Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Listen now. When people talk, listen completely. Don’t be thinking about what you’re going to say. Most people never listen. Nor do they observe.”

- Ernest Hemingway

“Imagine the people who believe such things and are not ashamed to ignore, totally, all the patient findings of thinking minds through the centuries since the Bible was written. And it is these ignorant people, the most uneducated, the most unimaginative, the most unthinking among us, who would make themselves the guides and leaders of us all’ who would force their feeble and childish beliefs on us; who would invade our schools and libraries and homes, I personally resent it bitterly.”

- Isaac Asimov

“Thus it has come about that our theoretical and critical literature, instead of giving plain, straightforward arguments in which the author at least always knows what he is saying and the reader what he is reading, is crammed with jargon, ending at obscure crossroads where the author loses its readers. Sometimes these books are even worse: they are just hollow shells. The author himself no longer knows just what he is thinking and soothes himself with obscure ideas which would not satisfy him if expressed in plain speech.”

- Major General Carl von Clausewitz

1. Korea says ‘no promise was made’ to China’s policy claim

2. N. Korea has selected workers to be dispatched to eastern Ukraine

3. South Korea’s Presidential Snub of Pelosi Was an Unforced Blunder

4. Two different victories after Pelosi’s trip

5. South Korea, US to hold talks next week on deterrence against North Korea

6. North Korea says Yoon’s ‘audacious plan’ is rehashed ‘waste’

7. 150 front-line Army commandoes to conduct joint training at US Army's National Training Center

8. Does the South Korean Ministry of Gender Equality Need to Be Abolished?

9. Ahead of U.S. midterm, Attention is Being Focused on the Appointment of Special Human Rights Envoy to North Korea

10. North Korea's triple economic woes stoke fears of 'silent' famine

11. Will North Korea sell its nuclear technology?

12. Ukraine Situation Report: Army Of North Korean ‘Volunteers’ Said To Be Ready To Help Russia

1. Korea says ‘no promise was made’ to China’s policy claim

China really is demanding adherence to the "Three Nos." That must be key to its Northeast Asia strategy.

As an aside I would much rather see the ROK push back on China this way than have the President meet with the US Speaker. This is much more important and sends a much more powerful message to China than a meeting with the Speaker.

Now deploy additional THAAD (but the ROK must fully support it logistically and security wise), establish an integrated missile defense (trilateral), and begin the work of establishing a ROK-US-Japan alliance. (I know this is still a naive fantasy)

Korea says ‘no promise was made’ to China’s policy claim

donga.com

Posted August. 06, 2022 07:26,

Updated August. 06, 2022 07:26

Korea says ‘no promise was made’ to China’s policy claim. August. 06, 2022 07:26. by Ki-Yong Kim kky@donga.com.

A high-ranking official from an embassy of the Republic of Korea in China rebutted the claim of the Chinese Foreign Ministry that the Yoon Suk-yeol administration has to uphold the former Moon Jae-in administration’s China policy related to THAAD, which is called “Three Nos.” The official said, “The Three Nos policy is not something we had promised to China.”

The official who remains anonymous told reporters in Beijing on Friday that even the former administration’s head of the negotiation and spokesperson said the Three Nos policy was not a promise.”

China's Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian publicly demanded on July 27 Korea uphold the Three Nos policy. “A new leader cannot look away from a book written by the previous leader,” he said. “All countries must basically maintain continuity and stability of their foreign policies.”

Against these remarks, the Korean official pointed out that the question here is whether there is a book written by the former administration in the first place. By denying the existence of the old book, the official emphasized that the Three Nos policy was not a commitment nor an agreement that the Yoon administration should uphold.

The policy, known as the ‘Three Nos,’ called for no additional THAAD deployment, no participation in a U.S. missile defense system, and no formation of a trilateral military alliance with Washington and Tokyo. Back in October 2017, the Moon administration announced the Three Nos policy in response to China’s ban on the import and airing of Korean entertainment content after Korea decided to deploy the American anti-ballistic missile system on its soil.

한국어

donga.com

2. N. Korea has selected workers to be dispatched to eastern Ukraine

Workers will be a cover for combat troops who will have to be dispatched to provide "security."

N. Korea has selected workers to be dispatched to eastern Ukraine - Daily NK

“Considering that the war isn’t over yet, the government is planning to send workers at an appropriate time while monitoring the situation on the ground,” a source told Daily NK

By Seulkee Jang - 2022.08.05 11:23am

dailynk.com · by Seulkee Jang · August 5, 2022

Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un in Vladivostok, Russia, on April 25, 2019. (Sputnik/Alexei Nikolsky/Kremlin via Reuters)

Following reports that the Russian ambassador to Pyongyang said that North Korean workers could help rebuild Ukraine, Daily NK has learned that the North Korean authorities have already selected workers to be dispatched to the pro-Russian Donbas region in eastern Ukraine.

North Korea’s leadership seems eager to send their compatriots to Ukrainian territory while the war is still raging, multiple sources told Daily NK.

A source in Russia told Daily NK on July 25 that the North Korean authorities had instructed companies operating in Russia to get ready to send workers to the war zone.

North Korean authorities are planning to send more than a thousand workers who are already in Russia to the Donbas region.

As a result, North Korean companies in Russia have until the end of the month to provide Pyongyang with lists of workers to dispatch.

In addition, the North Korean authorities have selected people inside the country to send to the Donbas region.

“The Overseas Construction Leadership Bureau, the Rungna Guidance Bureau, the Ministry of Fisheries, and the Ministry of Railways have assigned some workers on the waiting list to war areas [in Ukraine]. Those are the same organizations that recruited most workers dispatched to Russia in the past,” said a source inside North Korea.

North Korean authorities apparently plan to start by sending workers who are already in Russia to the Donbas region and then send additional workers in North Korea if requested by the Russian government.

Daily NK understands that North Korean authorities sent more workers to parts of Russia to earn foreign currency even after closing the national border to block the influx of COVID-19 in January 2020.

Given the current difficulty of sending North Korean workers overseas in large numbers, the North Korean authorities have apparently been sending them to Russia in small groups.

Amid rumors that workers dispatched to the war zone at the request of the Russian government will be given grueling and dangerous work for little pay, considerable numbers have reportedly been reluctant to go.

As a result, recruitment stalled in Pyongyang, and workers from the provinces made up most of those placed on the Donbas dispatch list.

However, the North Korean authorities have not yet ordered workers to begin moving to the Donbas region.

“Considering that the war isn’t over yet, the government is planning to send workers at an appropriate time while monitoring the situation on the ground,” the source in North Korea said.

“The Workers’ Party is making eager preparations because it regards the Russian request as a good opportunity to acquire foreign currency,” he added.

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Seulkee Jang · August 5, 2022

3. South Korea’s Presidential Snub of Pelosi Was an Unforced Blunder

For context, the author is a very strong Moon Jae In supporter and the ideology for which he stands.

South Korea’s Presidential Snub of Pelosi Was an Unforced Blunder

Yoon Suk-yeol simply isn’t up to international diplomacy.

By S. Nathan Park, a Washington-based attorney and nonresident fellow of the Sejong Institute.

Foreign Policy · by S. Nathan Park · August 5, 2022

Whether you were for or against U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Asia, you can’t overstate its importance. The legislator became the highest U.S. official to visit Taiwan, prompting a furious response from Beijing and adding to a U.S.-China rivalry that will shape the 21st century. Pelosi was welcomed by crowds in Taipei, Taiwan’s capital. On the Malaysia leg of her whirlwind tour, she lunched with Malaysian Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob. In Japan, she met with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.

But after completing her historic visit to Taiwan, Pelosi’s flight landed at the U.S. Air Force base in Osan, South Korea—where no Korean official came to greet her. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol sent his regrets, saying he was on vacation. South Korea has been the only country where she did not meet with a head of state or government. Pelosi skipped the press conference when she arrived at her hotel in Seoul, with a U.S. Embassy official telling the local media that she was “very displeased” with the lack of welcome.

Yoon’s snub of Pelosi is bewildering. It is not as if Pelosi caught Seoul by surprise: Her visit to Taiwan may have been under wraps until the last minute, but her visit to South Korea was not. It is also not as if South Korea believes in the sanctity of presidential vacations. Yoon—who once advocated for a 120-hour work week—only took office less than three months ago and is already on holiday. His predecessors have often put their vacations on hold to meet with visiting dignitaries for occasions far less momentous than this one.

This isn’t a moment when Yoon can afford to make mistakes. Thanks to the difficult economy, resurgence of COVID-19 cases, and his own missteps—including an inexplicable move of the presidential office out of the Blue House and a series of dubious cabinet appointments—Yoon’s approval rating has cratered at 24 percent in the latest Gallup Korea poll, a range last seen in October 2016 shortly before the so-called candlelight protests began against then-president Park Geun-hye, leading to her impeachment and removal.

This wasn’t a logistical problem. Yoon was on staycation in Seoul, just miles away from Pelosi. On the night of Pelosi’s arrival, Yoon and his wife were watching a play called The Tenants of Line 2. In a photo that went viral on social media—next to a photo of Pelosi landing in an airport devoid of any South Korean presence—the red-faced Yoon was shown having a drink with the play’s cast.

South Korea’s Office of the President only added to the confusion. Initially, it held the line that Yoon would not meet with Pelosi due to his vacation. Then, as Pelosi’s plane was approaching South Korea, the presidential office changed its story twice—first to say they were in talks to have a meeting after all, then to deny there were any such talks. Senior presidential staff also claimed that Yoon meeting with Pelosi would be “inappropriate” because her formal counterpart would be the head of South Korea’s legislature, apparently oblivious to the fact that Pelosi was meeting with the chief executives of four other Asian countries she was visiting.

In the end, Yoon salvaged a face-saving phone call with Pelosi in the afternoon of the day after her arrival, only after she visited the National Assembly, South Korea’s parliament, in the morning, where she received a belated honor guard welcome hosted by Kim Jin-pyo, speaker of the assembly from the liberal opposition.

Many have interpreted Yoon’s snub of Pelosi not only as a gaffe but also as a heel turn toward China. Yoon’s office stated that his decision not to meet with Pelosi was “decided in consideration of our national interest as a whole”—in other words, Yoon considered it in South Korea’s national interest to decline a meeting with the U.S. speaker of the House. Unusually, the presidential office produced no photos of Yoon speaking on the phone with Pelosi, apparently because he “felt awkward because he was at home wearing comfortable clothes and did not do his hair.” Some suspected, however, that Yoon was avoiding a photo op that would anger Beijing.

In a separate briefing, the Office of the President also said it would not use the term “Chip4,” the U.S.-led semiconductor alliance with Japan and Taiwan, explaining the term came across as “exclusionary” and South Korea will continue working with China on semiconductor supply chains. On the day Pelosi was leaving, South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin announced that he will visit China in the following week to meet with his counterpart, Wang Yi.

But perhaps Yoon’s snub was not all that intentional, as his foreign-policy fumbles are becoming a pattern. Nicknamed “a gaffe a day” during the presidential campaign, Yoon is not an eloquent orator or graceful presence. The career prosecutor and political novice barely won the presidential election in March with the narrowest margin in South Korean history by pandering to sexism and grievances about real estate taxes.

Koreans like to say, “A bucket that leaks indoors also leaks outdoors.” Accordingly, Yoon’s troubles have followed him abroad. Yoon attended his first major international event in June at the NATO summit held in Madrid—a critical meet as the Ukraine-Russia war was ongoing. At the historical occasion of being the first South Korean president to attend a NATO summit, Yoon appeared lost and awkward. News coverage of the summit often showed Yoon standing by himself in a crowd of global leaders who ignored him.

Meanwhile, First Lady Kim Geon-hee, who accompanied her husband, also appeared confused, as she “seemed not yet familiar with the protocol and was hesitant on how to greet or where to stand,” according to Spain’s El Confidencial. Later, she faced criticism as media reports revealed that she brought a personal friend with no official position on the presidential plane by issuing her a diplomatic passport and put her in charge of event planning during the NATO summit. The opposition Democratic Party likened the incident to the Choi Soon-sil scandal, when former President Park Geun-hye was impeached for having her friend with no official position handle government affairs and peddle influence.

To be sure, Yoon has good enough reasons not to antagonize China. Especially in a difficult global economy—South Korea’s international trade in July, including its trade with China, recorded its largest deficit in 66 years—China’s importance as South Korea’s largest trading partner looms even larger. But balancing diplomacy, surely, requires a greater finesse than the bungled and confused welcome that Yoon gave Pelosi.

If Seoul’s goal was to avoid wading into the Taiwan issue, there were many ways of doing so without offending one of the most senior officials of South Korea’s most important ally. Yoon, for example, could have met with Pelosi with a proper welcome, then focused the public discussion entirely on North Korea’s denuclearization. Meeting Pelosi could have also been a helpful catalyst for resolving the impasse between South Korea and Japan, as she has been a longtime advocate for justice for the so-called comfort women, the elderly Korean women who were former sex slaves of the imperial Japanese military.

But the truth is it almost does not matter what Yoon’s precise intentions were—because whatever they may have been, he was not able to execute them. He won’t magically transform into a smooth negotiator in short order. As a political novice, Yoon only has a small circle of advisors, nearly all of whom (including his wife, an art curator with a penchant for shamanism) are as inexperienced as he is. Meanwhile, facing a plummeting presidential approval rating, Yoon’s veteran staff is beginning to tune him out or head toward the exit.

Pelosi’s visit to Seoul should be a sobering moment for Washington. D.C. foreign-policy circles had quietly cheered for Yoon and against liberal rival Lee Jae-myung during South Korea’s presidential election based on the simplistic and mistaken belief that Korea’s conservatives were pro-United States and Korea’s liberals favored North Korea and China. But the evidence was plain that the foreign policy of South Korea’s conservatives is not all that different from that of their liberal counterparts. Despite his claims to “reconstruct the South Korea-U.S. alliance that collapsed” during the time of his liberal predecessor, Yoon’s more carefully considered words and deeds have indicated that he would stay within the broad strokes of South Korean foreign policy, which simultaneously includes a close relationship with the United States and strategic cooperation with China.

Yoon also amply displayed his inexperience and clumsiness during the presidential campaign. Incompetence, unfortunately, negates all commitment. Whatever ideological leanings Yoon may have are irrelevant if he simply has no capacity to deliver on his promises. At this historical moment, Yoon, the man Washington trusted to keep Seoul in the U.S. lane, is asleep at the wheel as South Korea is swerving wildly.

Foreign Policy · by S. Nathan Park · August 5, 2022

4. Two different victories after Pelosi’s trip

A fair criticism of President Yoon and a useful analytic perspective.

Excerpts:

From the perspective of military strategy, however, China clearly clinched a victory over America. Xi’s hawkish military response to Pelosi’s trip proved effective. After Xi sent fighter jets and warships to the strait, the airplane Pelosi was aboard had to make a detour from Malaysia. U.S. carrier strike groups dispatched to the strait to escort Pelosi’s plane could not across the “first island chain” the U.S. had drawn to protect against China’s threat after World War II. In a nutshell, China’s anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) strategy worked.

China also proved that the Taiwan strait is not international waters in times of crisis — thanks, partly, to the U.S. government’s failures to make Pelosi’s trip public and highlight the freedom of navigation before her departure. As the strategic implications suggest, the freedom of navigation was effectively denied by China in East China Sea, South China Sea and the Taiwan strait. That could adversely affect the future of the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Quad.

When Pelosi traveled on to Seoul, President Yoon Suk-yeol only had a 40-minute phone chat with her, no actual meeting. Pelosi’s Asian tour was closely linked to Korea’s national interests. A meeting with the House Speaker is not something that can be handed over to her South Korean counterpart. Past Korean presidents met Rep. Stephen Solarz, who often visited Seoul, and even the Rev. Billy Graham when needed. Mysteriously, however, Yoon did not meet the political heavyweight of his key ally, who could help him fix his administration’s position on the alliance through her visit.

Sunday

August 7, 2022

Two different victories after Pelosi’s trip

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/08/07/opinion/columns/China-Taiwan-the-US/20220807194124769.html

Choo Jae-woo

The author is a professor of Chinese foreign policy at Kyung Hee University.

In the lead-up to U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan on Tuesday, the United States and China exchanged tense tits-for-tats, something akin to a game of chicken. On July 21, U.S. President Joe Biden tried to distance himself from her trip by resorting to the Pentagon’s description of it as “not a good idea.” In a two-hour telephone conversation with Biden a week later, Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated his denunciation of last November of U.S. intervention in Taiwan issues. Warning the U.S. president not to cross a line, Xi said, “Those who play with fire will get burned.” That translated into a strong warning that if Pelosi pushed her trip to Taiwan, it could trigger serious ramifications.

Amid the escalating war of nerves over Pelosi’s trip, China kept rattling the saber toward Taipei. Following repeated infiltration of a fleet of fighter jets into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), the Chinese People’s Liberation Army conducted live shell firing drills toward Taiwan. Pelosi visited Taiwan under such circumstances to directly deliver the determination of the U.S. Congress to defend Taiwan in times of crisis. The composition of the U.S. delegation that accompanied Pelosi showed it: House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Gregory Meeks; House Veterans Affairs Committee Chairman Mark Takano; House Ways & Means Committee Vice Chair Suzan DelBene; House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence member Raja Krishnamoorthi; and House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees member Andy Kim.

Pelosi’s Taiwan trip earned America a political and diplomatic victory as the U.S. can strengthen relations with the state by delivering Congress’s solid position on defending the country. Biden has made pledges to defend Taiwan — three times this year alone — including the latest one in May after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Pelosi’s visit last week reaffirmed America’s resoluteness on the level of Congress.

The United States also earned a noticeable achievement on economic interests. Following the passage in the House last month of the $280 billion Chips and Science Act aimed at boosting U.S. semiconductor manufacturing and competitiveness with China, America has set the foundation to consolidate its strategic “Chip 4” alliance with South Korea, Japan and Taiwan. Pelosi met Mark Liu, Taiwan’s TSMC chairman, to discuss future cooperation with the chip foundry giant.

Beijing’s unrefined political attacks also helped Uncle Sam grab a political and diplomatic triumph. After the possibility of Pelosi visiting Taiwan grew, China intensified political and diplomatic offensives since July while ratcheting up the level of military pressure on the U.S. But the move went nowhere. China not only failed to block Pelosi’s trip, but also America did not “get burned.” If Beijing had stayed cool, it might have avoided losing face in the way it did. In a poignant twist, a White House official compared China to a “paper tiger.” Ouch!

From the perspective of military strategy, however, China clearly clinched a victory over America. Xi’s hawkish military response to Pelosi’s trip proved effective. After Xi sent fighter jets and warships to the strait, the airplane Pelosi was aboard had to make a detour from Malaysia. U.S. carrier strike groups dispatched to the strait to escort Pelosi’s plane could not across the “first island chain” the U.S. had drawn to protect against China’s threat after World War II. In a nutshell, China’s anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) strategy worked.

China also proved that the Taiwan strait is not international waters in times of crisis — thanks, partly, to the U.S. government’s failures to make Pelosi’s trip public and highlight the freedom of navigation before her departure. As the strategic implications suggest, the freedom of navigation was effectively denied by China in East China Sea, South China Sea and the Taiwan strait. That could adversely affect the future of the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Quad.

When Pelosi traveled on to Seoul, President Yoon Suk-yeol only had a 40-minute phone chat with her, no actual meeting. Pelosi’s Asian tour was closely linked to Korea’s national interests. A meeting with the House Speaker is not something that can be handed over to her South Korean counterpart. Past Korean presidents met Rep. Stephen Solarz, who often visited Seoul, and even the Rev. Billy Graham when needed. Mysteriously, however, Yoon did not meet the political heavyweight of his key ally, who could help him fix his administration’s position on the alliance through her visit.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.

5. South Korea, US to hold talks next week on deterrence against North Korea

South Korea, US to hold talks next week on deterrence against North Korea

The Korea Times · August 7, 2022

The 14th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) is under way at the Defense Ministry in Seoul, July 25, 2018. YonhapSouth Korea and the United States are set to hold regular defense talks here next week, informed sources said Sunday, as the allies are striving to reinforce security coordination amid North Korea's military threats.

The biannual Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) is expected to run from Aug. 16 to 17 in Seoul, the sources said, with the allies likely to discuss joint deterrence against North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.

The meeting comes amid speculation that Pyongyang has completed preparations for a nuclear test. It also comes ahead of the allies' combined exercise, dubbed the Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) training, set for Aug. 22-Sept. 1.

The allies are expected to conduct detailed discussions on measures to enhance the credibility of "extended deterrence," America's stated commitment to employing a full range of its military.

In May, U.S. President Joe Biden reaffirmed the U.S.' commitment to deploying its strategic military assets "in a timely and coordinated manner as necessary" during his summit with President Yoon Suk-yeol.

Launched in 2011, KIDD is a comprehensive defense meeting between the allies covering a wide range of issues. (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · August 7, 2022

6. North Korea says Yoon’s ‘audacious plan’ is rehashed ‘waste’

One thing to keep in mind is that north Korea does maintain institutional knowledge of history or proposals and negotiations.

And the denuclearization for economic engagement is another form of Trump's policy of if Kim makes the right strategic decision the north can have a brighter future.

The problem with these proposals (which seem very logical to any sane person) is that from KJU's perspective both actions are a threat to his rule. He cannot give up his nuclear weapons because his political warfare, blackmail diplomacy, and warfighting strategies to achieve domination of the Korean peninsula are dependent on them. And the economic engagement or "brighter future" will result in opening access to the country which means business to business and people to people engagement and information flow into the north. As much as giving up nuclear weapons, information to the Korean people is an existential threat to the regime. The regime cannot survive without nuclear weapons and it cannot survive if it opens up economically and allows information into the country.

The Yoon and Biden administrations as well as civil society in both the ROK and US and countries around the world have an opportunity for a new approach to the Korean security challenge. The ROK/US Alliance way ahead is an integrated deterrence strategy as part of the broader strategic competition that is taking place in the region. There is a need for a Korean “Plan B” strategy that rests on the foundation of combined ROK/U.S. defensive capabilities and includes political warfare, aggressive diplomacy, sanctions, cyber operations, and information and influence activities, with a goal of denuclearization but ultimately the objective must be to solve the “Korea question” (e.g., the unnatural division of the peninsula as described in para. 60 of the Armistice) with the understanding that denuclearization of the north and an end to human rights abuses and crimes against humanity will only happen when the “Korea question” is resolved and that leads to a free and unified Korea, otherwise known as a United Republic of Korea (UROK).

North Korea says Yoon’s ‘audacious plan’ is rehashed ‘waste’

koreaherald.com · by Jo He-rim · August 7, 2022

By Jo He-rim

Published : Aug 7, 2022 - 14:47 Updated : Aug 7, 2022 - 17:30

South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin (right) speaks with North Korean Ambassador to Indonesia An Kwang-il during a welcome dinner held as part of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Phnom Penh on Thursday. (Yonhap)

North Korea bashed the Yoon Suk-yeol administration’s North Korea policy, likening the “audacious plan” which offers economic benefits in exchange for denuclearization as rehashed “trash” on Sunday.

The Tongil Shinbo, a weekly North Korean publication, said Yoon’s “audacious plan” to offer significant economic benefits to the North if it abandons its nuclear program is only rehashing former president Lee Myung-bak’s North Korea policy, which it called discarded “trash.”

“To put it in one word, it is just a moderately modified version of Lee Myung-bak’s policy of ‘denuclearization, open and 3000,’ which was criticized by various circles in the South as an unrealistic reunification plan by absorption,” the weekly said in an article published Sunday.

“It is really an idiot’s strange behavior of Yoon Suk-yeol to bring back the plan that went down without seeing the light of day and became a piece of waste paper thrown in a trash bin 10 years ago, and rename it an ‘audacious plan.’”

The North Korean media outlet was referring to the “Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness,” a policy the conservative former Lee Myung-bak administration introduced in 2009.

The policy had promised to offer comprehensive aid to Pyongyang, to bring its per capital income to $3,000 within 10 years, if it chose the path of complete denuclearization. The policy made it clear that denuclearization should come before any economic incentives and lifting of sanctions were to be given.

Since coming into office in May, the Yoon administration has been determined to denuclearize North Korea. The government has said it is preparing an “audacious plan” that would “significantly” change the economy and the livelihood of North Koreans if Pyongyang chooses to discard its nuclear program.

The Yoon administration noted that its North Korean policy is not the same as former President Lee’s Vision 3000, as the plan includes incentives for each step the North takes towards denuclearization.

North Korea’s criticism on Sunday follows South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin’s presentation of the plan during a multilateral security meeting in Cambodia last week.

At the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on Friday, Park explained Seoul has prepared an “audacious plan” that would greatly improve Pyongyang’s economy.

The security meeting, which is the only regional security event that the reclusive regime participates in, was attended by North Korean Ambassador to Indonesia and ASEAN An Kwang-il.

Addressing the ASEAN Regional Forum, Park criticized the North for carrying out a total of 31 ballistic missiles test launches so far this year, including six intercontinental ballistic missiles, and violating multiple UN resolutions.

He also pointed out that the North’s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons only undermines its security, isolates the regime and deepens the suffering of its people.

Taking part in the meeting, An maintained Pyongyang’s attempt to strengthen its military is only a measure of self-defense, and noted that the introduction of US strategic assets on the Korean Peninsula, as well as Seoul and Washington’s joint exercises are “antagonizing” the North.

Park and An greeted each other during a welcome dinner on Thursday, while taking part in a series of foreign minister meetings hosted by ASEAN.

In a brief conversation, Park called for unconditional dialogue between the two Koreas, and expressed hopes for denuclearization to create peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, according to a Seoul Foreign Ministry official.

An responded that conditions should be created for these dialogues to happen.

The North Korean ambassador was seen to be attending the event on behalf of Pyongyang’s top diplomat Choe Son-hui, as the reclusive regime implemented strict quarantine measures in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.

By Jo He-rim (herim@heraldcorp.com)

7. 150 front-line Army commandoes to conduct joint training at US Army's National Training Center

I salute my Korean Special Forces brothers:

통일 - "unification"

안 되면 되게 하라 - “make the impossible possible”

150 front-line Army commandoes to conduct joint training at US Army's National Training Center

koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · August 7, 2022

By Yonhap

Published : Aug 7, 2022 - 10:14 Updated : Aug 7, 2022 - 10:14

(123rf)

About 150 South Korean Army commandoes will leave for the United States later this month for joint training with the US Army at the National Training Center (NTC) in California, officials said Sunday.

The special forces troops from a front-line Army corps will conduct joint exercises at the Fort Irwin training center for about a month as part of an annual training program the two countries have carried out since 2020 to establish a firm readiness posture.

It was the second time this year the two countries have held joint exercises at the NTC after some 100 officers from the Army's Special Warfare Command staged special warfare exercises with the US military at the training ground between June and July.

Until last year, NTC training took place once a year.

Located in the Mojave Desert in northern California, the NTC is one of the major training areas for the US military that is designed to provide realistic joint and combined arms training. (Yonhap)

8. Does the South Korean Ministry of Gender Equality Need to Be Abolished?

Conclusion:

MOGEF is uniquely qualified to handle the inordinate amount of gender issues that plague South Korean society, economy, and international soft power. Perhaps the answer is to rebrand, restructure, and add an inter-agency collaboration mandate instead of abolishment. Change the name of the Ministry of Women Affairs and Family, adjust the mission, and adopt inclusive language that reflects South Korea in all its gender and family diversity. It’s not a perfect solution but it is a pause, to quiet the critics and give Yoon the opportunity to work with MOGEF to solve South Korea’s pervading gender and social issues instead of burying them.

Does the South Korean Ministry of Gender Equality Need to Be Abolished?

A simple rebrand could make MOGEF a strong ally of the Yoon administration for solving many of the crises facing the South Korean public.

thediplomat.com · by Britt Robinson · August 5, 2022

The South Korean Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF) has been marred by drama since its founding in 2001, but never has it been so thrust into the spotlight of controversies as it currently is under the Yoon administration.

In April 2022, Yoon Suk-yeol won his bid for the South Korean presidency on a number of campaign promises; however, it was his anti-feminist platform that catapulted his campaign across the finish line.

A top-line campaign promise was the abolishment of MOGEF, but his delay in pursuing the abolishment after coming into office left many gender experts hopeful that Yoon would backtrack on this decision. In an effort to sustain the ministry, some have suggested a more moderate approach such as rebranding, restructuring, or redefining the mission of the ministry instead of outright abolishment.

Four months into his presidency Yoon’s popularity is at historic lows, bottoming out at a 24 percent approval rating. Note that former U.S. President Trump and U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson, at their lowest, held steady 34 percent approval ratings. Last month, in a suspected attempt to galvanize the anti-feminist base that won him the presidency, Yoon dashed any hopes of a stay-of-abolishment by requesting plans to be drafted for a swift dismantling of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family.

The MOGEF is a targeted scapegoat in large part because of its name; the “Ministry of Gender Equality and Family” is an incorrect translation — perhaps in part to please the international community. The Korean name 여성가족부 is more accurately translated as “The Ministry of Women Affairs and Family.” This correct translation is key to understanding the backlash against the ministry and the anti-feminist argument that South Korean men face reverse discrimination and neglect because the ministry only caters to women’s needs.

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The request to dismantle MOGEF comes at a time when South Korea is facing a population and gender crisis that has been years in the making. South Korea has a rapidly aging population, the highest suicide rate among the world’s high-income countries, and a death rate outpacing the birthrate since 2020. South Korea’s fertility rate, which is closely linked to birthrate, is 0.81 — the lowest in the world. South Korea is the only country with a fertility rate below one; to maintain population replacement levels, fertility rates need to level at 2.1 children per woman in her lifetime.

But what are the factors causing this population crisis, and what does population have to do with gender? A high suicide rate and a shockingly low birth rate are symptoms of larger issues in society, which also means the solutions should be found in exploring these larger issues, not triaging the symptoms.

South Korea has a work culture problem with long hours, abusive practices, lack of diversity, and high levels of discrimination — none of which contribute to an environment that is conducive to raising children in a dual-income family. The current economic and real estate crisis saw the cost of housing more than double in recent years, with young professionals and the elderly hardest hit. Additionally, South Korea has a care problem, from eldercare to long-term care to childcare — particularly for women, as the primary caregiver obligation is becoming unpopular with the younger, more progressive generations. These societal issues are intersectional and the solutions to correct them in a holistic and sustainable way must include a gender lens, a lens MOGEF can provide.

The dynamics of the Korean family are changing. The multigenerational home maintained by the wife as a stay-at-home mother is being replaced by the nuclear family along with the need for a dual-income household. As women shift into the workforce, society is often slow to catch up, placing the burden on women, as was seen in the United States circa 1970 when women entered the formal labor market in droves. Women face the “Doubleday” work day, working a full-time job and coming home to unpaid care and household work. In addition, women face the “motherhood penalty,” which often derails their careers. In response to these added burdens, some South Korean women are saying no to marriage and motherhood.

For women to start saying “yes,” a number of things need to change. Care work needs to be recognized and in some cases formalized, and there needs to be a division of care work at home — a reason why paternity leave and normal work hours are essential to healthy family growth. Only then will there be the opportunity for women to stay in the workforce without the “motherhood penalty” limiting promotional opportunities or making a return to work hostile, if not impossible, for women who take a career break. Additionally, non-traditional families need to be brought into policy considerations as single-parent families, multinational families, refugee families, and LGBTQ+ families become mainstream.

Ironically, the very same ministry that Yoon is trying to abolish is the ministry trying to solve these issues, which could very well be an essential partner to his administration.

What has MOGEF done for South Korean women?

In its short tenure, MOGEF has played a key role in bringing gender and families to the forefront of policy discussions. The ministry’s gains have been moderate at times but should not be discounted. MOGEF was instrumental in the abolishment of the Hojuje family registry system, which required all citizens to be registered under a male head of household regardless of marital status. The ministry established inter-agency cooperation for the protection of at-risk youth and victims of digital sex crimes. A chief outcome was interagency access to the Korean National Police Agency’s Illicit Image Tracking System, making image and video deletion requests an immediate and streamlined process for victims of digital sex crimes. Additionally, MOGEF has worked to establish programs and policies for increased participation of women in politics and the formal labor sector; implemented care benefits for childcare, long-term disability care, and elder care; and continues to operate centers for at-risk youth and teenage victims of abuse.

Days before Yoon called for action plans to dismantle MOGEF, the ministry released its latest report and policy recommendations to address the population crisis and other gender-related issues, including:

Increasing the number of state-accredited babysitters from 26,000 to 170,000, to ease the burden of childcare for double-income households.
Expanding the income ceiling for low-income families to qualify for childcare subsidies.
Creating shelters for male victims of sexual, domestic, and digital violence.
Increasing the percentage of single-parent families eligible for childcare expenses from 39 percent to 53 percent.
The launch of a pilot program providing a child support expense for parents under the age of 24 years old

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The idea of abolishing MOGEF and redistributing funding to other ministries to handle gender issues in accordance with their respective oversight is a misstep. In the recent past, other ministries have attempted to contribute gendered solutions to the low fertility rate, but their efforts have been problematic at best. In 2016, the Ministry of the Interior developed an interactive website mapping women of childbearing age by district and province. After its launch it faced public backlash, some deeming it a “rape map” for men to target women. The site was taken down.

In 2019, the Seoul city government created a pregnancy guide with sexist tips for expecting mothers such as “Before giving birth, prepare 3-7 days of food and clothes for your husband so he can conveniently use them while you are in the hospital.” Additional tips included advice for weight loss (“hang out clothes that you wore before getting married or small-sized clothes that you’d like to wear after giving birth and look at them when you want to eat more than necessary or want to skip a workout”) and the recommendation to buy a hairband “so that you don’t look disheveled, as you won’t be able to wash your hair for a while in the hospital.” The publication was taken down from Seoul’s Pregnancy and Childbirth Information Center website in 2021 due to public outcry.

In both situations, a call to the gender experts at MOGEF could have saved these agencies a fair amount of domestic and international embarrassment, in addition to the funds wasted on developing those materials.

MOGEF is uniquely qualified to handle the inordinate amount of gender issues that plague South Korean society, economy, and international soft power. Perhaps the answer is to rebrand, restructure, and add an inter-agency collaboration mandate instead of abolishment. Change the name of the Ministry of Women Affairs and Family, adjust the mission, and adopt inclusive language that reflects South Korea in all its gender and family diversity. It’s not a perfect solution but it is a pause, to quiet the critics and give Yoon the opportunity to work with MOGEF to solve South Korea’s pervading gender and social issues instead of burying them.

GUEST AUTHOR

Britt Robinson

Britt Robinson is a communications specialist at the International Center for Research on Women based in Washington, D.C. She holds a masters in Asian Studies with specializations on the Korean peninsula and Global Gender Policy. Follow her on Twitter: @Leznver

thediplomat.com · by Britt Robinson · August 5, 2022

9. Ahead of U.S. midterm, Attention is Being Focused on the Appointment of Special Human Rights Envoy to North Korea

We have not had a north Korea human rights ambassador since Ambassador Robert King left office in 2017. There were no significant calls for an ambassador during the previous administration that I recall (except among the Korea watcher community). South Korea had nearly an identical hiatus until last month when they appointed Lee Shin-hwa.

My recommendation remains Greg Scarlatoiu .

As I have written a number of times:

If I could make one recommendation to the Biden Administration it would be to nominate Greg as the next Ambassador for north Korean human rights. A fluent Korean speaker, one who lived through the tyranny of his native Romania to include the revolution in 1989, and one of the few Americans who has devoted decades to Korean studies and north Korean rights issues. In addition he is well regarded in the UN human rights community as well as throughout Europe in addition to Korea and Japan. There is no more qualified human rights expert than Greg.

I will keep beating the drum. The most qualified person for the US Ambassador for North Korean Human Rights is Greg Scarlatoiu.

Here is his bio:

Executive Director

Read BioGreg Scarlatoiu is the Executive Director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) in Washington, D.C. He has coordinated 28 HRNK publications addressing North Korea’s human rights situation and the operation of its regime. He is a visiting professor at the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul as well as instructor and coordinator of the Korean Peninsula and Japan class at the U.S. State Department’s Foreign Service Institute (FSI). Scarlatoiu is vice president of the executive board of the International Council on Korean Studies (ICKS). He is also a member of the advisory board for The Korea and World Politics Institute. Prior to HRNK, Scarlatoiu was with the Korea Economic Institute (KEI) in Washington, D.C. He has over six years of experience in international development, on projects funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. For fifteen years, Scarlatoiu has authored and broadcast the weekly Korean language ‘‘Scarlatoiu Column’ to North Korea for Radio Free Asia. A seasoned lecturer on Korean issues, Scarlatoiu is a frequent commentator for CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, Voice of America, Radio Free Asia and other media organizations. He has published op-eds and letters to the editor in newspapers including The Washington Post, The New York Times, and The Wall Street Journal. He has published academic papers in volumes produced by organizations including The Hanns Seidel Foundation, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, and the International Journal of Korean Studies. He has appeared as an expert witness at several Congressional hearings on North Korean human rights. Scarlatoiu holds a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School, Tufts University, and a Master of Arts and Bachelor of Arts from Seoul National University’s Department of International Relations. He graduated from the MIT XXI Seminar for U.S. national security leaders in 2016-2017. Scarlatoiu was awarded the title ‘Citizen of Honor, City of Seoul,’ in January 1999. He is fluent in Korean, French, and Romanian. A native of Romania born and raised under that country’s communist regime, Scarlatoiu is a naturalized U.S. citizen.

https://www.hrnk.org/about/staff-interns.php

Ahead of U.S. midterm, Attention is Being Focused on the Appointment of Special Human Rights Envoy to North Korea

(Park Soo Young, RFA)

Anchor: The U.S. Congress and human rights organizations in North Korea are calling for the appointment of a vacant State Department special envoy for human rights in North Korea. With only three months left until the midterm elections, it is highly likely that the special envoy for human rights to North Korea will be vacant until next year unless he is appointed as soon as possible. Reporter Park Soo Young reported on the voices calling for the early appointment of a special envoy for human rights to North Korea.

Rep. Rubio and Young Kim, "We must appoint a special envoy for human rights in North Korea as soon as possible."

The "2022 Human Trafficking Report" recently released by the U.S. State Department (19th) drew attention because North Korea's "Law on the Elimination of Reactionary Thought and Culture” was newly highlighted, unlike last year.

This is interpreted as a growing concern over human rights violations committed by North Korean authorities, who have recently been more proactive about blocking the inflow of external information and controlling internal discipline.

However, the U.S. State Department's special envoy for human rights in North Korea, which is considered a key lever for resolving the North Korean human rights issue, has not been named.

The State Department spokesman's office said to the RFA on the 19th, "There are no plans to announce personnel appointments regarding the appointment of a special human rights envoy to North Korea."

“The State Department is still concerned about the human rights situation in North Korea and is committed to putting human rights at the center of foreign policy," the spokesman said. "The Biden-Harris administration puts human rights at the center of foreign policy."

The U.S. Congress is critical of the delay in appointing a special envoy for North Korean human rights.

Senator Marco Rubio (Florida, Republican) stressed to the RFA on the 18th that "the special envoy for human rights in North Korea is an important position that needs to be filled as soon as possible."

Sen. Rubio, who led the legislation to re-approve the North Korean Human Rights Act, added, "The Kim Jong Un regime violates the human rights of North Koreans, and this is a diplomatic issue that should be prioritized.”

He stressed that within 180 days of the bill's passage, the administration must report to Congress on progress on the appointment of a special envoy.

Rep. Young Kim (California, Republican), who proposed a bill to re-approve the North Korean Human Rights Act in the U.S. House of Representatives, told the RFA on the 21st that the U.S. Congress is continuously encouraging the State Department to appoint a special envoy for North Korean human rights.

Rep. Young Kim said, "Even if torture, imprisonment, forced labor, and starvation cost the human rights of its citizens, the Kim Jong-un regime will not stop expanding its power and developing nuclear weapons."

"As an immigrant from South Korea, the human rights of North Koreans are an important matter for me personally," Rep. Young said. "We will not stop fighting until the House of Representatives passes the bill to re-approve the North Korean Human Rights Act."

Individuals from human rights groups in the U.S. also stressed that the special envoy for human rights in North Korea should be appointed as soon as possible.

Former U.S. State Department special envoy for North Korean human rights Robert King told the RFA on the 26th that the U.S. administration is unable to deal with North Korean human rights issues immediately due to political confrontation and because they are currently focusing on other issues.

[Robert King] The first problem is that there are many other important issues in the United States. Another problem is politics. The Republicans and Democrats and the U.S. Senate are very divided.

On March 1, 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden shakes hands with U.S. Senate Democratic Party leader Chuck Schumer (Democrat, New York) after speaking at a joint Senate and House of Representatives meeting at the Washington, D.C., U.S. Capitol.

He predicted that the appointment of a special envoy for human rights to North Korea would have little impact on the Biden administration's approval rating.

[Robert King] I don't think it's going to have any effect on the approval rating for Americans. Regarding international relations, the concerns of U.S. citizens are the endless rising prices and why the U.S. is not more actively blocking Russia's terrible moves in the Ukraine crisis.

If a candidate is not chosen within this month, the special envoy for human rights in North Korea will be vacant until next year.

Unless the selection of candidates for the special human rights envoy to North Korea, qualifications for candidates, and reasons for disqualification are considered before the November midterm elections, King said the appointment could be postponed until next year.

In order for the special envoy for human rights to North Korea to be nominated this year, a candidate must be elected within this month.

[Robert King] The problem is that the parliamentary session has reached its final stage. A third of the federal Senate's new Senate seats will be elected this fall. In the case of the House of Representatives, it is almost everyone. Therefore, if the appointment of a special envoy for human rights to North Korea is delayed further, it could be moved on to next year.

Greg Scarlatoiu, the executive director of The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), a U.S. human rights organization, told the RFA on the 26th that North Korea should not be overlooked for committing crimes against humanity.

[Greg Scarlatoiu] I understand that there are many special envoys, but when it comes to human rights in North Korea, we need special envoys. A new envoy should have been appointed immediately after January 20, 2017, when former special envoy Robert King stepped down. However, it has been five years and a half since it was vacated.

Executive Director Scarlatoiu, like King, said the appointment of a special human rights envoy to North Korea is not a major issue for the Biden administration.

[Greg Scarlatoiu] Unfortunately, I don't think the appointment of the North Korean envoy has any effect on Biden's approval rating.

The U.S. State Department pays focuses on the influx of intelligence into North Korea…the pivotal role of the special envoy for human rights in North Korea

Meanwhile, officials from human rights groups for North Korea noted that the North Korean authorities added the fact that they enacted the "Law on the Elimination of Reactionary Thought and Culture” in the 2022 human trafficking report released by the State Department.

The report pointed out that, based on the law, North Koreans face a labor-oriented punishment if they consume or distribute videos brought in from South Korea, the United States, and Japan.

He then mentioned a media report in November 2021 about North Korean authorities sentencing six high school students to five years of hard labor for watching Korean dramas.

Suzanne Scholte, head of the North Korean Freedom Coalition, said in the "2022 Human Trafficking Report" on the 19th that the attention to the inflow of information was a positive change not only for North Korea but also for U.S. administration.

[Suzanne Scholte] The State Department's Human Trafficking Report is excellent. I am particularly pleased to add the issue of information inflow. It is true that it has become more difficult to exchange information due to the recent COVID-19 pandemic, as channels for information exchange and communication have been blocked.

She also said that North Korea's enactment of the Reactionary Ideology Culture Disqualification Act can be interpreted as North Korea having difficulty controlling ideas.

[Suzanne Scholte] This suggests that the North Korean authorities are not controlling the minds of the people. North Korea has launched a strict crackdown, especially in recent years.

She stressed that if North Koreans were allowed any freedom of access to information, it could make a big difference.

[Suzanne Scholte] Young people who grew up during the time the marketplace was active, the "Jangmadang Generation," were most influenced by information.

Executive Director Scarlatoiu said the special envoy for human rights to North Korea could play a pivotal role in strengthening the inflow of information into the North.

[Greg Scarlatoiu] The U.S. Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea will certainly play an important role in bringing in information on North Korea. The essence of the Korean Peninsula issue is the North Korean human rights issue. If the special envoy for human rights in North Korea has a good understanding of North Korea and knows what comes first, he will be able to play a very important role in this matter.

King said the U.S. has been passive in North Korean human rights issues and stressed that it should contribute to promoting North Korean human rights through the special envoy.

[Robert King] The U.S. is less involved in the U.N. Human Rights Council. The U.S. must return to its normal form, putting pressure on North Korea's human rights issues I think.

Amid growing concerns about the human rights situation of North Korea due to the COVID-19 pandemic and border blockade, voices are growing that the U.S. administration should appoint a special envoy for human rights in North Korea as soon as possible and take an active stance on resolving the North Korean human rights issue.

Reporter Park Soo Young, editor Park Jungwoo, web team Lee Kyungha

Translated by Courtney Welch, HRNK Research Intern

10. North Korea's triple economic woes stoke fears of 'silent' famine

The only noise will be the sounds made by empty stomachs.

This bears watching. As I have written I fear the conditions could be heading to a worse case than the Arduous March of the famine of 1994-1996 and this time there is no relief valve in sight - No Sunshine Policy and due to the decisions by KJU to crack down on the markets, there will be no market activity to save the people.

We must dust off the contingency plans for internal instability and potential regime collapse.

North Korea's triple economic woes stoke fears of 'silent' famine

COVID curbs and sanctions deepen Pyongyang's isolation from the world

https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/N-Korea-at-crossroads/North-Korea-s-triple-economic-woes-stoke-fears-of-silent-famine

JUNNOSUKE KOBARA, Nikkei staff writer

August 7, 2022 11:00 JST

SEOUL -- With corn and rice prices soaring, North Koreans are struggling to put food on the table, stoking fears of the country's worst famine in decades.

International sanctions, stalled trade with China and coronavirus cases within the country are squeezing the North Korean economy. While Pyongyang is expected to maintain a hard-line stance toward the West, it will likely seek assistance from Beijing and Moscow.

South Korea's government-backed Korea Development Institute warned in a June 30 report that North Korea could fall into a "famine in silence," citing a lack of information coming from inside the country amid the coronavirus pandemic.

The report predicted that any food shortage would disproportionately affect the poor. The price of corn, often consumed by low-income households, was two to four times as high in 2021 and 2022 as in early 2020. The price of rice began climbing in late 2021, roughly doubling from early 2020 in certain months.

Some have raised the possibility that North Korea is facing a worse famine than during the so-called Arduous March famine of the 1990s, given a lack of assistance from South Korea this time around.

Meanwhile, news reports from North Korea seem to be pushing the narrative that the country has overcome the coronavirus pandemic. The official Korean Central News Agency on July 29 published photos of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un embracing veterans at a 69th-anniversary event for the Korean Armistice. No one in the photo wore masks.

North Korea reported nearly 400,000 daily new cases of "fever" during the peak of the outbreak there in May. No new cases have been reported since July 30.

But the official numbers have drawn skepticism. Seventy-four of the 4.77 million fever patients in North Korea have died since late April, according to KCNA. KDI called this an "impossible" number in a July 29 report, predicting that actual deaths may have reached 50,000.

North Korean health officials continue to closely monitor the coronavirus's BA.5 and BA.2.75 subvariants, as well as monkeypox, KCNA reported last week. The authorities appear eager to prevent another lockdown.

Protracted lockdowns will disrupt economic activity at North Korea's local markets and devastate people's lives, KDI said in its June report. Many North Koreans now rely on local markets to make a living as Kim encourages an opening up and reform of the economy.

Markets in Pyongyang were temporarily closed in May, according to the Daily NK. They were back to opening two or three days a week later that month, but a significant number of people went hungry during the shutdown to the point where they could no longer work, the news website reported.

North Korea was already hurting economically before COVID-19. The United Nations Security Council imposed strict sanctions on the country over repeated nuclear and missile tests in 2016 and 2017, resulting in major shortages. Between 2017 and 2021, North Korea's real gross domestic product only grew in 2019, the South's Bank of Korea estimates.

The pandemic only exacerbated North Korea's isolation from the world. Freight train service between North Korea and China, the former's most important trade artery, was suspended in early 2020 in an effort to keep COVID-19 out. Service resumed in early 2022, only to be suspended once again this April in response to the virus's resurgence in China. Bilateral goods trade plunged 89% from 2019 to 2021.

Logistical challenges extend to international aid as well. The World Food Program suspended food assistance to North Korea in March 2021 over the coronavirus and shut down its office in Pyongyang. Representatives from the International Committee of the Red Cross have been unable to enter North Korea for more than two years, and just 15,723 Swiss francs ($16,400 at current rates) made their way to the country in 2021.

Given U.N. and other sanctions, North Korea is expected to seek assistance from Russia and China. It has already asked to resume bilateral trade with China, though the response has been muted as Chinese President Xi Jinping pursues tough restrictions under his zero-COVID policy ahead of his ruling Communist Party's congress this fall. Russia, which itself has been targeted by Western sanctions over its invasion of Ukraine, has been moving closer to North Korea.

Meanwhile, U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi on Thursday visited the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom, a truce village at the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas, the Yonhap News Agency reported. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol told Pelosi in an earlier phone call that her visit would serve as a show of deterrence by the U.S. and South Korea against North Korea.

11. Will North Korea sell its nuclear technology?

Some day perhaps (if they have not already done so). If the price is right. And we need to be concerned with "loose nukes" after regime collapse as well. Note the past collaboration and networks.

Will North Korea sell its nuclear technology?

rapidcityjournal.com · by Daniel Salisbury - King's College London

(The Conversation is an independent and nonprofit source of news, analysis and commentary from academic experts.)

(THE CONVERSATION) Earlier this month CIA Director Mike Pompeo suggested “the North Koreans have a long history of being proliferators and sharing their knowledge, their technology, their capacities around the world.”

My research has shown that North Korea is more than willing to breach sanctions to earn cash.

A checkered history

Over the years North Korea has earned millions of dollars from the export of arms and missiles, and its involvement in other illicit activities such as smuggling drugs, endangered wildlife products and counterfeit goods.

Still, there are only a handful of cases that suggest these illicit networks have been turned to export nuclear technology or materials to other states.

North Korean technicians allegedly assisted the Pakistanis in production of Krytrons, likely sometime in the 1990s. Krytrons are devices used to trigger the detonation of a nuclear device.

Later in the 1990s, North Korea allegedly transferred cylinders of low-enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) to Pakistan, where notorious proliferator A.Q. Khan shipped them onward to Libya. UF6 is a gaseous uranium compound that’s needed to create the “highly enriched uranium” used in weapons.

The most significant case was revealed in 2007 when Israeli Air Force jets bombed a facility in Syria. The U.S. government alleges this was an “undeclared nuclear reactor,” capable of producing plutonium, that had been under construction with North Korean assistance since the late 1990s. A U.S. intelligence briefing shortly after the strike highlighted the close resemblance between the Syrian reactor and the North Korean Yongbyon reactor. It also noted evidence of unspecified “cargo” being transported from North Korea to the site in 2006.

More recently, a 2017 U.N. report alleged that North Korea had been seeking to sell Lithium-6 (Li-6), an isotope used in the production of thermonuclear weapons. The online ad that caught the attention of researchers suggested North Korea could supply 22 pounds of the substance each month from Dandong, a Chinese city on the North Korean border.

There are striking similarities between this latest case and other recent efforts by North Korea to market arms using companies “hidden in plain sight.”

The Li-6 advertisement was allegedly linked to an alias of a North Korean state arms exporter known as “Green Pine Associated Corporation.” Green Pine and associated individuals were hit with a U.N. asset freeze and travel ban in 2012. The individual named on the ad was a North Korean based in Beijing formerly listed as having diplomatic status. As was noted when the Li-6 story broke, the contact details provided with the ad were made up: The street address did not exist and the phone number didn’t work. However, prospective buyers could contact the seller through the online platform.

This case – our most recent data point – raises significant questions. Was this North Korea testing the water for future sales? Does it suggest that North Korea may be willing to sell materials and goods it can produce in surplus? Was the case an anomaly rather than representative of a trend?

A supplier in search of markets?

In the few public statements North Korea has made on the issue, it has generally denied that it will seek to export nuclear technology.

In 2006, for example, a Foreign Ministry official suggested that the country would “strictly prohibit any threat of … nuclear transfer.” The U.N. sanctions regime would also prohibit the export of nuclear technologies – although North Korea has been happy to defy the U.N. regime since its inception that same year.

Additionally, there have been significant developments in states which were customers, or have been rumored to have an interest, in North Korean nuclear technology in the past.

Syria has spent the past six years in a chaotic civil war. Since the 2007 bombing of the reactor, the country has shown no public signs of interest in nuclear weapons.

After giving up its nuclear ambitions in a 2003 deal Libya has seen significant political changes and unrest following the collapse of the Qaddafi regime in 2011.

The 2015 nuclear deal with Iran saw the country agree to limit its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief, and procure nuclear technology through a dedicated channel. If it continues to adhere to the deal, it has no need for illicit nuclear purchases. While some analysts have speculated about nuclear transfers from North Korea to Iran, no public evidence supports this. It’s unclear to what extent the Iran deal will survive the whims of the Trump administration, and what the longer-term implications are for Iran’s program and other states who may seek to acquire nuclear technology as a “hedge” against Iran in the region.

Myanmar, another country with unfounded allegations of past North Korean nuclear collaboration, has undergone significant political change and has made efforts to wean itself off imports of North Korean arms.

In other words, it’s unclear who – if anyone – would buy North Korean nuclear technology. However, the nightmare scenario of North Korea selling it to the highest bidder merits consideration.

It would not be the first time that an illicit procurement network turned to sales. Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan shifted his attention from procurement for Pakistan’s program in the 1970s and 1980s to sales to Iran, Libya and North Korea in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. The efforts of his network saw centrifuge enrichment technology, and even a weapons design, transferred in some of the most damaging transactions ever for the nonproliferation regime.

Following the discovery of the Khan network, the U.N. and others developed better export controls, and capabilities to detect, inspect and interdict shipments. The international community is better prepared; however, many challenges remain in preventing illicit nuclear-related trade.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article here: https://theconversation.com/will-north-korea-sell-its-nuclear-technology-83562.

Licenced as Creative Commons - attribution, no derivatives.

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rapidcityjournal.com · by Daniel Salisbury - King's College London

12. Ukraine Situation Report: Army Of North Korean ‘Volunteers’ Said To Be Ready To Help Russia

It will be a real problem for the regime when the Ukrainian military beats up on them. This is a potential significant influence opportunity for the ROK/US alliance. north Korean losses and and failure in Ukraine will be very useful.

Ukraine Situation Report: Army Of North Korean ‘Volunteers’ Said To Be Ready To Help Russia

Russian state TV floats a report that 100,000 North Koreans could backfill mounting losses and rebuild occupied territory.

STETSON PAYNE

AUG 6, 2022 7:05 PM

thedrive.com · by Stetson Payne · August 6, 2022

A Russian talk show host claimed that 100,000 North Korean “volunteers” are ready to assist in Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine.

Russia Channel One talk show host Igor Korotchenko suggested Russia welcome the North Koreans’ help not only on the frontlines but also as workers. Pyongyang confirmed a plan to send laborers to rebuild occupied Ukraine, according to a report from NK News.

Estimates of Russian losses since the invasion began on February 24 vary, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky claiming in a late-July speech some 40,000 Russians had died. By comparison, U.S. and British estimates put the number of dead near 15,000, with two to three times that wounded in the fighting, according to a report from The Economist.

This isn’t Pyongyang’s first move in backing Russia in its war with Ukraine. North Korea recognized the Russian-backed separatist governments in Donetsk and Luhansk in July, which led to Ukraine breaking off diplomatic relations with the Kim Regime.

The possibility of inserting North Korean troops into the war in Ukraine sounds bizarre, but considering Russia's losses, it may not be too unthinkable. At the very least, North Korean workers could flood into Russian-held territory in Ukraine to support the invasion and occupation efforts, especially in the form of cheap manual labor. North Korea exports its labor force around the world as a way to gain hard currency. (KCNA photo)

Just how effective North Korean troops, workers, or whatever you want to call them, would be on the frontlines in Ukraine isn’t clear. What the Korean People’s Army (KPA) lacks in technology it makes up for in size and firepower, two things Russia could well put to use in a drawn-out war of attrition in Ukraine. They are also, in many instances, accustomed to working in relatively horrible conditions with minimal rights or resources, which makes deploying them to a war zone likely attractive to Moscow.

The idea that an army of North Koreans could end up in Ukraine on Russia's behalf is just another reminder of just how bizarre this conflict has become.

Before heading into today’s latest news from Ukraine, The War Zone readers can get caught up with our previous rolling coverage here.

The Latest

Today’s intelligence update from the British Ministry of Defense noted that Russian forces are redeploying from the Donbas toward the Kherson frontline.

Whether those forces are meant for an offensive on the southern front after months of near-stalemate in the east or to shore up defenses in the face of an ongoing Ukrainian counterattack remains unclear.

That said, the situation at the Zaphorizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant near the Dnieper River city of Enerhodar continues to deteriorate as concerns about the plant being damaged in the fighting grow. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi told the BBC he was "extremely concerned" by reports of shelling at the plant, with the Ukrainian government claims parts of the facility suffered serious damage in Russian strikes aimed at cutting off its ability to distribute power. There have also been reports of the plant being mined and weapons, as well as other volatile materiel, sitting very near sensitive nuclear infrastructure. In addition, Ukrainska Pravda reported on Saturday that Russian occupiers damaged the nitrogen-oxygen unit and an auxiliary building, raising the risk of radioactive leak and fire at the plant.

We wrote about the incredible footage from the war's early days, when the world watched a live stream of Russia's nighttime assault on the complex. Russia has since been accused of turning the nuclear plant into a firebase, using the risk of disaster to deter retaliatory Ukrainian attacks. The European Union has condemned Russian activities at the plant and called for renewed IAEA access.

You can read our past reporting on the precarious state of the plant, the largest in Europe, here, but needless to say, the crisis is getting worse based on today's reports.

We have a new up-close image of one of the radar decoy barges positioned near the Kerch Bridge that connects Crimea and mainland Russia. We wrote about the Russian effort to move countermeasures near the strategic link between Crimea and Russia in early July, which you can read about here. Smaller radar decoys have been set up near two critical bridges over the Dnieper River near Kherson, as well.

This week’s rumor mill on North Macedonian Su-25s being sent to Ukraine appears to be true after confirmation from a Ukrainian presidential adviser on Saturday. We wrote about the potential transfer and the Macedonian Frogfoots' peculiar absence from their storage area, which you can read about here.

Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to President Zelensky, tweeted veiled thanks to North Macedonia for “substituting a Ukrainian shoulder in the form of tanks and planes.” North Macedonia previously provided T-72s from its only tank unit to Ukraine.

Podolyak further said nations like North Macedonia “are showing more courage today than half of the G20.” Ukrainian Su-25s remain in the fight, with regular videos appearing of the attack jets flying at low altitudes and employing munitions.

Speaking of military aid to Ukraine, the next U.S. package could exceed $1 billion and include both GMLRS rockets for the M142 HIMARS and missiles for the NASAMS surface-to-air missile system, according to a report from Reuters. The package would reportedly further include 50 medical variants of the M113 armored personnel carrier.

HIMARS’ impact on the battlefield has gained cult status with strikes on high-value Russian targets. The U.S. recently began NASAMS procurement for Ukraine, with the delivery date still unknown.

We also got cool low-level footage of Ukrainian Mi-24 Hinds skimming the fields near the frontline, just try to fight the urge to duck your head in the first few seconds.

There's also a disturbing video from the front showing a Russian soldier on a suicide mission to destroy an anti-tank mine with a dump truck. The soldier screams "Honor to Russia" and drives right into the mine with predictable results.

Lastly, there’s an alarming report from Sofia Santos (@Gralhix) and Benjamin Pittet (@COUPSURE) for the Center for Information Resilience documenting the forced resettlement of Ukrainian refugees in Russia. The report goes into stunning detail of how Russia is handling those its war has displaced, from the point of capture through “filtration” and an uncertain future in a hostile country, and it’s well worth your read.

We will continue to update this story until we state otherwise.

Contact the author: stetson.payne@thewarzone.com

thedrive.com · by Stetson Payne · August 6, 2022

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

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Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

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FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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