Quotes of the Day:
"The function of wisdom is to discriminate between good and evil."
- Marcus Tullius Cicero
"Stick to what’s in front of you – idea, action, utterance."
- Marcus Aurelius
"The result of a consistent and total substitution of lies for factual truth is not that the lie will now be accepted as truth, and truth be defamed as lie, but that the sense by which we take our bearings in the real world - and the category of truth versus falsehood is among the mental means to this end - is being destroyed."
- Hannah Arendt
1. U.S. envoy vows 'strongest possible deterrent' over N.Korea weapons tests
2. U.S. envoy says allies to respond 'decisively' to N. Korea's provocative acts
3. Sung Kim arrives on five-day trip to South
4. Time to change conciliatory approach to North Korea: FM nominee
5. S. Korea, US kick off military drills as N.Korea gears up for massive military parade
6. How Much Are South Koreans Willing to Pay Toward the US Alliance?
7. Thank President Moon for South Korea's Big Military Build-Up
8. North Korea urges tighter antivirus efforts against prolonged COVID-19 pandemic
9. Why S.Korea Should Support Ukraine
10. North Korea may need more time to restore tunnels at Punggye-ri nuclear test site
11. North Korea issues orders regarding young violators of anti-reactionary thought law
12. A behind-the-scenes look at Moon’s 5 years in office, from inter-Korean peace talks to real estate woes
13. North Korea, NFTs and a hit video game: inside a $500m cryptocurrency theft
1. U.S. envoy vows 'strongest possible deterrent' over N.Korea weapons tests
Excerpts:
"We agreed on the need to maintain the strongest possible joint deterrent capability on the peninsula," he said.
Kim also said the allies would "respond responsibly and decisively to provocative behaviour," while underlining his willingness to engage with North Korea "anywhere without any conditions."
Kim's arrival coincided with the start of a nine-day annual joint military drill by U.S. and South Korean troops.
U.S. envoy vows 'strongest possible deterrent' over N.Korea weapons tests
SEOUL, April 18 (Reuters) - The United States and South Korea would maintain the "strongest possible joint deterrent" over North Korea's "escalatory actions", the U.S. envoy on North Korea said on Monday, amid concerns that Pyongyang was preparing to resume nuclear testing.
U.S. Special Representative Sung Kim and his deputy, Jung Pak, met South Korean officials, including nuclear envoy Noh Kyu-duk, after arriving in Seoul early on Monday for a five-day visit.
"It is extremely important for the United Nations Security Council to send a clear signal to the DPRK that we will not accept its escalatory tests as normal," Kim told reporters after his talks with Noh.
Kim was referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
"We agreed on the need to maintain the strongest possible joint deterrent capability on the peninsula," he said.
Kim also said the allies would "respond responsibly and decisively to provocative behaviour," while underlining his willingness to engage with North Korea "anywhere without any conditions."
Kim's arrival coincided with the start of a nine-day annual joint military drill by U.S. and South Korean troops.
The exercise consists of "defensive command post training using computer simulation" and will not involve field manoeuvres by troops, South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff said on Sunday.
North Korea has condemned the joint drills as rehearsals for war, and they have been scaled back in recent years amid efforts to engage Pyongyang in diplomacy, and because of COVID-19 restrictions.
On Saturday, North Korea test fired what state media said were missiles involved in delivering tactical nuclear weapons. read more
The U.S. envoy has repeatedly offered to re-engage with North Korea, but Pyongyang has so far rebuffed those overtures, accusing Washington of maintaining hostile policies such as sanctions and the military drills.
Kim was also expected to meet with the transition team for President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol, who takes office in May.
A spokesperson for the team said there was no meeting confirmed between Yoon and Kim, but Yoon's foreign minister nominee, Park Jin, said he planned to meet Kim.
Kim also said at his talks with Noh that Washington looks forward to working closely with Yoon's team.
Reporting by Josh Smith and Hyonhee Shin; Additional reporting by Minwoo Park; Editing by Michael Perry, Simon Cameron-Moore and Raju Gopalakrishnan
2. U.S. envoy says allies to respond 'decisively' to N. Korea's provocative acts
My mantra is a decisive response at the time and place of the (kinetic) provocation.
Weakness and inaction invites escalation. Kim will not respond in the face of decisive strength.
“You probe with bayonets: if you find mush, you push. If you find steel, you withdraw”
― Vladimir Ilich Lenin
(5th LD) U.S. envoy says allies to respond 'decisively' to N. Korea's provocative acts | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with remarks by S. Korean envoy in 8th para)
By Song Sang-ho and Chae Yun-hwan
SEOUL, April 18 (Yonhap) -- The U.S. special representative for North Korea said Monday that Seoul and Washington will respond "responsibly and decisively" to Pyongyang's provocative acts while voicing concerns over its "escalatory actions."
Ambassador Sung Kim made the remarks as he met with his South Korean counterpart Noh Kyu-duk to discuss the North's test of a purported tactical guided missile over the weekend and of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) last month.
"We, of course, share your concerns about the DPRK's escalatory actions and we will continue to work closely to respond responsibly and decisively to the provocative behavior in the united context and beyond," he said.
DPRK stands for the North's official name, Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Their talks took place amid concerns that the North could engage in provocative acts, including a nuclear test, around the 90th founding anniversary of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army on April 25.
During the talks, the two envoys agreed on the need for a "strong" response to the North's destabilizing behavior, Kim said during a press availability after the meeting.
"It is extremely important for the U.N. security council to send a clear signal to the DPRK that we will not accept its escalatory test as normal," he said.
Noh also warned that the allies will respond strongly based on their watertight cooperation in case the North conducts a nuclear experiment or another ICBM launch.
However, the U.S. envoy reiterated Washington's willingness to talk with Pyongyang "anywhere without any conditions."
"I want to underline that we have not closed the door on diplomacy with the DPRK," he said. "I would like to make clear that we have no hostile intent to the DPRK."
Noh also underscored the need to "leave the door open for dialogue," but he called for the allies to "remain vigilant and guard against every possibility."
"(We should) leave no room for any miscalculation on Pyongyang's part about the enduring strength of the ROK-US alliance," Noh said. ROK is the acronym for the South's official name, Republic of Korea.
Kim, meanwhile, stated Washington looks forward to working closely with Seoul's new foreign policy team to be formed after President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol takes office next month.
Kim is expected to meet officials from Yoon's transition team to coordinate North Korea policy.
Observers say Kim could meet Kim Sung-han, a former vice foreign minister and key member of the transition team's foreign policy subcommittee, and foreign minister nominee Park Jin.
Kim plans to meet South Korean Unification Minister Lee In-young on Tuesday to share their views on the latest political situation surrounding the peninsula, according to Lee's office. He arrived in Seoul earlier Monday for a five-day stay.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
3. Sung Kim arrives on five-day trip to South
This is an example of the Biden administration's sustained high level diplomatic engagement with US allies and the importance of US allies to national security.
Excerpts:
Kim said the allies would continue to work closely to respond “responsibly and sternly” to North Korea’s actions.
Kim stressed that the U.S. will maintain close cooperation with South Korea through the presidential transition period in Seoul.
Noh characterized face-to-face consultations with the U.S. special envoy as “evidence that the two countries are closely cooperating on all issues related to North Korea.”
Kim is due to meet with South Korean Unification Minister Lee In-young in a closed-door meeting on Tuesday afternoon, according to the Unification Ministry.
Kim is also expected to meet officials from President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol’s transition team to coordinate North Korea policy with the incoming administration.
Observers say Kim could meet Kim Sung-han, a former vice foreign minister and key member of the transition team’s foreign policy subcommittee, and Park Jin, who Yoon has nominated as foreign minister.
Jung Pak, the U.S. deputy special representative for the North, will accompany Kim to his meetings.
Monday
April 18, 2022
Sung Kim arrives on five-day trip to South
U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Sung Kim, left, shakes hands with Noh Kyu-duk, Seoul’s special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, at the Foreign Ministry in Jongno District, central Seoul on Monday afternoon. [YONHAP]
The U.S. special representative for North Korea arrived in Seoul on Monday for talks with his South Korean counterpart and other officials, including the transition team of President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol, regarding Pyongyang's recent missile launches and possible future weapons tests.
Ambassador Sung Kim’s five-day trip to South Korea comes after the North tested what it called a “tactical guided weapon” on Saturday, which was witnessed by leader Kim Jong-un, according to the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
“It’s great to be back in Seoul to continue our close coordination on DPRK developments,” Kim told reporters upon arrival at Incheon International Airport, referring to the North by the acronym for its official name, Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Kim served as U.S. ambassador to Seoul from November 2011 to October 2014.
Kim met with Noh Kyu-duk, Seoul’s special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, at the Foreign Ministry in Jongno District, central Seoul in the afternoon.
The two exchanged views on North Korea’s Saturday weapons test and the security situation around the Korean Peninsula, they said at a press conference after their meeting, and vowed continued close cooperation.
Kim said the allies would continue to work closely to respond “responsibly and sternly” to North Korea’s actions.
Kim stressed that the U.S. will maintain close cooperation with South Korea through the presidential transition period in Seoul.
Noh characterized face-to-face consultations with the U.S. special envoy as “evidence that the two countries are closely cooperating on all issues related to North Korea.”
Kim is due to meet with South Korean Unification Minister Lee In-young in a closed-door meeting on Tuesday afternoon, according to the Unification Ministry.
Kim is also expected to meet officials from President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol’s transition team to coordinate North Korea policy with the incoming administration.
Observers say Kim could meet Kim Sung-han, a former vice foreign minister and key member of the transition team’s foreign policy subcommittee, and Park Jin, who Yoon has nominated as foreign minister.
Jung Pak, the U.S. deputy special representative for the North, will accompany Kim to his meetings.
Kim’s visit coincided with the beginning of annual springtime joint military exercises held by the United States and South Korea on Monday.
The drills, which will run through April 28, “will be an opportunity to improve the combined operational performance of South Korean and U.S. soldiers and further solidify the combined defense posture,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff said Sunday.
Seoul and Washington conducted a four-day crisis management staff training from Friday as a preliminary drill.
Pyongyang has traditionally protested Seoul-Washington military exercises, which it views as war rehearsals, and such annual drills have often been times of exacerbated tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
April 25 marks the 90th anniversary of the founding of the North Korean People's Revolutionary Army, which could be an occasion for a military parade, while Yoon Suk-yeol will be inaugurated as South Korea's new president on May 10.
A period of military tensions on the peninsula is expected to continue through next month, with analysts pointing out that North Korea could conduct a seventh nuclear test in the near future.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
4. Time to change conciliatory approach to North Korea: FM nominee
We are going to see sufficient ROK and US alignment of the strategic assumptions about the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.
Time to change conciliatory approach to North Korea: FM nominee
Foreign Minister nominee Park Jin speaks to reporters at his temporary office in Seoul, Monday. Yonhap
By Kang Seung-woo
Foreign Minister nominee Park Jin suggested, Monday, that the new South Korean government will turn away from the Moon Jae-in administration's inter-Korean peace initiative amid escalating threats from North Korea.
Stressing the importance of cooperating with the U.S. in handling Pyongyang's provocations and promoting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, the nominee said he expected to meet with the U.S. nuclear envoy, who arrived in Seoul earlier in the day for talks with his South Korean counterpart and officials of President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol's transition committee.
Park, a four-term lawmaker of the conservative People Power Party who is recognized as an expert on relations with the U.S., led the ROK-U.S. Policy Consultation Delegation to Washington, D.C., earlier this month. During their visit, the delegates met with key senior officials of the Joe Biden administration such as National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman and Kurt Campbell, the White House policy coordinator for Asia.
The incoming administration's departure from President Moon Jae-in's Korean Peninsula peace process has been highly anticipated since the election campaign, during which Yoon slammed "fruitless" peace efforts highlighted by South Korea's push for a declaration to formally end the 1950-53 Korean War, and heralded a major shift in dealing with its northern neighbor. Despite South Korea's repeated calls for the end-of-war declaration, North Korea has remained unresponsive.
"The Moon administration made efforts to improve inter-Korean ties in its own way, but North Korea did not respond to them properly. Since the Hanoi summit between the U.S. and North Korea in 2019 ended without a deal, the North has increased nuclear and missile threats without returning to dialogue," Park told reporters.
Park said the Korean Peninsula was at the end of its rope after failing to rein in the belligerence of the Kim Jong-un regime.
"We cannot stop North Korea from repeating military provocations only with a conciliatory stance and I think it is time to practically change our peacemaking policy toward North Korea," he added.
Park's remarks came shortly after North Korea announced, Sunday, it had test fired a new type of tactical guided weapon, Saturday, to boost its nuclear fighting capability, with its leader observing the launch.
The reclusive state has conducted multiple missile tests so far this year, including the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile, crossing Washington's unofficial "red line" against North Korea's saber-rattling.
"While the international community has imposed sanctions on the North Korean missile launches, there is a need to keep the provocations in check," Park said.
"The Yoon administration will pursue a balanced policy toward North Korea, which will use a pressure and persuasion approach to the North Korea denuclearization," he added.
With the incoming president scheduled to take office, May 10, U.S. President Joe Biden is highly expected to visit Seoul before attending the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) summit in Tokyo, slated for May 24.
Given that the president-elect vowed to engage in diplomacy that places alignment with the U.S. at the center of its foreign policy priorities, the envisaged summit may focus on reviving the bilateral alliance, which Yoon believes has been damaged over the past five years under the Moon administration, which balanced improving inter-Korean ties along with the country's alliance with the U.S.
One agenda among others may be South Korea's request for a permanent presence of U.S. strategic assets on the peninsula ― an issue the delegation discussed with the U.S. National Security adviser in Washington, D.C.
However, Park said nothing had been decided yet on what the two heads of state will discuss, but hinted that they could talk about the global supply chain, the climate crisis and COVID-19 response efforts as well as North Korea.
Sung Kim, the U.S special representative for North Korea, arrived in Seoul on Monday on a five-day trip, raising speculation that the U.S. government is trying to cooperate on North Korea policy with the incoming South Korean administration.
The foreign minister nominee said he could have a chance to meet with the U.S. envoy.
"I had a pleasant conversation in Washington, D.C. in early April and I got a call that he will be visiting Seoul this week. So, I think we will probably have a chance to meet," Park said.
5. S. Korea, US kick off military drills as N.Korea gears up for massive military parade
So we are on alert for the next possible large military parade on April 25th.
I like the contrast. The alliance conducts training and the nKPA may conduct a parade.
Excerpts:
Meanwhile, Pyongyang is believed to have begun its preparation to hold a massive military parade “in earnest” at the Mirim Parade Training Ground in eastern Pyongyang, according to a South Korean military source with knowledge of the matter.
North Korea has been gearing up for the military parade, which will likely be held to mark the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army on April 25.
The South Korean military forecasts that Pyongyang will show off numerous weaponry systems and mobilize up to “20,000 personnel” at the military parade.
Military equipment including aircraft, armored vehicles, tanks, tracked military vehicles and transporter erector launchers, as well as thousands of personnel have been visible at the Mirim Parade Training Ground, according to the source.
North Korea is also expected to display advanced, strategic weapons such as intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles at the upcoming military parade.
S. Korea, US kick off military drills as N.Korea gears up for massive military parade
Military equipment visible at Mirim Parade Training Ground in Pyongyang, source says
Published : Apr 18, 2022 - 15:04 Updated : Apr 18, 2022 - 17:46
Soldiers check tanks at a US military base in Dongducheon, 40 km north of Seoul on Monday, as South Korea and the United States kicked off their major springtime combined training that will take the form of a command-post drill through April 28. (Yonhap)
South Korea and the US on Monday kicked off their annual combined military exercise, while North Korea has begun its preparation for a massive military parade likely to be held during the training period “in earnest,” South Korean military officials said.
Seoul and Washington decided to conduct the nine-day, springtime Combined Command Post Training in light of the overall circumstances, including the COVID-19 pandemic and maintaining a combined defense posture.
“The training aims to enhance the combined operational capabilities of South Korean and US soldiers and will serve as an opportunity to further strengthen our combined defense posture,” South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a written statement.
The JCS said the military drills are “defensive in nature” and based on a computer simulation without a field training exercise element. Large-scale, theater-level field training exercises have been suspended since the first US-North Korea Singapore Summit in June 2018.
This is the last South Korea-US military exercise to be conducted under the Moon Jae-in government. But both sides reportedly will not conduct an assessment of the South Korean military’s Full Operational Capability required to transfer wartime operational control to South Korea.
The South Korean and US defense chiefs last December agreed to proceed with the long-postponed FOC assessment during this year’s Combined Command Post Training.
But the Moon Jae-in government had hoped to advance the timing of the assessment, which is the second part of the three-phase system to evaluate the South Korean military’s capabilities to command the future combined defense system.
N. Korea’s bellicose rhetoric
The South Korea-US combined military exercise comes days after the four-day crisis management staff training, or preliminary military exercises, between April 12 and 15.
During the period, the US nuclear-powered aircraft USS Abraham Lincoln operated in the international waters of the East Sea and conducted bilateral exercises with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.
The operation of the USS Abraham Lincoln, which can accommodate around 80 aircraft, in the waters between South Korea and Japan came after more than a four-year hiatus. The last time any US nuclear-powered aircraft carrier operated near the east of the Korean Peninsula was in November 2017.
North Korea’s external-oriented media outlets have recently ratcheted up their bellicose rhetoric specifically against South Korea, denouncing the beginning of South Korea-US combined military exercise and the deployment of the USS Abraham Lincoln.
Pyongyang has generally raised tensions in the run-up to the combined military exercise. North Korea on Saturday also test-launched new-type tactical guided weapons that can carry “tactical nuclear weapons“ with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in attendance.
Tongil Voice, a propaganda radio broadcast targeting the South Korean audience, on Monday criticized that “such behaviors of the South Korean warmongers are reckless provocations that prepare for the war of aggression.”
The media outlet reiterated that South Korea will not be a target of attack unless the South Korean military takes military action against them, echoing the recent statement issued by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s powerful sister Kim Yo-jong.
Tongil Voice said the South Korean military should not choose military confrontation against the “nuclear-weapons state,” warning of “merciless punishment.”
North Korea’s state-run website Uriminzokkiri on Sunday repeated its rhetoric that the annual military drills are “war rehearsals and nuclear war exercises to further fully prepare to implement the operational plan aimed at launching a preemptive strike” against the country.
Uriminzokkiri warned that a “minor accidental skirmish” could lead to “all-out war” at a time when the “situation on the Korean Peninsula has worsened due to the reckless words and actions” of the South Korean military.
“The aggressors … who have been pushing the situation to the extreme pitch (of tension) by clinging to the dangerous saber-rattling will surely pay a dear price,” Uriminzokkiri said in a Korean-language column. “Those who enjoy fire will be bound to be burned to death.”
Massive military parade on April 25
Meanwhile, Pyongyang is believed to have begun its preparation to hold a massive military parade “in earnest” at the Mirim Parade Training Ground in eastern Pyongyang, according to a South Korean military source with knowledge of the matter.
North Korea has been gearing up for the military parade, which will likely be held to mark the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army on April 25.
The South Korean military forecasts that Pyongyang will show off numerous weaponry systems and mobilize up to “20,000 personnel” at the military parade.
Military equipment including aircraft, armored vehicles, tanks, tracked military vehicles and transporter erector launchers, as well as thousands of personnel have been visible at the Mirim Parade Training Ground, according to the source.
North Korea is also expected to display advanced, strategic weapons such as intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles at the upcoming military parade.
6. How Much Are South Koreans Willing to Pay Toward the US Alliance?
Some interesting data.
Conclusion:
Admittedly, national security decisions such as alliances are not dependent on public approval, but broad public support in South Korea for the U.S. military presence certainly simplifies the decision. Our findings suggest the South Korean public will be receptive to Yoon’s intention to strengthen South Korea-U.S. security ties, especially as North Korea continues to hone its missile and nuclear capabilities.
Thinking long term, maintaining mutual satisfaction in the South Korea-U.S. alliance requires the continued identification of shared security goals and an awareness of potential sensitivities to cost-sharing arrangements. Yoon will benefit from not having to renegotiate cost-sharing arrangements, but his administration may wish to find ways to emphasize the value of the relationship to maintain public support for rising costs, perhaps focusing on gradual increases and other trust-building measures.
How Much Are South Koreans Willing to Pay Toward the US Alliance?
South Koreans are generally supportive toward hosting U.S. troops, but their preferred cost-sharing levels are below what Seoul already pays.
By Timothy S. Rich, Maggie Fields, Kierigan McEvoy, and Joe Black
April 16, 2022
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Conventional wisdom suggests that, outside of high-profile scandals such as rape cases, the South Korean public remains generally positive about the U.S. military presence. This is despite tensions in recent years about the costs of hosting U.S. troops. For example, in 2020, the Trump administration demanded a fivefold increase in South Korea’s payments for U.S. military costs, rejecting a 14 percent increase proposed by the Moon administration. The Biden administration ultimately agreed on a six-year extension with increases over time.
However, little attention has been to paid to what the South Korean public sees as a fair cost-sharing arrangement, and how this corresponds with overall evaluations of the U.S. presence.
Identifying exactly how much South Korea contributes toward the total cost of the U.S. presence is complicated and can vary based on the estimated value of land use, among other factors, with most estimates of South Korea’s commitment ranging from about 30 percent to 44 percent. Similarly, most South Koreans are unlikely to know their country’s actual contribution level but rather estimate what is acceptable based on perceived benefits and recent issues in South Korea-U.S. relations.
The importance of the South Korea-U.S. alliance can be seen with the united response condemning North Korea’s numerous missile tests this year, including its first IBCM test since 2017. The U.S. military presence in South Korea and Japan provides regional stability, with embassy officials in Seoul expressing that the presence deters regional adversaries. If so, the South Korean public, unsure of their own military’s deterrent capabilities, may see a U.S. presence as crucial to maintaining peace. But what cost are they willing to pay to preserve that presence?
To address South Korean public perceptions of the U.S. military, we conducted a national web survey of 1,107 respondents in South Korea from March 11-16, 2022, administered by Macromill Embrain and using quota sampling for age, gender, and geographic region.
We first asked: “On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being strongly opposed and 5 being strongly support, how do you feel about the presence of American military bases in South Korea?” We found that a majority of respondents state that they somewhat or strongly support the presence (55.83 percent) compared to only 10.84 percent stating they somewhat or strongly oppose, rates that suggest the public generally sees the presence as an effective and perhaps cost-effective deterrent to North Korean aggression. A third of respondents expressed a neutral position.
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We also asked, “From 0 percent to 100 percent, what percentage of the costs of the U.S. military presence in South Korea do you believe South Korea should pay?” The average response was 32.08 percent, below estimates of what South Korea currently pays.
Broken down by political party identification, we find supporters of the main conservative party, the People Power Party (PPP), overwhelmingly in favor of the U.S. presence (74.02 percent) with only 2.85 percent opposed. In contrast, a plurality of supporters of the main liberal party, the Democratic Party (DP), supported the U.S. presence (49.41 percent), with 17.8 percent in opposition.
When shifting to cost-sharing, PPP supporters on average supported a higher contribution (35.62 percent) than the DP supporters (31.19 percent). Even the higher amount, however, is below most estimates of South Korea’s current contribution level. The results suggest that President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol’s base, although supportive of the U.S. presence and likely supportive of Yoon’s desire to strengthen relations between the two countries, are unlikely to support higher cost shares.
We assumed that support for the U.S. presence would positively correspond to a willingness to shoulder higher costs. As shown in the figure below, this pattern is very clear, from an average of 9.26 percent cost-sharing among those strongly opposed to the presence to 42.40 percent for those strongly supportive. These findings suggest that the current high-end estimates of about 44 percent may be the best that South Korean administrations can offer without risking a public backlash.
Respondents were also asked, “In general, do you believe that the U.S. shares the same concerns as South Korea over North Korea?” Here we find that 56.55 percent of respondents say yes, and that those respondents indicate, on average, that South Korea should pay more (34.28 percent vs. 30.88 percent among those responding no). Again, we find PPP supporters slightly more likely to say yes (60.85 percent) compared to DP supporters (56.91 percent).
Admittedly, national security decisions such as alliances are not dependent on public approval, but broad public support in South Korea for the U.S. military presence certainly simplifies the decision. Our findings suggest the South Korean public will be receptive to Yoon’s intention to strengthen South Korea-U.S. security ties, especially as North Korea continues to hone its missile and nuclear capabilities.
Thinking long term, maintaining mutual satisfaction in the South Korea-U.S. alliance requires the continued identification of shared security goals and an awareness of potential sensitivities to cost-sharing arrangements. Yoon will benefit from not having to renegotiate cost-sharing arrangements, but his administration may wish to find ways to emphasize the value of the relationship to maintain public support for rising costs, perhaps focusing on gradual increases and other trust-building measures.
7. Thank President Moon for South Korea's Big Military Build-Up
What is not often considered is that liberal South Korean governments have invested in defense capabilities, sometimes on a larger scale than conservative governments.
Excerpts:
Yet there may be one area of broad agreement between the two parties—important after such a close election and with the National Assembly remaining in the soon-to-be opposition Democratic Party’s hands for two more years. Both parties support a more robust South Korean military.
On the Republic of Korea’s Armed Forces Day last October President Moon Jae-in
expressed “trust and pride” in his nation’s military and “strong security posture.” At the end of the year
he discussed even broader defense aspirations, reportedly opining that the ROK’s “defense capabilities are needed not only for deterrence against North Korea, but also for the autonomy of our country stuck between great powers.” Thus, “We should be equipped with defense capabilities befitting such a geopolitical location.”
More important, while talking of peace, his government prepared for war. For instance, last September Seoul announced that it was expanding its missile program. The Defense Ministry explained: “We will develop stronger, longer-range and more precise missiles so as to exercise deterrence and achieve security and peace on the Korean Peninsula.” These improvements became possible after the U.S. ended restrictions on South Korean missile production. Said the ministry: “Following the termination of the [missile] guidelines, we will exercise deterrence against potential threats and improve strike capabilities against main targets.”
...
Yoon’s election likely presages a faster South Korean military build-up. However, Moon’s aggressive military program provides a solid basis for Yoon’s plan to increase South Korean capabilities. Although time remains to cap and even reverse the North Korean nuclear program, if the North advances as fast as some analysts fear the Korean peninsula may enter a brave new world sooner than most anyone expects. Then today’s challenges will look simple compared to those facing future policymakers.
Thank President Moon for South Korea's Big Military Build-Up
The bitter South Korean presidential election reached its dramatic conclusion. Prosecutor Yoon Suk-yeol won a surprisingly narrow victory in a race that focused on domestic issues. However, the greatest divergence between the two candidates appeared to be on security issues.
Yet there may be one area of broad agreement between the two parties—important after such a close election and with the National Assembly remaining in the soon-to-be opposition Democratic Party’s hands for two more years. Both parties support a more robust South Korean military.
On the Republic of Korea’s Armed Forces Day last October President Moon Jae-in expressed “trust and pride” in his nation’s military and “strong security posture.” At the end of the year he discussed even broader defense aspirations, reportedly opining that the ROK’s “defense capabilities are needed not only for deterrence against North Korea, but also for the autonomy of our country stuck between great powers.” Thus, “We should be equipped with defense capabilities befitting such a geopolitical location.”
More important, while talking of peace, his government prepared for war. For instance, last September Seoul announced that it was expanding its missile program. The Defense Ministry explained: “We will develop stronger, longer-range and more precise missiles so as to exercise deterrence and achieve security and peace on the Korean Peninsula.” These improvements became possible after the U.S. ended restrictions on South Korean missile production. Said the ministry: “Following the termination of the [missile] guidelines, we will exercise deterrence against potential threats and improve strike capabilities against main targets.”
Equally significant, Seoul tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile in September. Moon watched the launch and insisted that it was “not a response to North Korea’s provocations.” However, he noted “the reinforcement of our missile capabilities can be a clear deterrent to North Korea’s provocations.” By matching North Korea’s SLBM program and providing an essentially invulnerable deterrent, the ROK is entering an exclusive club of just eight nations that currently possess this capability.
Moreover, SLBMs could prove valuable in confronting not just the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea but other states, most obviously China. Explained the Blue House: “The possession of an SLBM has a significant meaning for the purpose of securing deterrence capabilities responding to omnidirectional threats and will play a big role in the establishment of national self-defense and peace on the Korean Peninsula in the future.”
After the North’s seven missile tests in January, Defense Minister Suh Wook visited the Army’s Central Missile Command. He said the unit was “central” in responding to the North and “gives confidence to our people through overwhelming strategic victory at times of emergency,” The political nature of the visit was clear, but it highlighted the Moon administration’s increased military effort.
The Seoul government’s current blueprint would hike military outlays by a quarter by 2026. The latest budget envisions improved defenses against missiles, long-range artillery, and submarines, enhanced intelligence and surveillance capabilities, an aircraft carrier for vertical-takeoff aircraft, and much more. Roughly a third of military outlays would go to “force enhancement,” to maintain the South’s qualitative military edge over the DPRK. Although both Tokyo and Seoul have enjoyed a cheap ride at Washington’s expense, the South faces notably greater threats. Without an ocean moat against an armed and hostile North Korea, the South must take its defense responsibilities more seriously than has Japan.
Observed the U.S. War College’s Lami Kim: “Since Moon, a member of South Korea’s Democratic Party, took office in 2017, the country’s defense budget has increased by an average of 7.4 percent annually. Under the two previous conservative administrations of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, the defense budget only rose by between 4 and 6 percent annually. By 2022, South Korea is expected to spend more on defense than Japan—whose gross domestic product is three times as large—and become the fifth- or sixth-biggest-spender on defense in the world.”
Yoon might accelerate that pace. After the election he said he would “establish a strong military capacity to deter any provocation completely.” Nevertheless, Japan threatens to make defense outlays into a competitive race with its new defense plans. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s latest manifesto pledged to double outlays to two percent of GDP. Although no one expects Tokyo to reach that level soon, having America’s closest Asian allies vie to spend the most on the military would be a welcome change.
Most broadly, higher South Korean military outlays would respond to broad security concerns. Last year’s Defense White Paper declared:
“Our recent security situation is extremely complex and grave, both internally and externally. Neighboring countries of the Korean Peninsula continue to reinforce their cutting-edge military capabilities, pushing their own priorities while expanding their military domains not only in the sea and air but also to space and cyber. In addition, transnational and nonmilitary threats such as COVID-19, disasters and terrorism are emerging as challenges to national security. In particular, with the spread of COVID-19 and the strategic competition between the United States and China, the fluidity and uncertainty of the regional security structure are increasing.”
Greater military strength also would reduce Seoul’s dependence on Washington, an embarrassment for a nationalistic people who effectively surrender important military decisions to the U.S. Moreover, negotiating from a position of military strength would give Moon’s successor more confidence in dealing with the DPRK. Moon termed the South’s new capabilities a “clear deterrent to North Korea’s provocations.” Yoon promised to take a tougher stand against the North. A stronger ROK also would require fewer concessions from the North to secure peace. And North Korea would have more reason to yield if Seoul enhances its defense capabilities.
Pyongyang officials unintentionally make this point when they complain vociferously about South Korean military developments. For instance, the North claims that weapons developed by the ROK, including fighters and satellites, are intended for a preventive attack. The Kim regime even criticized South Korean weapons development as an “unpardonable act of perfidy.” The North understandably prefers a weaker South.
The ROK also has been seeking to confront unique threats posed by its nuclear-armed adversary. Ian Bowers and Henrik Stålhane Hiim of the Royal Danish Defence College and Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, respectively, observed: “To deter North Korea—and limit damage if a conflict breaks out—South Korea is operationalizing an independent conventional counterforce strategy, or offensive and defensive measures designed to destroy or deplete the nuclear forces of an adversary. To bolster deterrence, South Korea is also threatening countervalue strikes, seeking to hold the North Korean leadership at risk.”
Equally significant, perhaps, the ROK’s goal is to create military capabilities separate from America’s. Bowers and Hiim reported that though Seoul “is developing this strategy within the framework of its alliance with the United States, the ultimate goal is a fully independent operational capability.” They see this stance “as both a short- and long-term hedge against U.S. abandonment.” Yoon would be wise to continue this strategy. Although American subsidies reduce Seoul’s need to invest in the military, they increase Seoul’s vulnerability to swings in U.S. policy. And the endless stream of rising deficits facing Washington make future military cuts likely.
Improved South Korea capabilities will become more necessary if nuclear negotiations with North Korea continue to drag on without positive result. Unless an agreement is reached to at least cap the DPRK’s program, the North could soon end up as a mid-level nuclear power. The Rand Corporation and Asan Institute estimated “that, by 2027, North Korea could have 200 nuclear weapons and several dozen intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and hundreds of theater missiles for delivering the nuclear weapons. The ROK and the United States are not prepared, and do not plan to be prepared, to deal with the coercive and warfighting leverage that these weapons would give North Korea.”
Despite Yoon’s commitment to an even closer bilateral relationship, it is difficult to see how the alliance as presently organized could then survive. Although the North would face devastating retaliation if it initiated a first strike, it could threaten to use its nuclear weapons in any conventional conflict that threatened it with defeat and regime destruction. In 1950 China intervened to rescue the North after America’s entry into the war. That wouldn’t happen in another conflict, but Kim could threaten to use nukes in a similar circumstance unless Washington retreated from North Korean territory. No American president could responsibly risk U.S. cities under such circumstances. This conundrum necessarily would call the alliance into question.
South Koreans no less than Americans recognize the challenge, which was exacerbated by President Donald Trump’s reckless chest-thumping about “fire and fury” mixed with proposals to withdraw U.S. forces from the peninsula. Assessed Bowers and Hiim: “Under these conditions, South Korean military and political elites are unwilling to rely passively on extended deterrence by the United States. Instead, they are following a long-worn path of making incremental internal adjustments to their country’s military capabilities to strengthen its relative position in the alliance.”
Although with the right conventional weapons the South could wreak great harm on the North, Seoul still would feel vulnerable facing a nuclear North alone. Perhaps in fear of this future, the ROK already is considering its nuclear options. Last September Yoon advocated that the US reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons and negotiate a nuclear sharing agreement. So did conservative contenders Hong Joon-pyo and Yoo Song-min. Four years ago liberal Assemblyman Lee Jong-geol, a member of the Defense Committee, advocated choosing “tactical nuclear as the last negotiating card,” which he acknowledged “has been taboo until now.”
In April Yoon’s transition advisers visited Washington and advocated the return of “strategic assets,” such as bombers and submarines, to the peninsula. Opined Assemblyman Park Jin: “Deploying the strategic assets is an important element of reinforcing the extended deterrence, and the issue naturally came up during the discussions.”
Moreover, preparations are being laid, conveniently if perhaps inadvertently, for an ROK nuclear weapon. Bowers and Hiim contended that current policy “will bolster South Korea’s nuclear latency. Many of the capabilities South Korea is acquiring or considering—particularly advanced ballistic and cruise missiles—will shorten the time frame for development of a credible nuclear deterrent. Moreover, these conventional capabilities may function as a stopgap deterrent to protect South Korea during the dangerous window between abandonment and the attainment of deliverable nuclear weapons.”
In fact, there is notable political support for an independent nuclear deterrent. Popular backing for a nuclear capability has been increasing; it hit 69 percent, the highest over the last decade, in a September poll conducted by the Asan Institute. Hong forthrightly stated that he would consider constructing nuclear weapons, arguing that “Nukes can only be countered with nukes.” He added that “the balance of terror via nuclear weapons was achieved in Europe. The inter-Korean front is more dangerous place than Europe.”
He is not the first substantial political figure to take that position. In 2013 Chung Mong-joon suggested going nuclear, delivering a speech in Washington proposing to match the North while offering to halt nuclear activities if North Korea did so as well. Honorary chairman of the Asan Institute, he was a long-time member of the National Assembly, chairman of the ruling conservative party, and a 2002 presidential candidate. Chung declared that “The lesson of the cold war … is that against nuclear weapons, only nuclear weapons can hold the peace.’’
Yoon has yet to declare his position, and the issue remains a decided minority view among South Korea’s governing elite. However, changing circumstances could increase support. If there is reason to doubt Washington’s commitment to the ROK’s defense, Seoul would have to take over responsibility for its own defense, including against the possibility of a North Korean nuclear strike. In which case future Armed Forces Days might take on a very different character.
Yoon’s election likely presages a faster South Korean military build-up. However, Moon’s aggressive military program provides a solid basis for Yoon’s plan to increase South Korean capabilities. Although time remains to cap and even reverse the North Korean nuclear program, if the North advances as fast as some analysts fear the Korean peninsula may enter a brave new world sooner than most anyone expects. Then today’s challenges will look simple compared to those facing future policymakers.
A 1945 Contributing Editor, Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties. He worked as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry. He writes regularly for leading publications such as Fortune magazine, National Interest, the Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Times. Bandow speaks frequently at academic conferences, on college campuses, and to business groups. Bandow has been a regular commentator on ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC. He holds a JD from Stanford University.
8. North Korea urges tighter antivirus efforts against prolonged COVID-19 pandemic
The can be interpreted as even more draconian populations and resources control measures to exert even great control over the population. COVID provides the opportunity to do this.
North Korea urges tighter antivirus efforts against prolonged COVID-19 pandemic
People wearing face masks watch a dancing party of young people and students in celebration of the 110th anniversary of the birth of North Korea's late founder Kim Il-sung at Kim Il-sung Square in Pyongyang, April 15. AP-Yonhap North Korea reiterated a call to its people, Monday, to step up efforts to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in a message carried by a state-controlled main newspaper, stressing the need for officials to not let their guard down.
This came on the day when South Korea removed all social distancing measures with the exception of a mask mandate, in a major move to return to pre-pandemic normalcy.
The Rodong Sinmun, an organ of the Workers' Party of Korea, urged officials and party members to stay wary of the pandemic that is "getting worse day by day" and to follow antivirus measures more thoroughly.
"Officials should always ask their respective region or groups whether or not they feel even the slightest sense of laxity, or if there is any room for negligence and idleness," it said.
The paper said the rapid spread of the "stealth Omicron variant virus" since late last year has further exacerbated the pandemic, referring to the prevalence of the BA.2, so-called "stealth Omicron" sub-variant.
The regime has claimed to be coronavirus-free but has imposed relatively strict border controls since January 2020 after the global COVID-19 outbreak. (Yonhap)
9. Why S.Korea Should Support Ukraine
An excerpt from a forthcoming paper I have on the new Yoon administration"
We will see a defense of democratic values, the rules based international order, cooperation with other like-minded countries and alignment with entities such as the Quad. Korea is the the only country in the world to go from a major aid recipient following the Korean War armistice to a major donor nation after the Miracle on the Han. It stands as an example for the developing nations around the world. We should expect to see strong solidarity with Ukraine as it experiences similar attacks as Korea did in 1950.
Why S.Korea Should Support Ukraine
A delegation led by lawmaker Park Jin met with U.S. officials and experts in Washington, D.C. We hosted the delegation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) with former U.S. National Security Council officials, ambassadors to South Korea and U.S. Force Korea commanders, and there was uniform positive support for president-elect Yoon Seok-youl's foreign policy agenda.
But the delegation will have been struck during their week in town by how singularly focused Washington is on the war in Ukraine, rather than the pivot to Asia. The Yoon administration will have to adjust its foreign policy to these realities and go farther than the Moon Jae-in government did in supporting Ukraine's fight for freedom against Russia.
The Moon government's initial response to Russia's unprovoked war of aggression was uninspiring, to say the least. South Korea did not join any of the U.S.-led sanctions aimed to deter a Russian invasion, explaining that it did not want to harm its growing economic relations with Russia without acknowledging any South Korean interest in the political situation.
When the invasion occurred, Moon carefully avoided condemning the Russian invasion or calling out Putin by name, instead making passive statements about "upholding Ukrainian sovereignty," and "resolving the situation peacefully." South Korean actions remained focused on preserving energy imports from Russia and trade exports. This was essentially the same playbook followed in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea.
That South Korea saw no connection between the attack against Ukraine and the way the world came to Seoul's defense in June 1950 is astounding. The position came under criticism in Washington as a quiet acknowledgment that South Korea cannot be counted on in the community of democracies to stand up for freedom, unlike Australia, Japan or others, and that its voice in world affairs would remain faint. The excuse that the Moon government needed to appease Russia in order to gain Moscow's support on engaging North Korea was laughable in the face of multiple ballistic missile tests by the North this year.
It took four days after the invasion before South Korea would sign on to the broadest multilateral sanctions against Russia, but it would not enact bilateral ones. It later signed on to SWIFT sanctions and suspension of financial transactions with Russian banks. But at the same time it sought exemptions from the U.S. Foreign Direct Product Rule that restricts export of products with American electronic technology, which it only was able to win after announcing financial sanctions against Russia.
South Korea has to do better. If Russia wins in Ukraine, the world will be a different place, where autocrats will feel emboldened. That matters for South Korea. As a global power, South Korea needs to stand with other advanced industrialized democracies to deter aggression and to support the liberal international order. To do so in Ukraine is not a distraction from Korean affairs, but an action that invests in the obligation of others to do the same for South Korea against illiberal external threats, be they from North Korea or China.
Thus far, president-elect Yoon seems to understand what is at stake. He immediately called Russia's invasion an act of aggression in violation of international law and the UN Charter. And he stated on numerous occasions that this is not a problem on "the other side of the world" or a "stranger's business" for South Koreans.
This is all very encouraging. The question is what the president-elect can do to put actions behind these words. Thus far, South Korea's direct support of Ukraine has been modest. It has supplied some military uniforms and equipment to the Ukrainian army and US$10 million in humanitarian assistance. It has allowed about 3,800 Ukrainians in South Korea to extend their visas, and supported invitations to family members on humanitarian grounds with a simplified visa process.
But these are fairly minor actions that may tick the box on showing support but do not truly buttress the Ukrainian resistance on the battlefield, nor make waves in the international community as a sign of South Korea's commitment to defend democracy.
South Korea needs to consider the question whether it should provide lethal combat assistance to Ukraine. It is capable of providing infantry fighting vehicles, K-9 artillery, and K-10 ammunition transport vehicles as it is doing to Australia.
This would be the strongest statement of the new government's commitment to be a global player. It would fit with South Korea's own plans to demonstrate the world-class capacity of its defense industrial products. And it would resonate deeply with the Joe Biden administration as a contribution to the alliance as a bulwark of democracy.
Such an action would no doubt upset bilateral relations with Russia. But with Seoul having imposed financial and trade sanctions already, there is little chance that Putin will not already see South Korea as aligned with the West. The South Korean worry is that Russia will retaliate with its own sanctions on energy exports. This is likely, but it could be a spur to the Yoon government's plans to improve South Korea's supply-chain security.
It is undeniable that China and Russia have weaponized economic interdependence, which South Koreans remember very well from the 2017 Chinese boycott, so it is incumbent on the new government to create new supply-chain resilience by reducing dependence on these two neighbors. On bituminous coal, for example, South Korea has already reduced its dependence on Russia to 54 percent from 75 percent last year by purchasing more coal from Australia, which has ready supplies to export given China's sanctioning of Australian coal. This type of trade diversion is the only way to reduce future vulnerability to coercion by illiberal regimes.
10. North Korea may need more time to restore tunnels at Punggye-ri nuclear test site
Perhaps an indication that the regime wants to use this to support blackmail diplomacy and does not want to go straight to a nuclear test. Kim must believe he can manipulate the ROK and the US with these threats and increased tensions to get his political and economic concessions.
North Korea may need more time to restore tunnels at Punggye-ri nuclear test site
Within North Korea’s ruling party, there is a widespread belief that Pyongyang must conduct a seventh nuclear test to win recognition as a nuclear power from the international community
The fourth tunnel of North Korea’s Punggye-ri nuclear test site is blown up in 2018. (Joint Press Pool)
There are signs that North Korean authorities are working to restore the nuclear test site at Punggye-ri, Kilju County, North Hamgyong Province. However, a source in North Korea says he thinks restoring the tunnels will take some more time.
A high-ranking Daily NK source in North Korea said Thursday that North Korean authorities have tasked personnel with restoring Tunnel No. 3 at the Punggye-ri test site. He said work is fully underway.
North Korean authorities initially believed they could carry out a nuclear test next month, but the tunnel’s collapse was worse than thought. Additionally, more parts of the tunnel have collapsed naturally since North Korea demolished the site in May 2018, and with technical issues arising as well, the authorities will probably give workers more time to restore the site.
To restore the site, the authorities need to deploy the Seventh Regiment, First Brigade, which specializes in this sort of technical work. However, it has not been deployed to Punggye-ri, according to the source.
The source said Seventh Regiment, First Brigade is a technical unit deployed only when there are important tests. He said the brigade’s absence means the work at Punggye-ri has yet to reach the final stage requiring the installation of technical equipment.
However, the source said the authorities could move forward or delay a nuclear test depending on how quickly workers complete the restoration. He also said some officials say they need to test a hydrogen bomb to bolster the country’s firepower.
US nuclear scientist David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security told Radio Free Asia on Apr. 5 that if North Korea restarts nuclear testing, he expects them to conduct a test related to thermonuclear weapons. He said he believes North Korea wants to develop miniaturized, two-stage thermonuclear weapons that use less uranium.
Whether North Korean authorities intend to carry out a thermonuclear test after restoring the tunnel at Punggye-ri, or whether they plan to carry out a separate thermonuclear test after first testing a miniaturized tactical nuke, remains unclear.
However, if North Korean authorities plan to conduct a nuclear test right after restoring the tunnel, it seems likely they will opt for a low-yield tactical nuclear test.
Meanwhile, within North Korea’s ruling party, there is a widespread belief that Pyongyang must conduct a seventh nuclear test to win recognition as a nuclear power from the international community.
North Korea is stressing to high-ranking party cadres the need to bolster the country’s independent self-defense by quickly improving missile capabilities and perfecting multiple warhead technology. As the authorities have already made efforts to convince high-ranking cadres of the need for a test, the country’s leadership may carry out the test soon.
Moreover, even North Korea restarts nuclear tests, the regime may suffer little from sanctions from either the UN Security Council or the US.
In fact, the UN Security Council failed to put additional sanctions on North Korea following its ICBM test on Mar. 24 due to opposition from Russia and China. Instead, the US responded by announcing sanctions on organizations that support the development of ballistic missiles, including the Ministry of Rocket Industry, the Hapjanggang Trading Corporation, Korea Rounsan Trading Corporation, Sungnisan Trading Corporation, and the Unchon Trading Corporation.
However, North Korean authorities are reportedly responding to these sanctions with continued ideological efforts directed at party cadres, stressing that they “should not care” since “we’ve been under sanctions for 70 years.”
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
11. North Korea issues orders regarding young violators of anti-reactionary thought law
Also from a forthcoming paper I have on the new Yoon administration:
The ROK/U.S. alliance must bring all ROK and U.S. influence capabilities to bear on the north. It is important to understand that Kim Jong-un fears the Korean people in the north more than he fears the U.S. military. And his biggest fear is when the people have information and knowledge about life in the South, understand their unalienable rights and long to have the same rights as their brothers and sisters in the South.
North Korea issues orders regarding young violators of anti-reactionary thought law
Nationwide police surveys have reportedly revealed that 90% of young people have come into contact with foreign culture
Students at North Korea’s Pyongyang Elementary School take computer lessons. / Image: Ryukyung
The Justice Department of North Korea’s ruling party has recently instructed relevant agencies nationwide on how to deal with minors who violate the country’s law to eradicate “reactionary thought and culture.”
According to Daily NK sources in Pyongyang and South Hwanghae Province, the Justice Department sent a written proposal outlining its opinions on punishing youth offenders of the law on reactionary thought and culture to the Central Committee on Apr. 4. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ratified the proposal, and it was sent to legal and policing bodies nationwide in the form of an order from Apr. 8.
The sources say the Justice Department began preparing separate regulations after concluding that with crackdowns increasing since the December 2020 enactment of the anti-reactionary thought and culture law, which includes legal punishments for “anti-socialist behavior” such as distributing illegal videos, it could not make “ideological criminals” even out of minors who have experienced “foreign culture.”
One of the sources told Daily NK that the department made an internal conclusion that new, “realitist” legal directives regarding teens were needed with nationwide police surveys revealing that 90% of young people have come into contact with foreign culture.
The new regulations — called the “April 8 Ratification Tasks” — are fivefold, broadly speaking.
- Expunging the legal record of minors under the age of 14 who violated the law on reactionary thought and culture over the last two years, and freeing them from investigation or detention.
- Regarding minors ages 14 to 17, those being investigated while under confinement should be freed from Apr. 8, 2022 and subject to “social education.” However, this does not include those who have already been tried and legally processed.
- Violators under 14 will be subject to social education, with their parents and schools responsible for the classes. However, if the parents are being punished, too, the head of the administrative district where they live should take responsibility for the classes.
- Both offenders under the age of 14 and those between 14 and 17, as people subject to social education, will be regarded as people who have committed no crimes.
- Offenders under the age of 14 who were subject to education will face tougher punishments if they reoffend after the age of 17.
North Korea is making political use of the more lenient regulations, too, promoting them as “consideration” by the party to mark late North Korean leader Kim Il Sung’s birthday on Apr. 15.
The source in Pyongyang said this was the first time the authorities have issued orders to the police, prosecutors, and courts regarding the punishment of youth offenders since the enactment of the anti-reactionary thought and culture law.
Taken as a whole, the sources’ statements suggest that North Korea initially crafted no separate regulations on punishing young offenders when it enacted the law. Accordingly, courts were arbitrarily handing down sentences, sometimes sentencing minors to education, and sometimes sentencing them to the same heavy punishments as adults.
In particular, persons under the age of 14 had generally been exempt from investigations in accordance with laws excluding people under that age from criminal responsibility. But with cases of children distributing illegal videos rising, the authorities had reportedly been carrying out haphazard arrests and investigations of minors for violations of the law.
One of the sources said that some officials concluded that with several entities enforcing the law to eradicate reactionary thought and culture, enforcement agencies were competing for results, leading to excessive legal punishments of minors.
With the new regulations, minors who violated the law have been freed and sent home and to school, subject instead to “social education.”
The source in Pyongyang said about ten 13-year-old middle school students who were busted in Songyo and Rangrang districts for passing around South Korean music videos were freed from pre-trial detention.
North Korea reportedly distributed educational materials to the families and schools of the released offenders, and has been conducting classes to the effect that “ideological training during youth is an important factor determining not only their own lives, but also whether they will become good workers for the state and party, or ungrateful villains.”
The source in South Hwanghae Province added that in response to the new regulations, police, prosecutors and courts are telling schools, government organizations and inminban (people’s units) to carry out regular inspections of how students are using mobile phones and computers at home and in schools so that they avoid “being covered in strange cultures.”
This is to say, the authorities are stressing the importance of ideological education at home and in school to eliminate the phenomenon of curious young people using electronic devices to access foreign culture.
The source added that the courts and police are employing fear as well, telling adolescent offenders that if they reoffend during their teens — “ungrateful for the party’s benevolence” for subjecting them merely to education — they would face criminal punishment for both the latest crime and the one they committed when they were young.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
12. A behind-the-scenes look at Moon’s 5 years in office, from inter-Korean peace talks to real estate woes
A behind-the-scenes look at Moon’s 5 years in office, from inter-Korean peace talks to real estate woes
Posted on : Apr.15,2022 17:34 KST Modified on : Apr.15,2022 17:34 KST
A new book featuring interviews with current and former Blue House staffers gives an intimate look at the achievements and challenges of the Moon Jae-in administration
South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un wave to the crowd at a Rungrado 1st of May Stadium in Pyongyang on Sept. 19, 2018. (Pyongyang pool photo)
“At first, North Korea intended the format of the speech [at the Rungrado 1st of May Stadium] to be a simple greeting to the citizens of Pyongyang, but we suggested holding a live broadcast and making it an official address. This time, it was North Korea that seemed a little flustered.” (Youn Kun-young, former director of the Blue House office of state affairs planning and monitoring).“I remember it was around 3 am on the morning of Sept.14. There were [already] over 30 documents related to the military agreement, but around 2 am, the North said, ‘Let’s go back to the drawing board.’ We then suggested pushing through to the end instead, and if it doesn't work then, to withdraw. I don’t know what message they must have received, but the North shifted its stance to accept most of the issues between the two sides. I thought to myself, ‘North Korea really did have the determination [to sign a deal].” (Choi Jong-kun, former presidential secretary for peace and arms control).These stories took place during the short spring thaw of the Cold War that the Korean Peninsula experienced in the wake of President Moon Jae-in’s September 2018 address in Pyongyang and the subsequent dismantlement of guard posts on the Demilitarized Zone.A book detailing the behind-the-scenes process of this period has recently hit shelves. Titled “The Great Country of the People,” the book contains interviews with 41 officials, including 13 current and former officials who worked in the Office of the President under Moon.Push and pull inter-Korean peace processIn the book, Youn Kun-young, who previously served as director of the Blue House office of state affairs planning and monitoring and currently serves in the National Assembly, reveals never-before-told details of the negotiations between the two Koreas that took place regarding Moon’s 2018 speech in North Korea.Youn says there were “a lot of concerns about the plan itself.”“The speech was supposed to be given ahead of this mass play called ‘The Glorious Motherland’ boasted by North Korea. North Korea was using this performance into propaganda for the regime, and there were topics that could be sensitive, domestically speaking,” he says.“But instead, the president said that we should go out there boldly,” Youn says, adding that Moon argued there was no need to take a defensive position since South Korea is far “superior" and “confident.”After the South Koreans came to the negotiation table with that in mind, North Korea said it would revise any sensitive parts of the speech.“After many twists and turns, the schedule was finalized,” Youn says.Moreover, Choi Jong-kun, a former secretary to the president for peace and arms control and the current first vice minister of foreign affairs, conveys the push-and-pull bargaining process leading up to the Sept. 19 inter-Korean military agreement.“One of the things the North said was ‘If I go back to Pyongyang as is, I’d be seen as a surrenderer.’ This shows that the North was also internally putting significant effort into reaching a consensus,” Choi says.“The will of the supreme leader of North Korea is important, but how much of that will is materialized [. . .] through internal military consultations is another matter,” Choi adds.The cover of “The Great Country of the People” (courtesy of Hans Media Publishing)
Real estate was “wake-up call”The book also includes reflections on the Moon administration’s real estate policies. Calling the painful real estate issue a “wake-up call,” it acknowledges mistakes were made, stating that “the results of the policy did not meet expectations” and that the president had apologized multiple times to the Korean people for these failures.“[We were] unable to tame the buying craze that hit the real estate market, and, while watching prices soar, the young generation had to either put everything down to their soul on the line for a loan to buy [a home] or give up,” the book reads. The text notes the Moon administration’s “remorse for being unable to carry out a task so crucial to the livelihood of the people.”Additionally, a system in which individual landlords could register their property as a business promoted under Moon was seen by many as a tax loophole, and was criticized as exacerbating housing unavailability and rising home prices. To this point, the book states that the Moon administration “faced criticism for lack of policy consistency and undermining public trust.”Regarding the so-called “Three Laws on Rent and Lease” that President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol said his administration would revise, the book states that the system was initially introduced to “stabilize” the living situation for renters.“Although some confusion occurred at the beginning of the introduction of the system, it is still necessary to continuously review the necessity of supplementation as the system is still in the early stages of implementation,” the book states.In particular, an interview with the former Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport Byeon Chang-heum notes that the Blue House found it painful to lose the public’s trust regarding real estate policy.“Restoring trust in housing policies was important, but in the end, it is regrettable that public trust has instead fallen due to me, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, and the institution [Korea Land & Housing Corporation] I headed,” Byeon states.“If you’re not going to pay attention to what’s happening on the ground, at least watch the news”In addition, scenes of Moon’s exasperation during the mask shortage Korea faced early in the COVID-19 pandemic are included in the book. In a closed-door meeting, Moon reportedly expressed his deep frustration with the situation.“How long are you going to act like this, unable to solve this one [issue of] masks? What’s the problem here?” Moon reportedly asked his aides. “I hear you don’t watch the news, but if you’re not going to pay attention to what’s happening on the ground, at least watch the news,” Moon said, imploring his aides to understand what Koreans were facing.In response to this, Moon’s Chief of Staff Noh Young-min summoned national policy advisor Kim Sang-jo, and launched the so-called “Red Sea Project” to supply 20 million masks a day. In the book, it’s revealed that the Blue House chose this name because of the “pressing need for an Exodus-level miracle.” It marked the start of its full-on efforts to ensure Koreans had access to masks.The book also makes mention of Moon’s trips overseas. Park Yong-maan, the former chairman of the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, refutes the claim that Moon ordered businesspeople around to join him on these trips.“Nowadays, the chairmen of large corporations are not at [the president’s] disposal,” Park said.“I have traveled a lot with presidents of previous administrations too, but I was never able to do any real sightseeing,” Park says. “The president doesn’t bring busy people along to just have a good time.”However, regarding his experiences on foreign trips with the president, Park says that, compared to previous administrations, the atmosphere is much less rigid. “In the past, when the president walked by, everyone froze. These days, people just take pictures comfortably and feel freer,” Park said.By Lee Wan, staff reporterPlease direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]
13. North Korea, NFTs and a hit video game: inside a $500m cryptocurrency theft
Excerpts:
If one entrusts their keys to the wrong second-layer intermediary, it’s possible that they could be a victim of a heist. Collectively, most aren’t used to this responsibility.
Crypto companies are beginning to get more serious about security, Heilman said, but a world without hacks is not realistic, he added. “You never become secure, you just become more secure,” he said. “So given the ease of monetizing a vulnerability in one of these systems, I think that it is likely that we will continue to see things get hacked, and the question will not be, ‘is there a new hack this month?’ It will be: ‘how frequent are the hacks this month?’”
“There are important things that the industry needs to overcome in order to actually really grow and scale,” said Grauer, “because you can’t have a healthy growing industry if everyone is afraid of getting hacked.”
North Korea, NFTs and a hit video game: inside a $500m cryptocurrency theft
Another high-profile hack has raised more questions about the vulnerabilities of the blockchain
Late last month, hackers made off with what was then worth more than $500m from the systems of cryptocurrency network Ronin, in what is believed to be the second-largest cryptocurrency theft on record.
Ronin was a juicy target for a hacker. The blockchain project supports the wildly popular Axie Infinity video game, which with an estimated 8 million players has drawn comparisons to action-driven collecting games like Pokémon Go.
Axie Infinity is hot and involves substantial sums of money. Players purchase creatures called Axies in the form of NFTs, unique digital assets known as non-fungible tokens. The creatures can breed, battle and even be exchanged for cold, hard cash.
The game has swelled in popularity as players see the potential to earn real money. In 2020, one 22-year-old player from the Philippines reportedly bought two apartments in Manila with his earnings from the game. Last year, another player said he earned more through Axie Infinity and other online games than from his full-time job at Goldman Sachs.
But the underpinnings of the game face significant security challenges. To play, gamers must move their money from Ethereum to Ronin on a blockchain “bridge” system. Ronin is a “sidechain” of Ethereum – a scaling solution that allows transactions to happen faster than on Ethereum, which is congested by the amount of activity it hosts. Hosting the game on this sidechain ensures it can grow without losing functionality. Bridges can hold a lot of money at once, so by targeting the Ronin Bridge that transferred players’ assets between blockchains, hackers seized control of the assets and took off with the money.
In-game assets called ‘Axies’ are seen in this undated handout image from the blockchain-based game Axie Infinity Photograph: Sky Mavis/Reuters
The US government said this week it believes North Korean hackers are behind the heist. But it’s just the latest in a string of brazen high-profile crypto thefts. In 2018, more than $530m was stolen from the crypto exchange Coincheck. In February, hackers made off with $320m from the decentralized finance platform Wormhole (though that loot was eventually returned). And in that same month, in perhaps the most publicized cyber heist of the year, prosecutors charged odd couple Ilya “Dutch” Lichtenstein and his wife, Heather Morgan, – also known for her cringeworthy raps on TikTok under the name Razzlekhan – with conspiracy to launder billions of dollars worth of bitcoin stolen from the crypto exchange Bitfinex in 2016.
It’s a trend. In 2021, $3.2bn in cryptocurrency was stolen from individuals and services, according to a crypto crime report by Chainalysis, a company that provides blockchain data and analysis to banks, governments and other businesses. (Ronin is also working with Chainalysis to trace the funds stolen in the hack, according to Reuters.) The figure is almost six times this amount stolen in 2020. So far this year, more than $1bn has already been stolen, according to experts at Chainalysis and other security firms.
Vulnerabilities in smart contracts
The high-profile hacks and substantial sums of money involved have raised questions about how vulnerable the blockchain – long considered a secure place to store assets – is to such breaches.
Some experts say the rise in reports of cryptotheft come as cryptocurrency is more widely used and better understood than ever before.
“You basically have a lot of money on the table, and on a very public table,” said Nicholas Christin, an associate professor at Carnegie Mellon University who researches online crime and computer and network security. With large sums of money publicly moving around on these transparent systems, it can be enticing for a hacker to pounce.
To understand how these heists are possible, it’s important to distinguish between the blockchain and other programs that operate on top of it, experts say. The blockchain itself is a decentralized public ledger that allows for peer-to-peer transactions. It’s the foundational layer that bitcoin, Ethereum or Solana are built upon.
The second layer – the one that’s frequently exploited – are smart contracts that run on top of blockchains. Smart contracts are agreements in code that automatically execute when the terms of the contract are met. The common analogy is to a digital vending machine – select a product, put in the correct amount of money, and your item will be automatically dispensed. These contracts are irreversible.
The hackers weasel their way to the money through these second-layer systems by either taking advantage of bugs in the code, or getting hold of the private keys that will let them into the systems, explained Christin. Some hackers even subvert the smart contracts to redirect the funds into their hands.
In the Axie Infinity hack, which targeted the Ronin Bridge, the hacker obtained enough private keys to control the bridge and drain the funds. Since so many users had their assets in the bridge, the payout was massive.
“Underlying blockchain protocol is secure,” said Ronghui Gu, founder and CEO of the blockchain security firm Certik. “But the programs – the smart contracts – running on top of them are still like other normal programs, which can have software bugs and vulnerabilities.”
It’s common for hackers to try to exploit the code of one of their targets. And it helps that much of the code for blockchain programs is open source, making it easily accessible for hackers who want to look over the code and find potential bugs.
“In this world people say ‘in code we trust,’ but the code itself is indeed not that trustworthy,” said Gu. When he started his blockchain security firm in 2018, Gu explained, only a few companies used third-party security services like his to audit and assess their code – a critical security backstop – but he’s seen the number gradually tick up.
Crypto exchanges are also major targets for hacks. Exchanges are like banks, they’re central entities that hold massive amounts of their users’ money and transactions are irreversible. Like bridges, they are a middleman program that tends to be targeted. “Those big exchanges have a huge target on their back,” said Christin.
Victims left with big security burden
Once crypto assets are stolen it can be a challenge for thieves to cash out, especially if the heist is in the nine-figure range. That means funds are often left in limbo for years, or even indefinitely. During that time, the value of the stolen funds can fluctuate due to the volatile nature of the crypto market.
The Chainalysis crypto crime report estimates that criminals are currently holding at least $10bn worth of cryptocurrency, the vast majority obtained through theft. Thanks to transparency on the blockchain, it’s possible to trace these transactions and holdings, but the identity of the perpetrator is hard to nail down until the funds are cashed out.
One can look to the Bitfinex scandal as a case study in attempted laundering. “The funds didn’t move for an extremely long time. And then when they tried to initiate the laundering process, this was an opportunity for law enforcement to get involved again, because people are following these hacks,” said Kim Grauer, director of research at Chainalysis.
For victims of the schemes, there are few ways to recover assets. “If a bank’s security fails, it’s not that bad for the bank,” said Ethan Heilman, a cybersecurity expert and co-founder of the cloud service BastionZero. “But if you’re a cryptocurrency exchange and someone empties out all your cryptocurrency that’s really bad for you.” Banks have measures in place to protect their clients that the blockchain lacks. If one’s credit card is stolen, insurance policies ensure that one will usually receive that money back. On the blockchain, however, transactions are irreversible – there is no undo button.
That means there is a tremendous security burden on individual users to keep their assets safe. “End users may not necessarily be cognizant of the security risks that they incur,” said Christin. “Quite frankly, even people in the field don’t have time to necessarily go and review some smart contract source code.”
If one entrusts their keys to the wrong second-layer intermediary, it’s possible that they could be a victim of a heist. Collectively, most aren’t used to this responsibility.
Crypto companies are beginning to get more serious about security, Heilman said, but a world without hacks is not realistic, he added. “You never become secure, you just become more secure,” he said. “So given the ease of monetizing a vulnerability in one of these systems, I think that it is likely that we will continue to see things get hacked, and the question will not be, ‘is there a new hack this month?’ It will be: ‘how frequent are the hacks this month?’”
“There are important things that the industry needs to overcome in order to actually really grow and scale,” said Grauer, “because you can’t have a healthy growing industry if everyone is afraid of getting hacked.”
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
