Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Start where you are. Use what you have. Do what you can.”

– Arthur Ashe

“Don’t worry about siding for or against the majority. Worry about taking up any of their irrational beliefs. “

– Marcus Aurelius

“Hell is empty and all the devils are here.”

– William Shakespeare

1. Senior North Korean General Wounded in Recent Ukrainian Strike, Western Officials Say

2. N.K. leader says past negotiations with U.S. only confirmed hostile policy against Pyongyang

3. N. Korea's arms exhibition showcases latest weaponry from drones to ICBMs

4. JCS to launch new multidomain unit for future warfare readiness

5. N. Korea denounces new U.N. human rights resolution as 'political provocation'

6. S. Korea completes production of core vacuum vessel sectors for int'l nuclear fusion research project

7. Top air force commanders of S. Korea, U.S., Japan discuss cooperation

8. North Korea Fighting in Ukraine Could Start World War III

9. Russia provided N. Korea with anti-air missiles in exchange for troop deployment: S. Korea's top security adviser

10. Comments by North Korea's Kim Jong-un suggest bromance with Trump is over

11. Former Pentagon official expects Trump to pursue reengagement with Kim Jong-un

12. Could US-NK talks resume under Trump 2.0?

13. Currency crisis drives North Koreans to dollar, yuan

14. Split families face new scrutiny as N. Korea labels South 'hostile state'

15. Survivor of DMZ crossing: The man behind South Korea's 'Escape' film

16. South Korea’s Dockyards: A New Factor in Korea-US Military Burden-sharing

17. Evolving Perils: Assessing North Korea’s Shifting Security Dynamics in 2024

1. Senior North Korean General Wounded in Recent Ukrainian Strike, Western Officials Say

First reports are usually wrong but one can hope. And the more that the Urkainians kill the less the ROK/US alliance will have to kill.

Senior North Korean General Wounded in Recent Ukrainian Strike, Western Officials Say

White House has warned North Korean troops in Kursk would be ‘fair game’ for Ukrainian forces

https://www.wsj.com/world/senior-north-korean-general-wounded-in-recent-ukrainian-strike-western-official-says-c138121b?st=DgJXK4&utm

By Michael R. Gordon

Updated Nov. 21, 2024 4:30 pm ET

North Korea’s Embassy in Moscow. Photo: Yuri Kochetkov/Shutterstock

WASHINGTON—A senior North Korean general was wounded in a recent Ukrainian strike in Russia’s Kursk region, Western officials said Thursday.

It is the first time that Western officials have said that a high-ranking North Korean military officer has become a casualty in the escalating Russia-Ukraine conflict.

More than 10,000 North Korean troops are deployed in Kursk as the Kremlin tries to repel Ukrainian troops who mounted an offensive there in August, U.S. officials say.

The White House has condemned Moscow’s use of North Korean soldiers and warned last month they could be targeted by Ukrainian forces. Ukraine launched at least 10 British-supplied Storm Shadow missiles into Kursk on Wednesday, according to Ukrainian and Western officials.

Western officials didn’t disclose how the senior North Korean officer was wounded or his identity.

North Korea’s mission to the United Nations didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment on the strike, which has been described in Western intelligence reports.

Pyongyang has sent a senior officer, Col. Gen. Kim Yong Bok, to Russia to oversee the North Korean effort to coordinate with the Russians.

(LEAD) N.K. leader says past negotiations with U.S. only confirmed hostile policy against Pyongyang | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · November 22, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with more comments; CHANGES photos)

By Park Boram

SEOUL, Nov. 22 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has said that his country went to every length in negotiations with the United States, but it only confirmed Washington's unwavering hostile policy toward Pyongyang, the North's state media said Friday.

Kim made the remarks during a speech at the opening ceremony of an arms exhibition titled "National Defense Development-2024," in Pyongyang the previous day, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said.

"We have already gone to every length in negotiations with the U.S., and what was certain from the outcome was ... the unchanging invasive and hostile policy toward North Korea," Kim noted in the speech.

This photo, published by the Korean Central News Agency on Nov. 22, 2024, shows leader Kim Jong-un delivering a speech at the opening ceremony of an arms exhibition titled "National Defense Development-2024," in Pyongyang the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Kim's latest remarks appear to dash prospects for U.S.-North Korea dialogue, after former U.S. President Donald Trump's reelection in early November sparked speculation about a possible return to summit diplomacy between the two.

During Trump's first term, he and Kim had multiple meetings, including two summit talks in Singapore and Vietnam in 2018 and 2019, respectively, but failed to reach a meaningful deal.

Kim has now accused the U.S. of strengthening military alliances and deploying strategic weapons targeting North Korea, escalating military pressure and provocations to "extremes."

"In light of this reality, (North Korea) realizes every day and every hour that achieving the most powerful military capabilities is the only way to maintain peace and provides a solid guarantee of security and development," he noted.

He stated that his country will never, under any circumstance, overlook its security being breached, pledging that there will never be an occasion for the country to give up the "pendulum of the military balance" on its own.

During the speech, he also outlined tasks for upgrading military weapons to match modern warfare, saying that the country will "evolve self-defense capabilities more aggressively and without limits to correspond to the ever-evolving threats of enemy warfare methods."

The KCNA reported that the defense fair showcased the country's latest cutting-edge defense products, including strategic and tactical weapons.

According to a published photo of the event, intercontinental ballistic and hypersonic missiles were on display, as well as drones and multiple rocket launchers, all of which the North has unveiled so far this year.

This photo, published by the Korean Central News Agency on Nov. 22, 2024, shows North Korea's arms exhibition titled "National Defense Development-2024," which opened in Pyongyang the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · November 22, 2024

3. N. Korea's arms exhibition showcases latest weaponry from drones to ICBMs

Is Kim trying to compete with the South's membership in the arsenal of democracy? Of course the regime has been proliferating the full range of weapons to malign actors around the world for decades. The regime might argue it is the South that is trying to catch up,

We should be harnessing the proliferation security initiative (PSI) to interrupt the shipment of north Korean arms around the world.

N. Korea's arms exhibition showcases latest weaponry from drones to ICBMs | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · November 22, 2024

SEOUL, Nov. 22 (Yonhap) -- A North Korean weaponry exhibition featured the country's latest arms, ranging from suicide bombing drones to solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles, North Korean reports and photos showed Friday.

The North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that the "National Defense Development-2024" exhibition opened in Pyongyang the previous day, showcasing the country's "increased power and great leap forward."

The exhibition brought together the latest defense products in strategic and tactical weaponry, updated and developed to align with modern characters, the KCNA said.

It follows the "Weaponry Exhibition-2023," which North Korea hosted in July last year with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in attendance, marking the 70th anniversary of the Korean War armistice.

This image, published by the Korean Central News Agency on Nov. 22, 2024, shows the "National Defense Development-2024" weaponry exhibition, which opened in Pyongyang the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

This year's exhibition featured a wide spectrum of weaponry, ranking from rifles and tanks to a space projectile for launching reconnaissance satellites, according to photos released by the KCNA.

Items on display included the Chollima-1 rocket, which was used to launch the Malligyong-1 spy satellite into orbit in November last year, a presentation seen as suggesting the possibility of the Chollima being used as an ICBM if equipped with a warhead instead of a satellite.

Two latest, solid-fuel ICBMs -- the Hwasong-19, first test-fired last month, and the Hwasong-18, unveiled last year -- were also on display, along with other solid-fuel missiles, including the intermediate-range hypersonic Hwasong-16.

This demonstrates that the country's liquid fuel missiles are giving way to solid fuel counterparts, which require less preparation time, making it harder for adversaries to detect their launch.

Other notable items included a line of drones, including the Saetbyol-9, known as the North Korean version of the U.S. MQ-9 Reaper, as well as suicide bombing drones, for which North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has recently ordered mass production. Including them, at least six types of small unmanned aerial vehicles were identified in photos of the exhibition.

Also presented was a 240 mm multiple rocket launcher, following confirmation by the South Korean spy agency earlier this week that North Korea is assessed to have expanded its arms exports to Russia to include 240 mm multiple rocket launchers and other long-range artillery.

No new weapon systems appear to have been unveiled at the exhibition, but experts suggested that North Korea may be signaling to the world through the display that these weapons could be provided to Russia at any time.

It could also signal Pyongyang's intention to dash any prospects for dialogue with the incoming Donald Trump administration by demonstrating its commitment to bolstering its defense capabilities, according to experts.

During a speech given at the opening ceremony, the North Korean leader said the country had "already gone to every length in negotiations with the U.S., and what was certain from the outcome was ... the unchanging invasive and hostile policy toward North Korea," the KCNA reported.

pbr@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · November 22, 2024

4. JCS to launch new multidomain unit for future warfare readiness

JCS to launch new multidomain unit for future warfare readiness | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · November 22, 2024

SEOUL, Nov. 22 (Yonhap) -- The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is set to launch a new unit tasked with bolstering readiness in the domains of space, cyber and electronic warfare, officials said Friday, amid South Korea's push to better prepare for future warfare.

In a legislative notice, the defense ministry said the plan is aimed at better responding to changes in the security environment, such as the development of high-tech science and technology, expanding the domains of warfare and the growing importance of cognitive operations.

The envisioned unit, set to be established under the JCS' strategy division, is expected to serve as an overarching unit within the JCS to carry out integrated operations in various areas of future warfare.

"The JCS is pushing for an organizational restructuring to create a synergy effect amid the changing security environment," a JCS official said, adding the plan will go into effect should it be approved in a Cabinet meeting as early as next month.

Under the Defense Innovation 4.0 scheme, the defense ministry has been seeking to harness advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence, to strengthen its defense capabilities in the areas of space, cyber and electronic warfare.

This image, provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shows its insignia. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · November 22, 2024

5. N. Korea denounces new U.N. human rights resolution as 'political provocation'

An international focus on north Korean human rights undermines regime legitimacy and is a threat to the regime. We need to focus on human right sbecasud it is the right thing to do with 25 million Koreans in the north suffering on an unbelievable scale and also because it empowers the people and pressures Kim Jong Un to change or be changed by the korean people.

N. Korea denounces new U.N. human rights resolution as 'political provocation' | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · November 22, 2024

By Park Boram

SEOUL, Nov. 22 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Friday denounced a resolution recently adopted by a United Nations committee regarding the country's human rights violations as a "politically motivated provocation."

A spokesman from North Korea's foreign ministry made the statement in a press release carried by the country's official Korean Central News Agency.

On Wednesday (U.S. time), the U.N. General Assembly's Third Committee adopted a resolution calling the human rights situation in North Korea "grave" and urging the abolition of laws that suppress people's freedom of thought, expression and religion, marking its 20th consecutive annual resolution on the matter.

The North Korean foreign ministry called the resolution "a grave politically motivated provocation encroaching upon the dignity and sovereignty" of the nation, saying it "strongly denounces and rejects the farce."

"We express serious concern over the fact that the practice of adopting of resolution ... is turning into a political means for interfering in the internal affairs and damaging the image of independent and sovereign states," the ministry noted.

The adoption itself is a violation of the basic spirit of the U.N. Charter, "whose core is the respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of countries," it also said.

Referring to the resolution's accusation of North Korea funding its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programs through forced labor and other human rights abuses, the ministry said, "Protection of human rights apart from the national sovereignty is nothing but an empty talk."

It is an exercise of the "normal and legitimate right" of a sovereign state, for which no blame can be laid for taking "all necessary measures for defending its sovereignty," the statement said.

The emblem of the United Nations (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · November 22, 2024

6. S. Korea completes production of core vacuum vessel sectors for int'l nuclear fusion research project

The description of South Korea: It is a Global Pivotal State, the CHOOSES to be a peaceful nuclear power, is a major partner in the Arsenal of Democracy, that supports the rules based international order.

S. Korea completes production of core vacuum vessel sectors for int'l nuclear fusion research project | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · November 22, 2024

SEOUL, Nov. 22 (Yonhap) -- South Korea has completed the production of vacuum vessel sectors for the international thermonuclear experimental reactor (ITER) project, aimed at achieving fusion power production at power plant scale, the science ministry said Friday.

The country has completed building four vacuum vessels for the ITER, the world's largest tokamak to be set up in southern France, according to the Ministry of Science and ICT.

A tokamak is a magnetic fusion device created to demonstrate the viability of fusion as a large-scale, carbon-free energy source, operating on the same principle that powers the sun.

South Korea is a member of the ITER consortium, launched in late 2006, along with the European Union (EU), the United States, Russia, China, Japan and India.

The country is participating in the production of nine parts for the nuclear fusion device, including the vacuum vessel, the toroidal field conductor and thermal shields.

This photo provided by the Ministry of Science and ICT on Nov. 22, 2024, shows a vacuum vessel sector manufactured by South Korea for the international thermonuclear experimental reactor. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

The vacuum vessels delivered by Seoul, each weighing about 400 tons, are core equipment for the ITER as they create an ultra-high vacuum environment for the plasma, acting as the primary confinement barrier for radioactivity.

Seoul was initially set to produce two out of the total nine vacuum vessels needed, but procured two more due to a delay in production by the EU, according to the ministry.

"Based on the core technologies and manufacturing capabilities for fusion reactors acquired through our participation in the ITER project, we will take the lead in the upcoming nuclear fusion reactor construction market and strengthen our global leadership," First Vice Science Minister Lee Chang-yune said.

This infographic image provided by the Ministry of Science and ICT on Nov. 22, 2024, shows the details of vacuum vessel sectors manufactured by South Korea for the international thermonuclear experimental reactor. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

nyway@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · November 22, 2024

7. Top air force commanders of S. Korea, U.S., Japan discuss cooperation

Just imagine what the combined air power of these three countries could do against any adversary in the region.

Top air force commanders of S. Korea, U.S., Japan discuss cooperation | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · November 22, 2024

SEOUL, Nov. 22 (Yonhap) -- The top air force commanders of South Korea, the United States and Japan have held talks to discuss ways to strengthen their cooperation, such as expanding joint air drills, officials said, the latest in their trilateral security cooperation amid North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.

In the video-conferencing talks held Thursday, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Lee Young-su, and his U.S. and Japanese counterparts, Gen. David W. Allvin and Gen. Hiroaki Uchikura, respectively, vowed to continuously cooperate to deter the North's evolving threats and hold regular talks, the South's Air Force said.

In what marked their first meeting via teleconference, the top Air Force commanders also reviewed their joint air drills and discussed ways to expand such exercises going forward.

Since holding a joint air exercise for the first time in October last year, South Korea, the U.S. and Japan have held six rounds of such drills, including those conducted during the trilateral multidomain Freedom Edge exercise launched this year.

Earlier this month, the three nations held combined air drills, involving a B-1B bomber, in a show of force following North Korea's new intercontinental ballistic missile launch on Oct. 31.

This image, provided by South Korea's Air Force, shows Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Lee Young-su (top L) and his U.S. and Japanese counterparts, Gen. David W. Allvin (bottom) and Gen. Hiroaki Uchikura, respectively, holding talks via teleconference on Nov. 21, 2024. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · November 22, 2024

8. North Korea Fighting in Ukraine Could Start World War III

A lot of sensational speculation going on these days. It is so frustrating there are so many who do not want to look for the opportunities in the miscalations by Kim and Putin.

That said, we do have to be wary and cognizant that their miscalculations could lead to war.

North Korea Fighting in Ukraine Could Start World War III

North Korean troops, reportedly from the elite 11th Corps "Storm Corps", are fighting alongside Russian forces in Ukraine, marking a significant escalation in the war. With reports suggesting 11,000 North Koreans already deployed and potentially up to 100,000 planned, their presence amplifies concerns that this localized conflict could evolve into a broader international struggle.

The National Interest · by Harrison Kass · November 21, 2024

What You Need to Know: North Korean troops, reportedly from the elite 11th Corps "Storm Corps", are fighting alongside Russian forces in Ukraine, marking a significant escalation in the war. With reports suggesting 11,000 North Koreans already deployed and potentially up to 100,000 planned, their presence amplifies concerns that this localized conflict could evolve into a broader international struggle.

-The highly disciplined but inexperienced North Korean soldiers offer Russia much-needed manpower as it sustains heavy daily losses.

-While Ukraine has long served as a Western proxy, the deployment of foreign troops raises fears that other nations might follow suit, increasing the risk of a global conflict.

North Korean Troops in Ukraine: Does That Mean World War III?

North Korean troops are fighting for Russia, in combat, against Ukrainian forces. The North Korean presence in Ukraine raises serious questions about the provincial nature of the conflict and enhances the possibility of greater international involvement in what is essentially a territorial dispute.

Already a Proxy War or World War III?

Ukraine has functionally been serving as a Western proxy since the war began. Indeed, the war commenced, in part, because of Western overtures towards Ukraine, i.e., the prospect of joining NATO. And since Putin commenced his invasion, in February 2022, a steady inflow of Western weapons, cash, and expertise has helped the Ukrainians to resist the larger, stronger Russian forces.

The point is: that North Korean entry into the war is hardly the first investment of foreign capital into the conflict. However, the investment of foreign troops represents something of an escalation, drawing concerns that other nations could contribute manpower, creating what in essence would be a global struggle for a sliver of Eastern Ukraine.

What are the North Koreans Doing?

When reports surfaced that North Korean troops had joined the fray, some pundits suggested the inexperienced troops would be kept out of combat. But U.S. and Ukrainian intelligence are reporting otherwise: that the North Koreans are indeed participating in combat.

How many North Korean troops have been deployed is unclear.

Some initial reports suggested 11,000 North Koreans had been deployed, while other sources believe the Kim regime may ultimately deploy as many as 100,000 troops. Remember, North Korea has one of the world’s largest militaries, with 1.28 million active soldiers. The North Koreans are “thoroughly indoctrinated” but lack combat experience, one analyst, Mar Cancian, said. Still, the North Korean troops deployed to Russia appear to be amongst the most well-trained, coming from the 11th Corps, AKA the “Storm Corps.”

“A unit trained in infiltration, infrastructure sabotage, and assassinations,” the BBC reported.

The Storm Corps soldiers are “trained to withstand a high degree of physical pain and psychological torture,” said Michael Madden, a North Korea expert. “What they lack in combat they make up for with what they can tolerate physically and mentally.”

Such tolerance will be an asset on the fronts of Ukraine, where the fighting is reportedly of the most viscous variety experienced on the European continent since the conclusion of World War II.

Regardless, the Russians are in a position where any troops, with any experience level, would be welcomed; reports indicate that the Russians are losing about 1,000 soldiers killed or wounded each day. Meanwhile, Moscow has recruited about 20,000 new soldiers per month, but many of the troops are pulled from the street and thrown into combat without proper training.

So, by comparison, the North Korean special forces should be a welcomed option.

Hopefully, North Korea’s entrance into the conflict will not inspire other nations to contribute manpower.

About the Author:

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

The National Interest · by Harrison Kass · November 21, 2024

9. Russia provided N. Korea with anti-air missiles in exchange for troop deployment: S. Korea's top security adviser

The regime is deathly afraid of US and allied air power. The Koreans in the north have long memories of what US air power did to the north during the war and north Korean propaganda has emphasized that for seven decades.

But the joke is on Kim. If he is getting S-300 or S-400 air defense systems he should know that they were unable to defeat the Israeli air attacks in Iran. Those systems will not provide adequate air defense of the north from ROK and US air power. They will die an early death if Kim Jong Un miscalculates and attacks the South. They will be among the very first targets that allied air power will destroy.

Russia provided N. Korea with anti-air missiles in exchange for troop deployment: S. Korea's top security adviser | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · November 22, 2024

SEOUL, Nov. 22 (Yonhap) -- Russia has provided North Korea with anti-air missiles and air defense equipment in exchange for its troop deployment in support of Moscow's war in Ukraine, South Korea's top security adviser said Friday.

National Security Adviser Shin Won-sik made the remark as North Korea is believed to have sent more than 10,000 troops to fight alongside Russia in the western Kursk border region against Ukraine.

"Russia is believed to have provided equipment and anti-air missiles to strengthen Pyongyang's vulnerable air defense system," Shin said in an interview with broadcaster SBS when asked about what the North would be getting from Russia in return for the troop dispatch.

"Following North Korea's failed military spy satellite launch on May 27, Russia had already declared its intention to support satellite-related technologies (to the North), and it reportedly supplied various military technologies," Shin said.

"We believe that there has also been economic aid in various forms," he added.

South Korea's spy agency told lawmakers earlier this week that the troops deployed to Russia are believed to have been assigned to Moscow's airborne brigade and marine corps on the ground, with some of the soldiers having already entered combat.

The Wall Street Journal reported Thursday that a senior North Korean general was wounded in a Ukrainian strike in the Kursk region.

In this file photo, National Security Adviser Shin Won-sik delivers a speech at a conference on the South Korea-U.S. alliance at a hotel in Seoul on Oct. 30, 2024. (Yonhap)

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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · November 22, 2024

10. Comments by North Korea's Kim Jong-un suggest bromance with Trump is over

If we understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime, this should be no surprise.

Friday

November 22, 2024

dictionary + A - A

Comments by North Korea's Kim Jong-un suggest bromance with Trump is over

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-11-22/national/northKorea/Comments-by-North-Koreas-Kim-Jongun-suggest-bromance-with-Trump-is-over/2184262

Published: 22 Nov. 2024, 18:43

MICHAEL LEE
lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr

In this photo released by the Workers' Party's official newspaper Rodong Sinmun on Friday, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, center, smiles as he talks to senior military officials at the opening ceremony of an arms exhibition in Pyongyang the previous day. [NEWS1]

Recent comments by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un reported by Pyongyang’s state media on Friday suggest that the dictator takes a dim view of talks with Washington.

In a speech carried by the North’s state-controlled Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Kim claimed that his regime “went to every length” in negotiations with the United States, but that talks only confirmed Washington’s “unchanging invasive and hostile policy” toward Pyongyang.

Kim’s remarks at the opening ceremony of an arms exhibition in the North Korean capital, which took place a day before the KCNA report, appeared to cast doubt on the idea that dialogue between the United States and North Korea could resume upon Trump’s return to the White House in January.

During his first term, Trump met Kim on three occasions, including two summits in Singapore and Hanoi in 2018 and 2019.

The collapse of their Hanoi summit without an agreement was followed by a rapid deterioration in inter-Korean relations and an escalation in missile testing by the North.

On the campaign trail, Trump repeatedly cited his past interactions with the North Korean leader as evidence that he could re-establish rapport between Washington and Pyongyang if he returned to office.

In his Thursday comments, Kim accused the United States of bolstering its military alliances to “extremes” with North Korea’s neighbors and around the world by rotating American strategic assets in the region.

North Korea received antiair missiles for sending troops to Russia, says South's security adviser

North Korea's anti-South broadcasts harm mental, physical health of border residents, surveys suggest

UN working group criticizes China for last year's repatriations of North Korean defectors

North Korean troops assigned to Russian units and fighting Ukrainian forces, says South's spy agency

Kim said these developments made the North “realize every day and every hour that achieving the most powerful military capabilities is the only way to maintain peace and provides a solid guarantee of security and development.”

The North Korean leader further vowed that his regime would never allow any lapses in its security nor allow the balance of military power to shift in favor of his enemies.

Kim also called on his regime to develop its military capabilities “more aggressively and without limits to correspond to the ever-evolving threats of enemy warfare methods.”

South Korean Unification Ministry spokesman Koo Byoung-sam said Kim’s remarks essentially repeat Pyongyang’s earlier demands that Washington drop what the regime regards as “hostile policy” toward North Korea before any dialogue.

The KCNA report on the exhibition included descriptions of the regime’s most advanced arms, including strategic and tactical weapons.

The state news agency also released photos of intercontinental ballistic missiles, drones and multiple rocket launchers that the North displayed at weapons parades earlier this year.

BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]

11. Former Pentagon official expects Trump to pursue reengagement with Kim Jong-un

I am not so sure he will want to renegade in the same way. I hope that he will look at alternative strategies and be willing to again do something no president has done.

President-elect Trump did something during his first term that no president had done: “He gave it a shot.” He met Kim and he offered him a future. But it was Kim Jong Un who failed to appreciate the opportunity he had. Now in his second term President Trump has the opportunity to implement new elements of policy and strategy that have never before been attempted. These include a human rights upfront approach that keeps human rights on all agendas, a sophisticated and holistic information campaign, and the support of the Korean people's pursuit of a free and unified Korea. There are few pundits who see the opportunities that both President Yoon with his 8.15 Unification Doctrine and Kim Jong Un with his new hostile policy toward the South are providing to the U.S. and ROK/U.S alliance. It is time to recognize that the only path to denuclearization is through unification. Most importantly the prevention of war and nuclear use, and the long term outcome on the Korean peninsula are important to the national security and national prosperity of the U.S.

Friday

November 22, 2024

dictionary + A - A

Former Pentagon official expects Trump to pursue reengagement with Kim Jong-un

Published: 22 Nov. 2024, 10:50

Updated: 22 Nov. 2024, 15:53

U.S. President Donald Trump, right, meets with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on Sentosa Island in Singapore, on June 12, 2018. [AP/YONHAP]

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump may seek to reengage with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un "at some point" though the contours of their meeting will be different due to Pyongyang's progress in its weapons programs and Russia's backing for the regime, a former Pentagon official said Thursday.

Randall Schriver, who served as the assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs during Trump's first term, made the remarks amid expectations that Trump could try to revive his direct personal diplomacy with Kim after he takes office in January.

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"I suspect he will want to reengage with Kim Jong-un at some point. It'll be a very different dynamic than in the first term — the novelty of it, just the fact of the meetings was so significant. But this is a Kim Jong-un that's in a different place," Schriver said during a forum hosted by the Hudson Institute.

"He's got more abilities now. He did not halt their progress toward more capable strategic systems. He's got, presumably, the backing of Putin .. and more international standing because of that," he added.

Schriver anticipated that if held, future engagement between Washington and Pyongyang will go "broader than the nuclear issue."

"I suspect the engagement would have a broader scope, and the full range of issues that we've talked about in the context of pursuing denuclearization will be on the table," he said.

"So enhancing the political relationship through representation in capitals, perhaps some modest development assistance and economic cooperation, perhaps reintroducing the idea of an end to the Korean War [...] I suspect those things will be on the table."

The former official recalled the no-deal summit that Trump and Kim had in 2019 in Hanoi.

"I think President Trump [...] although he said in Hanoi from the podium [that] sometimes it's the right thing just to walk away from a bad deal, he wasn't happy that he didn't get a deal," he said. "I think he understands that the nuclear issue is extraordinarily difficult to pry them away through diplomacy."

Schriver had been deeply involved in preparations for Trump-Kim summits, including the first-ever bilateral summit in Singapore in 2018.

Yonhap

12. Could US-NK talks resume under Trump 2.0?

"Co-existence?" Yes, a new term for Kim Jong Un. It gives the engagers hope. But again, I caution us to examine this through the lens of the nature, objectives and strategy of the Kim family regime and understand that the use of co-existence is likely just a new tactic in Kim's political warfare strategy.

I am reminded of the word from the Who: "I won't get fooled again." (meet the new boss/ same as the old boss). Full lyrics below the article to reflect on with some humor as "the shotgun sings the song."

Could US-NK talks resume under Trump 2.0?

The Korea Times · November 22, 2024

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un delivers a speech at the opening of an arms equipment exhibition held in Pyongyang, Thursday, in this photo released the following day by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. Yonhap

'Washington-Pyongyang summit may be held sooner than expected,' says N. Korea expert

By Anna J. Park

A North Korea expert stated on Friday that the prospect of U.S.-North Korea dialogue during Donald Trump’s second presidency might be closer than ever, despite negative remarks from North Korean leader Kim Jong-un regarding his previous talks with Trump.

According to the Korean Central News Agency, North Korea's official news agency, Friday, Kim issued a message that sounded pessimistic about the country's relationship with the U.S., as he declared that Pyongyang has ultimately confirmed the U.S.' hostile policy toward it during past negotiations with the country.

"We have already explored all possible avenues of negotiation with the U.S. The conclusion we reached is not a willingness to coexist from a superpower, but a firm stance of power and an unchanging, invasive, and hostile policy toward North Korea,” Kim said during a speech at the opening ceremony of the arms equipment exhibition held in Pyongyang the previous day.

He referred to his earlier summits with Trump in 2018 and 2019, during the latter's first presidency. He did not mention Trump's win in the Nov. 5 U.S. presidential election.

Kim also pointed out that the U.S. is expanding military alliances that share nuclear weapons and deploying strategic assets on the Korean Peninsula to pressure North Korea.

“(The Korean Peninsula) has never faced a situation where it could escalate into the most destructive thermonuclear war as it does now. The overall reality makes us realize, every day and every hour, that the strongest defense power capable of overwhelming the enemy is the only way to safeguard peace and ensure solid stability and development,” the North Korean leader emphasized.

At first glance, this statement appears to dismiss the prospect of resuming U.S.-North Korea summit talks or negotiations, particularly in light of speculation about such talks following Trump’s reelection.

However, Hong Min, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said that Kim’s choice of words indicates conditions for opening dialogue with the U.S.

He specifically highlighted Kim’s use of the term “willingness to coexist as a superpower” as a key phrase in the speech.

"The term 'willingness to coexist as a superpower' is completely new," Hong said. "North Korea has rarely referred to the U.S. as a superpower, and combining it with the concept of 'willingness to coexist' is unprecedented," he explained.

Then-U.S. President Donald Trump, left, shakes hands with North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un, following a meeting at the Sofitel Legend Metropole hotel in Hanoi, Vietnam, Feb. 27, 2019. AFP-Yonhap

Pyongyang laying out conditions for dialogue

According to Hong, North Korea has traditionally used terms like “multipolarized” or “bloc-oriented” to describe the global order. Referring to the U.S. as a "superpower" marks a notable rhetorical shift, suggesting the North's acknowledgment of U.S. global hegemony. Hong noted that this could reflect Pyongyang's attempt to avoid provoking Trump.

"Coexistence is also a term we've never heard from Kim Jong-un before. The expression of 'willingness to coexist' is very mild, almost as if saying, 'I want to coexist, too; please help make it happen.' It seems like Kim's message is specifically directed at Trump," Hong noted.

He further explained that North Korea's traditional diplomatic rhetoric often comes across as harsh criticism of the other party, but "it actually is a plea for specific actions to address their demands."

Thus, Kim's message is seen as twofold: criticizing the U.S. for its lack of willingness to coexist with a nuclear-armed North Korea, while simultaneously outlining conditions for dialogue.

“Rather than pursuing denuclearization, Kim suggests the U.S. should adopt a new approach to coexistence — one based on arms control and mutual recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status. In essence, he is setting the terms for future dialogue between the two nations,” Hong explained.

Then-U.S. President Donald Trump, left, and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un talk before a meeting in the Demilitarized Zone in Panmunjeom from the South Korean side, in this photo taken on June 30, 2018. Joint Press Corps

Both Trump and Kim appear to show a willingness for high-level engagement, based on their previous statements.

Randall Schriver, former assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs during the first Trump administration, predicted that Trump would, if he resumes negotiations with Kim, seek agreements across a broader range of issues rather than focusing solely on North Korea’s nuclear program.

His remarks came during his keynote speech on challenges facing the South Korea-U.S. alliance at a Hudson Institute seminar in Washington, Thursday (local time).

Schriver, who was deeply involved in the planning of summits between Trump and Kim, said the bilateral talks might not happen on Trump’s first day in office or even within the first year, but he believes Trump will seek another meeting with Kim.

However, he noted that the dynamics will be very different from the first term, and Trump now understands that it will be extraordinarily difficult to diplomatically dismantle North Korea’s nuclear and strategic weapons programs. As a result, he expected the scope of negotiations to expand significantly.

Hong expected that the bilateral talks might arrive much earlier in the process of resolving the war between Russia and Ukraine.

"The timing of entering a dialogue phase between the U.S. and Russia is key, and the negotiations could progress much faster than expected," the expert said. "While a final agreement may still be far off, the likelihood of entering into a negotiation phase may come much earlier. Given that Trump only has four years in office, he has filled key positions with loyalists who align with his policy goals and secured control of Congress. This strengthens his leadership within the U.S. government, increasing the likelihood of achieving quick results."

The Korea Times · November 22, 2024

We'll be fighting in the streets
With our children at our feet
And the morals that they worship will be gone
And the men who spurred us on
Sit in judgement of all wrong
They decide and the shotgun sings the song
I'll tip my hat to the new Constitution
Take a bow for the new revolution
Smile and grin at the change all around
Pick up my guitar and play
Just like yesterday
Then I'll get on my knees and pray
We don't get fooled again
A change, it had to come
We knew it all along
We were liberated from the fold, that's all
And the world looks just the same
And history ain't changed
'Cause the banners, they all flown in the last war
I'll tip my hat to the new Constitution
Take a bow for the new revolution
Smile and grin at the change all around
Pick up my guitar and play
Just like yesterday
Then I'll get on my knees and pray
We don't get fooled again, no, no
I'll move myself and my family aside
If we happen to be left half-alive
I'll get all my papers and smile at the sky
For I know that the hypnotized never lie
Do you?
Yeah
There's nothing in the street
Looks any different to me
And the slogans are effaced, by-the-bye
And the parting on the left
Is now parting on the right
And the beards have all grown longer overnight
I'll tip my hat to the new Constitution
Take a bow for the new revolution
Smile and grin at the change all around
Pick up my guitar and play
Just like yesterday
Then I'll get on my knees and pray
We don't get fooled again
Don't get fooled again, no, no
Yeah
Meet the new boss
Same as the old boss
Writer/s: Peter Townshend
Publisher: Abkco Music Inc., Spirit Music Group
Lyrics licensed and provided by LyricFind

13. Currency crisis drives North Koreans to dollar, yuan

A country that loses control of the value of its currency does not usually survive. The years of cracking down on the use of foreign currency has not worked and Kim's policies have only made it worse for him.

Beware the indicators of regime instability.

Currency crisis drives North Koreans to dollar, yuan - Daily NK English

Rising dollar use in North Korean markets undermines Pyongyang's ability to control its currency

dailynk.com · by Seulkee Jang · November 22, 2024

The North Korean won has lost half its value against the dollar and yuan this year, driving more citizens to conduct marketplace transactions in foreign currencies.

Multiple sources in North Korea told Daily NK recently that because of the constant rise of exchange rates this year, public demand for foreign currency has increased while market vendors also prefer transactions to be conducted in foreign currency.

Due to the higher exchange rates diminishing the value of the North Korean won, market vendors prefer not to accept the local currency in exchange for their goods.

“The exchange rates sometimes jump several hundred won all at once. Vendors require a premium for won-denominated transactions. When one yuan is selling for 1,800 won, for example, they might charge 1,900 won per yuan, relative to the price. That’s the only way vendors can avoid a loss when exchange rates are rising so fast,” said a source in Ryanggang province.

In other words, North Korean merchants apply a higher exchange rate than the going rate when selling items for Korean won to offset potential loss on the rapidly depreciating won.

“Back when the border was locked tight during the pandemic, not only rice and corn but most products were bought for Korean won, but now everything can be bought with Chinese yuan. Everybody is using foreign currency because vendors would rather get dollars or yuan,” a source in North Pyongan province said.

‘Re-dollarization’ of North Korean markets

Trade restrictions during the pandemic reduced the demand for foreign currency in North Korea, leading to a decline in exchange rates. Consequently, this resulted in the de-dollarization of North Korean markets. However, the significant rise in exchange rates this year is prompting a re-dollarization of markets.

In Sinuiju, Uiju county and other parts of North Pyongan province that are adjacent to China, smuggling was rampant before the border was closed because of COVID-19. As a consequence, Chinese-made items were frequently sold in marketplaces there, and the dollar and yuan usage rates were higher there than elsewhere in North Korea.

But in rural areas that are not close to the border, it was uncommon to purchase rice and other domestic agricultural products with yuan at marketplaces until last year.

To be sure, market vendors have always preferred receiving dollars or yuan for purchases of imported factory goods or Chinese food products. However, North Korean won used to be generally accepted for items produced inside North Korea.

With the surge in foreign currency exchange rates this year, buying rice and corn with foreign currency has become commonplace, even in the rural markets of North Pyongan province where smuggling does not play a role. Due to the ongoing depreciation of the domestic currency and the rise of foreign currencies, merchants trading in domestic agricultural products are finding it profitable to be paid in foreign currency.

It has become more common for merchants to reject Korean won. Purveyors of vegetables and hot meals used to accept domestic currency, but recently, more of them are insisting on being paid in yuan and pretend not to have enough money to make change for Korean won.

The North Korean officials who monitor market activity are supposed to prevent vendors from doing transactions in dollars or yuan, but given the increasing usage of foreign currency at marketplaces, enforcement of those rules has reportedly become perfunctory.

“Despite the rules, market vendors who are just trying to make a living aren’t eager to accept North Korean won at a loss. Since the enforcers can be fobbed off with a bribe, nobody is stupid enough to throw away good money by taking Korean won,” the source in Ryanggang province said.

Given these circumstances, more North Koreans are turning to money changers in the marketplace to convert their local money to foreign currency. It is nearly impossible to do their shopping if all they have is local money.

Currency spiral weakens state control over economy

In summary, the continual increase in exchange rates is leading to a higher use of foreign currency, which in turn is boosting the demand for it within North Korea. However, these trends may result in even higher exchange rates, according to experts.

“Growing usage of the dollar makes it harder for the North Korean authorities to exercise fiscal policy or control the domestic currency. Given the depreciation of the North Korean won, attempts to guide or force North Koreans to use the Korean won are unlikely to be effective,” said Son Gwang-su, an analyst with the KB Financial Group Research Institute.

But the economic shock caused by the depreciation of the North Korean won may not be as severe as during the currency reform in 2009.

“North Korea is currently hoovering up foreign currency through its electronic payment system and has set up more commercial banks to run that system. That may create the sense that currency policy is a little more manageable than during the currency reform of 2009,” Son noted.

“But since government policy won’t have much of an effect, the authorities will find it harder to control the economy as more citizens turn to foreign currency.”

Daily NK works with a network of sources in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. For security reasons, their identities remain anonymous.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Seulkee Jang · November 22, 2024

14. Split families face new scrutiny as N. Korea labels South 'hostile state'

Another indicator that Kim Jong's new policies of the South as a hostile state and the removal of peaceful unification may be a miscalculation.

Kim will never achieve "ideological purity" this way. Will this be a tipping point for some in the north? It bears watching. If only the Korean people in the north had the knowledge and the tools for collective action to create the conditions for change. I hope some people in positions of influence recognize the current infection point and see the opportunities for execution of a new strategy based on human rights, information, and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea. Kim's actions here actually strengthen the case for the South's 8.15 Unification Doctrine.

Split families face new scrutiny as N. Korea labels South 'hostile state' - Daily NK English

“In an effort to hold his kingdom together, Kim Jong Un is trying to split the Korean nation into incompatible parts, like oil and water," a North Korea expert told Daily NK

By Jeong Tae Joo - November 22, 2024

dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · November 22, 2024

Han Shin-ja, aged 99, bids farewell to her North Korean daughter on the final day of the first session of the 21st reunion of divided families, which was held at Kumgangsan Hotel, on the afternoon of Aug. 22, 2018. (Yonhap News)

North Korea has directed officials to revise documents relating to families split between North and South Korea and mandated ideological training for these families, following recent constitutional changes that officially designate South Korea as a hostile state.

The directive, issued by the Central Committee’s Organization and Guidance Department on Nov. 11, requires South Hamgyong province to complete document revisions and conduct training sessions by year’s end, according to a source in the province recently.

These orders appear to confirm fears that North Korea’s shift to the “two hostile states” narrative and its elimination of concepts about reunification and one Korean nation would have a negative impact on inter-Korean humanitarian initiatives such as holding reunions for split families.

According to the source, the order to revise documents about the divided families means classifying members of the divided families in South Korea as figures from a hostile state that North Koreans should be on their guard for and removing personal information from divided family documents that are managed by state security organizations in North Korea.

These orders are designed to cement the view that South and North Korea are not two halves of a single nation but two hostile states and to completely halt any inter-Korean exchange or contact about split families.

Regime pressures divided families to reject Southern kin

In response, South Hamgyong province plans to have organization departments and state security bureaus at municipal and county party committees secretly carry out the Central Committee’s orders and to provide divided family members in North Korea with ideological training to disabuse them of any fantasies they may have about the South.

“The provincial party committee and the provincial state security bureau are planning to hold training sessions by the end of the year at which divided family members in the province will be urged to disown family members in South Korea and burn any related keepsakes. Individual meetings and ideological training sessions with divided family members are likely to be held by the end of the month,” the source said.

“The provincial state security bureau intends to bring in each (divided family member) for individual meetings at which they will be asked to submit information about any contact they have had with family members in South Korea and to cooperate with revision of the documents. Family members will also be given extra ideological training to help them disown their South Korean families and give up their fantasies about the hostile state,” the source said.

“In an effort to hold his kingdom together, Kim Jong Un is trying to split the Korean nation into incompatible parts, like oil and water. But that’s likely to arouse logical objections even inside North Korea,” said Kim Yeong-su, director of the Institute of North Korean Studies.

“North Korea’s position that South and North Korea are two hostile states would imply that defectors and divided family members are foreigners. That’s the logical implication of placing so much stress on border closures and hostile relations. If the Kim regime keeps making these claims, it will ultimately confront criticism, suspicions and resentment,” Kim added.

Daily NK works with a network of sources in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. For security reasons, their identities remain anonymous.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · November 22, 2024

15.

Please heed these words. There is growing resistance potential in north K0rea that can and must be exploited by providing knowledge and tools to empower the Korean people in the north to create the conditions for change.

Excerpt

“The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) has never once let its guard down. Despite that, there will continue to be North Korean soldiers like me who cross the DMZ in search of freedom.”

Survivor of DMZ crossing: The man behind South Korea's 'Escape' film

By Kim Min-seo,

Park Su-hyeon

Published 2024.09.03. 15:15

Jang Han-ul, the real-life inspiration behind the South Korean film 'Escape,' is interviewed by The Chosun Ilbo at an office in Chungmuro on Sept. 1, 2024./Cho In-won

“The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) has never once let its guard down. Despite that, there will continue to be North Korean soldiers like me who cross the DMZ in search of freedom.”

In an interview with The Chosun Ilbo on Sunday, Jang Han-ul, 30, recounted his 2012 defection from North Korea by crossing the heavily fortified Demilitarized Zone. “The hardest part was making the decision to risk my life. But once I made up my mind, there was nothing left to fear,” Jang said.

Jang is the real-life inspiration behind the South Korean film ‘Escape,’ which tells the story of a North Korean soldier’s defection. In the film, released in July, actor Lee Je-hoon plays Kyu-nam, a soldier who risks everything to escape across the DMZ just before completing his 10-year military service. Unlike the character in the film, Jang defected in August 2012 after serving for only a year and five months.

Born in Hamhung in 1994, Jang enlisted in the North Korean military after graduating from middle school. At the time of his defection, he was 18 years old, and it was the first year of Kim Jong Un’s rule following Kim Jong Il’s death. “Kim Jong Il, who had promised national reunification, died without fulfilling that promise, leaving me deeply disappointed,” Jang said. “After his death, I started picking up South Korean leaflets that had been dropped in North Korea, hoping to find some truth.”

The leaflets, which criticized Kim Jong Un’s regime, had a profound impact on the young soldier. One phrase in particular—”South Korea is an economic powerhouse with abundant electricity and lush forests”—struck a chord with him. “It felt like I had been hit over the head. From that moment on, I started planning my escape while on guard duty, something I had never paid much attention to before,” Jang recalled. At night, he would watch the lights in the South Korean villages through his binoculars.

Jang carefully planned his defection, choosing a day in August 2012 when a powerful typhoon had damaged the DMZ’s triple-layered fence, which included electric and barbed wire barriers. “That day, the senior soldier on duty with me disappeared, saying he was going to take a nap. It felt like a sign from above—I knew I couldn’t miss this chance,” Jang said. He pocketed two grenades and took his AK rifle with 90 rounds of ammunition as he made his way to the fence. The grenades were meant for suicide in case he was caught by North Korean forces.

Although he managed to cross the fence, Jang encountered unexpected obstacles. “Unlike what I had seen from the North Korean side, the DMZ was filled with 2-meter-tall reeds and thorny bushes that I had to fight my way through. My entire body was scratched and bleeding, and my uniform was torn to shreds,” Jang said. It took him 18 hours to cross the roughly 2-kilometer stretch of the DMZ. “Even now, I can’t tell if those 18 hours were a dream or reality. I remember hearing the North Korean soldiers calling my name, and 12 bullets whizzed past my head as they fired at me. Bullets also hit the river next to the reed field,” he recalled. During the crossing, he lost 2 kilograms. Weighing 43 kilograms immediately after his defection, he now weighs 67 kilograms.

A scene from the film 'Escape.'/MEGABOX PLUSM

Now in his 12th year living in South Korea, Jang reflects on the hardships he’s faced since his defection. “There have been many difficult times since coming to South Korea, but whenever things get tough, I think back to the day I risked my life to escape,” he said. After arriving in South Korea, Jang studied for six years before entering college in 2018, where he majored in political science and diplomacy. Since February 2020, he has run a YouTube channel called BukSital with Kim Kang-yoo, another defector who crossed the DMZ in 2016. The channel aims to raise awareness about the harsh realities faced by North Korean soldiers. It was through this channel that Jang was contacted by the production team of ‘Escape,’ who sought his advice and offered him a small role in the film. In January of this year, Jang also released a short film he directed and produced, titled Two Soldiers, which highlights human rights abuses in the North Korean military.

Jang hopes that societal prejudice and discrimination against defectors will diminish. “There’s discrimination in any society, but I wish the bias against North Korean defectors would disappear,” he said. “I also hope that negative perceptions of reunification—such as the idea that it’s a burden or that we shouldn’t have to take responsibility for North Koreans—will improve.”

16. South Korea’s Dockyards: A New Factor in Korea-US Military Burden-sharing

If we want to be ready to fight tonight AND tomorrow we need to leverage South Korea's capabilities because the US defense industrial base is unable to provide these capabilities and will not be able to for a long time to come. This is how we win with allies in strategic competition and in wars of the future.

Excerpts:

That said, the security landscape has undergone drastic changes since Trump was last in office. While China is rapidly putting out new warships to assert dominance in the South China Sea and Eastern China Sea, the United States Navy (USN) is finding it difficult to match the number due to the extreme decline of the U.S. shipbuilding industry. Although still proficient at producing state-of-the-art naval vessels, Washington no longer has a broader civilian shipbuilding ecosystem, producing only 0.2 percent of the world’s tonnage. Against this backdrop, the U.S. has already sought support from South Korea and Japan, the world’s second and third maritime industry powers, respectively. Although by law the USN cannot purchase vessels from its allies, it can have its warships overhauled and repaired at South Korean and Japanese dockyards. Hanwha, a Korean defense conglomerate, recently signed a contract with the USN for a maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) deal expected to exceed $60 billion annually.

Trump is aware of this. During a congratulatory call with President Yoon Suk-yeol on November 7 (Korean time), President-elect Trump emphasized the importance of the South Korea-U.S. alliance and specifically highlighted the capabilities of South Korea’s shipbuilding industry. While it’s premature to draw definitive conclusions at this point, considering Trump’s unpredictable nature, the strategic advantage of repairing and maintaining many USN vessels close to China is a potential bargaining chip for South Korea in future burden-sharing negotiations. The diminished U.S. shipbuilding industry cannot be resuscitated overnight, making the bustling dockyards of Seoul a vital advantage for the USN. Even if the United States had ample facilities, compared with the cross-Pacific route to reach U.S. dockyards, staying within the waters of South Korea and Japan saves much time, fuel, expenditure, and manpower fatigue, allowing the USN to maintain the best combat readiness posture in the Pacific.

Within Washington, regardless of the party affiliation, South Korea’s readiness to serve as a “forward-operating dockyard” is viewed as a significant U.S. national security “asset.” At this juncture, then, there seems to be more flexibility for South Korea to navigate under Trump 2.0 than in his first term. This does not imply that negotiating with him will be easy, but Seoul now possesses more leverage than before. Even if the new defense burden-sharing negotiations bring a high price tag, and even if the two nations at times disagree, the alliance is unlikely to falter.

South Korea’s Dockyards: A New Factor in Korea-US Military Burden-sharing

thediplomat.com

Negotiating with Trump will not be easy, but Seoul now possesses more leverage than before.

By James JB Park

November 21, 2024

Hyundai Heavy Industries shipyard in South Korea.

Credit: Wikimedia Commons/ SarahTz Subscribe for ads-free reading

With Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election, a new chapter of international relations begins. One of his signature statecraft moves, trading intangibles for tangibles, will present conundrums for South Korea, especially regarding the future of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) and the defense burden-sharing negotiations amid Trump’s renewed focus on isolationist, “America First,” and cost-effective foreign policies.

Although the actual amount fluctuates, the cost of stationing U.S. troops in Korea, according to the Government Accountability Office, was $13.4 billion from 2016 to 2019. That equates to an average of $3.5 billion per year, with South Korea kicking in approximately $1 billion in burden-sharing payments. The first Trump administration questioned the $2 billion deficit, in keeping with its habit of downplaying the intangible worth of overseas allies such as South Korea and Japan – two crucial players in maintaining regional stability and counterbalancing China and North Korea. Many experts predict Trump 2.0 will not digress from this stance. During a campaign speech, Trump bashed the South Korea-U.S. burden-sharing arrangement, naming Seoul a “money machine” capable of paying $10 billion a year – 10 times the current contribution.

In his first term, Trump used the threat of USFK withdrawal as leverage in burden-sharing negotiations. However, in 2025, such an action could prove disastrous, as it might send the wrong signal to Kim Jong Un and his regime. North Korea is armed with nuclear weapons and has 1 million active soldiers. Even a very conservative estimate assesses that another Korean War could cost the United States $2 trillion, a price many times higher than the cost of maintaining a robust USFK with South Korea’s contributions. Many analysts also argue that if the United States’ East Asian allies were to fall, authoritarian nations China and Russia would have access to the western Pacific Ocean any time, which poses an unprecedented existential threat.

While U.S. withdrawal from Korea is an option, it would likely deal a final blow to the United States’ already waning commitment to uphold the liberal international order. The “hub and spokes” bilateral alliance system would gradually, yet inevitably, erode, with Washington’s promise to defend the liberal order and like-minded nations from harm increasingly viewed as a bounced check.

Previous U.S. administrations’ agreements with South Korea on partial defense cost coverage underscore that such “intangible” factors have long been part of the equation. The question is whether the Trump administration will factor such considerations into its own deal-making.

Seoul made hurried efforts to finalize a five-year renewal of the burden-sharing agreement just weeks before the 2024 U.S. presidential election. The new plan requires Seoul to increase its contribution to $1.47 billion in the first year (up by 8.3 percent from the current $1.2 billion) to support the USFK and associated logistics. While the deal is valid for five years, Trump retains the authority to initiate renegotiations of both foreign treaties and executive orders.

That said, the security landscape has undergone drastic changes since Trump was last in office. While China is rapidly putting out new warships to assert dominance in the South China Sea and Eastern China Sea, the United States Navy (USN) is finding it difficult to match the number due to the extreme decline of the U.S. shipbuilding industry. Although still proficient at producing state-of-the-art naval vessels, Washington no longer has a broader civilian shipbuilding ecosystem, producing only 0.2 percent of the world’s tonnage. Against this backdrop, the U.S. has already sought support from South Korea and Japan, the world’s second and third maritime industry powers, respectively. Although by law the USN cannot purchase vessels from its allies, it can have its warships overhauled and repaired at South Korean and Japanese dockyards. Hanwha, a Korean defense conglomerate, recently signed a contract with the USN for a maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) deal expected to exceed $60 billion annually.

Trump is aware of this. During a congratulatory call with President Yoon Suk-yeol on November 7 (Korean time), President-elect Trump emphasized the importance of the South Korea-U.S. alliance and specifically highlighted the capabilities of South Korea’s shipbuilding industry. While it’s premature to draw definitive conclusions at this point, considering Trump’s unpredictable nature, the strategic advantage of repairing and maintaining many USN vessels close to China is a potential bargaining chip for South Korea in future burden-sharing negotiations. The diminished U.S. shipbuilding industry cannot be resuscitated overnight, making the bustling dockyards of Seoul a vital advantage for the USN. Even if the United States had ample facilities, compared with the cross-Pacific route to reach U.S. dockyards, staying within the waters of South Korea and Japan saves much time, fuel, expenditure, and manpower fatigue, allowing the USN to maintain the best combat readiness posture in the Pacific.

Within Washington, regardless of the party affiliation, South Korea’s readiness to serve as a “forward-operating dockyard” is viewed as a significant U.S. national security “asset.” At this juncture, then, there seems to be more flexibility for South Korea to navigate under Trump 2.0 than in his first term. This does not imply that negotiating with him will be easy, but Seoul now possesses more leverage than before. Even if the new defense burden-sharing negotiations bring a high price tag, and even if the two nations at times disagree, the alliance is unlikely to falter.

Authors

Guest Author

James JB Park

James JB Park, a Captain (R) of the Republic of Korea Army, is a 2024 Non-resident James A. Kelly Korea Studies Fellow at the Pacific Forum and an Indo-Pacific Geopolitical Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center. Captain Park is a Young Leader of the Pacific Forum and a NextGen member of the Royal United Service Institute. His work has been published in The Wall Street Journal, The Diplomat, and Asia Times.

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thediplomat.com

17. Evolving Perils: Assessing North Korea’s Shifting Security Dynamics in 2024

A fascinating essay that should provoke some critical thought.

Excerpts;

Building on the previous trepidations, President Yoon’s freedom-based unification policy, presented during an August 2024 speech commemorating the ROK’s Liberation Day, offers an alternative vision for the Korean Peninsula; The policy focuses on providing North Koreans with access to reliable information, sparking a desire for democracy and freedom, and opening a new avenue for inter-Korean dialogue. While some initially viewed this as an attempt at unification by force, the ROK government clarified that this approach is not aimed at forcibly absorbing the DPKR, but rather updating the long-standing unification roadmap to reflect the current international dynamics. Despite its potential, the policy may be a case of too little, too late in countering the DPRK’s immediate and escalating military provocations in 2024. Now more than ever is the DPRK an international security threat.

Experts have varying opinions on how to resolve the concerns the DPRK brings to international security, ranging from disrupting the DPRK-Russia arms trade, enhancing defense and deterrence measures through strengthened alliances, and engaging in robust diplomatic efforts with regional actors. Additionally, there have been suggestions to focus on human rights campaigns and continue economically and diplomatically isolating the DPRK to counter its aggressive strategies and maintain regional stability. While some experts agree on the need for a multifaceted approach to address the concern posed by the DPRK, others question the effectiveness of these measures. Moreover, while intergovernmental organizations such as NATO and the UN/UNSC have condemned the DPRK, they have their limits. NATO’s partnership with its Indo-Pacific allies is still (at the time of this writing) coming into fruition, and the UNSC has two permanent members who are the most prominent allies of the DPRK.

In terms of bilateral relations, the United States and ROK consistently sought for dialogue with the DPRK without preconditions, but the calls have gone unanswered. There needs to be a reassessment of past attempts and the formulation of a comprehensive strategy to effectively dissuade the threat posed by the DPRK once and for all. However, several hindrances stand in the way; First, so long as the Russian-Ukraine war continues and Putin remains in power, the DPRK will have its missing catalyst to numerous issues. Second, dialogue of some sort needs to be established before matters exacerbate. Utilizing third party facilitators as an approach should be considered. Third, as mentioned in the beginning of this piece, 2024 is a year of elections, with many leaders, including those in Japan, the ROK, and the United States, more focused on their efforts to either get re-elected or pave the way for the next administration. That being said, there is a strong possibility that a long-term strategy may not be instituted by the end of 2024. No matter what, there needs to be a foundation established by those leaders (whether they stay in office or not) or by non-state actors. If not, then the DPRK will remain an international security concern for years to come.

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Evolving Perils: Assessing North Korea’s Shifting Security Dynamics in 2024

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/11/22/evolving-perils-assessing-north-koreas-shifting-security-dynamics-in-2024/

by Jonathan Bak

11.22.2024 at 06:01am

Disclaimer: This analysis was completed on August 30, 2024. As world news is constantly evolving, developments may have occurred since this date that could counter the arguments and perspectives proposed herein.

Introduction

In January 2024, Kim Jong Un, the Supreme Leader of North Korea (DPRK), announced in his speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly that the country would no longer pursue the longstanding goal of unification of the Korean Peninsula, and would now view South Korea (ROK) as its primary foe. Days later, he began to emphasize war preparations to DPRK state media and made multiple appearances at military facilities to showcase the country’s procurement capabilities. In the months since then, numerous events have drawn attention to Kim and the so-called pariah state. As Kim has the longest tenure of all current leaders in Northeast Asia, he aims to establish his legacy in the DPRK. Experts in Indo-Pacific affairs have debated whether DPRK’s actions now, more than ever, could have an impact on global security. To fully understand the DPRK’s potential as an international security concern, this compostion will begin by examining the recent political and military advancements within the DPRK and the corresponding reactions from the United States (US) and the ROK. It will then explore the DPRK’s diplomatic ties with Russia and the ROK, focusing on significant shifts in their bilateral relations. The counterargument that the DPRK may not pose a significant security risk will then be assessed by scrutinizing the country’s current economic challenges and track record of provocation. Ultimately, the conclusion will present a nuanced perspective on how the United States and its allies should interpret the actions of the DPRK.

Reason #1: Actions on the Domestic Front

On the home front, Kim’s declarations are materializing in the DPRK, as he has mandated the amendment of the country’s constitution to designate the ROK as a primary adversary. While the amendment remains pending, it underscores Kim’s steadfastness in his stance. Additionally, in January 2024, the DPRK abolished several important government agencies that were responsible for managing inter-Korean relations, furthering the divide between the neighboring countries. At the civilian level, DPRK propaganda has been revised, removing the messages of unification, and now depicting antagonism towards the ROK. The DPRK has also dismantled iconic symbols of reunification such as the Arch of Reunification, a monument that symbolized the efforts for a unified Korean Peninsula and possibly sections of the Inter-Korean Railway, according to the National Intelligence Service of South Korea (NIS). As propaganda and symbolism are major apparatuses for the Kim regime to maintain its domination of the country, these changes underscore Kim’s seriousness about redefining bilateral relations with the ROK.

Another, more peculiar incident that further delineates the DPRK’s designation of the ROK as an adversary is the ongoing balloon quandary. The flying of ballons, which South Korean activists have engaged in for years, involves sending thousands of balloons with leaflets and USB drives containing South Korean content with the hope that North Korean civilians will retrieve them and learn about their neighbors. However, in the case of the DPRK’s response in May 2024, instead of leaflets and media, it sent bags of waste. Historically, both the DPRK and, at times, the ROK governments have expressed criticism regarding this activity, with the former also making threats. However, the decisive response from the DPRK represents a significant escalation. Although this incident may seem like a juvenile tit-for-tat, it can be interpreted as an insult, demonstrating a lack of interest in relations or any attempts at communication with the ROK. Following the initial balloon episode, a press statement by Kim Kang Il, Vice-Minister of National Defense of DPRK, was released in June 2024 vindicating its motives. He stated:

We made the ROK clans get enough experience of how much unpleasant they feel and how much effort is needed to remove the scattered wastepaper. We are going to halt wastepaper scattering over the border temporarily as our action was a countermeasure from A to Z. But, if the ROK clans resume anti-DPRK leaflet scattering, we will correspond to it by intensively scattering wastepaper and rubbish hundred times the amount of scattered leaflets and the number of cases, as we have already warned.

Astonishingly enough, the vice-minister used the word “guggyeong,” which means border. This wording is significant because the DPRK rarely refers to there being a southern border but rather the military demarcation line that divides the Korean Peninsula. The change in wording emphasizes that the DPRK has designated the ROK as a separate country. Since then, the predicament has continued and demonstrates that the DPRK is taking every opportunity to solidify its rhetoric.

Reason #2: The Enhancement of Military Weaponry

Moreover, a major factor contributing to the likelihood of a security risk is the DPRK’s growing military capability. The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment of the US. Intelligence Community notes that Kim will “Continue to pursue nuclear and conventional military capabilities that threaten the United State and its allies, enabling periodic aggressive actions to reshape the regional security environment in his favor.” Between January 2023 to August 2024, the DPRK launched more than 30 ballistic missile launch events. A study conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies indicated that these tests tend to increase during significant US events, such as election years and joint US-ROK military exercises. With 2024 being a year of global elections, including in the United States, Japan, and the ROK, the DPRK has demonstrated its willingness to use missile tests as a means of exerting political pressure and drawing international attention.

Furthermore, the DPRK claims its missile tests have been successful. For example, in March 2024, DPRK state media reported the “successful test of a solid-fuel engine for a new intermediate-range hypersonic missile.” According to experts, this type of missile is capable of reaching targets like Guam, home to several US military installations. In late May 2024, the DPRK launched a battery of ballistic missiles that flew over 200 miles before landing in the Sea of Japan, following a failed attempt to launch a military reconnaissance satellite. In July 2024, the DPRK launched a missile capable of carrying a super-large warhead. Additionally, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) intensified its exercises and launched more missiles in response to Freedom Shield 2024 and Freedom Edge 2024, joint exercises between the US and its regional allies. Notably, even Kim participated in some of the military exercises. The DPRK has also enhanced its nuclear arsenal. Although no nuclear test explosions occurred in the past year, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that the country has amassed around 50 warheads and has sufficient fissile material to potentially expand its arsenal to up to 90 warheads. These are just some of the actions in 2024 that highlight the DPRK’s ongoing efforts to enhance its military capabilities and assert its presence on the global stage

Reason #3: The revival of DPRK-Russia relations

A pivotal factor that has also contributed to the concerns of the DPRK is that it has reignited its bilateral relations with Russia, a longstanding ally and fellow heavily-sanctioned pariah state. According to the US Intelligence Community’s 2024 Annual Threat Assessment, “Russia has been providing North Korea with diplomatic, economic, and military concessions in exchange for weaponry to continue the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.” This became noticeable in mid-to-late 2023 when Kim hosted high-level Chinese and Russian delegations in Pyongyang, followed by his first post-pandemic overseas trip to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin. During the trip, the two leaders toured several Russian military facilities, including the Vostochney Cosmodrome, giving speculation that the arms trade, clear violations of United Nations (UN) Resolution 2270, was coming to fruition.

The United States gradually revealed its perception on its strategic rival collaborating with the DPRK. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken called the affiliation a matter of deep concern. In early 2024, the US State Department reported that between September 2023 and February 2024, the DPRK had “Transferred ballistic missiles as well as 10,000 containers of ammunition to Russia via train for use in the ongoing war in Ukraine.” Some sources estimate that Russia was provided with up to five million rounds of ammunition. In late April 2024, UN sanctions experts released a report validating claims from Ukrainian officials that DPRK ballistic missiles were found in missile debris in Kharkiv, Ukraine, a known hot zone in the Russia-Ukraine war. The Defense Intelligence Agency also confirmed this in a May 2024 report.

The re-ignition of DPRK-Russia bilateral relations is concerning because Russia has technology that the DPRK can utilize to augment its military capabilities, such as satellite technology. As the DPRK has successfully and disastrously launched several satellites since late 2023 to mid-2024, Russian technology could improve the success rate (although NIS has speculated Russia has already assisted in the launches). Additionally, the bilateral relationship, or as Kim has referred to as the “unbreakable relationship,” has benefitted the DPRK on the international stage because Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), vetoed the resolution to extend the mandate for the United Nations’ Panel Assisting Sanctions Committee on DPRK in March 2024. In June 2024, the bilateral ties further solidified when Putin visited the DPRK capital of Pyongyang, where he and Kim signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement. According to Russian state media, the comprehensive strategic partnership covers areas of cooperation such as military, political, and economics. After the signing, Kim stated to Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) that:

The relations of the two countries have also been placed on a better track of long-term development conducive to the progress and well-being of the two countries through the expansion of mutual cooperation in various fields, including politics, economy, culture, and military affairs.

This new treaty succeeds the previous bilateral agreements signed in 1961 and 2000, as experts have affirmed that it is a revision of the former, including language regarding mutual assistance in the event of aggression. During the event, Kim also went on the record to affirm his support of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Moreover, the ROK’s reaction to the DPRK-Russia alliance has brought its stance in line with that of the United States. ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol called the alliance “A threat to his country’s security and a violation of UNSC resolutions,” expressing concerns that it would have negative consequences on ROK-Russia relations. Following the signing of the agreement, ROK Vice Foreign Minister Kim Hong Kyun summoned the Russian Ambassador to object to the partnership and cease the cooperation, as the ROK is now worried that the DPRK may escalate tensions.

In addition, the ROK has already contributed to the efforts of the Ukrainians in their war with Russia; the ROK government has focused its direct support for Ukraine on financial, humanitarian, and non-lethal military aid due to being forbidden by its Foreign Trade Act to the export of weapons to countries at war and the re-export of weapons without permission. The ROK has found ways around the law by around it by transferring lethal military assistance to allies. For example, in 2023, it collaborated with the United States to send 300,000 shells to Ukraine.

Now, with the strengthened Russia-DPRK partnership, the ROK is reconsidering the Foreign Trade Act in order to directly procure arms to Ukrainian security forces as a deterrent and message to the partnership. Additionally, in July 2024, ROK Minister of National Defense Shin Wonsik and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin released a joint statement condemning Russia-DPRK partnership and underscoring that the trade is a clear violation of UNSC sanctions.

The DPRK-Russia bilateral relationship can be seen as a security concern for the United States, ROK, as well as for European countries who condemn Russia’s war of aggression. Unlike their relationship during the Cold War, the DPRK now has the upper hand, as it possesses what Russia urgently needs. Some scholars argue that this cooperation may be short-term or transactional but given the nature of the exchanges and Kim Jong Un’s continued expressions of gratitude, the partnership could endure. This evolving relationship highlights North Korea’s growing influence and reinforces why it should be seen as a security threat.

Reason #4: The corrosion of Inter-Korean Relations

Both the DPRK’s political and military adjustments have jointly deteriorated inter-Korean relations. Since the DPRK has terminated the inter-Korean offices, communications have been cut. The ROK and the United States have offered humanitarian and economic aid in order to initiate dialogue, but the DPRK has reportedly rejected all offers. With communication attempts ineffective, the ROK has taken other actions against the DPRK; in response to the May 2024 balloon incident, President Yoon approved a proposal for the country to suspend the 2018 Comprehensive Military Agreement, an inter-Korean arrangement on lowering front-line military tensions on the peninsula (part of the agreement had already been suspended by the DPRK in November 2023). Other actions include the ROK military reinstating loudspeakers aimed at the DPRK in July 2024 after an eight-year hiatus. The loudspeakers broadcast anti-DPRK propaganda, weather reports, and ROK music. This approach, arguably a form of psychological warfare, has been used historically, making it a somewhat antiquated tactic.

Moreover, the ROK has improved diplomatic relations with other neighboring countries, such as the United States, Japan, and (slightly) China. President Yoon attended the 2024 NATO Summit for the third consecutive year, where he, along with other Indo-Pacific partners of the alliance (the Asia-Pacific Four, or AP4), jointly condemned the DPRK’s role in the Russia-Ukraine War. However, the DPRK does not seem pleased by any diplomatic accomplishments made by the ROK. As stated before, the DPRK has increased its launching of missiles, not only to US triumphs but the ROK as well. For example, following a May 2024 trilateral summit that was attended by the ROK, Japan, and China, a joint declaration was released and stated that:

We reaffirmed that maintaining peace, stability and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia serves our common interest and is our common responsibility. We reiterated positions on regional peace and stability, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the abductions issue, respectively. We agree to continue to make positive efforts for the political settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue.

Immediately afterwards, the DPRK reportedly released a statement as well as fired 10 projectile missiles into the East Sea, also known as the Sea of Japan. It was later discovered that the DPRK had also attempted to disrupt South Korean GPS signals. The DPRK’s response was clearly displeasure towards the joint affirmation of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. As both Koreas strengthen their ties with their respective allies, the hostility towards one another is nostalgic to the inter-Korean relationship during the initial phase of the Korean War.

Counterargument #1 – Cannot Be a Security Concern and a “Pitiful State”

On the other hand, Kim Jong Un has priorities for the nation that would hinder the possibility of being a security concern, in particular the state’s well-being in terms of economic and food security. It is widely known that the DPRK has gone through eras of economic policies that navigate how GDP is allocated. For Kim II Sung, the first leader of DPRK, it was juche, the self-reliant approach without external assistance. His son and successor Kim Jong Il initiated songun, an expansion of its predecessor with an emphasis on military credibility at the expense of civilians and the economy. Then in 2013, Kim Jong Un initiated byungjin noseon, or parallel line, an expansion of the 1960s policy of economic development and a strengthened military, but with a new emphasis on nuclear capabilities. This marked a shift from previous policies, where the military was not prioritized or central to economic reform.

Although Kim’s economic policy seems reasonable on paper, the DPRK economy reportedly diminished according to scholars as well as from Kim himself, as he described it in the January 2024 8th Central Committee of the Korean Worker’s Party as a “pitiful state. However, a July 2024 report from the Bank of Korea (BOK) indicated that the DPRK’s GDP increased by 3.1% in 2023 due to eased COVID-related restrictions, growth in trade with China, and favorable weather conditions. Due to the BOK being of the few accredited sources for DPRK data, it suggests some recent improvements in the economic situation of the DPRK.

In February 2024, Kim announced a new 20×10 policy which would establish factories in twenty countries in the next decade. The policy seems to have put the nation in the right direction; Kim stated in the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea in the summer of 2024 that several construction projects were in development, cultivation was in progress, and that that the overall economic situation is on an “upward trajectory” compared the previous year. However, experts from the BOK caution that this growth might be temporary, dependent on continued cooperation with China and Russia.

In addition, DPRK is reportedly experiencing food insecurity; in a report published by Statistics Korea in December 2023, scholars noted that food production in the DPRK such as grains “decreased by 4 percent to 4.51 million tons in 2022 as well as food shipments from China also dropped from 500,000 tons of rice in 2021 to 130,383 tons in 2022.” However, in a July 2024 statement published by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), reported that its director, Qu Dongyu, made a recent visit to the DPRK and asserted that agricultural development in the country was improving. Nevertheless, DPRK experts have expressed doubt about the validity of this statement, suggesting it was more of a political gesture aimed at maintaining DPRK-FAO relations since UN agencies have struggled to re-enter the country since the COVID-19 pandemic. Their cynicism is reflected in the interpretation of the FAO statement:

The Director-General commended the great achievements made by the DPRK people in agriculture development, food security, and the Pyongyang city under the leadership of H.E. Kim Jong-un, and expressed his appreciation for being received by the DPRK as the first UN specialized agency principal allowed to visit since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2019.

Despite the recent positive developments, the underlying issues that have plagued the DPRK economy and food security persist, suggesting that the situation remains precarious. Therefore, while there are signs of recovery, the DPRK’s ongoing challenges may limit its ability to focus on extraordinary security measures effectively.

Counterargument #2 – DPRK’s Tactic of Provocations

Moreover, the DPRK has a long track record of conducting provocations, which arguably may not necessarily equate to an imminent threat of war; these provocations are typically controlled and strategically calculated to avoid escalating into full-scale conflict. These actions are often proportionate responses to perceived threats and include built-in mechanisms for de-escalation. For instance, the sinking of the ROK naval ship Cheonan in 2010, although severe, was designed to inflict political damage while avoiding full-scale retaliation. This viewpoint could indicate that the DPRK was aware of the consequences of pushing too far and aims to achieve specific political and military objectives without crossing the line into war. This can be seen in the increasing military capabilities and change of rhetoric. While these provocations contribute to regional instability, they may not suggest a reckless intent. Instead, they can reflect a complex strategy of controlled escalation, highlighting the need for measured responses that prevent miscalculation and unintended escalation.

Conclusion and Recommendations

When juxtaposed, there are compelling reasons to argue whether or not the DPRK poses a security concern more than ever. However, with each passing day, the actions taken by the DPRK increasingly corroborate distresses from the international community. DPRK military exhibitions have been increasing since the fallout of the Hanoi Summit. As missile launches transpire in response to ROK endeavors, the United States has expressed concerns of an October Surprise ahead of its 2024 presidential election. Additionally, Kim has dedicated significant time and resources to identifying the ROK as an adversary through political, military, and propaganda channels. It would seem imprudent to expend such assets merely to convey a false message. Inter-Korean relations have diminished with both nations taking action and strengthening their alliances. For the ROK, it’s the neighboring countries as well as the West. For the DPRK, it’s the “reciprocal cooperation” with Russia. In just a matter of months, Russia has become the DPRK’s most powerful diplomatic, economic and military patron. The DPRK has now officiated its role in the Russia-Ukraine War, meaning the conflict could escalate to the deployment of the KPA (as there are rumors of engineering troops being deployed for reconstruction work), or possibly expand into the Indo-Pacific. The invigorated Russia-DPRK alliance encompasses support in trade, economics, and humanitarian aid, addressing doubts about the DPRK’s threat level and demonstrating that it has allies beyond China. Although China has been relatively quiet regarding this alliance, it remains on complex terms with the ROK while at the same time maintaining economic and military ties with Russia. Another contention against viewing the DPRK’s rhetoric as a concern is that Kim Jong Un could be pursuing a new method for unifying the Korean Peninsula. Scholars such as Dr. Daniel Pinkston have considered that, despite the failures of past unification attempts, Kim has not abandoned the goal but has shifted towards considering force if conditions permit. This strategy reflects a persistent ambition for unification under Kim’s terms, adapted to the current unstable global order.

Building on the previous trepidations, President Yoon’s freedom-based unification policy, presented during an August 2024 speech commemorating the ROK’s Liberation Day, offers an alternative vision for the Korean Peninsula; The policy focuses on providing North Koreans with access to reliable information, sparking a desire for democracy and freedom, and opening a new avenue for inter-Korean dialogue. While some initially viewed this as an attempt at unification by force, the ROK government clarified that this approach is not aimed at forcibly absorbing the DPKR, but rather updating the long-standing unification roadmap to reflect the current international dynamics. Despite its potential, the policy may be a case of too little, too late in countering the DPRK’s immediate and escalating military provocations in 2024. Now more than ever is the DPRK an international security threat.

Experts have varying opinions on how to resolve the concerns the DPRK brings to international security, ranging from disrupting the DPRK-Russia arms trade, enhancing defense and deterrence measures through strengthened alliances, and engaging in robust diplomatic efforts with regional actors. Additionally, there have been suggestions to focus on human rights campaigns and continue economically and diplomatically isolating the DPRK to counter its aggressive strategies and maintain regional stability. While some experts agree on the need for a multifaceted approach to address the concern posed by the DPRK, others question the effectiveness of these measures. Moreover, while intergovernmental organizations such as NATO and the UN/UNSC have condemned the DPRK, they have their limits. NATO’s partnership with its Indo-Pacific allies is still (at the time of this writing) coming into fruition, and the UNSC has two permanent members who are the most prominent allies of the DPRK.

In terms of bilateral relations, the United States and ROK consistently sought for dialogue with the DPRK without preconditions, but the calls have gone unanswered. There needs to be a reassessment of past attempts and the formulation of a comprehensive strategy to effectively dissuade the threat posed by the DPRK once and for all. However, several hindrances stand in the way; First, so long as the Russian-Ukraine war continues and Putin remains in power, the DPRK will have its missing catalyst to numerous issues. Second, dialogue of some sort needs to be established before matters exacerbate. Utilizing third party facilitators as an approach should be considered. Third, as mentioned in the beginning of this piece, 2024 is a year of elections, with many leaders, including those in Japan, the ROK, and the United States, more focused on their efforts to either get re-elected or pave the way for the next administration. That being said, there is a strong possibility that a long-term strategy may not be instituted by the end of 2024. No matter what, there needs to be a foundation established by those leaders (whether they stay in office or not) or by non-state actors. If not, then the DPRK will remain an international security concern for years to come.

Tags: INDOPACOM, North Korea

About The Author

Jonathan Bak
Jonathan Bak is an independent researcher on international affairs, with a focus on the Indo-Pacific. He holds a Master of Arts in International Security Studies from the University of Arizona.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

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Evolving Perils: Assessing North Korea’s Shifting Security Dynamics in 2024

Introduction

Reason #1: Actions on the Domestic Front

Reason #2: The Enhancement of Military Weaponry

Reason #3: The revival of DPRK-Russia relations

Reason #4: The corrosion of Inter-Korean Relations

Counterargument #1 – Cannot Be a Security Concern and a “Pitiful State”

Counterargument #2 – DPRK’s Tactic of Provocations

Conclusion and Recommendations

About The Author