Quotes of the Day:
"I like to see a man proud of the place in which he lives. I like to see a man live so that his place will be proud of him."
- Abraham Lincoln
"An invasion of armies can be resisted, but not an idea whose time has come."
- Victor Hugo
"In all history there is no war which was not hatched by the governments, the governments alone, independent of the interests of the people, to whom war is always pernicious even when successful."
- Leo Tolstoy
1. On both sides of the Korean Peninsula, eyes are on Washington’s response to Russia.
2. Presidential candidates clash over lessons of Ukraine attack
3. Ukraine ambassador asks South Korea for help against Russian cyberattacks
4. N. Korea blames U.S.' 'high-handedness and arbitrariness' for Ukraine crisis
5. 4 S. Korean citizens flee Ukraine across Romanian border after Russia's invasion
6. New U.S. rotational unit's equipment arrives in S. Korea
7. S. Korea is hesitant to impose independent sanctions against Russia
8. Korea to launch Nuri-ho rocket for second time on June 15
9. China vows cooperation with North Korea under 'new situation'
10. Ukraine conflict, a cautionary tale for security-wary North Korea
11. [Editorial] Let Ukraine be a lesson (ROK)
12. Book Review: “North Korean Nuclear Funding Sources: A Secret Record of ‘UN Investigations’”
13. South Korea bets on home-grown missile defence system to replace US-made THAAD that angered China
14. Why South Korea’s outgoing president is less unpopular than most
15. N.Korean Defector Gets PhD on U.S. Scholarship
1. On both sides of the Korean Peninsula, eyes are on Washington’s response to Russia.
The result of this will be an assessment that confirms what many of us have long believed: that Kim Jong-un is even more unlikely to give up nuclear weapons than ever before. This I am afraid is going to lead to shift to the arms control advocates who advocate for arms control (limitation and then reduction) rather than denuclearization. Unfortunately once we shift to amr control negotiations, Kim will assess his political warfare strategy and blackmail diplomacy as a success and will eventually double down on them.
On both sides of the Korean Peninsula, eyes are on Washington’s response to Russia.
Feb. 26, 2022, 12:43 a.m. ET
Watching coverage of the invasion of Ukraine in a Seoul train station on Thursday. Credit...Ahn Young-Joon/Associated Press
SEOUL — Both North and South Korea are likely to be closely watching the American response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, though for different reasons, analysts say.
North Korea carried out a flurry of missile tests in January, but none this month — possibly out of deference to its neighbor and ally China, which was hosting the Winter Olympics. With the Games now over and the Biden administration’s attention fixed on Ukraine, North Korea might decide it’s time to resume weapons tests, to gain more diplomatic leverage with Washington.
“The crisis in Ukraine gives North Korea more room for options, whether it’s a long-range missile test or even a nuclear test,” said Cheon Seong-whun, a former head of the Korea Institute for National Unification, a government-funded research institute in Seoul.
In South Korea, many people will see Washington’s response to Russia’s invasion as a test of its dependability as a military ally, said Lee Byong-chul, a professor of political science at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University in Seoul.
He said a failure of American leadership could even increase public support for the idea of South Korea having its own nuclear weapons — an idea that the South’s government opposes, but which has gained popularity as the North has kept building its arsenal and China has become more assertive in the region.
“South Koreans saw the United States already looking something like a toothless tiger when it withdrew chaotically from Afghanistan,” Professor Lee said. “If it proves spineless in Ukraine, they will talk more about arming their country with nuclear weapons, because they wonder whether Ukraine would have suffered the humiliation it is suffering now had it not have given up its nuclear weapons.”
South Korean online chat rooms were abuzz with people discussing the Ukraine invasion’s implications for the divided Korean Peninsula. A weak American response would harden North Korea’s determination not to give up its nuclear arsenal, some people said.
The South Korean government has condemned the invasion and pledged to join international sanctions against Russia. As of Saturday, the North Korean government had not issued a statement about the invasion.
2. Presidential candidates clash over lessons of Ukraine attack
Two starkly different views of the Ukraine situation and the parallels with Korea. But it is troubling that anyone would blame Zelensky and indirectly give Putin a pass. It is similar to those who argue the US military presence is the cause of problems on the Korean peninsula and give Kim Jong-un a pass.
Excerpts:
Lee:
"A novice politician who only has six months of political experience became the country's leader and caused a major clash by inciting Russia with a hasty promise of Ukraine's NATO admission," Lee said of Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who was an actor and comedian before he was elected as the country's leader in April 2019.
"This is an example of a diplomatic failure. Yoon is too aggressive and rough in his diplomatic remarks, such as his pledge to establish South Korea's capability to launch preemptive strikes (against North Korea)."
Yoon:
"You can only prevent war when you have the capability for preemptive strikes and have the intent to do so … I believe the case of Ukraine shows that you cannot protect national security and peace with paper and ink," Yoon said, referring to the Minsk agreements or a series of pacts that sought to end fighting with Russia-backed separatists in the Donbas region of Ukraine.
"Candidate Lee and the current DPK administration stress the importance of an end-of-war declaration with North Korea, which will be done only on paper with ink. With North Korea refusing to give up its nuclear program, pushing forward the end-of-war declaration is the same as the case of Ukraine."
Presidential candidates clash over lessons of Ukraine attack
Candidates running for the March 9 presidential election pose before their fourth TV debate at broadcaster SBS' studio in Sangam-dong, Seoul, Friday. From left are Justice Party presidential candidate Sim Sang-jung, People's Party candidate Ahn Cheol-soo, People Power Party candidate Yoon Suk-yeol and Democratic Party of Korea candidate Lee Jae-myung. Joint Press corps
By Nam Hyun-woo
Rival presidential candidates of the ruling Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) and the main opposition People Power Party (PPP) clashed over their differing views of the lessons of Russia's attack on Ukraine during their TV debate, Friday. The DPK's Lee Jae-myung stressed a leader's diplomatic capability, while the PPP's Yoon Suk-yeol highlighted military deterrence to facilitate peace on the Korean Peninsula.
"A novice politician who only has six months of political experience became the country's leader and caused a major clash by inciting Russia with a hasty promise of Ukraine's NATO admission," Lee said of Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who was an actor and comedian before he was elected as the country's leader in April 2019.
"This is an example of a diplomatic failure. Yoon is too aggressive and rough in his diplomatic remarks, such as his pledge to establish South Korea's capability to launch preemptive strikes (against North Korea)."
Lee's comment came after Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on Sunday. Along with international condemnation of Russia's moves, criticism is also mounting over Zelenskyy's diplomatic miscalculation, which is being blamed for steering his country towards a clash with Russia.
On the other hand, PPP candidate Yoon criticized Ukraine's reliance on diplomatic agreements to maintain peace and emphasized the importance of military power and strong alliances to guarantee national security.
"You can only prevent war when you have the capability for preemptive strikes and have the intent to do so … I believe the case of Ukraine shows that you cannot protect national security and peace with paper and ink," Yoon said, referring to the Minsk agreements or a series of pacts that sought to end fighting with Russia-backed separatists in the Donbas region of Ukraine.
"Candidate Lee and the current DPK administration stress the importance of an end-of-war declaration with North Korea, which will be done only on paper with ink. With North Korea refusing to give up its nuclear program, pushing forward the end-of-war declaration is the same as the case of Ukraine."
The end-of-war declaration is President Moon Jae-in's proposal to have the two Koreas, the U.S. and China declare a formal end to the 1950-53 Korean War. Lee supports that idea, claiming it can lead to the resumption of stalled inter-Korean talks, while Yoon is against it, citing Pyongyang's escalating threats.
Lee and Yoon displayed stark differences in their diplomatic philosophies.
Lee stresses pragmatism in solving most pending diplomatic issues surrounding the Korean Peninsula, while Yoon has a clearer stance of enhancing Seoul's military deterrence and diplomatic presence through stronger ties with the U.S.
During the debate, People's Party presidential candidate Ahn Cheol-soo said South Korea should engage sincerely in talks with North Korea, but stressed that Seoul needs to be staunch in its opposition to Pyongyang's nuclear program and other provocations. He floated the idea of a nuclear sharing treaty between South Korea and the U.S. as a deterrent against the North.
Justice Party candidate Sim Sang-jung expressed doubts over Yoon's pledge to establish a preemptive strike capability, saying that proper deterrence is getting North Korea to acknowledge that using nuclear weapons will bring devastation.
Democratic Party of Korea presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung, left, bumps fists with People Power Party candidate Yoon Suk-yeol before their fourth TV debate at broadcaster SBS' studio in Sangam-dong, Seoul, Friday. Joint Press CorpsOver political reforms, Lee strived to court Ahn and Sim to join his idea of a coalition government based on a multi-party system, by agreeing to most of their political reform pledges, such as weakening the president's authority and preventing a party from gaining dominance.
A day earlier, the DPK announced a package of political reforms, allowing the National Assembly to recommend a prime minister and enabling the president to serve two four-year terms by amending the Constitution. The DPK also suggested a multi-party system, in which several parties across the political spectrum have control over the government under a coalition or separately.
But Yoon expressed his doubts over Lee's efforts to embrace Ahn and Sim.
"With the election taking place in 10 days, the DPK's political reform idea is inappropriate and an insincere trick to overshadow the public's yearning for a leadership change," Yoon said.
This was the second TV debate between the four candidates hosted by the National Election Commission, and the fourth televised debate between them.
3. Ukraine ambassador asks South Korea for help against Russian cyberattacks
I hope South Korea steps up here. I am troubled that it will only "support" international sanctions but is unwilling to implement their own sanctions against Russia as other countries (such as Japan) have.
Ukraine ambassador asks South Korea for help against Russian cyberattacks
Ukrainian ambassador to South Korea Dmytro Ponomarenko appealed from Seoul on Friday to help guard against Russian cyberattacks in Ukraine. Photo by Yonhap
SEOUL, Feb. 25 (UPI) -- Ukrainian Ambassador to South Korea Dmytro Ponomarenko on Friday called for Seoul to use its technological expertise to help Ukraine defend against further cyberattacks from Russia.
Advertisement
"We would also be grateful if the Republic of Korea, being a highly developed hi-tech country, gave us a hand in strengthening our cybersecurity capabilities," Ponomarenko said at a press conference attended by embassy officials from several countries in Seoul, according to Yonhap. The Republic of Korea is South Korea's official name.
On Thursday, cybersecurity firm ESET reported that cyberattacks by a new data-wiping malware had struck computers in hundreds of organizations in Ukraine. That assault came after waves of distributed denial of service attacks knocked key government and bank websites offline as Russia began its invasion.
President Joe Biden said at the White House on Thursday that the United States was ready for Russian cyber warfare.
"If Russia pursues cyberattacks against our companies, our critical infrastructure, we are prepared to respond," Biden said. "For months, we have been working closely with the private sector to harden their cyber defenses [and] sharpen our ability to respond to Russian cyberattacks as well."
Advertisement
The Japanese government also warned of the threat of cyberattacks in retaliation for sanctions against Russia, as the country's Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirokazu Matsuno urged domestic companies and organizations to be on their guard, according to .
Ponomarenko thanked South Korean President Moon Jae-in for speaking out in support of Ukraine and joining international sanctions efforts against Russia. Moon said Thursday that the "sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine must be guaranteed."
"The Republic of Korea, as a responsible member of the international community, will support and participate in the efforts of the international community, including economic sanctions, to deter armed aggression and resolve the situation peacefully," Moon said, in remarks reported by his spokesperson.
South Korea has not announced unilateral sanctions against Russia.
The Ukrainian envoy also said Friday that his country needed military assistance ranging from weapons to fuel to protective gear in order to "counter the biggest army in the continent."
Scenes from the Russian war on Ukraine
u
4. N. Korea blames U.S.' 'high-handedness and arbitrariness' for Ukraine crisis
Not unexpected from the north Korean Propaganda and Agitation Department.
N. Korea blames U.S.' 'high-handedness and arbitrariness' for Ukraine crisis | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Feb. 26 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Saturday ascribed the armed conflict in Ukraine to the United States' "high-handedness and arbitrariness," accusing Washington of having pursued "military supremacy" in disregard of Russia's security concerns.
In a post on the North's foreign ministry website, Ri Ji-song, a researcher at the Society for International Politics Study, made the remarks -- the North's first public mention of the conflict following Russia's invasion of Ukraine earlier this week.
"The root cause of the Ukrainian crisis also lies in the high-handedness and arbitrariness of the U.S. which has held on solely to the unilateral sanction and pressure while pursuing only global hegemony and military supremacy in disregard of the legitimate demand of Russia for its security," Ri wrote.
Ri also cited what he claims to be comments by global media and experts that the contributing factor to the Ukrainian crisis is the "imbalance of power in Europe due to the unilateral expansion of NATO and its threat as well as the grave threat to the national security of Russia."
The researcher reiterated Pyongyang's accusations of Washington employing "double standards."
"The U.S embellishes its own interference in internal affairs of others as 'righteous' for peace and stability of the world, but it denounces for no good reason self-defensive measures taken by other countries to ensure their own national security as 'injustice' and 'provocation,'" he said.
He added, "Gone are the days when the U.S. used to reign supreme."
North Korea watchers have been waiting to see how Pyongyang would react to Moscow's invasion, which some observers see as a case of "meddling in internal affairs" or an erosion of the "noninterference" principle that the North itself has advocated.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
5. 4 S. Korean citizens flee Ukraine across Romanian border after Russia's invasion
4 S. Korean citizens flee Ukraine across Romanian border after Russia's invasion | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Feb. 26 (Yonhap) -- Four more South Koreans have fled Ukraine across the border into Romania, with 19 others on their way to border regions for evacuation following a Russian invasion of the country, a Seoul official said Saturday,
Aboard a rental car provided by the South Korean Embassy in Romania, the four crossed the border, the official at the foreign ministry said. As of 8 a.m. (Korea time), the number of citizens still in Ukraine -- except for diplomatic staff -- had stood at 63.
The 19 citizens trying to flee the country are said to be moving toward either the Polish border or the Romanian border.
The ministry official said currently, 25 citizens in Ukraine still want to stay in the country.
South Korea's diplomatic personnel in Ukraine have been trying to ensure the safe evacuation of citizens.
Earlier this month, Seoul barred its nationals from travelling to Ukraine and urged those already in the country to leave for safe countries.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
6. New U.S. rotational unit's equipment arrives in S. Korea
At some point US strategic lift assets may have to be diverted to provide equipment to Ukraine. If we halt a unit rotation due to shortfalls in strategic lift it will highlight how vulnerable unit rotations make us. Rotational units to Korea is a self inflicted wound for our stretched strategic lift assets.
New U.S. rotational unit's equipment arrives in S. Korea | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Feb. 26 (Yonhap) -- Vehicles and equipment of a new rotational U.S. armored brigade team have begun arriving in South Korea to support an American infantry division stationed here, the U.S. military said Saturday.
Starting late this month, the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, from Fort Bliss, Texas, began arriving here to replace the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team returning home following a nine-month rotational deployment.
The new combat team will support the 2nd Infantry Division/ROK-US Combined Division and the Eighth Army, the military said in a press release. ROK stands for South Korea's official name, Republic of Korea.
The incoming team will bring some of its equipment to the Korean Peninsula, while the outgoing team will take portions of its equipment back to the United States. M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles are included in the home station equipment, the military said.
"The logistical process allows for proper maintenance and service of the old equipment and aligns our deployed forces with current Army-wide modernization and readiness efforts," it said.
All soldiers arriving as part of the new team showed a negative COVID-19 PCR test before arriving here and will complete a mandatory quarantine immediately upon arrival in accordance with U.S. Forces Korea policy, according to the military.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
7. S. Korea is hesitant to impose independent sanctions against Russia
This is troubling. The ROK has to step up and contribute to defending democracy.
S. Korea is hesitant to impose independent sanctions against Russia
Posted February. 26, 2022 07:41,
Updated February. 26, 2022 07:41
S. Korea is hesitant to impose independent sanctions against Russia. February. 26, 2022 07:41. niceshin@donga.com,tree624@donga.com.
The U.S. announced a series of export controls against Russia, but South Korea was not included on a list of allies joining the U.S.-led sanctions. Although the South Korean government announced that it would participate in international sanctions on Russia, it was not on the list of allies and partners joining the sanctions. Considering that the U.S. had reportedly shared detailed intelligence on the Ukraine crisis with the South Korean government since early this month, some are pointing out that Washington might have expressed its discontent with Seoul over its unwillingness to take action.
The U.S. Commerce Department on Thursday (local time) announced sweeping restrictions on exports to Russia and said the European Union (EU), Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand are among the countries that join the U.S.-led restrictions. South Korean was not on the list. South Korea was not included when a senior White House official earlier said on Tuesday (local time) that the U.S. had consulted with its allies regarding sanctions against Russia.
The U.S. persuaded South Korea to join sanctions against Russia by sharing detailed information, ranging from political situation to export controls against Russia, but the South Korean government has been hesitant to participate due to economic impact. It was on Thursday, when Russian forces stormed Ukraine, that South Korean President Moon Jae-in suggested that South Korea will join the sanctions, sending support for the efforts of the international community to deter Russia’s armed aggression and resolve the situation peacefully.
The South Korean government, however, is still discussing when or how it will join the sanctions. The possibility of independent sanctions is not high at this time. Park Soo-hyun, senior presidential secretary for public communication, reaffirmed on Friday that the country is not considering imposing independent sanctions, saying, “We are not in an era, where we can do things on our own. He implied that South Korea will not be at the forefront of sanctions, considering its relations with Russia.
In a phone interview with The Dong-A Ilbo, Rep. Cho Tae-yong of the People’s Power Party, who served as the first vice minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said he does not understand why the government is hesitant to join the sanctions when Russia has already been criticized for violating the international law. Rep. Cho warned that the loss coming from being excluded from the allied front will be much greater than the benefits coming from not provoking Russia.
8. Korea to launch Nuri-ho rocket for second time on June 15
Hopefully better luck this time.
Korea to launch Nuri-ho rocket for second time on June 15
Posted February. 26, 2022 07:40,
Updated February. 26, 2022 07:40
Korea to launch Nuri-ho rocket for second time on June 15. February. 26, 2022 07:40. bios@donga.com.
Korea has tentatively scheduled the second launch of ‘Nuri-ho,’ a Korean standard space rocket, on June 15.
The Science and ICT Ministry said it has fixed the schedule after confirming measures to address technical issues with Nuri-ho at the 40th meeting of the “working-level committee of space development and advancement” on Friday. The second launch was originally scheduled in May but has been postponed by about a month. The tentative dates of launch are June 16 to 23.
Nuri-ho is a three-stage Korean space rocket, which is designed to put a 1.5 ton-class commercial satellite into orbit 600 to 800 kilometers from the Earth. The rocket consists of four 75-ton liquid engines in its first stage, a 75-ton liquid engine in the second stage and a 7-ton liquid engine in the third stage. During the first launch in October last year, fuel in the third stage tank combusted prematurely, causing the rocket to fail to put the dummy satellite into the intended orbit.
The ministry’s launch investigation committee concluded that support structures holding helium tanks inside the third-stage oxidizer tank were loosened to trigger the failure. Researchers at the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) and its partners redesigned the tank to revise and strengthen the support structures and cover of manhole, which serves as the lid.
If production of this redesigned segment is completed, the researchers will disassemble the 3-stage engine that was assembled last year for the second launch, before reassembling and performing tests on its tightness. As they estimate that this technical improvement work will take about a month, they have decided to postpone launch schedule to June.
9. China vows cooperation with North Korea under 'new situation'
Closer than lips and teeth. But what is the "new situation?" (no elaboration in the article or from KCNA).
China vows cooperation with North Korea under 'new situation'
Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un wave from an open top limousine as they travel along a street in Pyongyang, North Korea, in this June 20, 2019, file photo released by China's Xinhua News Agency. AP-Yonhap
China's President Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of cooperation between Beijing and Pyongyang in an unspecified "new situation," North Korea's state media reported Saturday.
North Korea, officially known as the DPRK, carried out an unprecedented seven missile tests in January ― including its most powerful missile since 2017 ― with denuclearization negotiations with the United States at a standstill.
It paused testing during the Beijing Winter Olympics, with analysts saying the decision could have been made out of deference to China.
Beijing is Pyongyang's most important ally and economic benefactor, their relationship forged during the 1950s Korean War.
In his message to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, Xi said Beijing was ready to "develop the China-DPRK relations of friendship and cooperation" under a "new situation," the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported.
The KCNA did not further elaborate on what the "new situation" entailed.
North Korea is reeling economically from a self-imposed coronavirus blockade, and restarted cross-border trade with Beijing last month.
China accounts for more than 90 percent of the isolated country's bilateral trade.
Pyongyang is under multiple sets of international sanctions over its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
But regardless, it has warned it could abandon its self-imposed moratorium and resume testing intercontinental ballistic missiles or nuclear weapons.
Some experts have warned that with the eyes of the world focused on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, North Korea might take the opportunity to test-fire long-range missiles. (AFP)
10. Ukraine conflict, a cautionary tale for security-wary North Korea
This is the key point in the excerpt below. The regime has never trusted any agreement and is even more unlikely to agree to only paper agreements. It demands that agreements be backed up with action. The "security guarantee" that it seeks is not words and paper, it is an end to the ROK/US alliance, removal of US troops, and an end to extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella over the ROK and Japan. Unfortunately, this action, in return for progress on denuclearization, will achieve the key condition the regime seeks to both coerce the ROK and if necessary use force to be able to dominate the Korean peninsula.
Excerpt:
For Pyongyang, the unfurling crisis in Ukraine might be a grim indication that any future denuclearization deal ― whether that be with Washington or Beijing ― could be as fragile as the Budapest Memorandum, observers said.
Ukraine conflict, a cautionary tale for security-wary North Korea
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un attends a meeting of the Central Committee of the ruling Workers' Party in Pyongyang, North Korea, Jan. 19, in this photo provided by the North Korean government. Russian President Vladimir Putin's order to send troops into eastern Ukraine could be a reminder of the grim reality for North Korea: A deal to bargain away its nuclear arms could prove to be a scrap of paper anytime in the world of power politics. AP-Yonhap
Russian President Vladimir Putin's order to send troops into eastern Ukraine could be a reminder of the grim reality for North Korea: A deal to bargain away its nuclear arms could prove to be a scrap of paper anytime in the world of power politics.
Defying international pleas, Putin ordered his "peacekeeping" troops into two breakaway regions in Ukraine, Monday, recognizing them as "independent" states ― a move that U.S. President Joe Biden has said amounted to the "beginning of a Russian invasion."
The strongman's military step is now rekindling a debate over the fate of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum under which the United States, Russia and Britain pledged to offer security assurances to Ukraine in return for its handover of all Soviet-era nuclear weapons.
For Pyongyang, the unfurling crisis in Ukraine might be a grim indication that any future denuclearization deal ― whether that be with Washington or Beijing ― could be as fragile as the Budapest Memorandum, observers said.
"The Ukraine crisis will be yet another historical lesson for North Korea: A weak country is likely to face such a scenario after all," Park Won-gon, professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University, said.
"In fact, the North's position has long been that security assurances from major powers are futile, and that is a reason why it has sought to bolster self-reliant capabilities and build its own nuclear force," he added.
The escalating standoff over Ukraine came as nuclear negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang have remained stalled since the summit between the two countries in Hanoi in 2019 ended without a deal.
People wearing face masks walk on the street near the Pyongyang Railway Station, North Korea, Jan. 27. AP-Yonhap
The North's nuclear quandary has long eluded U.S. administrations partly because the recalcitrant regime has remained doubtful whether any American promises of security assurances can be credible and will remain unaffected by a change of government inherent in a democracy.
The North's such doubts were reinforced when in2018 former U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew Washington from the landmark 2015 Iranian nuclear deal signed under his predecessor, Barack Obama.
Putin's troop dispatch order this week harks back to Russia's 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, which was then cited as an ominous sign that the Budapest arrangement was hanging by a thread.
The 2014 redrawing of the European map and the current Ukrainian crisis have unnerved the U.S. and other allies as they see the two cases as a body blow to the long-held principle: National borders should not be altered by military force.
Amid growing signs of the principle's erosion, the North has gone overboard to sharpen its military edge through a series of advanced missile tests last month, including those of hypersonic and intermediate-range ones.
Pyongyang has also appeared keen on reinforcing its nuclear weapons capabilities, casting them as the "treasured sword." It has expressed a desire to develop tactical nuclear arms while doubling down on diversifying delivery vehicles.
"As North Korea watches the encroachment on the territorial integrity of Ukraine in the annexation of the Crimea and the ongoing crisis, the regime would find it difficult to abandon its nuclear program, which is like an insurance policy for the North," Kim Tae-hyung, a professor of international politics at Soongsil University, said.
A TV screen at Seoul Station shows a media report on the Ukrainian crisis, Feb. 22. Yonhap For South Korea, what's happening there may not be something it can write off as a faraway crisis. Beyond its potential economic fallout, the security crisis poses a major geopolitical question of whether to allow what could be a breach of a key international rule: noninterference.
The Seoul government has so far appeared cautious about the issue of joining the U.S.-led campaign to sanction Russia for its latest military operation, while signaling its desire to offer humanitarian assistance to Ukraine.
The U.S. and its allies imposed coordinated retaliatory sanctions targeting Russian officials and two key banks while warning of tougher measures to be rolled out in the case of escalation.
A senior official at Cheong Wa Dae said Wednesday that Seoul was not considering military support or deployment in connection to the Ukrainian crisis while leaving ambiguity on the sanctions issue.
"Major Western nations have expressed a willingness to join in sanctions. We are also looking at this while leaving various possibilities open," the official told reporters on the condition of anonymity.
As the Biden administration has been striving to rally its regional allies and partners against an assertive China and a nuclear-ambitious North Korea, Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang have appeared to be closing ranks with one another.
For Beijing and Pyongyang, however, the unfolding situations in Ukraine could be a worrisome development given that both have ardently championed the principle of noninterference ― a term they often use to criticize America.
"From the North's perspective, the Russian order to send troops into Ukraine might be an act against its anti-imperialist credo," Park of Ewha Womans University said. "For China that has balked at any acts to meddle in internal affairs, it could be an embarrassing one too." (Yonhap)
11. [Editorial] Let Ukraine be a lesson (ROK)
Sound advice to South Korea. It has to step up.
[Editorial] Let Ukraine be a lesson
Strategic ambiguity not the way to go as US, allies close ranks against Russia
Published : Feb 25, 2022 - 05:30 Updated : Feb 25, 2022 - 05:30
Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered troops to “maintain peace” in two breakaway regions in eastern Ukraine, after recognizing them as independent states. Then US President Joe Biden said Russia had begun “an invasion” of Ukraine and announced a new sanctions package against Russia.
For starters, Russia’s aggression is an illegal act of war on a sovereign state. Putin said “to maintain peace” but it is nothing but a pretext to whitewash violent infringement upon the territory and sovereignty of Ukraine.
The Ukraine situation may signal the New Cold War represented by a military confrontation between the West and Russia. For South Korea, the Ukraine crisis is not a fire across the river to look on with folded arms. The Korean Peninsula is a flashpoint that may be more dangerous than Ukraine. South Korea, a US ally, and North Korea, an ally of China and Russia, square off against each other, divided by the military demarcation line.
South Korea exports semiconductors, cars and electronic appliances to Russia. So, Washington is likely to ask South Korea to join or cooperate with export control sanctions against Russia sometime in the future. Economic damage will be inevitable if South Korea joins the sanctions. And yet it cannot keep up strategic ambiguity if the US and other allies keep closing ranks.
If South Korea looks away from allies when crisis befalls one of them, then they will likely look away when it faces crises of its own. Considering the possibility of North Korea escalating provocations to make the most of the New Cold War confrontation, the South Korean government needs to show a willingness toward international cooperation. Taking the Ukraine crisis as a lesson, it must try to keep the US alliance solid.
But Cheong Wa Dae’s evasive attitude is worrisome in that it may weaken allies’ mutual trust. It is doubtful that South Korea can cope with crises by itself if allies look away or hesitate when an emergency occurs on the Korean Peninsula.
On Russia sanctions, a senior US administration official said: “We announced our first tranche of sanctions in less than a day with Allies and partners from the European Union, from the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and Australia.“ This means that the US had close prior consultations with allies in preparing sanctions. South Korea was not mentioned.
President Moon Jae-in presided over a meeting on national security and economic strategy on Tuesday, but he did not denounce Russia’s invasion directly. He said the United States and Western countries condemned Russia’s actions and that they are preparing sanctions. He sounded like a stranger. On whether to join sanctions, he said there remains a possibility.
He said the government must try not to let the Ukraine situation hinder its efforts to activate the peace process for the Korean Peninsula. He is still hanging on to plans to declare the end of the Korean War and then sign peace accords. The Moon administration has cried out for peace almost blindly. But the peace in mind North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has is different from what people think of. He talked peace as a means to demand the easing of sanctions.
Peace is a value that must be pursued, but the Ukraine crisis showed that peace is not necessarily kept on an international stage just by asserting peace. Peace not buttressed with power is nothing but a sand castle.
North Korea and China are watching attentively how the United States and its allies including South Korea will respond to Russia’s actions on Ukraine. Moon’s passivity on going together with allies will lower their confidence in South Korea. There are no rules that a similar crisis facing Ukraine will not befall South Korea, if the US alliance reels under distrust.
12. Book Review: “North Korean Nuclear Funding Sources: A Secret Record of ‘UN Investigations’”
Book Review: “North Korean Nuclear Funding Sources: A Secret Record of ‘UN Investigations’”
北朝鮮核の資金源：「国連操作」秘録 (Kitachosen kaku no shikingen: ‘Kokuren sosa’ hiroku[1])
By Katsuhisa Furukawa. Shinchosha, 2017. 463 pp.[2]
Japanese Cover of “North Korean Nuclear Funding Sources: A Secret Record of ‘UN Investigations'” by Katsuhisa Furukawa.
How has the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), in the face of more than a decade of multilateral United Nations (UN) sanctions against entities and individuals of the Pyongyang regime, as well as sanctions levied unilaterally by a number of the world’s major powers, made advances over the years in developing nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic materials (ICBMs) capable of striking the continental United States? Katsuhisa Furukawa, a former UN employee and the author of this book, writes that numerous loopholes have allowed Pyongyang to progress in developing nuclear weapons. As the title suggests, Furukawa offers readers his insider’s view of the difficulties encountered in investigating violations of these sanctions.
Author’s Background
Born in Singapore in 1966, Katsuhisa Furukawa earned a bachelor’s degree in economics at Japan’s prestigious Keio University in 1990, a master’s in international security policy from Harvard University’s Kennedy School in 1998 and a doctoral degree in international relations in 2012 from the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo. He has worked in the United States as a researcher at the American Enterprise Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. He returned to Japan to work at the Research Institute of Science and Technology for Society (RISTEX) from 2004 to 2011, and then for the next five years worked at the United Nations Headquarters as a member of the Panel of Experts (PoE), which was established in 2009 for matters pertaining to sanctions against the DPRK. After working at the United Nations, Furukawa joined the Open Nuclear Network (ONN) of the One Earth Future Foundation. He has been the recipient of his publisher’s Shincho Documentary Prize (2018) and the Fujisankei Communication Group’s Seiron Award (2020).[3]
Political Considerations
The UN Security Council’s PoE, which Furukawa was a member of, is comprised of a coordinator and seven members with one from each of the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). It was established to conduct investigations and submit reports pursuant to the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee.[4] Furukawa describes Beijing and Moscow as being reluctant to impose sanctions on Pyongyang, uncooperative in responding to the PoE’s requests for information on DPRK activities in their countries, and in implementing UN sanctions. He writes that in regard to a PoE investigation of the network of companies tied to the DPRK’s Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) in China, Beijing would not provide even a single photograph or passport number of any of the Chinese nationals suspected of violating sanctions (144). Beijing’s insistence on the “One China” policy also hindered investigations by precluding the PoE from officially approaching Taipei for information. Russia, according to the author, was uncooperative and tended to accuse the PoE of conducting investigations “beyond its authority” (218). At one point, Furukawa details how China and Russia permitted a shipping company that had been reported to the Security Council to continue business in their countries because Pyongyang changed the names of the ships and re-registered them to new companies (367-371).
Furukawa portrays panel members acting less as employees of an international organization than as agents of their respective countries. He saw himself and his activist colleagues from the United States, Britain, France and the ROK as being pitted against the obstructionist Chinese and Russian members. The author writes that apart from Tokyo, the relative lack of ardor from within the activist camp for vigorously enforcing the ban against luxury goods for Pyongyang “affected” the PoE’s efforts in that regard (33). Furukawa recalls rushing back to New York in June 2012, in possession of inside information obtained in Tokyo. He called together only three other trusted colleagues, excluding the Chinese and Russian members of the PoE, for a confidential meeting on the rooftop of UN Headquarters to brief them and ask for their cooperation in plotting a course of action (64).[5]
Targets of Investigation, Sources of Concern
In his book, Furukawa writes at length of various cases he handled, the majority of which were tied to the DPRK’s KOMID, Green Pine Associated Corporation, Ocean Maritime Management Co., Ltd. (OMM) and the myriad of associated front companies around the world involved in the banned export and import of items linked to Pyongyang’s development of nuclear weapons. Trade in chemical and conventional weapons—from items linked to chemical weapons going to Syria to Soviet-era conventional arms “sweeping” the Middle East and Africa—were also targets of his investigations. Furukawa traveled the globe in pursuit of information, seeking details on the local North Korean connection from a general in Ethiopia, examining documents in the detained cargo ship Mudubong (Mu Du Bong) in Mexico and entering a building in Malaysia in search of a Glocom office.
In addition to the cargoes shipped in and out of DPRK ports, the author also writes of his concern regarding Pyongyang’s acquisition of knowledge applicable to WMD programs. Furukawa notes with some alarm that Pyongyang has gathered technical information over the years by sending people to the following: Russia’s Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR); the library of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria; India’s Center for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific (CSSTEAP); and advanced studies for graduate students at universities in China and Europe.
Furukawa also points with concern to what he sees as Japan’s lack of a proper legal framework for acting against violations of sanctions (88). The author points to the perennial problem of “stovepiping” in the Japanese government, weak in inter-agency coordination and top-down direction. In one example, he contrasts the ability of other governments to send unified delegations to the United Nations with the disarray he perceived in his country’s own government. One telling moment for the author was when Tokyo, having vigorously lobbied Mexico City against releasing the detained Mudubong, later lets go a suspect North Korean ship from a Japanese port for lack of a legal basis for freezing the assets of sanctions violators (376).
Adding Flesh to the Bone, Exploiting Sources and Methods
In his book, Furukawa provides readers a lively account of his work at the United Nations, adding flesh to the bone for findings published earlier in the PoE’s annual reports to the Security Council.[6] Writing for a general audience, the author sets scenes at the start of chapters and subsections with such openers as Chapter 1’s “October 2011: New York” and Chapter 13’s “A certain day, July 2014: A PoE colleague suddenly whispered the following to me.”[7] Furukawa shares his highs and lows in dealing with governments and colleagues, writes of ailments and exhaustion that beset him due to working overtime, takes readers on overseas investigations and names Manhattan Japanese restaurants where he dined. Colorful passages include the one in which he and his French PoE colleague “dissect” a Soviet SCUD missile at the Military Vehicle Technology Foundation in California to compare its parts to those found in the cargo of a detained ship (177). With such writing, the author turns the often-dry topic of sanctions into a rousing tale of one man’s efforts against North Korea’s development of nuclear-tipped ICBMs.
Since the PoE’s findings appear each year as public reports to the UN Security Council, the author’s references to exploiting sources and methods are of particular relevance. Early in the book, Furukawa declares that open sources of information accounted for ninety percent of the facts gathered in his investigations (34).[8] For the next 400 pages, he identifies a great many of them. He consistently references back to investigations in Japanese newspapers and television, and to the media-connected Asian Affairs Research Council. In his investigations, he discovered that corporate and organization websites pointed to suspect enterprises and sanctioned activities. Facebook and YouTube also proved to be fonts of information.
In his investigations of North Korean networks, Furukawa points to the vexing problems that foreign languages pose. For example, the author suggests that a company in North Korea’s network that reported the export of goods from Japan to a “Namcheongang Trading Corporation,” whose name closely resembles that of the sanctioned Namchongang Trading Corporation, may have been practicing deception (147). He writes that changing the spelling of a company’s name is a common DPRK tactic to evade sanctions. However, the change of a letter may have to do with the ROK’s official transliteration system, which renders ”Namchongang” as “Namcheongang” (남천강). In another investigation that Furukawa conducted, in which he failed to communicate by telephone with a local employee of the Taiwan branch of a Japanese corporation, the author reflects on the language barrier and imagines that “a rather different world would be visible” to him if he could only use Chinese in his investigations (231). According to him, one problem involving Chinese is that the DPRK’s Korea Millim Technology Corporation, for example, which operates in China, does not have an English version of its name, whereas the United States and other Western countries only release the names of Korean persons and entities in English (240).[9]
Weak and Strong Points
The book was published for a general audience, written in a lively writing style and packed with personal anecdotes. However, because of this, it falls short in presenting evidence, as the author is often short on details. For example, Furukawa vaguely describes, but does not identify, the group of visitors to Tokyo’s Big Sight for the 2010 Japan International Machine Tool Fair (JIMTOF)—one of the world’s foremost exhibitions of advanced machine tool technology. This lack of information is significant because the members of this group, while residents in Japan, gathered scientific and technological information to contribute to the DPRK’s development (215-216). In a book with multiple references to Pyongyang’s Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), one entire page is given over to an organization chart that links Green Pine Associated Corporation, which is at the bottom of the chart, to Kim Jong Un, “supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army,” who is at the top of the chart, via the RGB (83). However, no source of information is ever given for this chart. In yet another example, the author notes that Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation continued to advertise its wares “in multiple languages” even after its designation for sanctions in January 2013, without divulging where he saw those advertisements.[10] Whether details were scrubbed in the editorial and presumably a legal review process is unclear. Moreover, as is common with most Japanese paperbacks published for a general audience, the book has no bibliography, footnotes or index.[11]
The book is particularly short on details involving Japan. Reflecting what is a probable sensitivity on the part of the author and/or his publisher to lawsuits or other problems, the book avoids naming names. For example, Furukawa resorts in various parts of the book to vague terms like: “a certain government,” “the Taiwan branch company of a Japanese company” and Japanese companies “E” and “F.”[12] He also shows discretion in mentioning the actual names of individuals whom he merely describes in some cases as an “acquaintance” or a “friend” who pass him information for his investigations.
A third weak point is that the author is incomplete in his claims and at times, in my opinion, even completely off the mark in a few places. Early in the book, Furukawa posits that Pyongyang embarked on the development of nuclear weapons and missiles as a counter to its “international isolation,” rather than nuclear deterrence as the driving motive (26).[13] Later in the book, the author describes the merit of an imported transporter erector launcher (TEL) with off-road capabilities giving Pyongyang the ability to launch ICBMs in a surprise attack (53). However, he fails to mention that the primary advantage of having such vehicles for a power as weak as the DPRK is the enhanced survivability of its ICBMs against the strikes of a far stronger power, such as the United States or China.[14] Further on in the book, he writes of the “outflow” of information and technology on “advanced machine tools” from Japan to North Korea during the Cold War as if it had been some kind of leak or theft, while neglecting to mention that the DPRK was a prime market for Japanese exports of machine tools and other machinery for much of that era. (216)[15]
- [1]
The title of the book under review here points to a problem that plagues investigations into Pyongyang’s violations of UN sanctions–transliteration. Different transliterations for Korean, Japanese and Chinese names result in confusion. In the book’s Japanese title, the Library of Congress transliterates the name for North Korea as two words, Kita Chosen, whereas the librarians at Columbia University and elsewhere use the single word Kitachosen. Even more confusing are the variations that occur in various countries due to their different transliteration systems for Korean names used in the United States, the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Japan, China and Russia, where DPRK leader Kim Jong Un’s name is transliterated differently in each country’s language.
- [2]
Korean and Japanese names in this review are written in the traditional way, with surnames preceding given names. Korean names are written in Pyongyang’s version of the conventional McCune-Reischauer transliteration system.
- [3]
Furukawa’s curriculum vitae, with the exception of the information on his GRIPS doctoral degree and his work after leaving the United Nations, is on the rear sleeve of the book’s bibliographic information page and its promotional band. Information on his Ph.D. is found via the GRIPS website at www.grips.ac.jp. Regarding the ONN, see the Foundation’s website at https://oneearthfuture.org.
- [4]
The name refers to UN Security Council Resolution 1718, adopted in October 2006 to levy commercial and economic sanctions in response to Pyongyang’s first nuclear test conducted earlier that month.
- [5]
Furukawa writes of choosing the rooftop for that meeting because he believed UN offices to be bugged.
- [6]
- [7]
The translations in this review are my own.
- [8]
Open sources of information are also known as “open sources of intelligence” (OSINT).
- [9]
Korea Millim Technology Corporation (朝鲜密林技术会社 (C), 조선리림기술회사 (K)), another name for Pyongyang’s sanctioned Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation, illustrates the problem of tracking Korean persons and entities across borders. A researcher literate in Chinese may, without context, translate it from that language as Korea Milin Technology Corporation. Other researchers and analysts without knowledge of Chinese or Korean, may then mistake the two transliterations of that one entity for two different companies.
- [10]
He is almost certainly referring to the journal Foreign Trade of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, published quarterly in English, Chinese, Japanese, French, Russian and Spanish.
- [11]
A common preference of Japanese publishers.
- [12]
Despite the arrest and public trials of executives from companies “E” and “F,” Furukawa (or his publisher) refrains from identifying them. The book also includes references to unidentified Japanese companies “A” through “D.”
- [13]
Pyongyang’s nuclear program began in the 1950s, following Washington’s threat to use nuclear weapons to end the Korean War. By the 1960s, Pyongyang was showing clear interest in developing its own nuclear deterrent. This was demonstrated when a visiting delegation from Pyongyang made a request in 1964 that Beijing share its data for building a bomb. Pyongyang engaged in all this activity throughout the Cold War, when, as a member of the Communist Bloc and the international Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), it was far from existing in a state of “international isolation,” as Furukawa puts it. See Joel S. Wit et al., Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2005, paperback edition), 1-6. For another source, see Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea (Oxford University Press, 2013), 146-149.
- [14]
- [15]
In 1968, North Korea was the sixth largest foreign market for exports of Japanese machine tools. See Ha Sin Gi, Shogen: “Kita” bijinesu ura gaiko; Kin Seinichi to Inayama Yoshihiro, Koizumi, Kanemaru wo tsunagu mono [Testimony: The Back-Door Diplomacy of Business with the “North”; What Connects Kim Jong Il With Yoshihiro Inayama, Koizumi, and Kanemaru] (Kodansha, 2008), 114.
13. South Korea bets on home-grown missile defence system to replace US-made THAAD that angered China
I am not sure the ROK's system will "replace" THAAD. But the bottom line is the South needs an integrated air and missile defense system. THAAD or a similar system is but one capability.
South Korea bets on home-grown missile defence system to replace US-made THAAD that angered China
- The launch of a long-range surface-to-air missile interceptor is seen as an alternative to the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence system that earlier earned Beijing’s wrath
- It comes amid opposition presidential front runner Yoon Suk-yeol’s push to ‘buy’ and deploy the expensive US-built anti-missile shield near Seoul
+ FOLLOW
Published: 2:27pm, 24 Feb, 2022
South Korea successfully test-fired a long-range missile interceptor that could potentially replace an expensive US missile defence system installed in 2017 which triggered China’s wrath.
The state-run Agency for Defence Development launched the long-range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM) on Wednesday from a testing site in Taean, 150km southwest of Seoul, Yonhap reported.
The interceptor’s development came amid a recent barrage of North Korean ballistic missile tests and call by South Korea’s opposition presidential front runner Yoon Suk-yeol for further deployment of the US-built Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system near the Seoul metropolitan area to defend the capital from its nuclear-armed neighbour.
China, which sees the THAAD as a direct threat to its own security, retaliated economically against South Korea when it deployed the missile shield in Seongju, some 180km southeast of Seoul, five years ago.
Yoon, the People Power Party’s candidate, said he plans to “buy” the system from the US if elected to the top post in the March 9 election.
Each THAAD unit, containing six-nine launch vehicles and loaded with eight interceptors, reportedly costs an estimated US$3 billion.
“This is good news for South Korea as L-SAM may serve the same purpose as THAAD, which is intended to intercept middle and long-range missiles,” said Kim Jung-sup, a defence expert at the Sejong Institute.
Kim said the new system, which can target incoming missiles at altitudes of around 50-60km, could be rolled out by 2028.
South Korea’s defence ministry declined to confirm Wednesday’s test launch.
“The costs to develop and deploy the new missile defence system will be much cheaper than the THAAD and it will take a lot less time to put them in place as well,” Kim said, adding that procurement bottlenecks, including parliamentary screening and negotiations with the US provider, could delay the process which took eight years for the United Arab Emirates before it put the anti-missile battery in place in 2016.
Lee Jae-myung from the ruling Democratic Party shot down his rival Yoon’s proposal, saying defending Seoul, which lies only 24km from the nearest point from the border with the North, using the THAAD system is “impractical.”
Lee, who denied he is soft on Pyongyang, said the South has technology and resources to build its own missile defence that can deter the hermit kingdom.
Seoul will also seek technical cooperation from the US to assemble nuclear-powered submarines, he added.
The L-SAM is a “cutting-edge indigenous weapon system” currently under development to defend against missiles or other high-flying threats, according to South Korea’s Agency for Defence Development.
The L-SAM is designed to be part of a “layered defence network” that already includes US-made Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missiles and locally produced Cheongung II KM-SAM medium-range weapons, capable of intercepting targets at varying altitudes and ranges.
The US-built THAAD missile defence system installed at a golf course in Seongju, South Korea. File photo: Yonhap via AP
Seoul plans to produce a US$2.6 billion artillery interception system, similar to Israel’s “Iron Dome”, designed to protect against North Korea’s arsenal of long-range guns and rockets.
South Korea is looking as well into exporting some of its latest missile interceptors. It signed its largest defence sale ever in January with the export of KM-SAM to the UAE in a deal valued at around US$3.5 billion.
Additional reporting by Reuters
+ FOLLOW
Park Chan-kyong is a South Korean journalist who has worked for the Agence France-Presse Seoul bureau for 35 years. He is now working for the South China Morning Post. He studied political science at Korea University and economics at the Yonsei University Graduate School.
14. Why South Korea’s outgoing president is less unpopular than most
"less unpopular." Interesting analysis.
Why South Korea’s outgoing president is less unpopular than most
Under Moon Jae-in the country has weathered covid-19 and acquired global cultural heft
Feb 26th 2022
SEOUL
JUDGED AGAINST his own high standards Moon Jae-in, South Korea’s outgoing president, is a failure. He took office in May 2017 in a snap election after Park Geun-hye, his predecessor, had been jailed for corruption and abuse of power. There had been months of protests against Ms Park and the discredited political class; Mr Moon campaigned on a platform of social, political and economic renewal. He promised to end the cosy links between politics and big business and create an egalitarian economy. He would move the president’s office from the leafy outskirts to central Seoul, be in constant dialogue with citizens and end self-dealing and partisan strife. Moreover, he would bring an era of peace to the Korean peninsula by making overtures to Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s dictator.
With just over two months left of Mr Moon’s single five-year term, none of this has come to pass. The president remains ensconced in his palace in Seoul’s northern hills. He has pardoned Ms Park and paroled Lee Jae-yong, the heir of the Samsung empire, from whom she accepted bribes. Other leaders of conglomerates have been reassured of their firms’ central place in the economy. Ordinary citizens are struggling with unaffordable housing and a continuing shortage of jobs for the young. Partisan squabbling and mudslinging endure; indeed, they dominate the campaign to elect Mr Moon’s successor. North Korea, meanwhile, has expanded its arsenal of missiles and nuclear warheads and blown up the North-South liaison office in the demilitarised zone between the two Koreas.
Yet when it comes to how Mr Moon is likely to be remembered, all this may matter less than it first appears to. South Korea has weathered the covid-19 pandemic more successfully than any other rich country, at least partly thanks to his government. Mr Moon’s tenure also coincided with a huge jump in South Korea’s global cultural clout. And he has, in a quiet way, strengthened his country’s still-young democracy and begun to make life a little less stressful for its people. All that explains why he is likely to leave office as the most popular president in South Korea’s democratic history. Depending on the pollster and the type of survey, between two-fifths and just under half of all voters say they approve of the president, though less than a third say the same of his party.
Mr Moon is likely to be remembered chiefly for the way he shepherded South Korea through the pandemic. Although it is currently suffering a surge in covid-19 infections from the Omicron variant, it still has the second-lowest number (after New Zealand) of confirmed deaths from the disease relative to population of any country in the OECD, a club mostly of rich countries. Two years in, South Koreans are chafing under ongoing curfews and social-distancing rules, but they have not had to endure lockdowns or overwhelmed hospitals. Nor has the country’s economy suffered on the same scale as much of the world. GDP returned to pre-pandemic levels early last year, grew by 4% in 2021 and is predicted to grow by 3% in 2022.
That was not Mr Moon’s achievement alone. Reforms to public-health systems after a disastrous outbreak of MERS in 2015 help explain the bureaucracy’s nimble response to the pandemic. South Korea set up testing, tracing and isolation systems much faster than other rich countries. It helped that its highly automated semiconductor factories were less susceptible to disruption by covid-19 outbreaks than other industries were.
But Mr Moon set the train in motion when he called emergency meetings in January 2020 to persuade companies to speed up production of test kits. His decision to remain in the background of public-health management probably helped earn bipartisan support for the measures the authorities imposed. It has been maintained, and is reflected in ubiquitous mask-wearing and a vaccination rate of 86% of the population, one of the world’s highest. The legislative supermajority his party won in the elections to the National Assembly in 2020 helped the government swiftly dole out generous pandemic relief, minimising economic disruption.
That victory also allowed Mr Moon to advance another goal: to improve the work-life balance of overworked South Koreans. Before the pandemic, a reduction in working hours for employees at large companies had already led to increased spare time and fewer after-work dinners with the boss. More generous parental leave had encouraged more fathers to spend time with their children. Since then, the curbs on working hours have been extended to smaller companies. Budgets for parental leave and child care have been boosted.
Companies still have some catching up to do to accommodate these new habits. And the president’s commitment to improving life has waned at times: he has done little, for instance, to push his party to adopt fast-changing social mores on such matters as gay marriage and discrimination on grounds of sex, sexual orientation or health. Prominent political associates of the president have been embroiled in sexual-abuse scandals. Little by little, however, Mr Moon’s policies have been chipping away at a culture that puts work above all else.
The parliamentary supermajority also helped Mr Moon fulfil his promise to strengthen South Korean democracy. He curbed the power of the public prosecutor’s office by diverting some of its powers to other agencies. Supporters hope that the reforms will strengthen oversight of powerful government agencies and break the culture of politically motivated prosecutions that has bedevilled the presidency. All Mr Moon’s democratically elected predecessors have found themselves subject to corruption investigations after leaving office. Yoon Seok-youl, Mr Moon’s former chief prosecutor and now the conservative candidate for president, has threatened to go after his former boss if he wins the election. If he does, the result will be a test not just of Mr Moon’s probity, but also of the resilience of his reforms.
The changes wrought by Mr Moon have been mirrored in a development for which he is cannot claim credit, but for which he will probably be remembered as well: South Korea’s rise as an exporter of pop culture. BTS and Blackpink are the world’s most popular boy band and girl band respectively. Bong Joon-ho, who was one of thousands of artists and intellectuals blacklisted by Ms Park for his left-wing views, won a Best Picture Oscar for “Parasite”, a dark satire about inequality. “Squid Game”, a gory television show directed by Hwang Dong-hyuk, also offering a crude critique of capitalism, topped the Netflix charts and produced countless memes now lodged in the global imagination. That both directors are now treated as national icons rather than enemies of the state suggests South Korea’s democracy has indeed grown stronger under Mr Moon. That both shows depict a world hopelessly stacked against the little guy suggests that Mr Moon’s promised egalitarian revolution still has a long way to go. ■
This article appeared in the Asia section of the print edition under the headline "K-popular"
15. N.Korean Defector Gets PhD on U.S. Scholarship
N.Korean Defector Gets PhD on U.S. Scholarship
February 25, 2022 12:06
A defector from North Korea has obtained a doctorate from a U.S. university on a Fulbright scholarship.
Kim Seong-ryeol (37) recently earned his PhD in international relations from Syracuse University, the first of four North Korean defectors on doctoral courses on the scholarship to complete his thesis.
Kim Seong-ryeol
Kim told Voice of America on Wednesday that he wants North Korean defectors to look beyond their home country and broaden their horizons.
"Young defectors do not know much about democracy or free market values because they were not taught about them when they were in the North," he said. "I feel so privileged to be able to study in the U.S. on a Fulbright scholarship."
A native of Chongjin in North Hamgyong Province, Kim dropped out of middle school when he was in seventh grade to help his mother sell wheat flour because his family was poor. His family crossed the border to China in 1997, only to be caught and sent back to the North. They fled again in 2004, when he was 19, and finally settled in South Korea.
In South Korea he had to go back to school and then studied at Handong Global University and obtained a master's degree in Korean unification studies from Yonsei University.
The number of defectors from North Korea who gain American university degrees is increasing, VOA reported.
Two young defectors living in South Korea have landed a Fulbright scholarship this year, bringing the total to 15. Five defectors won the scholarship in 2018, four in 2019, one in 2020, and three last year.
- Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
