Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“In our age there is no such thing as ‘keeping out of politics.’ All issues are political issues….” 
- George Orwell

“On the question of the machinery of government, we have seen that a good deal of our trouble seems to have stemmed from the extent to which the executive has felt itself beholden to the short-term trends of public opinion in the country and from what we might call the erratic and subjective nature of public reaction to foreign-policy questions. I would like to emphasize that I do not consider public reaction to foreign-policy questions to be erratic and undependable over the long term; but I think the record indicates that in the short term our public opinion, or what passes for public opinion in the thinking of official Washington, can be easily led astray into areas of emotionalism and subjectivity which make a poor and inadequate guide for national action.”
- George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy

"In a revolution, as in a novel. the most difficult part to invent is the end."
- de Tocqueville



1.  North Korea Appears to Have Restarted Yongbyon Nuclear Reactor
2. Yongbyon nuclear reactor appears to be in operation: IAEA report
3. Korea, US and Afghan withdrawal
4. Opinion | Engage North Korea, but hold it accountable
5. 'Don't mention 3Ts': Confucius Institutes endanger academic freedom in Korea
6. Rumors suggest Kim Jong Un may have gotten vaccinated against COVID-19 back in May
7. N.Korea Sends Young Elite into Internal Exile
8. Like It or Not, the South Korea-US Alliance Is Changing
9. N. Korea denounces S. Korea, U.S. over joint military drill, vows to strengthen war deterrence
10. IAEA report puts pressure on Seoul's bid to restart peace initiative
11. Shut the Yongbyon facility
12. Brokering US-North Korea dialogue: Breaking away from 'you first' attitudes
13. Apology from intelligence chief (South Korea)
14. Kim Jong Un vows to be prepared for dialogue, confrontation with US
15. North Korea stresses close relations with Cuba on 61st anniversary of diplomatic ties





1. North Korea Appears to Have Restarted Yongbyon Nuclear Reactor
I think we have to assess the words and actions of the regime over the past few months in the context of its overall strategy.  The regime has been trying to shape the information and political environment to be able to get sanctions relief which is his number one near term objective. Kim may believe he has just put a "new" (or old) "bargaining chip" in play which is to halt activity at Yongbyon. He may offer to halt activity in return for sanctions relief or at least partial sanctions relief.

Kim may assess that the Biden administration needs some kind of foreign policy success and may really want to show progress on north Korea. That makes Kim think he can continue execution of his political warfare strategy and this will lead to the administration giving concessions in return for a promise to negotiate.

And if Kim receives any kind of concession on sanctions, he will assess his political warfare strategy as successful and he will double down on it, to include continued blackmail diplomacy (the use of increased thentions, threats, and provocations to gain political and economic concessions.)

North Korea Appears to Have Restarted Yongbyon Nuclear Reactor
Inspectors cite evidence of resumed operations at the plutonium-producing plant, which had been shut down since 2018
WSJ · by Michael R. Gordon and Laurence Norman
“Since early July, there have been indications, including the discharge of cooling water, consistent with the operation of the reactor,” said the report by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The Yongbyon reactor appeared to have been inactive from December 2018 until the beginning of July 2021, the report noted. It added that signs that the reactor is now being operated coincides with indications that North Korea is also using a nearby laboratory to separate plutonium from spent fuel previously removed from the reactor.
The agency, whose inspectors were kicked out of North Korea in 2009, described the twin developments as “deeply troubling” and a clear violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions.
The North Korean Mission to the United Nations didn’t respond to a request for comment. Biden administration officials didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.
“It appears to indicate North Korea has resumed producing plutonium for its nuclear weapons program,” said Gary Samore, director of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University.
“While North Korea already has a significant stockpile of nuclear weapons, this suggests it is moving to expand its current arsenal,” added Mr. Samore, a former National Security Council expert on weapons of mass destruction.
The Biden administration has said that it is prepared to engage in talks with Pyongyang over its nuclear weapons program, but North Korea hasn’t taken Washington up on its offer.
In explaining its approach, the White House has said it is pursuing a “calibrated” strategy that would attempt to steer a middle course between former President Trump’s top-level summitry and the Obama administration’s patient stance.
“ ‘The activities at Yongbyon shows that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program ... needs to be a higher priority for the Biden administration’ ”
— Joel Wit, a fellow at the Stimson Center
Former officials have said, however, that pursuing talks with North Korea has been a less urgent matter for President Biden than seeking a way to revive the Iran nuclear deal, dealing with the fallout over leaving Afghanistan and continuing arms control discussions with Russia.
“The activities at Yongbyon shows that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program can’t be ignored and needs to be a higher priority for the Biden administration,” said Joel Wit, a former State Department official, now a fellow at the Stimson Center, a Washington think tank.
Siegfried Hecker, former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and an expert on North Korea’s nuclear program, has estimated that the country may have 20 to 60 nuclear weapons using plutonium and highly enriched uranium.
During then-President Donald Trump’s 2019 meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Hanoi, the North Korean side offered to shut its Yongbyon complex, encompassing the reactor and other facilities, in return for major sanctions relief. The Trump administration rejected that offer as insufficient.
“The recent inactivity of key facilities at Yongbyon seems related to Kim Jong Un’s offer at the Hanoi summit to shut down Yongbyon,” said Robert Einhorn, a former senior State Department official who negotiated with North Korea. “Resumed operations at the reactor and reprocessing facility may be an indication that he sees little prospect of a nuclear deal.”
In June, IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi said the agency was seeing indications of possible reprocessing work to separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. However at the time, there was no indication that the reactor plant at Yongbyon was operating.
In January, North Korea’s leader laid out a plan to modernize its nuclear technology, including developing miniaturized nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered submarines.
He is facing growing troubles at home, acknowledging food shortages over the summer for the country, which faces tight international sanctions and closed its borders last year to stymie the spread of coronavirus.
The Biden administration’s North Korean envoy said Monday, during a trip to South Korea, that he was ready to meet North Korean counterparts at any time and stressed that Washington doesn’t have any “hostile intention” toward Pyongyang.
Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com and Laurence Norman at laurence.norman@wsj.com
WSJ · by Michael R. Gordon and Laurence Norman


2. Yongbyon nuclear reactor appears to be in operation: IAEA report

Excerpts:
"The five-month timeframe is consistent with the time required to reprocess a complete core of irradiated fuel from the 5MW(e) reactor," it added.
The report stressed that the North's nuclear activities remain a "cause for serious concern."
"Furthermore, the new indications of the operation of the 5MW(e) reactor and the Radiochemical Laboratory are deeply troubling," the report said.


(2nd LD) Yongbyon nuclear reactor appears to be in operation: IAEA report | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · August 30, 2021
(ATTN: ADDS foreign ministry's response in para 11)
By Song Sang-ho
SEOUL, Aug. 30 (Yonhap) -- The U.N. nuclear watchdog has detected "deeply troubling" indications that a key nuclear reactor at North Korea's main Yongbyon complex has been in operation since July, including the release of cooling water, an annual report showed Monday.
Submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors on Friday, the report covered new developments of the five megawatt reactor, from which the North obtained spent fuel rods to extract plutonium -- a fissile material used for a bomb -- in the past.
The report based on satellite imagery and other sources came as Seoul and Washington push to resume dialogue with the North, following its furious reactions to the allies' recently concluded annual military exercises.
"Since early July 2021, there have been indications, including the discharge of cooling water, consistent with the operation of the reactor," the report reads, noting there were no indications of such a reactor operation from early December 2018 to the start of July this year.
The report also said that the steam plant, which serves the radiochemical laboratory at the Yongbyon complex, operated for approximately five months, from mid-February 2021 until early July 2021. The plant is used to provide heat to a fuel rod reprocessing facility
"The duration of the operation of the steam plant and Radiochemical Laboratory in 2021 is significantly longer than that observed in the past during possible waste treatment or maintenance activities," the report said.
"The five-month timeframe is consistent with the time required to reprocess a complete core of irradiated fuel from the 5MW(e) reactor," it added.
The report stressed that the North's nuclear activities remain a "cause for serious concern."
"Furthermore, the new indications of the operation of the 5MW(e) reactor and the Radiochemical Laboratory are deeply troubling," the report said.
"The continuation of the DPRK's nuclear programme is a clear violation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and is deeply regrettable," it added, referring to the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Regarding the report, the foreign ministry said the government is continuously monitoring the North's nuclear and missile activities in close cooperation with the United States.
The latest development came after the North responded angrily to the South Korea-U.S. exercise, calling it the "most vivid expression of the U.S. hostile policy" toward the North and warning of a "serious security crisis."
Apparently to allay the North's anger, the U.S. special representative for the North, Sung Kim, said during his trip here last week that Washington does not have a hostile intent toward the North, renewing his offer to "meet with my North Korean counterparts anywhere, at anytime."
During their talks, Kim and his South Korean counterpart, Noh Kyu-duk, discussed various areas of humanitarian assistance to the North, such as health care, to encourage the North's return to dialogue.
Over the weekend, Noh flew to Washington for talks with officials from the State Department and the White House National Security Council.

sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · August 30, 2021


3.  Korea, US and Afghan withdrawal

An interesting perspective from a U Sprofessor teaching in Korea.

I disagree with some of his analysis (security lapses and the idea that we are only in Korea to protect Japan). But I agree with the four concluding paragraphs here. It is a strategic weakness when the US wants something more than its alliance partner.

Still, there is an important lesson to be learned from the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. According to a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Korea, the lesson has to do with the attitude of the Korean people: "If South Korea has no will to fight, then the U.S. cannot help her." No truer words may have been spoken.

The U.S. has no plans to abandon South Korea, but this does not mean Koreans can be complacent. If Koreans want a transfer of military operational control, then they must meet the high standards set by the U.S. military, and they must avoid blatant, embarrassing security lapses.

South Korea must enhance its strategic value in regional and global affairs, by continuing support for multi-national security missions abroad. The South Korean military must continue to increase and improve its operational readiness and capacity through hardware acquisition and joint training with U.S. forces.

It is through actions and deeds amassed by working together in harmony and trust that will maintain and strengthen the U.S.-South Korea alliance. It has been this way for more than 70 years. The U.S. failure in Afghanistan does not change that.




Korea, US and Afghan withdrawal
The Korea Times · August 29, 2021
By Sean O'Malley
In the wake of the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan, voices of concern are rising in South Korea. There is speculation that the United States may abandon its alliance commitment. The corollary between a U.S. troop withdrawal in Afghanistan and a withdrawal in South Korea is weak.

The precedent has not been set. The U.S. will not abandon South Korea. That is a prediction of course, but those who fail to learn their history fail to see the forest for the trees.

Critics of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan should recognize that it was inevitable. The nation-building effort there was always going to fail. Nation-building requires two fundamental aspects to succeed: an indigenous consensus for change and effective governance. Afghanistan had neither.

For two decades, the Taliban and other elites undermined political reconciliation and consensus. The collapse of the Afghan military and police forces, as well as the well-documented corruption of the Afghan government, are clear indicators that Afghan governance was an illusion. Great powers cannot overcome such obstacles in the face of a determined indigenous commitment to independence.

The U.S. followed the failures of other great powers in Afghanistan because once again "Americans were blind to evidence of mankind's capacity all over the world to generate indigenous chaos without regard to global powers."

Those poignant words were written in 1975, in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam, another failed nation-building effort. The writer though was reflecting on the U.S. commitment to help South Korea in its war with the North, 25 years earlier.
Those claiming the U.S. simply needed more time to force change on Afghanistan have failed to learn their history. The mission and goals in Afghanistan had grown muddied over time. This is not the case in the U.S.-Korea relationship.

The goal of U.S. forces in South Korea is clear. "The objective, beyond maintaining the independence of South Korea, is the security of neighboring Japan." In addition, with a rising China and a resurgent Russia, U.S. strategic fundamentals have not changed: the "strategy is global but contains fixed priorities … the defense of Western Europe and the security of Japan."

If such quotes seem like mere rhetoric, then think again. They were also written in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam, some 46 years ago.
The U.S. alliance commitment to South Korea has evolved since then, but it has not wavered. For decades, South Korea has enjoyed a bilateral consensus in Washington that it is an important ally. It has powerful friends throughout U.S. government institutions. The U.S. remains in large part because its friendship with the South Korean people is stronger than the occasional ranting of inexperienced presidents.

The U.S. defense establishment blocked President Carter's desire for troop withdrawal from South Korea in the late 1970s. The U.S. Congress blocked Donald Trump's threat of troop withdrawal with a new law that stripped the U.S. president of his unilateral decision-making power in regards to cutting the number of U.S. forces stationed on the peninsula.

Still, politics of the U.S.-Korea alliance has its challenges. Certain political elites, especially from progressive political circles in South Korea, would like U.S. forces to leave. Anyone with serious political ambitions does not state this openly of course.

It is much better to float such an idea at a private institute in Washington or New York via proxy to maintain political deniability. An open declaration for troop withdrawal would be political suicide, as many Koreans want U.S. forces to stay, albeit grudgingly for some.

Actually, the U.S. overlooks a number of factors that seemingly harm its presence in South Korea. Relatively recent security lapses include failing to detect a North Korean crossing the demilitarized zone and failing to detect a North Korean boat sailing for days in South Korean waters and then docking in the South.

In addition, the Moon Jae-in administration has been reluctant to allow more permanent provision for the U.S.-operated THAAD anti-missile battery in Seongju, North Gyeongsang Province.

Of course, political ambivalence and security lapses can be overlooked, in light of an overwhelming strategic value to the national interest of the U.S. The fact is that a military alliance is a partnership. Both sides must see value in the relationship. For more than 70 years, the U.S. has been a good partner for South Korea and South Korea has been a good partner for the U.S.

Still, there is an important lesson to be learned from the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. According to a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Korea, the lesson has to do with the attitude of the Korean people: "If South Korea has no will to fight, then the U.S. cannot help her." No truer words may have been spoken.

The U.S. has no plans to abandon South Korea, but this does not mean Koreans can be complacent. If Koreans want a transfer of military operational control, then they must meet the high standards set by the U.S. military, and they must avoid blatant, embarrassing security lapses.

South Korea must enhance its strategic value in regional and global affairs, by continuing support for multi-national security missions abroad. The South Korean military must continue to increase and improve its operational readiness and capacity through hardware acquisition and joint training with U.S. forces.

It is through actions and deeds amassed by working together in harmony and trust that will maintain and strengthen the U.S.-South Korea alliance. It has been this way for more than 70 years. The U.S. failure in Afghanistan does not change that.

Sean O'Malley (seanmo@dongseo.ac.kr) is a professor of international studies at Dongseo University, where he teaches classes on U.S.-Korea Relations and South Asia. He has published numerous papers on security and regional issues important to South Korea. His most recent publication is "Assessing Threats to South Korea's Undersea Communications Cable Infrastructure" in the Korean Journal of International Studies.


The Korea Times · August 29, 2021

4. Opinion | Engage North Korea, but hold it accountable

As much as I would like to have large-scale people to people engagement in the north, the Kim family regime does not make that possible and all Americans traveling to north Korea are at risk.


Opinion | Engage North Korea, but hold it accountable
The Washington Post · by Today at 5:52 p.m. EDT · August 29, 2021
Regarding the Aug. 26 news article “End sought for N. Korea travel ban”:
Any lifting of the U.S. travel ban on North Korea must go with assurances that Americans who travel to North Korea to meet family members, do business, cover news stories, teach and provide humanitarian aid will not be subject to intimidation, arrests, and harsh and prolonged sentencing on unacceptable grounds, influenced by the political climate. Between 2009 and 2019, North Korea detained 16 Americans without due process, many of whose releases had to be negotiated by senior U.S. officials or prominent former officials, including two presidents — as if they were political hostages.
American travelers must also be confident that if they are detained they will receive regular visits from the protecting power for the United States in North Korea, Sweden, which has not always been the case. North Korea moreover owes an honest accounting to the United States about what happened to American student Otto Warmbier, who was returned in a coma, and it owes compensation to his family for his brutal treatment.
Though engagement between Americans and North Koreans should be encouraged to help normalize relations and facilitate humanitarian aid, the United States must insist on the security of its citizens in accordance with long-held international norms and practices.
Roberta Cohen, Washington
The writer is co-chair emeritus
of the Committee for Human Rights
in North Korea.
The Washington Post · by Today at 5:52 p.m. EDT · August 29, 2021


5. 'Don't mention 3Ts': Confucius Institutes endanger academic freedom in Korea

Ah the 3T's. Here they are:

Zhang testified that CI teachers are trained either to refuse to answer or to change the conversation topic, in the event that students ask them questions about the so-called "3Ts" ― namely Taiwan, Tibet and Tiananmen Square, where the Chinese government brutally suppressed pro-democracy protesters in 1989 ― three touchy issues that pit China against the rest of the world. Zhang took the CI's discriminatory employment and censorship practices to the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, which led to McMaster University closing the CI on its campus.

'Don't mention 3Ts': Confucius Institutes endanger academic freedom in Korea
The Korea Times · August 30, 2021
Confucius (551-479 BCE), a Chinese philosopher and politician / gettyimagesbank

Heavily dependent on tuition-paying Chinese students, Korean universities turning blind eye to controversies surrounding Chinese government-funded culture and language centers

This article is the second in a three-part series to highlight growing anti-China sentiment in Korea and the current state of relations between the two countries. ― ED
By Kang Hyun-kyung

With sweat on their faces due to the summer heat and poor air conditioning, some 100 people, gathered at Gwangin Central Church in the southeastern city of Daegu on Aug. 6, were intently watching the documentary titled, "In the Name of Confucius."

Directed by Chinese Canadian filmmaker Doris Liu, the 2017 documentary revolves around Sonia Zhang, a former Confucius Institute (CI) teacher at McMaster University in Canada, who was unable to keep her job after her affiliation with the Falun Gong was revealed.

Zhang testified that CI teachers are trained either to refuse to answer or to change the conversation topic, in the event that students ask them questions about the so-called "3Ts" ― namely Taiwan, Tibet and Tiananmen Square, where the Chinese government brutally suppressed pro-democracy protesters in 1989 ― three touchy issues that pit China against the rest of the world. Zhang took the CI's discriminatory employment and censorship practices to the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, which led to McMaster University closing the CI on its campus.

The film gives audiences in Korea a rare opportunity to learn about CIs and how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has flexed its muscles behind the scenes in order to use these government-funded culture and language centers to disseminate their ideas selectively and in a politicized manner according to their own biases and preferences.

Since the documentary premiered in a local theater in Seoul this May, a local civic group, the Citizens for Unveiling Confucius Institutes (CUCI), has organized screenings of the film to inform Koreans about the CIs and their alleged attempts to indoctrinate students in Korea and around the world.

The film has been screened in churches, conference halls and other non-theater settings in several different cities, whenever and wherever the civic group gets requests.

Unlike in Western countries, the anti-CI campaign has not drawn much attention from the Korean public.

"There are various reasons why our campaign has yet to take off," CUCI founder and president Han Min-ho told The Korea Times. "First and foremost, lawmakers have turned a deaf ear to our repeated calls to look into the CCP-backed institutions. The generous funding from China has also silenced cash-strapped universities. Being heavily dependent on tuition-paying students from China, the universities are discouraged from confronting the institutes because any possible actions could stir up Chinese students on their campuses."

If universities here close the CIs on their campuses, Han went on to say that the Chinese students there won't sit back, as the nation has already seen how "patriotic" Chinese students reacted to pro-Hong Kong rallies and other issues that incite nationalist sentiment in China.

Activists of the Citizens for Unveiling Confucius Institutes (CUCI) hold a press conference demanding the closure of Confucius Institutes in front of the Chinese Embassy in Seoul in this June 2 file photo. They claimed the Chinese government-funded cultural and language centers are a propaganda arm of the Chinese Communist Party. Courtesy of CUCIAccording to the Korean Educational Development Institute, over 71,000 Chinese students were studying in undergraduate and graduate institutions in Korea as of 2019, which accounted for 44 percent of all international students here. Across the nation, 365 universities and colleges have Chinese students, and 17 of them have 1,000 or more studying on their campuses.

Korea was the first country to host a CI in southern Seoul in 2004. Since then, 22 universities have signed contracts to establish CIs on their campuses.
The risks posed by CIs drew brief media attention last year during a National Assembly inspection of the Ministry of Education, when Rep. Chung Kyung-hee of the conservative main opposition People Power Party expressed her worries about the Chinese government-funded language centers.

Chung claimed that CIs are in fact a propaganda arm of the CCP to infiltrate South Korean universities, adding that the institutes ironically do not offer any actual teachings of Confucius. The lawmaker expressed her concerns about distortions of history, stating that at CIs, the Korean War is portrayed as "the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea."

In response, the Ministry of Education vowed to team up with the Northeast Asia Foundation to conduct joint research into the controversies surrounding CIs.

This reporter checked with the Ministry of Education on Thursday if there had been any progress made during the past 10 months in their joint research activities. An official said on condition of anonymity that they have been monitoring foreign media coverage for any controversies or threats posed by the institutes. Asked when a final report or any other product of their joint research would be released, the official said that at the moment, they have no plans to produce any reports or research papers, reiterating that they will keep an eye on any overseas cases.

Terry Russell, a professor of Asian Studies at the University of Manitoba in Canada, said that there are risks to having a CI on campus.

"The main risks associated with having a CI on campus have to do with the influence and propaganda function of the CIs," he said in an email interview with The Korea Times. "The CI staff recruited in China are charged with presenting a positive image of the People's Republic of China to students and to the university community as a whole. The messaging reflects the official Chinese Communist Party narrative of Chinese culture, history and current affairs."

Russell said that having CIs on campus could undermine academic freedom. "It very pointedly excludes information critical of the CCP and its policies in Tibet, Xinjiang and Hong Kong, and must represent the official line on the true situation in Taiwan, Chinese border regions and internationally," he said. "In short, the CIs are designed to present the CCP's version of reality, and they are not a space where informed debate on important issues can take place."

Korean universities' "lenient and cozy" relationships with CIs stand in stark contrast with how universities in the West have reacted to the CI controversies. An increasing number of universities in the United States, Canada and Australia have been closing CIs on their campuses. The number of CIs in the United States, for example, has dropped to 47 in May 2021, from 103 in 2017.

Reasons for these closures of CIs vary. McMaster University in Canada, for example, severed ties with the Chinese cultural and language center for its discriminatory hiring practices, in which staff must sign agreements that they will not practice certain beliefs. Other universities decided to terminate contracts with CIs over pressure to censor the universities on topics the CCP objects to, concerns over the CIs repressing academic freedom and other problematic influences.

Russell said that the U.S., Canadian and Australian universities did the right thing by closing the CIs on their campuses. "I believe that it is absolutely the right decision for Canadian, Australian and American universities to close the CIs on their campuses," he said. "I would encourage all universities around the world with existing CIs to consider closing them."

Han Min-ho, founder and president of the civic group Citizens for Unveiling Confucius Institutes (CUCI), stages a one-man rally in front of a Confucius Institute in southern Seoul in July. It was the first Confucius Institute established in 2004 outside China. Courtesy of CUCIThe transparency of funding for CIs is another source of concern for Western universities, although this issue has been less widely reported.

David Shambaugh, an award-winning author and professor of Asian Studies at George Washington University, addressed the illegal nature of funds that universities receive when they open CIs on their campuses.

"(F)oreign universities are typically approached by the Education Counselor of the local Chinese embassy offering 'no strings attached' funds to establish a Confucius Institute. The Recipient is told that the funding comes from the Ministry of Education, but it is in fact laundered through the MOE from the Chinese Communist Party's Propaganda Department's External Propaganda Department," he said in his book, "China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy."

Universities receive $100,000 or more up in startup costs provided by the Chinese International Education Foundation, formerly known as Hanban, with annual payments of another $100,000. Teachers and textbooks are provided by the same organization, along with various paid trips and exchange programs.

Having CIs on campus paves the way for Chinese interference in universities' key decisions. After North Carolina State University scheduled a 2009 visit by the Dalai Lama, Provost Warwick Arden received a stern warning from Bailian Li, a forestry professor and the then-director of the CI on its campus, that the visit by the Tibetan spiritual leader could disrupt "some of the strong relationships we were developing with China." The visit was canceled. Arden was quoted as saying that the CI presents an opportunity "for subtle pressure and conflict."

The late American cultural anthropologist, Marshall Sahlins, called CIs "academic malware."

Canada's intelligence agency CSIS, in its annual report for 2020, "The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians," warned of espionage as another threat of academic exchange programs with China.

Citing China's talent programs and academic exchange programs, the intelligence agency said these programs were used to exploit Canadian expertise in the areas of science and technology. "(China's) Thousand Talents Program, established in 2008 to encourage Chinese scientists abroad to bring their research to China, is currently under investigation by the U.S. Justice Department," it reads.

This reporter contacted the directors of the CIs on three university campuses in Korea via email to ask for their positions on the controversies surrounding the China-funded institutions. Two of them didn't respond and one wrote back saying that he would be willing to speak but later changed his mind without answering this reporter's questions.

The Korea Times · August 30, 2021

6. Rumors suggest Kim Jong Un may have gotten vaccinated against COVID-19 back in May

RUMINT that seems closer to speculation.

Excerpts:
North Korean cadres believe it highly likely Kim was vaccinated at this time. There are even rumors that about 100 people have been vaccinated, including high-ranking cadres who meet with Kim in person.
However, some people believe Kim was not the first person in North Korea to be vaccinated. Given the nature of the North Korean system – which puts the safety of the country’s “supreme leader” first – it is very likely the authorities carried out a test vaccination to determine any side effects before administering a dose to Kim.
The buried lede - vaccinated to return to diplomacy? Has Kim been preparing the information environment to make a demand for concessions in return for a promise to negotiate?

Meanwhile, some North Koreans claim Kim got vaccinated despite the side effects because, among other reasons, he wanted to overcome the country’s economic difficulties “through diplomatic action” in the second half of this year.

Rumors suggest Kim Jong Un may have gotten vaccinated against COVID-19 back in May - Daily NK
Kim made no public appearances for about a month between May 6 and June 4
By Seulkee Jang - 2021.08.30 2:20pm
dailynk.com · August 30, 2021
Rumors are circulating among North Korean cadres that the country’s leader, Kim Jong Un, was vaccinated against COVID-19 in May.
According to a Daily NK source on Thursday, the rumors are relatively detailed. Namely, they say that Kim was vaccinated at a villa located away from Pyongyang more than three months ago.
Kim made an unplanned disappearance when he experienced high fever and nausea after the vaccination, according to some of the rumors.
In fact, Kim made no public appearances for about a month between May 6, when he attended an arts performance for military families, and June 4, when he chaired a Central Committee politburo meeting.
North Korean cadres believe it highly likely Kim was vaccinated at this time. There are even rumors that about 100 people have been vaccinated, including high-ranking cadres who meet with Kim in person.
However, some people believe Kim was not the first person in North Korea to be vaccinated. Given the nature of the North Korean system – which puts the safety of the country’s “supreme leader” first – it is very likely the authorities carried out a test vaccination to determine any side effects before administering a dose to Kim.
Earlier this year, the Chinese government provided Sinopharm and other vaccines at the request of the North Korean authorities, so it appears North Korean trading company officials and foreign ministry cadres were vaccinated first.
Kim Jong Un at the leadership podium during the Party Foundation Day military parade in Pyongyang on Oct. 10, 2020. / Image: KCNA
Meanwhile, some North Koreans claim Kim got vaccinated despite the side effects because, among other reasons, he wanted to overcome the country’s economic difficulties “through diplomatic action” in the second half of this year.
According to another source in North Korea, North Korean authorities hope to arrange a meeting between Kim and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in the latter half of the year. And if the conditions are right, the authorities reportedly believe Kim could engage in dialogue with the United States as well.
The source explained that North Korea holds in its hands two diplomatic strategies — one toward the United States and the other toward China – and the country will move forward with these strategies depending on the situation.
That is to say, North Korean authorities believe if the United States generates a “friendly atmosphere” towards North Korea and creates an opportunity for the North to engage in dialogue, Pyongyang is ready to sit down with Washington. But they also believe that if such conditions do not materialize, receiving direct aid through China is not a bad strategy, either.
Speaking on condition of anonymity, one North Korea expert told Daily NK that China is currently focusing on successfully hosting next year’s summer Olympics, and that “there is little to be gained from meeting North Korea.”
According to this expert, “for the United States, however, managing North Korea has grown in importance after the Afghanistan business, and North Korea ultimately wants to negotiate with the United States, too.
“Given this, the possibility that North Korea and the United States will contact each other is more likely,” he added.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
dailynk.com · August 30, 2021


7. N.Korea Sends Young Elite into Internal Exile

This could have some blowback for Kim Jong-un. Perhaps it will be the youth that eventually takes collective action.

While Kim assesses the youth as weak for their lack of ideological purity; perhaps we should view them as strong for having beliefs beyond the ruling Kimfamily regime's ideology.

N.Korea Sends Young Elite into Internal Exile
August 30, 2021 12:55
The North Korean regime has been sending elite young Workers Party functionaries into internal exile at remote construction sites to shore up crumbling discipline.
The practice is being presented as "volunteering," but it appears they are not given a choice.
One senior defector said, "One of the biggest problems leader Kim Jong-un faces is young people who have been influenced by South Korean culture and angry about the economic crisis. The aim appears to be to neutralize them so they can't foment internal dissent."
Young North Koreans celebrate Youth Day in Pyongyang on Aug. 28, in this photo from the [North] Korean Central News Agency.
The official Rodong Sinmun daily on Sunday published a statement from Kim to mark Youth Day the previous day. "What makes me especially happy is to see young people who have been left behind make the magnificent decision to sacrifice themselves for their country and start fresh by moving on to difficult and demanding areas," he said.
He attributed the "weakness" of young North Koreans to the "stubborn ideological and cultural infiltration schemes of the imperialists."
The victims gathered in Pyongyang to hold what was billed as a "debate" last week. They included a graduate from Sariwon Teachers College who "volunteered" to teach in a school in a remote outpost, a youth guidance official from Nampo who "chose" to work on a cooperative farm, and a high-end store worker in Pyongyang who "opted" to work on a ranch in Kangwon Province.
The echoes of the massive reeducation efforts of China's Cultural Revolution or Cambodia's Khmer Rouge are unmissable.
One intelligence official here said, "Many young North Koreans are essentially being sent to labor camps."


8. Like It or Not, the South Korea-US Alliance Is Changing

I do not agree with Capt Yoon here. I have not heard anyone say that the Biden administration wants the Moon administration to abandon its "peace-oriented policy." Second, while it would be nice for Korea to be engaged in operations out of the Korean theater I think we have to recognize that as long as north Korea poses an existential threat to the South, the number one priority must be to sustain a deterrence and defense capability on the peninsula. This could be weakened if too many ROK forces are engaged out of theater.

There are deep diplomatic differences between President Joe Biden of the United States and President Moon Jae-in of South Korea. Biden wants Moon to abandon his peace-oriented policy toward North Korea, but Moon insists on continuing to try, despite the underwhelming results so far achieved. Can the next president of South Korea make any better progress?
Another point of contention between Seoul and Washington is Biden’s desire for the South Korean military to take a more active role in the wider region, in particular by participating in various U.S.-led multilateral military exercises. The incoming South Korean president will need to finesse this issue carefully if relations with China are to remain cordial.

Like It or Not, the South Korea-US Alliance Is Changing
The ROK-U.S. alliance is at a time of transition, and a lot of changes will be required to maintain the strength and effectiveness of the alliance into the future.
thediplomat.com · by Sukjoon Yoon · August 27, 2021
Advertisement
Early next year, the next president of South Korea will be sworn in. The new president – whoever that will be – will face some major foreign policy and security issues, but the potential candidates have so far been focused mostly on domestic matters.
This election cycle, North Korea is causing less difficulty than usual, with the Kim Jong Un regime having been greatly affected by weather-related natural disasters and also by COVID-19. Instead, the most important foreign policy and security issues are clearly concerned with the United States and China.
There are deep diplomatic differences between President Joe Biden of the United States and President Moon Jae-in of South Korea. Biden wants Moon to abandon his peace-oriented policy toward North Korea, but Moon insists on continuing to try, despite the underwhelming results so far achieved. Can the next president of South Korea make any better progress?
Another point of contention between Seoul and Washington is Biden’s desire for the South Korean military to take a more active role in the wider region, in particular by participating in various U.S.-led multilateral military exercises. The incoming South Korean president will need to finesse this issue carefully if relations with China are to remain cordial.
Can the next president of South Korea initiate any new policies toward the United States, China, and North Korea? The truth is that South Korea’s policies toward these countries are interdependent in many different ways. If there are any solutions to be found for this Gordian Knot, then the ROK-U.S. alliance is the best hope we have. So how should we envisage the future of the long-standing alliance between the ROK and the United States?
Moon’s Promises to China: The Three Noes
When the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system was deployed on South Korean soil, China objected vigorously and used its commercial leverage to punish South Korea. As a consequence, Moon was obliged to placate China by making three promises. Will these “three noes” cause difficulties for the next president?
The first promise was that the United States will not deploy additional THAAD systems in South Korea. The U.S. budget for fiscal year 2021 has no funding for additional THAAD systems, but there are some funds allocated for upgrading the existing one to integrate it into a remote networked command and control system, together with Patriot and other systems deployed near the Korean Peninsula. This is a third and final phase based on the U.S. adoption of the Joint All Domain Command and Control system which U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) plans to adopt shortly.
Advertisement
The second “no” is that trilateral security cooperation between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea will not develop into a military alliance. Given the dire state of relations with Japan, this promise is easy to keep for any South Korean president.
The third promise is that South Korea will not participate in the U.S. Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) regional missile defense system. In practice the THAAD system deployed at Seongju has already been integrated into the MDA’s regional architecture. Staff at the South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND) have implicitly acknowledged the fact. As for any further cooperation with the MDA, the MND has made clear that it prefers to develop its own missile defense system.
It seems, then, that Moon’s “three noes” will not seriously constrain the next president.
Hypersonic Weapons on South Korean Soil?
At the recent Biden-Moon summit, South Korea agreed to become more actively involved with the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. Following the takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban in August 2021, it is appropriate to discuss the future of the ROK-U.S. military alliance.
China is continuing its military buildup, and seeking to extend and strengthen its diplomatic influence across the region. Against this background, it is time for the United States to increase its military resources to counter Chinese adventurism.
Several nations are developing hypersonic ballistic and cruise missiles, either medium-range (following Trump’s withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty) or long-range. Chinese and Russian weapons systems are well advanced, and the United States has initiated or reactivated several hypersonic missile development projects under various names: the U.S. Navy’s Prompt Global Strike (PGS); U.S. Army’s Long Range Hypersonic Weapon; U.S. Air Force’s AGM-183 Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon and Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile; and DARPA’s Tactical Boost Glide and Operational Fires and Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept.
As commentators have noted, though, the U.S. would have to find a place to deploy its missiles. Indeed, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper explicitly suggested that U.S. allies, including Australia, Japan, and South Korea, should allow the United States to deploy hypersonic weapons to assist in the strategic deterrence of Chinese threats.
Any deployment of such U.S.-developed hypersonic missiles on South Korea soil would inevitably be strenuously resisted by China, much like THAAD in 2017, and could seriously unbalance South Korean foreign policy. Recently, however, Australia has categorically rejected any such deployment, and with none of the other regional allies happy to accept them, it seems that South Korea is off the hook.
There is no particular reason why the United States needs to deploy hypersonic weapons on South Korean territory. There are no specific high-value targets in China’s northeastern provinces, and other U.S. allies seem better placed for the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to manage Chinese threats, such as Japan and the Philippines, not the mention the U.S. territory of Guam.
Advertisement
Nuclear ballistic missiles can be identified, tracked, and classified as incoming threats by missile defense systems, for example those established by the MDA, but PGS and medium-range hypersonic missiles equipped with conventional warheads cannot be intercepted by any missile defense system. It is unclear whether the U.S. prefers hypersonic-capable and conventional PGS weapons to the existing medium-range ballistic missiles with nuclear capability. This uncertainty opens an opportunity for South Korea, now that limitations on its indigenous missile development have been lifted. New South Korean medium-range ballistic missiles would supplement U.S. capability in countering Chinese military threats to Northeast Asian security, as well as deterring the North Korean military threat.
Other Issues Affecting the Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance
Some of the frontrunners to be the next president of South Korea have spoken about making changes to the ROK military and to the command-and-control structure of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), but they have said very little about the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Some military commentators argue that South Korea should pay more attention to operational and tactical matters than to political and strategic issues. In that regard, there are a variety of topics to be considered.
An Expanding Alliance
First, from the U.S. perspective, rebuilding the alliance is a priority. During the Trump era, his transactional and populist approach opened up some deep divisions between South Korea and the United States. Biden is now working to repair the damage. More than that, however, he also wants to extend the scope of the alliance beyond its historic focus on threats to the Korean Peninsula by involving Seoul in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, a thinly-veiled project to contain China.
A related initiative targets common domain awareness, with the ROK military trying to up its game by taking new responsibility for space, electronic, information, and cyberwarfare. To this end, the first meeting of a newly established ROK-U.S. ICT cooperation committee was held on August 5. Also, the ROK Air Force has reorganized its combat development group into an air and space combat research group, so that it can share a Common Operational Picture with the U.S. Space Force. The ROK Army and the ROK Navy are also getting more involved with space; for example the Cheonro-an satellite now monitors the surrounding seas of the Korean Peninsula, including the East China Sea.
In addition, now that South Korea is explicitly committed to more involvement in regional security, including potentially acting with the USFK to contingencies in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, the scope of the ROK-U.S. alliance has broadened. Future roles and missions for the ROK-U.S. CFC will be hampered by disparities between the two militaries unless a combined combat development group is established. The Japan-U.S. alliance has benefitted from bilateral joint research and development projects, and something similar is needed for the ROK-U.S. alliance.
Changing Doctrines
Second, there is widespread agreement that attempts to strengthen the capacity of the ROK-U.S. alliance should focus on doctrinal standardization. The United States is currently undergoing a great transformation of its expeditionary forces. Thus, the U.S. Army is establishing three Multi-Domain Task Forces, for the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Arctic. The U.S. Marine Corps also has a new mobile, agile, and flexible force, the Marine Littoral Regiment, designed to fight in a contested maritime environment. Likewise, the U.S. Navy has its Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations concept, for which it wants to build light amphibious ships, rather than large LHDs or LHAs.
These changes to U.S. forces mean that South Korea’s military will also need to change to ensure the future success of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Specifically, South Korean forces must pursue both technological and doctrinal interoperability, so that they can effectively interface with the new operational concepts of the United States. An integrated ROK Army, Navy Air Force, and Marine Corps force has been suggested, which could then operate in combined units between the ROK and U.S. militaries at the squadron and battalion level. And perhaps the United States should be invited to serve as an advisor in developing the concepts and frameworks of Defense Reform 2050, currently under development by the MND.
New Platforms, New Cooperation
Third, now that South Korea is building an aircraft carrier, close liaison with the U.S. Navy and Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) is needed. With the navies of South Korea and Japan both building or refitting light aircraft carriers, close cooperation is essential to ensure maximum interoperability. The U.S.-U.K. agreement on cooperative CV operation is the obvious model to follow. A considerable degree of interoperability has already been established, due to the F-35B take-off and landing system, which is the same on the U.S. Navy’s CVs, but much more is possible. The U.S. Navy has built up a vast repertoire of skills and know-how, which should be shared with South Korea and Japan for mutual benefit in the operation of CVs.
Advertisement
Fourth, some operational and tactical improvements are necessary. For example, South Korea and the United States need to better coordinate their strategic assets with the JMSDF, specifically: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets such as Global Hawk UAVs; airborne early warning and control assets; air refueling tankers and heavy lift aircraft; aircraft carriers; and amphibious assets. Also, the U.S. Navy needs a permanent presence in the form of destroyers at South Korean naval bases; the current arrangements with a one-star admiral are inadequate to deter potential threats from North Korea and China. And the South Korean Agency for Defense Development should be working on more research and development projects together with the U.S. DARPA, such as how to operate Manned-Unmanned Teaming between the two fleets. NATO has a variety of cooperative arrangements between multiple countries, and some of these could be usefully emulated by the ROK-U.S. alliance.
In short, the ROK-U.S. alliance is at a time of transition, and a lot of changes will be required to maintain the strength and effectiveness of the alliance into the future. The next South Korean president will have plenty of work to do.
Conclusion
Most of South Korea’s presidential candidates are proposing policies toward the United States, China, and North Korea that simply rehash previous ideas from the left or right, and in any case are based on outdated and obsolete scenarios. The world has moved on, and the ROK-U.S. alliance needs to acknowledge the fact. When the next president of South Korea is inaugurated in May 2022, he or she will have a very full inbox: the continuing COVID-19 pandemic, ever worsening climate change, the regional impact of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, growing doubts about the dependability of Pax Americana, and uncertainty over the future of the global economy.
Some candidates have flirted with populism during the campaign, but South Korea’s foreign and security policy needs someone grounded in reality. Thus, it is greatly to be hoped that the next president of South Korea will have the necessary experience and qualifications in these areas, and that they will choose the very best people for the relevant cabinet appointments. It would also be helpful if he or she has clearly articulated their approach to the United States, China, and North Korea so that there is a mandate for change – because change is coming to the ROK-U.S. alliance, like it or not.
thediplomat.com · by Sukjoon Yoon · August 27, 2021


9.  N. Korea denounces S. Korea, U.S. over joint military drill, vows to strengthen war deterrence 

Continuing to shape the information environment. I am going to try to adopt some north Korean rhetoric since it is so colorful. We "will endlessly accumulate our war deterrence."

"The exercise of invasive war by the U.S. and South Korea has keenly reminded us again of the need to continue to strengthen our national defense and preemptive capabilities strong enough to cope with and remove external threats," the ministry said.
"We will endlessly accumulate our war deterrence as we will triumph over ever-growing military threats from the U.S. and stand up to recklessly rampant hostile forces on the principle of power for power," it added.

N. Korea denounces S. Korea, U.S. over joint military drill, vows to strengthen war deterrence | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 고병준 · August 30, 2021
SEOUL, Aug. 30 (Yonhap) -- North Korea slammed South Korea and the United States over their recent summertime joint military drill, vowing to strengthen "war deterrence" strong enough to counter and remove any external threats.
The North's foreign ministry issued the criticism in a statement Sunday as Seoul and Washington concluded the combined military exercise last Thursday, which was held in a scaled-back manner due to the coronavirus situation and peace efforts involving North Korea.
"The exercise of invasive war by the U.S. and South Korea has keenly reminded us again of the need to continue to strengthen our national defense and preemptive capabilities strong enough to cope with and remove external threats," the ministry said.
"We will endlessly accumulate our war deterrence as we will triumph over ever-growing military threats from the U.S. and stand up to recklessly rampant hostile forces on the principle of power for power," it added.
North Korea has angrily responded to the recent joint military drill. Earlier, Kim Yo-jong, the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, issued a statement and slammed the drill as an "unwelcoming act of self-destruction for which a dear price should be paid."
North Korea has also not responded to the South's regular phone calls via liaison and military hotlines since Aug. 10, when a preliminary exercise kicked off in the run-up to the nine-day summertime drill.
On Monday, the unification ministry in Seoul said the latest criticism appears to be in line with Kim Yo-jong's earlier statement but stressed the importance of continued efforts to prevent tensions on the Korean Peninsula from rising under any circumstances.
kokobj@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 고병준 · August 30, 2021


10. IAEA report puts pressure on Seoul's bid to restart peace initiative
north Korea and the Kim family regime show their true colors. Yes, pundits will blame the US for not taking the Yongbyon deal at Hanoi. But that deal would have left the regime with the capability to continue to develop nuclear weapons. But the bottom line is this action shows that despite the Moon administration's continued overtures for peace, the regime has no intention of any kind of peaceful co-existence with the South. It wants to dominate the peninsula and we must understand that as we move forward with engagement, dialogue and the execution of our pn superior political warfare strategy.


IAEA report puts pressure on Seoul's bid to restart peace initiative
The Korea Times · August 30, 2021
This satellite photo released in May by 38 North, a U.S.-based website for analysis of North Korea, shows satellite imagery of North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear complex. Yonhap

IAEA says North Korea appears to have restarted nuclear reactor in Yongbyon
By Kang Seung-woo

A recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report indicating that North Korea has restarted its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon is likely to pour some cold water on South Korea's efforts toward the early resumption of the stalled Korean Peninsula peace process, according to diplomatic observers, Monday.

"Since early July, there have been indications, including the discharge of cooling water, consistent with the operation of the reactor," the IAEA said in its annual report, adding that there were no indications of reactor operation from early December 2018 to the beginning of July of this year.

"The new indications of the operation of the reactor and the radiochemical laboratory are deeply troubling," the report also said.

The report comes as Noh Kyu-duk, the South Korean chief nuclear envoy, flew to the United States, Sunday, to discuss with officials at the White House and the State Department ways to reactivate President Moon Jae-in's peace initiative.
"With the report coming to light, South Korea and the U.S. are likely to see their bandwidth limited in their move to restart the Korean Peninsula peace process," said Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

"Given the fact that the North Korean regime is set to continue to pressure the U.S. in the mid- to long-term, it remains to be seen how the allies will respond."
President Moon's peace initiative has been seeking engagement between South and North Korea and the United States in order to improve inter-Korean relations, but the unstable ties between the two Koreas have been stymieing the initiative.
However, with the U.S. grappling with the fallout of its withdrawal from Afghanistan, Seoul seems to have found room for negotiations with Washington to resume the peace process, Park noted.

When Sung Kim, the U.S. special representative for North Korea, visited Seoul last week, Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong appealed to the importance of reactivating the Korean Peninsula peace process at an early date. In addition, ahead of his departure for Washington, D.C., Noh told reporters that he will discuss with U.S. officials ways for the early resumption of the peace process.

"When Sung Kim visited here, he provided a clear glimpse of the U.S. wanting to stably manage the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in that respect, the South Korean government seems to have taken steps to convince the U.S. administration to stand on the same line regarding the issue," Park said.

The professor added that the Biden administration will not oppose the idea, given that when the two Koreas are on good terms with each other, North Korea is less likely to stage a military provocation.

When Noh arrived in the U.S., Sunday (U.S. time), he said that South Korea and the U.S. were at a critical point for restarting the Korean Peninsula peace process.
"I came to Washington in order to continue the discussions I had with Special Representative Sung Kim in Seoul last week," Noh told reporters upon his arrival at Dulles International Airport.

"I wish to hold in-depth discussions on various issues related to the Korean Peninsula, including the North Korean nuclear issue, with U.S. government officials during my U.S. trip."


The Korea Times · August 30, 2021


11. Shut the Yongbyon facility

This is partly a description of how the regime executes its political warfare strategy:

And yet, Pyongyang engaged in its signature strategy of deceiving Seoul by restoring the inter-Korean military communication lines at the end of July to feign a peaceful move. The Moon Jae-in administration reportedly detected the North’s suspicious move in Yongbyon at the time. Yet it heartily welcomed the restoration of communication lines as if North Korea had a willingness to improve inter-Korean relations. As a result, the Moon administration noticeably scaled back the annual South Korea-U.S. joint military drill which ended last week. After South Korea took the step, the U.S. forces were reportedly embarrassed. The government even skipped the Ulchi Freedom Guardian, a command post exercise aimed at changing the government’s administrative system to a wartime mode.

The resumption of nuclear facilities is not simply aimed at pressuring the United States but at increasing the number of plutonium-based nuclear bombs, which are used to spark the explosion of a hydrogen bomb at the initial stage. We wonder if North Korea reopened the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon to produce hydrogen bombs in a full-fledged way from now.

Monday
August 30, 2021

Shut the Yongbyon facility
 The reactivation of nuclear facilities at Yongbyon by North Korea gathers dark clouds over the Korean Peninsula once again. The facilities revealed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) include the 5MWe reactor and the Radiochemical Laboratory. The gas-cooled reactor, which resumed operations in July, produces plutonium for nuclear bombs. The lab has reprocessed the spent nuclear fuel from the reactor to extract plutonium since February.

On top of that, signs of activity were detected on a uranium mine, suggesting a continuous production of nuclear fuel by North Korea. If these findings in the IAEA’s September report are true, North Korea has resumed the production of nuclear weapons after violating the South-North and North-U.S. agreements in 2018.

And yet, Pyongyang engaged in its signature strategy of deceiving Seoul by restoring the inter-Korean military communication lines at the end of July to feign a peaceful move. The Moon Jae-in administration reportedly detected the North’s suspicious move in Yongbyon at the time. Yet it heartily welcomed the restoration of communication lines as if North Korea had a willingness to improve inter-Korean relations. As a result, the Moon administration noticeably scaled back the annual South Korea-U.S. joint military drill which ended last week. After South Korea took the step, the U.S. forces were reportedly embarrassed. The government even skipped the Ulchi Freedom Guardian, a command post exercise aimed at changing the government’s administrative system to a wartime mode.

The resumption of nuclear facilities is not simply aimed at pressuring the United States but at increasing the number of plutonium-based nuclear bombs, which are used to spark the explosion of a hydrogen bomb at the initial stage. We wonder if North Korea reopened the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon to produce hydrogen bombs in a full-fledged way from now.

The recalcitrant state is expected to possess as many as 100 nuclear weapons now — and up to 200 in just five to six years, according to an analysis by the RAND Corporation. That poses a serious threat to world peace, not to mention South Korea and Northeast Asia. Nevertheless, the Moon administration is persistently begging North Korea for peace.

North Korea faces the worst-ever situation on the economic, food and public health fronts. Despite its touted self-reliance, it cannot overcome the crisis unless UN sanctions are lifted. Its adherence to nuclear weapons cannot help its people. It is time for Pyongyang to give up nuclear weapons and missiles and immediately shut its nuclear facilities. Otherwise, it can never find a way out.

12.  Brokering US-North Korea dialogue: Breaking away from 'you first' attitudes

The US has continued to stress it is willing to talk anywhere and anytime without preconditions which the north and the author below state is hypocrisy (which is bulls**t). Simply stated it is Kim Jong-un who has to decide if he will act as a responsible member of the international community.

But this analysis is part of the typical one-sided analysis showing how north Korea has acted (no more nuclear weapons tests of ICBM test). But he does not acknowledge the 21+ missile and rocket tests in 2019-2020, the continued modernization of the military (showed to us in October 2020 and January 2021), the extortion of South Korea ino passing the anti-leaflet law after blowing up the ROK liaison building in Kaesong) the continued proliferation of military equipment and training to conflict zones in the Middle east and Africa, its global illicit actions, sanctions evasion activities, the use of its all purpose sword for cyber attacks around the world, its drug trafficking and counterfeiting, overseas slave labor and human rights abuse and crimes against humanity in north Korea, its deliberate decision to cut off market economy activity among the Korean people in the north, and so much more.

But it is the US that is the bad actor according to the author (and other pundits).

Finally we must remember that analysts and pundits and politicians who advocate for sanctions relief to jump start negotiations will lead KimJong-un to believe his political warfare strategy is working and he will double down on blackmail diplomacy (the use of increased tensions, threats, and provocations to gain political and economic concessions).

One final point: for those who advocate for sanctions relief I ask which malign (and evil) behavior do you wish to condone: Continued nuclear and missile development and testing? Continued global illicit activities? Continue proliferation? Continued cyber attacks? Conducted human rights abuses and crimes against humanity. Please tell me which malign behavior you condone when you call for sanctions relief.




Brokering US-North Korea dialogue: Breaking away from 'you first' attitudes
The Korea Times · August 30, 2021
By Yang Moo-jin
The situation on the Korean Peninsula, which has been frozen since the Hanoi summit between the United States and North Korea, is still in a stalemate. North Korea is focusing on self-reliance and internal solidarity while refusing to engage in dialogue with the U.S. and South Korea. However, the conflux of problems, including sanctions against North Korea, natural disasters, COVID-19 and the de facto closure of the border for preventive measures against the pandemic are exacerbating North Korea's economic difficulties.

Under these circumstances, the restoration of the inter-Korean communication lines on July 27 was expected to be an important turning point. At the time of the reopening of the inter-Korean communication lines, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) supported this expectation, calling the reopening "a big step toward restoring trust and promoting reconciliation" with "a positive effect on the improvement and development of inter-Korean relations."

But these hopes did not last long. North Korea denounced the South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises in August as "the most intensive expression of its hostile policy toward Korea," and effectively cut off the inter-Korean communication lines again on Aug. 10, after they had previously been restored with great difficulty.

On Aug. 26, the South Korea-U.S. joint exercises ended. It is fortunate that there has been no military response from North Korea, so it is time quickly to revive the atmosphere for the resumption of dialogue and improvement of relations, which was built on the trust between the leaders of the two Koreas.

North Korea is likely to emphasize its importance through provocation if it thinks that the U.S. will return to Obama's policy of "strategic patience" or that North Korea is a low priority for the U.S. Based on this understanding, I would like to make some suggestions as a scholar.

First, I hope that the U.S. makes its policy position clear so as to bring North Korea to the negotiating table. It will be of great help to create an environment for dialogue if the U.S. makes public that not only denuclearization, but also North Korea's concerns ― such as sanctions relief, security guarantees and a peace regime ― will be discussed when the dialogue resumes, and that corresponding measures will be fully considered in the process of phased denuclearization.

From North Korea's point of view, the U.S. is all talk and no action, although North Korea has taken good-faith measures towards denuclearization and building trust, such as halting nuclear and inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) test launches, closing the Punggye-ri nuclear test site and returning the remains of U.S. soldiers.

Pyongyang's disparagement of the Biden administration's proposal, to meet anytime and anywhere without condition, as "hypocrisy to conceal aggressive intention," in the Aug. 10 statement of Kim Yo-jong, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's powerful sister, can be interpreted as a request for Washington to show its will to improve relations through actual actions.

If the U.S. presents concrete outcomes that North Korea can achieve through future negotiations, it can show the sincerity of the Biden administration's North Korea policy principle of resolution through dialogue and diplomacy, and it can be a good cause for North Korea to return to dialogue.

Second, I hope that North Korea comes to the table and engages in serious negotiations. While the Trump administration preferred attempting grand bargains through so-called "big deals," the Biden administration is advocating a phased and pragmatic approach aimed at reducing threats.

As it can be seen that the U.S. and North Korea are in agreement with each other to a considerable degree when it comes to the denuclearization methodology, North Korea needs to show flexibility, breaking away from its rigid position that it will resume dialogue only when the U.S. abandons its hostile policy toward the North.
Meanwhile, the Biden administration has announced a new North Korea policy that is different from the Obama and Trump administrations, but it has not even started dialogue with North Korea.

In addition, there may be political constraints that make it difficult to provide substantive concessions to North Korea before the start of dialogue. I believe that it is more reasonable and pragmatic for North Korea to return to the negotiating table and listen to the Biden administration's North Korea policy, to achieve what it wants while having negotiations.

Third, I hope that North Korea responds to the South Korean government's proposal for cooperation in overcoming the COVID-19 pandemic. South Korea is constantly emphasizing the importance of health and medical cooperation with North Korea, including the prevention of the spread of COVID-19, saying that South and North Korea, connected by sky, land and sea, share a common destiny in the fight against infectious diseases.

In addition, South Korea has announced its plans to discuss the issue of establishing a videoconferencing system between the two Koreas. If North Korea responds, a system that enables inter-Korean dialogue even during the COVID-19 pandemic ― such as videoconferencing and safe face-to-face talks ― can be completed as soon as possible.

The continuation of the current stalemate is in no one's interest. While spending time doubting the intentions of the other party, the security threat posed by North Korea's strengthening of its nuclear capabilities will intensify, and the economic development and improvement of people's livelihoods that North Korea wants will inevitably be constrained. I hope that the U.S. and North Korea make a courageous decision to break away from the accusatory cliche of "you first" and make a wise choice.

Yang Moo-jin (yangmj@kyungnam.ac.kr) is a professor at the University of North Korean Studies and the vice chairman of the Korean Association of North Korean Studies. He is also a standing committee member of the National Unification Advisory Council and a policy consultant at the Ministry of Unification.

The Korea Times · August 30, 2021


13. Apology from intelligence chief (South Korea)

Excerpt:

Under a revision to the National Intelligence Service Act approved last December, the agency is obliged to maintain political neutrality and is prohibited from undertaking domestic surveillance operations. Now, its duties are confined to gathering information on foreign countries and North Korea, anti-espionage, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and space. If the NIS fulfills its duties faithfully under the law without being swayed by political power, it will be able to regain public confidence someday. But this requires painstaking efforts by the NIS to be reborn as an agency serving the state and the people. Hopefully, there will be no more need for apologies from the NIS.

Apology from intelligence chief
The Korea Times · August 30, 2021
Time for NIS to be reborn as agency for state and people

National Intelligence Service (NIS) director Park Jie-won apologized Friday for the spy agency's illegal surveillance of civilians and political interference in the past and vowed not to repeat such blunders. "The illegal surveillance and interference were carried out systematically via the NIS command structure at the behest of Cheong Wa Dae. Politicians, government officials, scholars, members of related organizations and their families were illegally spied on and persecuted," Park said at a news conference in Seoul.

Having enumerated such wrongdoings from the past, including gathering information on artists and religious leaders, drawing up blacklists of entertainers and offering money to expand pro-government organizations, he said the NIS mistook itself for an agency to protect those in power. "But I dare to say that there has been no such interference or illegal surveillance since the current administration took office. All NIS members will surely keep a distance from politics."

Park's apology is a follow-up to a resolution passed by the National Assembly last month. The resolution had urged the NIS to declare a complete end to its surveillance of civilians and sincerely apologize to the victims. Nonetheless, Park's apology deserves credit, given that it could prompt the intelligence agency to renew its determination not to repeat past misdeeds and commitment to political neutrality in the run-up to next year's presidential election.

Under a revision to the National Intelligence Service Act approved last December, the agency is obliged to maintain political neutrality and is prohibited from undertaking domestic surveillance operations. Now, its duties are confined to gathering information on foreign countries and North Korea, anti-espionage, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and space. If the NIS fulfills its duties faithfully under the law without being swayed by political power, it will be able to regain public confidence someday. But this requires painstaking efforts by the NIS to be reborn as an agency serving the state and the people. Hopefully, there will be no more need for apologies from the NIS.

The Korea Times · August 30, 2021


14. Kim Jong Un vows to be prepared for dialogue, confrontation with US

The regime is trying to shape the information environment using threats and increased tensions to try to drive the US to dialogue to obtain concessions of sanctions relief. The actions and rhetoric of the past few months has been a major north Korean shaping operation.


Kim Jong Un vows to be prepared for dialogue, confrontation with US
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ordered his government to be prepared for both dialogue and confrontation with the Biden administration but more for confrontation, state media reported Friday, days after the United States and others urged the North to abandon its nuclear programme and return to talks.
Kim's statement indicates he'll likely push to strengthen his nuclear arsenal and increase pressure on Washington to give up what North Korea considers a hostile U.S. policy, though he'll also prepare for talks to resume, some experts say.
During an ongoing ruling party meeting Thursday, Kim analysed in detail the policy tendencies of the U.S. under President Joe Biden and clarified unspecified steps to be taken in relations with Washington, the Korean Central News Agency said.
Kim stressed the need to get prepared for both dialogue and confrontation, especially to get fully prepared for confrontation in order to protect the dignity of our state and its interests for independent development and to reliably guarantee the peaceful environment and the security of our state.
In 2018-19, Kim held a series of summits with then-President Donald Trump to discuss his advancing nuclear arsenal. But their negotiations fell apart after Trump rejected Kim's calls for extensive sanctions relief in return for a partial surrender of his nuclear capability.
Biden's administration has worked to formulate a new approach on North Korea's nuclear program that it describes as calibrated and practical. Details of his North Korea policy haven't been publicized, but U.S. officials have suggested Biden would seek a middle ground between Trump's direct meetings with Kim and former President Barack Obama's strategic patience to curb Kim's nuclear program.
Earlier this week, leaders of the Group of Seven wealthy nations issued a statement calling for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the verifiable and irreversible abandonment North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.
They called on North Korea to engage and resume dialogue and respect human rights conditions. Kim has recently threatened to enlarge his nuclear arsenal and build high-tech weapons targeting the U.S. mainland if Washington refused to abandon its hostile policy on North Korea.
In March, Kim's military performed its first short-range ballistic missile tests in a year. But North Korea still maintains a moratorium on long-range missile and nuclear tests in an indication that Kim still wants to keep prospects for diplomacy alive.
Kwak Gil Sup, head of One Korea Center, a website specializing in North Korea affairs, wrote on Facebook that Kim's statement suggested he's taking a two-track approach of bolstering military capability and preparing for talks. But he said Kim will more likely focus on boosting military strength and repeating his demand for the U.S. to withdraw its policy.
Kim said last week must stay on high alert "to fulfill its noble mission and duty of firmly defending the sovereignty and security of the country.
Analyst Cheong Seong-Chang at the private Sejong Institute in South Korea said North Korea will still likely return to talks but it won't accept a call for immediate, complete denuclearisation. He said North Korea may accede to a proposal to freeze its atomic program and partially reduce its nuclear arsenal in phased steps if the Biden administration relaxes sanctions and suspend its regular military drills with South Korea.
Kim called the ruling Workers' Party's Central Committee meeting taking place this week to review efforts to rebuild his economy, which has been severely crippled by pandemic border closings, mismanagement amid the U.S.-led sanctions, and storm damage to crops and infrastructure last year.
On Tuesday, Kim opened the meeting by warning of potential food shortages, urging officials to find ways to boost agricultural production because the country's food situation is now getting tense. He also urged the country to brace for extended COVID-19 restrictions, suggesting North Korea would extend its border closure and other steps despite the stress on its economy.

15. North Korea stresses close relations with Cuba on 61st anniversary of diplomatic ties


Cold War solidarity between two remaining communist countries.

North Korea stresses close relations with Cuba on 61st anniversary of diplomatic ties
The Korea Times · August 29, 2021
In this 2018 November file photo released by North Korea's Rodong Sinmun, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel hold hands at Pyongyang International Airport. Yonhap

North Korea on Sunday stressed its close relations with Cuba and expressed continued support and solidarity on the occasion of the 61st anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties.

"For the last 60-odd years, the DPRK and Cuba have strengthened and developed the fraternal and comradely relations of mutual support and close cooperation on the sacred road of joint struggle for accomplishing the socialist cause," the North's foreign ministry said on its website.

DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The North also said that it is "rejoiced" over Cuba's success in the "vigorous struggle to defend and advance the cause of socialism towards victory while smashing grave challenges from within and without."

"We will, in the future, too, continue to extend full support and solidarity to the Cuban people in their just struggle and move forward hand in hand with them on the road of struggle for independence against imperialism and for socialism," the website said.

North Korea and Cuba have maintained close relations since establishing diplomatic ties in 1960.

Pyongyang has recently been seeking to maintain closer ties with its traditional allies amid an impasse in nuclear negotiations with Washington. (Yonhap)


The Korea Times · August 29, 2021




V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Company Name | Website
basicImage