliban are far from compliant in Kabul. Both of these points are important: the former because some of Afghanistan’s neighbors were content to see the West lose and the latter because these same neighbors lack the resolve and resources to help the country survive under its new leaders.

Afghans Into Militants

It is bad enough that the Taliban are now ensconced in Kabul, but a greater source of concern are reports that even more dangerous groups are once again taking root in Afghanistan. The UN and other sources have provided extensive evidence that foreign terrorist organizations, including a branch of the Islamic State known as Islamic State Khorasan (ISIS-K), among others, remain active in Afghanistan. The Taliban tolerate some of these groups, such as al Qaeda, because of historic ties and for the leverage the groups may provide against regional and international powers; others, such as ISIS-K, have flourished because of myopic decisions by the Taliban government, such as freeing prisoners from Bagram in August 2021, and the Taliban’s targeting of rival groups, which has helped swell the ranks of ISIS-K.

The country’s dire economic situation has not helped. A majority of young Afghans—in a country that boasts the youngest population of any state outside sub-Saharan Africa—remain unemployed, and, as a result, many are being lured into joining ISIS-K and other militant movements. If there were alternatives, they would seek them. But by abandoning Afghanistan, the West has deprived the population of secure livelihoods, the consequence of which is an entire generation of young Afghans who are vulnerable to recruitment by radical groups.

The assassination of one terrorist leader will not solve the problem.

The presence of Zawahiri in Kabul at the time of his assassination highlights the conundrum Taliban leaders face concerning their historic allies. The rank and file as well as the regional founders of the Taliban will not tolerate the expulsion of foreign terrorist leaders and their supporters, given the religious ideologies these groups share with the Taliban and al Qaeda’s oath of allegiance to the Taliban leader.

But the removal of one terrorist leader will not solve the problem. In 2021, Colin Kahl, the U.S. undersecretary of defense, warned that ISIS-K and al Qaeda forces based in Afghanistan could have the capacity to launch attacks on the West within two years. Clearly, more comprehensive engagement and pressure will be needed to persuade the Taliban to shun groups allied with the movement. The Taliban will need to understand that the policies that worked well during their violent insurgency are unlikely to help them govern the country.

Although Western governments may be encouraged by the conclusion of some U.S. spy agencies that al Qaeda has not done much to reestablish itself since the Taliban took control and that only a handful of longtime al Qaeda members remain in the country, many analysts remain skeptical.

Coming In From the Cold

What the last four decades have shown is that what happens in Afghanistan rarely stays in Afghanistan. Today’s dire economic and humanitarian crisis could reignite a civil war, which would further destabilize the wider region and allow international terrorist groups to reestablish themselves in the country—even more brazenly than in previous decades.

Europe’s leaders, currently dealing with the Ukrainian refugee crisis, could soon find themselves coping with a fresh influx of desperate Afghans and an increased flow of narcotics from the world’s largest producer of heroin. Already, large numbers of Afghans are attempting to cross any border that is open to them, driven into flight by fear and hunger. They may be forced to make the journey northward, along the same route used by drug smugglers, passing through Iran and Turkey. On a continent where even centrist political leaders have grown hostile to new refugees, the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Afghans could dramatically alter the political landscape.

The United States, European countries, and international organizations have sought to avert a humanitarian disaster by providing emergency assistance to the population through the UN and other NGOs coupled with limited development or “basic needs” efforts focused on livelihoods, food security, and economic resilience. But these initiatives will have a durable impact only if the West remains engaged with Afghanistan, including with the Taliban government. It has also become clear that Europe and the Western allies are unprepared to take the initiative in Afghanistan; U.S. leadership is of paramount importance.

In fact, there is much more that Washington and its international partners can do not only to steer the pragmatic leaders of the Taliban toward a more inclusive and moderate Afghanistan but also to help the Taliban come in from the cold. There needs to be a clear, incremental road map to normalization that sets standards and expectations and also prioritizes engagement. This road map should have well-defined phases that allow time for difficult decisions and confidence building on both sides—perhaps over a 24- to 36- month period.

International recognition need not be an all-or-nothing proposition. There could be limited recognition in exchange for progress on key issues: rights for women and minorities, say, or steps toward a more inclusive government. But Western governments must act now to support a national dialogue outside of stilted meetings between diplomats and the Taliban in third countries. For example, an intra-Afghan forum could be convened in which prominent Afghan leaders—members of the Taliban, opposition leaders, civil society, and others—gather to discuss the future of the country. And international donors need to move forward with bold efforts to safeguard the gains made in Afghanistan over the last two decades. This means finding ways to increase educational access for all Afghans, maintaining an independent media, and harnessing the private sector to provide jobs, economic opportunity, and a moderating influence on the government. Although international donors are no longer providing hundreds of billions of dollars to station their own troops in Afghanistan and support the Afghan security forces, robust humanitarian and development aid could have a big impact at a fraction of the cost.

Many continue to view the Taliban leadership as intransigent, recalcitrant, and unyielding. A year in office has helped some Taliban leaders recognize the need for compromise, even though they have mostly not acted on that impulse. But the cement is not yet dry. As has been shown in the case of past regime changes such as those in Cuba and Iran, the window for change, once passed, can remain closed for a very long time. By nurturing and encouraging moderating tendencies in Afghanistan and by allowing more pragmatic leaders to form new domestic alliances, the West can help empower the realist elements of the Taliban. This will not be easy, and for the moment, the country seems to be on a trajectory that does not bode well for compromise. But Washington ignores Afghanistan at its own peril: by failing to support the Afghan people or engage with the Taliban, the West may be consigning the country to a future as a humanitarian catastrophe and terrorist haven.

Foreign Affairs · by Saad Mohseni · August 16, 2022

15. Ukraine Defies Russia With Attacks on Crimea, a ‘Holy Land’ to Putin

Live Updates: Ukraine Defies Russia With Attacks on Crimea, a ‘Holy Land’ to Putin

A senior Ukrainian official said that an elite military unit was responsible for the attack on an ammunition storage site, the latest to directly target the peninsula that holds special meaning for Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The blasts at an ammunition storage site are near a Russian military base in Crimea.

The New York Times · by Anton Troianovski · August 16, 2022

Ukrainian forces have launched several strikes in Crimea in recent weeks, despite strong Russian threats against attacks on the territory.Credit...Reuters

A series of brazen attacks on Russian-occupied Crimea by Ukraine in recent days — the latest on Tuesday by an elite military unit operating behind enemy lines — come in defiance of dire warnings of retaliation from Moscow. A senior Russian official vowed last month that if Ukraine attacked Crimea, it would immediately face its “Judgment Day.”

The Black Sea peninsula that Russia illegally seized in 2014 is more than a crucial military base and staging ground for its invasion of Ukraine. It holds special meaning for President Vladimir V. Putin, who has told his people that Crimea is a “sacred place” and Russia’s “holy land.” And by repeatedly striking at the territory, which Russia has held for the better part of a decade, Ukraine has posed a fresh challenge to Mr. Putin’s standing at home.

On Tuesday, huge explosions rocked a Russian ammunition depot, as Ukraine tries to counter Moscow’s advantages in matériel and disrupt supply lines by ratcheting up its military tactics and striking deep behind the front. Last week, blasts at a military airfield in Crimea sent beachgoers rushing for cover, and an attack by a makeshift drone in the port city of Sevastopol on July 31 forced Russia to cancel its Navy Day celebrations.

A senior Ukrainian official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss Tuesday’s operation, said an elite unit was responsible for the explosions. And Russia’s Defense Ministry called the blasts an “act of sabotage” — a significant acknowledgment that the war is increasingly spreading to what the Kremlin considers Russian territory.

Some pro-Kremlin commentators called on the military to make good on the country’s threats to respond harshly to any attacks on Crimea. Andrei Klishas, a senior lawmaker from Mr. Putin’s United Russia party, said in a social media post that “Russia’s retaliatory strikes must be very convincing.”

“This is about protecting our sovereignty,” he wrote.

Ukrainian officials did not publicly claim responsibility for Tuesday’s blasts, although President Volodymyr Zelensky praised those helping Ukraine’s intelligence apparatus and “special services” weaken the Russian military.

“The reasons for the explosions in the occupied territory can be different, very different,” he said in his nightly address. But, he added, the result is the same: damage to Russia’s military infrastructure.

Mr. Zelensky said those now choosing to leave Crimea for Russia “already understand or at least feel that Crimea is not a place for them.”

No single action that Mr. Putin has taken in his 22-year rule provoked as much pro-Kremlin euphoria among Russians as his largely bloodless annexation of Crimea, which cemented his image at home as a leader resurrecting Russia as a great power. And in the run-up to the invasion last winter, it was Crimea that Mr. Putin repeatedly cited as the locus of an existential security threat posed by Ukraine, warning that a Western-backed effort to retake the peninsula by force could trigger a direct war between Russia and NATO.

When Mr. Putin launched his invasion on Feb. 24, Russian forces lunged north from Crimea in a lightning operation that captured a large swath of territory in southern Ukraine, including the Kherson region, which Russian forces almost fully control. Russia is now using Crimea to provide air and logistics support to its forces in Kherson and the neighboring Zaporizhzhia region, where Ukraine has been attacking Russian supply lines and threatening a counteroffensive.

Pavel Luzin, an independent Russian military analyst, said that Ukraine’s attacks are limiting the ability of Russia to “seize the initiative.”

“Crimea is the only way to support the grouping of troops in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions,” he said. “Otherwise, this grouping of troops does not exist.”

Crimea is also the base of operations for the Russian Navy, which has begun to struggle with its control of the Black Sea, the British Defense Intelligence service said in its latest assessment Tuesday. Following the loss of its Black Sea fleet flagship, the Moskva, it has demonstrated only “limited effectiveness” and has kept its patrols within sight of the Crimean coast, even as it continues to fire long-range missiles at the mainland.

Mr. Putin, who addressed a security conference in Moscow by video link a few hours after the early-morning blasts in Crimea on Tuesday, made no mention of the attack and instead focused on a frequent argument: a Western-allied Ukraine poses an existential threat to Russia.

Russia, he said, was prepared for a lengthy war.

16. Strategic Outpost’s Seventh Annual Summer Vacation Reading List

Strategic Outpost’s Seventh Annual Summer Vacation Reading List - War on the Rocks

DAVID BARNO AND NORA BENSAHEL

warontherocks.com · by David Barno · August 16, 2022

How can the summer be ending already?? Temperatures are soaring, vacations are wrapping up, and many of you are realizing that you have only a couple of weeks left to rest and relax before the new national security school year begins after Labor Day! Luckily, your loyal Strategic Outpost columnists are happy to present our seventh (!!) annual list of what we think you should be reading, watching, and listening to as you navigate your way back towards the real world from your last chance for sunburns, hangovers, and lost luggage! As we have in each of our previous summer reading lists, we’ve provided an eclectic blend of serious and not-so-serious recommendations that we think will pique your interest and set you up for being one of the smartest office pundits around. Enjoy!

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War in Ukraine

Anything involving Michael Kofman. Whatever this impressive analyst at CNA has to say about the war in Ukraine is worth listening to. Kofman consistently provides penetrating insights about the conflict, expertly drawing upon his deep knowledge of the Russian military. We recommend listening to his frequent conversations with Ryan Evans on the War on the Rocks podcast, especially the most recent episode on the next phase of the war, and one from June that focuses on how both combatants are dealing with relentless battle and attrition. Also check out his Twitter feed for excellent Kofman facts and analysis in real time.

David Johnson’s articles. Given the tsunami of publications about the tragic war in Ukraine, it can be hard to separate the true gems from the ever-growing analytic clutter. While Kofman, the good folks at the Institute for the Study of War, and others continue to do excellent work on the day-to-day conduct of the war, Johnson adds unparalleled analysis of what it all means for the United States. Whether making the case for the continued relevance of tanks and modern armor, warning against the wrong lessons being learned, or reminding us of the grinding nature of long wars, Johnson has been unerringly on the mark. Don’t miss these, and anything else he writes on this topic!

The Future of Warfare

Connected Soldiers, by John Spencer. A deeply insightful memoir that is simultaneously a very personal account of small-unit leadership, and an exploration of how nearly unlimited connectivity while at war may be undermining the bonds of battlefield comradeship that are so critical in combat. Spencer led soldiers during the initial invasion of in Iraq in 2003 and returned five years later to find his troops spending their free time checking social media and FaceTiming with loved ones instead of connecting with each other — and much later experienced connected warfare from the home front, as the spouse of a deployed soldier in 2018. Spencer readily acknowledges that he does not have all the answers, especially about how leaders can intentionally foster environments to promote the critical bonds of wartime cohesion that used to occur naturally. But he raises all the right questions, in a story that also stands as one of the best combat memoirs of the recent wars.

7 Seconds to Die, by John Antal. This small gem dissects the little-known second Nagorno-Karabakh war, which Antal calls “the first modern war primarily decided by unmanned weapons.” Loitering munitions, lethal drones, battlefield transparency, and the inability to protect forces from modern forms of attack all unexpectedly tipped the balance of this conflict to the underdog. Many of these dynamics are currently playing out at scale in Ukraine and have tremendous implications for the U.S. military and the future of warfighting — including the consequences of the newly-transparent battlefield, the urgent need to mask forces for survivability, and the vital importance of mission command in a dispersed and degraded environment.

“The Tactical Defense Becomes Dominant Again,” by T.X. Hammes. This National Defense University professor persuasively argues that the offense — long seen as the only decisive way to win a war — is now being replaced by the ascendency of the defense. Hammes suggests that the proliferation of new and relatively inexpensive technologies such as commercial drones and satellite imaging, together with the advent of AI applied to military problems, now provides huge defensive advantages to those seeking to rebuff an attacker. If he’s right, the U.S. military may need to shift much of its doctrine and investments that have long been prioritized for offensive operations to a whole new way of thinking that achieves victory by leveraging new defensive strengths to deny the goals of an adversary’s aggression.

Strategy and a Rising China

“What Makes a Power Great,” by Michael Mazarr. This provocative article in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs reminds us that enduring power and influence in the world rely upon factors that may not always be obvious in the short term: strong national ambition, a culture of learning and innovation, and vibrant diversity and pluralism that can provide depth and resiliency. Mazarr offers a thoughtful corrective to those who view the United States as facing an inevitable decline. But he also stresses that retaining a competitive edge may require “nothing less than a new national project to reinvigorate its essential characteristics” — including rebuilding a shared national identity, addressing rising inequality, and especially addressing the “corrosive information environment.”

The Avoidable War, by Kevin Rudd. Rudd, who served nearly three years as Australia’s Prime Minister, thinks about the unthinkable in this sobering piece: A full-blown war between the United States and a rising, nationalistic China. Rudd knows what he’s talking about: He is reportedly fluent in Mandarin, has visited China more than 100 times, has met Chinese leader Xi Jinping personally, and, in order to intensively study Xi’s nationalism, may well have become the first former head of state to enroll in a doctoral program (at Oxford) after leaving office. Ultimately, he advocates a policy based on “managed strategic competition” between the United States and China, though he acknowledges the very real risks of that competition spilling over into a devastating war.

Americans and War

Uncertain Ground: Citizenship in an Age of Endless, Invisible War, by Phil Klay. Former Marine and acclaimed novelist Klay returns with a compilation of the non-fiction essays that he has published since 2010. The common theme that unites these otherwise disparate works is the growing civil-military gap in the United States, and the problems that result from the fact that the nation’s wars are “mostly invisible” to average Americans. He writes eloquently about “the personal stake in war that the veteran experiences viscerally, and which is so hard for the civilian to feel.” But he also includes an essay that offers a stinging rebuke to those like former Marine general and White House Chief of Staff John Kelly, for example, who have long expressed “disdain for those who haven’t served and yet dare to have opinions about military matters.” Klay decisively dismisses that view, noting that if he has any “authority to speak about our military policy, it’s because I’m a citizen responsible for participating in self-governance, not because I belonged to a warrior caste.”

Looking for the Good War: American Amnesia and the Violent Pursuit of Happiness, by Elizabeth Samet. Has the prevailing narrative of World War II and the Greatest Generation done more harm than good for the United States? Samet answers this provocative question in the affirmative, arguing that the myths of national unity and purpose only arose decades after the war. A natural storyteller, Samet beautifully weaves together themes and ideas from hundreds of different movies, books, articles, and art to show the far more complex and ambivalent views of Americans between 1941 and 1945. Yet these powerful myths continue to shape how we think about war, and the American “need to return to some finest hour” has only increased in the aftermath of the messy, long, and largely unsuccessful wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Space and Intergalactic Insights

To Boldly Go, edited by Jonathan Klug and Steven Leonard. This fascinating collection of 30 short essays examines the challenges of future wartime leadership and strategy through the lens of science fiction. Klug, an Army War College professor, and Leonard, best known as the voice and pen behind Doctrine Man, have compiled a full plate of stories to educate, inform and provoke. The short stories are penned by authors both famous and obscure, and who draw their examples from well-known sci-fi hits such as Dune, Star Wars, and Ender’s Game.

Images from the James Webb Telescope. If you’re a fellow space geek, nothing can beat the jaw-dropping pictures on the telescope’s official web page. The Webb is the largest optical telescope ever sent into space and uses infrared technology to capture images of celestial objects heretofore inaccessible. These stunning pictures are some of the first images released to the public of phenomena dating as far back as 4.6 billion years ago. Breathtaking and unprecedented, these new pictures remind us of just how small and fragile our tiny spinning blue-and-green speck of the universe continues to be.

An Astronaut’s Guide to Life on Earth, by Chris Hadfield. Yes, we know, we mentioned this book briefly on last year’s list. But the author of this column whose name is not Nora just read it cover-to-cover on his summer vacation and was so impressed that he deemed it worthy of a standalone entry this year. Hadfield flew on two NASA space shuttle missions, and later served as commander of the International Space Station. He offers up a fascinating and philosophical account of his 20 years as a Canadian astronaut, and what he learned about himself and those around him. His impressive account goes far beyond a spaceflight travelogue to share what his experiences have taught him about leadership, ego, and what it takes to be good member of a team — and a better human being. And for those of you intrigued by just how astronauts perform everyday human tasks while in orbit, check out Hadfield’s charming short videos (which have drawn tens of millions of views) of such things as brushing his teeth and making a peanut butter sandwich in space.

The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy, by Douglas Adams. This classic and wacky sci-fi adventure tells the story of Arthur Dent, who is rescued from Earth seconds before the planet is demolished by interplanetary travelers in order to build a space freeway. Dent’s rescuer is Ford Prefect, an intergalactic researcher who was marooned on earth for 15 years finding material for the newest edition of the eponymous Hitchhiker’s Guide. This hapless pair are flung across the galaxy, meeting a constellation of equally improbable travelers in a series of bizarre adventures that are sure to bring a smile to your face. It provides answers to questions big and small, such as: Why are we born? Why do we die? Why do we spend so much time in between wearing digital watches? And why should space hitchhikers carry a towel at all times?

A Practical Tool for Many of Us

How to Hold a Grudge, by Sophie Hannah. This cheerful text helps us understand that there is a constructive way to deal with those frustrating people in our lives whose offenses can sometimes build up and threaten to become overwhelming. Hannah, the writer chosen by Agatha Christie’s family to continue writing the famed Hercule Poirot mystery series, offers some remarkably practical advice on how to file, discard, and, at times, nurture grudges when we need to find a way to deal with those truly irritating people who occasionally pop up in our world. If you work in the Pentagon — or practically anywhere else in Washington — this book is for you.

Just for Fun

The Children’s Illustrated Clausewitz, Volume I, by Caitlin Fitz Gerald. Get them started early on the classics! In this slim volume, author and illustrator Fitz Gerald takes the first three books of On War — otherwise known as the natsec nerd bible — and re-casts them in a light-hearted children’s story. Gorgeous illustrations depicting a forest full of woodland creatures learning some big strategic ideas in the simplest of terms highlight this unique interpretation of the dead Prussian’s most famous work. It’s fun to see how Fitz Gerald grasps a key chunk of the master’s important lessons and reduces them to something that even children can understand. A great gift for the small people in your life. Just don’t blame us if they start out-strategizing you!

Well, that’s it for this year’s almost-end-of-summer list! If we made you think, and helped you laugh — even just a little bit — we can call this year’s list a summertime success! Thanks to each of you for your readership, feedback, and continued support, and we’ll see you after Labor Day when Strategic Outpost returns to work!

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* We thank Kevin Benson and T.X. Hammes for recommending 7 Seconds to Die; T.X. Hammes for recommending Connected Soldiers; Richard Lacquement for recommending To Boldly Go; Carrie Lee for recommending Uncertain Ground; Maggie Feldman-Piltch for recommending The Children’s Illustrated Clausewitz; and David Aronstein for his work on the James Webb Space Telescope — and for showing it to us while it was still on Earth!

Lt. Gen. David W. Barno, U.S. Army (ret.) and Dr. Nora Bensahel are visiting professors of strategic studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and senior fellows at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies. They are also contributing editors at War on the Rocks, where their column appears regularly. Sign up for Barno and Bensahel’s Strategic Outpost newsletter to track their articles as well as their public events.

Image: Pixabay

Special Series, Strategic Outpost

warontherocks.com · by David Barno · August 16, 2022

17. 'A post-retirement sweetener for military brass'? Pentagon defends mentor program amid fresh scrutiny

Only $90 per hour? Consultants demand a much higher rate. These generals could make a lot more money than by working for DOD.

'A post-retirement sweetener for military brass'? Pentagon defends mentor program amid fresh scrutiny

USA Today · by Tom Vanden Brook

The Pentagon employs about 80 retired generals and admirals, at around $90 an hour, to advise current commanders involved war games and other military activities.

| USA TODAY

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First Black defense secretary Lloyd Austin confirmed by Senate

The Senate confirmed Lloyd Austin as the nation's first Black secretary of defense. He is President Joe Biden’s second nominee to be confirmed by the Senate.

Staff Video, USA TODAY

The Pentagon's $90 an hour payments to retired generals for mentorship draws fresh scrutiny.
Congress reformed the mentor program after a USA TODAY investigation unearthed conflicts.
Mentors who serve in the program say it offers invaluable perspective for current commanders.

WASHINGTON – A lucrative Pentagon contracting program in which retired officers serve as "senior mentors" is under fresh scrutiny, despite reforms that required retired generals and admirals to disclose possible conflicts of interest.

The Pentagon employs about 80 retired generals and admirals, at around $90 an hour, to advise current commanders involved war games and other military activities. USA TODAY reviewed the financial disclosure forms of 77 senior mentors and found only a few working for defense contractors – a problem that had plagued the program when it was loosely regulated and conflicts of interest abounded.

But the revamped senior mentor program appears to be staffed almost entirely by men, the vast majority of them white, even as the Pentagon for several years has sought to develop leaders who reflect the diversity of the armed forces and the nation.

Another flashpoint: the conduct and hiring of two mentors. One of the retired officers, Lt. Gen. Gary Volesky, was suspended after mocking first lady Jill Biden on Twitter. A second mentor, Lt. Gen. David Huntoon, inappropriately used his aides to staff private charity events, feed a friend's cats and provide driver's lessons, according to a 2012 investigation by the Pentagon's watchdog.

Huntoon paid them with Starbucks gift cards. Admonished by the inspector general and the Army, he agreed to reimburse the employees more than $1,800.

“This is the crux of the problem with many in our military: They refuse to play by the rules and are allowed to get away with it,” said Rep. Jackie Speier, who chairs the House Armed Services Military Personnel subcommittee. “I expect to be briefed on the so-called mentor-mentee program. If it is a post-retirement sweetener for military brass, it not only offends me and the American taxpayer, it suggests a culture that continues the good ol’ boy network of feathering the nest of the elite officers no matter what."

The original senior mentor program had virtually disappeared after an investigation in 2009 by USA TODAY found that retired officers were being paid as much as $330 an hour to advise military services. Most of the mentors were also working for defense firms seeking to sell products to the Pentagon.

Because the retired officers were hired as contractors, few ethics rules applied. In some cases, mentors were paid by the military to run war games involving weapons systems made by their consulting clients.

Then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Congress intervened, requiring the mentors to be hired as government employees, subject to pay caps and required to file public financial disclosure forms. Virtually all of the mentors quit after those mandates took effect.

In 2011, the Pentagon inspector general found that only four of 194 senior mentors surveyed from 2010 continued in the program. The bottom line reasons that retired generals and admirals quit, according to the inspector general's report: a reluctance to disclose ties to defense contractors and the promise of greater riches in the private sector.

At U.S. Joint Forces Command, then commanded by Marine Gen. James Mattis, retired officers said they quit the senior mentors program because "conflicts of interest could limit a (mentor's) employment opportunities in the private sector," according to the inspector general's report.

Mattis, in an interview in 2009, dismissed the need for greater oversight of the program, citing the need to trust the retired senior officers. He acknowledged that mentors who worked for defense clients picked up information that benefits their private employers, but added that was the only way to ensure that top experts are teaching officers.

"If your concern is that we're exposing them to things that would allow them to have an advantage for their company, I doubt if that can be refuted," Mattis said. "I believe that's a reality. The only way to not have that would be to have either amateurs on their boards of directors, or amateurs in our (program)."

Imposing "an assumption of distrust and firewalls" could sour retired generals on the mentor program, Mattis said. "Ultimately, it comes down to trust."

But good-government advocates say the reforms were crucial.

"The reforms were intended to prevent this mentorship program from being a backdoor path for defense contractors to improperly influence Pentagon policy," said Danielle Brian, executive director of the Project on Government Oversight, a nonpartisan watchdog. "The only way to prevent corruption is through the transparency created by Congress a decade ago."

'Invaluable' perspective: Supporters defend current program

Since the IG's 2011 report, the program has rebounded and now boasts about 80 mentors.

Each of the services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff hire retired generals and admirals as "highly qualified experts," government employees with the rare skill and experience to advise senior officers on waging war. Ethics lawyers at the Pentagon review their finances and vouch for their eligibility to become senior mentors.

Army Maj. Gen. Mark Quantock, who retired as a top intelligence officer and is a mentor, said his colleagues did not join the program to make money. There's more to be made in private industry, he said, where he works for Babel Street, a data discovery and analytics software company.

"Having retired general officers providing perspective on what's worked and – more importantly – what hasn't worked to senior leadership is invaluable," said Quantock, who resigned from the mentor program in April.

The Army is the top employer of mentors, with 53. Many of them advise commanders in war games run through the Mission Command Training Center at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.

Some mentors have commanded at the corps level, where they led about 40,000 soldiers. They provide firsthand experience and insights to the Army's current commanding officers, said Myron Reineke, the top civilian official at the center.

Mentors allow the Army to "maximize training effectiveness, enhance unit readiness, and then implement lessons learned to ensure that these commanders the staffs are best prepared for future conflict," Reineke said.

There are only two women among the Army's 53 mentors, according to Cynthia Smith, an Army spokeswoman. Mentors are not required to disclose race or national origin, but Reineke said the mentors at Ft. Leavenworth are "overwhelmingly Caucasian."

"They are a reflection of the Army that they joined 30, 35 years ago," he said, referring to the decades it takes to ascend the ranks and become a general. "We strive to reflect what the diversity of the Army is, and again, that will continue to evolve over time."

The Army has struggled to diversify its ranks, particularly with Black officers. In 2020, Black people made up 22.7% of enlisted soldiers, 16.5% of warrant officers and 11% of officers on active duty.

Role models? Volesky and Huntoon's participation raises eyebrows

The Army suspended Volesky after he responded on Twitter to a post by first lady Jill Biden criticizing the Supreme Court's decision overturning the right to abortion.

"For nearly 50 years, women have had the right to make our own decisions about our bodies," Biden tweeted. "Today, that right was stolen."

Volesky tweeted in response: "Glad to see you finally know what a woman is."

Experts on military-civilian relations called his tweet a breach of decorum that strayed into partisan politics by an official on the payroll of the Pentagon, which is supposed to steer clear of such matters. His tweet was later deleted.

Huntoon's ethical lapse occurred more than a decade ago when he was superintendent at West Point. The Pentagon inspector general found Huntoon had improperly leaned on his staff to work at private events, including a "War College Ladies Luncheon" and "West Point Women's Club Viva! Las Vegas Night."

The report was released just prior to his retirement, and the Army announced that a letter was placed in his file admonishing Huntoon. Heavily redacted, the report notes that officers cannot use enlisted soldiers as "servants."

Speier, the California Democrat, said Huntoon's actions are symptomatic of the military's inability to police its own even after Huntoon had admitted to abusing his "authority and office for personal gain," she said.

"Leadership has been reluctant to hold their own accountable who fall short of the high standards that Americans expect from the military," Speier said.

USA Today · by Tom Vanden Brook

18. Proliferation Security Initiative Asia-Pacific Exercise Rotation Joint Statement - United States Department of State

Good to see this. The PSI does not get enough visibility. But we need more than exercises. We need interdiction operations.

Proliferation Security Initiative Asia-Pacific Exercise Rotation Joint Statement - United States Department of State

state.gov · by Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

Home Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Remarks & Releases...Proliferation Security Initiative Asia-Pacific Exercise Rotation Joint Statement

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Proliferation Security Initiative Asia-Pacific Exercise Rotation Joint Statement

Joint Statement

Proliferation Security Initiative

August 15, 2022

The United States hosted Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Exercise Fortune Guard 22 from August 8-12, 2022 in Honolulu, Hawaii, with the participation of over 250 representatives from 21 countries. This was the eighth Asia Pacific Exercise Rotation (APER) event.

Since its establishment in 2003, the PSI has provided an effective forum to enhance cooperation in preventing illicit transfers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials. The Initiative has grown significantly since its inception from 11 endorsing countries to 107 today.

The Asia-Pacific region is home to vibrant economies, trading hubs, and financial centers. At the same time, we are all aware of the threats present in this critical part of the world, where we all face the potential for natural and man-made crises — including the threats caused by state, and non-state actors, who attempt to trade in WMD. To address these threats, APER countries have hosted annual exercises: Fortune Guard 14 in the United States; MARU 15 in New Zealand; Deep Sabre 16 and the hybrid Deep Sabre 21 in Singapore; Pacific Protector 17 in Australia; Pacific Shield 18 in Japan; and, Eastern Endeavor 19 in the Republic of Korea.

Fortune Guard 22 featured briefs by experts on a number of topics, a tabletop discussion on a proliferation problem, a demonstration of ship boarding interdiction capabilities (LIVEX), and a demonstration of seaport interdiction capabilities (PORTEX). Experts covered a range of issues, including: the growth and development of PSI and the international norm for interdiction; current and emerging proliferation threats; international legal frameworks supporting counterproliferation; case studies in counterproliferation; information sharing best practices; export enforcement; and regional perspectives on the proliferation problem.

Participation in the LIVEX included vessel boarding teams from the USS Chafee, the U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Security Response Team – West, the Australian Border Force, and the Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense and Coast Guard. The PORTEX included a separate, three-day subject-matter-expert exchange on practices and technology used in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) identification, assessment, sampling, and decontamination. Experts came from Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, the Republic of Korea, and the United States. The culmination of this gathering was a demonstration of CBRN interdiction capabilities in a seaport. These exercises have substantially enhanced capabilities, understanding, and coordination across the region in relation to counter-proliferation activities. APER countries remain committed to supporting PSI objectives with partners in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.

Australia

Japan

New Zealand

Republic of Korea

Singapore

United States

state.gov · by Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

19. How Beijing’s belligerence over Taiwan is connected to a Belt and Road Initiative in distress

Interesting analysis.

How Beijing’s belligerence over Taiwan is connected to a Belt and Road Initiative in distress

For years, China focused on economic matters both at home and abroad, with the Belt and Road Initiative exemplifying that approach
But as its economic influence encounters roadblocks, there are signs of a pivot in Chinese diplomacy towards geopolitical wrangling and militarism

Mohamed Zeeshan

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Published: 9:15am, 15 Aug, 2022

By Mohamed Zeeshan South China Morning Post4 min

View Original

Illustration: Stephen Case

In the wake of US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, many analysts in Washington are inclined to blame the congresswoman for China’s renewed belligerence. But even before Pelosi’s visit, Beijing was already on a path of militarism and aggression, due to a creeping economic crisis in its foreign policy.

Years ago, when Chinese President Xi Jinping unveiled his flagship Belt and Road Initiative, it seemed like a masterstroke in some ways. China was looking for ways to divert its excess infrastructure capacity and stave off overinvestment.

Meanwhile, many developing countries were envious of its investment-driven growth model. The solution was to use Chinese money, muscle and manpower to build swanky infrastructure overseas.

At first, it was a big hit. People from Tunisia to Tajikistan looked forward to the arrival of posh highways, tall towers and ornate stadiums. But the returns did not quite follow. Many hosts of belt and road projects struggled to emulate the Chinese growth model because, simply put, they were not China: they lacked its bureaucratic capacity, cheap skilled labour, land, water and electricity.

Many belt and road partners were also run by corrupt, authoritarian regimes, which built massive projects more to boost the national ego than the economy. In Sri Lanka, for instance, the recently deposed Rajapaksa clan built a port, airport and conference centre in their hometown of Hambantota.

But the port lost US$300 million in six years and the airport was so unproductive that it could not even cover its electricity bills at one point. Meanwhile, the conference centre cost over US$15 million to build but has remained largely empty.

08:07

The rise and fall of Sri Lanka’s Rajapaksa dynasty

In Kenya, long-serving President Uhuru Kenyatta has his own white elephant: a US$4.7 billion railway project. The train was meant to connect the port city of Mombasa with neighbouring Uganda, ushering in a new era of regional trade. But public debt has stalled the project’s completion and, in 2019-20, one survey found that a whopping 87 per cent of Kenyan respondents believed that their government had borrowed too much money from China.

All told, some 19 emerging economies – ranging from Sri Lanka and Lebanon to El Salvador and Pakistan – are either already in default or on the brink, according to Bloomberg. Many owe some of their debt to China, which means that public anger towards Beijing is also on the rise.

China now has a difficult choice: forgive and restructure a few loans, thereby setting a precedent for its remaining loans, or be firm and see economic partners potentially collapse. Either way, the Belt and Road Initiative is now in distress, and Beijing’s capacity to rescue it has been shrunk by the pandemic.

This year, China’s own total debt is projected to climb to a record 275 per cent of gross domestic product. Much of that is due to the ongoing credit expansion aimed at restarting the struggling economy, according to the director of Beijing’s National Institution for Finance and Development. Yet, far from being temporary, that number has being growing steadily for years, from about 141 per cent at the end of 2008.

02:35

Belt and Road Initiative explained

For Xi, all this is beginning to represent an inflection point in foreign policy. For years, China focused on economic matters both at home and abroad, as it sought to build its strength and bide its time. But as its economic influence encounters roadblocks around the world, there are already signs of a pivot in Chinese diplomacy – pushing it towards geopolitical wrangling and militarism.

Tensions in the Taiwan Strait were running high even before Pelosi visited the island. Following the visit, Japan said that some of China’s missiles landed in its economic exclusive zone near Taiwan.

China’s geopolitical assertiveness has been growing even far from its neighbourhood. A Chinese survey vessel capable of monitoring satellite, rocket and missile launches was recently scheduled to visit debt-ravaged Sri Lanka before the plan was scuttled after protests from India.

China recently signed a contentious pact with the Solomon Islands that would reportedly allow Honiara to request Beijing to send police or military personnel to help “maintain social order”. That agreement came a few months after a mass protest against the Solomon Islands’ government for its decision to cut ties with Taiwan.

But as debt-laden governments elsewhere begin to draw public wrath, such agreements may become more common – not least to protect Chinese investments.

02:17

China confirms signing of Solomon Islands security pact, as US warns of regional instability

The one thing going for Xi so far, however, is that the US has been unable to replace China as an investment partner. Officials in Washington have noted that the US government cannot order private companies to take their money to Kenya or Somalia, as Chinese state-owned entities do.

The West has also suffered some loss of goodwill in the wake of the Ukraine war, as it tries to coerce countries into abandoning Russia. During his trip to Africa last week, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken heard about that from his South African counterpart in no uncertain terms. “One thing I definitely dislike is being told either you choose this – or else,” Naledi Pandor, South Africa’s foreign minister, said.

Xi will also gain from democratic backsliding across Asia and Africa, as those countries balk at depending on Washington. According to Freedom House, as many as 60 countries suffered from declines in freedom over the past year. That many of them are geopolitically crucial countries, such as India and Brazil, opens up strategic space for Beijing.

Yet, despite those opportunities, to keep its global influence expanding in an era of economic distress and political centralisation, China may pursue a more militaristic foreign policy than it ever has.

Mohamed Zeeshan is a foreign affairs columnist and author of “Flying Blind: India’s Quest for Global Leadership”

20. IntelBrief: Unprecedented Number of Threats Facing U.S. Federal Law Enforcement

This is really troubling.

IntelBrief: Unprecedented Number of Threats Facing U.S. Federal Law Enforcement - The Soufan Center

thesoufancenter.org · by Mohamed · August 16, 2022

August 16, 2022

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IntelBrief: Unprecedented Number of Threats Facing U.S. Federal Law Enforcement

FBI Flag

Bottom Line Up Front

In the wake of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) lawful search of former President Trump’s estate at Mar-a-Lago, threats against the FBI and federal law enforcement spiked, reflecting a growing tide of anti-government violent extremism.
There were also numerous attempts by individuals to “doxx” FBI agents, making public their personal information so that others could harass or target them with threats and physical violence.
Other online threats called for a “dirty bomb” to be detonated in front of FBI Headquarters, along with more general threats of impending civil war and armed rebellion.
Just over a year and a half after the January 6 Capitol insurrection, far-right extremists in the United States are once again energized and ramping up calls for violence.

In the wake of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) search of former President Trump’s estate at Mar-a-Lago, Florida, threats against the FBI and federal law enforcement have spiked. The former President is reportedly facing potential prosecution for violating the Espionage Act and obstruction of justice after documents classified at the top secret/sensitive compartmented information (TS/SCI) level were found at his property, including extremely sensitive documents related to nuclear weapons. Subsequently, threats have been directed against FBI personnel and property, prompting the bureau and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to issue a joint intelligence bulletin laying out the range of possible threats. The bulletin comes as the latest in a series of warnings about the growing tide of anti-authority and anti-government violent extremism (AAAGVE).

Several violent acts followed in the wake of widespread condemnations by Republican lawmakers and supporters of the federal authorities who executed the search. Last week, an individual who was known to the FBI attempted to attack its field office in Cincinnati, Ohio, and was then shot and killed in a standoff with law enforcement. There was also an armed protest outside of the FBI’s Phoenix field office over the weekend. Also over the weekend, a man drove his car into a barricade at the U.S. Capitol, then fired a gunshot into the air before killing himself. FBI Director Christopher Wray addressed the issue of FBI employees’ safety in a memo distributed last week, highlighting the severity and apparent credibility of the threats. There were also numerous attempts by individuals to “doxx” FBI agents, making public their personal information so that others could harass or target them with threats and physical violence. At times, former President Trump’s own inflammatory rhetoric following the search has contributed to the already volatile security situation. Others have echoed his incendiary rhetoric.

Online vitriol and threats included calls to “kill all feds” as well as exhortations of violence against a federal magistrate judge and the U.S. Attorney General, Merrick Garland. Other online threats called for a “dirty bomb” to be detonated in front of FBI Headquarters, along with more general threats of impending civil war and armed rebellion. A disinformation campaign related to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has also caught the attention of militia violent extremists (MVEs) and others, who released direct threats on social media. “Civil war” and “lock and load” were among the phrases trending on sites such as Telegram, Gab, and Reddit, in addition to Truth Social, former President Trump’s social media platform, which is where the Cincinnati gunman Ricky Shiffer posted direct threats and implored others to kill federal law enforcement agents. Even elected members of Congress, including Rep. Paul Gosar (R-AZ), joined in, tweeting, “We must destroy the FBI.” Other fringe political figures such as Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-GA) called to “defund the FBI.” On Monday, in his first remarks to the press since the Mar-a-Lago search, President Trump acknowledged that the "temperature has to be brought down," adding that "if there is anything we can do to help, I, and my people, would certainly be willing to do that." However, the former president has made no efforts to discourage threats against law enforcement and has actively spread mis- and disinformation regarding the search and the ongoing investigation.

Just over a year and a half after the January 6 Capitol insurrection of 2021, far-right extremists in the United States are once again energized and ramping up calls for violence. This current landscape of political violence and anti-government extremism is reminiscent of the early to mid-1990s, the same environment that produced Timothy McVeigh whose 1995 truck bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City resulted in 168 dead and nearly 700 injured. To this day, it remains the deadliest act of domestic terrorism in U.S. history. Online comparisons of the FBI to Nazi Germany’s gestapo, Adolf Hitler’s secret police, merely serve to ratchet up tensions and encourage violent extremists to act. Several Republican politicians repeated the comparison, including Rep. Lauren Boebert (R-CO) and Florida Senator Rick Scott. Former Trump White House adviser, Steve Bannon, went even further, commenting, “I do not think it’s beyond this administrative state and their deep state apparatus to actually try to work on the assassination of President Trump,” in remarks to conspiracy theorist Alex Jones on his show last week. Continued violent rhetoric by politicians and the media, amplified by a far-right ecosystem rife with disinformation, is almost guaranteed to lead to future acts of extremist violence targeting U.S. government institutions and federal law enforcement agencies and their personnel.

thesoufancenter.org · by Mohamed · August 16, 2022

21. Why No One Was in Charge in Afghanistan

Conclusion:

These measures are no panacea and will not rescue the United States from impossible situations like Afghanistan in 2021. But they will reduce the number of unforced errors and own goals that make fiascos and tragedies more likely.

Why No One Was in Charge in Afghanistan

Foreign Policy · by Christopher D. Kolenda · August 15, 2022

Argument

An expert's point of view on a current event.

Three ways to prevent another debacle.

By Christopher D. Kolenda, a retired U.S. Army colonel who served in Afghanistan as a task force commander in 2007-08 and was a senior adviser to three four-star generals. He is the author of the award-winning book Zero-Sum Victory: What We’re Getting Wrong About War.

In this handout provided by U.S. Central Command Public Affairs, U.S. Air Force personnel load passengers onto a C-17 Globemaster III during evacuation efforts in Kabul on Aug. 24.

In this handout provided by U.S. Central Command Public Affairs, U.S. Air Force personnel load passengers onto a C-17 Globemaster III during evacuation efforts in Kabul on Aug. 24. Master Sgt. Donald R. Allen/U.S. Air Forces Europe-Africa via Getty Images

On the first anniversary of the meltdown of Afghanistan, one of the best ways for the United States to respect the service and sacrifice of Americans and Afghans is to learn from its shortcomings and enact sensible measures that reduce the likelihood of future national security disasters.

Washington’s unenviable track record in post-9/11 military interventions, combined with increasing global volatility, suggests that reform is necessary and urgent to avoid being trapped in another quagmire of broken promises and impossible commitments. Here are three issues that contribute to U.S. failures—and some practical steps the U.S. government can take to prevent more fiascos.

Coordination is impossible without a common playbook. The State and Defense departments are two agencies separated by a common language. The U.S. government has no official national security terms and concepts, so the same words can have different meanings, which makes coordination haphazard and heightens the risk of miscommunication.

The tortured discussion about the meaning of the word “defeat” in 2009 during the Obama administration’s policy debate is a case in point. To the Defense Department, defeating the Taliban meant forcing them to abandon their efforts to overthrow the Afghan government. The State Department and the White House took the term to indicate that the Pentagon wanted to eradicate the Taliban, which reinforced their suspicions that the military was trying to box in the president for a massive troop surge.

Terms of art such as “reconciliation” had at least three meanings. For some State Department officials, it meant delivering a grand bargain between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Others at State and the Pentagon viewed it as an effort to pressure or co-opt Taliban leaders into defecting. Yet other officials took it to mean the process of getting talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban started. Without shared terminology and an expert body of knowledge on conducting wartime negotiations, Obama administration officials talked past one another, which undermined coordination and made coherence impossible.

The absence of agreed terms and concepts also impeded the U.S. ability to see and seize on opportunities. In December 2001, the Taliban offered to stop fighting and support the new government in return for being able to live in peace. Hamid Karzai, then head of the interim Afghan government, endorsed the deal, but Washington rejected it. Nine years later, the Taliban wanted modest concessions to begin talks with the Afghan government. State and Defense were at a loss about how to work together to use the United States’ considerable leverage. (I was the Pentagon representative in the talks.) The Obama administration was unwilling to prioritize gaining a negotiated settlement, and the negotiations went nowhere. By 2020, the United States found itself promising to withdraw all troops in exchange for Taliban counterterrorism promises.

There’s no one in charge on the ground. In most conflicts since Vietnam, no U.S. official below the president has been responsible and accountable for achieving U.S. war aims. As such, officials brag about individual progress while the war unravels.

The U.S. government deploys to conflict zones in bureaucratic silos. The military commander reports to the Pentagon, the ambassador reports to State, the development professionals report to the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the intelligence officers report to their agencies. The results are impressive individual efforts that become less than the sum of their parts and leave huge vulnerabilities.

The military’s singular focus for the first eight years of the war in Afghanistan on hunting the Taliban led to significant civilian casualties at the hands of Afghan militias, military forces, and the coalition. The State Department’s desire to maintain cordial relations with Afghan officials allowed a predatory kleptocracy to emerge in plain sight, exploit the Afghan people, and rob donor countries. Development efforts created a racket for corruption; most projects had little local economic impact and often created animosity. Afghan officials and power brokers duped U.S. intelligence by providing false reports about local rivals, which the spies sent to the military for targeting. These problems motivated people to withhold support from the government and some to join the Taliban.

Congress would haul the generals in to testify about the state of the war, but Pentagon officials could only discuss the military part of the U.S. effort. They would gesture cryptically at strategic risks such as corruption and Pakistan but were careful to stay in their bureaucratic lanes. The result was that Congress and successive presidents never got a strategic picture of the war—only the pieces their subordinates showed. This problem undermined the president’s decision-making ability and congressional oversight.

Likewise, the president had no one official to hold accountable for the direction and progress of the war. No one official had the responsibility and authority over U.S. agencies in Afghanistan to set priorities, allocate resources, and make decisions to advance the probability of a favorable and durable outcome. Cabinet meetings took place at such a high level of abstraction that general guidance went to the departments, and officials on the ground continued business as usual. The status quo led to a slow and expensive failure.

Dependency and corruption undermine legitimacy. Tough love is empathy without sympathy. Host nations need to earn legitimacy and learn to fight their own battles. The United States needs to stop enabling corruption and dependency.

In each major intervention since Vietnam, corrupt host nation governments hemorrhaged legitimacy faster than any well-meaning efforts could build it. Since these conflicts turn on political legitimacy, the United States’ inability to prevent or address corruption is a significant shortcoming. As with wartime negotiations, there’s no expert body of knowledge that officials can draw on for guidance and coordination. Longitudinal studies suggest that the self-reliance timeline for corrupt militaries is infinite. This situation presents problems for U.S. strategies that rely on transitioning security responsibility to the host nation.

U.S. diplomats and military officials were complicit in creating an Afghan government and military that could not function without U.S. aid, logistics, and air power. Afghan officials who had lived most of their lives outside the country had little idea of the difficulty of installing a Western-style government or the backlash that would come when elections appeared to be a cloaking device for corruption.

The U.S. military has a doctrine on training partner military units but nothing for building a developing country’s military institutions, especially from the ground up, as was the case in Afghanistan—so the military went with what it knew. Well-meaning officials created a mini-me army that lacked buy-in from the Afghan people and was impossible to operate independently. Afghan military officials, believing the Americans would never leave, turned their attention toward exploiting their positions for personal gain. Most Afghan senior offices were for sale, so people would pay the price, get the high-ranking job, and turn a profit by selling military equipment, food, fuel, ammunition, and repair parts on the black market. Dependency and poor leadership led to the Afghan military’s collapse.

The U.S. government should undertake three low-cost, high-payoff actions to learn from the Afghanistan debacle. Many of these problems damaged U.S. efforts in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and Vietnam.

Publish national security terms and concepts. The Biden administration should develop an authoritative lexicon and basic playbook for future use so that officials use the same words to mean the same things and have anchor points for coordinating complex interagency efforts in conflict zones.

Designate who is in charge on the ground, and give them the resources and authority to succeed. In most cases, this person should be the U.S. ambassador, supported by an interagency staff. All U.S. officials in-country should report to the person in charge. If the sitting ambassador is not the right fit, then the president should appoint a civilian or military official, ideally confirmed by the Senate.

Develop expert bodies of knowledge on wartime negotiations, dealing with corruption, and building military institutions in the developing world. The Foreign Service Institute or other State Department institutions should house these areas of expertise, create educational and training curricula, conduct wargames, and support implementation.

These measures are no panacea and will not rescue the United States from impossible situations like Afghanistan in 2021. But they will reduce the number of unforced errors and own goals that make fiascos and tragedies more likely.

Christopher D. Kolenda is a retired U.S. Army colonel who served in Afghanistan as a task force commander in 2007-08 and was a senior adviser to three four-star generals. He is the author of the award-winning book Zero-Sum Victory: What We’re Getting Wrong About War.

22. CIA sued over alleged spying on lawyers, journalists who met Assange

CIA sued over alleged spying on lawyers, journalists who met Assange

Reuters · by Kanishka Singh

WASHINGTON, Aug 15 (Reuters) - A group of journalists and lawyers sued the CIA and its former director Mike Pompeo over allegations the intelligence agency spied on them when they visited WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange during his stay in Ecuador's embassy in London.

The lawsuit said that CIA under Pompeo violated the privacy rights of those American journalists and lawyers by allegedly spying on them. The plaintiffs include journalists Charles Glass and John Goetz and attorneys Margaret Kunstler and Deborah Hrbek, who have represented Assange.

"The United States Constitution shields American citizens from U.S. government overreach even when the activities take place in a foreign embassy in a foreign country," said Richard Roth, the lead attorney representing the plaintiffs.

The CIA, which declined to comment on the lawsuit, is prohibited from collecting intelligence on U.S. citizens, although several lawmakers have alleged that the agency maintains a secret repository of Americans' communications data.

Assange has appealed to the High Court in London to block his extradition to the United States to face criminal charges in a legal battle that has dragged on for more than a decade. read more

Monday's lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

The filing said the journalists and lawyers were required to surrender their electronic devices to Undercover Global S.L., a private security company which at the time provided security to the embassy, before their visits to Assange. The lawsuit alleged the company copied that information and provided it to the CIA, which was then headed by Pompeo.

Assange spent seven years in the embassy before being dragged out and jailed in 2019.

Pompeo and Undercover Global S.L. could not immediately be reached for comment.

Assange is wanted by U.S. authorities on 18 counts, including a spying charge, related to WikiLeaks' release of confidential U.S. military records and diplomatic cables. His supporters say he is an anti-establishment hero who has been victimized because he exposed U.S. wrongdoing in conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. read more

Reporting by Kanishka Singh; Additional reporting by Jonathan Landay; Editing by Richard Chang

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Kanishka Singh

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

VIDEO "WHEREBY" Link: https://whereby.com/david-maxwell

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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