Quotes of the Day:
“In keeping silent about evil, in burying it so deep within us that no sign of it appears on the surface, we are implanting it, and it will rise up a thousand fold in the future. When we neither punish nor reproach evildoers, we are not simply protecting their trivial old age, we are thereby ripping the foundations of justice from beneath new generations.”
- Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago 1918–1956
"The golden way is to be friends with the world and to regard the whole human family as one."
- Mahatma Gandhi
"Success is to be measured not so much by the position that one has reached in life as by the obstacles which he has overcome."
- Booker T. Washington
1. President-elect Yoon completes phone talks to all four Quad leaders
2. Yoon aims to open Cheong Wa Dae to public 'before spring flowers wither'
3. U.N. rapporteur urges provision of vaccines to N. Korea
4. Relocation of presidential office emerges as hot button issue
5. Yoon's transition team dominated by Seoul-born, 50-something men with SNU diplomas
6. Winston Churchill's advice for new Korean leadership
7. Why North Korea Won’t Give Up Its Nuclear Weapons
8. A debate about nuclear weapons resurfaces in East Asia
9. [Editorial] End imperial presidency (South Korea)
10. U.N. report: North Korea food shortages, human rights abuses worst in years
11. U.S. and ROK committed to maintaining ironclad alliance
12. The problem with ‘han’ 한 恨
1. President-elect Yoon completes phone talks to all four Quad leaders
An indicator of the president-elect's future intentions or crafted reporting by the Donga Ilbo to support an agenda?
President-elect Yoon completes phone talks to all four Quad leaders
Posted March. 18, 2022 07:53,
Updated March. 18, 2022 07:53
President-elect Yoon completes phone talks to all four Quad leaders. March. 18, 2022 07:53. by Jeong-Soo Hong hong@donga.com.
South Korean President-elect Yoon Seok-youl on Thursday had a phone call with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi – the 5th major head of state with whom he spoke since he was elected the 20th South Korean president. Yoon has talked to the leaders of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) – the United States, Japan, Australia and India – over the phone for the past eight days after being elected.
President-elect Yoon and Indian Prime Minister Modi reached agreement on the enhancement of the two nations’ cooperative relationship in a 20-minute-long dialogue. Last Thursday, Prime Minister Modi tweeted a congratulatory message to Yoon, saying, “I am looking forward to working with him to further expand and strengthen the India-ROK Special Strategic Partnership.”
India was Yoon’s 5th nation to talk to over the phone following the United States last Thursday, Japan last Friday, Britain on Monday and Australia on Wednesday. Experts analyzed that Yoon may intend to come closer step by step to the joining of the Quad – a united front across the Indo-Pacific region led by the United States against China, describing his recent moves as an implication of the upcoming Yoon administration’s pragmatic diplomatic policy with a stronger South Korea-U.S. alliance at the center.
2. Yoon aims to open Cheong Wa Dae to public 'before spring flowers wither'
Yoon aims to open Cheong Wa Dae to public 'before spring flowers wither' | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, March 18 (Yonhap) -- President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol aims to open Cheong Wa Dae to the public "before spring flowers wither," Yoon's spokesperson said Friday, suggesting that the compound would be turned into a public place before Yoon's inauguration in May.
Kim Eun-hye, Yoon's spokesperson, made the remarks as Yoon and his transition team is considering relocating the presidential office to either the foreign ministry building in Gwanghwamun or the defense ministry compound in Yongsan.
"We will return Cheong Wa Dae to the people before spring flowers wither," Kim told reporters.
Yoon pledged during the campaign that if elected, he would set up his office in the Seoul government complex in Gwanghwamun and open the Cheong Wa Dae compound to the public.
The defense ministry compound in Yongsan has recently emerged as an alternative because of its advantages in terms of security and other issues.
Some members of Yoon's transition committee plan to visit the foreign ministry building and the defense ministry compound later Friday.
Yoon's transition committee will determine the final location after the on-site inspection, Kim said.
"There should be a consensus on this because it was the most important pledge of President-elect Yoon," she said. "After today's inspection, we will go through the process of collecting various opinions and holding debates and discussions."
Critics have viewed Cheong Wa Dae as a symbol of an "imperial" presidency and as a cause of making the president be out of touch with the public due to its location on a secluded compound on the foothills of a mountain just north of Gwanghwamun.
"What we're going to do is get out of Cheong Wa Dae, which has been a symbol of absolute power in Korean history," Kim said. "We will be returning the power to the people."
Media reports said relocating the presidential office may cost as much as 1 trillion won (US$827.9 million). However, Kim said such an estimate is "excessive," adding the transition team will not waste taxpayers' money.
kdh@yna.co.kr
(END)
3. U.N. rapporteur urges provision of vaccines to N. Korea
But the question is whether Kim Jong-un will accept them?
U.N. rapporteur urges provision of vaccines to N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, March 18 (Yonhap) -- The U.N. special rapporteur on North Korea's human rights has repeated his call for the international community to send enough COVID-19 vaccines to the reclusive country, a report showed Friday.
Tomas Ojea Quintana described it as a "new way" to engage with the North in his report on its human rights situation to be submitted to the U.N. Human Rights Council next week, with his six-year term ending in August.
"A new way of thinking needs to take hold," the report read. "This can begin with an offer of 60 million vaccines to tackle COVID-19 as the gateway to broader conversations on capacity development, including on food production, healthcare, and water and sanitation to improve the capacity of the state to fulfill its human rights obligations."
He visited Seoul last month to gather information for the annual report. The North, which has a population of over 25 million, has yet to begin an anti-coronavirus inoculation program.
The report also noted "further deterioration" of the human rights situation in the North over the past six years, adding Pyongyang has failed to make "meaningful reform." It called on the nation to urgently invest available resources to ensure basic needs are met and to gradually open its borders.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
4. Relocation of presidential office emerges as hot button issue
The President-elect will start his term with controversy of his own making.
(News Focus) Relocation of presidential office emerges as hot button issue | Yonhap News Agency
By Lee Haye-ah
SEOUL, March 18 (Yonhap) -- President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol's push to relocate the presidential office has become a hot button issue amid competing views on whether it will help the president better communicate with the people or simply waste resources.
Yoon was elected last week after promising to "return" Cheong Wa Dae to the public in a move intended to demonstrate his commitment to removing the office of the president from its high pedestal.
Yoon's plan was to work from the government complex in nearby Gwanghwamun, keep his aides close in the same building and interact frequently with people passing through downtown.
But the vision for a "Gwanghwamun era" hit a snag this week as officials questioned whether the building can be secured from outside threats, given that it is surrounded by other high-rise structures, and whether the Cheong Wa Dae compound can be fully opened to the public if the president still needs to use the underground bunker in national emergencies.
As an alternative, Yoon's transition team began to consider the defense ministry compound in Seoul's central district of Yongsan, which proponents argue would resolve any security concerns and still meet the president-elect's wishes to be closer to the people because of its proximity to a planned national park.
That option, however, was also met with skepticism.
Some insiders worried the incoming government will give the impression of a "military regime" if the president shares his work space with the military, while others claimed the walled compound is no less secluded than Cheong Wa Dae and construction on the planned park could still be years away as the land has yet to be returned from the U.S. military, which uses it as a base.
The ruling Democratic Party stepped up its attacks on Yoon's main opposition People Power Party.
"If the president's office moves to the defense ministry, the many departments of the ministry and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ... that are faithfully carrying out their duties inside the compound will all have to stop their work and move before the end of the month," Rep. Kim Byung-joo of the DP, a former Army general, said during a joint press conference Thursday.
"At a time when they must focus on maintaining readiness and respond to real-time events because of North Korea's missile launches and growing security threats, I feel devastated at the reality that the entire military personnel are preparing to move," he said.
While the Gwanghwamun government complex has been ruled out, the adjacent annex building used by the foreign ministry remains one of two options, along with the defense ministry.
The government estimates that relocating to the defense ministry will cost 50 billion won (US$41 million), while relocating to the foreign ministry building will cost 100 billion won.
The difference is largely due to the rent the foreign ministry will have to pay on new office space after it moves out and the cost of establishing a secure network for communications with overseas missions, according to officials.
But despite the larger space occupied by the defense ministry compound, military sources said it isn't enough to accommodate the presidential office unless some of the current occupants move out.
The compound stands on 276,000 square meters of land and is shared by numerous military commands and units with some 4,000 military personnel and public servants.
The 50 billion won involved in moving the presidential office to the defense ministry does not include the cost of moving military facilities out of the compound.
Yoon is not the first person to pledge to relocate Cheong Wa Dae.
President Moon Jae-in made a similar pledge before scrapping it over logistical and security issues, leading some of his aides to join the relocation debate in apparent defense of Moon.
Park Soo-hyun, senior presidential secretary for public communication, said Thursday that the current Cheong Wa Dae layout does not prevent Moon from communicating with his aides and that Moon is always able to meet with his aides "within a minute or two."
His comment came after Yoon's spokesperson, Kim Eun-hye, claimed that it takes "a considerable amount of time" to move between the president's office and his secretaries' office building.
"President Moon has never used the office in the main building," Park wrote on Facebook, saying there must have been confusion with the Cheong Wa Dae of the administrations of former Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye.
"In order to remove the physical distance between the main building and the secretaries' building, he uses the third floor office in the (secretaries' building)," Park said.
Tak Hyun-min, Moon's protocol secretary, added on his Facebook page: "I just checked the travel time (between the main building office and the secretaries' building), and it took 30 seconds running and 57 seconds walking."
On Friday, Yoon's spokesperson made clear that the relocation will move forward following Yoon's decision Thursday to choose between the foreign ministry building and the defense ministry building.
Yoon made the decision after a meeting with his transition team members, and some of the members are scheduled to visit the two sites Friday afternoon.
"Because it was the most important of President-elect Yoon's campaign promises, as much as it is important, there needs to be a consensus," Kim said at a press briefing Friday. "We will return Cheong Wa Dae to the people before the spring flowers wither."
Earlier this week, she had said there is "zero chance" Yoon will move in to Cheong Wa Dae.
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
5. Yoon's transition team dominated by Seoul-born, 50-something men with SNU diplomas
Yoon's transition team dominated by Seoul-born, 50-something men with SNU diplomas
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol, front row third from left, poses with the leadership of the conservative main opposition People Power Party and members of his transition committee in front of the committee headquarters in Seoul's Jongno District, Friday. Joint Press Corps By Jung Da-min
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol's transition committee has faced criticism that its membership lacks the diversity needed to represent the views of different gender and age groups.
Yoon's transition committee has been dubbed "Seo-oh-nam" in Korean, with "Seo" indicating Seoul National University and those born in Seoul, "oh" referring to those in their 50s and "nam" meaning men.
Out of the total 24 members including the spokeswoman and 23 members of seven divisions under the committee, 13 graduated from Seoul National University and 12 were born in Seoul.
Their average age is 57.6. While 22 of the 24 are in their 50s or 60s, only two members are in their 40s, with the youngest being 45-year-old Nam Ki-tae, professor at the department of materials science and engineering of Seoul National University, on the science, technology and education division.
Only four are women, and they are in their 50s and 60s.
Other political parties, including the liberal ruling Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) and the minor progressive Justice Party, said Yoon's transition committee has failed to present a vision for national unity due to the "closed and regressive" selection of its members.
Park Ji-hyun, co-chairwoman of the DPK's emergency committee, pointed out that the committee has no members in their 20s or 30s.
"Such a selection of members favoring certain age groups, certain universities and certain regions is the wrong answer and it is regretful that there is no diversity," Park said during a meeting of the DPK emergency committee at the National Assembly, Friday.
Yoon graduated from Seoul National University Law School, which is also the alma mater of former First Vice Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok, head of the transition committee's first economy division, conservative main opposition People Power Party (PPP) Rep. Yoo Sang-bum, a member of the committee's state affairs, judiciary and administrative division, PPP Rep. Kwon Young-se, the transition committee's vice chairman, former Jeju Governor Won Hee-ryong, its planning chief, and former four-term lawmaker Park Joo-sun, the chair of the inauguration ceremony preparation committee.
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol, center, presides over the first meeting of his transition committee at the committee headquarters in Seoul's Jongno District, Friday. Joint Press Corps
"I believe President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol's nomination principle which values ability and experience is reflected in the nominations for the transition committee," Park Joon-sun said in a radio interview with local broadcaster CBS, Friday, when asked about the criticisms of the transition committee's lack of diversity.
The DPK's emergency committee co-chair Park said Yoon's transition committee is also missing figures who could represent many other fields, including education and climate crisis management.
"There is no member in charge of dealing with the climate crisis which is an important and priceless matter. It seems like Yoon's transition committee does not care about the future of the young generation as well as young students or children," Park said.
"Education experts have also been excluded in the nominations for the transition committee's science, technology and education division, when only science and technology experts were included... The growing need to bridge the education gap amid the COVID-19 crisis should not be ignored."
Criticism also grew against Yoon's transition committee for lacking a member in charge of real estate issues, after one of Yoon's main pledges was to resolve real estate issues.
As for the criticism regarding the absence of real estate experts, Yoon's spokeswoman Rep. Kim Eun-hye said Thursday that the transition committee is planning to bring in other experts from different fields including real estate as expert members.
All three members of the committee's diplomacy and security division held high-ranking positions previously in the 2008-13 Lee Myung-bak administration. They are Kim Sung-han, former second vice foreign minister from 2012 to 2013 and a professor at Korea University's Graduate School of International Studies who will lead the division, Kim Tae-hyo, who served as presidential secretary on national security strategy between 2008 and 2012, and Lee Jong-sup, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
6. Winston Churchill's advice for new Korean leadership
Conclusion:
Despite best efforts, the new leadership will inevitably face many critical moments where no end is in sight and risk of any options are too high. He may have to compromise for a second best or less worst option. He could learn from some of his predecessors and foreign leaders, who as Churchill admonished, "rose to the occasion" for their national interests and noble causes with unfaltering resolve.
President John F. Kennedy, who sagaciously overcame the 13 day hair-trigger Cuban missile crisis, recalled his final yet lonely decision: "the essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer, often, indeed decider himself."
The ultimate decisions of the next leadership will shape the destiny of South Korea not just for the next five years, but for many years to come.
Winston Churchill's advice for new Korean leadership
By Yun Byung-se
"Kites rise highest against the wind, not with it," said Winston Churchill, former British Prime Minister and a foremost role model for the Korean President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol. Among the many good lessons from Churchill, this maxim seems to be a quite fitting reminder and advice for the new Korean leader at this juncture.
The President-elect is now set to steer the Korean nation through the turbulent waters for the next five years. Turbulent not only in the Korean waters, but also in the Indo-Pacific and global waters. Nowhere are the waters calm. Underneath, tectonic changes are taking place. The geopolitical weather forecast does not show when normalcy will be restored. But it is certain that frequent storms, heavy rains and high winds will await him as he tries to sail safely.
The two months from now until inauguration on May 10 will be a critical time for the transition team to lay the groundwork for the incoming government. Since the devil is in the details, they will have to refine their broadly framed presidential campaign pledges into actionable policies with adjustments as necessary. It will be far from a leisurely rehearsal. It is rather like waiting in full gear in crisis mode.
His team cannot afford the luxury of a prolonged familiarization process.
As he nominates his forthcoming cabinet members later, one cannot overemphasize the importance of proven capabilities of individuals and seamless teamwork in the foreign and national security team to tackle multiple daunting challenges and crises of unprecedented magnitude and complexity. The transition committee's groundwork and composition of the new cabinet will be a litmus test that will determine the success or failure of the new administration.
His first challenge as the president is most likely to come from North Korea. He has no time to lose in preventive diplomacy and crisis management to address the direct and imminent threat from Pyongyang's formidable nuclear arsenal and missile capability of all sorts as well as publicized intention to actually use them.
Over the last 30 years, North Korea has shown a clear pattern of testing the will of new administrations in either South Korea or the United States during their transition. Even the progressive Moon Jae-in administration had to swallow four rounds of North Korean missile tests, including an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), in his first month of presidency to be followed by a nuclear test some months later.
Ten rounds of missile tests since January this year, including an IRBM and a hypersonic gliding vehicle (HGV), is a historic record. Last Friday, South Korea and the U.S. jointly concluded that North Korea's two recent launches, disguised as space launches, were partial tests of a new monster inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) dubbed Hwasong-17, prior to conducting a full launch in the near future. Kim Jong-un's recent instructions and visit to the ICBM site substantiates this analysis.
When the ICBM launch becomes a reality, it will be a breach of the moratorium that Kim has self-imposed for the last four years, dealing a final blow to Moon's engagement policy. It will certainly raise the crisis level to a new height and complicate the North Korean nuclear and missile conundrum, inviting much tougher responses from the new Korean leadership in coordination with the Biden administration.
For South Korea, new game-changers such as Iskander missiles, tactical nukes, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and HGVs pose an ever-greater existential threat. By the end of Yoon's term, North Korea is estimated to possess between 150 and 240 nuclear weapons. The gravity of the challenge surpasses that of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.
This is one key reason why the new president should coordinate with the U.S. on a new concerted North Korea strategy as soon as possible. His forthcoming meeting with President Biden in the near future will serve as a critical momentum to restore the faded trust between the two allies.
His second challenge will be to reset or reorient key foreign and security policies as were promised throughout the campaign. More changes, rather than continuity, are expected. In his first press conference as the president-elect last week, he set the right tone and direction on North Korea, defense posture, ROK-U.S. alliance, Japan and China policies, Korea's regional and global roles, economic security as well as human rights and democracy. It will be a return to normalcy like putting back the horse before the cart once again.
Nevertheless, policy shifts will not come without ramifications. For example, crises and tensions could arise in such issues as U.S. nuclear posture and diplomacy vis-a-vis Pyongyang, additional THAAD deployment, recurring history disputes with Japan, Quad participation and U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral cooperation, Russia sanctions, and ROK-U.S. military exercises, just to name a few. How to defuse and manage possible adverse reactions from diverse stakeholders demands sophisticated strategy and diplomacy from the outset. At the core of all these efforts should be the iron-clad ROK-U.S. comprehensive alliance.
His third challenge is to position South Korea wisely and firmly in ever-deepening fragmentation of regional and global order as were manifested by U.S.-China strategic competition and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The new Korean administration should make its commitment to peace, democracy and universal values clear and play responsible roles commensurate with its weight and status in the ongoing geopolitical and geo-economic transformation.
As economic security is becoming integral to national security, it needs to tackle and stay ahead of the global supply chain and technology disruption emanating from diverse factors. Active expansion of its regional and global network is a sine qua non for navigating through the fierce competition.
Despite best efforts, the new leadership will inevitably face many critical moments where no end is in sight and risk of any options are too high. He may have to compromise for a second best or less worst option. He could learn from some of his predecessors and foreign leaders, who as Churchill admonished, "rose to the occasion" for their national interests and noble causes with unfaltering resolve.
President John F. Kennedy, who sagaciously overcame the 13 day hair-trigger Cuban missile crisis, recalled his final yet lonely decision: "the essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer, often, indeed decider himself."
The ultimate decisions of the next leadership will shape the destiny of South Korea not just for the next five years, but for many years to come.
Yun Byung-se is former foreign minister of South Korea. He is now a board member of Korea Peace Foundation and is a member of several ex-global leaders' forums and task forces, including the Astana Forum and its Consultative Council as well as the Task Force on U.S. Allies and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation sponsored by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.
7. Why North Korea Won’t Give Up Its Nuclear Weapons
It is good to see some people are finally coming around to this understanding.
Why North Korea Won’t Give Up Its Nuclear Weapons
North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong Un’s regime has conducted missile tests almost every week since the start of 2022.
How will Americans know when North Korea has developed nukes that could strike the United States? A missile defense expert was once asked. He shrugged and said, “Well, you’re going to see a bright light.”
The answer speaks to the uncertainty of whether Pyongyang can actually defeat U.S. defense systems and drop a nuclear warhead on the country. But this catastrophic possibility alone is precisely why the small and isolated country is able to threaten the world’s dominant power from afar—and why North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has shown little interest in giving up its arsenal of missiles and nuclear bombs despite United Nations sanctions that have hamstrung its economy.
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Barely three months into 2022, Pyongyang has already conducted 10 missile tests—more than it did in all of 2021. The latest one took place on March 16, when it tested a ballistic missile, according to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. The increasingly frequent weapon tests prompted U.S. forces stationed in South Korea to ramp up readiness.
Recent satellite images have also shown signs of renewed activity at North Korea’s main nuclear-testing site, Punggye-ri, which Pyongyang blew up in 2018 ahead of disarmament talks with then-U.S. President Donald Trump that eventually broke down.
Pyongyang has tested nukes six times, most recently in 2017. With Russia issuing veiled threats of nuclear war over the Western response to its invasion of Ukraine, a resumption of nuclear testing in North Korea could further complicate the global security environment.
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Why Is North Korea Testing Missiles?
Pyongyang has put military capabilities at the center of its foreign policy and has developed a variety of weapons, from short-range missiles to thermonuclear bombs.
Boasting a large arsenal has become a source of national pride for North Korea, as it hopes to gain equal footing with its ultimate rival, the United States. It can also leverage its capabilities in international negotiations.
Heather Chen, Junhyup Kwon
03.04.22
By developing weapons of mass destruction, North Korea hopes to prove to other nations that it is a legitimate power not to be taken lightly. Kim Jong Un frequently attends missile launches and takes pride in Pyongyang’s military breakthroughs, which all help maintain his image as an invincible ruler.
Pyongyang also thinks it can’t survive without nuclear weapons. As an isolated state with an unstable economy, North Korea is surrounded by far more powerful rivals, such as South Korea and Japan. Having nuclear capability could help North Korea deter attacks.
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North Korea launched its most recent missile on March 16. Photo: JUNG YEON-JE/AFP via Getty Images
How Did North Korea Get Its Nukes?
North Korea first started getting its supplies in the 1960s from the Soviet Union. Afraid it could lag behind South Korea after the Korean War, Pyongyang agreed to peaceful development programs with the Soviet Union and, in return, received a nuclear research reactor, missile designs, and some nuclear fuel.
In the 1970s, North Korea began cooperating with China and Pakistan to develop ballistic missiles. Pyongyang would also acquire Pakistani centrifuge technology in the 1990s, necessary to develop nuclear bombs.
Now, the dictatorship may have up to 60 nukes in its arsenal, according to U.S. intelligence officials.
Is North Korea Dangerous?
Pyongyang has regularly issued threats of force, often in response to sanctions, criticism of its human rights abuses, and joint military exercises conducted by the U.S. and its ally South Korea.
Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai
01.13.22
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It has never followed through on its threats of nuclear annihilation, in good part because that would invite an overwhelming counter strike. But North Korea has steadily grown its capabilities and weapon tests over the years.
The U.S. State Department estimates that the country, one of the poorest in the world, spends nearly a quarter of its gross domestic product (GDP) on its military. North Korea now has the world’s fourth largest military in terms of active personnel, behind China, India, and the U.S.
The country has conducted a total of 137 missile launches since 1984, 102 of them after Kim Jong Un took power in late 2011, according to a database maintained by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Significantly, in 2017, North Korea tested a nuclear weapon 10 times more powerful than the ones that devastated the Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II. The underground test, the detonation of a hydrogen bomb that could fit on the country’s intercontinental ballistic missiles, caused tremors detectable from as far as South Korea and China.
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China is one of North Korea's key partners. Photo: Ju Peng/Xinhua via Getty
Who Are North Korea’s Allies?
China is one of North Korea’s key allies, although their partnership has been under strain over Pyongyang’s nuclear program.
The world’s most populous nation shares a long border with North Korea and has largely supported its neighbor since the Korean War broke out in 1950, lending political and economic backing to several generations of North Korean leaders.
Mitchell Prothero
10.13.21
In January 2022, China and Russia delayed a U.S. effort to sanction five North Koreans linked to the country’s ballistic missile program.
North Korea also maintains friendly relations with Pakistan, which provided aid in developing nuclear weapons in the 1990s. Pyongyang has also set up weapons factories across certain African nations, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Madagascar, and Uganda. Egypt and Libya also have economic ties to North Korea.
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Who Are North Korea’s Enemies?
Kim Jong Un himself has said North Korea’s biggest enemy is the United States.
Having skipped diplomatic talks for the past two years, Washington and Pyongyang have a poor relationship, marred with sanctions, name-calling, and boycotts.
Hanako Montgomery
03.25.21
Also on North Korea’s blacklist are South Korea, Japan, and other nations that have called for an end to Pyongyang’s nuclear testing.
Where Does North Korea Stand on Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine?
Though Pyongyang stayed silent during the early days of the Ukrainian crisis, it later publicly blamed the West for its “abuse of power” and for the war.
“The root cause of the Ukraine crisis totally lies in the hegemonic policy of the U.S. and the West, which enforce themselves in high-handedness and abuse of power against other countries,” a North Korean foreign ministry spokesperson said.
As much of the Western world slaps sanctions on Russia, North Korea has stood firmly with its economic partner. If prevented from exporting oil, Russia could start exporting fuel to Pyongyang, ignoring previously imposed sanctions.
North Korea has stood with Russia during the ongoing Ukraine conflict. Photo: AP Photo/Vadim Ghirda
Where Does North Korea Get Money?
Strapped for cash, North Korea has sought various ways to make money over the years.
Viola Zhou
01.06.22
According to the Central Intelligence Agency, about 75 percent of North Korea’s trade is done with China.
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It also makes its money through cybercrime, the proceeds making up 8 percent of its total GDP in 2020, according to the Bank of Korea in Seoul. In 2016, it nearly succeeded in stealing $1 billion from Bangladesh by hacking into the SWIFT network that manages payments between banks.
Forced labor is another source of profit for Kim. By sending North Koreans to work abroad, Pyongyang is able to get its hands on foreign currency, something it’s had little access to due to international sanctions.
Are North Korea and South Korea at War?
North and South Korea are still technically at war with each other.
Bloody fighting during the Korean War, which started when the communist North invaded the U.S.-backed South, brought the two countries to a stalemate. More than 3 million people were killed in the span of three years. China and the Soviet Union fought on the side of North Korea.
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An armistice was signed in 1953, but there’s never been a treaty that officially ended the conflict. As tensions heightened between the two neighboring countries in recent years, international powers are worried that fighting could resume along the 38th parallel—the boundary between North and South Korea.
Kim Jong Un has been in power since 2011, after his father Kim Jong Il passed away. Photo: The Asahi Shimbun via Getty Images
What Is Kim Jong Un Like?
With little political or military experience, Kim Jong Un was thrust into power at age 27, after the death of his father Kim Jong Il.
Since 2011, the Swiss-educated Kim has grown into his role as the supreme leader of 25 million people. He oversaw the rapid development of the North’s nuclear and missile programs, and is said to have purged high-ranking officials (including members of his own family) to keep his power. Two years after he assumed office, Kim ordered the execution of his uncle. In February 2017, he sent assassins to kill his half-brother, who reportedly worked with the CIA, in a Malaysian airport using a banned nerve agent.
8. A debate about nuclear weapons resurfaces in East Asia
This usually comes and goes though I think in the coming months and years we are going to hear more of this debate than less.
A debate about nuclear weapons resurfaces in East Asia
Some in Japan and South Korea worry about a distracted America’s commitment to their security
Mar 19th 2022
WELL BEFORE Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, doubts were growing in Asia about the durability of the American-led order that has largely kept the peace since the Vietnam war. One set of doubts concerns China’s bullying, mercantilist approach to economic relations, and its aggressive conduct in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and along the Himalayas.
The other set had to do with the staying power of America. Its friends were unnerved by then-President Donald Trump’s “America First” rhetoric, his disparaging of allies and his love-in with North Korea’s nuclear-armed despot, Kim Jong Un. President Joe Biden has charted a much more reassuring course, reminding friends of America’s commitment to Asia. But can it last?
Vladimir Putin’s war has turbocharged both sets of doubts. Despite welcome reassurances from the Biden administration, some in Asia still worry. At the same time, China grows only more dangerous. President Xi Jinping declared a friendship with “no limits” with Mr Putin, while recently reaffirming co-operation with Mr Kim. To Asian democrats, it looks like a new axis of authoritarianism. Japan’s once-convivial relations with Russia have all but ruptured since Mr Putin attacked Ukraine. Meanwhile, North Korea may have resumed testing long-range, nuclear-capable missiles.
East Asians are debating America’s nuclear umbrella. This formally shields Japan and South Korea. It is the least visible way in which America protects its Asian allies: its intercontinental ballistic missile bases are far away in Wyoming and Montana; its nuclear-armed submarines and bombers are out of sight.
Japan’s is the only country ever to have suffered nuclear attacks. That experience informs its pacifism. Its government has long been committed to three “no’s”: Japan will not own, make or allow on its territory any nuclear weapons. In this context, the umbrella is rarely acknowledged. Discussions about nuclear strategy occurred behind the shoji screen.
That, though, has suddenly changed. Soon after Mr Putin’s invasion began, a former prime minister, Abe Shinzo, suggested that Japan should discuss hosting American nukes, as some countries do in Europe. Mr Abe noted that Ukraine gave up its Soviet-era nuclear weapons in 1994, and that this perhaps made it more vulnerable to its predatory neighbour today. What he left unsaid is that if Japan hosted weapons, it would remove all doubt about its ability to deter an invader or a nuclear aggressor. But in saying as much as he did, he punched a hole through the shoji.
Past attempts by Japanese politicians to raise the topic have been slapped down by establishment security experts. This time, notes Richard Samuels, a political scientist at MIT, the debate is more substantive. The prime minister, Kishida Fumio, who hails from Hiroshima, has dismissed the idea. Yet this week his Liberal Democratic Party said it would begin internal discussions on nuclear deterrence.
Japan still has loads of nuclear inhibitions—and Mr Abe raised a non-starter in part to drive a hard bargain within the ruling coalition to accept other forms of American defence, such as (non-nuclear) missiles, notes Ankit Panda at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a think-tank. Neighbouring South Korea’s nuclear inhibitions are fewer. The hawkish president-elect, Yoon Suk-yeol, promised during his campaign to ask for the redeployment of American battlefield nukes, removed in 1991, in the event of a crisis on the Korean peninsula. A report last month by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, another think-tank, found that 56% of South Koreans polled supported hosting American nuclear weapons. Even more—71%—favoured South Korea having its own capability.
Both Japan and South Korea could swiftly make their own nuclear weapons if they wanted to. They have the technology, materials and expertise. Easier and less controversial would be to let America station its nukes on their territory. Neither outcome is likely, for now. America insists its nuclear and non-nuclear assurances are cast-iron.
That is all right so long as America keeps providing the political solidarity, the emphasis on shared interests and the constant reassurance that matter more to its Asian allies than missiles on their soil. Mr Biden understands this. But Mr Trump or someone like him could win in 2024. So the debate will not go away. The possibility of a nuclear “cascade” in which Asian powers develop their own nukes cannot be discounted.
Read more from Banyan, our columnist on Asia:
This article appeared in the Asia section of the print edition under the headline "Behind the shoji screen"
9. [Editorial] End imperial presidency (South Korea)
[Editorial] End imperial presidency
Yoon to abolish office of senior secretary for civil affairs, appoint special inspector
Published : Mar 17, 2022 - 05:30 Updated : Mar 17, 2022 - 05:30
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol made it clear his plan to abolish the office of senior presidential secretary for civil affairs. He also plans to appoint a special inspector, a Cheong Wa Dae post left vacated so far by President Moon Jae-in, when he takes office.
The office watches public officials for irregularities, weighs up nominees for important government posts, and is a bridge between the president and the Ministry of Justice. Also as a command center over the prosecution and police, it supports presidential authority.
The post of a special inspector in the presidential office was created in 2014 to prevent corruption by the president’s spouse and close relatives and senior presidential secretaries.
Yoon said on Monday that the office effectively controlled political opponents of the president and secretly investigated people through its grip on inspection and investigation agencies. In a word, it abused its power.
Under the Moon administration, the office even looked into private calls made on officials’ mobile phones it seized semicoercively under the pretext of inspection. The office was allegedly involved in Cheong Wa Dae’s interference with the Ulsan mayoral election in a bid to make an old friend of the president become a mayor.
It is hard to justify a presidential organ that tries to strengthen the power of the president through a means of scrutinizing officials or tightening discipline over them. Abolishing the office should be the first step to eliminate politically motivated inspections and dismantle apparatus for the imperial presidency.
Yoon’s plan to appoint a special inspector in Cheong Wa Dae is in the same vein as his pledge to abolish the office of the senior presidential secretary for civil affairs. It is a move to put a check on the presidency which is already too powerful.
Moon left the post vacant. He effectively blocked any inspection and probe of his family and close relatives. If Korea is not a despotic country, nobody should be an exception to the rule of law. Not even the president.
With the post remaining vacant, allegations involving Cheong Wa Dae have piled up. For example, the presidential office allegedly intervened in the Ulsan election and suspended inspections of bribery allegations involving a former Busan vice mayor close to Moon. The nation was jolted by irregularities involving Cho Kuk, Moon’s former senior secretary for civil affairs, who was later appointed as Justice Minister, and his family. Lee Sang-jik, a former Democratic Party of Korea lawmaker currently in jail for embezzlement and breach of trust, is suspected of giving Moon’s son-in-law a job at a budget airline he founded and also of helping Moon’s daughter and her family emigrate to Thailand.
By vowing to appoint a special inspector Yoon means he would allow any allegations involving his family and close relatives to be handled strictly according to the law.
During the presidential election campaign, Yoon’s wife was found to have falsified her career when she applied for a teaching job in a university, and she apologized to the public. She is also suspected of being involved in a stock price manipulation scheme. Yoon’s mother-in-law is waiting for the Supreme Court’s decision on charges that she received medical care benefits she was not entitled to.
People already know all this. If new allegations emerge after Yoon takes office, they should be clarified. If he tries to cover them up, people will begin to turn their backs.
Yoon must appoint a special inspector early in his term and let the inspector do his or her duty properly. Above all, he must not forget his initial determination to deal strictly with allegations involving the first family. People are watching.
10. U.N. report: North Korea food shortages, human rights abuses worst in years
There should be no doubt about the horrendous suffering among the Korean people in the north.
U.N. report: North Korea food shortages, human rights abuses worst in years
By Thomas Maresca
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Human rights violations are worsening in North Korea under a prolonged COVID-19 border lockdown, a U.N. report said Friday. File Photo by Stephen Shaver/UPI | License Photo
SEOUL, March 18 (UPI) -- Under prolonged COVID-19 border closures and a growing crackdown on citizens, North Korea is facing its worst food and human rights situation in years, according to a report released Friday by a United Nations investigator.
Tomas Ojea Quintana, U.N. special rapporteur on North Korean human rights, said in the report that conditions in the secretive state have deteriorated over the six years that he has held the position.
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"The Special Rapporteur is gravely concerned about the deteriorating human rights situation under further isolation of the country, in particular the aggravation of the food crisis and stricter control of people's freedoms," Ojea Quintana wrote in the final report of his tenure, which will be presented to the U.N. Human Rights Council on Monday.
Over 41% of the population is food insecure, the report said, while just 29% of children aged 6-23 months are receiving the minimum acceptable diet as defined by the World Health Organization. North Korea's food production was 4.6 million tons last year, according to the Korea Institute for National Unification, while the country needs upwards of 6 million tons to feed its people.
"Chronic shortfalls in the availability of adequate and nutritious food year-round has been a continuing preoccupation over the years, and now with the country still in the grip of strict COVID-19 measures, concerns over the right to food are more serious than at any point during the Special Rapporteur's six years on the mandate," the report said.
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The report also cited worsening human rights violations including arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, forced labor and restrictions on freedom of expression, religion and movement.
"This situation has not improved during [my] time in the mandate," Ojea Quintana said. "On the contrary, control over the population has further tightened, particularly since the beginning of 2020 in the context of COVID-19 prevention measures."
The flow of North Korean defectors to South Korea has trickled to almost a standstill over the past two years, with only 63 escapees arriving in 2021, down from 1,047 in 2019.
An estimated 1,500 North Koreans are currently being detained in China, Ojea Quintana said, and are at risk of being repatriated once the border reopens, where they will likely receive severe punishment in political prison camps.
The rights investigator called on China to adhere to the international legal principle of non-refoulement, which holds that no one will be returned to a country where they face torture and ill-treatment.
Ojea Quintana also recommended that the international community find a way to provide North Korea with 60 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines, enough to cover two shots for the entire population. He said the effort could kickstart a new strategy of engagement with Pyongyang.
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"The current approach by the international community is not securing improvements to the situation of human rights in [North Korea]," the report said. " A new way of thinking needs to take hold."
Ojea Quintana visited Seoul last month to gather information for the report. His term as special rapporteur will end in July.
11. U.S. and ROK committed to maintaining ironclad alliance
The message that cannot be reinforced enough.
U.S. and ROK committed to maintaining ironclad alliance
U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Kris Bonet
by Staff Sgt. Kris Bonet
U.S. Forces Korea
March 17, 2022
Defense Minister Suh Wook, Ministry of National Defense, visited United States Army Garrison - Humphreys to thank United States Forces Korea and United Nations Command for their unwavering commitment to maintaining peace and security of the Korean peninsula today.
Gen. Paul J. LaCamera, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea Commander, hosted Minister Suh as they toured several different USFK facilities and visited with military units that protect and defend the ROK.
“Today was a great opportunity to thank Minister Suh for his tireless support and dedication to strengthening the ROK-U.S. Alliance,” said LaCamera.
Both emphasized the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance and maintaining a strong combined defense posture to maintaining peace, security and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
“Our combined military forces provide a credible military deterrence to any adversary or threat who oppose us, and owe a great deal of gratitude to Minister Suh for prioritizing our ironclad alliance,” said LaCamera.
Photo Caption:
Members of Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense, United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, U.S. Forces Korea, and 2nd Infantry Division/ROK-U.S. Combined Division stand together at 2ID Headquarters’ Hall of Heroes, Republic of Korea, March 16, 2022. Minister Suh, Wook, Republic of Korea Minister of National Defense, visited Camp Humphreys to thank U.S. Forces Korea and United Nations Command for their unwavering commitment to maintaining peace and security of the Korean peninsula.
12. The problem with ‘han’ 한 恨
An essay on Korean culture to reflect on. We non-Koreans must try to grasp this.
The problem with ‘han’ 한 恨
Korean culture is characterised by an untranslatably profound sorrow and regret. Or is that just another stereotype?
As a Korean resident of the United States, I have been both amazed and bewildered by the recent success of Korean popular culture in the country. When I first came to the US in the mid-1980s, despite South Korea’s significant economic advances of the previous decades, most Americans I met still had the impression of my homeland as an impoverished third-world country that made cheap but shabby goods, often placing it in Southeast Asia, and sometimes confusing it with Vietnam.
But now, my students at the Midwestern university where I teach listen avidly to K-pop music (I still get startled when I turn on the radio to a local station and hear the singing of Korean lyrics), while many of my American friends are enthusiastic consumers of K-dramas. In 2020, the Korean film Parasite (2019) was nominated for six Academy Awards, out of which it won four, including Best Picture, the first foreign-language film to do so. In the following year, a movie about Korean Americans in 1980s Arkansas, Minari (2020), was also nominated for six awards, with the veteran actress Youn Yuh-jung, a familiar figure to South Koreans, winning Best Supporting Actress. In 2021, the television show Squid Game became the most-watched programme on Netflix in the US and in many other countries. I myself may have benefited from this development in a modest way, as the Penguin Classics edition of my translation of the Joseon dynasty novel The Story of Hong Gildong (2016) – the narrative of an outlaw hero comparable to Robin Hood, and the subject of a number of films and K-dramas – sold surprisingly well, and became required reading in many college and high-school classes.
These works have increased interest in Korean culture in general, creating opportunities for Korean American writers to emerge as explicators of all things Korean. In their writings, the concept of han (한) has been invoked as crucial to understanding the Korean character, as well as its culture and art. A supposedly untranslatable term, it denotes a uniquely Korean sense of profound sorrow, regret, resentment, rage and other negative emotions that are all bound up inside an individual as well as the people as a whole. It has been claimed that modern Koreans inherited it from deep tradition, as a collective emotional memory of their ancestors’ experiences of historical traumas, including many foreign invasions throughout the centuries. Han has frequently been mentioned in the US media too.
An early example is a 2003 episode of the TV show The West Wing that is titled ‘Han’, involving a visiting North Korean pianist who seeks to defect to the US. When thwarted from the course, the show explains, he’s filled with han, ‘a sadness so deep that no tears can come’. The late Anthony Bourdain, in his cooking and travel show Parts Unknown (2013-18), said that ‘To take a peek into the dark heart of the Korean psyche … it helps to get familiar with han … [it’s a] concept that for non-Koreans can be difficult to fully grasp.’ The concept was also invoked in magazine reviews of Parasite and Squid Game, though the word was never used directly.
When interpreters of Korean cultural products such as films and TV shows mention han, they are referring to the works’ intense emotionality, especially the feelings of sorrow, regret, resentment and rage associated with the concept. Parasite, for instance, begins with a family of swindlers who target a rich family, but their plot turns deadly with the explosion of seething anger from class resentment. Squid Game features the sad desperation of people whose lives are in such shambles that they willingly risk death in a series of sadistic games for a slim chance at salvation. Among other popular Korean films, one could point to the sorrow and rage of the inexplicably imprisoned man in Oldboy (2003), the abused and traumatised wife in Lady Vengeance (2005), the colonial subjects having to humble themselves before their Japanese masters and their collaborators in The Handmaiden (2016), and the poor youth who loses the girl he loves to a rich man in Burning (2018).
Seen from the perspective of han, such emotions seem to be the common theme running throughout all the works. That notion is a questionable one, yet, because han has become the unavoidable go-to term in explicating all things Korean, it is important to explore its exact origin and meanings. And it is ultimately necessary to ask whether it is indeed a useful term in understanding Korean culture.
For much of the 20th century, han has played a significant role in the self-definition of Koreans. It became a particularly important cultural concept starting in the 1960s when South Korea embarked on a concerted effort to overcome the tragedies of the recent past: colonisation by the Empire of Japan from 1910 to 1945; the forced division of the country into North and South following the defeat of Japan in the Second World War; and the devastation of the Korean War (1950-53). Even after South Korea took its place on the global stage as an emerging economic powerhouse, the stigma of han remained. Han not only pointed to all the sorrow and rage from the traumas inflicted on the people by the historic events, but also described the unique ways in which they carried and dealt with the experiences. Ultimately, han came to signify a kind of Korean exceptionalism defined by strength and resilience in the face of inherent sadness and pain.
The trope of han took powerful hold of the Korean imagination. In the cultural realm, major literary figures such as the novelist Pak Kyongni (1926-2008) and the poet Ko Un (1933-), among many others, claimed han to be the central aesthetic principle in Korean art and literature, applicable even to popular media products such as TV dramas and film. When explaining the term to non-Koreans, it became commonplace to insist that one could not understand the people without comprehending han, while also claiming that only a Korean could truly grasp it.
The influence of han reached a pinnacle with the release of the film Seopyeonje (1993) by the celebrated director Im Kwon-taek, about practitioners of the traditional singing/storytelling art of pansori, a work replete with the aesthetics of han. The movie was a domestic blockbuster, the highest-grossing film up to that time, but it also proved to be the last hurrah of han’s cultural significance.
The idea of han has undergone a significant decline in cultural importance in South Korea itself
When a cultural idea is transmitted from a country (South Korea) to emigrants from that place to another land (Korean Americans), there is an inevitable lag as well as a translation process that sometimes results in distortions. This often occurs across generations, when a notion is passed down to those who are not fluent in the language of their ancestry. The case of han provides a good example of this process.
In recent years, many Korean Americans have taken up the idea to define their identity and describe their life experiences and heritage. They say han explains Korean character and culture in mainstream media. And the concept shows up frequently in fiction written by Korean Americans, most recently in Patricia Park’s novel Re Jane (2015), which reimagines the story of Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre (1847) in contemporary New York City with a Korean American protagonist. In the work, the ‘untranslatable’ han is characterised as the sensation of a ‘fiery anguish roiling in the blood, the result of being wronged’. In Jay Caspian Kang’s nonfiction book The Loneliest Americans (2021), on the status of Asian Americans in US society and culture, han is described as a ‘Korean condition in which the afflicted convinces himself that the world has turned its back on him…’
Yet few Korean Americans seem aware that the idea of han has undergone a significant decline in cultural importance in South Korea itself since the late 1990s, now to the point of irrelevance. With the achievement of prosperity and democracy, the notion of an essential character defined by a profound sorrow from trauma and unrealised potential no longer seems appropriate. Of course, the people of the country experience economic disparity, as brilliantly allegorised in Parasite and Squid Game, and gender inequality, as excruciatingly detailed in Cho Nam-Joo’s controversial feminist novel Kim Jiyoung, Born 1982 (2016; English translation 2020). They are cognizant of the endless crisis situation with North Korea, along with quality-of-life issues stemming from the competitive, workaholic culture (sometimes referred to as ‘Hell Joseon’).
But given the astounding economic, political and social achievements of the recent past, South Korean people no longer feel that they are perennially condemned as the passive victims of history. The word han is still mentioned occasionally in popular culture and used in colloquial language, notably in reference to the so-called ‘comfort women’, victims of sexual slavery by the Japanese military during the Second World War. For most contemporary South Koreans, however, the larger idea of han as a defining characteristic feels increasingly like a retrograde notion from the past. So they are likely to be taken aback that Korean Americans are still using the term to explain contemporary Korean culture to Americans.
The modern irrelevance of han is hardly the main reason to pause before invoking it yet again, however. Research into the concept’s origin reveals a deeply troubling history, one that has been implicated in Japanese imperial ideology, ethnonationalism and sexist reaction to the advancement of women’s rights.
Looking over the historical origin of han, I am immediately struck by the non-Korean source of both the word and its significance. Since ancient times, Koreans have assimilated Chinese culture into their own, including numerous words in their language. Scholars have estimated that as much as 60 per cent of Korean words are of Chinese origin (Sino-Korean), though only about 35 per cent are widely used in everyday language. Han is derived from hen (恨) which is in common usage in modern Chinese with the same general meanings of ‘resentment’ (yuanhen, 怨恨), ‘hatred’ (chouhen, 仇恨), and ‘regret’ (huihen, 悔恨). Of course, its Sinitic origin does not disqualify it as a Korean word, same as numerous English words are of medieval French origin, but it is somewhat ironic that a Sino-Korean term is thought to signify a concept so quintessentially and uniquely Korean. In addition, there is not a single piece of evidence that anyone prior to the 20th century thought that the word held some special meaning for the Korean character. In other words, the notion that Koreans are essentially a people of han was constructed entirely in the modern era.
The idea itself has roots in the Japanese imperial ideology that was used to justify the subjugation and exploitation of Koreans during the colonial era. With the expansion of the Empire of Japan, apologists for the takeover of Korea came up with the notion of naisen ittai (literally, ‘Japan and Korea, One Body’). It was based on the historical myth that the Japanese and Korean people came from the same ethnic stock, but Japan was able to advance through the natural stages of a civilisation’s development, ultimately reaching modernity, while Korea stagnated due to the backward and corrupt tyranny of its ruling class with its slavish devotion to Chinese culture. It was the duty of the Japanese to come to the aid of their unfortunate cousins and civilise them through imperial tutelage. The idea has its roots in Western theories of racial essentialism that the Japanese adopted, adjusted and then utilised for their own purpose. And despite the seemingly benevolent veneer of naisen ittai, it became the basis of an overt and virulent racism toward the Korean subjects of the empire.
In the modern era, the term han was utilised in praising women who bear their sorrow in silence
If there is one person who could be identified as the father of what would later be labelled han, it is not a Korean but the Japanese artist and art theorist Yanagi Muneyoshi (1889-1961). Yanagi disliked the impact of modernisation and industrialisation on art and the general culture of Japan. While he was a vociferous anti-imperialist who opposed the domination of Korea, he inadvertently contributed to the imperial project by buying into the historical myth of naisen ittai and elaborating on the essential sorrow of the Korean people from their sorry condition. Because Korea was such a backward and primitive place, its common people produced works (mainly pottery) of unrefined but authentic beauty that were filled with profound sadness. As elaborated in his essay Chōsen no bijutsu or ‘Korean Art’ (1922), a significant part of the misfortunes of the Korean people came from repeated invasions of the peninsula by foreign powers over the centuries. Artisans took all the negative feelings from their sufferings and channelled them into art, creating a sublime effect he called the ‘beauty of sorrow’ (hiai no bi). And so Yanagi was the first to fully articulate the notion of Koreans as a people defined by their sadness.
The idea of a Korean character shaped by foreign invasions is another modern myth, one still circulating today. The Korean peninsula was indeed subject to a series of terrible calamities through the 20th century, starting with colonisation by Japan in 1910. But in the previous period of the Joseon dynasty (1392-1910), during its more than 500-year span, it experienced just two major foreign invasions – by the Japanese in 1592-98, and by the Manchus in 1627 and 1636. While those events were no doubt terrible and traumatic, two such events in 500 years hardly constitute ‘constant invasions’. By comparison, one could look at how many times the Italian peninsula was invaded since the 14th century, or Poland or India, for that matter.
Korean nationalists, who fought for independence during the colonial era and then worked to build a new nation after liberation, were modernisers who had no interest in restoring the old order of monarchy and the yangban aristocracy. In their critique of the ruling class of the Joseon dynasty, it made ideological sense for them to adopt the imperial narrative of the stagnant backwardness of the country before colonisation. They even took up Yanagi’s notion of the deeply ingrained sadness of the Korean people caused by living under the tyranny and corruption of their feudal masters.
While Yanagi used the term hiai (悲哀, ‘sorrow’), Korean nationalists favoured han (한), a rather obscure word in the Joseon dynasty that began to appear with some frequency during the colonial period. Starting in the 1960s, intellectuals and artists went even further, elevating the notion as the true signifier of the essential Korean character, forged by the great sufferings of the past. This version of han, which emphasised inner strength, became an ethnonationalist concept, denoting the absolute uniqueness of the Korean character and culture. And so Korean culture, Korean art, Korean literature, Korean personality and Korean national characteristics all came to be explicated in terms of han.
In the 1970s, the idea became entrenched, taking on troubling gender implications as well. Scholars of imperial ideology such as Anne McClintock have pointed out that the colonial subject is consistently feminised as weak, irrational, primitive, childlike and unintelligent, needing the strong and rational rule of their masculine imperial masters. Once the Japanese who espoused the idea left the peninsula and Koreans adopted the notion that their people were defined by han, the concept was literally feminised through the idea that women were the exemplary carriers. This was expressed in the aestheticisation of women’s sorrow, which became a common trope in the culture.
A few years ago, I translated a Joseon dynasty novel entitled Record of the Virtue of Queen Inhyeon, Lady Min, which is loosely based on events that occurred in the royal court in the 17th century, involving a love triangle of the king, his virtuous wife and his evil concubine who schemes to take the place of the queen. I explicated the story in terms of how, in a patriarchal society, a woman is lauded for her passive acceptance of suffering through her loyalty to male authority figures, while a woman who seeks to better her lot through self-assertion and the pursuit of ambitions is vilified as a nefarious upstart. With the persistence of the idea in the modern era, the term han was utilised in praising women who bear their sorrow in silence.
Yet complimenting women for accepting their subordinate position in society has become inappropriate in today’s South Korea, where women have access to education and a majority of them choose to pursue their ambitions through work. Consequently, the use of han for the advocacy of a virulent and increasingly retrograde sexism became one of the reasons for its decline. As a feminist scholar once told me: ‘For feminism in Korea to thrive, han must die.’ What the present moment calls for is the aestheticisation of the beauty of women’s healing, resistance and empowerment.
When a word has a problematic history, it’s important to take note. Like han, the idea of ‘hysteria’ underwent a number of significant changes over time. In its ancient Greco-Egyptian conception, it was described as a woman’s illness resulting from the detachment of the womb. The term was revived in the early modern period as a form of profound melancholia. By the late 19th century, it had taken an ugly turn. In that era, the French neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot sought a physiological cause for abnormal behaviour that ranged from depression and violent acting out to paralysis and catatonia. Although Charcot thought that both men and women could be subjected to hysteria, it was generally coded as feminine. Finally, Charcot’s student, Sigmund Freud, denied the physiological basis of hysteria, turning it into a wholly psychological condition.
In the course of the 20th century, both the medical and psychological establishments have rejected hysteria as a diagnostic term. They’ve universally noted the great suffering that the label has caused to countless patients, the vast majority of them women, who were diagnosed as hysterics and subjected to all manner of intrusive, abusive and damaging ‘treatments’. Although still in colloquial use today, mainly in the form of ‘mass hysteria’, those who are cognizant of its history regard ‘hysteria’ as a toxic term tainted by its troubling history, its misogyny and the damage it’s done writ large.
The history of han is as problematic as that of ‘hysteria’, which begs the question of why anyone aware of its past would want to persist in its use, even through a redefinition that rejects its imperialist, racist, ethnonationalist and sexist legacy. Ever since Japanese propagandists invented the notion of Koreans as a people defined by their essential sorrow, so many people have attached so many disparate meanings to it that it has become a confused mishmash of ideas, in the same way that ‘hysteria’ became a meaningless term signifying any person, usually a woman, who displays extreme emotional behaviour.
Some people insist that han is a uniquely Korean idea that only Koreans can truly grasp. Yet it is about as useful at explaining everything Korean as the term ‘rugged individualism’ is at explaining everything American or the ‘Samurai’ is in capturing all that is Japanese. It is true that all the calamities and traumas of the modern era have provided Koreans with a great well of powerful emotional experiences from which to draw. But intense emotionality is hardly unique to Korean narratives, and the notion of a specific kind of sorrow/regret/frustration/rage that only Koreans can feel is absurd.
The key to understanding the success of Korean popular culture lies, then, in its hybrid nature
So if han is an idea that is too vague and incoherent to explain the spirit of modern Korean films and TV shows, what accounts for their global popularity? The attraction, I believe, lies in a hybrid approach to cultural creation at which South Koreans have become particularly adept while striving for domestic wealth and respect abroad.
When the Korean War ended in 1953, South Korea – a small country with no valuable natural resources to speak of – was one of the poorest nations in the world, with urban and industrial centres flattened by bombs and people traumatised by division and war. From that dire situation, the only way the country could hope to achieve a measure of prosperity was through rapid industrialisation and participation in global trade. The endeavour began in earnest in the 1960s, under corporatist dictatorships and upon the backs of the labouring class. In the beginning, South Korea did make cheap and shabby goods for export but, by the 1980s, the country’s industry moved on to more sophisticated products such as electronics, automobiles and ships, and then later semiconductors, cellphones and high-end cosmetics. After achieving wealth and democracy in the late 1980s, there was a concerted effort to export Korean cultural products.
During the 1990s, a commonly heard phrase related to the enterprise was ‘What is most Korean is most global’, meaning that the key to successfully introducing Korean culture abroad was not through slavish imitation of foreign art but offering what was authentically Korean.
It turned out that the formula was only half right. The supposedly quintessential Korean film and domestic blockbuster Seopyeonje failed to garner much interest abroad.
The success of Korean popular culture thereafter lay in offering narratives of local interest to audiences abroad. That was accomplished by emphasising universal themes such as love across forbidden boundaries or frustration at social inequity, and presenting them through the mastery of cutting-edge filming and narrative techniques. So Parasite and Squid Game are about class conflict in contemporary South Korea, but their creators’ familiarity with the conventions of Western media allowed them to tell the stories in ways that audiences of any capitalist country could comprehend and even identify with. Likewise, the films The Host (2006) and Train to Busan (2016) successfully replicated the Western genre of the monster or zombie movie but in Korean settings and featuring Korean themes.
In the case of Train to Busan, about people on a train trying to survive a zombie outbreak, the critique of selfishness and loss of community is crystal clear. International viewers not only enjoyed the narrative but also the novelty of a foreign setting. Western viewers responded to the idea of survival based on a sense of community, rather than needing an individual to prevail. In other words, what made these films attractive to non-Koreans was not the mere replication of the Western genre conventions but the mixing of Korean aesthetics with Western ones. It would be hard to argue that their popularity with American viewers had anything to do with emotions associated with han.
The key to understanding the success of Korean popular culture lies, then, in its hybrid nature, of featuring Korean and Western as well as international elements, creating a captivating effect of being familiar but also novel/alien/foreign at the same time. South Koreans have proven to be particularly adept at this approach because finding a place for their country’s goods in the global market through adaptation was something that they have had to do from the beginning of its effort to achieve domestic prosperity and international respect.
Recently, a number of Korean American writers have written beautifully about what han has meant to them, especially in the construction of their identity as Korean Americans. But they have largely avoided the troubling historical origins and the problematic uses the term has had in the past. I invite people to consider the full story so that they can make informed decisions about whether the term is worth preserving as anything other than a historical artefact that is best left in the past.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
