Quotes of the Day:
Meny Odnakovo
By Taras Shevchenko
1847
It matters not to me
If I live in Ukraine of not.
If I’m remembered or forgotten
Amid the snows of foreign lands
It matters not to me.
I grew up asa serf midst strangers
A child with no kin bemoaning me
In bondage I will weep and die,
And in death take it all with me,
Not leave a trace
In all our glorious Ukraine –
A land that’s ours, but not our own.
There’s not a father-son commiseration.
He will not tell his son to pray: “Pray,
Pray my son: for he had suffered for Ukraine.”
I do not care if that son prays or not.
What matters is if evil people
Lull Ukraine into a sleep,
Then cruelly awaken her, ablaze and plundered.
That matters more than anything else to me.
- Translated into English by LBB, 2018
“Avoid fraternizing with non-philosophers [i.e., people who don’t try to improve themselves]. If you must, though, be careful not to sink to their level; because, you know, if a companion is dirty, his friends cannot help but get a little dirty too, no matter how clean they started out.”
- Epictetus (Enchiridion 33.6)
"I am not afraid... I was born to do this."
- Joan of Arc
1. Ukraine Conflict Update - March 6, 2022 | SOF News
2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 5
3. Sanctions won’t move Putin — we must bolster Ukraine’s air defenses by Philip Breedlove
4. Reliable Sources For ‘Open-Source Intelligence’ From Ukraine
5. Putin Lost the Digital War Abroad. Will He Lose at Home?
6. Send More Aid to Taiwan, Before It’s Too Late
7. EXCLUSIVE: Retired US Special Forces sergeant from Bay Area headed to Ukraine on medical mission
8. Desperate Russian Rear-Area Troops Are Armoring Their Vehicles With Wood Logs
9. Ukraine Is Waging a 'People's War' Against Russia: How Will It End?
10. America Must Do More to Help Ukraine Fight Russia
11. Ukraine invasion: China needs to rethink Taiwan
12. American Veterans Volunteer to Fight in Ukraine
13. RFE/RL Suspends Operations In Russia Following Kremlin Attacks
14. The Limits of Putin’s Propaganda
15. Opinion | Gen. Mark Milley: Why no-fly in Ukraine is a no-go
16. Opinion | We need a more realistic strategy for the post-Cold War era
17. Opinion | The sanctions that will really stop Putin
18. U.S. and allies quietly prepare for a Ukrainian government-in-exile and a long insurgency
19. A Trump-appointed former senior adviser to the Secretary of Defense says Russian forces have been 'too gentle' on Ukraine and called Zelensky a 'puppet'
20. Russia's second-largest internet provider cuts off Russian websites
1. Ukraine Conflict Update - March 6, 2022 | SOF News
Ukraine Conflict Update - March 6, 2022 | SOF News
Curated news, analysis, and commentary about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, tactical situation on the ground, Ukrainian defense, and NATO.
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Russian Campaign Update. While the Russian advance on the ground is not taking place at the pace many military analysts thought . . . the facts are . . . they are making slow, steady progress. Certainly their logistics need to be improved, air supremacy has not yet been achieved, and the information operations fight is dismal. The two largest cities of Ukraine are still held by the Ukrainians. Over time, as more and more Russian troops, tanks, and supplies flow into Ukraine the defense will wear down. It remains to be seen just how deep into Ukraine Russia intends to go. Will they stop at the capital city of Kyiv? Or try to go all the way to the far western border?
Russia’s offensive activities on Saturday (Mar 5) were less than expected. It is likely that the Russians are consolidating their positions, letting logistics catch up to the forward elements, and preparing for the next set of offensive actions. Those interested in Russia’s ground combat capabilities can take a peek at The Future of the Russian Military, RAND Corporation, 2019, PDF, 116 pages.
Power Generation. The Russians have already captured the largest of the four active nuclear power plants. The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant was recently attacked and is now held by the Russians. Radiation levels remain normal at this plant. Two of the six reactors are in operation. The Ukrainian staff continue to work, however they are confined to the plant and not allowed to leave. There are reports that the Russians are heading to the Kaniv hydroelectric power plant located 60 miles south of Kyiv on the Dnieper River.
Fight for the Skies. After more than a week of war in Ukraine the Russian air force has yet to commence large-scale operations. The continued absence of major air operations now raises serious capability questions. Certainly the presence of Ukrainian man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and other air defense systems have had an effect. However, some analysts are thinking that the Russian air force lacks the institutional capacity to plan, brief, and fly complex air operations at scale. “Is the Russian Air Force Actually Incapable of Complex Air Operations?”, RUSI, March 2, 2022.
Drones in the Fight. A volunteer drone force is helping Ukraine repel the Russian invasion. Citizens are asked to donate hobby drones and volunteer to operate them on the front line. The drones have been used to track Russian convoys. The operators then relay the images and GPS coordinates to Ukrainian troops. “Ukrainian drone enthusiasts sign up to repel Russian forces“, AP News, March 4, 2022.
Maritime Activities. The amphibious task force with naval infantry remains posed to strike at Odessa on the coast of the Black Sea. Some commercial ships in the Black Sea have been hit by the Russians with a few of them sinking causing a loss of life. Turkey has closed the Turkish straits separating the Mediterranean Sea from the Black Sea to all warships. Read more about this under the “Commentary” section below.
Kyiv. The capital city of Ukraine is considered the primary objective of the Russians. The Capture of Kyiv would allow Russia to put in place its puppet government. The city is not yet fully encircled – with terrain southeast and south of the city still held by Ukrainian forces. Vehicles can still depart but only when the curfew is not in effect. The trains were still running as of Saturday (Mar 5).
Kharkiv. The second largest city of Ukraine is Kharkiv located in the northeast of the country. The city has endured shelling by the Russians. Artillery, rocket, and missile fire has struck military and civilian targets. As of Saturday residents were still able to flee although transportation out of the city is limited. Many civilians have been injured or killed.
Mariupol. Located on the Sea of Azov, the coastal city of Mariupol is under siege by the Russians. This city is situated along the coastal road network that would provide Russia with a land bridge between Russia and the Crimea. A humanitarian corridor from Mariupol heading west had been negotiated between the two adversaries but was immediately fired upon by the Russians. So very little people were able to escape the city through the corridor. The 400,000 residents are without electricity, food, and water.
Mykolayiv. Located on the west bank of the Dnieper River close to the coast of the Black Sea, Mykolayiv is a strategic objective for the Russians that is on the road to Odessa located further west along the coast of the Black Sea.
Russia’s PMCs Recruiting. Russian private military companies have stepped up recruiting – looking for people with military experience. There are reports that the Wagner Group has up to 1,000 personnel in Ukraine.
Map – Russian MLRS Ranges and Nuclear Power Plants. “TinCup Intel” @KenGriffeySr1 has published an image depicting the ranges of various types of rockets from current Russian occupied and contested areas and where Ukraine’s five nuclear power plants are. DOI and author of map unknown. The world is concerned about the possibility of damage to one of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants that would result in a radiation leak. The United Nations Security Council engaged in a debate over the recent Russian attack on a nuclear plant in Ukraine. (UN News, 4 Mar 2022). The Russians appear to be approaching another Ukraine nuclear plant in Yuzhnoukrainsk.
Current Situation – Map. The territory currently held by Russian forces is depicted on a map (as of 5 Mar) provided by the Institute for the Study of War. See also a map posted by the UK Ministry of Defence (as of 6 Mar).
General Information
Putin’s Threats. The president of Russia has not only raised the threat of nuclear conflict with the west, he has also issued a lot of other threats. A few days back he threatened Finland and Sweden for their statements on possible NATO membership.
Federal Republic of Ukraine? When the hostilities subside Russia will attempt to consolidate its territorial gains. There is very little doubt on the intentions of Russia for western Ukraine. There will be an announcement declaring the independence of that region. A possible new name of the territory may be the Federal Republic of Ukraine. Read “Putin threatens Ukraine’s ‘statehood,’ likens sanctions to ‘declaration of war'”, The Washington Post, March 5, 2022.
Ukrainian SOF. The Ukrainian Special Operations Command (SOCOM) was established in 2015. It has four army special operations regiments, three navy special operations regiments, two training centers. It has worked closely with U.S. Special Operations Command – Europe (SOCEUR) in developing its training and doctrine. “Ukraine conflict: Ukrainian special operations forces in focus”, Janes.com, March 4, 2022.
The Coming Resistance
OSS Manual Translated into Ukrainian. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) published the Simple Sabotage Field Manual for use by its agents and operator during World War II. Its purpose was to instruct citizens from countries under Nazi occupation about how to perform acts of sabotage using everyday items. The OSS Society has translated the OSS Simple Sabotage Manual into Ukrainian. Read more about the manual in “For the Glorious Ukrainian Resistance”, by Charles T. Pinck, Small Wars Journal, March 5, 2022. The manual (Ukrainian) can be read online or downloaded here. The English version is available here.
Territorial Defense Forces. According to the National Guard of Ukraine, over 100,000 citizens have joined the newly established volunteer branch of the armed forces since the invasion took place. There are estimates that over 66,000 Ukrainians have returned to their home country from various parts of the world to join in on the defense of Ukraine. Over 3,000 U.S. volunteers have joined up to serve in the newly established international force.
Cyber and Information Operations
Ham Radio Operators and Spreading the Truth. The media and internet in Russia is currently locked down and controlled by the Russian government. Russian citizens are hard pressed to read anything that resembles the truth of the invasion and current status of the conflict. Some of them are getting news through their radio amateurs and short wave radios. One method of countering this one-sided media coverage in Russia is to use the capability resident in the worldwide ham radio community. There are a lot of ham radio enthusiasts who can assist in this endeavor. Many of them assisted U.S. service members in decades past with communications with their families using the the Military Auxiliary Radio System (MARS). Perhaps it is time for them to go to work once again.
World Response
Arms Transfers and Assistance. A research briefing was published by the UK that details military assistance provided to Ukraine prior to the invasion and in the initial days of the invasion by the United Kingdom, United States, NATO, EU, and others. Read Military Assistance to Ukraine since the Russian Invasion, House of Commons Library, March 3, 2022, PDF, 29 pages.
Fighter Jets for Ukraine. A few days ago there were reports that three countries would provide Ukraine with fighter jets. That news story got squashed. However, on Saturday new reports came out saying that Poland would provide jets to Ukraine and in return the U.S. would move F-16 fighter jets into Poland. This would require White House approval and congressional action.
Credit Cards. Visa and Mastercard have suspended operations in Russia. The Russians continue to be hit with ever increasing economic sanctions as punishment for its invasion of Ukraine.
Commentary
Podcast – Examining Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine. After more than a week of conflict, the Russians have made some clear gains. But they have also exhibited some serious deficiencies. Rob Lee and Aaron Stein of the Foreign Policy Research Institute discuss the trajectory of the war, the Russian challenges, and the future of the conflict in this podcast. Chain Reaction, March 4, 2022, 42 minutes.
Closing the Turkish Straits. Cornell Overfield is an analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses – the Navy’s federally funded research and development center. He writes on how Turkey is implementing the obligations under the 1936 Montreux Convention that requires it to restrict transits of Russian warships through the Turkish straits separating the Black Sea from the Mediterranean Sea. Currently Turkey has closed the straits to all warships. Overfield argues that the straits should only be closed to Russian and Ukrainian warships. Read his perspective in “Turkey Must Close the Turkish Straits Only to Russian and Ukrainian Warships”, Lawfare, March 5, 2022.
SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, defense, or the current conflict in Ukraine then we are interested.
Maps and Other Resources
Russia-Ukraine Monitor Map. This map is a crowdsourced effort by the Centre for Information Resilience (CIR) and the wider open source community to provide reliable information for policymakers, journalists, and justice organizations about the evolving situations both on the ground and online.
UK Ministry of Defence. Check out the map posted by @DefenceHQ on Twitter.
Ukraine Graphics by Reuters. “Russia Invades Ukraine”
Ukraine Conflict Info. The Ukrainians have launched a new website that will provide information about the war. It is entitled Russia Invaded Ukraine and can be found at https://war.ukraine.ua/.
Janes Equipment Profile – Ukraine Conflict. An 81-page PDF provides information on the military equipment of the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces. Covers naval, air, electronic warfare, C4ISR, communications, night vision, radar, and armored fighting vehicles, Ukraine Conflict Equipment Profile, February 28, 2022.
Arms Transfers to Ukraine. Forum on the Arms Trade.
Ukraine: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The UN refugee agency is actively assisting in the Ukraine emergency, working alongside authorities, UN agencies, and other partners to deliver humanitarian aid.
2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 5
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 5
Fredrick W. Kagan, George Barros, and Katya Stepanenko
March 5, 3:00 PM EST
Russian forces in Ukraine may have entered a possibly brief operational pause on March 5 as they prepare to resume operations against Kyiv, Kharkiv, Mykolayiv, and possibly Odesa in the next 24-48 hours. Russian troops did not launch major ground offensive operations against Kyiv, Kharkiv, or Mykolayiv in the last 24 hours. Ukrainian forces near Kharkiv, on the other hand, conducted a counter-offensive that reportedly penetrated to the Ukrainian-Russian border.
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces conducted no major offensive operations against the cities of Kyiv, Kharkiv, or Mykolayiv in the past 24 hours;
- Russian troops continued to encircle, bomb, and shell Mariupol;
- Russian forces east of Kharkiv and in northern Luhansk Oblast appear to be trying to link up;
- Russian troops around Kherson city are likely preparing to resume offensive operations against Mykolayiv and ultimately Odesa; and
- Russian naval infantry in Crimea continue to prepare for amphibious operations, which would most likely occur near Odesa.
Russian forces are engaged in four primary efforts at this time:
- Main effort—Kyiv (comprised of three subordinate supporting efforts);
- Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv;
- Supporting effort 1a—Luhansk Oblast;
- Supporting effort 2—Mariupol; and
- Supporting effort 3—Kherson and advances westward.
Main effort—Kyiv axis: Russian operations on the Kyiv axis consist of a main effort aimed at enveloping and ultimately encircling the city from the west and supporting efforts along the Chernihiv and Sumy axes to encircle it from the northeast and east.
Russian operations against Kyiv made little progress in the past 24 hours. ISW has tentatively concluded that Russian movements to the eastern outskirts of the city reported in our March 4 update were likely raids or forward elements that did not hold ground much beyond the towns of Nizhyn and Priluky on the Sumy axis; we have updated our control of terrain map accordingly. Russian troops made no significant advances around Kyiv in the past 24 hours.
Subordinate main effort along the west bank of the Dnipro
Russian forces remain deployed in the positions north and west of Kyiv that they have occupied for several days and have not initiated major combat operations in the past 24 hours. The Ukrainian General Staff continues to assess that 15 Russian BTGs are active on this axis, that two BTGs attempted to move toward Vyshgorod, near the Dnipro north of Kyiv, and that the Russians are establishing a forward base for helicopters near Ivankiv, roughly 70 kilometers northwest of Kyiv’s center.[1] An excellent OSINT analyst commented that social media reports of Russian Ka-52 attack helicopters escorting a military convoy near Kyiv on March 5 suggest that Russian forces are adopting better practices for operating against a determined and capable enemy.[2] Hostomel, the town near Antonov airfield northwest of Kyiv, remains contested, with reports that troops of the Russian 31st Airborne Brigade had taken 40 civilian hostages in the town on March 4.[3]
Subordinate supporting effort — Chernihiv axis
Russian activity northeast of Kyiv remained very limited over the past 24 hours.[4]
Subordinate supporting effort — Sumy axis
Russian forces do not appear to have been active on this axis in the past 24 hours. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ukrainian Air Force attacked elements of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the Central Military District near Peremoha, roughly 25 kilometers northeast of central Kyiv, on March 5.[5]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv:
Russian forces remain focused on attacking Kharkiv using air, artillery, rocket, and missile fire rather than ground offensives while seeking to bypass the city and possibly to prepare for a future ground assault.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff reports that elements of the Russian 6th and 20th Combined Arms Armies (CAA) were preparing to conduct offensive operations toward Kharkiv on March 5.[7] The General Staff report asserts that 3,000 Russian reservists have appeared near the Russian city of Belgorod, likely to serve as individual replacements for casualties among the Russian ground forces units that have been fighting near Kharkiv.[8]
Ukrainian forces conducted a counter-offensive against Russian forces near Kharkiv that damaged Russian front-line units.[9] Ukrainian military personnel posted video of a Russian armored column they claim was destroyed in this raid on March 5 and reported capturing 30 pieces of Russian equipment during an ambush.[10] The governor of Kharkiv Oblast claimed that Ukrainian forces drove all the way to Ukraine‘s border with Russia at an unspecified location northwest of Kharkiv City.[11] He added that Ukrainian forces intended to drive north to the border near Belgorod in the coming days.[12]
Supporting Effort #1a—Luhansk Oblast:
Russian forces have devoted sufficient effort to opening axes of advance through and near northern Luhansk Oblast as to merit a slight modification to our assessment of the weighting of the Russian campaign. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 5 efforts by up to seven BTGs of the Donetsk and Luhansk proxy forces and the 150th Motorized Rifle Division to try “to continue offensive operations in the directions of the cities of Dnipro and Zaporizhia.”[13] The General Staff also reported that elements of the 20th Combined Arms Army, possibly of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division, were trying to advance toward Severodonetsk but were stopped somewhere along the Northern Donets River.[14] The Russians may be trying to establish a link between the 20th CAA and the 8th CAA and the proxy forces it controls in northern Luhansk to set conditions for further advances toward the west.
Supporting Effort #2—Mariupol:
The Russian encirclement of Mariupol continues, causing widely-reported suffering among the population in that city.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reports that elements of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 22nd Army Corps (based in Crimea), and 7th Airborne Division are involved in operations in and around Mariupol.[16] Russian violations of the negotiated humanitarian corridor via Volnovakha may be related to reported efforts by Russian military and proxy forces to drive west toward the border of Zaporizhya Oblast (which would not, of course, excuse the Russian humanitarian violations).[17]
Supporting Effort #3—Kherson and west:
Russian troops continue consolidating control of Kherson city while likely preparing to renew their advances toward Mykolayiv and ultimately Odesa. The Ukrainian General Staff reports that as many as 17 BTGs drawn from the 8th Combined Arms Army and 22nd Army Corps were preparing to resume the offensive on March 5.[18] ISW has observed no indications of renewed major military operations on that axis in the past 24 hours (which is consistent with the Ukrainian General Staff report).
Russian forces in Kherson did not apparently attack or interfere with a large protest against their presence on March 5.[19] Media reports indicate that Russian troops are raping local women, however, and additional personnel from either Russia’s FSB or Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) reportedly arrived in Kherson on March 4.[20] It is possible that Russian conventional forces prefer not to engage directly with civilian protesters but that the Russian services often used to suppress dissent violently within Russia will deal much more harshly with the local population. Reported rapes, which would be war crimes, may indicate poor discipline among Russian soldiers.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of Russia’s 810th Naval Infantry Brigade were loading onto large amphibious ships on the west coast of the Crimean Peninsula on March 5.[21] These forces may be additions to the naval infantry already aboard Russian amphibious ships as of March 4.[22] Russian amphibious operations are most likely aimed at Odesa or its immediate vicinity since Russian troops already control nearly the whole of the Sea of Azov littoral.
Immediate items to watch
- Russian operations northwest of Kyiv may resume attacks on the city and/or attempts to encircle it to the west in the next 24-48 hours;
- Russian forces east of Kyiv may resume their drive likely intended to envelop Kyiv from the east;
- Humanitarian conditions in Mariupol will continue to collapse and may cause the city to surrender;
- Russian forces may attempt amphibious landings anywhere along the Black Sea Coast from Odesa to the mouth of the Southern Bug in the next 24-48 hours.
[12] https://fakty dot com dot ua/ua/ukraine/20220305-u-harkovi-liniyu-voroga-posunuly-do-derzhavnogo-kordonu-oda/; https://gordonua dot com/ukr/news/war/na-harkivshchini-ukrajinski-vijskovi-perejshli-v-kontrnastup-ova-1598414.html
3. Sanctions won’t move Putin — we must bolster Ukraine’s air defenses by Philip Breedlove
Sanctions won’t move Putin — we must bolster Ukraine’s air defenses
Attempts at deterrence by sanctions have failed. The question now is: Does the West expect sanctions to change Russian President Vladimir Putin’s actions? We think not — and the world should have given up years ago on expecting them to dissuade him.
This is not merely a Ukraine crisis. Russia is bombing Europe. This is a larger, profound and long-term Russia crisis. And the West must act before it gets worse.
First, let’s brush away the confusion that NATO and the United States are in any way responsible for war in Eastern Europe. The sole responsibility lies at the foot of the Kremlin and goes back three decades. It started with so-called frozen conflicts in Georgia and Moldova in the early 1990s. Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 because Georgians wanted to be free of Russian control. In 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine because Ukrainians wished to be free of Russian domination. In 2016, Moscow effectively closed the Azov Sea in an attempt to strangle the Ukrainian economy.
Putin’s recent erratic speeches reflect Russia’s long-term strategy for Eastern Europe and beyond. Russian troops in Belarus are most likely there to stay. The Kremlin is on a quest to rewrite the security architecture for Eastern Europe. Putin’s vision for Europe is clear and simple: a continent with more Russia and less America. He will not stop invading independent and free Eastern European countries.
Ukraine is central now because of the steadfastness of Ukrainians: They want less East and more West. They want freedom. But Russian warfare against Europe doesn’t rely on land grabs alone. Eastern, Central and Western Europeans (in that order) have had to deal with political, economic, technological and social warfare for many years.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is on a mission to rewrite the security architecture for Eastern Europe.Andrei Gorshkov, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP
The Kremlin’s tentacles will continue to sink themselves into Europe with espionage, influence operations, cyberattacks, disinformation, commercial ties, the export of kleptocracy and energy dependence. Where the Kremlin does not grab land, it takes control over people and infrastructure.
The West under US leadership needs to reassess Russian deterrence. So far, we have exercised passive deterrence. We need to upgrade to active deterrence — and we need to do so immediately.
A superpower is invading a sovereign nation with the intent to subjugate it, even destroy it. We should not stand by and watch a civilian slaughter.
Ukrainians are defending Western values and freedom against a revisionist and highly aggressive nuclear power. We are eternally thankful for their bravery. But we have done too little, too late to help them.
The US was too slow on delivering much-needed ammunition, weapons and equipment to Ukraine while Russia had mobilized convoys.Roland Balik/U.S. Air Force via AP
Washington’s years-long delay in shipping Javelin missiles comes to mind. If we had properly armed Ukraine with modern defensive systems over the last eight years, we would not have the problem we face today. We can have peace through strength, if we acknowledge that passive deterrence has not worked.
The West has made it very clear it will not fight for, or in, Ukraine. Rather Western nations seek to equip and resupply the Ukrainian forces who fight alone.
Ukrainians are holding their own on the ground; it’s air assistance they need most. Their army has much improved since 2014, but the navy and air force still have challenges. America is finally providing Stinger surface-to-air missiles; NATO has been for some time, but they’re made for low-altitude air defense.
Ukrainian cities continue to fall to Russian forces.NY Post Illustration
Get them systems giving them medium- and high-altitude defense capabilities: Washington is about to mothball A-10 ground-attack aircraft. Send them to Ukraine, which has some pilots trained to fly them.
Ukrainians also know how to fly the Soviet-made MiG-29s that Eastern European nations have offered for transfer. This would be a concrete and much-needed addition to their capabilities. Not only have they lost planes in the battle; Russian forces are stepping up their bombing campaign.
see also
Ukraine’s air defenses are stretched thin. Kyiv lost its main television tower this week, with Russia knocking out a prime communication medium and killing civilians in the process.
Every day we see the growing human disaster of Russia’s criminal attack. NATO should establish a humanitarian no-fly zone immediately to protect corridors to provide food, medical supplies and other humanitarian relief to Ukraine’s beleaguered civilians. If constructed carefully, this does not have to be an act of war: Cover western Ukraine, stopping at Kyiv, and go no farther east to avoid conflicts with Russian forces.
Finally, to help Ukraine defend itself, give it real-time, at threat speed, access to US intelligence about Russian forces and positions.
It’s clear now that Putin will continue to use military power to flout international norms. The West with its unmatched hard and soft power is standing by and watching a great European nation be attacked by one of the world’s leading military powers. Western leadership is required to turn the tide. The United States must be a central part of that leadership.
The longtime goal of a Europe whole and free will not happen without new strategic approaches by the West and American leadership. Sanctions have and certainly will hurt the Kremlin and the Russian people, but they have not changed Putin’s behavior. The West needs to move to active deterrence to change Putin’s calculus.
Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Philip Breedlove is distinguished chair at the Middle East Institute’s Frontier Europe Initiative, which Iulia Sabina-Joja directs.
4. Reliable Sources For ‘Open-Source Intelligence’ From Ukraine
Reliable Sources For ‘Open-Source Intelligence’ From Ukraine
Open-source intelligence, or OSINT, has changed the way journalists and analysts observe violent conflict. Using a variety of publicly-available sources, like satellite imagery, in-person footage and even public radio traffic, OSINT researchers work from afar to confirm the time, location, and nature of battlefield details such as troop movements, artillery impacts, and destroyed military equipment. Most importantly, they can do this without relying on intelligence released by governments, which can be selective and used to advance that government’s objectives.
As OSINT has grown in popularity, however, it’s more important than ever for news consumers to ensure that their information sources are credible. Individuals and organizations that do OSINT work often don’t operate within traditional newsrooms, with editors and fact-checkers vetting their work. Instead, they do their work in public, collaborating with others and sometimes making mistakes along the way. The best OSINT researchers and organizations show their work, describe where they’ve gotten their source information, and admit quickly when they’ve gotten something wrong.
We spoke to experts in the field who reviewed the contents of this list. If you’re looking to get an on-the-ground view of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, these resources are a good place to start:
Bellingcat – A leader in OSINT journalism known for painstakingly geolocating video and photo evidence, Bellingcat is tracking the use of cluster munitions in Ukraine and debunking dubious footage from the Russian invasion. The Twitter feeds of individual Bellingcat journalists including Christo Grozev and Aric Toler, among others, are also useful sources.
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Liveuamap – An interactive map that pins the locations of video and photo evidence of military movements, strikes, and other events. (A recent NYT story describes its history.)
The Centre for Information Resilience – With another mapmaking effort, CIR is working with Bellingcat and others to chart original source material of significant incidents in Ukraine. The group also frequently updates its Twitter account with its work geolocating footage from social media.
Ukraine Weapons Tracker – This active Twitter account identifies Russian weapons and abandoned (and destroyed) vehicles.
Satellite imagery companies – Several companies, including Capella Space, Planet and Black Sky have become a valuable source for journalists, researchers and governments seeking to track developments like Russian convoy movements from above.
Flight trackers – If you’re interested in the movement of Russian oligarchs’ private jets or the impacts of countries’ bans on Russian aircraft, check out the popular flight-tracking sources FlightRadar24 and ADS-B Exchange.
Individual Twitter users – Lots of great OSINT comes from individual journalists and researchers sharing their work in real time. This can mean coming in contact with raw and sometimes unverified information, so it’s best if news is confirmed by multiple sources, such as Rob Lee, OSINTtechnical, John Marquee and Tom Bullock.
5. Putin Lost the Digital War Abroad. Will He Lose at Home?
It ain't over to the plus size opera lady sings either in Russia or around the world. We should be cautiously confident but not cocky.
Putin Lost the Digital War Abroad. Will He Lose at Home?
Its diplomatic efforts in tatters, its agencies beset by cyber vigilantes, the Russian government is still choking off the information that fuels its homegrown protest movement.
The Kremlin's vaunted influence operators failed to defuse the nearly universal condemnation of its war on Ukraine, which has led tech companies to turn their backs on the country and provoked digital vigilantes into action against Russian targets. But Vladimir Putin’s accelerating efforts to control information within his own country—and keep his own populace from turning against him—may yet prove successful.
The failure of the external influence effort could perhaps be seen most starkly at the United Nations, where 141 countries voted to condemn the attack and a committee overwhelmingly approved an investigation into alleged Russian human-rights violations in Ukraine. Moscow’s messaging has proven no match for the flow of images and video clips showing the brutal war in Ukraine, said David Kaye, a former UN Special Rapporteur on the freedom of expression.
“Simply the…very images that we're getting from Ukraine, the…social media and communications effort that [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelenskyy has been undertaking, I think all of those things kind of play into making it easier for diplomats to isolate Russia.”
Emerson T. Brooking, a co-author of Like War, concurred.
“Russia was part of the G8 less than a decade ago. It's been rendered a pariah state in the course of a week. And I think that's due tremendously to the public pressure that Ukrainians were able to exert and the fact that this conflict was playing out on everyone’s smartphone,” Brooking said during an Atlantic Council Digital Forensics Lab event.
The failure is in stark contrast to past hybrid-war campaigns in which Russia has skillfully used information tactics to stave off effective global pushback—for example, when seizing Crimea or pushing into eastern Ukraine eight years ago.
“They pioneered obfuscation of forces, psychological dislocation, mass disinformation campaigns, and repeated denials, which, in 2014—it really frustrated a rapid international response to their actions,” Brooking said. “They didn’t use that playbook this time” because the size of the operation, and the months-long build-up on the Ukrainian border it required, made that impossible, he said.
“There's no way to obscure the fight in the gray zone when you're launching a conventional invasion involving 190,000 soldiers.”
That failure is largely due to U.S. efforts to highlight Russian false-flag operations before they occurred and rally a strong, unified response. But the Russians did themselves no favors in how clumsily they attempted to persuade audiences that Ukrainian forces were committing atrocities in in the Russian-occupied portion of the Donbas, said Nika Aleksejeva, a lead researcher for the Baltics at the Atlantic Council's Digital Forensic Research Lab.
“It was more like theatrics, like really staged footage or quite poorly edited footage,” she said. Examples include videos that purported to show Ukrainians shelling Donetsk (using obviously timed explosions) and injured civilians (using an amputee actor who had not even bothered to fully remove his prosthetic).
Russia is still pushing messages on social media via bot networks. “We’ve seen reports of some apps being blocked in Russia or taken out to the app stores, but plenty of pro-Russia content continues to be generated,” said McDaniel Wicker, a vice president for strategy at the firm BabelStreet. But those messages simply don’t seem to be landing effectively.
Now the Russian government is losing the ability to influence audiences abroad via its established propaganda channels Sputnik and RT, both of which are now banned in the European Union. The U.S. arm of RT has also shuttered its doors.
There are several reasons for that, said Liran Tancman, who helped found Israel’s Cyber Command and now leads the Rezilion cybersecurity firm. First, the tools a nation-state might use to steal information from a network are very different from the ones that could destroy it.
“There is always an inherent tension between using cybersecurity for intelligence versus using cybersecurity for attacks,” Tancman said.
Nor would cyberthievery do much good. Though there have been some reports of Russia using credential information possibly stolen from Ukrainian targets to steal data from other governmental targets across Europe, there’s no equivalent to the Russia-backed theft of Democratic Party emails that were used to undermine Hillary Clinton’s presidential run..
The failure of the external influence operation can also be seen in the way cyber vigilantes have begun acting against Russian agencies and organizations. The Hactivist collective Anonymous has targeted Russian television and other government sites. Ukraine's Vice Prime Minister for Innovation has put together an “IT army” to find vulnerabilities in Russian government and television networks. And new vigilante groups are gathering volunteerss to attack yet other targets.As the world watches Russian artillery shell civilian buildings across Ukraine, it’s a safe bet their numbers will grow.
Russia’s pariah status will undermine its cybersecurity in ways its leaders probably did not expect. Microsoft’s Friday decision to suspend sales in the country means that the many Russian businesses and institutions that use its software won’t be able to buy new versions, leaving them increasingly vulnerable as flaws are inevitably discovered.
The influence war at home
Protests continue to flare across Russia, but government efforts to reduce the flow of information into and around the country may sap dissident communities of vital fuel.
The government has been choking off social media, first slowing down access to Twitter and Facebook and, as of Friday, simply blocking the latter entirely. Meanwhile, it has been turning up its own propaganda efforts, especially on television.
“There are reports [that] if you check programming of Kremlin-owned TV channels, the air times for propaganda talk shows was increased,” said Aleksejeva of the Digital Forensic Research Lab.
She said much of the faked footage purporting to show Ukrainian atrocities was likely aimed at domestic audiences.
“I think it was more intended to generate headlines for…Kremlin-owned media, to basically create this alertness in the news cycle and convince internal audiences, because the international audience was clearly unconvinced,” Aleksejeva said.
This may be worsening the generation gap in Russian perceptions of the war, because older people are more likely to get their information from television, she said.
The Russian government is also increasing the punishment for speaking out, passing a law on Friday that prescribes up to 15 years in prison for spreading “fake information” about the military or the war in Ukraine.
Kaye and Aleksejeva worry that Western efforts to shut down Russian outlets in their own countries, which has in some cases prompted Moscow’s counter-reaction, are also reducing the ability of dissidents within Russia to gather information and recruit others to their cause.
As well, Kaye said, “There has been a push by some in the Ukrainian government to…say to the companies, ‘Don't allow access to those tools in Russia.’ I think that it was a serious miscalculation...It's just politically sort of counterproductive because you want to make sure that people who support your perspective, or who might support your perspective, have access to information about what's actually happening.”
Even Aleksejeva, who said she favors a ban on RT and other propaganda channels in Europe, said banning Facebook and other sites make it harder to get information from abroad.
“So if people are lazy, if they just stick with their habit of just watching TV and sourcing their understanding from there, then it's quite bad,” she said.
6. Send More Aid to Taiwan, Before It’s Too Late
Could I ask my pundit, press, and think tank friends to finally start thinking about conventional deterrence and the resistance operating concept? Can't you see just a little bit how important it is to be able to support resistance? Unconventional deterrence must be part of integrated deterrence.
Just to reprise my comments from the previous day:
The 1st principle of deterrence must be Sir Lawrence Freedman's observation: "Deterrence works, until it doesn't." Recognize it can & eventually will fail and thus maintain readiness. 2nd, deterrence must be built on a credible capability to defend & attack if necessary. 1/2
3d, integrated deterrence must include nuclear , conventional & UNCONVENTIONAL deterrence (resistance & resilience among populations) and include a psychological warfare competent (yes I will use that dreaded term) integrated with & supported by all elements of national power.2/2
(In response to Rep Mike Gallagher’s hearing question and tweet on integrated deterrence to ADM Lescher - See the video here:
https://twitter.com/RepGallagher/status/1499487269803245568)
We need to invest in unconventional deterrence, resistance, and resilience now. The irony is it is low cost and so does not meet the threshold of service and congressional interest.
Note:
"Taiwan will fight to the end if China attacks, Foreign Minister Joseph Wu said yesterday, adding that the United States saw a danger that this could happen amid mounting Chinese military pressure near the island"...."We are willing to defend ourselves without any questions and we will fight the war if we need to fight the war. And if we need to defend ourselves to the very last day we will defend ourselves to the very last day." https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/taiwan-says-it-will-fight-to-the-end-if-beijing-attacks
We should take Minister Wu at his word and provide the advice and assistance to build on that sentiment with the intent to prevent having to fight to the last man. Just like the SOF Truth, "competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur," effective resistance and resilience is best developed long before the war starts.
Send More Aid to Taiwan, Before It’s Too Late
There are decades when nothing happens. And there are weeks when decades happen. Vladimir Lenin may not have said that. But Vladimir Putin made it a reality.
In this compressed chapter in history, the United States must respond urgently to one crisis while acting prudently to prevent another. A spending bill to be passed by Congress by March 11 should not only include support for Ukraine’s brave defense against Putin’s invasion. It should also authorize and fund a new long-term initiative to bolster Taiwan’s defenses and deter future aggression.
On March 3, the White House proposed $10 billion in emergency supplemental funding in response to Putin’s war in Ukraine. The proposal would provide $6.2 billion in security and humanitarian assistance for Ukraine with the remainder primarily covering costs associated with recent U.S. troop deployments. Congress is eager to act on the proposal by the end of next week. Congress should pass this necessary legislation. But it should do so without self-congratulation.
The simple fact is that the United States could and should have done more over the last eight years to aid Ukraine in its cause and in its need. We should have provided more security assistance. More of that assistance should have been lethal weaponry. And that lethal weaponry should have been provided sooner and in greater quantities to prevent an invasion, not respond to one. Ukrainians have fought well and fought bravely. But regrettably, they have done so—at least initially—with less help than they deserved.
The United States must not make the same mistake when it comes to Taiwan.
The most effective way to deter war and preserve peace in the Indo-Pacific is to ensure Taiwan can defend itself. That’s why for the last four decades the United States has been committed to enabling Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. But in recent years, China’s rapid military modernization has radically altered the military balance across the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific.
It’s time to launch a new U.S. foreign military financing, or FMF, initiative for Taiwan as lawmakers have recently proposed. In November, Sen. Jim Risch, R-Idaho.), the top Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, introduced the “Taiwan Deterrence Act.” A similar bill, the “Arm Taiwan Act,” has been introduced in the House and Senate. The annual military funding of $2 billion to $3 billion that these bills propose would bring Taiwan closer in line with U.S. support for Israel, which likewise confronts a grave security situation.
As part of emergency Ukraine funding legislation, Congress should authorize a long-term Taiwan FMF program and make a downpayment of at least $1 billion.
A dedicated Taiwan FMF program is both necessary and affordable. Taiwan would use FMF funds in the form of grants and loans to purchase defense equipment “made in the USA.” More importantly, the urgency of restoring credible deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and the consequence of failure means the only thing more costly than boosting assistance for Taiwan would be not to.
Supporting Taiwan would help correct a historical imbalance in FMF funding. Just 2 percent of the State Department’s most recent FMF budget request was for East Asia and the Pacific. FMF funding for Taiwan should reflect its status as a critical partner in our primary theater and threatened by our pacing adversary.
New funding would not alleviate Taiwan of its responsibility to spend more and spend better on its own defense. Instead, this funding would be a mechanism to incentivize Taiwan’s growing investments in robust asymmetric capabilities that exploit Taiwan’s advantageous geography and undermine Beijing’s military advantages.
Some might argue boosting FMF funding for Taiwan now would provoke Beijing. Perhaps, but no more so than the $750 million arms sale to Taiwan proposed by the Biden administration last August. Instead, bolstering U.S. support for Ukraine and Taiwan simultaneously would send a message to Beijing that its unwillingness or inability to restrain Moscow has sharpened the resolve of the international community to oppose unilateral attempts to alter the status quo by force. Moreover, a fresh initiative like this would reassure Indo-Pacific allies and partners that the United States isn’t taking its eye off the region.
The legendary economist and strategist Thomas Schelling once warned of the danger that springs from “the inability of individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it is the occasion—which is usually too late.” Putin should not have had to invade Ukraine a second time for the United States to summon the spirit of urgency, solidarity, imagination, and ambition that appears to have taken hold at last. Let us act in that spirit now to support Taiwan before decades collapse once more into weeks of even greater peril.
Dustin Walker and Eric Sayers are Nonresident Fellows at the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Walker was the lead adviser to the Senate Armed Services Committee on Europe and the Indo-Pacific (2017-2020). Mr. Sayers was the lead adviser to the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Indo-Pacific (2014-16) and an adviser to the commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (2016-2018).
7. EXCLUSIVE: Retired US Special Forces sergeant from Bay Area headed to Ukraine on medical mission
He is unnamed. However, as an aside, Dr. Aaron Epstein is a graduate of Georgetown's Security Studies Program (and then he went to Georgetown Medical School!). He single handedly created one of the most unique medical NGOs in the world. They have done extensive work in Syria and Iraq and other lesser known conflict areas as well.
EXCLUSIVE: Retired US Special Forces sergeant from Bay Area headed to Ukraine on medical mission
KGO
By
EXCLUSIVE: Retired Bay Area Special Forces Sgt. headed to Ukraine
PALO ALTO, Calif. (KGO) -- The ABC7 I-Team has learned that a group of U.S. Special Forces left Friday for Ukraine. No, these are not active duty troops being sent into battle. These are veterans and volunteers on a medical mission, including one man from Palo Alto - a newly-retired member of the elite US Army Special Forces.
Among all the online bravado from Americans who say they want to fight in Ukraine, there are some serious offers.
The I-Team's Dan Noyes received one private message being passed to veterans on social media: "Want to go do something? Have your passport? Contact us ASAP by email with your DD214," the official record of military service said.
Dan Noyes: "Want to do something? Have your passport? It's kind of cryptic, right?"
Dr. Aaron Epstein: "Yeah, yeah. I mean, basically, it was like trying to reach out to the right people."
Aaron Epstein is a surgeon in Buffalo, New York who worked as a defense contractor in a previous career. In 2015, he started GSMSG - Global Surgical and Medical Support Group to treat victims of Isis, and arranged doctors from places like Harvard, Yale and Georgetown to volunteer in Iraq.
A Russian San Francisco couple helped raise $200,000 for Ukrainian refugees. The husband is now flying overseas to give them the money in person.
"Then bring them right to these kind of frontline communities because we could cocoon them in my other network of security guys, "said Dr. Epstein. "We were essentially bringing levels of care that these communities hadn't seen before."
His message now on social media uses abbreviations that veterans will understand, asking for Special Forces combat medics from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines. He says GSMSG has 1,500 qualified medical professionals on its roster.
"The vast majority are former military or intelligence community folks who either were medical providers while in service or became medical providers after," he said.
Dan Noyes checked and GSMSG is an active 501c3 non-profit that has sent medical staff to the Middle East, Africa, and Central America. They were also busy staffing field hospitals in New York for the pandemic, and then Russia invaded Ukraine.
Last week, Dr. Epstein received a letter from Ukraine's Minister of Defense, saying, "We would ask for all possible cooperation from GSMSG in the field of medical/surgeon training."
As more than 1-million flee, thousands of Bay Area Ukrainians are looking to head the opposite direction - to go home and fight against Russia.
So Friday, 10 GSMSG volunteers are on their way to Ukraine: a surgeon, a pediatrician, an OR nurse, medics, and a newly-retired US Army Special Forces Sergeant from Palo Alto.
Dr. Aaron Epstein:: "I've told them that they can be armed, if it's starting to look like where they will be is going to be a hostile combat area."
Dan Noyes:"But if they're going to come under fire, they can return fire?"
Dr. Aaron Epstein: "Yeah, yeah, absolutely. Absolutely."
The group has also translated the US military's "Tactical Combat Casualty Care Course" into Ukrainian and posted it online. The aim -- to train more Ukrainians to take care of their own.
The requirements for joining GSMSG are tough - along with medical qualifications, you have to be in the same top shape you were in the military. Dr. Epstein is worried about all those keyboard warriors, who might actually show up in Ukraine with no military experience, very little to offer, looking for a fight.
"If these idiots run into a combat situation, get killed, and suddenly Russians are killing Americans. I mean, I don't think they understand that like this could literally start World War III. I mean, I think that a lot of people don't understand what's actually at stake when they just want to go shoot some people. I mean, it's insane."
Dr. Epstein is not heading to Ukraine himself. He is already scheduled for upcoming trips to Kenya and South America, and can't afford to take more time off from his paying job, as a surgeon in Buffalo.
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8. Desperate Russian Rear-Area Troops Are Armoring Their Vehicles With Wood Logs
I hear the ghost of Donald Rumsfeld whispering, “You go to war with the army you have, not the one you want.”
Desperate Russian Rear-Area Troops Are Armoring Their Vehicles With Wood Logs
Absent better security, Russian drivers are doing whatever they can to survive Ukrainian ambushes.
Via @OSINTTechnical
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Ukrainian roads have quickly become a killing ground for Russian convoys moving through hostile territory amid a reportedly worsening logistics situation. While losses of heavily armored tanks and armored personnel carriers to anti-tank weapons are piling up, far less fortified vehicles are vulnerable even to small arms fire. Losses of light and unarmored vehicles trying to ferry men and materiel to advancing Russian forces are also increasing. As a result, Russian drivers have gotten creative in fortifying their trucks for the deadly roads leading ever deeper into Ukraine.
Images of Russian KAMAZ trucks appeared Saturday showing logs stacked on the front bumper as additional improvised armor. Crews even managed to retain their distinctive “V” markings seen on Russian vehicles in the sector. Other vehicles use wood boards and junk metal to protect their most vulnerable frontal areas.
Via @OSINTtechinical
The three vehicles look to be carrying PMP pontoon bridge elements, a valuable logistics asset and one of the Ukrainian forces’ preferred targets alongside fuel trucks. A PMP bridge was likely set up over the Pripyat River in the Belarusian side of the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone in the final days leading up to the war.
The logs themselves appear cut from trees right behind the vehicles and are likely intended to protect the trucks’ radiators from small arms fire. The last thing any Russian vehicle crew wants is to survive an ambush only for the truck to overheat and break down nearby.
As Russian forces have advanced into Ukraine, their supply lines back to friendly borders in Russia, Crimea, and Belarus have grown longer and thus require greater security.
Reports both from western defense officials and Russian leaks indicate varying levels of disarray in these supply lines, some of it indicative in the miles-long traffic jam of trucks and armor north of Kyiv seen stalled on satellite imagery. There is also an ongoing effort within Ukraine to dismantle road signs to confuse invading Russian forces and inviting wrong turns into waiting ambushes.
Russian forces’ inability to secure these supply routes have made for a flood of videos and images documenting the charred and mangled wreckage after Ukrainian attacks. These attacks have come from Ukrainian ground forces, resistance fighters, as well as Ukrainian air raids using combat aircraft, helicopters, and Bayraktar TB-2 drones. Some ambushes have left many vehicles lightly damaged or abandoned on Ukrainian roads for fighters or even civilians to find and claim later.
Public Domain
M4A3 seen on Iwo Jima with wood armor.
In the end, necessity is the mother of invention and even if some logs will keep your radiator intact long enough to escape, that is probably worth the effort.
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9. Ukraine Is Waging a 'People's War' Against Russia: How Will It End?
Spoiler alert. The title question is not answered. :-)
Dr. Karber is one of the recognized experts on Ukraine. His reporting on Russian operations in the region over the last decade plus has provided important insights.
Regarding training I wonder if it is only describing the training conducted by US conventional and National Guard units (who were very visibly withdrawn just before the war began). Or is he including the advise and assist operations conducted by US Special Forces? Regardless, he is identifying one of the weaknesses of most of our Security Force Assistance and Foreign Internal Defense and counter-unconventional warfare operations (countering Russian little green men) and more broadly irregular warfare activities. By restricting US trainers and advisors to a small number of training areas we undermine both the effectiveness of training and the ability to provide long term advice and assistance through the development of sustained relationships. Our risk averseness and self imposed constraints always ends up reducing our effectiveness. Note the British method described. But I do hope that our Special Forces advisors were not operating under the same constraints described by Dr. Karber.
Ukraine Is Waging a 'People's War' Against Russia: How Will It End?
Ukraine Expert Not Surprised At All Kyiv Has Initiative on the Battlefield: Dr. Phillip Karber, in an interview recently with our own Defense Editor, Brent Eastwood, predicted before the war that Ukraine would fight valiantly in defense of their country. He also predicted Ukraine would inflict heavy casualties on the Russians. Karber now says that Ukrainian troops are highly motivated and are leading from the front in a “People’s War.”
Are you surprised by how strongly the Ukrainian armed forces have resisted? How much of their success is a result of training by active U.S. forces, NATO, and retired U.S. forces who went to Ukraine to help in the last few years since the Crimea annexation?
NOT surprised at all — and I stressed their commitment and capability in our last interview.
Why have the Ukrainians done so well?
The war has also weeded out old-style “sit behind the desk” managerial-style officers afraid to take initiative and waiting for top-down guidance. This new generation knows their troops, the terrain, and lead from the front.
The Ukrainians have developed their own version of “mission command.” I have been talking to Ukrainian guys I know: leading the armored brigade fighting at 7 to 1 odds and still holding Chernigov; the recon company seizing the initiative capturing prisoners at Kharkiv; the marines surrounded at Mariupol; the airborne taking on a full division at Mykolaiv; and alpha professionals who slaughtered the Chechen mercenaries in the suburbs of Kyiv. Any one of those would be considered historic heroic stands.
Because they have not had an abundance of long-range fire support from missiles, fighters or helicopters they have not become as dependent on those higher echelon assets as many Western armies. Likewise, operating against an opponent using extensive electronic warfare and massive suppressive fires, they have learned the hard way, to disperse, employ camouflage and deception.
The troops are intensely motivated — Russian perfidy and brutality have left an indelible scar and there is no more talk about them being “big brothers.” Over and over, you hear the phrase “did we ask them to come here?” and the response of the Snake Island defenders has become the national motto: “go f— yourself.”
This is particularly true in the east among the Russian ethic troops who have witnessed first-hand the cruelty of Donbas proxies and indiscriminate attacks on civilians. The entire population is outraged and for the first time in 70 years, a Western nation is waging a “People’s War” on its own territory. This support is contagious, and with ordinary citizens arming themselves to help their men in arms, it creates an energizing synergy seldom seen in modern times.
How much of their success is a result of training by US forces, NATO, and retired US forces who went to Ukraine to help in the last few years since the Crimea annexation?
Well, I believe they appreciated the U.S. effort and found value in it.
But to be honest, it had limitations. First, due to American political constraints, our trainers were restricted to the Yavoriv training area, so Ukrainian units had to rotate to them for several weeks of basic infantry training. Many of our trainers told me “we are learning more from them than they’ve from us” and “they have much more experience fighting Russians than we do”.
Second, because of that approach, we only trained a fraction of the units. And third, a lot of the Ukrainian troops that went thru Yavoriv between 2016-2020 returned to civilian life as reservists — so they were not the active guys fighting in the initial battles. The British approach was to have their trainers go to the Ukrainian units and “train the trainers,” which, I believe, was much more effective and lasting. The Lithuanians focused on junior leader training which also seems to have been very effective.
Bottom line — U.S. training was nice to have, but not decisive, and in no way should we try to take credit for the skill, commitment, and raw courage demonstrated by 90 percent of the troops who are fighting that never had the benefit of our training.
Are there any other weapons we can give to Ukraine that they can use right now that would help?
First, let me address an issue that is the inverse of your first question: “How could the Ukrainian forces have done better?”
Unfortunately, American declarative policy was to: NOT increase weapons deliveries and military aid (other than what was already in the pipeline) until the invasion started.
The good news is that in the last week we are tripling our lethal aid and many other NATO countries are suddenly sending lethal aid as well — thousands of antitank weapons and hundreds of man-portable air defense systems. If Ukraine survives, it will have one of the best-armed infantry forces in Europe.
But the bad news is that it takes time to get the aid into country — complicated when ports are blockaded and airfields under attack; time to distribute systems within the country — complicated when lines of communication are under interdiction and units are deployed in front-line positions or surrounded; time to train crews on new weapons that are complicated by their being in under fire.
Infantry Soldiers with 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, fire an FGM-148 Javelin during a combined arms live fire exercise in Jordan on August 27, 2019, in support of Eager Lion. Eager Lion, U.S. Central Command’s largest and most complex exercise, is an opportunity to integrate forces in a multilateral environment, operate in realistic terrain and strengthen military-to-military relationships. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Liane Hatch)
Tragically, many deserving units may be destroyed before they see any Western weaponry.
What about small arms like M16s?
The Ukrainian regular troops are generally equipped with AK-74 modern rifles with the 5.45×39mm cartridge (similar in performance to M-16s). But the AK-47 chambered in 7.62x39mm is still popular. It is the primary weapon of territorial and militia units, who not only like its easy operation and robust performance but prefer it for close quarter urban combat.
They like the Dragunov Sniper Rifle (7.62x54mm) that has similar characteristics to the NATO 7.62 standard — not just for sniping but for penetration at longer range engagement. They are even bringing out the 100 year-old Maxim M-1910 (7.62x54mm) machine guns mounted on a wheeled carriage with a gun shield — it may look like an antique. but its mobility is really handy and the gun shield is popular with gunners.
The one U.S. small arm that the Ukrainians love and can’t get enough of is the .50 caliber Barrett rifles (all models) along with tons of ammo. The more Barretts they get, the more miserable the Russians will be.
Does this mean retired M1 Abrams tanks could be sent to Ukraine?
Unfortunately, it is way too late to talk of armor reinforcement or heavy equipment in terms of the current campaign.
If Ukraine survives this stage of the war, the smart play would be an approach called “Roll-over.” General Wesley Clark and I introduced it in testimony before Congress in July 2014 and it is finally catching on. The basic idea is to take American weaponry in storage (already paid for by the taxpayer, and for which the U.S. neither has the force structure to man nor requirement as war reserve stock) and equip our East European allies who need modernization to NATO standards. We have literally thousands of still combat-worthy M-1 tanks, M-2 infantry fighting vehicles, HUMVEEs, and hundreds of M-109 howitzers, which would be a major upgrade for a country like Poland, which has T-72 tanks, BMP, and self-propelled 122mm guns and 152mm howitzers. All of those immediately proximate to Ukraine and familiar to their troops.
Since testing at U.S. Army Cold Regions Test Center, the Department of Defense’s lone extreme cold natural environment testing facility, began in January 2020, the M1A2 System Enhancement Package version 3 main battle tank was driven more than 2,000 miles in rugged conditions across three seasons of sub-Arctic weather, fired hundreds of rounds for accuracy in extreme cold, and underwent testing of its auxiliary power unit.
Though the platform was extensively tested at U.S. Army Yuma Test Center prior to being put through its paces in Alaska, the sub-zero temperatures brought forth glitches that would have been unimaginable in the desert.
There are two American weapons that would be real game-changers. First, getting 1,000 of our excess Bradley M-2/3 with the TOW-2 tandem warhead anti-tank guided missile. TOW-2 has shown to be very effective against even the T-90. Over eight years of war, and now in the middle of an invasion, Ukrainians have taken massive losses in their BTR wheeled armored personnel carriers and BMP infantry fighting vehicles. The M-2 Bradley would be the perfect replacement and upgrade.
Ukraine was in the process of setting up 28 Territorial Defense brigades to be manned by reservists when this invasion started. They have the manpower, but no mobility or anti-tank / air defense capability. On average, each of those Territorial sized areas is the size of Maryland or Massachusetts in square miles of territory. Equipping each brigade with our excess HUMVEES, some of which carrying Javelin and Stinger crews would be an order of magnitude increase in their Territorial capability.
Of course — all of that is dependent on Ukraine surviving.
Putin seems as if he is in a bind and his conquest of Ukraine will not be an easy victory.
Clearly, the Russian invasion has not gone as smooth as they had anticipated:
— The penetrations of a number of independent Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) did not have enough weight or staying power to achieve their aggressive objectives. The Russian approach of combining a variety of BTG into ad hoc formations has meant that their command and control, fire support, and, critically important, coordination of sustainable logistics resupply were not optimized.
Russian President Putin.
—While approximately half of the 120 BTGs that were committed consisted of elite troops or at least fully manned with contract (professional) personnel, the other half had a mixture of conscripts or young, short term contractors who were neither trained nor psychologically prepared for the aggressive tasks expected of them. Many were told they were on a peacetime training exercise and were surprised when they entered Ukraine and found that the population that they were supposed to liberate see them as aggressors.
On the other hand, on several large invasion axes where the force consisted of an integrated divisional sized command, Russian success was more significant. As illustrated in the attached map: the armored thrust passed Chernigov towards Kyiv; the successful penetration at Konotop by the 1st Guards Tank Army’s 4th Guards Tank Division; and the breakthrough from Crimea with dual deep thrusts seizing Kherson and threatening Mykolaiv to the west and overrunning Melitopol and heading to surround Mariupol.
Overall, the slowed momentum of the invasion and disjointed penetrations to date must demonstrate to Putin that this is not going to be an easy or fast campaign. On the other hand, with key urban areas on the point of being surrounded such as Mariupol, Kharkiv, and Chernigov there remains the serious potential of eastern Ukraine eventually being overrun as far as the Dnipro river line.
If the southern drive continues to the west, Odessa likewise, is threatened and the Russians may achieve a link up with Transnistria.
To the northwest, there is a large offensive force assembled in Belarus that has yet to be committed. This includes BTGs from the Far Eastern 5th, 29th, 35th Armies as well as Belarussian elite air assault and special forces. They pose a serious threat of eventually cutting off Ukraine from the West.
How far do you think [Putin] will go to achieve his objectives?
If one looks at where the Russian main effort is directed, Putin’s strategic objectives appear to be three-fold: Seizing the capital Kyiv and forcing a regime change — which has clearly stalled and may be at the point of failing;
—Seizing Eastern Ukraine up to the Dnipro river line —a slowly developing offensive but one which could accelerate if key cities are surrounded and defensive positions become in danger of envelopment along the Donbas front; and,
—Occupying and controlling southern Ukraine, including the entire coastline — an area between Rostov and Transnistria and as far north as Kryvyi Rih and Dnipropetrovsk — which is the most successful effort so far.
Bottom line, for Ukraine the situation remains extremely grave. For the Russians, they face the prospect of a campaign continuing for weeks (as opposed to days) to achieve those objectives with much higher losses.
Russian Military T-90 Tank. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
In Syria, for example, [Russia] bombed schools and hospitals and waged war on civilians. Putin seems to be doing more of this now. How far will he go knowing the world is watching his every move?
It is interesting that, originally, he described this campaign as a “Special Military Operation” focused on demilitarizing Ukraine. Several days ago, in his new directive to Minister of Defense Shoigu it was changed to “Military Offensive.” The subtle nuance being the gloves are coming off and this is now a campaign treating all Ukrainians (not just the military) as enemies. The US intelligence community has warned that this means the use of massive firepower to destroy major urban centers of resistance irrespective of civilian casualties. I agree with that assessment.
Some are calling for a no-fly zone over Ukraine?
The Ukrainians are begging for western help to get Russian air off of their back, however, there are both military and political impediments to doing that.
Where they need that the most are over Kyiv, in the east and south of the country, which is a very long reach for the limited number of U.S. and NATO aircraft available particularly in trying to police around the clock a no-fly zone. Politically, President Biden has declared that U.S. forces are not to engage the Russians, and his “no boots on the ground” prohibition presumably includes “seats in cockpits” over Ukraine without the U.S., any air action by NATO is militarily infeasible.
Is a no-fly zone really possible?
Despite what I already said I believe we have yet to face the real decision point. Several years ago, I participated in a NATO analysis that included a Russian invasion of eastern and southern Ukraine which estimated up to 10 million refugees fleeing to the west. At the time the sheer scale of that seemed unimaginable however in the last three days alone, the rate of refugee flight is actually faster and larger than those previous estimates.
Capt. Andrew “Dojo” Olson, F-35A Lightning II Demonstration Team pilot, performs over Miami Beach, Fla., May 25, 2019. Olson performed the demo during both days of the Miami Beach Air and Sea Show. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Jensen Stidham)
Realistically we are facing the prospect of 10 million refugees with 75 percent of them concentrated in border areas on Ukrainian territory, waiting for processing and in dire need of food, shelter, medical supplies, and security. We can’t blame the NATO countries for insisting on orderly and methodical processing for what could be a deluge of displaced persons running amuck. But we need to come to the realization that the world may be witnessing millions of people suffering, even dying women and children. Already it has been pointed out that it is similar to watching another Holocaust and doing nothing.
Given that Russian forces are not in western Ukraine or near the border areas at this time, it would be prudent to insert large-scale humanitarian assistance into those areas protected by multinational peacekeeping forces and protected by an allied “aerial secure” zone above. If we don’t recognize that need and respond in time our Commander in Chief and the reputation of the American people will be branded in history for cowardliness.
Lastly, if the Russian economy were to collapse and Putin’s back is against the wall would he dare strike NATO?
I believe that both we and Putin have misunderstood the role and power of economic sanctions. On our side, we assumed they would have a deterrent effect and clearly, that was a mistaken assumption. Putin appeared to believe, based on past history, that the sanctions would be small and affect the Russian economy marginally. It may take months. but the combined impact of the announced sanctions threatens to put Russia’s economic condition back a quarter-century to where it was in the mid-1990s.
Russian T-90 Tank. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
If Putin fails in Ukraine, he will not be in a position to seriously threaten NATO with conventional invasion. If he succeeds with defeating Ukraine’s military and occupying the country with draconian police state suppression, within a year or two NATO may see Russian Tank Armies forward-deployed not only in Belarus but in Ukraine aimed like a dagger toward Poland and the Baltics.
Would Putin in any situation try to negotiate his way of this?
It seems that Putin has three fundamental options (with a host of variance in between):
— Option 1, stay on the current path with a methodical, extended war against Ukraine.
— Option 2, escalate with the use of a low-yield battlefield tactical nuclear weapons and chemical attacks on urban resistance.
— Option 3, at some point offer a seize fire with the following conditions; regime change in Ukraine to include a friendly coalition government, demilitarization of Ukraine or at least two thirds of it and cessation of sanctions in return for returning his forces to Russian territory.
Only “the Devil” knows which option he will pick.
Dr. Phillip A. Karber is President of the Potomac Foundation. Dr. Karber is an internationally recognized authority on defense and national security matters; an accomplished business executive; and a university professor. He has prepared studies and recommendations on defense strategy for the highest levels of the U.S. government; advised many NATO governments on defense issues; headed BDM Corporation’s International Division; served as JFK International Air Terminal’s Chairman of the Board; and teaches courses in national security and military affairs at Georgetown University.
10. America Must Do More to Help Ukraine Fight Russia
Conclusion:
The war in Ukraine is shaping up to be a protracted struggle because the Russian military has been unable to quickly achieve its objectives. Ukrainians are resisting in battle and through civil disobedience and protests. Morale will be a decisive factor. Despite immense destruction and suffering in Ukraine, the flight of more than a million refugees from the country, and the Russian military’s despicable war crimes, Ukrainians are holding firm in their belief that they will prevail. In contrast, the Russian economy is imploding without any prospects for relief, and morale remains low among the Russian military. It may be too soon for optimism, but there is still reason for hope. And although hope is not a strategy, hopelessness guarantees defeat.
America Must Do More to Help Ukraine Fight Russia
A Lend-Lease Plan for the Ukrainian Military
March 6, 2022
Foreign Affairs · by Alexander Vindman and Dominic Cruz Bustillos · March 5, 2022
Kyiv is still standing. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is still leading. Vladimir Putin, the Russian dictator, has still not brought Ukraine to its knees.
Contrary to the grim predictions and prognoses of Ukraine’s fate by many analysts, the Russian military has underperformed, and Ukrainian forces have repeatedly proved their mettle. Ukrainians have inflicted devastating losses on the Russian invaders, dominated the information war, and inspired significant action on the part of the international community, which had demonstrated relative apathy toward Ukraine in the eight years since Putin first invaded the country. It is impossible to overstate the significance of, among other things, the monumental surge in transatlantic unity, the about-face in Germany’s hitherto pacifistic foreign policy, the raft of new anticorruption measures enacted by Western democracies, and the renewed interest from Finland and Sweden in NATO membership.
All of these developments, however, trace back to Ukrainian resolve in the face of Russian aggression. In recent years, the world has been locked in a struggle between democracy and resurgent authoritarianism. Ukraine’s victory over Russia could prove to be a turning point in this struggle.
Yet Ukraine cannot hold out on its own. The Kremlin has suffered catastrophic losses in terms of personnel, vehicles, and equipment, but the Russian military has significant reserves to replenish its forces. Meanwhile, Ukraine will run short of fuel, ammunition, antitank weapons, air defense systems, unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), and aircraft long before its manpower is exhausted or its morale breaks.
Ukraine cannot hold out on its own.
Western democracies have the necessary resources to close this gap and ensure that Ukraine prevails. Talk of supporting a hypothetical Ukrainian insurgency is premature and counterproductive while the Ukrainian army and territorial defense battalions remain far from defeated. To give those forces a fighting chance, Washington and its allies should establish a lend-lease program modeled on the one that provided arms and assistance to U.S. allies in Europe during World War II. This program would allow the United States and other NATO members to loan or give aid to Ukraine at little or no cost; such aid could include medium- and long-range air defense systems, antitank weapons (beyond the Javelins that have already been provided), advanced extended-range antiarmor capabilities, coastal defense systems, high mobility artillery, and critically important UCAVs. Kyiv could also benefit from systems that could be leased from the United States and its allies, albeit with the understanding that the weapons and equipment would not necessarily be returned after the war.
Ironically, the chief beneficiary of the original lend-lease program was the government in Moscow: at the time, the Soviet Union was a bulwark in the fight against fascism. Today, however, the Kremlin has become a fascist threat, and it is Ukraine that is leading the charge to defend Europe—a fight that the world cannot afford to let the Ukrainians lose.
THE LOAN RANGERS
A new lend-lease program would expedite the transfer of much-needed lethal aid and equipment to Ukrainian defenders. Establishing a no-fly zone over Ukraine may be too provocative, but if the West is unwilling to stage that sort of intervention, then it ought to supply Ukraine with the tools it needs to control the skies itself, including ones that would allow Ukraine to strike Russian warehouses or staging areas holding aircraft, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles beyond Ukraine’s borders. This would include UCAVs with air-to-surface and air-to-air capabilities, as well as fighter jets, such as the MiG-29s and Su-25s that Bulgaria, Poland, and Slovakia had proposed to transfer to Ukraine before backtracking for reasons that remain unclear. (Unconfirmed media reports suggest that Washington may have pressured those countries to reverse course.) If NATO members express concerns over transferring fighter jets because of potential gaps in their own air defenses, then the United States and NATO should step in to provide donors with advanced air defense capabilities and more modern fighters, with corresponding training.
The long-term aim of a lend-lease arrangement would be to create stockpiles of military aid along Ukraine’s borders. Ideally, any time Ukraine would submit a request for support, the necessary materiel would be readily available for transport rather than subject to a lengthy procurement process. The most daunting hurdle to this proposal would likely be the initial stages of passing legislation and coordinating plans with allies. But bureaucracy should not stand in the way of waging an existential fight for democracy. Historically, providing aid to Ukraine has been a strong point of bipartisan cooperation, and majorities in both parties understand the importance of Ukraine’s victory in this war. Therefore, the Biden administration is well positioned to mobilize bipartisan support for a new Lend-Lease Act, much as President Franklin Roosevelt did in 1941 despite isolationist opposition. Doing so could even provide a rallying point for Washington after years of domestic polarization.
For such a plan to succeed, officials in Washington and in European capitals must not become paralyzed by a sense of defeatism as they listen to doomsayers foretell the fall of Kyiv, Zelensky’s death, and Putin’s subjection of Ukraine to the brutal measures he used to level Grozny during the Chechen wars and Aleppo during the Syrian civil war. War is unpredictable; nothing in this fight is predetermined. A narrative of inevitable Ukrainian defeat could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Washington and its allies must not shrink from taking the actions that will help now in favor of steps that might be helpful only after Ukraine has already fallen. It is still well within the West’s ability to influence the outcome of this war; Western leaders must realize the agency they hold.
A narrative of inevitable Ukrainian defeat could become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Another barrier to a new lend-lease agreement would be posed by the frequent overestimation of the risks involved in arms transfers to Ukraine. In confronting Russian aggression for the past two decades, Western policymakers have generally chosen to reduce short-term risks at the expense of long-term stability. This approach directly contributed to the catastrophe currently unfolding in Ukraine. The truth is that there are no risk-free options right now, and the longer the West waits, the worse the options will become. Accepting the risks of escalation now will prevent the need to confront greater risks in the future.
Putin has menacingly invoked Russia’s nuclear arsenal as a warning to the United States and its allies to stay out of the war. But ending this conflict as quickly as possible by directing massive resources to Ukraine is more likely to preclude a NATO-Russian confrontation than to hasten nuclear war. This does not mean the West should be reckless. But it is important to keep in mind that deconfliction channels, incentives among the military establishments on both sides, and the widespread acceptance of the idea that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought would all reduce the likelihood of a doomsday scenario.
ALL IS NOT LOST
Existing pledges on the part of Western democracies to provide Ukraine with antitank weapons, man-portable air defense systems, small arms, body armor, and munitions are necessary but insufficient to meet the demands of the battlefield. Moreover, although the Biden administration has formally asked Congress for $10 billion to support Ukraine, only a fraction of this sum will be earmarked for increased lethal aid, and it remains unclear if this aid will include the kinds of capabilities Ukraine desperately needs. Reacting to events on the ground with a steady stream of Band-Aids is not a sustainable strategy, and help that arrives only at the eleventh hour will be too late. A new Lend-Lease Act would help resolve this issue by codifying a long-term aid program of the kind that has been painfully absent throughout the entirety of Putin’s eight-year war on Ukraine.
The war in Ukraine is shaping up to be a protracted struggle because the Russian military has been unable to quickly achieve its objectives. Ukrainians are resisting in battle and through civil disobedience and protests. Morale will be a decisive factor. Despite immense destruction and suffering in Ukraine, the flight of more than a million refugees from the country, and the Russian military’s despicable war crimes, Ukrainians are holding firm in their belief that they will prevail. In contrast, the Russian economy is imploding without any prospects for relief, and morale remains low among the Russian military. It may be too soon for optimism, but there is still reason for hope. And although hope is not a strategy, hopelessness guarantees defeat.
Foreign Affairs · by Alexander Vindman and Dominic Cruz Bustillos · March 5, 2022
11. Ukraine invasion: China needs to rethink Taiwan
Excerpts:
Russia might indeed bulldoze Ukraine into submission in the coming weeks. But things will not go back to normal. Russia and its economy will struggle. And it will be many years before Russia and Russians aren’t looked at askance. Putin’s Ukraine adventure reminded much of the West that it still has some principles – and even a backbone.
The big lesson for Beijing: Intimidating an opponent into submission is harder than it looks. Russia tried for many months, even years, against Ukraine.
China has been trying for decades against Taiwan. And without any real success. Invading Ukraine seems to have made things worse for Russia – and the excuses, such as claiming Russia “had no choice,” have mostly fallen flat.
Xi Jinping might have to go back to the drawing board if he wants to subjugate Taiwan.
Ukraine invasion: China needs to rethink Taiwan
China may have earlier underestimated Western resolve, difficulties of conquest, cost in lives, money and reputationChina may have earlier underestimated Western resolve, difficulties of conquest, cost in lives, money and reputation
Xi Jinping and his people are no doubt paying close attention to events in Ukraine. They may not like what they are seeing – and this should cause them to rethink a Taiwan seizure scenario on several fronts.
These include the military and operational, of course. But as important, if not more so, they may need to reconsider assumptions about Taiwan’s willingness to resist.
Also they may want to reassess the willingness of the United States, the European Union (EU) and other free nations (such as Japan) to provide military support (direct or indirect) to Taiwan and impose punishing financial and economic sanctions on the PRC.
Beijing may reckon it has underestimated Western backbone, the difficulties of seizing Taiwan at a reasonable cost as measured in People’s Liberation Army (PLA) lives, the economic and reputational harm to China, and the risk of the PRC turning into an international pariah.
Suppose you’re a Chinese strategist tasked with writing up a report to inform Xi and the rest of the Chinese leaders at Zhongnanhai about what guidance recent events offer when they’re thinking about Taiwan. Here are a few things you might include:
China flew 39 warplanes, including 24 J-16s like this one and 10 J-10s, toward Taiwan on January 24, in its largest such sortie of the new year. Photo: eng.chinamil.com.cn
Military/operational
The Russians were apparently counting on a show of “shock and awe” (after an extended intimidation campaign and covert subversion) being enough to bring Ukraine to its knees. Not quite.
Beijing was counting on something similar. Time won’t be on China’s side. Beijing needs a quick fait accompli or it risks – as Russia is learning in Ukraine – Taiwan supporters’ having the time to steel and organize themselves to back Taiwan and punish the PRC.
Especially as images of dead Taiwanese and destroyed buildings hit the internet – images that also would not be welcome inside the PRC, assuming they get through the Great Firewall.
Beijing will face stiff challenges in many areas, including terrain, cyber, air and weapons systems.
In terms of terrain, the two battle zones (Ukraine and Taiwan) couldn’t be more different. Ukraine is basically a plain – some open and some forested – sharing a land border with Russia and the Belarus puppet state.
The main island of Taiwan is 90 miles offshore from China with a narrow, largely urbanized coastal plain on the west side and the rest mountainous. Forget about armored assaults, but don’t forget about the difficulties of urban combat.
Taiwan’s terrain is advantageous for the defender. Taiwan’s military has its problems, but it is a competent and serious force that can bleed an attacker. And a little bit of success can mushroom and bolster military and public confidence.
Even a relatively small number of committed and reasonably well-trained defenders can cause all sorts of problems – and savage and delay an attacking force – in urban, forested and even relatively open terrain.
Cyber defenses may also be tougher to breach than imagined. Ukraine’s communications networks still seem to be operating to a fair degree – and “command and control” of the Ukrainian military is operational. Closing down Taiwan’s networks may not be so easy.
Missile strategy
Similarly, missile bombardment may not be as decisive as expected. The Russians have employed long range missile attacks but they don’t seem to have had so much effect.
Would using a lot of more missiles be more effective? Beijing should wonder. Sometimes you’re just moving the rubble around – and it’s terrible ‘optics’ from a propaganda perspective. There’s no better way to build international sympathy for the people you are attacking.
Seen from the Air
Also, it may be much harder than expected for China to establish control of the air.
The Russian Air Force outnumbers and outclasses the Ukrainian Air Force (UAF) in every respect and Ukrainian airfields are all known and targetable. Yet, the UAF is still operating at a certain level (although the Russians appear to have held back a bit).
Shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, such as the Stinger, can be very effective for a resilient air defense – even against an opponent that has a far superior Air Force. They are cheap, easy to employ, and hard to locate.
Military helicopters carrying large Taiwan flags do a flyby rehearsal on October 5, 2021, ahead of National Day celebrations amid escalating tensions between Taipei and Beijing. Photo: AFP / Ceng Shou Yi / NurPhoto
Precision Weapons
As for other precision weapons, in Ukraine’s case the Javelin and other anti-tank missiles can cause no end of trouble to an attacking force – even a much more powerful attacking force.
In China’s case, anti-ship missiles will be the equivalent of the Javelin in the Ukraine fight. A single anti-ship missile can reach out many miles – including the Chinese coast – and sink a ship.
These weapons are easy to deploy and operate and very hard to locate and destroy. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) could find itself running out of ships (and crews) before Taiwan runs out of anti-ship missiles.
No-nuclear card
It’s also possible the “nuclear weapons card” isn’t all it’s cracked up to be. Russia has nukes and yet Ukraine hasn’t crumbled. Quite the opposite.
And the Americans and the Europeans have developed a backbone and are providing serious and effective weaponry to Ukraine regardless – even though just a short while ago most pundits thought it impossible as it would be too provocative.
Economic/financial
Beijing probably won’t like what it sees on the economic/financial front either if the Americans, Europeans, and others decide to do to the PRC what they are doing to Russia. They have shown themselves willing to apply serious economic and financial sanctions against Russia and, as importantly, against Russia’s top leaders.
Targeting overseas assets must worry Zhongnanhai and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) elites, given the extent to which they’ve moved overseas and the scale of their property holdings. Russian and Chinese elites are glad to have their citizens absorb all sorts of punishment – but when it affects them personally, it’s a different equation.
The PRC leaders presumably thought Westerners and others would never impose sanctions that were also self-harming to their own elites and their economies. They seem to have been mistaken – although time will tell about the level of commitment.
Cut off US financial dealings, economic ties and tech transfers to the PRC and the Chinese economy will be in serious trouble, and fast.
The EU has also banned Russian aircraft from operating in EU territory. The Americans may follow. Russian media outlets are similarly being pressured.
Business relations
Chinese leaders may have discounted this level of potential isolation if they invade Taiwan. They may need to reconsider. British Petroleum and others pulling out of Russia must have been a surprise. The PRC must wonder now if many foreign anchor tenants and firms that claimed they were in China for the long haul just might leave.
And if their home governments impose restrictions and sanctions, that decision might be made for them. Shareholders might help make the decision as well – complaining that companies should not invest in a country that attacks its democratic neighbors.
One notes that, to date, allegations of genocide, organ harvesting, strangling Hong Kong and bullying neighbors haven’t been enough to move Western businesses to divest from China. Maybe Taiwan (following on Ukraine) will do the trick.
CCTV surveillance footage shows a missile hitting a residential building in Kiev, Ukraine, February 26, 2022, in this screen grab.
Political/psychological
Ukraine and Taiwan are battles as much of the mind as of blood and steel. A so-called decapitation strike to eliminate a nation’s leadership isn’t always so easy – as Ukraine has shown. The same might apply to Taiwan.
And brave leaders can rally a people who were thought to be demoralized and ready to crumble. The PRC may be underestimating Taiwan in this regard. And even if a few top leaders are killed or captured, that doesn’t mean everyone else rolls over for the invader. Not at all.
China, like Russia, may have been counting on Quislings and fifth columnists to help collapse Taiwan/Ukraine from within. Given Ukraine’s resilience and it’s leadership’s bold efforts to rally a defense, the Russians must be wondering what happened?
The Chinese too must wonder if the money they’ve spent on subverting Taiwan’s politicians, academics, media, and others has been well spent.
Image making – image breaking
Killing civilians and destroying civilian infrastructure can be counterproductive. Rather than terrorizing into submission it may provoke greater and more widespread resistance and spur other nations and organizations to step up pressure to punish and isolate the perpetrators (in this case, China). So China will go from being seen in foreigner’s eyes as lovable Pandas to bloodthirsty fire-breathing dragons.
A clear lesson from Russia’s actions is that if the PRC invades Taiwan and it turns into a long bloodbath, China’s global reputation will go down the toilet fast – and keep going. It will be isolating itself and turning itself into an international pariah. Sort of like a really big North Korea.
Even America’s financial and business classes – who have to date been able to overlook overwhelming evidence of human rights violations in the PRC in hopes of making some money – may change their tune when videos appear of Taipei, Taichung, and Kaohsiung getting blasted, civilians lying dead in the streets.
Wake-up call
Ukraine is waking up Taiwan and Taiwanese to the threat they face from the PRC. Taiwanese might have wanted to ignore the Chinese threat. But in the same way Hong Kong woke them up about the reality of brutal political warfare, Ukraine is reminding everyone of the imminent danger of kinetic warfare.
This is more likely to lead to an improved Taiwanese defense as more attention and resources are applied. And it may also result in faster improvement of military reserve capabilities, and maybe even a rudimentary Civil Defense scheme.
And don’t forget that because of Ukraine, many other nations (America, European Union, Japan, and others) are now internalizing that a “Taiwan scenario” is indeed likely in the near future. So the issue is going to get far more attention and with more of a sense of immediacy – and possibility – than before.
The Russians have even managed to get the Germans to finally stand up on their hind legs. Can you imagine?
China must wonder whether the Japanese will do the same? Attack Taiwan and they probably will. And not just the Japanese. Maybe the South Koreans and a long list of others.
None of this is good news for the Chinese Communist Party leadership.
Taiwanese soldiers in a drill in a file photo: Image: Facebook / Agencies
Finding backbone
Russia might indeed bulldoze Ukraine into submission in the coming weeks. But things will not go back to normal. Russia and its economy will struggle. And it will be many years before Russia and Russians aren’t looked at askance. Putin’s Ukraine adventure reminded much of the West that it still has some principles – and even a backbone.
The big lesson for Beijing: Intimidating an opponent into submission is harder than it looks. Russia tried for many months, even years, against Ukraine.
China has been trying for decades against Taiwan. And without any real success. Invading Ukraine seems to have made things worse for Russia – and the excuses, such as claiming Russia “had no choice,” have mostly fallen flat.
Xi Jinping might have to go back to the drawing board if he wants to subjugate Taiwan.
Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine and a former diplomat and business executive who spent many years in Asia. He is a senior fellow with the Center for Security Policy. This article, republished with permission, was originally published by JAPAN Forward.
12. American Veterans Volunteer to Fight in Ukraine
American Veterans Volunteer to Fight in Ukraine
March 05, 2022 11:55 AM
Washington —
When Matthew Parker, an American veteran with 22 years of service in the U.S. Army, heard that Russian forces had invaded Ukraine, he thought about a Ukrainian American soldier who had served alongside him with U.S. forces in Iraq and decided he wanted to help the Ukrainians defend their homeland.
“I had a soldier in Iraq with me who was from Ukraine,” he told VOA of his decision to join what he sees as a fight about justice and friendship. “He became an American citizen, joined the Army, and he told me about his home. He told me about his family and how proud they were. I remember him telling me about his little sister.
“Now … I'd like to think that by going to Ukraine, maybe I protect his mother, or his little sister or his home. Maybe in some small way, I say thank you to him for serving by doing something like this.”
Parker, who fought battles in Bosnia and Iraq, is not alone.
A representative of the Ukrainian Embassy in Washington told VOA that 3,000 U.S. volunteers have responded to the nation’s appeal for people to serve in an international battalion that will help resist Russia’s invading forces. Many more have stepped forward from other countries, most from other post-Soviet states such as Georgia and Belarus.
In an emotional video posted to his Telegram channel on Thursday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy referred to an “international legion” of 16,000 foreign volunteers, who he said are being asked to “join the defense of Ukraine, Europe and the world.”
“We have nothing to lose but our own freedom,” the president said.
FILE - Ukrainian soldiers patrol an area not far from burning military trucks in a street in Kyiv, Ukraine, Feb. 26, 2022. Over 3,000 American volunteers are reportedly heading to Ukraine to help its soldiers fight the invading Russian military.
Zelenskyy’s appeal was echoed in a Facebook posting by Ukraine’s armed forces, which emphasized they are looking for people with combat experience who “are standing with Ukraine against [the] Russian invasion.” The government has already temporarily lifted visa requirements for the volunteers.
For Parker, a gray-haired father with four adult children, the decision to go and fight in Ukraine came even before Zelenskyy’s appeal.
Initially, he and 12 veterans, men he served with over the years, planned to board a plane to Poland, get to the Ukrainian border and register for territorial defense units along with other Ukrainian volunteers.
The path forward became much clearer, however, after Zelenskyy called for the formation of the international legion and the Ukrainian government laid out a procedure for people who want to help.
“When we did not have the procedure, it would have been a process of showing up at the border. Maybe not knowing how to speak the language and trying to convince somebody. This way, they know our experience. They know our training. They can send us to places where they need us,” he said.
Parker, a native of the U.S. state of South Carolina, said in his years with the U.S. Army, he had been an instructor as well as a combat leader who led soldiers in combat situations.
Matthew Parker, center with rifle, instructs other U.S. soldiers on the use of the AK-47 assault rifle during his military service in Tikrit, Iraq, in 2006. (Courtesy - Matthew Parker)
“They can place me where they need me,” he said. “Or they can only leave me as an instructor with the legion to teach Ukrainians how to use different weapons systems. So now they have a choice, they can put me in combat or use me as an instructor, but we're happy to help in whatever.”
For Parker, the fight in Ukraine is about more than the defense of one central European country that has been subjected to an unprovoked attack by a larger neighbor. Like many of the volunteers, he feels that Americans’ own democratic rights will be threatened if Russia is able to prevail.
“What Ukrainians are fighting is a bully, they are facing someone who does not honor international law, who does not care about women and children, and we fought this type of people before,” Parker said.
“We're stopping a bully from hurting women and children.”
Another of Parker’s former combat friends was from Georgia, where Russia staged a similar war in 2008.
“They served next to me, soldiers from Georgia in Iraq. And I know how it felt being around them while their country was being attacked. Now we have another free country similar to Georgia that's being attacked,” he said.
Parker said he is leaving his security training business in South Carolina, his family, and three dogs and heading to Ukraine as soon as next week.
Russian President Vladimir Putin “has already taken the Crimea,” he said. “Which should have never been allowed. That was a weakness by the international body. He can't be allowed to take the rest of Ukraine.”
13. RFE/RL Suspends Operations In Russia Following Kremlin Attacks
We have to revert to Cold War operations operating from external locations. This is all the more reason why we have to work to get information into the Russian people. They will not hear anything but Putin's propaganda.
RFE/RL Suspends Operations In Russia Following Kremlin Attacks
Also on March 4, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law that could subject any journalist who deviates from the Kremlin’s talking points on the Ukraine war to a 15-year prison sentence. Because RFE/RL journalists continue to tell the truth about Russia’s catastrophic invasion of its neighbor, the company plans to report about these developments from outside of Russia.
Said RFE/RL President & CEO Jamie Fly, “It is with the deepest regret that I announce the suspension of our physical operations in Moscow today. This is not a decision that RFE/RL has taken of its own accord, but one that has been forced upon us by the Putin regime’s assault on the truth. Following years of threats, intimidation and harassment of our journalists, the Kremlin, desperate to prevent Russian citizens from knowing the truth about its illegal war in Ukraine, is now branding honest journalists as traitors to the Russian state. We will continue to expand our reporting for Russian audiences and will use every platform possible to reach them at a time when they need our journalism more than ever. Despite this bleak moment, we know from our organization’s 70-year history that one day, perhaps sooner than many think, we will be able to reopen a bureau in Russia. Time is on the side of liberty, even in Vladimir Putin’s Russia.”
Over the last week, nine of RFE/RL’s Russian language websites were blocked after RFE/RL refused to comply with the Russian government’s demands to delete information about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Overnight on March 3-4, Russian authorities blocked access within Russia to websites run by RFE/RL’s Russian, Tatar-Bashkir, and North Caucasus services, including the Russian-language North.Realities, Siberia.Realities, Idel.Realities, and Caucasus.Realities sites. On February 28, Russia blocked access to two other RFE/RL websites, including Current Time, the 24/7 digital and TV network led by RFE/RL in cooperation with VOA.
Since invading Ukraine, Russia has blocked a number of Russian-language websites producing news content from abroad, including Meduza, BBC, Deutsche Welle and Voice of America. The Kremlin has also blocked access to Facebook and Twitter.
The technical cause of the bankruptcy of RFE/RL’s Russian entity is its longstanding refusal to comply with Russia’s unlawful demand that every piece of RFE/RL’s Russian-language content—every video, every article, every tweet—be accompanied by a state-mandated warning that RFE/RL is a “foreign agent.” In the past year, Russia’s media regulator Roskomnadzor has issued 1,040 violations against RFE/RL that will result in fines of more than $13.4 million for its refusal to submit to this content-labeling regime. In addition, 18 RFE/RL journalists have been designated as individual “foreign agents.” On February 9, RFE/RL filed its final written submission with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), asking for a hearing to consider the merits of the legal case it filed in May 2021 challenging Russia’s “foreign agent” laws.
RFE/RL has been broadcasting to Russian audiences since March 1, 1953, when the first programs of “Radio Liberation” were directed at audiences in the Soviet Union. Between November 1988 and August 1991, as Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s “glasnost” policies took hold, the Russian Service built up a network of as many as 400 people across the U.S.S.R. and over 40 people in Moscow. On August 27, 1991, Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree giving RFE/RL accreditation and allowing it to open a bureau in Moscow; the decree was revoked by Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2002.
RFE/RL’s Russian Service is a multiplatform alternative to Russian state-controlled media, providing audiences in the Russian Federation with informed and accurate news, analysis, and opinion. The Russian Service’s websites, including its regional reporting units Siberia.Realities and Northern.Realities, earned a monthly average of 12.7 million visits and 20.6 million page views in 2021, while 297 million Russian Service videos were viewed on YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram.
RFE/RL's Tatar-Bashkir Service is the only major international news provider reporting in the Tatar and Bashkir languages to audiences in the Russian Federation’s multiethnic, Muslim-majority Volga-Ural region. Since 1953, the Service, known locally as Radio Azatliq, and its Russian-language reporting unit Idel.Realities, have provided an important and innovative alternative to government-controlled media.
RFE/RL's North Caucasus Service is one of the few independent media outlets reporting in this predominantly Muslim region of the Russian Federation. Producing content in Chechen and Russian via its Caucasus.Realities unit, the service reports the news in one of the most violent and dangerous regions in the world.
Current Time is a 24/7 Russian-language digital and TV network led by RFE/RL in cooperation with VOA. In addition to reporting uncensored news, it is the largest provider of independent, Russian-language films to its audiences. Despite rising pressure on Current Time from the Russian government, Current Time videos were viewed over 1.3 billion times on YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram/IGTV in FY2021.
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14. The Limits of Putin’s Propaganda
Excerpts:
Whether or not Putin genuinely believed that Ukrainians would greet Russian soldiers as liberators, it seems clear that he made a severe miscalculation when he gave the orders to invade Ukraine. The initial position of Russian forces seemed to indicate that Putin was planning a relatively short campaign to capture Kyiv, one that would avoid protracted combat and result in a decisive Russian victory. This plan has fallen apart. Russia’s military is actively bombarding Ukrainian cities. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is reporting more than 9,000 Russian military deaths, while Russia is reporting less than 500. Putin has escalated to nuclear threats because they are his remaining leverage to prevent the consequences of his unforced error from coming to fruition.
Since the 2014 occupation of Crimea, Western leaders and a concerned public have watched Putin use every tool available to bend reality to suit his ambitions. He eliminated anything—including freedom of expression, political opposition, and an independent media—that could have stood between him and such an egregious miscalculation. A feedback loop of his own creation cut Putin off from reality.
The Limits of Putin’s Propaganda
By on March 4, 2022
BY ELEANOR LOPATTO
Ukraine has upended Putin’s otherwise successful strategy of gaining leverage over neighboring states by manufacturing then freezing separatist conflicts within their borders. Before the occupation of Crimea, a coordinated, multiplatform disinformation campaign flooded eastern Ukraine with reports of violence targeting Russian speakers. These fabricated reports obscured the real motivations behind Russia’s military occupation and illegal annexation of Crimea. In contrast, Russia’s recent attack on Ukraine has been met with clear-eyed condemnation from the international community, backed up by severe financial consequences. Putin’s disinformation machine has failed to convince Ukrainians, global onlookers, and even his domestic audience that Russia’s war in Ukraine is justified.
The “De-Nazification” Narrative
Putin squandered any remaining pretext of moral justification for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with his surreal televised address on February 24, declaring a “special operation” to “strive for the demilitarization and de-Nazification of Ukraine.” Eight years after the initial occupation of Ukraine, Putin’s claim that the Russian military was entering Ukrainian territory “to protect people who have been abused by the genocide of the Kyiv regime” has failed to gain any purchase among Ukrainians or a global audience.
Accusing perceived enemies of Nazism or fascism is a typical Kremlin disinformation narrative. A recent open letter signed by over 300 “scholars of genocide, the Holocaust, and World War II” states that Russian propaganda regularly presents the elected leaders of Ukraine as Nazis and fascists. “This rhetoric is factually wrong, morally repugnant, and deeply offensive to the memory of millions of victims of Nazism and those who courageously fought against it, including Russian and Ukrainian soldiers of the Red Army.”
As is the case with conspiracy theories, this one has a kernel of truth: several Ukrainian nationalist figures committed atrocities against Jewish people and collaborated with Nazis during World War II. But Putin isn’t invading Ukraine to protect that country’s people from Stepan Bandera or Symon Petliura. As Harvard historian of Jewish and Eastern European History Josh Meyers noted on Twitter, what makes modern Ukraine so inspiring (and Putin’s lies so transparent) is that “there are no modern Petliuras today in Ukraine”: The Azov battalion—a far-right all-volunteer infantry military unit formed in May 2014 with about 900 current members—“is real and awful. But it is one battalion. To the contrary, Pew Polls have found Ukraine one of the least antisemitic countries in Europe. The President is a Jew. The former Prime Minister is a Jew.”
Former deputy chairman of the Central Bank of Russia Sergey Aleksashenko wrote that when Putin announced a Russian military operation in Ukraine, “it became obvious that the only clearly stated goal was to change the country’s political leadership.” Instead of giving the Russian leader the moral high ground, invoking Nazis has invited comparisons between Putin and Hitler.
From 2014 to 2022: What Changed?
Some differences between the world’s reaction to Russia’s military operations in Ukraine in 2014 versus 2022 include more proactive strategic communication practices from the West, an abundance of open-source intelligence, and Russian public opinion.
In contrast to the U.S. response to the occupation of Crimea in 2014, the White House has made a concerted effort to release intelligence to the public about Russian plans before they happened, in order to undermine the potency of “false flags” that fabricate a pretext for invasion. By consistently “pre-bunking” these plans, the Biden administration, in partnership with Western allies such as the UK, has prevented Russia’s disinformation tactics from achieving their goal: to sow confusion surrounding Russia’s actions in Ukraine in order to prevent an effective, unified response. Subsequent falsified videos from Ukraine’s separatist regions prove that these intelligence disclosures were warranted.
Second, a constant stream of on-the-ground information, including photos and video, is being uploaded to social media and instant messaging platforms. This has given the average internet user unprecedented access to raw footage of troop movement, equipment transport, and the damage caused by Russian bombardment of Ukrainian cities. This overwhelming amount of raw information also provides cover to propaganda and misreporting. Luckily, it is matched by a growing cohort of open-source investigators with the necessary skills to verify and analyze reports from the conflict zone.
Another difference between Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territory in 2022 versus 2014 is the reception of Putin’s primary audience, Russians. When Putin declared Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, his popular approval rating rose above 80 percent, attributed to the “Crimea effect.” According to Levada Center’s Denis Volkov, there is no general consensus in Russia on whether the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics should be independent, should be incorporated into Russia, or should remain Ukrainian. Putin instead gained public consensus for escalating tensions with Ukraine through exhaustion.
Not only has Russia’s invasion of Ukraine failed to boost Putin’s popularity but there are early indicators that it has weakened his base of support. According to the latest reporting from OVD-Info, more than 6,440 people were arrested in four days of antiwar protests across Russia. The billionaires Oleg Deripaska and Mikhail Fridman have both called for peace talks.
By occupying a peaceful neighbor, forcing the populations of its cities underground to escape bombardment, and allegedly committing war crimes, it’s clear even to Russians living in the Kremlin echochamber that Putin presents an exponentially greater threat to Ukraine than Nazis, NATO, or whoever he may blame next.
Disinformation Is a Devil’s Bargain
Whether or not Putin genuinely believed that Ukrainians would greet Russian soldiers as liberators, it seems clear that he made a severe miscalculation when he gave the orders to invade Ukraine. The initial position of Russian forces seemed to indicate that Putin was planning a relatively short campaign to capture Kyiv, one that would avoid protracted combat and result in a decisive Russian victory. This plan has fallen apart. Russia’s military is actively bombarding Ukrainian cities. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is reporting more than 9,000 Russian military deaths, while Russia is reporting less than 500. Putin has escalated to nuclear threats because they are his remaining leverage to prevent the consequences of his unforced error from coming to fruition.
Since the 2014 occupation of Crimea, Western leaders and a concerned public have watched Putin use every tool available to bend reality to suit his ambitions. He eliminated anything—including freedom of expression, political opposition, and an independent media—that could have stood between him and such an egregious miscalculation. A feedback loop of his own creation cut Putin off from reality.
The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the authors and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.
About the Author
Eleanor Lopatto
Program Assistant
Eleanor Lopatto is a Program Assistant at the Kennan Institute. Prior to joining the Wilson Center, Eleanor worked for the National Organization of Veterans' Advocates in Washington, DC.
Kennan Institute
The Kennan Institute is the premier U.S. center for advanced research on Russia and Eurasia and the oldest and largest regional program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The Kennan Institute is committed to improving American understanding of Russia, Ukraine, and the region through research and exchange. Read more
15. Opinion | Gen. Mark Milley: Why no-fly in Ukraine is a no-go
Our fear of escalation is the greatest deterrent to action. We are self-deterred by our fear of escalation.
Opinion | Gen. Mark Milley: Why no-fly in Ukraine is a no-go
ADAZI, Latvia — Rebuffing Ukrainian pleas for Western protection of its airspace, the United States’ top military commander said NATO has “no plans that I’m aware of to establish a no-fly zone” over the country.
The comments Saturday from Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff came as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called for such an air embargo and Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that he would treat imposition of a no-fly zone as “participation in the armed conflict.”
“If a no-fly zone was declared, someone would have to enforce it, and that would mean someone would have to then go and fight against Russian air forces,” Milley explained. “That is not something that NATO Secretary [Jens] Stoltenberg, or member states’ political leadership, has indicated they want to do.”
Milley made his remarks in an interview Saturday with Latvian journalists at a military base here, as part of a visit to Europe to assess the Ukraine conflict. His rejection of the no-fly zone echoes comments by other Biden administration officials, who have argued for weeks that although the United States wants to help Ukraine resist Russian aggression, it won’t make any moves that might place U.S. military forces, including Air Force planes, in direct conflict with Russia.
Milley made another comment to journalists here that was perhaps meant to check rising tensions about Russian escalation, spawned by Putin’s announcement last Sunday that he was putting Russian nuclear forces on “special combat readiness” because of “aggressive comments” from the West.
Despite Putin’s threatening language about nuclear weapons, Milley said, “we are not now seeing anything out there in the alert postures of the actual nuclear forces of Russia that would indicate any increased set of alerts.” He said the United States was monitoring the situation closely.
The remarks here by America’s top military leader illustrate once again the delicate balance the United States and its NATO allies are trying to strike between supporting Ukraine with lethal weapons and other aid — but avoiding direct confrontation with Russian forces that could lead to a wider conflict and increase the cataclysmic risk of nuclear war.
Putin has appeared to want to keep these escalatory tensions high, as part of his psychological pressure campaign against the West to gain dominance in Ukraine. Milley and other U.S. officials, in contrast, want to check these anxieties. But that’s becoming increasingly difficult as Russia broadens its assault on a defiant Ukraine, whose people and president have become heroes around the world.
16. Opinion | We need a more realistic strategy for the post-Cold War era
Opinion | We need a more realistic strategy for the post-Cold War era
Robert M. Gates served in the administrations of eight presidents and was CIA director from 1991 to 1993 and defense secretary from 2006 to 2011.
Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has ended Americans’ 30-year holiday from history. For the first time since World War II, the United States faces powerful, aggressive adversaries in Europe and Asia seeking to recover past glory along with claimed territories and spheres of influence. All in defiance of an international order largely shaped by the United States that has kept the peace among great powers for 70 years. The Russian and Chinese challenge to this peaceful order has been developing for a number of years. Putin’s war has provided the cold shower needed to awaken democratic governments to the reality of a new world, a world in which our strategy in recent years — including the “pivot” to Asia — is woefully insufficient to meet the long-term challenges we face.
Though we have a number of security challenges — Iran and North Korea, as well as terrorism and global problems — Russia and China are the main threats to our economic, political and military interests. The two nations each pose a different kind of hazard.
The threat from Russia is a megalomaniacal leader convinced that his historical mission is to restore the Russian empire and rewrite history since the collapse of the Soviet Union. He is willing to use the most brutal measures to achieve that goal, at home and, as we are seeing, even beyond Russia’s borders. When he passes from the scene, though, a different Russia could emerge. We caught a glimpse of such an alternative during the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev from 2008 to 2012.
Now hopelessly compromised, Medvedev spoke then about the need for Russia to diversify its economy and build stronger economic links to the West; he lifted many of Putin’s restrictions on foreign nongovernmental organizations and acquiesced in the intervention in Libya in 2011. That is not to say Putin will be succeeded by some kind of liberal democrat, but perhaps rather by a nationalist who sees the opportunity for an economically stronger, politically more influential Russia and a better life for Russians. In short, post-Putin, we could see a Russia much less threatening to its neighbors and to us.
China, on the other hand, will be a long-term challenge for the United States. Deng Xiaoping’s strategy 40 years ago of “hiding” China’s strength and “biding” its time was designed to avoid provoking American hostility and resistance prematurely — until China was ready to claim its global leadership role based on both economic and military power. Deng’s successors embraced that strategy, each doing his part to advance economic growth and build a strong military. Xi Jinping has now jettisoned “hide and bide” for much more threatening and aggressive policies abroad and exceptionally repressive measures at home. There is no reason to expect the challenge to diminish under Xi or his successors.
A new American strategy must recognize that we face a global struggle of indeterminate duration against two great powers that share authoritarianism at home and hostility to the United States. They are challenging us not only militarily but also in their use of other instruments of power — development assistance, strategic communications, covert and other influence operations, and advances in cyber- and other technologies.
We cannot pretend any longer that a national security focus primarily on China will protect our political, economic and security interests. China, to be sure, remains the principal long-term threat. But, as we have seen in Ukraine, a reckless, risk-taking dictator in Russia (or elsewhere) can be every bit as much a challenge to our interests and our security. We need a new strategy to deal effectively with adversaries in both Asia and Europe — adversaries with global reach.
A new strategy addressing global challenges to America — and all democracies — in the 21st century requires significant changes to U.S. national security structures that are, for the most part, a legacy of the late 1940s. If we can avoid war with Russia and China, our rivalry with them will be waged using nonmilitary instruments of power — the same kind of instruments that played a significant role in winning the Cold War: diplomacy, development assistance, strategic communications, science and technology, ideology, nationalism, and more.
Another crucial nonmilitary instrument — as we have seen in recent days — is our alliances and the power inherent in acting together. Two of the most important agencies during the Cold War were the United States Information Agency (strategic communications) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (economic assistance). We need creatively to reinvent both — and other critical nonmilitary instruments of power — for the global struggle in which we are now engaged.
At the same time, Putin’s war has reminded us of the decisive importance of military power. We need a larger, more advanced military in every branch, taking full advantage of new technologies to fight in new ways. Air power will be critical in both Europe and Asia, yet the Air Force is reliant on aircraft that, on average, are a quarter-century old. A significantly bigger Navy is needed, especially in Asia, to protect lines of communication and freedom of navigation worldwide. The Army needs to be larger, in particular to allow us to increase our military presence in Europe, at least as long as Putin is in power.
If we are to have a bigger, more powerful and technologically advanced military to support a global strategy, there must be radical reform inside the Pentagon. The current ways of doing business there put us at risk. Old bureaucratic habits must give way to new approaches that force speed and agility in moving new technologies and acquisitions from decision to deployment. Overhead must be slashed, with the savings plowed into military capabilities.
When I was defense secretary, in 2009, with three months’ work, we cut three dozen wasteful or failing legacy programs that, had they been built to completion, would have cost taxpayers $330 billion. A year later, again with only a few months’ effort, we identified $180 billion in overhead savings. Taxpayers cannot be asked for more money to ensure our military is superior to our adversaries without demonstrating that the wasteful, painfully slow defense bureaucracy can and will be reformed.
Obviously, Congress has a central role in all of this. Members of both parties must begin to behave more responsibly in national security. Long-standing, mindless opposition to the proper funding of nonmilitary instruments of power such as foreign aid must give way to understanding the critical role these capabilities have played in U.S. national security in the past and must play in the future.
On the military side, parochial defense of legacy weapons systems and unnecessary bases and facilities must give way to the imperative of deploying new equipment and advanced weapons. Defense leaders need more budgetary and organizational flexibility to take advantage of new innovative opportunities and technologies. Congress’s disgraceful failure, year after year, to appropriate budgets for our national security organizations by the beginning of the fiscal year — forcing agencies to limp along for months under continuing resolutions — must end.
Putin’s war reminds us that the world is a dangerous, deadly place. And that we are in a global contest with two ruthless, authoritarian powers that are determined to achieve their aspirations through any means. Our executive and legislative branches must understand the new world we live in, set aside business as usual and embrace dramatic change to ensure that we and our democratic allies prevail in that contest.
Finally, the president — and members of both parties in Congress — need to work together to explain to the American people why the fate of other countries, including Ukraine, matters to the United States. Of course, deterring aggression and supporting freedom and democracy matter. But Americans need also to understand in practical terms how events abroad affect security here at home and their own pocketbooks. This role falls, principally, upon the president. As President Franklin D. Roosevelt said, “the greatest duty of a statesman is to educate.”
Putin’s war and Xi’s aggressive ambitions have ended the post-Cold War era and upended the global order of the past 70 years. The U.S. government must respond by reforming and strengthening our national security institutions, developing a global strategy and helping our citizens understand why events abroad matter to us.
17. Opinion | The sanctions that will really stop Putin
I am all for conducting strategic strangulation of Russia through cutting off Russian energy exports. But we have to brace for the severe economic blowback that will occur. I am not sure the American people can handle it, especially because the "loyal opposition" we once had will not support it but instead exploit the blowback for political purposes.
Excerpts:
There is one path to changing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s calculus: sanctioning Russia’s oil and gas industry. This is Putin’s golden goose, the source of the state’s wealth and the reason he might believe that he can weather any storm. So far, not only have these been left untouched, but the financial sanctions have been carefully designed to allow Russia room to continue to sell energy to the world.
The conventional wisdom is that the West cannot sanction Russian energy because it would trigger an energy crisis along the lines of the 1970s episode, which would cause deep discontent at home. But the situation is not analogous to the 1970s predicament at all. Today the United States is the largest producer of oil and gas in the world. It can ramp up production and exports and help open the spigots in other countries. President Biden is worried that he is going to look like former president Jimmy Carter, when his power position is actually more like that of the king of Saudi Arabia.
Biden should announce that he is going to respond to this massive challenge to the international order by expediting as much production and export of U.S. petroleum as possible to replace Russian energy. With natural gas, he should urge his regulators to facilitate production and he should help more with the financing of liquefied natural gas, so that it can be sent to Europe. He should also encourage countries such as Japan and South Korea to divert more of their liquefied natural gas to Europe (they have alternative energy sources). Some of this will take time, but markets will react to the signals and new supplies — and prices will fall.
Opinion | The sanctions that will really stop Putin
The Washington Post · by Fareed ZakariaColumnist |AddFollowToday at 6:23 p.m. EST · March 3, 2022
The battle has been joined. Now, all that remains to be seen is who will win.
President Biden has rallied not just the West but also much of the world. He has announced sanctions that are more far-reaching than any ever inflicted on a major economy. The results are already evident. Russia’s stock market and the ruble are in tatters.
But despite all this, economic sanctions have rarely forced a country to reverse its path, let alone caused regime change. In the few cases where they do appear to have had some effect — South Africa with apartheid, Iran with its nuclear enrichment — sanctions were usually widely enforced and comprehensive. Because key countries including China, India and the Gulf states are unlikely to boycott Russia, they will lack that long-term bite.
There is one path to changing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s calculus: sanctioning Russia’s oil and gas industry. This is Putin’s golden goose, the source of the state’s wealth and the reason he might believe that he can weather any storm. So far, not only have these been left untouched, but the financial sanctions have been carefully designed to allow Russia room to continue to sell energy to the world.
The conventional wisdom is that the West cannot sanction Russian energy because it would trigger an energy crisis along the lines of the 1970s episode, which would cause deep discontent at home. But the situation is not analogous to the 1970s predicament at all. Today the United States is the largest producer of oil and gas in the world. It can ramp up production and exports and help open the spigots in other countries. President Biden is worried that he is going to look like former president Jimmy Carter, when his power position is actually more like that of the king of Saudi Arabia.
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Biden should announce that he is going to respond to this massive challenge to the international order by expediting as much production and export of U.S. petroleum as possible to replace Russian energy. With natural gas, he should urge his regulators to facilitate production and he should help more with the financing of liquefied natural gas, so that it can be sent to Europe. He should also encourage countries such as Japan and South Korea to divert more of their liquefied natural gas to Europe (they have alternative energy sources). Some of this will take time, but markets will react to the signals and new supplies — and prices will fall.
But this will not be enough. Biden should also help to unlock two large sources of oil that are currently not getting to the market fast enough or in sufficient quantities. He should suspend former president Donald Trump’s sanctions on Venezuela and Iran. If possible, Washington should work with Iran to close the few remaining gaps and re-enter the nuclear deal, which would bring all of Iran’s oil back on the market. And Biden should personally reach out to Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia and Mohammed bin Zayed of the United Arab Emirates (both of whom feel unloved by Washington these days), patch up relations with them and ask them to ramp up production — which the Gulf states can best do in the short term.
I can hear all the objections from right and left. Let me address a few. Much of this oil and gas will simply be substituted for (banned) Russian energy, so it is unlikely to cause net-higher emissions. There is even an environmental benefit. U.S. gas leaks less methane than Russian gas, and U.S. oil production is also less environmentally harmful than Russian production. In many places, the increase in natural gas could mean countries like Germany could use less coal, a dirtier fuel in nearly every way. In fact, the best way to cut carbon emissions in the short term — with current technologies and at scale — is to replace coal with natural gas.
All of these measures have downsides — some symbolic, some real. But to govern is to choose, and to govern in a crisis is to make hard, painful choices. The country that has best understood this is Germany. It has suspended its Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, announced plans to build two new terminals to receive liquefied natural gas, and acknowledged that it might have to use more coal and extend the life of its nuclear plants that were scheduled to be shuttered. These policies are coming from a coalition government whose second most important partner is the Green Party, which has historically been tenacious in its environmental goals.
The Biden administration has said that the stakes could not be higher. And it is right. If Putin’s aggression succeeds, we will live in a different world. So let us make sure that he does not.
When Adolf Hitler attacked the Soviet Union, Winston Churchill, a lifelong and rabid anti-communist, said that if Hitler invaded hell, he (Churchill) would have found something nice to say about the Devil. All we must do is take some steps to support all non-Russian energy, and that policy shift will become a deadly weapon that strikes at Putin’s real Achilles’ heel.
The Washington Post · by Fareed ZakariaColumnist |AddFollowToday at 6:23 p.m. EST · March 3, 2022
18. U.S. and allies quietly prepare for a Ukrainian government-in-exile and a long insurgency
I wonder who will be put in command of the irregular warfare operation to support the Ukraine insurgency and resistance against an occupying power. Who has the expertise and what organization should take the lead with the requisite responsibility, authorities, and resources?
U.S. and allies quietly prepare for a Ukrainian government-in-exile and a long insurgency
The Ukrainian military has mounted an unexpectedly fierce defense against invading Russian forces, which have been dogged by logistical problems and flagging morale. But the war is barely two weeks old, and in Washington and European capitals, officials anticipate that the Russian military will reverse its early losses, setting the stage for a long, bloody insurgency.
The ways that Western countries would support a Ukrainian resistance are beginning to take shape. Officials have been reluctant to discuss detailed plans, since they’re premised on a Russian military victory that, however likely, hasn’t happened yet. But as a first step, Ukraine’s allies are planning for how to help establish and support a government-in-exile, which could direct guerrilla operations against Russian occupiers, according to several U.S. and European officials.
The weapons the United States has provided to Ukraine’s military, and that continue to flow into the country, would be crucial to the success of an insurgent movement, officials said. The Biden administration has asked Congress, infused with a rare bipartisan spirit in defense of Ukraine, to take up a $10 billion humanitarian aid and military package that includes funding to replenish the stocks of weapons that have already been sent.
Should the United States and its allies choose to back an insurgency, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky would be the pivotal force, officials said, maintaining morale and rallying Ukrainians living under Russian occupation to resist their powerful and well-equipped foe.
The possible Russian takeover of Kyiv has prompted a flurry of planning at the State Department, Pentagon and other U.S. agencies in the event that the Zelensky government has to flee the capital or the country itself.
“We’re doing contingency planning now for every possibility,” including a scenario in which Zelensky establishes a government-in-exile in Poland, said a U.S. administration official, who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive security matter.
Zelensky, who has called himself Russia’s “target No. 1,” remains in Kyiv and has assured his citizens he’s not leaving. He has had discussions with U.S. officials about whether he should move west to a safer position in the city of Lviv, closer to the Polish border. Zelensky’s security detail has plans ready to swiftly relocate him and members of his cabinet, a senior Ukrainian official said. “So far, he has refused to go.”
Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Zelensky, declined to describe any contingency plans Ukraine was making in the event that Russian forces capture the capital.
“One can only say that Ukraine is preparing for the defense of Kyiv as purposefully as Russia is preparing for its attack on Kyiv,” Podolyak said.
“This war has become a people’s war for Ukrainians,” he continued. “We must win the war. There are no other options.”
Volodymyr Ariev, a member of Ukraine’s parliament from the opposition European Solidarity party, expressed confidence that the Rada, Ukraine’s parliament, would continue to be able to meet despite the wartime situation and noted that many lawmakers remain in Kyiv.
“In our party, we didn’t discuss any plan of evacuation, because we don’t want to give up,” Ariev said. “We are not in this government, but we have arms, and we will fight against invaders here, together with the people. This is the only plan we have — no evacuation, nothing.”
Nevertheless, European diplomats, like their American counterparts, are starting to prepare for how to support the Ukrainian government if Kyiv falls or the country is entirely occupied by Russia. A United Nations resolution this past week condemning the invasion, which drew 141 votes, is one element of “laying the groundwork” to recognize Zelensky’s administration as Ukraine’s legitimate government and to keep it afloat even if it no longer controls territory, said a senior European diplomat.
“We haven’t made a plan yet, per se, but it would be something we would be ready to move on right away,” the diplomat said. “In our experience, it helps to know generally you have international support.”
As early as last December, some U.S. officials saw signs that the Ukrainian military was preparing for an eventual resistance, even as Zelensky downplayed the threat of invasion.
During an official visit, a Ukrainian special operations commander told Rep. Michael Waltz (R-Fla.), Rep. Seth Moulton (D-Mass.) and other lawmakers that they were shifting training and planning to focus on maintaining an armed opposition, relying on insurgent-like tactics.
Ukrainian officials told the lawmakers that they were frustrated that the United States had not sent Harpoon missiles to target Russian ships and Stinger missiles to attack Russian aircraft, Moulton and Waltz said in separate interviews. The United States diverted some military aid to Ukraine that it had planned to send to Afghanistan, but that package mostly included small arms, ammunition and medical kits meant for a fight against the Taliban, not Russia, said Waltz, who served in Afghanistan as a Special Forces officer.
As the Russian military struggles with logistical challenges — including fuel and food shortages — Waltz anticipates that the Ukrainians will repeatedly strike Russian supply lines. To do that, they need a steady supply of weapons and the ability to set improvised explosive devices, he said.
“Those supply lines are going to be very, very vulnerable, and that’s where you really literally starve the Russian army.”
Moulton, who served in Iraq as a Marine Corps infantry officer, said that he is in favor of sending Harpoons and Stingers — the administration has decided to send the latter weapons, according to a U.S. official and a document obtained by The Washington Post — but that using them also will require training.
“You can’t ship them to Ukraine at the last minute and expect some national guardsman to pick up a Stinger and shoot down an aircraft,” he said. Continuing a resistance campaign will require continued clandestine shipments of small arms, ammunition, explosives and even cold-weather gear.
“Think about the kinds of things that would be used by saboteurs as opposed to an army repelling a frontal invasion,” Moulton said.
Officials remain cautious about overt support for a Ukrainian insurgency lest it draw NATO member countries into direct conflict with Russia. In Moscow’s eyes, support for a Zelensky government operating in Poland could constitute an attack by the alliance, some officials warned.
But Ukraine’s leaders and its citizens aren’t likely to be deterred by NATO’s concerns.
“I doubt very much that the Ukrainians will not continue an underground resistance campaign even after the Russians establish control,” said a senior Western intelligence official.
Moscow has “grossly underestimated Ukraine’s ability to resist,” the official said. “I’m reminded, especially by my eastern colleagues, about Ukrainians themselves. Ukrainians were some of the fiercest fighters … for the Soviets during World War II.” He predicted that a resistance would continue for months and possibly years.
The United States has backed and fought against successful insurgencies. Veterans of such conflicts say that the Ukrainians so far have demonstrated the key ingredient.
“The number one thing you have to have is people on the ground who want to fight,” said Jack Devine, a retired senior CIA officer who ran the agency’s successful covert campaign to arm Afghan fighters who drove out the Soviet military in the 1980s.
If Russian and Ukrainian negotiators who have been meeting near the border in Belarus reach some settlement, that will likely diminish the momentum for an insurgency and support for it, Devine predicted.
Marta Kepe, a senior defense analyst at the Rand Corp. who studies resistance movements, said that they often change during the course of a war.
“As occupation progresses and extends for a longer time, what can start out as a more centralized resistance often changes into smaller resistance groups or units. It is not a negative thing,” she said. “In fact, smaller groups allow more resilience.”
NATO policymakers admire the spirit of the Ukrainian forces, but they also say that their ability to hold out against Russia is not unlimited, especially as stocks of ammunition dwindle and the Russian military extends its encirclement of major cities.
“Russia has more troops than Ukraine,” said a second senior European diplomat. “Ukrainian troops are very brave, but they are already fighting more than a week.”
Experts in resistance and urban warfare said Russian occupation forces will try to squeeze supply pipelines and cut off cities.
Rita Konaev, director of analysis for Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology, said Ukraine should be preparing its citizens for combat in cities accompanied by mass air and artillery bombardment, which Russia will use to try to reduce the amount of door-to-door fighting that taking cities requires.
Konaev said that Ukrainians should also lay in supplies in advance, because Russian forces will likely disable the electrical grid and cut off access to water in the cities, and that they should establish safe areas underground to survive the aerial bombardment.
Once Russian forces try to move into the cities, Ukrainians will have an advantage because they know the terrain, she said. They can build barriers, destroy bridges to limit entrances into the city, and place snipers on rooftops.
“In urban warfare, defense has the advantage,” Konaev said.
European leaders have been trying to game out what Russian President Vladimir Putin would accept as a potential end state for a defeated Ukraine. Policymakers say they don’t have a clear sense, although the first European diplomat said that Putin might attempt to reduce Ukraine “to a much smaller state.”
Under that scenario, western Ukraine would remain independent. The other territories would be incorporated into Russia, occupied, or declared independent states, as the Kremlin has already done with the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
But Russia’s ability to impose that vision is “most improbable,” the diplomat said, given the profound anger in Ukraine against the Russian invasion.
“This is a country of 40 million [people],” the diplomat said. The Kremlin “can try to have a strategy. But I think in our strategic calculations we are always forgetting one small obstacle, and that’s the will of the people. Putin has forgotten how to be elected in a democratic way.”
NATO leaders also say that even if Russia captures Kyiv, that would not end the resistance, nor the existence of the Ukrainian state.
“Russians cannot occupy all the country and subdue it,” said Latvian Defense Minister Artis Pabriks, whose country maintained a diplomatic service in exile for 51 years after it was occupied in 1940 by the Soviet Union. Washington never recognized the annexation of the three Baltic states.
“There will be a partisan war, there will be resistance. So even if Kyiv falls that does not mean the end of the war,” Pabriks said.
Stern reported from Mukachevo, Ukraine. Ellen Nakashima and Paul Sonne contributed to this report.
19. A Trump-appointed former senior adviser to the Secretary of Defense says Russian forces have been 'too gentle' on Ukraine and called Zelensky a 'puppet'
Yes an inflammatory headline. But I tried hard to see where his comments were taken out of context. I tried to give him the benefit of the doubt. But I think he gives all Colonels a bad name.
A Trump-appointed former senior adviser to the Secretary of Defense says Russian forces have been 'too gentle' on Ukraine and called Zelensky a 'puppet'
A burnt-out car is seen on the street after a missile launched by Russian invaders hit near the Kharkiv Regional State Administration building in Svobody (Freedom) Square) at approximately 8 am local time on Tuesday, March 1, Kharkiv, northeastern Ukraine, on March 1, 2022, in Kharkiv, Ukraine.
Vyacheslav Madiyevskyy/Ukrinform/NurPhoto via Getty Images
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has remained in Ukraine despite assassination attempts.
- He called on Ukrainians to defend their country against invading Russian forces.
- On Friday, a former Trump appointee called him a "puppet" and said Russia has been "too gentle."
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A Trump appointee said Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was a "puppet" and said the Russians have been too gentle in their attack on Ukraine.
"The first five days Russian forces I think frankly were too gentle. They've now corrected that. So, I would say another ten days this should be completely over," Retired Col. Douglas Macgregor, who former President Donald Trump appointed as a senior adviser to the Secretary of Defense, said in an interview with Fox Business' Stuart Varney on Friday.
—Liz Cheney (@Liz_Cheney) March 5, 2022
Macgregor, who Trump also nominated in July 2020 as ambassador to Germany, said the war could have "ended days ago" if Zelensky had accepted what the Russians want, which he said is a "neutral Ukraine."
"I think Zelensky is a puppet and he is putting huge numbers of his own population in unnecessary risk," Macgregor said.
Macgregor laughed when Varney was asked if he thought Zelensky was a hero for standing up and fighting.
"I don't see anything heroic about the man. I think the most heroic thing he could do right now is come to terms with reality. Neutralize Ukraine," Macgregor said. "This is not a bad thing. A neutral Ukraine would be good for us and Russia. It would create the buffer that frankly both sides want but he's I think being told I think to hold on and trying to drag this out, which is tragic for the people that have to live through this."
Varney ended the interview by telling Macgregor that he disagreed with him.
"We will not send our forces to fight, but we are urging Ukrainians to die pointlessly in a fight they can't win. We're going to create a far greater humanitarian crisis than anything you've ever seen if it doesn't stop," Macgregor said.
Griffin said Macgregor's comments had many "distortions."
"The kind of appeasement talk that Colonel Macgregor, who should know better — when he was in government, he was the one who was advising Trump to pull all troops out of Germany," she said. "That projection of weakness is what made Putin think he could move into a sovereign country like Ukraine."
20. Russia's second-largest internet provider cuts off Russian websites
Russia's second-largest internet provider cuts off Russian websites
For better or worse, Russia's internet just got kneecapped.
Cogent Communications is cutting off internet service to its Russian clients, the Washington Post reported on Friday. This puts it in league with companies like Meta, which has blocked Russian state-affiliated news agencies on Facebook in Europe; Twitter, which slaps a warning label on tweets from state-run Russian media outlets; and others.
Cogent is an internet infrastructure provider that serves international clients, including many companies in Russia. In fact, it is the country's second largest internet service provider, according to Reuters.
Cogent told Reuters that it made the decision to cut off access in order to counter "outbound cyber attacks or disinformation" staged by Russian interests aligned with President Vladimir Putin. However, the company also noted that it was "a tough decision," since keeping Russians connected to the internet is crucial for them to get non-state sanctioned information.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
