Quotes of the Day:
"Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short."
- Thomas Hobbes
"They are constantly trying to drive us into a corner because we have an independent position, because we maintain it and because we tell it like it is and don't engage in hypocrisy. But there is a limit to everything. And with Ukraine, our Western partners have crossed the line, playing the bear and acting irresponsibly and unprofessionally."
-- Vladimir Putin
I would never want Ukraine to be a piece on the map, on the chessboard of big global players, so that someone could toss us around, use us as cover, as part of some bargain.
-Volodymyr Zelensky
1. Seoul: North Korean missile exploded in air in failed launch
2. US holds military exercises in Yellow Sea amid signs N. Korea is prepping missile test
3. What the US can expect from South Korea's incoming president by John Bolton
4. U.S. Conducts Show of Force Against N.Korean Provocations
5. Indo-Pacific Command Conducts Carrier-Based Air Demonstration in the Yellow Sea
6. Moon-Yoon meeting called off due to unfinished working-level consultation
7. Concrete facilities identified at Pyongyang airfield suggest N. Korea missile launch
8. The Military Logic Behind North Korea’s Missile Medley
9. UN asks China not to send 7 North Korean refugees back home
10. Failed test scatters debris around airport near Pyongyang
11. Li Ning Goods Detained by U.S. Customs on North Korea Link
12. North Korea intensifies battle against “anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior”
1. Seoul: North Korean missile exploded in air in failed launch
No need for anyone to overreact. That is exactly what KJU wants us to do. We need to execute a superior political warfare strategy while sustaining a high level of military readiness.
There are no failures. Every launch advances the program in some way. No one should gloat over a failed launch. The truth is they learn from failures sometimes more than successful launches. But every launch is about advancing the program. It is about developing war fighting capabilities. We should never forget that.
It looks like they are really trying to put the pressure on the US to lift sanctions by continuing what appear to be preparations for an ICBM test. Blackmail diplomacy and political warfare that also advance military capabilities. No surprise. Again, don't overreact.
Some of my thoughts on how to proceed:
How To Prepare: North Korea Could Soon Test An ICBM Or Nuclear Weapon
North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Test: A 6 Step Strategy To Respond
Seoul: North Korean missile exploded in air in failed launch
AP · by HYUNG-JIN KIM and KIM TONG-HYUNG · March 16, 2022
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — A North Korean missile fired from its capital region exploded soon after liftoff in an apparent failed weapons launch on Wednesday, South Korea’s military said, amid speculation that the North is preparing to launch its longest-range missile in its most significant provocation in years.
Details of the missile explosion and the possibility of civilian damages weren’t immediately known. But the launch, the 10th of its kind this year, shows North Korea is determined to press ahead on its push to modernize its weapons arsenal and pressure its rivals into making concessions amid dormant denuclearization talks.
The North Korean missile blew up while it was flying at an altitude of less than 20 kilometers (12.4 miles), a South Korean military official said requesting anonymity because he wasn’t publicly authorized to speak to media on the issue. He said the cause of the explosion wasn’t known.
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South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff earlier said the launch was made from the Sunan area near Pyongyang, the North’s capital, around 9:30 a.m. (0030 GMT) but gave no other details.
Lee Choon Geun, an honorary research fellow at South Korea’s Science and Technology Policy Institute, said the missile likely exploded less than a minute after its launch. He said if the missile’s toxic fuels fell on civilian residential areas in North Korea, they would likely cause a major health impact. There was no immediate outside report of such damages in North Korea.
The Sunan area is where North Korea’s international airport is located. South Korean media reported that Wednesday’s launch occurred at the airport, but Seoul’s Defense Ministry did not specify the exact launch site.
Chang Young-keun, a missile expert at Korea Aerospace University in South Korea, said the missile explosion likely sent debris as far as 100-200 kilometers (62-124 miles) away, rather than causing it to fall straight down from the mid-air blast site, due to its flying speed. The missile likely flew about 10 kilometers (6.2 miles) before it exploded, he said.
The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command later said that North Korea had fired a ballistic missile but didn’t say whether it was a failed launch. A command statement said the launch didn’t pose an immediate threat to U.S. territory and its allies but called on North Korea to refrain from further destabilizing acts.
Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirokazu Matsuno told reporters that a flight of a ballistic missile has not been confirmed and that Tokyo is working with Washington and Seoul to further analyze what happened.
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Experts say past failures have moved North Korea closer to its goal of acquiring a viable nuclear arsenal that could threaten the American homeland. Of eight “Musudan” intermediate-range missiles tests in 2016, only one of those launches was seen by outside analysts as successful, which led to debates of whether North Korea’s path toward ICBMs had been cut off.
However, the North in 2017 flew more powerful intermediate-range missiles over Japan and conducted three successful test-flights of ICBMs that demonstrated a potential range to strike deep into the U.S. mainland.
North Korea’s successful satellite launches in 2012 and 2016 — which were viewed by the U.N. as disguised tests of its long-range missile technology — also followed repeated failures.
The U.S. and South Korean militaries said last week that North Korea had tested an ICBM system in two recent launches, referring to the developmental Hwasong-17 missile, the North’s biggest weapon, which it unveiled during a military parade in October 2020.
In the two recent launches on Feb. 27 and March 5, the North Korean missiles flew medium-range distances, and experts have said North Korea likely tested the first stage rocket of the Hwasong-17 missile. It wasn’t clear if Wednesday’s launch also involved parts of the Hwasong-17.
After its two previous launches, North Korea said it had tested cameras and other systems for a spy satellite and released what it said were photos taken from space during one of the two tests, but it didn’t confirm what rocket or missile it launched.
Observers say North Korea aims to boost its ICBM capability while trying to place its first functioning spy satellite into orbit. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has vowed to acquire an improved ICBM and a spy satellite among an array of sophisticated weapons systems he says his country needs to cope with what he calls American hostility.
Earlier Wednesday, North Korea’s state news agency released photos of a smiling Kim, clad in a long black leather coat, visiting a towering apartment complex under construction on the outskirts of Pyongyang. The news agency didn’t say when Kim was there, but it typically reports on his public activities one or two days after they occur.
The Hwasong-17 could potentially fly up to 15,000 kilometers (9,320 miles), far enough to strike anywhere in the U.S. and beyond. The 25-meter (82-foot) missile, which was shown again at a defense exhibition in Pyongyang last year, has yet to be test-launched.
The three ICBMs that North Korea tested in 2017 were the Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15. Some analysts say developing a larger missile could mean the country is trying to arm its long-range weapons with multiple warheads to overcome missile defense systems.
If North Korea makes a new ICBM launch, it would be its highest-profile weapons tests since its third and last ICBM launch in November 2017.
North Korea may call its potential new ICBM test a rocket launch to place a reconnaissance satellite in space, not a weapons test. That could invite condemnation but likely no fresh U.N. sanctions, some analysts say, since Russia and China wield vetoes on the Security Council and would oppose it.
Other North Korean missiles tested this year were mostly shorter-range, nuclear-capable weapons which place South Korea and Japan, both key U.S. allies, within striking distance. In January alone, North Korea carried out seven rounds of missile tests, a record number of monthly tests since Kim took power in late 2011.
U.S.-led diplomacy aimed at persuading North Korea to abandon its nuclear program collapsed in 2019 due to wrangling over U.S.-led sanctions on the North. Washington has urged North Korea to return to talks without any preconditions, but Pyongyang has rejected such overtures saying the United States must first withdraw its hostile policies.
In January, North Korea hinted at lifting its four-year moratorium on ICBM and nuclear tests. South Korea’s Defense Ministry said Friday it detected signs that North Korea likely is restoring some of the tunnels at its nuclear testing site that it detonated ahead of the now-dormant nuclear diplomacy.
__
Associated Press writer Mari Yamaguchi in Tokyo contributed to this report.
AP · by HYUNG-JIN KIM and KIM TONG-HYUNG · March 16, 2022
2. US holds military exercises in Yellow Sea amid signs N. Korea is prepping missile test
Demonstrate strategic reassurance and strategic resolve and increase readiness to deal with the full range of contingencies from and in north Korea.
US holds military exercises in Yellow Sea amid signs N. Korea is prepping missile test
The Hill · by Ellen Mitchell · March 15, 2022
The U.S. military conducted an aircraft carrier-led exercise in the Yellow Sea and intensified air defense artillery drills at a base in South Korea in response to increased missile tests from North Korea, U.S. forces said Tuesday.
“The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has significantly increased the pace and scale of ballistic missile launches since September 2021,” U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (Indopacom) said in a statement. “The United States strongly condemns these launches,” which include intercontinental ballistic missile tests on Feb. 27 and March 5.
In response, Indopacom conducted an air demonstration in international airspace over the Yellow Sea, mobilizing fighter jets from the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier along with other regionally based Air Force aircraft.
At the Osan Air Base, in South Korea, the 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade “increased the intensity of their certification exercise” to demonstrate its capabilities and commitment to defend the peninsula “against any threat or adversary,” according to a statement from U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).
“DPRK’s significant increase in its missile testing activity undermines peace, security and destabilizes the Northeast Asia region,” USFK said.
“While this type of training is routinely conducted by U.S. Patriot batteries across [South Korea], its increased intensity of its certification underscores the seriousness USFK takes against the DPRK's recent missile launch behavior,” the statement added.
Indopacom said the recent missile launches were “a brazen violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions” as well as its "international commitments” that threaten nearby countries and the world.
North Korea last tested an intercontinental ballistic missile in 2017, which was followed by a self-imposed halt on long-range missile and nuclear testing.
Pyongyang insisted the new launches were held to prepare for a satellite launch, but there is speculation the isolated nation could test the missile at full range as soon as this week. That move would break the four-year hiatus from such demonstrations, Reuters reported.
The Hill · by Ellen Mitchell · March 15, 2022
3. What the US can expect from South Korea's incoming president by John Bolton
Excerpts:
As Yoon’s May 10 inauguration approaches, Ukraine’s grinding war will remind his transition team that, pressing domestic economic priorities notwithstanding, South Korea needs a more resolute national security policy. Inevitably, North Korea will be the central focus. Yoon should prioritize Pyongyang’s nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs, which his predecessor, Moon Jae-in, always seemed to be sliding away from. This is not to diminish reunifying the Peninsula as a policy goal, but to recognize that reunification will only come with the disappearance of Pyongyang’s hereditary communist dictatorship.
That brings us to Korea’s real problem: China. Beijing is responsible for the North’s intransigence and is the ultimate guarantor of its very existence — realities that can no longer be ignored, either in Washington’s relations with Beijing or Seoul’s. Both South Korea and America have extensive economic relations with China, making any strategic dispute potentially difficult. But it is better to understand and consider how to mitigate such costs now, not later. Moreover, any serious effort at reuniting the two Koreas in the manner of the German model, with the South essentially absorbing the North and transforming its society, requires Chinese acquiescence at least.
I would take a slightly different view on denuclearization and unification than Ambassador Bolton. There will be no denuclearization as long as the Kim family regime remains in power. The only way we are going to see an end to the nuclear program and military threats as well as the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people living in the north by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime is through achievement of unification and the establishment of a United Republic of Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, and human rights as determined by the Korean people. In short, a United Republic of Korea (UROK).
What the US can expect from South Korea's incoming president
The Hill · by John Bolton, Opinion Contributor · March 15, 2022
Yoon Suk-yeol, South Korea’s president-elect, will be the first new leader of a U.S. ally in the post-Ukraine era. Russia’s invasion is far from over, and may be transpiring on another continent, but its impact will be felt far beyond the immediate neighborhood. Comforting assumptions about a “rules-based international order” have been brutally shattered, hard men stalk the world and nations commit unprovoked aggression.
The still-divided Korean Peninsula should have been a stark reminder of these realities. The West, however, looked aside even when Russia portioned modern-day Ukraine by force in 2014, annexing Crimea and creating two “autonomous republics.” Whether Ukraine, now locked in mortal combat with a nuclear power, will be further partitioned remains to be seen.
President-elect Yoon need not look far to grasp the potential impact of conventional war against nuclear powers. The North Korean prison state has a growing nuclear arsenal, and the Peninsula borders China and Russia, two other nuclear powers. Northeast Asia is a crowded nuclear neighborhood. Fortunately, leading a U.S. treaty ally, Yoon will have our long, strong commitment to defend his country and American forces garrisoned there.
South Koreans weren’t always so fortunate. They have never forgotten Dean Acheson’s words in January 1950 that drew the U.S. defense perimeter in Asia and excluded South Korea. In June, the North invaded. Koreans haven’t forgotten that either. Thirty years after the Soviet Union dissolved, Ukraine was also on the wrong side of a Washington-drawn line. Coincidence?
Yoon will lead a deeply split country. In this century, Seoul’s presidents have alternated between those advocating a “sunshine policy” toward Pyongyang and those taking a harder line. Yoon is of the latter school, but his victory margin was under 1 percent of the popular vote, and South Korea’s National Assembly has a substantial “sunshine” majority until the next legislative election in 2024.
Russia’s naked aggression, however, affords Yoon’s People Power Party a strong opportunity to overcome internal foreign policy divisions and achieve its campaign pledges of higher defense budgets; closer relations with Washington; and more cooperation with other like-minded Indo-Pacific states.
As Yoon’s May 10 inauguration approaches, Ukraine’s grinding war will remind his transition team that, pressing domestic economic priorities notwithstanding, South Korea needs a more resolute national security policy. Inevitably, North Korea will be the central focus. Yoon should prioritize Pyongyang’s nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs, which his predecessor, Moon Jae-in, always seemed to be sliding away from. This is not to diminish reunifying the Peninsula as a policy goal, but to recognize that reunification will only come with the disappearance of Pyongyang’s hereditary communist dictatorship.
That brings us to Korea’s real problem: China. Beijing is responsible for the North’s intransigence and is the ultimate guarantor of its very existence — realities that can no longer be ignored, either in Washington’s relations with Beijing or Seoul’s. Both South Korea and America have extensive economic relations with China, making any strategic dispute potentially difficult. But it is better to understand and consider how to mitigate such costs now, not later. Moreover, any serious effort at reuniting the two Koreas in the manner of the German model, with the South essentially absorbing the North and transforming its society, requires Chinese acquiescence at least.
The evolving China-Russia entente will see the Korean Peninsula as a major focal point. Geography so dictates. As the Ukraine crisis pounds on, Beijing is scrutinizing how Washington and the West as a whole perform, to understand better the implications for its aspirations in the Indo-Pacific.
Yoon will take office with the entente in its early stages, but Koreans have deep historical memories of how the post-1949 USSR-PRC axis empowered Kim Il-sung’s invasion of the South, four subsequent Cold War decades of threats and dangers, and Pyongyang’s continuing threat. With one of the entente’s partners perfectly content to use force across its borders, Yoon and his advisers can hardly miss the point. The spate of North Korean ballistic missile launches this year simply underlines that Pyongyang’s nuclear menace, by endangering the United States itself, also gravely threatens South Korea and others, not to mention the North’s substantial conventional capabilities.
The real question is not whether Yoon understands the risks he faces, but whether Washington does. The lessons from Ukraine to date are mixed. The Biden administration’s rhetoric has far exceeded its performance, utterly failing to deter Vladimir Putin’s invasion, and now seemingly deterred itself from acting effectively in response to Putin’s aggression. Republicans, almost unanimously, have at least escaped their recent aberrations to oppose Russia’s invasion. Obviously, however, they don’t hold executive power, which is the only true test of insight and resolve.
Fortunately, Japan has had no trouble getting the point. In the first call between Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and President-elect Yoon, both pledged closer cooperation with the U.S. Their conversation was only an initial formality, but even so it signifies significant progress in badly damaged Seoul-Tokyo relations. Historical animosities between the two countries are deep, but the current moment may be opportune to begin drawing a line under that history.
In the Indo-Pacific, there is considerable creative ferment underway, from the emerging India-Japan-Australia-America Quad to the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine project. These and other rising combinations recognize the overarching threat China poses, but hardly constitute what the region has long lacked, namely dense alliance structures like NATO.
South Korea can easily participate in what European theorists call in their region “variable geometry” without risking China’s ire, at least for now. And if China’s ire is aroused, Seoul should understand that tolerance for dissenting viewpoints is not one of Xi Jinping’s strong points. The one trouble spot where South Korea must step up, Chinese ire or not, is Taiwan. Tokyo understands that an attack on Taiwan is an attack on Japan, and Seoul must draw the comparable conclusion for South Korea.
President-elect Yoon can expect only a limited honeymoon. He and his team, obviously contemplating major foreign and defense policy changes, must keep Ukraine top of mind. If so, they can contribute significantly to helping Washington and the West generally in the uncertain and threatening security environment now before us.
John Bolton was national security adviser to President Trump from 2018 to 2019, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations from 2005 to 2006 and held senior State Department posts in 2001-2005 and 1985-1989. His most recent book is “The Room Where It Happened" (2020). He is the founder of John Bolton Super PAC, a political action committee supporting candidates who believe in a strong U.S. foreign policy.
The Hill · by John Bolton, Opinion Contributor · March 15, 2022
4. U.S. Conducts Show of Force Against N.Korean Provocations
Some doctrinal terms for reference from Joint Pub 1-02 the DOD Dictionary:
show of force — An operation planned to demonstrate United States resolve that involves
increased visibility of United States deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific
situation that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to United States interests or
national objectives. (JP 3-0)
demonstration — In military deception, a show of force similar to a feint without actual
contact with the adversary, in an area where a decision is not sought that is made to
deceive an adversary. (JP 3-13.4)
amphibious demonstration — A type of amphibious operation conducted for the purpose
of deceiving the enemy by a show of force with the expectation of deluding the enemy
into following an unfavorable course of action. (JP 3-02)
diversion — 1. The act of drawing the attention and forces of an enemy from the point of
the principal operation; an attack, alarm, or feint that diverts attention. 2. A change
made in a prescribed route for operational or tactical reasons that does not constitute a
change of destination. 3. A rerouting of cargo or passengers to a new transshipment
point or destination or on a different mode of transportation prior to arrival at ultimate
destination. 4. In naval mine warfare, a route or channel bypassing a dangerous area by
connecting one channel to another or it may branch from a channel and rejoin it on the
other side of the danger. See also demonstration. (JP 3-03)
U.S. Conducts Show of Force Against N.Korean Provocations
March 16, 2022 11:28
The U.S. on Tuesday conducted an aerial show of force in the West Sea by mobilizing stealth fighters from an aircraft carrier amid fears that North Korea is preparing to launch of a new intercontinental ballistic missile.
On its website Tuesday, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command publicized the exercise "as a demonstration of our resolve and commitment to our regional allies."
"This demonstration was carried out in international airspace by 4th and 5th generation aircraft from the USS Abraham Lincoln, along with regionally-based U.S. Air Force aircraft."
Patriot missiles are set up in an undisclosed location in this photo released by U.S. Forces Korea on Tuesday.
It included pictures of F-35C stealth fighters, saying they made a long-distance flight to the West Sea from the Lincoln in the Philippine Sea.
The U.S. also released a video clip of F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jets and an E-2C early warning aircraft, as well as F-35Cs, taking off from the Lincoln.
Until recently, U.S. aircraft carriers and military aircraft were reluctant to operate in the West Sea because of fears of agitating China. But it apparently felt a highly publicized show of force is necessary to warn North Korea off further missile and nuclear tests.
In another press release Tuesday, the U.S. Forces Korea said that the 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade of the U.S. Eighth Army "validated their armistice and wartime mission requirements" following the Indo-Pacific Command's "enhanced ballistic missile defense directive" in response to Pyongyang's "frequent projectile launches this year."
Meanwhile, North Korea on Wednesday morning fired a projectile that appeared to be a ballistic missile. Military authorities here said North Korea fired the projectile on 9:30 a.m. in Sunan near Pyongyang, but it apparently failed shortly after launch. They added that they are closely cooperating with the U.S. to analyze what happened.
- Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com
5. Indo-Pacific Command Conducts Carrier-Based Air Demonstration in the Yellow Sea
I wonder why INDOPACOM chose not to use "show of force" to describe this action?
Some doctrinal terms for reference from Joint Pub 1-02 the DOD Dictionary:
show of force — An operation planned to demonstrate United States resolve that involves
increased visibility of United States deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific
situation that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to United States interests or
national objectives. (JP 3-0)
demonstration — In military deception, a show of force similar to a feint without actual
contact with the adversary, in an area where a decision is not sought that is made to
deceive an adversary. (JP 3-13.4)
amphibious demonstration — A type of amphibious operation conducted for the purpose
of deceiving the enemy by a show of force with the expectation of deluding the enemy
into following an unfavorable course of action. (JP 3-02)
diversion — 1. The act of drawing the attention and forces of an enemy from the point of
the principal operation; an attack, alarm, or feint that diverts attention. 2. A change
made in a prescribed route for operational or tactical reasons that does not constitute a
change of destination. 3. A rerouting of cargo or passengers to a new transshipment
point or destination or on a different mode of transportation prior to arrival at ultimate
destination. 4. In naval mine warfare, a route or channel bypassing a dangerous area by
connecting one channel to another or it may branch from a channel and rejoin it on the
other side of the danger. See also demonstration. (JP 3-03)
Indo-Pacific Command Conducts Carrier-Based Air Demonstration in the Yellow Sea
Keyword
Category
Start & End Date
15 March 2022
From U.S. 7th Fleet Public Affairs
YELLOW SEA - The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has significantly increased the pace and scale of ballistic missile launches since September 2021.
The United States strongly condemns these launches, to include the two intercontinental ballistic missile tests on Feb. 27 (KST) and March 5 (KST).
As a demonstration of our resolve and commitment to our regional allies, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command conducted a carrier-based air demonstration in the Yellow Sea. This demonstration was carried out in international airspace by 4th and 5th generation aircraft from the USS Abraham Lincoln, along with regionally-based U.S. Air Force aircraft, and is in addition to previously announced increases in ISR collection in the Yellow Sea and enhanced regional ballistic missile defense posture on the Korean peninsula.
The ICBM launches by DPRK are a brazen violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions—as well as its international commitments—and pose a threat to regional neighbors and the international community. We have made clear our growing concern over the significant increase in DPRK’s missile testing, and we will continue to take all necessary measures to ensure the security of the United States and our allies.
We remain in close coordination with our allies and partners to address the threats posed by the DPRK. Our commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea and Japan remains ironclad.
6. Moon-Yoon meeting called off due to unfinished working-level consultation
Is this an indication of how difficult the trassniation might be between now and May?
(2nd LD) Moon-Yoon meeting called off due to unfinished working-level consultation | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: ADDS remarks, details in last 6 paras)
By Kim Deok-hyun
SEOUL, March 16 (Yonhap) -- A planned meeting between President Moon Jae-in and President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol has been called off as working-level, pre-meeting discussions have not been completed yet, both sides said.
Moon and Yoon had been scheduled to hold a one-on-one lunch at Cheong Wa Dae on Wednesday in their first meeting since Yoon won the election last week, though the two spoke by phone a day after the election.
"As working-level consultations have not been completed, we decided to reschedule the meeting," Moon's spokesperson Park Kyung-mee said in a statement. "We will continue working-level consultations."
Yoon's spokesperson Kim Eun-hye made similar remarks.
Pre-meeting talks have been led by Lee Cheol-hee, senior presidential secretary for political affairs, and Yoon's chief of staff Chang Je-won to set the agenda for the meeting.
Both sides did not provide details on what the problems were.
But a disagreement over whether to pardon imprisoned former President Lee Myung-bak could be one of them, as Yoon planned to ask for a special pardon for Lee, now serving a 17-year prison term for embezzlement and bribery.
Moon and Yoon had also been expected to discuss a range of other issues, including the presidential transition, coronavirus responses and North Korea's moves to test-fire a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).
A senior official at Cheong Wa Dae told Yonhap News Agency the two sides needed more time to set the agenda, saying they did not have sufficient discussions before the Wednesday meeting.
The Wednesday meeting had been originally designed to be an encounter for sharing well-wishing remarks and pledging a smooth transition of power, but it became talks with an official agenda, according to the official.
"In the circumstances, it can be burdensome to have a meeting without having sufficient conversations on the agenda," the official said on the condition of anonymity.
Other thorny issues could include whether Moon should exercise his right to appoint the heads of public institutions in the final months in office, such as the Bank of Korea governor, whose term ends at the end of this month.
Yoon's spokesperson, Kim, said earlier this week Yoon's side asked Cheong Wa Dae to have consultations with the president-elect's camp on personnel appointments for key posts.
However, a senior official at Cheong Wa Dae rebuffed the proposal, saying it is natural for Moon to exercise his authority to appoint personnel until his term ends in early May.
kdh@yna.co.kr
(END)
7. Concrete facilities identified at Pyongyang airfield suggest N. Korea missile launch
Concrete facilities identified at Pyongyang airfield suggest N. Korea missile launch
Posted March. 16, 2022 07:59,
Updated March. 16, 2022 07:59
Concrete facilities identified at Pyongyang airfield suggest N. Korea missile launch. March. 16, 2022 07:59. by Sang-Ho Yun ysh1005@donga.com.
A concrete structure assumed to be used to launch missiles for ICBM has been identified at Sunan airfield in Pyongyang, raising concerns that North Korea’s new ICBM model, Hwasong-17, could be launched soon.
Voice of America reported on Tuesday, citing photos taken by private satellite service Planet Labs on March 12, that two concrete slabs were identified at the Sunan airfield. The report said the structures are both 50 meters wide, 220 meters and 100 meters long and appears to have been built around March 8 and 9. North Korea had launched missiles back in July and November 2017 after building concrete slabs to launch Hwasong and 15 (both ICBM) missiles. Recent satellite images suggest that the concrete slabs are likely to be used to fire Hwasong-17 missiles. Military sources view the recent changes as signs for imminent missile provocation.
The U.S. is responding quickly to the changes as well. In addition to launching reconnaissance planes for communication monitoring on March 14, it has launched reconnaissance plane Cobra Ball (RC-135S), which traces missile trajectory, in the West Sea and the Seoul Metropolitan Area. “We are making preparation to respond. If we are given different orders, we are ready to execute as well,” said Kenneth Wilsbach, Commander for the Pacific Air Forces, at an online forum hosted by the Mitchel Institute of the U.S. Air Force Association.
8. The Military Logic Behind North Korea’s Missile Medley
Excerpts:
The novel delivery vehicles the DPRK has tested since the beginning of the year are, like many of the North’s other missiles, typically dual-use systems that can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads.[1] Arming delivery systems with nuclear warheads can amplify their effects by increasing their physical-psychological impacts and compensating for inaccuracies, defenses and other factors.
North Korea has engaged in an intense missile testing program in recent months. Besides the unprecedented number of these launches in such a short time span, the new systems display novel capabilities, such as hypersonic glide. Several factors are likely behind this surge, which looks likely to continue and even escalate to the renewed launching of ICBMs. Even if conventionally armed, North Korea’s emerging missile capabilities could make DPRK leaders more confident about successfully employing force, making rapid military gains, and deterring or defeating US-ROK defenses. Newly elected South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and his international partners must augment their deterrent and defense capabilities while developing additional means to manage these new challenges.
The Military Logic Behind North Korea’s Missile Medley - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea
(Source: Rodong Sinmun)
It is understandable that, even during the most severe European security crisis in decades, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken conferred with the Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi and South Korean Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong in Hawaii. The three governments urgently need a collective response to the increasingly belligerent stance the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has pursued this year. For instance, the DPRK conducted more tests this January than any other month in its history and resumed testing after the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics. Furthermore, indications that North Korea is building a new missile base and new activity at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Testing Site for the first time in four years suggest that further missile testing is likely, including of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). On March 10, the US Department of Defense announced that the DRPK missile tests on February 26 and March 4 aimed to advance the development of precisely such a system, ending the moratorium on ICBM tests in force since November 2017.
According to a United Nations (UN) group of experts monitoring North Korean-related sanctions, the DPRK has exploited purloined cryptocurrencies and other cyber thefts to sustain a robust missile and nuclear weapons development program. The US intelligence community warns that even resumed nuclear weapons tests are possible. For more than a year, the DPRK has disregarded US and South Korean proposals to resume arms control talks and other negotiations. Though the United States imposed additional sanctions on the DPRK in response to recent missile launches, Chinese and Russian opposition has prevented the UN Security Council from taking a strong collective stand against these tests, which violate multiple UN Security Council resolutions.
Multiple reasons might explain the sudden surge in DPRK missile testing. One possibility is that North Korea is attempting to coerce the US and its regional allies into reducing sanctions, accepting its missile tests as a legitimate or at least unavoidable element of its defense policy, or securing recognition of the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state. The North may also seek to exacerbate the growing divisions among the DPRK’s main interlocutors, such as between the United States and China, South Korea and Japan and the US and Russia. Another explanation might be that the DPRK hopes to exploit America’s perceived weakness following the flawed Afghanistan withdrawal and its preoccupation with other issues, such as the conflict in Ukraine. Other reasons could be that North Korea aims to stay ahead in its missile competition with the Republic of Korea (ROK) or advance longstanding weapons development programs. Internally, the DPRK leadership may aim to impress domestic audiences or mark significant historical anniversaries over the next few weeks. The surge in testing also advances Kim Jong Un’s declaration at the Eighth Party Congress of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea that the DPRK would enhance its arsenal of advanced missiles and other strategic weaponry.
Since the North has so many reasons to develop and test missiles, halting this DPRK missile display anytime soon will prove problematic. The new ROK government and its allies will need to focus for now on reinforcing their defense and deterrent capabilities while seeking off-ramps to avert escalation and a means of dialogue to hedge against dangerous mutual misperceptions.
Deterrence and Defense
Notwithstanding these possibilities, the North’s efforts to field a fleet of next-generation missiles has military logic. The DPRK will likely need several more years of testing to operationalize these new delivery systems. Once they enter into service, though, these missiles could eventually help Pyongyang deter military actions against the DPRK in peacetime, fight foreign forces in wartime, challenge the credibility of US security guarantees to South Korea and Japan, and provide the North with the additional means for coercing other countries. The missiles can also raise the risks of crises, wars and escalation by potentially making DPRK decision makers more confident about employing force, controlling conflicts, achieving rapid war gains and deterring or defeating US counteractions.
North Korean defense policymakers are likely concerned that the Pentagon would employ conventional precision-strike systems to preemptively destroy the DPRK’s nuclear forces, command-and-control systems and other strategic capabilities. Doubts about assured deterrence capacity have spurred countries to invest in offensive strike systems to achieve effective retaliation, notwithstanding missile defenses and other challenges to their deterrents. Like others, North Korean strategists may interpret the brutal Russian assault on Ukraine as a reminder of the danger weaker countries face when they lack effective nuclear deterrents. Having the capacity to threaten offensive and retaliatory strikes against US soil, with even a small number of ICBMs, is important for the DRPK to deter US attacks.
In addition, the DPRK is acquiring more advanced intermediate- and shorter-range missiles to attack US forward-based forces, US and allied bases, and other priority targets. Weakening Washington’s extended deterrence guarantees to its allies and partners in Asia further enhances the North’s coercive capacity to intimidate these countries. For example, North Korea can leverage its improved deterrence against US strikes on its territory to make its threats of attacking other states more credible.
Prioritizing Hypersonics
In its most recent five-year plan, the DPRK leadership designated developing hypersonic weapons as a top priority. There are two common types of hypersonic delivery systems, which by definition, travel at five or more times greater than the speed of sound. Hypersonic glide vehicles are delivered on a ballistic missile into the upper atmosphere and then glide toward a terrestrial target. Hypersonic ballistic or cruise missiles employ a rocket or scramjet engine to attain sustained hypersonic speed.
Since September 2021, the DPRK has announced three tests of hypersonic weapons. Though the capabilities of these prototypes remain contested, North Korea has demonstrated its stubborn determination and consistent progress in developing defense technologies. Prudent planning mandates preparing for the North’s possible fielding of one or both types of specially designed hypersonic vehicles in the next few years. In response to the DPRK and Chinese progress in this area, Japan and the United States are enhancing their defense industrial cooperation in the hypersonic field.
Since hypersonic systems pose a different threat profile than North Korea’s other delivery systems, they can hold ROK and US assets at risk in novel ways, which could change when and how the North might launch strikes against targets. In particular, hypersonic systems can better circumvent present-day missile defenses due to their combination of sustained rapid speed, increased maneuverability, nontraditional flight paths and other characteristics. For example, they could fly below the preferred targeting profile of the US and ROK Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile systems in South Korea, which are designed to intercept missiles at higher altitudes, but above the optimal range for lower-range interceptors like the US Patriot or the Korea Air and Missile Defense system. The wing design of some hypersonic systems allows for greater lateral and vertical maneuvers along a shallower trajectory than traditional missiles that fly along more parabolic paths. Compared with slower missiles, hypersonic missiles also decrease the response time available to defenders.
Instability and Preemption
Hypersonic missiles can give North Korea an additional means to strike first in a potential conflict. Due to their likely limited number, the North would have the incentive to use them early in a conflict before losing them to a ROK-US strike. The DPRK could employ hypersonic systems to quickly attack time-sensitive, mobile and other high-priority command, control, logistical and transportation targets. By removing these critical systems from the battlefield, DPRK hypersonic systems can facilitate follow-on attacks by the North’s more numerous, non-hypersonic missiles and other weapons against other targets.
The novel delivery vehicles the DPRK has tested since the beginning of the year are, like many of the North’s other missiles, typically dual-use systems that can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads.[1] Arming delivery systems with nuclear warheads can amplify their effects by increasing their physical-psychological impacts and compensating for inaccuracies, defenses and other factors.
North Korea has engaged in an intense missile testing program in recent months. Besides the unprecedented number of these launches in such a short time span, the new systems display novel capabilities, such as hypersonic glide. Several factors are likely behind this surge, which looks likely to continue and even escalate to the renewed launching of ICBMs. Even if conventionally armed, North Korea’s emerging missile capabilities could make DPRK leaders more confident about successfully employing force, making rapid military gains, and deterring or defeating US-ROK defenses. Newly elected South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and his international partners must augment their deterrent and defense capabilities while developing additional means to manage these new challenges.
North Korea has engaged in an intense missile testing program in recent months. Besides the unprecedented number of these launches in such a short time span, the new systems display novel capabilities, such as hypersonic glide. Several factors are likely behind this surge, which looks likely to continue and even escalate to the renewed launching of ICBMs. Even if conventionally armed, North Korea’s emerging missile capabilities could make DPRK leaders more confident about successfully employing force, making rapid military gains, and deterring or defeating US-ROK defenses. Newly elected South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and his international partners must augment their deterrent and defense capabilities while developing additional means to manage these new challenges.
[1] For a comprehensive review of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, see: Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “North Korean nuclear weapons, 2021,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 77, no. 4, (2021): 222-236, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2021.1940803, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2021.1940803; and Sang-Hyun Lee, “Asymmetric WMD Threats: DPRK Nuclear, Cyber, and Bio-Chemical Weapons Capabilities,” Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, December 2021, https://cms.apln.network/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Sang-Hyun-Lee_APLN-Special-Report.pdf.
9. UN asks China not to send 7 North Korean refugees back home
If they send them back there is nt more clear evidence that China is complicit in north Korean human rights abuses. China should be held accountable.
UN asks China not to send 7 North Korean refugees back home
Refugee rights groups say escapees face severe punishment upon repatriation.
By Jeong Eun Lee
2022.03.15
The U.N. is asking Beijing not to repatriate seven detained refugees from North Korea who escapee rights groups say would face severe retribution from the government if returned to their home country.
In a letter to the Chinese government, the U.N. human rights officials also ask for information about the detainees, one of whom is reportedly in poor health, and the charges they face, their legal status and the measures Chinese authorities are taking to protect them.
Although the Chinese government has pledged to adhere to the U.N. convention forbidding countries to return refugees to their home countries if they will face serious threats to their life or freedom, Beijing claims it must return North Koreans found to be illegally within Chinese territory under two bilateral border and immigration pacts.
“We are concerned that these seven refugees are facing the risk of forcible repatriation in violation of the principle of non-refoulement. We are also concerned about the information that [name redacted] health condition is not good,” the letter stated.
It was signed by Tomás Ojea Quintana, the U.N.’s special rapporteur on North Korean Human Rights, and Nils Meltzer, the special rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
The letter was dated Feb. 15 and released by the U.N. on March 11. The names of the detainees and the places of their arrests were obscured to protect their identities.
The two U.N. officials emphasized that there were multiple appeals to the Chinese government to prevent the repatriation of North Korean refugees in China. Forced repatriations endanger people’s lives and can destroy families, they said in the letter.
Deporting the seven refugees would be a clear violation of international law, Su Bo Bae of the Seoul-based Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, told RFA.
She said that North Korean refugees returned home have been tortured and sexually assaulted, although there is some indication the government may be moving away from relying on violence as a means of punishment in these cases.
“There was a guidance that came down from the top telling the Security Department, the Ministry of Security, or the officials in each detention facility not to torture or beat the repatriated people. Perhaps that’s why the most recent testimonies regarding serious human rights violations, such as forced abortions and infanticide, are decreasing,” Su said.
The issue of North Korean refugees in China is a wide-ranging international problem, not just concerning China, North Korea and South Korea, said Kim Youngja, director general of the Seoul-based Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights.
“The South Korean government must tell the Chinese government that it intends to protect North Korean refugees in China in any positive way,” Kim said. “The international community, including the United Nations, should actively speak up and not let the attention fade.”
Last month’s letter echoes one U.N. rights officials sent to the Chinese government in August asking them to provide information on at least 1,170 North Korean refugees known at that time to have been detained in China. They feared that those refugees were facing the risk of forcible repatriation.
The Chinese government replied in September, arguing that the “principle of non-refoulement” did not apply to these cases because the persons were illegal immigrants and not refugees.
RFA reported in July 2021 that 50 North Koreans were loaded onto buses in the Chinese border city of Dandong and taken across the Yalu River. Sources said Chinese onlookers were hostile to the police, warning that they were effectively sending the refugees to their deaths.
Hundreds of thousands of North Koreans fled to China to escape a mid-1990s famine, with about 30,000 making their way to South Korea. As many as 60,000 North Koreans remain in China, despite having no legal status. Some have married Chinese nationals.
RFA reported in August that police had begun actively arresting North Korean spouses of Chinese nationals after a long period of time during which they were treated leniently.
Translated by Claire Lee and Leejin Jun. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
10. Failed test scatters debris around airport near Pyongyang
Probably a major police call being conducted by the people to pick up the debris.
Wednesday
March 16, 2022
Failed test scatters debris around airport near Pyongyang
North Korea test-fired an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), Hwasong-12, on Jan. 30 as shown in photos released by the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) a day later. The photos show the missile launched from a transporter erector launcher (TEL) and images taken by a camera on the missile warhead from space. [KCNA]
North Korea launched an unidentified projectile from an airfield near Pyongyang Wednesday morning but the test failed almost immediately, according to the South Korean military authorities.
It was suspected to be a long-range ballistic missile.
Seoul’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) sent a text message to reporters at 10:06 a.m. about the failed launch, adding that South Korean and U.S. intelligence were analyzing the launch.
The projectile exploded at an altitude of less than 20 kilometers (12.4 miles) after being launched from Sunan Airport near Pyongyang. The mid-air explosion sprayed debris over areas near the capital, according to NK News.
The announcement from the JCS came after Japanese broadcaster NHK issued a news report that a North Korean missile test was imminent, citing an unnamed Japanese defense official.
The failed launch came shortly after South Korean intelligence told the JoongAng Ilbo on Sunday that Seoul had detected signs that the North was gearing up to launch additional missiles from Sunan Airport.
Satellite imagery of the airport taken between March 5 and 11 suggested that the regime was preparing for a missile launch by laying down concrete strips to reinforce the runway surface.
Amid a flurry of missile tests — seven in January alone — Pyongyang conducted two missile tests on Feb. 27 and March 5, also at Sunan Airport.
In state media reports on those two tests, the North claimed the launches were aimed at developing the country’s space program by placing a reconnaissance satellite into orbit.
However, South Korean and U.S. intelligence believe that the purported satellite missile launches were actually tests of the Hwasong-17 ICBM.
The Hwasong-17 was first unveiled at an Oct. 10, 2020 military parade marking the 75th anniversary of the founding of the North’s ruling Korean Workers’ Party. It was also displayed at a defense exhibition in Pyongyang last Oct. 12.
With an estimated length of 23 meters (74.5 feet) and a 2.3-meter diameter, the Hwasong-17 is the largest ICBM in the world.
The missile is believed to be propelled by several Paektusan-type liquid-fuel engines developed by the North, which “likely suffered a technical malfunction” during Wednesday’s launch despite “having been verified through previous launches,” according to Lee Chungeun, an honorary fellow at the Sejong-based Science and Technology, in an interview with the JoongAng Ilbo on Wednesday.
Wednesday’s failed launch is the first by the North since the election of Yoon Suk-yeol of the conservative People Power Party, which is expected to take a harder stance on Pyongyang's development of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.
On the campaign trail, Yoon suggested that South Korea should once again host U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on its soil and hone its capability to strike first against the North if an attack against the South is detected.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
11. Li Ning Goods Detained by U.S. Customs on North Korea Link
Li Ning Goods Detained by U.S. Customs on North Korea Link
Bloomberg News
March 15, 2022, 8:17 PM EDTUpdated onMarch 15, 2022, 9:44 PM EDT
Merchandise made by Chinese sportswear giant Li Ning Co. has been detained at U.S. ports, after an investigation indicated the company used North Korean labor in its supply chain.
The action against Li Ning Sporting Goods was effective March 14, U.S. Customs and Border Protection said in a statement.
Some Li Ning goods can enter the U.S. if the company “provides clear and convincing evidence that their merchandise was not produced with convict labor, forced labor, or indentured labor under penal sanctions within 30 days of notice of detention,” U.S. Customs said. Otherwise the merchandise may be subject to seizure and forfeiture, it said.
Li Ning shares fell as much as 3.2% in early Hong Kong trading, before erasing the losses and rising 4.2% to HK$53.10 at 9:42 a.m. local time. The stock is down almost 38% this year.
North Korea has for years sent tens of thousands of citizens to places like Russia and China for manual labor. This earned the regime more than $500 million a year in vital foreign currency -- or about 1.5% of the country’s economy by the time the United Nations called for a halt to the practice in 2017 to punish Pyongyang for its nuclear and ballistic missile tests.
Even though Russia was supposed to halt the importation of labor from its neighbor under UN sanctions, the North Koreans still came. The exact figure is unknown but are likely several thousand North Korean workers there now, according to NK News. They mostly work in the timber and construction industries in the country’s Far East, being paid in rubles and forced to convert large portions of their salaries to dollars, or another major currency, which is then handed over to cash-starved North Korea.
Earlier this month, Norway’s $1.3 trillion sovereign wealth fund excluded Li Ning due to the risk that the company contributes to serious human rights violations in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Textile production in Xinjiang has become a controversial issue in developed countries over concerns that China is detaining more than 1 million Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minorities in “re-education” camps, which the U.S. has called an ongoing genocide. China has repeatedly denied these claims
Li Ning, founded by the Olympic gold medal winning gymnast, makes shoes, sporting apparel and accessories under its Li Ning and Kappa brands. It has made significant overtures in recent years into overseas markets, and is doubling down at home where it is benefiting from rising interest from Chinese consumers in local brands.
The company didn’t immediately respond to requests to comment on the U.S. detainment action. In a January filing, Li Ning said it has “zero tolerance” to misconduct including forced labor, and is “firmly committed to conducting business in a legal and ethical manner.”
— With assistance by Daniela Wei, and Jon Herskovitz
(Adds share reaction, concerns over Xinjiang cotton and Norway’s exclusion of Li Ning.)
12. North Korea intensifies battle against “anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior”
This is the number one priority, the main effort for the regime. This is even more important than the nuclear and missile programs. Information that influences the Korean people in the north is an existential threat to the regime. If we really wanted to respond to the regime;'s missile tests we would launch a comprehensive information and influence campaign.
North Korea intensifies battle against “anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior”
The North Hamgyong Province branch of Unified Command 82 began full-scale efforts to crack down on anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior from the start of this month
By Kim Chae Hwan - 2022.03.16 2:30pm
North Korean authorities have recently upped their war on “anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior” using the so-called “Unified Command 82.”
This suggests that the authorities have once again underscored their will to watch for and punish all sorts of behavior that runs counter to the regime. The North Korean government considers “anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior” to refer to importing and watching foreign films and TV, smuggling, and using Chinese-made mobile phones, among other infractions.
Daily NK recently obtained a Central Committee order issued early last month to regional branches of Unified Command 82 calling for a “war of extermination” to bring “anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior” to an end.
Ahead of this, Daily NK reported that the Third Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee ordered in June that the “unified command against anti-socialism and non-socialism” be renamed “Unified Command 82,” further instructing the unified command to intensify its “war of extermination” on violent crime, drugs, superstition, and “impure publications.”
This year’s focus on combatting “anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior,” coming after last year’s campaign, suggests the authorities intend to strictly move against preventing people exposed to information from overseas, including South Korean pop culture, from “parting ways” with the regime.
The order is apparently also an admission that the authorities have failed to improve the “ideological health” of the people, despite waging operations with such martial names as “war of extermination” and “mop up operations.”
In fact, the order calls on the unified command to root out and punish criminals “causing fear and insecurity among the people.” The authorities have essentially switched to an approach favoring threats over inducements.
It is also worth noting that the order calls for the formation of “unified strike teams” composed of police, security personnel, prosecutors, and court officials in regions where there is “rampant anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior.”
These teams could include armed personnel and legal officials when necessary.
A screenshot of the order, obtained through a Daily NK source, handed down to Unified Command 82 branches throughout the country in early February.
This is noteworthy because it indicates that the authorities intend to dispatch more officials with jobs similar to those that make up Unified Command 82, which is also composed of officials from the police, security services, and prosecutor offices. They would presumably watch over matters to root out the corrupt practice of taking bribes to look the other way at illegal behavior.
A Daily NK source said that though Unified Command 82 has been waging a war on anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior since last year, the authorities believe there is still a lot of bad behavior to root out. Because of this, they have issued another tough, specific order this year, he added.
The order included reference to Kim Jong Un-style “love for the people,” along with such language as “violent criminals who violate the lives and safety of the people” and “reacting firmly to properly address the people’s complaints.”
These statements appear intended to promote the idea that officials should take the lead in resolving public discontent while shifting responsibility for various crimes that have arisen due to economic difficulties in the wake of COVID-19 onto a handful of criminals.
The source pointed out that the Unified Command 82’s priority target is “South Korean pop culture.” North Korean authorities believe fans of South Korean pop culture are “filthy with capitalism and committing violent crimes.”
The source said the authorities have tried to block South Korean pop culture for many years using various organizations, but “critics said these efforts have yielded few results.” He said the authorities intend to use Unified Command 82 to “decisively root out” anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior — including South Korean pop culture — as the COVID-19 lockdown continues.
Relatedly, the North Hamgyong Province branch of Unified Command 82 began full-scale efforts to crack down on anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior from the start of this month. After bolstering the number of its personnel, the organization has reportedly launched sweeping crackdowns in densely populated Chongjin and Hoeryong.
How long the unified command can continue intense crackdowns and punishments remains anyone’s guess, however. The source said not only have people found more ways to avoid crackdowns, but South Korean films and TV programs have also grown in popularity.
The source further noted that though many young people have been punished for watching South Korean films or TV programs, considerable numbers continue to try watching them anyway. He added that ban enforcers are placed in “difficult positions” because the children of cadres or wealthy families are getting caught up in the crackdowns, too.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
