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Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"If you do not have the power to close the skies, then give me planes.” 
-President Volodymyr Zelensky

"Let us be firm, pure and faithful; at the end of our sorrow, there is the greatest glory of the world, that of the men who did not give in." 
- Charles de Gaulle

"Neither a wise man nor a brave man lies down on the tracks of history to wait for the train of the future to run over him."
-Dwight D. Eisenhower


1. UKRAINE CONFLICT UPDATE 14
2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 3
3. What Putin’s Nuclear Threats Mean for the U.S.
4. Putin Thought Ukraine Would Fall Quickly. An Airport Battle Proved Him Wrong.
5. Russian troops may soon be fighting Ukrainian special operators with years of secretive training from the US
6. "Wanted: Dead or Alive": Russian Tycoon Puts $1M Bounty on Putin's Head
7. Top Russian general is killed by Ukrainian sniper as Kyiv claims 9,000 of Putin’s troops have died during invasion
8. How Ukraine is winning the propaganda war
9. Ukraine Conflict Update - March 4, 2022 | SOF News
10. RT America ceases productions and lays off most of its staff
11. False Claims of U.S. Biowarfare Labs in Ukraine Grip QAnon
12.  EXPLAINER: How dangerous was Russia's nuclear plant strike?
13. Putin and his band of dictators: Russia is supported by four regimes in UN vote
14. The U.S. Is Not at War, But Its Civil Society Is Mobilizing Against Russia
15. Fire out at Ukraine nuclear plant after Russian attack, no radiation released
16. Lviv is turning its factories into improvised weapon centers
17. Opinion | I’ve Dealt With Foreign Cyberattacks. America Isn’t Ready for What’s Coming.
18. Russia blocks access to BBC and Voice of America websites
19. The Dangerous Allure of the No-Fly Zone
20. China’s Strategic Assessment of Russia: More Complicated Than You Think
21. The War in Ukraine Is Keeping Chinese Social Media Censors Busy
22. Ukraine a Case for Hypocrisy and Political Diversion?
23. FDD | Iran Approaches the Nuclear Threshold
24.  Erdogan’s Balancing Act Between Russia and Ukraine
25. Accommodating Iran Will Be No More Successful Than Accommodating Russia
26. US, Russia Agree to Deconfliction Hotline As Putin’s Attack On Ukraine Escalates
27. Opinion: The world’s fault lines show in response to Russian invasion of Ukraine
28. Putin’s war, as seen in Russia: Protests, arrests and alternate reality
29. China seeks to unify public in support for Russia
30. Russia should be cut off from the world and treated like North Korea
31. International Cat Federation bans Russian cats from competitions




1. UKRAINE CONFLICT UPDATE 14

UKRAINE CONFLICT UPDATE 14
Mar 3, 2022 - Press ISW
Institute for the Study of War, Russia Team
with the Critical Threats Project, AEI
March 3, 2022
ISW published its most recent Russian campaign assessment at 4:00 pm EST on March 3.
This daily synthetic product covers key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine.
Key Takeaways March 3
  • Russian forces opened a new line of advance from Belarus south toward Zhytomyr Oblast, west of Kyiv, as Russian forces attempting to encircle Kyiv from the northwest were driven further west by determined Ukrainian resistance and counterattacks. Russian forces will struggle to complete an encirclement of Kyiv at all if they have to advance along ring roads as far from the city center as those they are now using.
  • Russian forces on the east bank of the Dnipro River remain unable to secure the important town of Chernihiv or to break through Ukrainian defenses in the northeastern outskirts of Kyiv.
  • Russian ground forces have remained relatively static near Kharkiv as Russian artillery, air, and missile bombardments wreak devastation in the city, though the Ukrainian military indicates that a regiment-sized Russian formation will try to envelop or bypass Kharkiv in the coming days.
  • Russian forces are attempting once again to open a line of advance through northern Luhansk Oblast, possibly to assist efforts at Kharkiv or, as the Ukrainian General Staff assesses, to drive on Dnipro and Zaprozhya. The Russian forces currently reported as engaging in that drive are far too small to attack either city successfully and are probably insufficient to sustain a long drive on their own.
  • Russian troops have surrounded Mariupol and are attacking it brutally to compel its capitulation or destroy it.
  • The mayor of Kherson conditionally surrendered to the Russians, allowing Russian forces to renew their advance on Mykolayiv. The Ukrainian military nevertheless reportedly defeated an attempted Russian air assault to take an airfield near Mykolayiv.
  • The Kremlin escalated domestic censorship of Ukraine coverage and accused Western platforms of launching disinformation campaigns.
  • Sweden and Finland are increasing cooperation with each other and NATO and may consider NATO membership due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
  • Georgia and Moldova officially applied to join the European Union.
  • Western intelligence sources reported that Chinese President Xi Jinping had prior knowledge of the Russian invasion and asked Russia to delay operations until after the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics.
Key Events March 2, 4:00 pm EST – March 3, 4:00 pm EST
Military Events:
The Russian military has continued its unsuccessful attempts to encircle Kyiv and capture Kharkiv. The Russians continued to attack piecemeal, committing a few battalion tactical groups at a time rather than concentrating overwhelming force to achieve decisive effects. Russian commanders appear to prefer opening up new lines of advance for regiment-sized operations but have been unable to achieve meaningful synergies between efforts along different axes toward the same objectives. They have also continued conducting operations in southern Ukraine along three diverging axes rather than concentrating on one or attempting mutually supporting efforts. These failures of basic operational art—long a strong suit of the Soviet military and heavily studied at Russian military academies—remain inexplicable as does the Russian military’s failure to gain air superiority or at least to ground the Ukrainian Air Force. The Russian conventional military continues to underperform badly, although it may still wear down and defeat the conventional Ukrainian military by sheer force of numbers and brutality. Initial indications that Russia is mobilizing reinforcements from as far away as the Pacific Ocean are concerning in this respect. Those indications also suggest, however, that the Russian General Staff has concluded that the forces it initially concentrated for the invasion of Ukraine will be insufficient to achieve Moscow’s military objectives.
Operations to envelop Kyiv remain Russia’s main effort. Russian troops are also continuing three supporting efforts, one to seize Kharkiv, one to take Mariupol and secure the “land bridge” connecting Rostov-on-Don to Crimea, and one to secure Kherson and set conditions for a drive west toward Mykolayiv and Odesa.
The Russian attack on Kyiv likely consists of a main effort aimed at enveloping and ultimately encircling the city from the west and a supporting effort along the axes from Chernihiv and Sumy to encircle it from the east.
Russian forces in the south resumed offensive operations toward Mykolayiv on March 3 after securing Kherson on March 2, but do not appear to pose an imminent danger to Odesa. Russian forces likely seek to force Mariupol to capitulate by destroying critical civilian infrastructure and killing civilians to create a humanitarian catastrophe—an approach Russian forces have repeatedly taken in Syria.
Russian forces are engaged in four primary efforts at this time:
1) Main effort—Kyiv; Russian operations on the Kyiv axis consist of a main effort aimed at enveloping and ultimately encircling the city from the west and supporting efforts along the Chernihiv and Sumy axes to encircle it from the northeast and east. Russia has not achieved air superiority over Ukraine as of March 3. Russia is likely mobilizing reinforcements to support its existing axis against Kyiv from the northwest. Russian forces did not attempt assaults on the cities of Chernihiv or Sumy on March 3, instead bypassing the city to advance on the outskirts of Kyiv.
2) Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv: Russian forces will likely attempt to encircle Kharkiv in the next 24-48 hours but may not succeed with the forces they are committing to the operation. Russian forces likely seek to encircle and bypass Kharkiv before bombarding it to force a capitulation.
3) Supporting effort 2—Mariupol: Russian forces fully encircled Mariupol as of March 2 and are conducting a deliberate campaign to destroy critical civilian infrastructure and residential areas in a likely attempt to force the city to surrender.
4) Supporting effort 3—Kherson and advances westward: Russian forces secured a negotiated surrender of Kherson on March 2 and continued advances toward Mykolayiv on March 3, including a failed airborne landing. Russian forces will likely struggle to fully resource three simultaneous lines of effort from Crimea—Mikoayiv, Zaporizhya, and Mariupol. Russian forces have not made territorial advances towards Zaporizhya since March 1.
Russian Activity
The Kremlin increased legal penalties for spreading what the Kremlin claims is false information about Russia’s war in Ukraine, forced key liberal Russian media outlets offline, and limited domestic access to non-Russian-controlled social media on March 3. A Russian State Duma (Parliament) Committee approved an amendment to Russia’s existing law against spreading false information about the Armed Forces on March 3 to imprison any person “spreading fakes” about the Russian military and its operations for 10 to 15 years.[1] State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin called for Russia to adopt a law criminalizing false information about the Russian Armed Forces and to combat disinformation campaigns allegedly targeting Russia on Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube on March 3.[2] Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova baselessly alleged that the BBC has undermined Russia’s domestic security; Russia may attempt to ban BBC coverage in Russia to retaliate for the EU‘s ban of the Russian state-run RT and Sputnik.[3] The Russian Prosecutor General’s Office stated that outlets promoting “supposedly peaceful anti-war actions” are banned in Russia due to their “connections with extremist activities” on March 3.[4] The Prosecutor General’s Office also announced it will begin investigations on allegedly extremist platforms and their calls for Russian citizens to protest Russian actions in Ukraine on March 3.[5]
The Kremlin is increasingly limiting Russia’s domestic information space to include only Kremlin propaganda. The board of Russia’s last liberal, publicly broadcast radio station, Echo Moskvy, closed the radio station on March 3 to avoid prosecution.[6] Russian censoring body Roskomnadzor previously forced Echo Moskvy off the air on March 1, falsely claiming the station promoted extremist activities and published false information about the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[7] Roskomnadzor also demanded that Google block “false information” YouTube ads targeting Russia and remove the “foreign” media outlet Dozhd’s online TV channel for promoting disinformation on March 3.[8] Dozhd General Director Natalia Sindeeva announced on March 3 that Dozhd will “temporarily stop” its operations but assured that the channel plans to return to the air.[9]
The Kremlin is also attempting to limit Russian domestic usage of Western social media platforms. Russian state officials and social media experts accused Facebook of launching a disinformation campaign against Russia and suggested that Russian-owned Telegram and VKontakte are among the suitable alternatives for Russian citizens.[10] Russian social media network MirTesen claimed it tripled its userbase as Russian censoring body Roskomnadzor restricted and slowed access to Western platforms.[11] The United States condemned Russia’s censorship on March 3 for blocking Russian citizens from witnessing the human costs of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[12]
Kremlin officials continued to frame the invasion of Ukraine as a necessary and successful “limited operation” to protect Donetsk and Luhansk and obfuscated the true extent of Russian losses on March 3. Russian President Vladimir Putin told Russia’s national security council that his “special military operation” is on schedule and going according to plan.[13] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov expressed their full confidence that Russia will complete its objectives in Ukraine and claimed that “a solution to the situation around Ukraine will definitely be found, and the Western hysteria will pass.”[14] The Kremlin reiterated that the objective of its “limited operation” is to restore the borders of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) to the full extent of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, premised on the “self-determination” of DNR and LNR residents.[15] The Kremlin cited a UN “arms expert” who stated that the Ukrainian military has no chance against Russian forces.[16] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov warned against “hoaxes” that misrepresent Russian casualty numbers.[17]
Russia rejected US attempts to ease nuclear tensions with Russia and Belarus on March 3 and continued to paint the United States as the aggressor in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The United States canceled a test launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) on March 2.[18] Department of Defense spokesperson John Kirby stated the United States has “no intention of engaging in any actions that can be misunderstood or misconstrued.”[19] The United States warned Russia and Belarus against deploying nuclear arms in Belarus during a UN arms control meeting on March 3.[20] US envoy Aud-Frances McKernan told the Conference on Disarmament that “any movement of Russian nuclear weapons into Belarus would be dangerously provocative and further destabilize the region.”[21]
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that it is NATO, not Russia, that presents a risk of nuclear war on March 3.[22] Lavrov would not rule out the possibility of the United States launching an attack against Russia and claimed that the United States is acting like Napolean and Hitler towards "European countries.”[23] Lavrov stated Russia is not considering a nuclear deployment but that the West is continuing to escalate concerns and ”go crazy” over Russian nuclear capabilities.[24] Russian State Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin claimed that if Russia had not launched its operation in Ukraine, ”literally the next day the operation would have started from NATO, but only by the hands of neo-Nazis of Ukraine.”[25] Volodin also claimed that the Russian operation has saved hundreds of thousands of lives. Multiple Russian media outlets reported that Russia is finally retaliating after years of the United States humiliating Russia.[26] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov said that Russia’s relations with the West will improve after having reached rock bottom, but that such an improvement would require US initiative.[27]
Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied Ukrainian claims that Russia is preparing for martial law on March 3.[28] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Mikhail Podolyak claimed earlier on March 3 that the Russian Duma will meet to discuss implementing martial law on March 4.[29] Peskov also rejected reports that Russia plans to restrict all men from leaving the country.[30] Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Ryabkov stated on March 3 that the Foreign Ministry is working in crisis mode after the West imposed harsh sanctions against Russia.[31] Some Russian men received conscription letters or orders to appear at Russian military enlistment centers on March 3; lawyers stated that these letters and orders do not have legal authority and warned that those who appear to the enlistment centers may be forced to sign a legal summons or short-term contract for military service under false pretenses.[32]
Belarusian Activity
N/A
Ukrainian Activity
Ukrainian and Russian negotiators agreed on the potential future establishment of humanitarian corridors but did not reach a ceasefire agreement during their second round of negotiations in Belarus on March 3. Head Russian negotiator Vladimir Medinsky stated the two parties agreed on the possibility of creating humanitarian corridors to facilitate civilian evacuation and food and medical supply delivery.[33] The establishment of corridors includes the potential for a ceasefire in the agreed-upon areas during civilian evacuations.[34] Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak stated that the objectives of the Ukrainian delegation were to achieve an immediate ceasefire, an armistice, and humanitarian corridors, but that the Ukrainian delegation did not get the results they wanted.[35] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky maintained that he is ready to discuss all issues with Putin directly, including the status of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.[36] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov outlined additional demands for the negotiations and stated that the agreement “must include a clause on the elimination of weapons that threaten Belarus,” likely setting conditions to demand the “demilitarization” of Ukraine.[37]
Ukraine and the international community called on Russia to implement nuclear fallout prevention measures on March 3. The Ukrainian Energy Ministry called on NATO to enforce a no-fly zone over nuclear power plants and ask Russia to agree to a ceasefire that would prevent Russian ground forces from moving within 30 kilometers of a nuclear power plant.[38] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) called on Russia to let Ukraine control its nuclear facilities on March 3. Russian IAEA Envoy Mikhail Ulyanov called the IAEA resolution full of “politically motivated lies,” indicating that the Kremlin may not agree to proposed nuclear fallout mitigation measures that involve ongoing Ukrainian control of nuclear facilities.[39] Ukraine’s nuclear agency said that it still controls the Zaporizhzhia nuclear powerplant as of March 3 despite encroaching Russian forces and shelling in nearby towns.[40]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that the first of 16,000 expected foreign volunteer fighters began arriving in Ukraine on March 3.[41] Numerous outlets reported that small numbers of Japanese, US, French, and UK volunteers are among the foreign fighters, as well as many citizens from former Soviet states.[42]
Military Support to Ukraine
NATO and EU countries provided additional lethal defense equipment and humanitarian aid to Ukraine on March 3.[43]
Germany announced on March 3 it will add 2,700 anti-aircraft Strela rockets to its next arms shipment to Ukraine.[44] German Chancellor Olaf Scholz also approved the export of German-origin weapons from the Netherlands and Estonia to Ukraine.
  • Spain is sending 1,370 anti-tank grenade launchers, an unspecified number of light machine guns, and 700,000 rounds of ammunition as part of its first arms shipment to Ukraine on March 4.[45]
  • Norway delivered 2,000 M72 anti-tank launchers to Ukraine on March 3.[46]
  • Canadian Defense Minister Anita Anand said on March 3 that Canada will send up to 4,500 M72 rocket launchers and up to 7,500 hand grenades to Ukraine.[47]
  • The White House asked Congress on March 2 to approve $10 billion in lethal and humanitarian aid for Ukraine as part of a $32.5 billion emergency funding request.[48]
  • A deputy Turkish foreign minister described Turkish drone shipments to Ukraine as “private sales,” not “military aid,” on March 3. Turkey is attempting to balance its relationships with both Russia and Ukraine.[49]
Sanctions and Economic Activity
Japan joined sanctions targeting Russian and Belarusian businessmen and trade as EU and NATO countries prepared to remove Russia and Belarus’ most-favored nation status. Calls to ban Russian and Belarusian banks from SWIFT and for the US to ban oil imports grew.
Japan sanctioned Russian businessmen and Belarusian officials on March 3.[50] Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida stated that Japan will freeze the assets of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, other key government officials, and wealthy businessmen. Kishida said Japan will ban financial transactions with seven Russian banks and implement restrictions on transactions with the Russian Central Bank.
  • Canada removed Russia and Belarus’ “most-favored nation” (MFN) status on March 3.[51] Canada announced it revoked Russia and Belarus’ MFN status as trading partners, resulting in a 35 percent tariff on Russian and Belarusian goods imported into Canada.[52] An anonymous European Commission spokesperson told Reuters on March 3 that the EU is discussing the possible suspension of Russia’s MFN status at the World Trade Organization (WTO).[53] The MFN principle requires equal treatment of all WTO members. Further suspensions would greatly increase tariffs on Russian exports to member states.
  • UK Foreign Secretary Liz Truss pushed on March 3 for Western allies to ban all Russian banks from SWIFT and for the West to further reduce dependency on Russian hydrocarbons. Both moves would likely harm Europe’s energy supply and raise global oil prices.[54]
  • An anonymous EU official told Reuters on March 3 that the EU is considering excluding Belarusian banks from SWIFT.[55]
  • US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi announced her support for a bipartisan effort to ban Russian oil imports into the US during a news conference on March 3.[56] Pelosi said she “is all for [banning] the oil coming from Russia.”[57]
  • The Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank suspended all operations with Russia and Belarus on March 3.[58] The Chinese government founded the bank and is the largest shareholder at 30 percent.[59]
The Kremlin continued implementing capital control measures in a likely unsuccessful attempt to mitigate Western sanctions on March 3. The Russian Central Bank kept the stock market closed for the fourth consecutive day in a likely attempt to defer selloffs.[60] Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on March 2 prohibiting citizens and foreigners from transporting more than 10 thousand USD of foreign currency outside of Russia, likely to prevent further loss of foreign capital.[61] The State Duma submitted a draft law to protect Russian citizens from the effects of Western sanctions on March 3. The draft law promotes domestic social assistance programs, protects domestic consumers of foreign companies, and prevents foreign countries from further divesting from the Russian market.[62] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that the Kremlin is not considering nationalizing foreign assets on March 3 despite Russian Security Council Deputy Dmitry Medvedev’s February 26 call to nationalize the assets of foreigners from “the US, EU, and other unfriendly jurisdictions.”[63] The Russian Federal Space Agency announced that it would stop exporting rockets to the United States on March 3; this attempt is likely an ineffective countermeasure due to a US store of Russian engines and existing contracts with US domestic producers.[64] CEOs of Russian diamond company Alrosa and the Federal Space Agency reduced their salaries on March 3 to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions on their workforces and research.[65] Russian billionaire Oleg Deripaska predicted that Western sanctions would drive Russia into a prolonged economic crisis and called for a peace deal to end the Ukraine war in a March 3 speech to other businessmen.[66]
Humanitarian Concerns
Russian sieges deteriorated living conditions in southern Ukraine and indiscriminate Russian attacks killed more civilians in northern Ukraine, causing more demands for war crimes investigations.
  • The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) will send an expert delegation to Ukraine to investigate war crimes and violations and abuses of international human rights laws after 45 member states called for an investigation.[67]
  • The US mission to the OSCE stated on March 3 that Russian forces plan to execute some Ukrainian opponents and send others to camps after a military occupation. The US mission warned of Russian planning to use lethal population control measures to counter-protests and Ukrainian resistance during a Russian occupation of Ukraine.[68]
  • International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor Karim Khan launched an immediate criminal investigation of alleged Russian war crimes on March 3.[69] Khan expedited normal procedures and sent a team to Ukraine after 39 ICC member states called for action.
  • Lithuanian prosecutors launched a war crimes investigation into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on March 3.[70]
Other International Activity
Sweden and Finland are increasing cooperation with each other and NATO in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and may be considering NATO membership.
  • NATO announced on March 2 that the foreign ministers of Finland and Sweden will attend a scheduled meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) Ministers of Foreign Affairs on March 4.[71] Non-NATO members Finland and Sweden typically send delegations to relevant NATO meetings.[72]
  • Sweden and Finland conducted a joint air and sea exercise in the Baltic Sea as part of increased joint military cooperation “against the backdrop of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.”[73]
  • Finland's parliament met on March 2 to discuss a petition calling for a vote on NATO membership.[74] Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin stated that because the petition reached the necessary threshold of 50,000 signatures, “it made sense to hear views on the issue.”[75] 53% of Finns now support joining NATO according to a poll conducted by Finnish broadcaster Yle on February 28.[76] Reuters reported that Finnish officials are considering a referendum on NATO membership rather than a parliamentary vote.[77] Russia threatened military and political consequences on February 25 if Sweden or Finland join NATO.[78]
  • Seven of the eight Arctic Council members—Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, the United States, Canada, and Denmark—announced on March 3 that they would boycott future talks in Russia.[79] Russia holds the Arctic Council’s rotating chairmanship and was scheduled to host talks in May in Arkhangelsk.
Georgia and Moldova formally applied to join the EU on March 3 following Ukraine’s request to join the bloc on February 28.[80] Applicants must first have their candidacies unanimously approved by all 27 EU member states.[81] Then Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova must all make their political, judiciary, and economic systems compatible with the EU system of common law and extensive regulations in a process that can take as long as a decade.
A Western intelligence report leaked on March 3 says that Chinese President Xi Jinping knew ahead of time about the Russian invasion and asked Russia to delay operations until after the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics.[82] The Chinese Foreign Ministry called the report “pure fake news” designed to shift blame.[83]

[1] https://iz dot ru/1299904/2022-03-03/komitet-gd-odobril-popravku-o-lishenii-svobody-do-15-let-za-feiki-o-vs-rossii
[2]https://riafan dot ru/1619213-volodin-otmetil-neobhodimost-prinyat-reshenie-ob-otvetstvennosti-za-feiki-o-vs-rf
[4] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/13950943
[5] https://iz dot ru/1300032/2022-03-03/genprokuratura-izuchit-fakty-vovlecheniia-v-aktcii-protiv-spetcoperatcii-vs-rossii
[6] https://iz dot ru/1299926/2022-03-03/peskov-rasskazal-o-pozitcii-kremlia-po-likvidatcii-radio-i-saita-ekho-moskvy; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/13948307
[8] https://tvrain dot ru/news/roskomnadzor_potreboval_ot_google_udalit_prilozhenie_dozhdja-549039/?from=rss; https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-03-03/c...
[9] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/13952963
[10] https://iz dot ru/1299952/2022-03-03/eksperty-nazvali-alternativy-facebook
[11] https://iz dot ru/1299922/2022-03-03/sotcset-mirtesen-zafiksirovala-trekhkratnyi-prirost-auditorii
[13] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/13955421
[14] https://iz dot ru/1299908/2022-03-03/lavrov-vyrazil-uverennost-v-reshenii-krizisa-vokrug-ukrainy; https://iz dot ru/1299888/2022-03-03/riabkov-vyrazil-uverennost-v-dovedenii-do-kontca-spetcoperatcii-v-donbasse; https://tass dot ru/politika/13950223
[15] https://riafan dot ru/1619125-pravo-na-sobstvennoe-gosudarstvo-pochemu-dnr-i-lnr-dolzhny-byt-vosstanovleny-v-granicakh-2014-goda
[16] https://iz dot ru/1299865/2022-03-03/voennyi-ekspert-zaiavil-ob-otsutstvii-shansov-ukrainy-na-pobedu
[22] https://riafan dot ru/1619152-lavrov-ugroza-nachala-yadernoi-voiny-ishodit-ot-nato-a-ne-rossii
[23]https://riafan dot ru/1619165-lavrov-sravnil-vlast-ssha-v-evrope-s-gitlerom-i-napoleonom; https://riafan dot ru/1619152-lavrov-ugroza-nachala-yadernoi-voiny-ishodit-ot-nato-a-ne-rossii
[24] https://tass dot ru/politika/13950223; https://riafan dot ru/1619162-lavrov-predrek-skoroe-okonchanie-isterii-zapada-na-fone-antirossiiskih-sankcii
[25] https://tass dot ru/politika/13944613
[26] https://riafan dot ru/1619278-lantidiplomatico-mnogoletnie-popytki-unizit-rossiyu-obernulis-dlya-ssha-tragediei
[27] https://iz dot ru/1299887/2022-03-03/riabkov-rasskazal-o-perspektivakh-otnoshenii-rossii-i-ssha
[28] https://tvzvezda dot ru/news/2022331332-8ZpFH.html
[29] https://sud dot ua/ru/news/publication/231082-v-rossii-mogut-vvesti-voennoe-polozhenie-podolyak; https://gazeta dot ua/ru/articles/world-life/_rossiya-planiruet-vvesti-voennoe-polozhenie-zapretyat-mitingi-ogranichat-svyaz/1073534
[30] https://tvzvezda dot ru/news/2022331332-8ZpFH.html
[31] https://riafan dot ru/1619074-ryabkov-mid-rf-rabotaet-v-krizisnom-rezhime
[36] https://tass dot ru/politika/13957353
[37] https://riafan dot ru/1619203-lavrov-mirnye-soglasheniya-kieva-i-moskvy-dolzhny-soderzhat-punkt-o-bezopasnosti-belorussii
[61] https://tvrain dot ru/news/putin_zapretil_vyvozit_iz_rossii_bolshe_10_tysjach_dollarov-548984/?from=rss
[62] https://iz dot ru/1299809/2022-03-03/pravitelstvo-razrabotalo-proekt-o-zashchite-rossiian-ot-sanktcii-zapada
[63] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/13947725
[64] https://iz dot ru/1299934/2022-03-03/rossiia-prekratit-postavki-raketnykh-dvigatelei-v-ssha; https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-03-03/c...
[65] https://iz dot ru/1300038/2022-03-03/gendirektor-alrosy-poprosil-vdvoe-snizit-svoiu-zarplatu-iz-za-sanktcii




2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 3


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 3
Mar 3, 2022 - Press ISW
Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko
March 3, 4:00 pm EST
The Russian military has continued its unsuccessful attempts to encircle Kyiv and capture Kharkiv. The Russians continued to attack piecemeal, committing a few battalion tactical groups at a time rather than concentrating overwhelming force to achieve decisive effects. Russian commanders appear to prefer opening up new lines of advance for regiment-sized operations but have been unable to achieve meaningful synergies between efforts along different axes toward the same objectives. They have also continued conducting operations in southern Ukraine along three diverging axes rather than concentrating on one or attempting mutually supporting efforts. These failures of basic operational art—long a strong suit of the Soviet military and heavily studied at Russian military academies—remain inexplicable as does the Russian military’s failure to gain air superiority or at least to ground the Ukrainian Air Force. The Russian conventional military continues to underperform badly, although it may still wear down and defeat the conventional Ukrainian military by sheer force of numbers and brutality. Initial indications that Russia is mobilizing reinforcements from as far away as the Pacific Ocean are concerning in this respect. Those indications also suggest, however, that the Russian General Staff has concluded that the forces it initially concentrated for the invasion of Ukraine will be insufficient to achieve Moscow’s military objectives.
Operations to envelop Kyiv remain Russia’s main effort. Russian troops are also continuing three supporting efforts, one to seize Kharkiv, one to take Mariupol and secure the “land bridge” connecting Rostov-on-Don to Crimea, and one to secure Kherson and set conditions for a drive west toward Mykolayiv and Odesa.
The Russian attack on Kyiv likely consists of a main effort aimed at enveloping and ultimately encircling the city from the west and a supporting effort along the axes from Chernihiv and Sumy to encircle it from the east.
Russian forces in the south resumed offensive operations toward Mykolayiv on March 3 after securing Kherson on March 2, but do not appear to pose an imminent danger to Odesa. Russian forces likely seek to force Mariupol to capitulate by destroying critical civilian infrastructure and killing civilians to create a humanitarian catastrophe—an approach Russian forces have repeatedly taken in Syria.[1]
Key Takeaways
  • Russian forces opened a new line of advance from Belarus south toward Zhytomyr Oblast, west of Kyiv, as Russian forces attempting to encircle Kyiv from the northwest were driven further west by determined Ukrainian resistance and counterattacks. Russian forces will struggle to complete an encirclement of Kyiv at all if they have to advance along ring roads as far from the city center as those they are now using.
  • Russian forces on the east bank of the Dnipro River remain unable to secure the important town of Chernihiv or to break through Ukrainian defenses in the northeastern outskirts of Kyiv.
  • Russian ground forces have remained relatively static near Kharkiv as Russian artillery, air, and missile bombardments wreak devastation in the city. The Ukrainian military indicates that a regiment-sized Russian formation will try to envelop or bypass Kharkiv in the coming days. Similar Russian attempts at such operations elsewhere in Ukraine render the success of such an undertaking at that scale unlikely.
  • Russian forces are attempting once again to open a line of advance through northern Luhansk Oblast, possibly to assist efforts at Kharkiv or, as the Ukrainian General Staff assesses, to drive on Dnipro and Zaprozhya. The Russian forces currently reported as engaging in that drive are far too small to attack either city successfully and are probably insufficient to sustain a long drive on their own.
  • Russian troops have surrounded Mariupol and are attacking it brutally to compel its capitulation or destroy it.
  • The mayor of Kherson conditionally surrendered to the Russians, allowing Russian forces to renew their advance on Mykolayiv, which they have done. The Ukrainian military nevertheless reportedly defeated an attempted Russian air assault to take an airfield near Mykolayiv.

Russian forces are engaged in four primary efforts at this time:
  • Main effort—Kyiv (comprised of three subordinate supporting efforts);
  • Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv;
  • Supporting effort 2—Mariupol; and
  • Supporting effort 3—Kherson and advances westward.
Main effort—Kyiv axis: Russian operations on the Kyiv axis consist of a main effort aimed at enveloping and ultimately encircling the city from the west and supporting efforts along the Chernihiv and Sumy axes to encircle it from the northeast and east.
The Ukrainian General Staff published an assessment of Russia’s likely plan to encircle Kyiv on March 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported at 6:00 am local time on March 3 that Russian forces are attempting to conduct offensive operations in the area of Kozarovychi (40km north of Kyiv) on the west bank of the Dnipro River toward Vyshhorod (15km north of Kyiv); Fastiv (70km southwest of Kyiv and approximately 50km south of Russia’s current furthest point of advance west of Kyiv); and Obukhiv (40km directly south of Kyiv).[2] The Ukrainian General Staff likely assesses that Russian forces seek to encircle Kyiv from the west along a line running through these towns. Russian forces remain far from all four towns except Kozarovychi and likely will require further combat power to complete the encirclement of Kyiv. The Ukrainian General Staff reported at noon local time on March 3 that Russian forces committed an additional battalion tactical group (BTG) to operations against Kyiv along an unspecified axis.[3]
Ukrainian Airspace Remains Contested
Russia has not achieved air superiority over Ukraine as of March 3. The Ukrainian Air Force continues operating a week after the invasion began, with the Ukrainian General Staff reporting that Ukrainian Su-24s and Su-25s conducted airstrikes in Kyiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv oblasts in the last 24 hours.[4] Ukrainian air defenses reportedly intercepted a Russian missile targeting Kyiv’s main railway station, which remains packed with refugees, the night of March 2.[5] Russian failures to secure air superiority likely reduce the effectiveness and extent of Russian air and missile attacks, increase the risk to Russian airborne and air assault operations, and force Russian ground combat units to face periodic air attack, likely degrading their operations to some extent. Russia’s failures in the air superiority fight are very surprising; ISW cannot offer any explanations for them at this time.
Russia Continues Clandestine Operations and Prepares More Disinformation
Russian efforts within and in the immediate vicinity of Kyiv have reportedly relied on saboteurs and reconnaissance elements, often out of uniform or wearing Ukrainian uniforms, rather than on attacks by regular combat forces. ISW cannot confirm any new developments in central Kyiv on March 3. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) warned Ukrainians that Russian forces may employ a deepfake video depicting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s surrender to Russia on March 3.[6] The GUR warned that Russia could use such a deepfake video to demoralize the Ukrainian population and convince Ukrainians to surrender.
Russia Likely Mobilizing Reinforcements from the Far East and Donbas
Russian social media users observed new trains loaded with combat vehicles likely of the Eastern Military District (EMD) in Khabarovsk, far eastern Russia.[7] These elements will likely deploy to Belarus to reinforce the EMD’s existing axis against Kyiv from the northwest. Ukraine’s commander in chief claimed on March 3 that Russia mobilized residents of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) and is transporting them to Belgorod via mainland Russia to support assaults on Kyiv.[8] Ukraine’s commander in chief also claimed that Russia is transporting DNR and LNR citizens via Krasnodar to Crimea to support a Russian assault on Odesa.[9]
Subordinate main effort along the west bank of the Dnipro
  • Ukrainian forces halted Russian efforts to extend their western envelopment of Kyiv into Zhytomyr Oblast directly west of Kyiv. The Ukrainian General Staff reported halting Russian forces in Pirozhky, Rizniya, and Ukrainka as of noon local time on March 3.[10] These towns are just west of Makariv, where Ukrainian forces halted Russian advances on March 2. Ukrainian forces additionally likely shot down a Russian Su-30 over Irpin on March 3.[11] Russian forces are likely unsuccessfully attempting to extend their envelopment of Kyiv westward to bypass Ukrainian forces around Makariv.
  • Russian forces additionally opened a new line of advance into northern Zhytomyr Oblast from Belarus, advancing roughly 20km into Ukraine toward Bihun and Ovruch as of noon local time on March 3.[12] ISW cannot currently assess the concentration of Russian forces on this new axis of advance. The Ukrainian General Staff reported two Russian BTGs are operating in Zhytomyr Oblast as a whole but did not differentiate between operations west of Makariv and new Russian advances across the Belarusian border.[13]
  • Russian forces continued to assemble supplies in Borodyanka, Katyuzhanka, and Gavronshchyn, north of Kyiv.[14] The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian forces began assembling logistics camps in these towns on March 2. Russian forces are likely further deploying supplies and munitions forward from Belarus, but heavy cloud cover impeded satellite imagery north of Kyiv on March 2-3.
Subordinate supporting effort — Chernihiv axis
  • Russian forces did not attempt assaults on Chernihiv on March 3, instead bypassing the city to advance on the outskirts of Kyiv.[15] Elements of Russia’s 41st Combined Arms Army and 90th Tank Division remain concentrated in Lyubech and Mena west and east of Chernihiv, respectively.[16] Russian forces continued to shell Chernihiv on March 3, destroying a school and killing nine civilians.[17]
  • Ukrainian forces reported that two BTGs of Russia’s 2nd Combined Arms Army are advancing toward eastern Kyiv along the “Peremoha-Brovary” axis.[18] Elements of the Russian 200th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade are additionally participating in this line of advance.[19] Ukrainian forces likely halted Russian forces in Peremoha on March 2.[20] Ukrainian forces additionally halted Russian advances in Korosten, 30km south of Chernihiv.[21]
  • ISW cannot confirm the presence of any Belarusian forces in operations on the Chernihiv axis. Ukrainian Territorial Defense authorities claimed on March 1 that Belarusian combat troops have entered Chernihiv District in support of the Russian offensive.[22]
Subordinate supporting effort — Sumy axis
  • Ukrainian forces halted Russian offensive operations towards Nizhyn and Pryluky (approximately 130km northeast of Kyiv) by seven BTGs of Russia’s 2nd and 6th Combined Arms Armies, supported by missile and artillery assets, as of noon local time on March 3.[23]
  • Russian forces did not attempt assaults on Sumy March 3, instead concentrating on further advances toward Kyiv’s northeastern outskirts.[24] Two BTGs from the Pacific Fleet’s 200th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade continued to keep Sumy, Lebedyn and Okntyrka ”under siege” as of March 2.[25] Ukraine’s 93rd Separate Motorized Brigade reported destroying several Russian tanks near Sumy on March 2 and 3.[26]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv: Russian forces will likely attempt to encircle Kharkiv in the next 24-48 hours. The Ukrainian General Staff reported six Russian BTGs around Kharkiv “moved to the defense” on March 3, but additionally assessed that three BTGs will “probably make an attempt to surround Kharkiv from the south.”[27] Russian forces likely seek to encircle and bypass Kharkiv before bombarding it to force a capitulation—as Russian forces are currently similarly attempting against Mariupol. Russian forces continued to deliberately target civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv with multiple-launch-rocket systems (MLRS), tube artillery, cluster munitions, and Kalibr cruise missiles on March 3.[28] The Russian air, artillery, and missile barrage may be intended to generate panic and reduce the morale of Ukrainian defenders in Kharkiv and elsewhere. It is not likely to achieve that effect. It is too early to evaluate the likelihood that a renewed Russian ground offensive will succeed in taking the city.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 3 that two Russian BTGs will “probably try to advance in the direction of Izum [south of Kharkiv]” from northern Luhansk Oblast with the eventual objective of taking Dnipro and Zaporizhya from the north.[29] If confirmed, this would be a wide Russian enveloping maneuver, likely seeking to cut off all Ukrainian forces in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. Two BTGs would be unable to complete this encirclement, let alone attack two large cities.
Supporting Effort #2—Mariupol: Russian forces fully encircled Mariupol as of March 2 and are conducting a deliberate campaign to destroy critical civilian infrastructure and residential areas in a likely attempt to force the city to surrender. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Mariupol is “stable” as of noon local time on March 3, though LNR forces (likely supported by Russia’s 8th Combined Arms Army) continued attacks on the city.[30] ISW cannot confirm the status of Ukrainian defenders or the extent of Russian attacks on the city on March 3.
The LNR announced that it captured the seven towns of Novoaidar, Krasnorichens'ke, Epifanovka, Stepnoy Yar, Havrylivka, Starobilsk, and Andriivka in Luhansk Oblast on March 3.[31] ISW assesses that Russian proxy forces control Havrylivka, Starobilsk, and Krasnorichens'ke, but cannot confirm Russian proxy control over Novoaidar, Krasnorichens'ke, Epifanovka, and Andriivka at this time.[32] Ukraine’s General Staff acknowledged that that LNR forces continued offensive operations near Novoaidar at 6:00 am local time on March 3.[33]
The Ukrainian General Staff additionally published photos on March 2 of a Russian plan Ukrainian forces captured from a battalion of the Black Sea Fleet’s 810th Naval Infantry Brigade.[34] The plans stated that Putin authorized a Russian invasion of Ukraine on January 18, planned at that time to run from February 20 to March 6. The BTG reportedly planned to conduct an amphibious landing at Stepanovka, on the Sea of Azov, before operating with elements of the 58th CAA and 117th Naval Infantry Regiment to surround and seize Melitopol. No such landing occurred.
Supporting Effort #3—Kherson and west: Russian forces secured a negotiated surrender of Kherson on March 2 and continued advances toward Mykolayiv on March 3, including a failed airborne landing. The mayor of Kherson confirmed that no Ukrainian forces remain in the city and that "for the Ukrainian flag to continue flying over us" he negotiated several conditions with Russian forces, including a strict curfew from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. and forbidding civilians from walking in groups larger than two or confronting Russian forces.[35] Russian forces deployed additional reserves and resumed offensive operations toward Mykolayiv on March 3.[36] Ukrainian forces additionally defeated a heliborne assault by Russian VDV (airborne) or special forces on Balovne, an airport near Mykolayiv.[37]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces committed reserve elements of the 205th Motor Rifle Brigade of the 49th Combined Arms Army towards both Mariupol and Zaporizhya on March 3.[38] Russian forces will likely struggle to fully resource three simultaneous lines of effort from Crimea – Mikoayiv, Zaporizhya, and Mariupol. Russian forces have not made territorial advances towardsZaporizhya since March 1.
Immediate items to watch
  • Russian forces maneuvering to the west and southwest of Kyiv to envelop and then encircle it
  • Russian forces securing the crossings over the Desna near Chernihiv and/or linking up with forces advancing from the Sumy axis to open a new front against Kyiv from the east
  • Belarusian ground forces might begin actively participating in the Russian offensive campaign
  • Russian efforts to encircle Kharkiv following air/missile/artillery attacks
  • Russian forces around Kherson resuming their advance toward Mykolayiv and Odesa
  • Russian and proxy force offensive to take Mariupol or continued air/missile/artillery campaign to force the city to surrender
[22] https://t dot me/suspilnechernihiv/6484, https://gur.gov dot ua/content/spysky-kerivnoho-skladu-viiskovykh-chastyn-viiskovo-povitrianykh-syl-respubliky-belarus.html; https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine/posts/261783329466428
[31] https://lug-info dot com/news/narodnaya-miliciya-osvobodila-ot-kievskih-silovikov-eshe-sem-naselennyh-punktov-lnr


3. What Putin’s Nuclear Threats Mean for the U.S.

Excerpts:
Similarly, the U.S. should focus its own conventional posture on the goal of denying Russia and China the ability to conduct rapid military campaigns that revise the territorial status quo. In coordination with allies, the U.S. should prioritize intelligence assets, forward deployment of munitions and equipment, and investment in weapons systems such as nuclear-powered attack submarines and penetrating bombers that have the best chance of surviving a fight with a highly capable adversary. Even in the presence of large nuclear arsenals, these conventional capabilities will remain vital to keeping the peace against opponents who may otherwise believe that nuclear weapons give them cover for aggression.
The U.S. nuclear arsenal remains the ultimate backstop of its alliance commitments. Distasteful as it is to contemplate, having the ability to threaten limited nuclear attacks, particularly against military targets, remains important for deterring Russia and China, both of which are readily deploying such weapons. The key is to signal prior to any war both that the U.S. has no desire to initiate conflict and that threats of nuclear escalation won’t force the U.S. to back down. The presence of the American arsenal can also help reassure allies that the U.S. will defend them, making them less likely to seek nuclear weapons of their own.

What Putin’s Nuclear Threats Mean for the U.S.
Washington needs to develop new strategies for a world where nuclear weapons don’t deter conventional aggression
WSJ · by Caitlin Talmadge
The U.S. cannot overlook these chilling threats. They are part of a deliberate strategy to advance Russia’s revisionist political and military goals. Countering them will require the U.S. and its friends to tailor both their conventional and their nuclear postures to the emerging danger—not only in the current crisis with Russia but also to prepare for the possibility that China might follow the same playbook in a future war over Taiwan.
Mr. Putin’s unusually explicit rhetoric has sent a clear message to the West: Stay out of my attack on a third party or risk nuclear conflict. Having bolstered in recent years its arsenal of nuclear weapons that can evade missile defenses and hit targets in Europe and the U.S., Russia is attempting to use these forces as a shield for conventional aggression. Mr. Putin is betting that despite the conventional military might of the U.S. and its allies, they will shrink from confrontation at least partly out of fear of nuclear escalation.
“Precisely because all-out nuclear war would be so costly for both the U.S. and Russia, Mr. Putin likely believes it won’t happen.”
This approach to nuclear deterrence calls into question the often-cited logic of mutually assured destruction, or “MAD.” This traditional notion assumes that mutual nuclear vulnerability—that is, a situation in which both sides have nuclear forces that can inflict significant retaliation on the other, even after suffering a nuclear first strike—can actually stabilize world politics and make conflict between nuclear adversaries, even over third parties, less likely. Under this condition, the risks of nuclear escalation become so dangerous and so inescapable that countries will hesitate even to provoke a crisis, much less to fight wars. Many credit MAD with keeping the Cold War cold.
The problem is that precisely because all-out nuclear war would be so costly for both the U.S. and Russia, Mr. Putin likely believes it won’t happen. As a result, he may feel relatively safe engaging in conventional aggression or even limited nuclear use below that threshold—demonstration strikes, for example, or attacks on military targets—without much risk of a Western response. In general, he appears to believe that Russian nuclear weapons provide cover for Russian aggression, while American nuclear weapons don’t provide reciprocal freedom to respond, perhaps because the U.S. is less invested in defending the status quo than Mr. Putin is in challenging it. Pakistan has honed exactly this strategy against India, and now a revisionist Russia is adopting it too.
Russia has longstanding grievances with the geopolitical status quo, including most notably the expansion of NATO after the humiliating contraction of the Soviet empire. These resentments, combined with a serious miscalculation about how the West would respond to his invasion, may have emboldened Mr. Putin to make nuclear threats, despite the powerful U.S. arsenal. Ultimately, however, Russia doesn’t want to get into a nuclear war with NATO. It just wants NATO to stay out of Russia’s conventional war against Ukraine.
Unfortunately for the U.S., Russia isn’t the only opponent that could use its nuclear arsenal as a shield for conventional aggression against third parties. China is in the midst of modernizing its nuclear forces, building better nuclear weapons in larger numbers than it ever has before. These include both long-range forces that can threaten the U.S. and medium-range nuclear weapons well-suited to limited attacks on U.S. military targets and allies in the western Pacific.
“An opponent that has little desire to fight a nuclear war with the U.S. may nevertheless rely on its nuclear forces to stiff-arm an American conventional response.”
China’s arsenal likely will remain significantly smaller than those of both Russia and the U.S. for some time. Nevertheless, Beijing is pushing Washington into a state of deeper mutual nuclear vulnerability. As with Russia, the U.S. would find an all-out nuclear war with China extremely costly, and both sides will have strong incentives to avoid it. Yet this strategic nuclear stalemate is unlikely to be stabilizing given that China, like Russia, is deeply dissatisfied with the status quo, especially over Taiwan.
A more robust nuclear arsenal may not make China more cautious. Instead it may give China confidence that if it conventionally challenges U.S. friends or allies in the region, the U.S. can’t simply lean on its nuclear status to get China to back down.
By attempting to neutralize the U.S. ability to make credible nuclear threats in a crisis, China may believe it can keep the fight conventional—which would play to China’s strengths. China overmatches Taiwan conventionally, just as Russia does Ukraine. Likewise, Beijing cares about Taipei’s status more than Washington does. Again, an opponent that has little desire to fight a nuclear war with the U.S. may nevertheless rely on its nuclear forces to stiff-arm an American conventional response.
Russia and China have distinct relationships with the U.S., but they present a common problem: The U.S. seeks to maintain credible commitments to allies and friends in the two regions. But how can it do this when conventionally strong, nuclear-armed U.S. opponents seek to revise the status quo through the use of force?
As Ukrainian resistance has already demonstrated, robust conventional forces are a critical part of the answer, both on NATO’s eastern flank and along the first island chain in East Asia. An adversary’s nuclear threats aimed at keeping the U.S. out of a conventional fight will matter much less if allies can make that fight conventionally costly for the opponent, regardless of whether, when or how the U.S. intervenes. The key is to provide allies with defensive capabilities that don’t threaten adversaries unless they attack.
Especially for Taiwan, that means investing less in high-prestige aircraft and ships and more in mines, submarines, drones, missiles and air defenses that can impose heavy costs on a Chinese attempt to cross the strait. Improving the island’s economic and military resilience in the event of air and missile attacks is also important, as is publicly signaling these measures.
Similarly, the U.S. should focus its own conventional posture on the goal of denying Russia and China the ability to conduct rapid military campaigns that revise the territorial status quo. In coordination with allies, the U.S. should prioritize intelligence assets, forward deployment of munitions and equipment, and investment in weapons systems such as nuclear-powered attack submarines and penetrating bombers that have the best chance of surviving a fight with a highly capable adversary. Even in the presence of large nuclear arsenals, these conventional capabilities will remain vital to keeping the peace against opponents who may otherwise believe that nuclear weapons give them cover for aggression.
The U.S. nuclear arsenal remains the ultimate backstop of its alliance commitments. Distasteful as it is to contemplate, having the ability to threaten limited nuclear attacks, particularly against military targets, remains important for deterring Russia and China, both of which are readily deploying such weapons. The key is to signal prior to any war both that the U.S. has no desire to initiate conflict and that threats of nuclear escalation won’t force the U.S. to back down. The presence of the American arsenal can also help reassure allies that the U.S. will defend them, making them less likely to seek nuclear weapons of their own.
—Dr. Talmadge is associate professor of security studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and the author of “The Dictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes.”
WSJ · by Caitlin Talmadge


4.  Putin Thought Ukraine Would Fall Quickly. An Airport Battle Proved Him Wrong.
“When the hour of crisis comes, remember that 40 selected men can shake the world” Yasotay (Mongol Warlord)

And it is all about the assumptions in strategy. Get those wrong and if you do not adjust your strategy, you fail.

Excerpts:

Russia’s bid to seize the airport embodied its military planners’ ambitious assumptions that Ukrainian defense would collapse under overwhelming firepower. Russian officials and propagandists have for years boasted that Moscow’s forces could overrun its smaller neighbor in days.
But the resistance by Ukraine’s army and soldiers such as Lt. Kharchenko, backed by volunteer fighters, has slowed the Russian advance, halting it entirely in the area around Hostomel Airport after a day of back-and-forth fighting. The airport standoff has emerged as the key to Ukrainian resistance and one big reason Russian forces have become bogged down so far. On Thursday, the Russian military made gains in the south, penetrating the city of Kherson and pushing toward Zaporizhya.
This account of scenes in one of the most significant battles during the week-old conflict is based on firsthand reports of two soldiers involved in the chaotic fighting, official Ukrainian military reports and videos and images of events at the airfield.


Putin Thought Ukraine Would Fall Quickly. An Airport Battle Proved Him Wrong.
Russia wanted to use Hostomel Airport outside Kyiv to bring troops directly to the capital. A band of Ukrainian soldiers fought to keep the Russians from using the landing strip, forcing them to move soldiers and supplies over land.
WSJ · by James Marson
Elite Russian airborne troops had landed in helicopters hours earlier on the first day of Russia’s war against Ukraine. If they could hold the airfield, Russia would be able to fly in hundreds of soldiers and move rapidly to seize the Ukrainian capital, part of Mr. Putin’s plan to force a quick capitulation.
The Russians, protected by a concrete barrier topped with barbed wire, were directing withering fire at Lt. Kharchenko’s unit. Another Ukrainian force speeding to join the fight was delayed.
The paratroopers pressed on. “We knew what was at stake,” Lt. Kharchenko said.

Lt. Anatoliy Kharchenko, a Ukrainian paratrooper who took part in the battle at Hostomel.
Photo: Anatoliy Kharchenko
Russia’s bid to seize the airport embodied its military planners’ ambitious assumptions that Ukrainian defense would collapse under overwhelming firepower. Russian officials and propagandists have for years boasted that Moscow’s forces could overrun its smaller neighbor in days.
But the resistance by Ukraine’s army and soldiers such as Lt. Kharchenko, backed by volunteer fighters, has slowed the Russian advance, halting it entirely in the area around Hostomel Airport after a day of back-and-forth fighting. The airport standoff has emerged as the key to Ukrainian resistance and one big reason Russian forces have become bogged down so far. On Thursday, the Russian military made gains in the south, penetrating the city of Kherson and pushing toward Zaporizhya.
This account of scenes in one of the most significant battles during the week-old conflict is based on firsthand reports of two soldiers involved in the chaotic fighting, official Ukrainian military reports and videos and images of events at the airfield.
The first sign of war in Hostomel came at 7 a.m. on Feb. 24, hours after Mr. Putin announced the invasion, when a cruise missile slammed into the ground meters from an apartment block, blasting a crater and blowing out the building’s windows.
The airport has a long runway used to test aircraft and for cargo, making it a juicy target for airborne forces to seek control of.
The Ukrainian National Guard unit defending the airport was below full strength. Most of its heavy equipment and personnel were hundreds of miles to the east, on the front lines of a war that Russia had fomented eight years earlier.
Still, this was the elite Rapid Reaction Brigade, based at the airport precisely because of its fighting skills and ability to deploy quickly. Formed in 2015, it had spent years fighting Russian proxies in eastern Ukraine.

National Guard Lt. Andriy Kulish, a 36-year-old who left his job in communications to join the army in 2014, had just made tea for two comrades a few hours after the missile hit when he heard the chopping of helicopter blades.
The attack aircraft had flown in low, avoiding Ukrainian radar. They unleashed a barrage of rockets and machine-gun fire on the airport and adjoining military base, sending the Ukrainian soldiers diving for cover.
The Ukrainians felt outmatched. “It was like turning up with a knife to a gunfight,” said Lt. Kulish in an interview.
After the first barrage, he saw two soldiers sheltering near his room.
“Do you want your tea now?” he called out. The incongruous question drew laughter.
Coming under aerial bombardment was a new experience for the unit, because the Russian-led militants in the east have no air force. But the defenders, including officers, contract soldiers and conscripts, soon got their bearings.
They spread out throughout the base and the airport and fired back “passionately and fiercely” with everything they had, said Lt. Kulish: automatic rifles, antiaircraft guns and a few shoulder-fired missiles.
The Russian military said it sent 200 helicopters on the mission. Ukrainian officials and soldiers defending the airport described some 30 or more helicopters.
The aircraft flew in twos and threes, circling for strike runs on the airport and the base.
The initial Russian barrage badly damaged the Antonov airplane Mriya, Ukrainian for Dream, the largest transport aircraft in the world. Lt. Kulish said he saw a plume of smoke rising from the hangar where it was undergoing repairs.
The defenders said they downed three helicopters with missiles. Lt. Kulish said the sheer number of bullets they pumped into two others forced them down despite their armor.
After nearly three hours of fighting, the Russian helicopters began to land and disgorge airborne troops, who fanned out and began firing.

A Russian Ka-52 helicopter gunship downed during the airport battle.
Photo: Efrem Lukatsky/Associated Press
The Ukrainian defenders had run out of antiaircraft missiles and were running low on other ammunition. Now facing an enemy on the ground as well as in the air, the brigade commander ordered a withdrawal, stuffing the unit’s flag down his jacket before they left.
The Russian military said its paratroopers suffered no losses and killed 200 of what it calls “nationalists,” part of Moscow’s false claim that its military is primarily facing nationalists rather than regular army units, which it portrays as weak and demoralized.
Lt. Kulish said his unit had no dead and one injured.
The Russians moved quickly to establish themselves at the base. A CNN crew shot video of the Russian paratroopers running with a machine gun and ammunition in green wooden boxes and exchanging fire with adversaries.
As the foreign forces dug in, Ukrainian intelligence got wind of the Russian plan: to send 18 Il-76 transport aircraft into Ukraine from Belarus. Sixty miles to the west, Lt. Kharchenko’s unit of 48 paratroopers jumped into three helicopters and sped toward Hostomel.
Their mission: get close enough to the landing strip to take out at least the first Il-76 so no other pilots would dare land.
Reaching a field west of the airport, the paratroopers spilled from their helicopters. Lt. Kharchenko led the way quickly but silently across a road flanked by houses, a field and a ditch filled with trees and branches.
As they approached the landing strip, a microdrone buzzed overhead. They had been spotted.
The paratroopers rushed forward, but then hit a 7-foot concrete wall topped with barbed wire. Lacking explosives to blast through, Lt. Kharchenko cut a hole in the wire and started helping his comrades over the wall. Five made it over. Then Russian machine-gun fire burst at them.

Three of the Ukrainians were badly hurt. Lt. Kharchenko radioed for help from another unit of Ukrainian paratroopers in armored vehicles, who were supposed to be assaulting the airport from the north. Their commander, call-sign Monk, replied they weren’t there yet.
The Russians pinned down Lt. Kharchenko’s paratroopers with heavy fire. A grenade exploded and set alight the grass where they were lying.
Lt. Kharchenko tried to calm the soldiers on the other side of the wall, worried that their screaming would direct the Russians to pick them off.
“We understood that the situation had changed radically,” he said. “The enemy had managed to build a good line of defense.”
The paratroopers pulled out small shovels and hurriedly dug a tunnel under the wall, managing to drag one of their comrades out.
Lt. Kharchenko called in coordinates for Ukrainian artillery to hit the enemy from the south.
The radio brought good news: Monk and his men had begun attacking from the north. And another Ukrainian unit was rushing in from the southeast in civilian vehicles.
The paratroopers set up a firing point for antiaircraft missiles in the field outside the wall.
Hours after the fighting began, the tide was turning. The Russians were pinned down. The Ukrainian commander told them over the radio that the latest intelligence indicated the Il-76s had aborted their mission. They wouldn’t risk a landing.
There was no time to celebrate. Monk came over the radio: A Russian armored column was approaching from the north. Lt. Kharchenko decided he would have to leave the men behind who were trapped on the other side of the fence. Two of them were unconscious.
“My conscience was tortured,” he said, “because losing people is a heavy burden for any commander.”

Smoke from fighting at the Hostomel Airport on Feb. 24.
Photo: daniel leal/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
The paratroopers withdrew to the south, moving slowly because several were wounded, including Lt. Kharchenko, who had been shot in the leg. It took them 40 minutes to cross a field that they had sped across in 10 minutes in the other direction.
Suddenly, they heard the roar of Russian armored vehicles heading their way. They quickly set up an ambush, taking out the tank at the front of the column and firing rocket-propelled grenades at the other vehicles. The remaining vehicles turned around.
As the Ukrainians trudged south toward Kyiv, a civilian car pulled up. In the dark, Lt. Kharchenko worried whether the driver was friend or foe. Then he saw a Ukrainian flag in the passenger window and collapsed inside with relief.
The paratroopers hadn’t retaken the airport, but they had foiled the Russian airborne operation. Ukraine quickly brought up reinforcements that have halted Russian forces on a front line around Hostomel and in neighboring towns that have seen heavy fighting in recent days. The big troop carriers from Belarus haven’t landed at Hostomel.
Lt. Kharchenko is recovering in a hospital in a nearby town. He was smoking outside the day after the raid when a soldier he didn’t recognize approached him.
“I am your eyes,” the soldier told him. It was the first paratrooper who had jumped over the fence at the airport. He had crawled out despite severe back wounds from a grenade and been taken to a hospital by locals.
—Oksana Grytsenko contributed to this article.
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
News and insights on Russia's attack on Ukraine and the West's response, selected by the editors
Write to James Marson at james.marson@wsj.com
WSJ · by James Marson


5. Russian troops may soon be fighting Ukrainian special operators with years of secretive training from the US

Just as a reminder:

2016 NDAA Sec 1099: (d) Unconventional Warfare Defined.—In this section, the term “unconventional warfare” means activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area."

Essence of UW

UW thinking informs everything SOF should do

UW is fundamentally problem solving; using unique, non-doctrinal and non-conventional methods, techniques, people, equipment to solve (or assist in solving) complex political-military problems

And creating dilemmas for our adversaries

UW is fundamentally about influencing behavior of target audiences (which can include a population, a segment of the population, a political structure, or a military force); therefore, it is integral to the action arms of IO/PSYOP/CA. 

Traditional strategic unconventional warfare objectives may include the following:

•Undermining the domestic and international legitimacy of the target authority.
•Neutralizing the target authority’s power and shifting that power to the resistance organization.
•Destroying the confidence and will of the target authority’s leadership.
•Isolating the target authority from international diplomatic and material support while obtaining such support for the resistance organization.
•Obtaining the support or neutrality of the various segments of the society.


Russian troops may soon be fighting Ukrainian special operators with years of secretive training from the US
Business Insider · by Stavros Atlamazoglou

Ukrainian soldiers ride in a military vehicle in Mariupol, Ukraine, February 24, 2022.AP Photo/Sergei Grits
  • Russia's offensive against Ukraine comes eight years after it seized Crimea and stoked a separatist movement in eastern Ukraine.
  • Since that 2014 invasion, US and Western special-operations forces have trained Ukrainian troops to conduct unconventional warfare.
  • Should the conventional fight in Ukraine end in Russia's favor, Ukrainians could put those unconventional skills to use.
Get a daily selection of our top stories based on your reading preferences.
The invasion of Ukraine isn't going as planned for Russian President Vladimir Putin. Days into the operation, his forces are struggling to meet their objectives and facing fiercer-than-expected Ukrainian resistance.
Sooner or later, Russian quantitative and qualitative military superiority might give Putin his so-desired victory. But then the unconventional war will begin, and Ukrainians have been preparing for that since Russia's invasion and seizure of Crimea in 2014.
US and Western special-operations forces have worked extensively with the Ukrainian military in the years since, setting up commando units, training them, and preparing them to wage a guerrilla campaign against an occupying force.

Civilians train in Kyiv with the Georgian Legion, a paramilitary unit formed to fight Russian forces, February 19, 2022.Efrem Lukatsky/AP
Now that Putin has invaded Ukraine for the second time in less than a decade, the lessons that US commandos taught their Ukrainian counterparts have deadly relevance.
Unconventional warfare is the bread and butter of the US Army's Special Forces Regiment — the Green Berets — and members of the 10th Special Forces Group, which has Europe as its area of responsibility, have worked with Ukrainian special-operations forces.
Reports also indicate that the US intelligence community has provided special-operations and intelligence training to Ukraine.
Guerrilla warfare

Kyiv Territorial Defense Unit members train in Kyiv, January 15, 2022.Photo by Brendan Hoffman/Getty Images
Thus far, Russian forces appear to have tried not to engage civilians, which may be an effort to avoid alienating Ukrainians in keeping with Moscow's attempts to portray the invasion as "liberating" Ukraine.
But there have been hundreds of civilian deaths, according to the Ukrainian government, and a guerrilla war in Ukraine, home to 44 million people, will also be bloody for defenders, insurgents, and bystanders.
When it comes to guerrilla tactics, Ukrainian resistance would target Russian soft spots. A column of T-90 main battle tanks that is supported by mechanized infantry is a hard target, but the supply trucks and depots that support them are softer targets that Ukrainian guerrillas would zero in on to counter Russia's numerical and technological superiority.
"The Russians' logistics chain, which is already in a mess trying to keep their troops supplied, would become a primary target. They are soft-skinned, road-bound, and are staffed by conscripts, not professional warriors," Steve Balestrieri, a journalist and retired Army Special Forces warrant officer, told Insider.

Ukrainian troops fire a Javelin anti-tank missile during drills in Ukraine, February 2022.Ukrainian military/Handout via REUTERS
"They won't attack a battalion tactical group head-on. They attack and exploit gaps in the formations. The rear-echelon troops are especially vulnerable," Balestrieri said.
The morale of the Russian occupiers will be another target. A US defense official has said morale is low among Russians in Ukraine now, and footage of the fighting shows that Russian troops are not being welcomed.
Civilians are already openly protesting the Russian invaders, even going as far as standing in front of tanks to stop military movements. Russian soldiers occupying the country will be targeted early and often.
"[Occupied] government buildings, isolated outposts, small groups of Russian soldiers would all be targets. If any high-ranking officers or politicians visit, they would all be likely targets for guerrilla attacks. The Russian battalion tactical groups are ill-prepared for being occupying powers in the cities of Ukraine," Balestrieri added.
Guerrilla forces draw their strength from surprise, not might, and US and Western special operators would have trained Ukrainians to bide their time and strike when an enemy is most vulnerable, a Green Beret assigned to a National Guard Special Forces group told Insider.
"An untrained guerrilla with an anti-tank weapon will just want to shoot at the first tank he sees and scoot to the woods for safety. But a well-trained guerrilla will know to let the first few tanks pass and then strike them either from behind or strike the supply trucks," said the Green Beret, who was not authorized to speak publicly.

Lithuanian troops and US Army Special Forces soldiers during an exercise in September 2018.US Army/Sgt. Karen Sampson
Ukraine's borders with four NATO members would also facilitate an insurgency by making it easier to support. Weapons, supplies, and reinforcements would have a relatively easy time entering and exiting the country.
"The guerrilla force will have plenty of external sanctuaries to the west where NATO will provide plenty of support. While the terrain doesn't offer the kind of concealment that we've previously considered, Ukraine is vast — the second-largest country in Europe — and the guerrillas can strike at any place of their choosing," Balestrieri added.
Using improvised explosive devices, guerrillas "would wreak havoc on the Russians trying to cover a country the size of Texas," Balestrieri said.
As the defenders against an invading force, they would also have an advantage in the information domain.
"Controlling the narrative would be a big boost for the Ukrainians," Balestrieri told Insider. "Putin framed this as a war against Nazis and fascists, but he really fears democracy on his border, which could result in regime change" in Russia.
Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate.

Business Insider · by Stavros Atlamazoglou

6. "Wanted: Dead or Alive": Russian Tycoon Puts $1M Bounty on Putin's Head



"Wanted: Dead or Alive": Russian Tycoon Puts $1M Bounty on Putin's Head
Newsweek · by Jake Thomas · March 2, 2022
A Russian businessman is offering $1 million to any military officer who apprehends Russian President Vladimir Putin "dead or alive" for committing war crimes in his invasion of Ukraine.
Alex Konanykhin, an entrepreneur and former banker, posted the bounty on social media as Russia enters a full week of military action against the neighboring country. Western governments and companies have responded to the invasion by seeking to economically punish Putin and Russia's ruling elite. The bounty offered by Konanykhin, who is now based in the U.S., places an even more direct target on the Russian leader as backlash over the invasion continues to escalate.
Konanykhin said in a Facebook post Tuesday that he promised to pay the officer or officers the money for arresting "Putin as a war criminal under Russian and international laws."

A Russian businessman has put a $1 million bounty on Russian President Vladimir Putin's head for ordering the invasion of Ukraine. Above, Putin attends a meeting to discuss the Ukrainian peace process on October 19, 2016, in Berlin, Germany. Adam Berry/Getty Images
"As an ethnic Russian and a Russia citizen, I see it as my moral duty to facilitate the denazification of Russia," Konanykhin said in the post. Putin has sought to justify his invasion of Ukraine by saying Russian forces would "denazify" the country, an explanation that has been dismissed by Western powers.
Konanykhin, whose profile picture shows him wearing a shirt with the yellow and blue colors of the Ukrainian national flag, said in his post that he would continue his "assistance to Ukraine in its heroic efforts to withstand the onslaught of Putin's Orda." "Orda" means "horde" in Russian.
An earlier version of Konanykhin's post on LinkedIn included a photo of Putin with the words "Wanted: Dead or alive. Vladimir Putin for mass murder," according to The Jerusalem Post. The post appears to have been taken down.
Konanykhin, who made his fortune and rose to prominence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, said in his post that Putin came to power "as the result of a special operation of blowing up apartment buildings in Russia, then violated the Constitution by eliminating free elections and murdering his opponents."
Earlier in the invasion, Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky said that Russian military forces marked him and his family as top targets during a televised address last week.
"The enemy marked me as target number one, and my family as target number two," Zelensky said last week.
Konanykhin had started more than 100 companies by the age of 25, following the fall of communism in Russia, according to a 1996 article in According to his website, Konanykhin is currently based in New York City and is the CEO of TransparentBusiness, a digital work platform.
Newsweek has reached out to Konanykhin for comment.
Newsweek · by Jake Thomas · March 2, 2022

7.  Top Russian general is killed by Ukrainian sniper as Kyiv claims 9,000 of Putin’s troops have died during invasion

TeleCaller's (cold calling) job is similar to sniper's, wait patiently for the Right Party Connect/Target and make no mistake. — Honeya

The noise makes your heart jump, but hearing a sniper bullet is a good thing. The bullet outruns the sound wave; if it's on target, it kills you before you ever hear the sound of the shot. — Benedict Jacka

When I was in my routine training for the Israeli army as a teenager, they discovered completely by chance that I was a lethal sniper. I could hit the target smack in the center further away than anyone could believe. Not just that, even though I was tiny and not even much of an athlete, I was incredibly accurate throwing hand grenades too. Even today I can load a Sten automatic rifle in a single minute, blindfolded. — Ruth Westheimer

Top Russian general is killed by Ukrainian sniper as Kyiv claims 9,000 of Putin’s troops have died during invasion
  • Major General Andrey Sukhovetsky was reportedly killed yesterday by a sniper
  • He is by far the most senior figure to have been killed amid the Russian invasion
  • His death represents a major blow to Russia's 'special military operation'
  • It will be seen in Ukraine as a sign that the invasion is not progressing as planned 
  • It comes as the armed forces claimed to have downed 9,000 Russian troops  
  • The Kremlin meanwhile insists that less than 500 of its soldiers have been lost 
  • Click here for MailOnline's liveblog with the latest updates on the Ukraine crisis 
PUBLISHED: 08:06 EST, 3 March 2022 | UPDATED: 11:37 EST, 3 March 2022
Daily Mail · by David Averre · March 3, 2022
A top Russian general has been killed amid bitter fighting in Ukraine in what represents a major blow to the Russian invasion.
Major General Andrey Sukhovetsky, who was the deputy commander of the 41st Combined Arms Army of Russia's Central Military District, died yesterday as Ukrainian defence forces repelled the Russian offensive.
His death has not yet been officially confirmed by Russia's Ministry of Defence, but was announced on social media by his colleague Sergey Chipilyov and was widely reported by several Russian and Ukrainian news outlets.
A military source confirmed that he was killed 'by a sniper', and suggested a funeral for the Major General - by far the most senior Russian figure to have died in the conflict thus far - will be held in Russia on Saturday.
After days of denial, the Kremlin yesterday admitted that 498 of its troops have been killed and 1,600 injured in the 'special military operation' in Ukraine, but the true figure is almost certainly higher.
Ukraine's armed forces meanwhile claimed today that Russia's army had suffered 9,000 casualties - though the statement recognised that the calculation of the death toll 'is complicated by the high intensity of hostilities'.

Major General Andrey Sukhovetsky, who was the deputy commander of the 41st Combined Arms Army of Russia's Central Military District, died yesterday as Ukrainian defence forces repelled the Russian offensive

Andrei Sukhovetsky, the Deputy Commander of the 41st Combined Arms Army of the Central Military District. Pictured with Sergey Chipilyov (right

Huge convoys of Russian armour have rumbled into several Ukrainian cities, only to be met with fierce resistance as well-armed troops used a mixture of their own and NATO-supplied anti-tank weapons to wreak havoc on the invaders

An armed man stands by the remains of a Russian military vehicle in Bucha, close to the capital Kyiv, Ukraine
Chipilyov, of the Airborne Forces Union of Russian Paratroopers, confirmed Sukhovetsky's death on social media earlier today in perhaps the most definitive proof of the general's passing.
'With great pain, we received the tragic news about the death of our friend, Major-General Andrey Aleksandrovich Sukhovetsky, in Ukraine during a special operation.
'We express our deepest condolences to his family,' the post read.
It was not clear where Sukhovetsky was killed.
The 47-year-old was a highly decorated veteran who was appointed deputy army commander of the 41st division in October 2021.
Prior to that, he commanded the 7th Airborne Assault Division in Novorossiysk for three years, and had completed several combat deployments in the Chechen war, Abkhazia and the intervention in Syria.
Sukhovetsky twice participated in the Victory Parade in Moscow's Red Square, and was awarded two Orders of Courage, the Order of Military Merit and the Medal of Courage.
He also received special commendation for his participation in Russia's annexation of Crimea.
His loss will be taken in Ukraine as yet another encouraging sign that the Russian invasion is not progressing as planned.

Day eight of Russia's invasion dawned today with the city of Kherson, in the south of Ukraine, having fallen into Moscow's hands. Kherson, a city of 300,000 on the Black Sea, appears to have fallen under Russian control after the mayor said 'armed visitors' had taken over a council meeting and imposed curfews. But defences elsewhere are still holding fast despite coming under heavy bombardment
Day eight of Russia's invasion dawned today with the city of Kherson, in the south of Ukraine, having fallen into Moscow's hands.
Kerson is the first regional capital to have been taken by Putin's men after a week of fighting that has seen his army suffer heavy casualties as Ukraine's forces continue to defy the Russian onslaught.
Defences elsewhere are still holding fast despite several cities - Chernihiv, Mariupol and Kharkiv chief among them - coming under heavy Russian bombardment.
Kyiv was struck by four large missiles overnight, one of which hit the central train station and three of which struck TV or radio stations.
In a video address to the nation early Thursday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky praised his country's resistance and vowed that the nation's cities will be rebuilt with Russian money
The Ukrainian president claimed that 'all lines of defence are holding' with the cities of Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy and Mykolaiv all resisting Russian attacks.

KYIV: An apartment building in Borodyanka is seen on Thursday morning almost totally destroyed after a Russian missile struck it the day before, causing a large part of it to collapse

KYIV: Another view of the apartment block in Borodyanka shows it suffered heavy damage in a Russian strike on Tuesday, as Putin's men continue to try and take the country
'They wanted to destroy us. They failed. We've been through so much. And if anyone thinks that, having overcome all this, Ukrainians will be frightened, broken or surrender, they know nothing about Ukraine,' Zelensky said, adding: 'We will restore every house, every street, every city and we say to Russia: learn the word 'reparations'.
'You will reimburse us for everything you did against our state, against every Ukrainian, in full.'
'We are a people who in a week have destroyed the plans of the enemy,' he said. 'They will have no peace here. They will have no food. They will have here not one quiet moment.'
He said the fighting is taking a toll on the morale of Russian soldiers, who 'go into grocery stores and try to find something to eat.'
'These are not warriors of a superpower,' he said. 'These are confused children who have been used.'
Daily Mail · by David Averre · March 3, 2022


8. How Ukraine is winning the propaganda war

Sometimes the underdog has a propaganda advantage.
How Ukraine is winning the propaganda war
armytimes.com · by Sarah Sicard · March 4, 2022
The laundry list accomplishments of the “Ghost of Kyiv,” Europe’s first Ace pilot since World War II, continues to grow as the Russian invasion in Ukraine, which began Feb. 23, rages throughout its cities.
Latest kill count reports suggest the Ghost has downed six Russian aircraft. But is he real? Nobody knows, though it‘s unlikely. For now, the phantom flying legend is proving to be, more or less, a great piece of Ukrainian propaganda.
Though its troops face what some would call an insurmountable challenge from the Russian military, Ukrainian media, with the help of organic reach, is currently winning the hearts of minds of people in the Western world with tales of old ladies standing up to Russian troops, 80-year-old grandfathers volunteering to fight, Army cats that catch snipers, and one brave soul who punched a convoy of Russian trucks in the face.
The veracity of these stories have proven impossible to independently verify as firefights rage across the country. But the enigmatic nature of these stories, as New America strategist and the author of ‘Likewar: The Weaponization of Social Media’ Peter Singer notes, may actually be helping the cause.
“It is more about the story of a hero fighting back against the odds than his name or even the truth of the story,” Singer told Military Times.
And the internet is abuzz with rumors of Ukrainian citizens showing unparalleled bravery in the face of impossible odds against Russia, the supposed propaganda pros.
“They have flipped the script on the supposed Russian masters of it,” Singer said. “Ukraine was not only able to keep its population in the fight when the key Russian goal was to cause the quick collapse, but it also energized the West into levels of support that few imagined before all this.”
RELATED

An unidentified woman reportedly confronted Russian soldiers as they invade her homeland.
Social media has played a large role in endearing the West to the Ukrainian cause.
The Ukrainian media is highlighting the Russians as aggressors committing atrocities against an otherwise peaceful neighbor, a former senior Army information warfare officer told Military Times, who asked to speak on background to discuss propaganda missions freely.
“On the Russian side, they are trying to portray themselves as not as being the aggressors, but rather as number one defenders of ethnic Russians located inside of the Ukraine,” the retired officer said. “That’s why they try to portray that Ukraine is committing atrocities against ethnic Russians.”
Russia has largely relied on its tight state-held grip over information flow within its own borders.
“Most of the traditional media inside Russia is controlled and they are also on different social media platforms, with high levels of censorship,” Singer noted. “If the war drags on, casualties grow, and the economy slumps further, it will be harder and harder for Putin to sustain their early narrative of an emergency ‘rescue’ and quick and easy win.”
Both the officer and Singer believe that Ukraine is winning the propaganda war at the moment.
“When even Switzerland is joining in the sanctions, you’ve lost that narrative battle,” Singer said.
Ukrainian media has been particularly savvy in playing up the eleventh hour rise of its president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, whose line, “I need ammunition; not a ride,” may rival the likes of William Shakespeare’s “cry havoc and let slip the dogs of war” in terms of quotability.
“He went from relatively little known outside Europe to global icon,” Singer said. “That rise of support and sympathy was a key part of Ukraine convincing other states to aid its cause. Great strategy, from a natural communicator.”
Zelenskyy essentially became a hero, the voice of freedom from tyrannical oppression overnight. But to Russians, he is the villain.
“I heard one media source refer to him as the the George Washington of Ukraine,” the former officer said. “But in Russian media, he’s portrayed as being illegitimate and the guy responsible for these atrocities against ethnic Russians within the Ukraine.”
It is, as the intelligence officer noted, up to the media to help determine truth from sensationalism.
“Both sides are trying to control the narrative,” he said. “For me, that’s the story. Right. They’re using these unconfirmed reports and social media to portray things the way they want them portrayed to garner global public opinion.”
Ukraine, however successful it has been with sharing and having signals boosted on feel-good stories, it’s not without its share of disinformation, however.
Early in the conflict, the Defense Ministry’s official Facebook page was caught sharing footage of a supposed aerial dogfigh with the caption “MiG-29 of the Air Force of the Armed Forces destroys the ‘unparalleled’ Su-35 of the Russian occupiers”. It turned out to be from a video game called “Digital Combat Simulator, according to BBC.
Social media has made it increasingly difficult to find fact from fiction, the former intelligence officer said, adding that journalists need to be the ones defining that line.
“It’s Western media’s responsibility to be more objective in their reporting,” the Army officer noted. “What’s changed is that now, the media has become so ubiquitous sources of media are so ubiquitous, that how those stories get written and portrayed is it even more important than it ever has been.”
Observation Post is the Military Times one-stop shop for all things off-duty. Stories may reflect author observations.
About Sarah Sicard
Sarah Sicard is a Senior Editor with Military Times. She previously served as the Digital Editor of Military Times and the Army Times Editor. Other work can be found at National Defense Magazine, Task & Purpose, and Defense News.

9. Ukraine Conflict Update - March 4, 2022 | SOF News


Ukraine Conflict Update - March 4, 2022 | SOF News
sof.news · by SOF News · March 4, 2022
Curated news, analysis, and commentary about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, tactical situation on the ground, Ukrainian defense, and NATO.
Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it five (almost) days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).
Russian Campaign Update. The Russians are continuing their attacks against Ukraine. The effort in the north is somewhat stalled while gains are being made by the Russians in the south. The Russians don’t appear to have an operational plan where the different columns are in a supporting posture – it seems more of a piecemeal effort with separate battles going on in different parts of Ukraine. The White House is reporting that 90% of the pre-invasion force on the borders of Ukraine has now entered the country.
The capture of Kyiv is the main effort. The cities of Kharkiv, Mariupol, and Mykolayiv are secondary targets. The 40-mile long Russian column advancing into the interior of Ukraine has been slow moving and has come under attack frequently by Ukrainian forces. As of Thursday (Mar 3) the column was 15 miles from the capital city – Kyiv. The forward elements of the convoy are likely moving into their staging areas, with some elements heading south and then west to complete the encirclement of the capital city.
Fight for the Skies. The Russians have yet to commit the full force of its air force and its long-range and short-range missiles. This is a failure of planning, an attempt to minimize civilian casualties, or some other factor. But it remains a mystery to military analysts. The Ukrainian Air Force, although diminished, is still flying. The anti-air capabilities of Ukraine are reduced but still active. Stingers appear to be making a difference.
Maritime Activities. An Estonian cargo ship was reportedly sunk in the Black Sea after hitting a naval mine of the coast of Odessa. A Bangladeshi-flagged ship was also hit by a Russian missile. An amphibious force of four large landing ships is off the coast of Odessa. They will likely take part in an operation once the Russian forces from the Crimea spearhead start moving west along the coast of the Black Sea. Or, they are a feint to keep Ukrainian forces in the Odessa region while the Crimea-based Russian forces either head to Kyiv or conduct a pincer movement to cut off Ukrainian forces in the eastern part of the country.
Kyiv. The capital city is almost completely encircled. Open roads leading out of the capital are likely to the southwest. The train heading west is running . . . and always full of passengers. It is likely that the Russians want to take the city and install a puppet regime. There is probably a plane waiting in Moscow to board the ‘new government’ and fly them to Kyiv once the city is secured by the Russians.
Kharkiv. The second largest city of Ukraine is Kharkiv located in the northeast of the country. There is a fierce fight for this city that is close to the Russian border. A lot of artillery and rocket attacks by the Russians have occurred. Most reports say that the city is completely encircled.
Mariupol. Located on the Sea of Azov, the coastal city of Mariupol is under siege by the Russians. This city is situated along the coastal road network that would provide Russia with a land bridge between Russia and the Crimea.
Going West? With the capture of Kherson by the Russians, attention is now focused on Mykolayiv and Odessa. The question is, will this concentration of Russian troops that emerged from Russian-occupied Crimea push north to Kyiv or head west towards Odessa?

Western Arms. Over 20 countries – most from NATO and the European Union – are sending weapons, ammunition, and military supplies to Ukraine from across the Polish border. Rocket launchers, Stinger surface-to-air missiles, and Javelin antitank missiles are among the more important weapons being sent to Ukraine. Turkey is providing Bayraktar TB2 drones that have proved surprisingly effective against Russian forces.
Fight at Nuclear Power Plant. Russian forces fired at buildings in a complex housing the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. This took place in the southern city of Enerhodar. The fire has since been put out, no news on radiation leaks. The International Atomic Energy Agency reports that the Ukraine regulator has not detected a change in radiation levels. Russian news reports that a joint Russian-Ukrainian exercise was held on Thursday to practice procedures at the power plant. The exercise is now over and completed all of its training objectives.
Russian General Killed. The former commander of Russian 7th Airborne Assault Division was killed by a Ukrainian sniper on Wednesday (Mar 2). At the time of his death he was the deputy commander of the 41st Combined Arms Army of the Central Military District. “Ukraine Forces Reportedly Kill Russia General Andrei Sukhovetsky in Blow to Invading Army”, Newsweek, March 3, 2022.
Negotiations. Talks are ongoing each day at the Belarusian town of Gomel just across the Belarus border. Ukraine has demanded a ceasefire and the establishment of humanitarian corridors at the talks. Ukrainian President Zelensky has requested direct talks with Russian President Putin.
Refugees. Over a million people have fled Ukraine in the past seven days according to the United Nations. This is about 2% of the country’s total population. Most are being taken in by Poland and Hungary.
“Volunteer Formations of Territorial Communities”. The provisions of Article 8 of the Law of Ukraine “On Fundamentals of National Resistance” have established civilian organizations that are under the command and control of the commander of the military unit of the Territorial Defence Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The tasks of the Volunteer Formations of Territorial Communities is to construct checkpoints, block movement of the enemy, and perform other tasks given them. The most significant change to the law included the clearly defined powers of the Special Operations Forces, which will lead the resistance movement, as well as giving volunteer fighters the right to use small arms.
“Members of voluntary formations of territorial communities have the right to use personal hunting weapons, small arms, other weapons and ammunition while performing territorial defense tasks, in accordance with the procedure established by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.”
Foreign Volunteers? Russia Will Prosecute. Volunteers from across the globe are traveling to Ukraine to fight against the Russians. Apparently several hundred volunteers have arrived in Ukraine to fight alongside Ukrainian forces. The Ukrainian embassy in Washington, D.C. says they have received more than 3,000 applications for U.S. citizens wanting to help out. Many of them are military veterans. Once in the Ukraine they are integrated into the International Legion of Territorial Defense of Ukraine. The Russian Defense Ministry says that military contractors sent by Western countries and ‘foreign mercenaries’ will be prosecuted. It is likely that this announcement will not apply to the Wagner Group. Read more:
The Coming Resistance
U.S. SOF and Ukraine. From intelligence gathering to training civilians in guerrilla tactics, here’s what the U.S. and NATO might do to push back against the Russian invasion while avoiding escalation. “How U.S. Special Forces Can Fight Putin Without Starting World War III”, by Jeremy Kryt, Daily Beast, March 1, 2022.
Insurgency? Long and Bloody. Thomas Pepinsky, a professor of government and public policy at Cornell University, writes that the Ukrainians should steel themselves for a long and difficult insurgency in the months and years ahead. The Ukrainians are unlikely to defeat the larger and better equipped Russian army they are confronted with. So an insurgency seems to be the only alternative to capitulation. Insurgent warfare is designed to grind down the occupying force’s resolve. But that takes months if not years. “A Ukrainian Insurgency Will Be Long and Bloody”, Modern War Institute at West Point, March 3, 2022.

Cyber and Information Operations
Hackers on both sides of the conflict continue their efforts in cyberspace. Some social media platforms are being restricted or shutdown – in Russia and around the world by respective nations. The United States is considering a bill in Congress entitled Strengthening American Cybersecurity Act of 2022. Despite the fact that Russia has a huge army of cyber warriors it seems to have not coordinated a pre-invasion cyber attack very effectively, and its current operations are not decisive. It cyberwar overrated?
Hackers Targeting Refugee Orgs. Cyber hackers from Belarus are going after organizations that are helping Ukrainian refugees and delivering humanitarian aid to Ukraine. Phishing attacks have been launched from emails pretending to be from the Ukrainian security services. “Warning: Hackers are Targeting the Ukraine Refugee Crisis”, Forbes, March 2, 2022.
Hacktivists and Cyber War. Some computer techies have a criminal focus. But we now see them opposing each other as they align with Russia or Ukraine in the current conflict. Hacktivists around the world have got involved in the Ukraine War. Ukraine put out a call for a digital army to help it resist the Russian invasion. Anonymous and other individual hackers have answered the call. Russia’s cyber army has been building its cyber capabilities over the past 15 years. “The cyberwar over Ukraine is like nothing we’ve seen before”, Deutsche Welle, March 3, 2022.
The Cyberspace War – Podcast. Russian soldiers continue to push toward Kyiv. In cyberspace, a volunteer Ukrainian cyber army, hacktivists, and cybercriminals are battling for impact in an increasingly chaotic information war. “How the battle between Russia and Ukraine has developed in cyberspace”, National Public Radio, March 3, 2022.
Russia Today (RT). The production company for RT America has laid off a majority of its staff. DirecTV, one of the main television providers, dropped RT America. This news network has been a mouthpiece for Russian propaganda for many years.
Russia, the Media, and the War. Media coverage of Russian troops invading Ukraine is unfolding differently in Russia than in the U.S. Using maps and disinformation, many television programs are shaping public opinion by justifying Moscow’s decision to attack its neighbor. “How Russian State Media is Portraying the War in Ukraine”, Wall Street Journal, March 3, 2022, YouTube, 6 minutes.
UATV. Watch broadcast TV in Ukraine live.
World Response
Project DYNAMO. A Tampa-based nonprofit that has been assisting in the evacuation effort of Afghans since the coming to power of the Taliban is now operating in Ukraine. Project DYNAMO recently coordinated for two buses of evacuees out of Ukraine since the Russian invasion took place. Thousands of people have requested assistance from Project DYNAMO – including American citizens, lawful permanent residents, and people from other nations. See “Tampa-based nonprofit, Project DYNAMO, rescues evacuees, including Americans, from Ukraine”, ABC Action News, March 1, 2022.
U.S. Offers TPS. The secretary for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Alejandro Mayorkas, has created a 18-month Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program for Ukrainians who have lived in the U.S. since March 1, 2022. This allows eligible people to apply for work permits and deportation protections. This TPS designation is expected to benefit 30,000 Ukrainians living in the U.S. on temporary student, tourist, or business visas. Read more in “Secretary Mayorkas Designates Ukraine for Temporary Protected Status for 18 Months”, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), March 3, 2022.
$10B Ukraine Fund. Congress has been asked to provide about $10 billion to cover the cost of troop deployments to Eastern Europe, covert support to Ukraine, U.S. weapons for Ukraine, humanitarian aid, and military aid. The request (see White House letter) was made on Thursday (Mar 3). See “White House seeks new $10B Ukraine fund with half for Pentagon”, Defense News, March 3, 2022.
Evac Groups and Maps. The Kabul non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) began in August 2021 after the fall of the Afghan government and the occupation of Kabul by the Taliban. Various volunteer groups formed up quickly to assist Afghans onto the Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) in Kabul. Some of the organizations had access to numerous mapping applications to assist in their operations. One of these apps was developed by a SOF-focused firm based in Tampa, Florida called Quiet Professionals. Read more in “Offering Hope to Those Left Behind in Afghanistan”, ESRI.com, Winter 2022.
EU Membership. Ukraine has already asked for membership in the European Union. Now Moldova and Georgia are also seeking EU membership. Both countries have asked the EU to begin membership talks.
Commentary
Avoiding the Larger War. While the United States and other NATO countries need to reinforce Eastern Europe and support the Ukrainian people, it needs to be careful not to escalate the current conflict into a larger war. Samuel Charap, a senior political scientist with RAND Corporation, provides some cautionary advice. “Ensuring Russia’s War with Ukraine Doesn’t Morph into Direct Conflict with NATO”, RAND Corporation, March 2, 2022.
Closing the Turkish Straits. The passage of ships through the Turkish Straits is regulated under the 1936 Montreux Convention. Turkey has the right to close the straits in time of war. On March 1, 2022, it closed the straits to warship transits. It is unclear if the closure is for just Russian warships or all warships. A professor of law at the U.S. Naval War College looks into the legal aspects of the Turkish move in “Closing the Turkish Straits in Times of War”, Articles of War, Lieber Institute West Point, March 3, 2022.
The Finnish Model of Defense. If you want ordinary people to make your society occupation-proof, you have to teach them to kill well before they need to do so. Ukraine failed in this respect. On the other hand, Finland seems quite prepared to repeat its performance of the 1939 Winter War. “How the Finns Deter Russian Invasion”, The Atlantic, March 3, 2022.
Avoiding WWIII. Aaron Stein is the director of research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He outlines some of the things that could happen that could get us into another world war. One scenario is the possibility of an encounter between opposing aircraft along the Polish Ukrainian border that escalates quickly. “Ukraine and a Guide to Avoiding World War III”, War on the Rocks, March 3, 2022.
SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, defense, or the current conflict in Ukraine then we are interested.
Maps and Other Resources
Russia-Ukraine Monitor Map. This map is a crowdsourced effort by the Centre for Information Resilience (CIR) and the wider open source community to provide reliable information for policymakers, journalists, and justice organizations about the evolving situations both on the ground and online.
UK Ministry of Defence. Check out the map posted by @DefenceHQ on Twitter.
Ukraine Graphics by Reuters. “Russia Invades Ukraine”
Ukraine Conflict Info. The Ukrainians have launched a new website that will provide information about the war. It is entitled Russia Invaded Ukraine and can be found at https://war.ukraine.ua/.
Janes Equipment Profile – Ukraine Conflict. An 81-page PDF provides information on the military equipment of the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces. Covers naval, air, electronic warfare, C4ISR, communications, night vision, radar, and armored fighting vehicles, Ukraine Conflict Equipment Profile, February 28, 2022.
Russian EW Capabilities. “Rah, Rah, Rash Putin?”, Armada International, March 2, 2022.
Arms Transfers to Ukraine. Forum on the Arms Trade.
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Image: Graphic by John Spencer, Chair of Urban Warfare Studies with the Madison Policy Forum. Major, US Army (ret). John tweets at @SpencerGuard
sof.news · by SOF News · March 4, 2022



10. RT America ceases productions and lays off most of its staff

Excerpts:

The news would mean an effective end to RT America. The network, one of Russian President Vladimir Putin's main mouthpieces in the US, was dropped earlier this week by DirecTV, dealing a major financial blow to it. The satellite carrier was one of the two major television providers in the US to carry the network.

Roku, a company that sells hardware which allows users to stream content through the internet, also said that it had banished RT America from its platform.

RT, which operates multiple networks across the world, has seen its reach significantly diminish in recent days as technology companies and television providers have moved to sever ties with it as a result of Russia's unprovoked war on Ukraine.



RT America ceases productions and lays off most of its staff
CNN · by Oliver Darcy, CNN Business
New York (CNN Business)RT America will cease productions and lay off most of its staff, according to a memo from T&R Productions, the production company behind the Russian state-funded network, which CNN obtained.
Misha Solodovnikov, the general manager of T&R Productions, told staff in the memo that it will be "ceasing production" at all of its locations "as a result of unforeseen business interruption events."
"Unfortunately, we anticipate this layoff will be permanent, meaning that this will result in the permanent separation from employment of most T&R employees at all locations," Solodovnikov wrote.
T&R Productions operated offices in New York, Miami, Los Angeles, and Washington, DC.
The news would mean an effective end to RT America. The network, one of Russian President Vladimir Putin's main mouthpieces in the US, was dropped earlier this week by DirecTV, dealing a major financial blow to it. The satellite carrier was one of the two major television providers in the US to carry the network.
Read More
Roku, a company that sells hardware which allows users to stream content through the internet, also said that it had banished RT America from its platform.

RT, which operates multiple networks across the world, has seen its reach significantly diminish in recent days as technology companies and television providers have moved to sever ties with it as a result of Russia's unprovoked war on Ukraine.
Several employees from RT's various networks have also publicly resigned from the outlet.
RT America employees who worked from the Washington, DC, bureau were told on Wednesday that an all-staff meeting would occur on Thursday afternoon, according to an email obtained by CNN.
When hosts, correspondents, producers, and others gathered in RT America's lounge, Solodovnikov delivered the news in person, a person who attended the meeting told CNN.
"The meeting was all of about two minutes," the attendee said, explaining that Solodovnikov told the assembled staff RT America would be stopping production and that staff would be provided two months pay.
The attendee, who requested anonymity to discuss the internal deliberations, told CNN that the mood was somber.
"A lot of people were shocked," the person said. "A lot of people were crying."
An RT America host, who also spoke to CNN on the condition of anonymity, said that she watched as her entire staff was told "their jobs were no more."
"I have never felt more heartbroken as they have nothing to do with this conflict and seriously were just trying to make a decent living to provide for their families," the host said.
Solodovnikov did not immediately respond to a request for comment. A spokesperson for RT America did not respond to multiple requests for comment.
CNN · by Oliver Darcy, CNN Business




11. False Claims of U.S. Biowarfare Labs in Ukraine Grip QAnon

QAnon cult quacks. QAnon: useful idiots or providing aid and comfort to the enemy?

False Claims of U.S. Biowarfare Labs in Ukraine Grip QAnon
The conspiracy theory has been boosted by Russian and Chinese media and diplomats.
By Justin Ling, a journalist based in Toronto.
Foreign Policy · by Justin Ling · March 2, 2022
Pro-Russian channels and QAnon conspiracy theorists think Moscow is launching airstrikes on Ukraine to destroy bioweapon-manufacturing labs in order to prevent the American infectious disease expert Anthony Fauci from creating a sequel to the COVID-19 virus.
This theory hangs on the entirely discredited idea that the coronavirus was designed as a bioweapon, perhaps by the U.S. government itself. And yet, the theory is being shared thousands of times, faster than regulated social media networks can yank the conspiracy theory down. On unregulated platforms, such as Telegram and 8chan, the conspiracy theory has become incredibly popular, racking up hundreds of thousands of hits each day.
The theory is now being actively contributed to, and promoted, by one Russian embassy, an official Russian state propaganda outlet, and media channels in Serbia and China.
Pro-Russian channels and QAnon conspiracy theorists think Moscow is launching airstrikes on Ukraine to destroy bioweapon-manufacturing labs in order to prevent the American infectious disease expert Anthony Fauci from creating a sequel to the COVID-19 virus.
This theory hangs on the entirely discredited idea that the coronavirus was designed as a bioweapon, perhaps by the U.S. government itself. And yet, the theory is being shared thousands of times, faster than regulated social media networks can yank the conspiracy theory down. On unregulated platforms, such as Telegram and 8chan, the conspiracy theory has become incredibly popular, racking up hundreds of thousands of hits each day.
The theory is now being actively contributed to, and promoted, by one Russian embassy, an official Russian state propaganda outlet, and media channels in Serbia and China.
The Russian government has laid the groundwork for this conspiracy for some time. In January, a Russian-language Telegram account warned that a “full-fledged network of biological laboratories has been deployed,” studying deadly viruses that are already making people sick in Kazakhstan with “American grants.” The Russian newspaper Izvestia ran a story in May 2020 making similar claims, and they have been repeated in pro-Russian Ukrainian news sites. A close advisor of Russian President Vladimir Putin himself has accused the United States of developing “more and more biological laboratories … mainly by the Russian and Chinese borders.”
The conspiracy has received past support in Chinese propaganda, after Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Hua Chunying said last May, in response to claims in Australian media about China’s own supposed biowarfare programs, that the United States had been secretly working on biolabs and had 16 in Ukraine alone. Chinese state media has repeatedly spread the false claim that the coronavirus originated from the U.S. Army base at Fort Detrick. The conspiracy theory even pushed the Security Service of Ukraine to debunk the allegation of American-run bioweapons facilities in 2020.
Yet the conspiracy theory emerged with new purpose this week. The most recent incarnation of this conspiracy theory seems to have begun with the moderately prominent—and now suspended—Twitter account @WarClandestine, which posted two maps comparing Russian airstrikes and “US biolabs in Ukraine.”
“It certainly appears Putin is targeting the cities and locations with #USBiolabs present,” the account tweeted. “He is 100% going after the alleged bioweapons.”
The @WarClandestine account, and others linked to it, do seem to legitimately belong to an American, whose first name is Jacob and who has occasionally posted images and video of himself—in one TikTok video, he says he served in the U.S. Army. Over the past two years, the account has frequently shared QAnon conspiracy theories, often racking up thousands of retweets on Twitter before being suspended from the platform for spreading misinformation.
In December 2020, the account earned mockery after sharing an overwrought story of a date that went badly due to his support for Donald Trump. In recent weeks, the account was closely following the anti-vaccine occupation in Canada, at one point tweeting at Ottawa’s police force: “We got enough rope for your fascist asses too. When all is said and done, you’ll be swinging with the rest of them.”
The supporting evidence for @WarClandestine’s Ukrainian bioweapons idea is flimsy, even by conspiracy theory standards: The account rests on little more than the assumption that all laboratories that accept American funding are responsible for creating bioweapons. It also uses the nebulous term “biolabs” to describe a wide swath of facilities, which are numerous and common in every European country.
But even a lazy conspiracy theory can take hold if it is promoted enough.
Within hours of the initial tweet, the conspiracy site Infowars published a story largely regurgitating the conspiracy theory. Not long after, the right-wing media site OpIndia ran a similar story. While Infowars’ social media reach is stunted by bans from most major websites, OpIndia’s version of the story was shared more than 2,500 times to Facebook. A constellation of other anti-vaccine and QAnon websites picked up the story from there. A write-up on one minor conspiracy site was shared widely among Bulgarian speakers.
Through all this, the hashtag #usbiolabs began trending. TikTok videos promoting the theory racked up tens of thousands of hits. “If you believe those U.S.-funded biolabs in Ukraine aren’t making biological weapons, please sit all the way down,” one TikTok user said. A YouTube video, regurgitating the Infowars shared, was viewed some 350,000 times by Tuesday afternoon. After Twitter suspended @WarClandestine, screencaps of his theory were posted on Reddit, on a part of the site notorious for disinformation known as “r/conspiracy,” where it hit nearly 2,000 upvotes. On the QAnon sections of the fringe message board 8chan, users linked a series of unconnected data points to flesh out the sensational tale.
The baseless nature of the conspiracy theory was picked up by such debunkers as Snopes and @PatriotTakes.
With Russia’s war effort struggling against fierce Ukrainian resistance, the Russians gave the story a boost.
On Feb. 27, the Russian Embassy in Bosnia and Herzegovina came out endorsing the theory, posting on Facebook, according to Serbian broadcaster N1, that the United States was “filling Ukraine with biolabs, which were—very possibly—used to study methods for destroying the Russian people at the genetic level.”
Requests for comment sent to the Russian embassies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada went unanswered.
@WarClandestine, after being suspended by Twitter, reappeared under a new account not-so-subtly labeled “Definitely Not Clandestine” to share the Serbian news item. “My hypothesis was correct!” he wrote, in a tweet that garnered more than a thousand retweets in a matter of hours. He has also popped up on the unregulated social media sites Gettr and Telegram.
By Tuesday morning, an official channel for Sputnik, a Kremlin-owned propaganda outlet, posted to Telegram: “Here are some of the documents on US biolabs in Ukraine,” posting documents from the U.S. government. (While they do not show anything nefarious or unusual, the documents appear to be offline as of Tuesday afternoon.) The idea has also returned to the fringes of Chinese state media, not heavily promoted but present in coverage.
Mention of these biolabs and the missing documents were seen hundreds of thousands of times across an array of Russian-language Telegram accounts, including several that have had a particularly large role in spreading pro-Kremlin propaganda since the war began and that were, immediately prior, sharing information complimentary of anti-vaccine convoys in the United States and Canada. One concluded that “the United States was engaged in the creation of a deadly virus in a biolaboratory in Kharkov”—the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv has been subject to a particularly brutal bombing campaign, with at least nine civilians dying in airstrikes on Monday.
The premise of the theory is baseless. Ukraine has no labs labeled as “BSL-4,” the highest grade that allows them to work on the most dangerous pathogens, and only one BSL-3 lab. American support for the facility is not secret and has funded science on a number of zoonotic diseases in Ukraine: Washington also funds facilities in Georgia and even Russia-friendly Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. The United States has been engaged in a program known as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which cooperates on reducing epidemiological risk in Ukraine and elsewhere: Some of the Russian reporting has mistranslated this as the “Special Defense Weapons Agency.”
We also know, from a U.S. intelligence community assessment and a preponderance of scientific evidence from around the world, that the COVID-19 virus was not a bioweapon. Just this week, new research bolstered the idea that the coronavirus spilled over from an animal host in a live animal market in Wuhan, China—further decreasing the likelihood it spread into the world after a lab leak.
This would not be the first time that a conspiracy theory was posted to Twitter and moved through the pipeline of QAnon and Infowars – ideas that sometimes emerge as dogma for the right wing of the Republican Party. Allegations that the billionaire philanthropist George Soros and World Economic Forum head Klaus Schwab are secretly plotting a global socialist takeover has become an increasingly common take—seen everywhere from the streets of Ottawa in recent weeks, to Trump’s official speeches, to government policy in authoritarian-leaning Hungary.
On Saturday, @WarClandestine, using the name Jacob, called in to the major QAnon-peddling RedPill78 podcast, which featured a special guest: Republican congressional candidate J.R. Majewski—whom host Zak Paine introduced as “fresh off the boat, having lunch with POTUS [Trump] today.” Majewski is seeking the Republican nomination in Ohio’s 9th Congressional District, a toss-up district where he has netted an impressive fundraising haul. He attended the Conservative Political Action Conference in Florida last month, where he took a selfie in the front row of Trump’s speech. He claimed on the livestream that he had lunch with Trump at Mar-a-Lago afterward, where they discussed Trump’s planned presidential campaign and the war in Ukraine.
The podcast host and guests expounded on the idea that the U.S. government had created the coronavirus— as well as HIV and other viral infections. “That truly does give us an avenue for military tribunals,” Jacob said.
At the end of the call, Jacob said he was keen to run for a congressional seat in Virginia in 2024.
Foreign Policy · by Justin Ling · March 2, 2022


12. EXPLAINER: How dangerous was Russia's nuclear plant strike?



EXPLAINER: How dangerous was Russia's nuclear plant strike?
AP · by DAVID RISING · March 4, 2022
BANGKOK (AP) — Europe’s largest nuclear power plant was hit by Russian shelling early Friday, sparking a fire and raising fears of a disaster that could affect all of central Europe for decades, like the 1986 Chernobyl meltdown.
Concerns faded after Ukrainian authorities announced that the fire had been extinguished, and while there was damage to the reactor compartment, the safety of the unit was not affected.
But even though the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant is of a different design than Chernobyl and is protected from fire, nuclear safety experts and the International Atomic Energy Agency warn that waging war in and around such facilities presents extreme risks.
One major concern, raised by Ukraine’s state nuclear regulator, is that if fighting interrupts power supply to the nuclear plant, it would be forced to use less-reliable diesel generators to provide emergency power to operating cooling systems. A failure of those systems could lead to a disaster similar to that of Japan’s Fukushima plant, when a massive earthquake and tsunami in 2011 destroyed cooling systems, triggering meltdowns in three reactors.
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The consequence of that, said Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, would be widespread and dire.
“If there is an explosion, that’s the end for everyone. The end for Europe. The evacuation of Europe,” he said in an emotional speech in the middle of the night, calling on nations to pressure Russia’s leadership to end the fighting near the plant.
“Only urgent action by Europe can stop the Russian troops. Do not allow the death of Europe from a catastrophe at a nuclear power station.”
WHAT HAPPENED?
After taking the strategic port city of Kherson, Russian forces moved into the territory near Zaporizhzhia and attacked the nearby city of Enerhodar to open a route to the plant late Thursday.
It was not immediately clear how the power plant was hit, but Enerhodar Mayor Dmytro Orlov said a Russian military column had been seen heading toward the nuclear facility and that loud shots were heard in the city.
Later Friday, Ukrainian authorities said Russia had taken over the nuclear plant.
Plant spokesman Andriy Tuz told Ukrainian television that early Friday morning, shells fell directly on the facility and set fire to one of its six reactors.
Initially, firefighters were not able to get near the flames because they were being shot at, Tuz said.
After speaking with Ukrainian authorities on Friday, Rafael Grossi, the director general of the IAEA, the U.N.’s nuclear watchdog, said a building next to the reactors was hit and not a reactor itself.
“All of the safety systems of the six reactors at the plant were not affected at all and there has been no release of radioactive material,” he said.
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“However, as you can imagine, the operator and the regulator have been telling us that the situation naturally continues to be extremely tense and challenging.”
Earlier this week, Grossi already had warned that the IAEA was “gravely concerned” with Russian forces conducting military operations so close nearby.
“It is of critical importance that the armed conflict and activities on the ground around Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and any other of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities in no way interrupts or endangers the facilities or the people working at and around them,” he said.
WHAT COULD HAVE HAPPENED?
The reactor that was hit was offline, but still contains highly radioactive nuclear fuel. Four of the other six reactors have now been taken offline, leaving only one in operation.
The reactors at the plant have thick concrete containment domes, which would have protected them from external fire from tanks and artillery, said Jon Wolfsthal, who served during the Obama administration as the senior director for arms control and nonproliferation at the National Security Council.
At the same time, a fire at a nuclear power plant is never a good thing, he said.
“We don’t want our nuclear power plants to come under assault, to be on fire, and to not have first responders be able to access them,” he said.
Another danger at nuclear facilities are the pools where spent fuel rods are kept to be cooled, which are more vulnerable to shelling and which could cause the release of radioactive material.
Perhaps the biggest issue, however, is the plant’s power supply, said Najmedin Meshkati, an engineering professor at the University of Southern California who has studied both the Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters, raising a concern also voiced by Wolfsthal and others.
The loss of off-site power could force the plant to rely on emergency diesel generators, which are highly unreliable and could fail or run out of fuel, causing a station blackout that would stop the water circulation needed to cool the spent fuel pool, he said.
“That is my big — biggest concern,” he said.
David Fletcher, a University of Sydney professor in its School of Chemical and Biomolecular Engineering, who previously worked at UK Atomic Energy, noted that even shutting down the reactors would not help if the cooling system failed in such a way.
“The real concern is not a catastrophic explosion as happened at Chernobyl but damage to the cooling system which is required even when the reactor is shut down,” he said in a statement. “It was this type of damage that led to the Fukushima accident.”
WHAT CONCERNS REMAIN?
Ukraine is heavily reliant on nuclear energy, with 15 reactors at four stations that provide about half the country’s electricity.
In the wake of the attack on Zaporizhzhia, U.S. President Joe Biden, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and others called for an immediate end to the fighting there.
Following a conversation with Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal, IAEA Director Grossi appealed to all parties to “refrain from actions” that could put Ukraine’s nuclear power plants in danger.
Shmyhal called on western nations to close the skies over the country’s nuclear plants.
“It is a question of the security of the whole world!” he said in a statement.
Ukraine is also home to the former Chernobyl nuclear plant, where radioactivity is still leaking, which was taken by Russian forces in the opening of the invasion after a fierce battle with the Ukrainian national guards protecting the decommissioned facility.
In an appeal to the IAEA for help earlier this week, Ukrainian officials said that Chernobyl staff have been held by the Russian military without rotation and are exhausted.
Grossi earlier this week appealed to Russia to let the Chernobyl staff “do their job safely and effectively.”
During fighting on the weekend, Russian fire also hit a radioactive waste disposal facility in Kyiv and a similar facility in Kharkiv.
Both contained low-level waste such as those produced through medical use, and no radioactive release has been reported, but Grossi said the incidents should serve as a warning.
“The two incidents highlight the risk that facilities with radioactive material may suffer damage during the armed conflict, with potentially severe consequences,” he said.
James Acton, the co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said the simple key to keeping the facilities safe was to immediately end any military operations around them.
“Under normal circumstances, the likelihood of a reactor losing power and of the emergency diesel generators being damaged and of not being repaired adequately quickly is very, very small,” Acton said.
“But in a war, all of these different failures that would have to happen for a reactor to become damaged and meltdown — the likelihood of all of those happening becomes much more likely than it does in peacetime.”
Mitsuru Fukuda, a professor at Nihon University in Tokyo and expert on crisis management and security, said the Zaporizhzhia attack raises broader questions for all countries.
“Many of us did not expect a respected country’s military would take such an outrageous step,” he said. ”Now that (Russian President Vladimir) Putin has done it, not only Ukraine but the international community, including Japan, should reevaluate the risk of having nuclear plants as potential wartime targets.”
_____
Associated Press writers Lynn Berry and Michael Biesecker in Washington, Jon Gambrell in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and Mari Yamaguchi in Tokyo contributed to this report.
AP · by DAVID RISING · March 4, 2022





13. Putin and his band of dictators: Russia is supported by four regimes in UN vote
The captains have chosen their teams and it is clear who is on which side.


Putin and his band of dictators: Russia is supported by four regimes in UN vote while other nations including China and India continue to walk diplomatic tightrope
PUBLISHED: 05:34 EST, 3 March 2022 | UPDATED: 05:34 EST, 3 March 2022
Daily Mail · by Jack Newman For Mailonline · March 3, 2022
Russia has been fiercely rebuked by the UN in a new resolution deploring Vladimir Putin's savage invasion of Ukraine which also called for the immediate removal of his troops.
In an emergency session, 141 countries stood with Ukraine and voted in favour of the resolution in a thumping majority, showing the world's solidarity with Volodymyr Zelensky and his defiant countrymen against the invading forces.
But Putin still retained the support of his band of tyrants and despots, with four countries voting alongside Russia against the resolution, while 35 countries abstained.
The anti-democratic regimes of North Korea, Belarus, Eritrea and Syria, each led by dictators accused of human rights violations or even war crimes, backed Putin in their two-fingered salute to the West and the people of Ukraine.
Other countries continued to walk a diplomatic tightrope by abstaining or refusing to vote, through fear of upsetting relations with Russia.
Among them, China, India and Pakistan refused to condemn Putin in order to preserve their vital trade links with the nation which is now facing serious economic woes after being targeted by sanctions.
China, which has territorial ambitions of its own in Taiwan, said it wants to broker peace and has accused NATO of provoking Russia through eastern expansion, while at the same time 'deploring the outbreak of conflict'.
Others such as Venezuela who have backed Putin throughout the invasion, were unable to show their support after losing their UN voting rights due to unpaid fees.
But the vote does starkly reveal the self-interested nations putting their own economic ties above the safety of Ukrainians in the face of heavy bombardment from Russia.
Here, MailOnline takes a look at the countries that have planted their flag in Putin's camp and those who are cowering in the shadows.


In Wednesday's vote, 141 countries voted in favour of the resolution to condemn Russia, five voted against and 35 abstained
Putin's backers
Belarus
The neighbouring countries of Belarus and Russia share more than just a land border.
The former Soviet nations have important economic and political ties, with Russia accounting for 48 per cent of Belarus' external trade.
The two nations also share similarly-minded strongmen at the helm, with authoritarian Alexander Lukashenko enjoying the role of Putin's war-mongering sidekick.
He owes him loyalty after Putin backed the then-beleaguered Belarusian leader when protests nearly ousted him from power under his repressive regime without fair and free elections.
Lukashenko, who has been accused of human rights violations for his crackdown on the press, has since allowed Russian forces to engage in war games on his territory in the lead-up to the invasion and take part in joint military drills while amassing troops on the Ukraine border.
A US official has now claimed Belarus will join Russia in the war just after a referendum on Sunday approved a new constitution ditching the country's non-nuclear status.

Vladimir Putin and Alexander Lukashenko are close allies, with Belarus now the target of sanctions for its role in the war

Lukashenko allowed Russian forces to engage in war games on his territory in the lead-up to the invasion
The American official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to the Washington Post, said that 'it's very clear [Belarus' capital] Minsk is now an extension of the Kremlin.
Belarus' role in the invasion so far has already resulted in sanctions from Britain and the EU.
Sanctions will hit 'some economic sectors, and in particular timber, steel and potash,' the EU said in a statement.
Belarus was one of only four other counties to support Russia on Wednesday's vote.
Syria
Bashar al-Assad has praised Putin for his deadly invasion and denounced Western 'hysteria' over Russia's actions.
The Syrian leader, who himself has been accused of war crimes for the use of chemical weapons which Putin denied, said events in Ukraine are 'a correction of history and restoration of balance which was lost in the world after the breakup of the Soviet Union'.
He added: 'Syria stands with the Russian Federation based on its conviction that its position is correct and because confronting NATO expansionism is a right for Russia.'
Russia and Syria have enjoyed strong relations with the Soviet Union previously supporting Syrian independence.

Putin embraces Bashar Al Assad in Sochi in 2017. Russia and Syria have enjoyed strong relations with the Soviet Union previously supporting Syrian independence
The alliance was strengthened between the two leaders when Putin entered the Syrian civil war in support of the dictatorship.
The decision to join the war was Moscow's first military action outside the former Soviet Union since the federation's collapse.
It saved Assad's government and turned the tide of the war in his favour, enabling the Syrian leader to brutally reassert control over much of Syria.
Russian airstrikes often indiscriminately hit hospitals, schools and markets.
The war-ravaged country became a testing ground for Russian weapons and tactics that it can now bring to bear in Ukraine.

Russian presence: Putin's soldiers walk past a Russian military police vehicle at a position in the north-eastern Syrian city of Kobane
Within Syria, Russia added a soft power campaign. In some areas, festivals were put on to popularise Russian culture, Russian national songs were played on Syrian television, self-serving propaganda was churned out and hot meals were served to civilians.
Assad owes much to Putin for his intervention, and he has now returned the favour to Russia by signalling his support in the UN resolution.
North Korea
North Korea broke its silence on Russia's invasion of Ukraine on Monday, blaming the 'hegemonic policy' and 'high-handedness' of the US and the West.
In its first official statement on Russia's attack, the Foreign Ministry said that the West was guilty of 'abuse of power'.
'The root cause of the Ukraine crisis totally lies in the hegemonic policy of the U.S. and the West, which enforce themselves in high-handedness and abuse of power against other countries,' the North's official KCNA news agency said, citing an unnamed foreign ministry spokesperson.


The Soviet-era allies who share an 11-mile-long border are both motivated by anti-West and anti-NATO sentiments
North Korea accused Washington and its allies of 'ignoring Russia's reasonable and legitimate demands' for guaranteeing legally backed security assurances.
They 'systematically undercut the European security environment by pursuing the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's expansion towards the east, including blatantly deploying attack weapons systems,' KCNA said.
'The reality proves once again that as long as the U.S. unilateral and double-dealing policy that threatens a sovereign country's peace and safety exists, there will never be peace in the world.'
The Soviet-era allies who share an 11-mile-long border are both motivated by anti-West and anti-NATO sentiments and have nuclear capabilities.
Eritrea
The Eastern African nation is a one-party state ruled by Isias Afwerki who has never held an election since gaining power in 1993.
The country's human rights record regularly ranks among the lowest in the world with virtually no freedom of the press and 10,000 political prisoners locked up and subjected to torture.
It is no surprise then that the regimes of Russia and China have cosied up to the regime.

Eritrea is a one-party state ruled by Isias Afwerki who has never held an election since gaining power in 1993
Afwerki signed up to China's Belt and Road initiative last year, shortly after refusing to condemn the abuse of Uighur Muslims under President Xi.
Russia has also been considering building a military base in the Horn of Africa country to gain more of a foothold on the continent.
Eritrea has been the target of international sanctions including the supply of arms and military equipment, but Russia has frequently opposed the measures.
The partnership is mutually beneficial with Russia wanting use of the strategic ports by the Red Sea, with Eritrea gaining the support of a global superpower after decades of isolationism.
The UN vote shows the country's continuing support for Russia.
Venezuela
According to the Kremlin, Venezuela's leader Nicolas Maduro offered 'strong support' to Putin on Tuesday.
The authoritarian pair discussed an increasing strategic partnership in a phone call after Maduro denounced 'the perverse plans that seek to surround Russia militarily and strategically'.
And last week, Venezuela's foreign ministry blamed the US for the violence perpetrated by Russia.
They said in a statement: 'The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela expresses its worry over the worsening of the crisis in Ukraine, and laments the mockery and violation of the Minsk accords on the part of NATO, encouraged by the United States of America.
But on Wednesday, the country was unable to vote and show their support for Putin in the UN because it had lost its voting rights due to unpaid fees.
The UN ordered Venezuela to pay £30million to restore its voting rights.



Putin's Hollywood lackey Steven Seagal, a Russian special envoy, presents Nicolas Maduro with a sword in Caracas last year
Venezuela is Russia's most important trading ally in Latin America as an anti-US left-wing state.
During the Soviet Union, relations were established during the two countries and these continued under Hugo Chavez who bought billions of pounds worth of arms from his ally.
During the current presidential crisis in Venezuela, Putin has pledged his support to Maduro and recognised his election wins which others have deemed fraudulent.
The two nations have carried out joint military exercises and share an opposition to the West, worsened by sanctions imposed against Maduro's perceived illegitimate government.
'Neutrals' or so-called allies sitting on the fence
China
China's support of Russia was viewed as a bellwether on whether the invasion would spark similar actions worldwide, with President Xi known to have designs on Taiwan.
The Communist Party has tried to avoid voicing too much support to either Russia or Ukraine in a bid to stay neutral.
Last week, China was one of only a handful of countries who decided to abstain from voting on a UN Security Council resolution condemning Russia's illegal invasion.
They made the same move on Wednesday, continuing the balancing act in order to maintain its diplomatic ties.


China has found itself walking a diplomatic tightrope after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine took many in Beijing by apparent surprise. Picturd: Chinese President Xi Jinping, right, and Russian President Vladimir Putin talk during a meeting in Beijing, February 4, 2022
China has so far refused to call Russia's action in Ukraine an 'invasion' or criticise the Kremlin despite intensifying assaults from Putin's military.
Beijing has also thrown Moscow another sanction-busting lifeline by lifting wheat import restrictions in an economic boost to Moscow despite sweeping sanctions imposed by the West in a bid to stop the war.
Imports had been restricted in recent months over concern over Russia's measures to prevent plant diseases, particularly in agricultural crops.
The move to keep the market open was reportedly part of a deal between Moscow and Beijing concluded earlier this month and is the latest sign of growing ties between the two states.


China's UN Ambassador Zhang Jun addresses the United Nations Security Council, Friday, Feb. 25, 2022. Last night, China, India and the UAE abstained from voting on a UN Security Council resolution condemning Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine
But it was also reported over the weekend that several Chinese public banks are limiting financing to purchase raw materials from Russia for fear of Western sanctions should they be seen to be supporting the Kremlin.
About 30 percent of oil and gas produced in Russia now sold to China.
Putin is relying on his ties to China's Xi Jinping to bail him out of the increasingly tough sanctions being put on Moscow by Western nations as the invasion escalates.
In China's latest statement, Foreign Minister Wang Yi said Beijing 'deeply regrets that conflict has broken out between Ukraine and Russia, and is paying extreme attention to the harm suffered by civilians', state broadcaster CCTV reported, adding that Wang called for the two countries to 'find a way to resolve the issue through negotiations'.
India
Narendra Modi's government has also been trying to perform a balancing act and abstained in both UN resolutions.
India has not explicitly condemned Russia's actions or called them an invasion, nor voiced support for Putin, leading to pleas from the US and Ukraine to 'do the right thing'.
The Russian embassy in India welcomed their stance, saying: 'Highly appreciate India's independent and balanced position at the voting in the UNSC.


India has not explicitly condemned Russia's actions or called them an invasion, nor voiced support for Putin
'In the spirit of the special and privileged strategic partnership, Russia is committed to maintain close dialogue with India on the situation around Ukraine.'
Russia continues to be India's biggest arms suppliers and the two vast nations were close during the Soviet era.
Putin supplies 49 per cent of India's weapons, although this has dropped from 70 per cent in recent years due to a boost in domestic manufacturing.
Russia is also providing the S-400 missile defence system to India, giving it a deterrence against China and Pakistan amid their border disputes.
Moscow has previously vetoed UN resolutions over Kashmir to preserve its ties with India, and Modi appears to be following suit.
Michael Kugelman, deputy director at think tank the Wilson Center, told the BBC: 'India doesn't seem comfortable with what is happening in Ukraine but it's not likely to change its stand.
'It simply can't afford to do so at the moment because of its defence and geopolitical needs.'
India also has 20,000 students in Ukraine and doesn't want to take a stance that could endanger their welfare, instead preferring to keep all diplomatic channels open.
Modi has spoken with Ukraine but only to express concern over the violence as he attempts to avoid getting drawn into the international row.
Cuba
Like Venezuela, Cuba has pledged allegiance to Russia and placed the blame with the US and the West, but it stopped short of joining Russia in the UN vote and instead chose to abstain.
The nation has criticised the US for imposing 'the progressive expansion of NATO towards the borders of the Russian Federation' while calling for a diplomatic solution.
In a statement, the foreign ministry said: 'The US government has been threatening Russia for weeks and manipulating the international community about the dangers of an 'imminent massive invasion' of Ukraine.

Cuba and Russia have had close relations since the Soviet Union when ballistic missiles were placed there by Nikita Khrushchev (pictured together in 1963)
'It has supplied weapons and military technology, deployed troops to several countries in the region, applied unilateral and unjust sanctions, and threatened other reprisals.'
Cuba and Russia have had close relations since the Soviet Union when ballistic missiles were placed there by Nikita Khrushchev, sparking the Cuban Missile Crisis.
After the 1959 Cuban Revolution led by Fidel Castro, the new Marxist-Leninist administration sought a close alliance with the Soviets.
The resulting sanctions and embargos from the US moved Cuba further into the Soviet sphere and the countries have maintained their strong relations following the collapse of the superpower.
Cuba also recognised Crimea as part of Russia during the 2014 annexation.
Pakistan
Pakistan became the first major nation to back Putin as it signed the first new trade deal with Russia since the invasion earlier this week.
Prime Minister and former cricketer Imran Khan said his country will import about 2million tons of wheat and supplies of natural gas after meeting the Russian President last Thursday - the day he sent troops into its sovereign neighbour.
Despite Russia facing international isolation and a raft of sanctions crippling its economy, Khan has defended potentially pumping billions into the Kremlin's coffers saying Pakistan's economic interests 'required it'.

A Pakistani man gestures as Imran Khan addresses the nation having announced that he has done a deal for gas and wheat with Russia

Imran Khan (pictured with Putin last week) said that 'God willing' the trade deal will be good for Pakistan, which stands alone in supporting the Kremlin financially since it declared war
He said of the two-day trip: 'We went there because we have to import 2million tons of wheat from Russia. Secondly, we have signed agreements with them to import natural gas because Pakistan's own gas reserves are depleting,' Khan said, adding: 'Inshallah (God willing), the time will tell that we have had great discussions'.
Pakistan has expressed concern about the invasion but stopped short of condemning it and remained neutral in Wednesday's vote.
Top diplomats from 22 countries jointly called on Pakistani government to support the new resolution but Khan refused.
Central Asia
The nations of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan have all tried to remain out of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
The countries maintain strategic partnerships with Russia but none of their governments have spoken out in support of the invasion.
The Kremlin claims the respective leaders 'respect' the land grab but this has been refuted by their governments.
Some of the countries are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization military alliance with Russia, but they have already said they will refuse to send troops to Ukraine.
The neutrality is a result of the nations wanting to maintain ties with the US, Ukraine and Russia at the same time.
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan refused to vote on Wednesday while the other countries abstained.
Mali and Central African Republic
The presence of the Wagner Group of mercenaries in Africa has led to pro-Russian sentiment in Mali and the Central African Republic.
The group is considered by military experts to be at the beck and call of Vladimir Putin, although the Kremlin has repeatedly denied this.
The force has already been heavily involved in supplying weapons, experienced special operations personnel, and military training to pro-Russian militias in eastern Ukraine, according to military sources.

Vladimir Putin poses with four alleged Wagner officers at a function at the Kremlin - which denies any involvement with Russian mercenary groups
It has previously been deployed to Africa, where it has carried out black ops operations that the Kremlin wants done while avoiding direct responsibility.
The army-for-hire is allegedly run by oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin - a close ally of the Russian president who is often dubbed 'Putin's chef'.
Wagner Group has been involved in fighting across Africa, including in Syria, Libya, Mozambique and the Central African Republic - with observers noting the close correlation between their actions and the Kremlin's own policy aims.
Wagner's appearance in Mali was one of the reasons given by French president Emmanuel Macron for his decision to pull out 2,400 troops from the country, where they had been fighting jihadists.
Mr Macron suspected the mercenaries had struck a deal with Mali's ruling junta.
Their presence in Africa has given Russia influence and access to valuable mineral deposits.
Protests have broken out with supporters waving Russian flags in Mali and the governments have refused to condemn Putin.
South Africa
South Africa's Department of International Relations and Cooperation last week called on Russia to withdraw its troops and respects Ukraine's sovereignty and integrity.
But President Cyril Ramaphosa has now effectively rescinded the statement, wanting to take a more neutral stance.
An updated statement by ambassador Mathu Joyini failed to condemn or even name Russia, saying: 'South Africa is of the view that this armed conflict, like all others, will result in unnecessary human suffering and destruction with global ramifications.
'In situations of conflict, the most vulnerable tend to suffer most, during and post the conflict.'
The neutrality moves South Africa in line with the BRICS block of major emerging economies comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
Ramaphosa's supporters say the line is consistent with the country's tradition of nonalignment in warfare.
Reluctant voters
Myanmar
Myanmar's military government had expressed support for Putin and his territorial ambitions in Ukraine, before siding with the West and NATO in Wednesday's vote.
General Zaw Min Tun, a spokesperson for the junta's council, said: 'Number one is that Russia has worked to consolidate its sovereignty.
'I think this is the right thing to do. Number two is to show the world that Russia is a world power.'


Military trucks with soldiers inside are parked behind police security standing guard behind a road barricade in Mandalay, Myanmar, Feb. 19, 2021
The government in exile has backed Ukraine, saying in a Twitter statement it condemned Russia's actions.
The support from the junta comes as a result of Russia and China's military backing.
A UN human rights expert said last week the two powers are providing Myanmar's military junta with fighter jets that are being used to slaughter civilians.
The report said Russia had supplied drones, two types of fighter jets, and two kinds of armoured vehicles, one with air defence systems.
Russia has been the generals' closest international allies amid efforts by the West to isolate them, but that failed to secure their support in the UN resolution.
Brazil
In Brazil, there is a stark divide between the government's official line and Jair Bolsonaro's favourable view of Putin and Russia.
The authoritarian has declined to condemn the invasion of Ukraine, while departing from his government's official stance of neutrality.
On Wednesday, the government went even further and supported the resolution despite Bolsonaro's overtures.
The far-right populist recently snubbed US entreaties not to visit Putin in Moscow ahead of the invasion, and angered Western allies by saying he was 'in solidarity with Russia,' without elaborating.
On Friday, Brazil voted for a draft U.N. Security Council resolution that would have denounced the Russian invasion of Ukraine, despite reluctance by Bolsonaro. Russia vetoed the resolution.


In Brazil, there is a stark divide between the government's official line and Jair Bolsonaro's favourable view of Putin and Russia
At a press conference, Bolsonaro said he spoke for two hours with Putin. In a subsequent statement, the country's foreign ministry said Bolsonaro did not speak with Putin on Sunday, but was instead referring to his conversation with the Russian leader in Moscow.
In Sunday's press conference, Bolsonaro said Brazil will remain neutral in the conflict, noting Russia and Ukraine were 'practically brother nations.'
'We will not take sides, we will continue being neutral, and help with whatever is possible,' Bolsonaro said. 'A big part of Ukraine's population speaks Russian.'
Asked by a reporter whether he was willing to condemn Putin's actions, he said he would wait for a final report, or see how the situation is resolved, before giving his opinion.
He added that he was against any sanctions that could bring negative repercussions for Brazil, citing Russian fertilizers which are crucial for the country's giant agribusiness sector.
Bolsonaro also said he did not think Putin's forces would carry out any mass bloodletting in Ukraine.
'A chief of state like that of Russia does not want to undertake a massacre, anywhere,' he said, adding that in two southern regions of Ukraine, some 90% of the population wanted to 'approximate themselves to Russia.'
In reference to Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskiy, Bolsonaro said Ukrainians have 'placed the hope of their nation in the hands of a comedian.'
On Saturday, Bolsonaro tweeted his government would not cease in efforts to evacuate Brazilians from Ukraine.
'I ask all Brazilians in contested territory to stay firm, follow instructions and report any incidents to us. I know about the difficulties, but we won't spare any efforts to solve them,' Bolsonaro wrote on Twitter.
On Sunday, Bolsonaro said his government had so far managed to remove some 70 Brazilians from Ukraine.
Daily Mail · by Jack Newman For Mailonline · March 3, 2022





14. The U.S. Is Not at War, But Its Civil Society Is Mobilizing Against Russia

Questions raised below:

This massive show of what is sometimes called “non-state soft power” may be the first experiment in a new kind of conflict, or at any rate a broad-based version of something that has only happened before at much smaller scales. While no state of war exists between the government of the United States and the government of Russia, a sort of opt-in, cultural-economic quasi-war exists between American civil society and the Russian government. The same goes for many if not all of the other countries arrayed against Russia. This raises lots of interesting and difficult questions:

The U.S. Is Not at War, But Its Civil Society Is Mobilizing Against Russia
The massive use of “non-state soft power” raises difficult questions.
by BENJAMIN PARKER  MARCH 4, 2022 5:30 AM
thebulwark.com · by Benjamin Parker · March 4, 2022
What happens when an entire society goes to war—but the government doesn’t? That might be what’s going on right now in response to Russian dictator Vladimir Putin’s “special operation” against Ukraine. Governments from Tallinn to Tokyo have imposed sanctions, closed airspace to Russian aviation, and denounced Putin’s war of naked aggression at the U.N. But the response from the free world didn’t end there.
Where governments stopped, other entities picked up. Companies with financial risk were among the first: BP and Exxon pulled out of joint ventures in Russia and Boeing announced that it would discontinue all activity in the country—no new planes, no spare parts, no access to maintenance manuals. Warner Bros. announced that its new movie, The Batman, won’t be released in Russia. The list goes on: Renault, FedEx, UPS, Maersk, Bain, Boston Consulting, McKinsey, Apple, etc. Have so many major companies abandoned a market of 140 million people so quickly when their own country was not a belligerent?
Outside Russia, YouTube has blocked channels belonging to RT and Sputnik, and Google has dropped the Russian propaganda networks from its news services. (Putin, meanwhile, has been blocking various U.S.-based platforms from Russia—apparently as a matter of censorship, not retaliation.)

Podcast · March 03 2022
Zelensky has inspired the world and led a continent to change its foreign policy. But…
Yes, profit-maximizing companies have completely apolitical reasons to avoid risk and to give up on any project in which their return was to be denominated in rubles (the ruble has lost about 40 percent of its value against the dollar in the last month; as various Twitter wags have put it, the ruble is turning to rubble).
But there’s more. The international hacking group Anonymous declared war on Putin’s Russia. Not long after, the official website of the Russian presidential administration, kremlin.ru, went down and Russian TV channels, all of which either directly or indirectly answer to the government, suddenly started broadcasting Ukrainian songs. Anonymous also took credit for lifting the personal information of 120,000 members of the Russian armed forces from a Defense Ministry database.
A group called the Belarusian Cyber Partisans hacked into the Belarusian railway system to stymie the movement of Russian troops toward the Ukrainian border.
And a Florida student whose previous hobby was tracking Elon Musk’s private plane around the world now devotes his attention to tracking the jets of Russian oligarchs. Another good Samaritan, funded through Patreon, has started tracking their yachts.
Some of the actions of these private individuals and institutions were predictable consequences of the U.S. and international sanctions imposed on Russia. But many others have arisen spontaneously, the uncoordinated reactions of people and organizations moved by their innate humanity to oppose Putin.
This massive show of what is sometimes called “non-state soft power” may be the first experiment in a new kind of conflict, or at any rate a broad-based version of something that has only happened before at much smaller scales. While no state of war exists between the government of the United States and the government of Russia, a sort of opt-in, cultural-economic quasi-war exists between American civil society and the Russian government. The same goes for many if not all of the other countries arrayed against Russia. This raises lots of interesting and difficult questions:
How many of these institutions have thought about the long term? Will they keep up these restrictions indefinitely if the war on Ukraine becomes an indefinite occupation?
Can the Russian government retaliate against American civil society?
Does the American government have a duty to protect these groups from retaliation, even if, like the hackers, they violate American law?
What happens if the foreign policy of the United States and the actions of these entities moving against Russia conflict?
How vulnerable is the United States to the kind of treatment Putin is getting?
Democracies probably have an advantage in this new arena of political warfare. Openness, transparency, and pluralism probably make it harder to rally such fervent, united opposition from people and organizations around the world. If they have a disadvantage, it’s that an authoritarian country would have an easier time organizing non-state soft power campaigns in the first place—but after all, isn’t that what Putin has been doing for years, anyway?
thebulwark.com · by Benjamin Parker · March 4, 2022




15. Fire out at Ukraine nuclear plant after Russian attack, no radiation released

Fire out at Ukraine nuclear plant after Russian attack, no radiation released
militarytimes.com · by Jim Heintz, The Associated Press · March 4, 2022
The latest details about Russia’s attack on Ukraine:
Russians take over plant
5:53 a.m. EST March 4
Ukrainian firefighters on Friday extinguished a blaze at Europe’s biggest nuclear plant that was ignited by a Russian attack and no radiation was released, U.N. and Ukrainian officials said, as Russian forces pressed their campaign to cripple the country despite global condemnation.
The head of the United Nations’ atomic agency said that a Russian “projectile” hit a training center at the Zaporizhzhia plant. Ukrainian officials have said Russian troops took control of the overall site, but the plant’s staff are continuing to ensure its operations. International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi sad that Russian forces were at the plant, but the Ukrainians were in control.
Ukraine’s state nuclear plant operator Enerhoatom said that three Ukrainian soldiers were killed and two wounded in the attack. Grossi said two people were injured in the blaze that broke out.
Ukraine’s state nuclear regulator earlier said that no changes in radiation levels have been recorded so far after the plant came under attack. Grossi later said no radioactive material was released.
The attack caused worldwide concern — and evoked memories of the world’s worst nuclear disaster, at Ukraine’s Chernobyl.
The shelling of the plant came as the Russian military advanced on a strategic city on the Dnieper River near where the facility is located, and gained ground in their bid to cut the country off from the sea. That move would deal a severe blow to Ukraine’s economy and could worsen an already dire humanitarian situation.
With the invasion in its second week, another round of talks between Russia and Ukraine yielded a tentative agreement to set up safe corridors to evacuate citizens and deliver humanitarian aid to the country, overturned by a war that has sent more than 1 million fleeing over the border and countless others sheltering underground night after night. A handful cities are without heat and at least one is struggling to get food and water.
Initial reports conflicted over whether one or two fires broke out at the plant in the city of Enerhodar. Nuclear plant spokesman Andriy Tuz told Ukrainian television overnight that shells fell directly on the facility, and set fire to reactor No. 1, which is under renovation and not operating, and to an administrative training building.
On Friday morning, officials only referenced a blaze at the training building when they said that all fires at the plant were out — which Grossi also confirmed. The regional military administration reported unspecified damage to the compartment of reactor No. 1, but said it does not affect the safety of the power unit.
The nuclear regulator said staff are studying the site to check for other damage.
Grossi confirmed Friday that the building hit was a training center and “not part of the reactor.” He said he did not know what hit the plant but called a “projectile” from Russian forces.
He said that only one reactor at the plant is operating, at about 60% capacity.
The confusion itself underscored the dangers of active fighting near a nuclear power plant. It was the second time since the invasion began just over a week ago that concerns about a nuclear accident or a release of radiation materialized, following a battle at Chernobyl.
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A Ukrainian defense official said that they've received more than 3,000 applications for U.S. citizens wanting to fight.
The regulator noted in a statement on Facebook the importance of maintaining the ability to cool nuclear fuel, saying the loss of such ability could lead to an accident even worse than 1986 Chernobyl disaster or the 2011 Fukushima meltdowns in Japan. It also noted that there is a storage facility for spent nuclear fuel at the site, though there was no sign that facility was hit by shelling.
Leading nuclear authorities were worried but not panicked. The assault led to phone calls between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and U.S. President Joe Biden and other world leaders. The U.S. Department of Energy activated its nuclear incident response team as a precaution.
The Zaporizhzhia regional military administration said that measurements taken at 7 a.m. Friday (0500 GMT) showed radiation levels in the region “remain unchanged and do not endanger the lives and health of the population.” Nuclear officials from Sweden to China also said no radiation spikes have been reported.
“The fire at the (nuclear plant) has indeed been extinguished,” Enerhodar Mayor Dmytro Orlov announced on his Telegram channel Friday morning. His office told The Associated Press that the information came from firefighters who were allowed onto the site overnight.
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson called for an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council in “coming hours” to raise the issue of Russia’s attack on the plant, according to a statement from his office.
In an emotional speech in the middle of the night, Zelenskyy said he feared an explosion that would be “the end for everyone. The end for Europe. The evacuation of Europe.”
But most experts saw nothing to indicate an impending disaster.
The International Atomic Energy Agency said the fire had not affected essential equipment and that Ukraine’s nuclear regulator reported no change in radiation levels.
“The real threat to Ukrainian lives continues to be the violent invasion and bombing of their country,” the American Nuclear Society said in a statement.
Orlov, the mayor of Enerhodar, said Russian shelling stopped a few hours before dawn, and residents of the city of more than 50,000 who had stayed in shelters overnight could return home. The city awoke with no heat, however, because the shelling damaged the city’s heating supply, he said.
Loud shots and rocket fire were heard late Thursday around the plant. Later, a livestreamed security camera linked from the homepage of the plant showed what appeared to be armored vehicles rolling into the facility’s parking lot and shining spotlights on the building where the camera was mounted.

This image made from a video shows Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant in Enerhodar, Ukraine on Oct. 20, 2015. Russian forces pressed their attack on a crucial energy-producing city by shelling Europe’s largest nuclear plant early Friday, March 4, 2022, sparking a fire and raising fears that radiation could leak from the damaged power station. (AP Photo)
Then there were what appeared to be muzzle flashes from vehicles, followed by nearly simultaneous explosions in surrounding buildings. Smoke rose into the frame and drifted away.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s forces have brought their superior firepower to bear over the past few days, launching hundreds of missiles and artillery attacks on cities and other sites around the country and making significant gains in the south.
The Russians announced the capture of the southern city of Kherson, a vital Black Sea port of 280,000, and local Ukrainian officials confirmed the takeover of the government headquarters there, making it the first major city to fall since the invasion began a week ago.
Troops, meanwhile, advanced on Zaporizhzhia, a strategic city near the plant of the same name. A Russian airstrike on Thursday destroyed the power plant in Okhtyrka, leaving the northeastern city without heat or electricity, the head of the region said on Telegram.
“We are trying to figure out how to get people out of the city urgently because in a day the apartment buildings will turn into a cold stone trap without water, light or electricity,” Dmytro Zhyvytskyy said.
Heavy fighting continued on the outskirts of another strategic port, Mariupol, on the Azov Sea. The battles have knocked out the city’s electricity, heat and water systems, as well as most phone service, officials said. Food deliveries to the city were also cut.
Associated Press video from the port city showed the assault lighting up the darkening sky above deserted streets and medical teams treating civilians, including a 16-year-old boy inside a clinic who could not be saved. The child was playing soccer when he was wounded in the shelling, according to his father, who cradled the boy’s head on the gurney and cried.
Ukraine’s defense minister said Friday that the flagship of its navy has been scuttled at the shipyard where it was undergoing repairs in order to keep it from being seized by Russian forces. Oleksii Reznikov said on Facebook that the commander of the frigate Hetman Sahaidachny decided to flood the ship.
“It is hard to imagine a more difficult decision for a courageous soldier and crew,” Reznikov said.
Overall, the outnumbered, outgunned Ukrainians have put up stiff resistance, staving off the swift victory that Russia appeared to have expected. But Russia’s seizure of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 gives it a logistical advantage now in the country’s south, with shorter supply lines that smoothed the offensive there, said a senior U.S. defense official, speaking on condition of anonymity.
Ukrainian leaders called on the people to defend their homeland by cutting down trees, erecting barricades in the cities and attacking enemy columns from the rear. In recent days, authorities have issued weapons to civilians and taught them how to make Molotov cocktails.
“Total resistance. ... This is our Ukrainian trump card, and this is what we can do best in the world,” Oleksiy Arestovich, an aide to Zelenskyy, said in a video message, recalling guerrilla actions in Nazi-occupied Ukraine during World War II.
At the second round of talks between Ukrainian and Russian delegations Thursday, Putin warned Ukraine that it must quickly accept the Kremlin’s demand for its “demilitarization” and declare itself neutral, renouncing its bid to join NATO.
The two sides said that they tentatively agreed to allow cease-fires in areas designated safe corridors, and that they would seek to work out the necessary details quickly. A Zelenskyy adviser also said a third round of talks will be held early next week.
The Pentagon set up a direct communication link to Russia’s Ministry of Defense earlier this week to avoid the possibility of a miscalculation sparking conflict between Moscow and Washington, according to a U.S. defense official who spoke on condition of anonymity because the link had not been announced.
Karmanau reported from Lviv, Ukraine. Chernov reported from Mariupol, Ukraine. Sergei Grits in Odesa, Ukraine; Francesca Ebel, Josef Federman and Andrew Drake in Kyiv; and other AP journalists from around the world contributed to this report.



16. Lviv is turning its factories into improvised weapon centers

Whole of nation, whole of society.

Lviv is turning its factories into improvised weapon centers
militarytimes.com · by Askold Krushelnycky · March 3, 2022
LVIV, UKRAINE - Ihor Tokarivsky runs a successful business erecting mobile telephone towers across Ukraine. His company manufactures the steel parts for the towers at a factory in Lviv, assembles them on site and then mount the electronic components.
But with 300 Belarussian tanks parked at the border 110 km to the north, Tokarivsky, 35, repurposed his production facilities this week to build tank traps and devices to shred the thick tires of military vehicles.
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Follow along for continued coverage of the conflict in Ukraine.
He’s one of the scores of residents assembled in Lviv’s picturesque old town square devising imaginative ways to defend their city. Some made camouflage nets for the military while others manufactured hundreds of Molotov cocktails.
Experts in urban warfare such as the John Spencer, a retired Army major, have been sharing urban tactical knowledge online and in interviews with tips on how to protect their towns. This includes parking buses in main roads and breaking off the keys in the ignition to removing batteries from cars to immobilize them. All of it is aimed at slowing the Russian advance. Urban defense and insurgency ingenuity has few boundaries.
Now, Ukrainian civilians pressed into this fight are using what they have on hand and getting creative as they go.

A box of homemade "hedgehog" devices designed to puncture military tires. (Askold Krushelnycky photo).
Tokarivsky said that when Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine started last week he immediately dispatched his wife and two year old son to safety across the Polish border some 60 miles away.
In the meantime, Tokarivsky decided the most useful thing he could do was to take the tools at his facilities to build devices to impede Russia’s military vehicles.
“Although many people refused to believe that Putin would really attack, I was fairly certain he would,” he said. “I worked in Moscow for a couple of years and saw the twisted way they thought about Ukraine.”
Since then, a group of seven employees and 10 other volunteers from neighboring businesses have manufactured more than 50 tank trap obstacles. The objects weigh about 400 kilograms each by welding steel girders into structures that hook and lift armored vehicles that drive into them. Tokarivsky said the devices not only immobilize the vehicles but and make the vehicles’ underbellies more vulnerable to anti-tank weapons.
The group is also turning out smaller devices they call “hedgehogs” made of two lengths of construction-strength steel reinforcing rods that have been bent and welded together with all four ends sliced into sharp spikes. Tokarivsky explained that whichever way the hedgehog lands on the ground it always presents spikes that will puncture even the heaviest tires used by military vehicles.
By Tuesday evening they had purchased enough steel to make more than 11,000 of the weapon. Each one takes about 10 minutes.
“Of course I am ready to fight against the enemy if they come here,” he said. “But I wondered if there was something more I could do than just pick up a gun. I raised we had the tools to make items that would help our military. "
Another man welded bars that were first cut by two of his colleagues, then bent into shape by a powerful hydraulic tool. “Everyone in Lviv is trying to do something to defend our country against this invasion,” he said.
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A Ukrainian defense official said that they've received more than 3,000 applications for U.S. citizens wanting to fight.
Tokarivsky said “hundreds, maybe thousands” of other small and medium businesses in Lviv and other towns all over Ukraine had rapidly transformed themselves to produce items helping in the country’s defense.
Much of Tokarivsky’s production is dispatched to Kyiv and other cities under Russian attack. Volunteers from Lviv have daily been driving vans and trucks loaded with “hedgehogs,” medicines, food, stretchers, tents, communications equipment and other supplies to the embattled capital. At another part of the industrial park a team of five men turned empty beer bottles into Molotov cocktails, an improvised gasoline bomb.
Tokarivsky said that Lviv’s oldest and best know “Lvivske” brewery, had offered 1,000 bottles for the task. “The bottles were already filled with beer and we had to tip 500 liters of that great stuff down the drains. That was heartbreaking!” Now, the bottles have been filled with petrol and chunks of polystyrene that had been soaked in a solvent. Ripped up sheets were stuffed into the bottles acted as fuses. Then crates of the assembled cocktails were then driven to selected locations throughout the city.
“I’m sort of in the communications industry, building the mobile phone towers,” and pointing to the bottles with their Lvivske labels, “and this is our collective message in a bottle to Putin.”
At the city’s picturesque, old market square, dozens of men and women worked turning hundreds of square yards of fishing-style net into camouflage for the Ukrainian military to conceal battlefield positions, buildings, tents and vehicles by tying in strips of different-colored material. Their work was interrupted by air raid sirens going off around the city and the volunteers sheltered some of the basements beneath each of the venerable old buildings fringing the square. But about 20 minutes after the all-clear sounded, people quickly returned to work.
One of them, a 20-year-old student, said: “We’ve been preparing for the worst for weeks. I’ve taken a first aid course and another to learn how to use firearms. We trained with pistols, rifles and Kalashnikov machine guns. But right now this is the most useful thing I can do.
Military Times editor-at-large Todd South contributed to this report.



17. Opinion | I’ve Dealt With Foreign Cyberattacks. America Isn’t Ready for What’s Coming.

A warning. We had better get ready. All of us.
Opinion | I’ve Dealt With Foreign Cyberattacks. America Isn’t Ready for What’s Coming.
The New York Times · by Glenn Gerstell · March 4, 2022
March 4, 2022

A Facebook data center in Prineville, Ore.Credit...Kim Steele for The New York Times
By
As Russian missiles rain on Ukraine, there’s another battle brewing — in the cybersphere. Destructive malware has flooded hundreds of Ukrainian websites and computers since Vladimir Putin announced his invasion. It would be a mistake to assume such attacks will remain limited to Ukrainian targets.
Last week President Biden warned Mr. Putin against Russian cyberattacks on United States critical infrastructure. But American businesses aren’t ready for a war in cyberspace. Although Mr. Biden designated the Department of Homeland Security to lead what he vowed would be a forceful response to any such aggression, this isn’t enough. The D.H.S. doesn’t have the legal authority to order the private sector to follow its lead. More broadly, the federal government, even if warned by companies like Microsoft of incoming cyberattacks, doesn’t have the necessary infrastructure in place to protect American businesses from many of these attacks.
That the United States has to resort to threats of retaliation is itself a problem. America should already be cyberattack-proof, but coordinating these efforts across the country has been an uphill battle.
As the former general counsel of the National Security Agency, I witnessed daily the scope and sophistication of such maliciousness from Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. All of them leverage the various sectors of power at their disposal — including commercial and state-owned enterprises as well as spy agencies — to come out against U.S. businesses and citizens in full force.
Yet the United States lacks an organized response. The weekly reports of ransomware attacks and data breaches make it clear that we’re losing this battle. That’s why America’s leaders must rethink the current cyberdefense system and rally around a centralized regulator to defend both citizens and the private sector against current and future attacks.
The decentralized nature of the American government does not lend itself to fighting foreign cyberthreats. Government agencies handle cyberregulation and threats in the sectors they oversee — an inefficient and ineffective way to address an issue that cuts across our entire economy. In just the past few months, the D.H.S.’s Transportation Security Agency announced new cybersecurity requirements for pipelines and railroads; the Federal Communications Commission put out its own proposal for telecommunication companies; the Securities and Exchange Commission voted on rules for investment advisers and funds; and the Federal Trade Commission threatened to legally pursue companies that fail to fix a newly detected software vulnerability found in many business applications. And on Capitol Hill, there are approximately 80 committees and subcommittees that claim jurisdiction over various aspects of cyberregulation.
These scattered efforts are unlikely to reduce, let alone stop, cybercrime.
Echoing a number of expert studies, our first national cyber director says that the United States needs a fresh approach that “meaningfully alters the relationship between public and private sectors.” But social and bureaucratic inertia, industry resistance and partisan divisions have stood in the way of centralizing cyberdefense efforts and regulations. At a recent congressional hearing, several industry representatives and Republican members of Congress objected to stricter requirements for notification of breaches. It’s time to move past partisanship and standard objections to regulation.
From a private-sector perspective, the case for a centralized effort makes sense as well. Almost every industry runs its computers on one of three operating systems: Windows, macOS and Linux. In many cases, they also use the same business software — a defense contractor’s payroll system isn’t much different from a pharmacy’s. That means vulnerabilities are similar across industries, and will therefore require similar solutions. A centralized government response center, then, makes sense. Getting information about hacks and vulnerabilities flowing quickly and effectively between the government and the private sector — as a central agency would — is essential to stopping cyberattacks before they spread too far. And such an agency would help standardize security products and services, which in turn would reduce the overall burden on businesses by lowering costs.
The overarching goal for a central cyberregulator would be to have standards uniformly applied, yet specifically tailored where necessary to the needs of a particular sector. I’m not envisioning a rigid one-size-fits-all policy, but it should be possible to design cross-industry regulation effective enough to safeguard the public without crimping innovation.
A number of other industrialized democracies are already adopting a centralized approach: With its recent Network and Information Security Directive, the European Union is now proposing uniform cybersecurity standards across industries and its 27 member nations. True, Americans tend to be more wary of regulation than Europeans are. But some of America’s closest allies — Britain, Canada and Australia — have also moved to consolidate their cybersecurity functions into one agency that works with the private sector, while retaining specialized functions for intelligence collection and law enforcement.
These moves shouldn’t be dismissed. While it is too early to fully assess the success of these new consolidating measures, the United States is clearly behind the curve: Britain has just adopted its second multiyear national cyberstrategy, while the United States struggles to come up with its first.
Blueprints already exist that could guide the creation of a central cyberregulator. The S.E.C. worked with investment banks and stock exchanges in its early years to fashion an entirely new disclosure framework for public companies in every industry. As a result, a public company’s prompt disclosure of market-moving news (good or bad) is now taken for granted — just as insider trading and covering up corporate developments were routine practices in the days before the securities laws.
Last month, the Environmental Protection Agency and its federal partners urged the nation’s 52,000 private and municipal water supply systems to bolster defenses against a potential Russian cyberattack that could disrupt or contaminate our drinking water. A central regulator would greatly simplify this process. It could ensure that the managers of each water system were fully aware of the critical details of a possible Russian attack. It could immediately disseminate critical information regarding the attack. And it could educate potential victims on how to minimize the spread of the attack.
None of this will be easy or put in place quickly. The Cyberspace Solarium Commission, established in 2019 to develop a bipartisan consensus on a strategic approach to defending the United States in cyberspace, recently reported that even some of its less extensive recommendations might require a “future emergency” to “create the political impetus needed to overcome existing barriers.”
Russia’s war on Ukraine might be that “future emergency.” If we don’t want to have to worry about Russian hackers contaminating our drinking water every time we turn on the faucet, now is the time to rethink our approach.
Glenn S. Gerstell is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies focused on technology and national security. He served as the general counsel of the National Security Agency and Central Security Service from 2015 to 2020.
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The New York Times · by Glenn Gerstell · March 4, 2022



18. Russia blocks access to BBC and Voice of America websites

Threats to authoritarian regimes everywhere.

Russia blocks access to BBC and Voice of America websites
Reuters · by Reuters
MOSCOW, March 4 (Reuters) - Russia cut access to several foreign news organisations' websites, including the BBC and Deutsche Welle, for spreading what it alleged was false information about its war in Ukraine.
Russia has repeatedly complained that Western media organisations offer a partial - and often anti-Russian - view of the world while failing to hold their own leaders to account for devastating foreign wars such as Iraq and corruption.
Russia's communications watchdog said on Friday it had blocked the websites of the BBC, Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Deutsche Welle and other media outlets.
"Access has been restricted to a host of information resources owned by foreigners," the watchdog, known as Roskomnadzor, said in a statement.
"The grounds for restricting access to these information resources on the territory of the Russian Federation was their deliberate and systematic circulation of materials containing false information."
It said the media organisations had spread falsehoods about "the essence of the special military operation in Ukraine, its form, the methods of combat operations (attacks on the population, strikes on civilian infrastucture), the Russian armed forces' losses and civilian victims".
The BBC said it would not be deterred by the Russian curbs.
"Access to accurate, independent information is a fundamental human right which should not be denied to the people of Russia, millions of whom rely on BBC News every week," it said.
"We will continue our efforts to make BBC News available in Russia, and across the rest of the world."
The European Union this week banned Russian state-controlled media outlets RT and Sputnik. Facebook owner Meta (FB.O), Alphabet Inc's Google (GOOGL.O), YouTube and TikTok are already blocking access to RT and Sputnik in the EU.
Twitter (TWTR.N) has said it would comply with the EU ban.
INFORMATION
The BBC said on Wednesday it would start broadcasting four hours of news a day in English on shortwave radio in Ukraine and parts of Russia, reviving a antiquated technology used in the Cold War to circumvent state censorship.
The Russian language websites of the BBC and Voice of America could not be opened without using a Virtual Private Network on Friday, a Reuters reporter said. Voice of America's English language site was accessible, but BBC's was not.
Western leaders have for years raised concerns about the dominance of state media in Russia and say the freedoms won when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 have been rolled back by President Vladimir Putin.
According to an official notice received on March 3, the Russian communications watchdog said Radio Liberty's Russian service had spread "obviously fake socially significant information about the alleged Russian attack on Ukrainian territory".
"Such information is wrong," Radio Liberty cited the official notice as saying.
Describing the situation in Ukraine has become a sensitive issue in Moscow.
Putin, who has described the West as an "empire of lies", said the "special military operation" was essential to ensure Russian security after the United States enlarged the NATO military alliance to Russia's borders and supported pro-Western leaders in Kyiv.
Russian officials do not use the word "invasion" and say Western media have failed to report on what they cast as the "genocide" of Russian-speaking people in Ukraine.
Reporting by Moscow bureau; editing by Guy Faulconbridge, Frank Jack Daniel and Alex Richardson
Reuters · by Reuters




19. The Dangerous Allure of the No-Fly Zone


Seems so easy to us laymen and non air power experts.

Excerpts:
The establishment of a no-fly zone over Ukraine would unquestionably be a major escalation in the conflict and would bring NATO and possibly other European forces into direct conflict with Russian forces. It’s also not clear what military advantage might accrue. The majority of Ukrainian civilian casualties seem not to be inflicted by airpower but by artillery. Russian precision strikes seem to be inflicted by ballistic and cruise missiles, which once fired cannot be interdicted by aircraft in a no-fly zone.
The fact that Russia does not yet have air superiority has not significantly impeded its advance. Ukraine does not control its skies either — the two sides have air parity. Enforcement of a no-fly zone would require overflight of Ukrainian airspace, putting coalition forces directly in the air space both sides are fighting over — and at extreme risk from both Russian and Ukrainian air defenses. Surface-based air defenses in bordering nations could only command airspace where Russian aircraft aren’t flying, having no practical effect except to commit NATO. The obvious Russian response, attacking aircraft over Ukraine from outside Ukraine, would be yet another escalatory element that would render Russian air defenses politically immune from counterattack.
From a distant viewpoint, the no-fly zone might seem like a somewhat impersonal option for the employment of military force. The reality is that effective enforcement involves flying over territory where fighting is occurring, and enforcing a no-fly zone means the intent to kill anything that opposes it — whether a fighter in the air or a missile system on the ground.
In Ukraine, the potential no-fly zone is fundamentally a political statement. In this case, the political statement is much more than the threat of escalation — it is a direct escalation against Russia and a general widening of the conflict to include NATO as a direct combatant.
As such, a no-fly zone imposition serves only Ukraine, which would gain NATO as a co-belligerent without the precursor of a formal alliance. In effect, this political use of airpower would mirror the entangling alliances that brought Europe into World War I. The no-fly zone is the wrong tool for the wrong job and would create dangerous and destructive outcomes for the United States and its NATO allies.


The Dangerous Allure of the No-Fly Zone - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Mike Pietrucha · March 4, 2022
Editor’s Note: This is a heavily revised and updated version of an article written by the authors for these pages in 2016. Don’t miss our comprehensive guide to Russia’s war against Ukraine.
A press conference with U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson captivated the world when Daria Kaleniuk, a Ukrainian activist, implored him and other Western leaders to set up a no-fly zone over Ukraine to shelter its people from Russian aircraft. The tragedy of the current situation, the sincerity and sadness of the activist, and prime minister’s delicately worded but practical response — in which he told her that there would not be a no-fly zone due to the risk of a NATO-Russian war — made footage of the press conference go viral.
The internet has since buzzed with the question: Why hasn’t a coalition established a no-fly zone?
Contrary to what so many in the commentariat seem to believe, a no-fly zone is not a military half-measure. It is a combat operation designed to deprive the enemy of its airpower, and it involves direct and sustained fighting. The fact is, a general European war has not started, and we must do everything we can to ensure it does not. That means that a no-fly zone should be off the table.
Part of the reason that no-fly zones keep being brought up as solutions is that the nature of airpower is so poorly understood. Advocates have trumpeted airpower as a strategic and tactical shortcut for nearly a century — the way to win battles and even wars without the messy complications inherent in the operations of other military arms.
After the rise of airpower in World War II, it was invigorated by the lopsided victory in 1991’s Operation Desert Storm and propagated through repeated limited military air-centric actions. These conflicts reinforced the notion that airpower is the solution to all military challenges overseas. The problem with this view is that it is not supported by a century of evidence. Although airpower can prove decisive and has even been used as the primary method of settling conflicts, it is not a one-size-fits-all solution. Air campaigns, just like naval and ground campaigns, must be carefully tailored to political and military objectives, the adversary, the environment, and the prevailing conditions. Unfortunately, a byproduct of a generation of low-intensity operations has only reinforced this evolving political infatuation with two pillars of what we term political airpower: airstrikes and no-fly zones. While each can be effective, neither is a shortcut around a need for a comprehensive strategy — both are merely elements of one.
The History of the No-Fly Zone
After Operation Desert Storm ended in 1991 with much of Iraq’s army still intact, Saddam Hussein was able to successfully put down revolts among the Shia in Basra and the Kurds in Northern Iraq. Fearing the inevitable retribution, well over a million Kurdish civilians headed north toward the Turkish border, which had not yet emerged from winter. British forces started a relief effort, Operation Provide Comfort, which was soon supported by a U.N. resolution plus American, Turkish, and other NATO forces. The no-fly zone followed close behind, a mere five weeks after the end of the operation.
The official declaration of a no-fly zone formalized the current state of affairs, as U.S. Air Force F-15s had already shot down two Iraqi Su-22 jets over northern Iraq by this point. Operations Provide Comfort II and III followed and then continued under the name Northern Watch from 1997 on. While the focus of the operation was on the “no-fly” aspect of the zone, operations in the north also enforced a “no-radiate” condition on surface-to-air missile systems and effectively defended the “Green Line” between Iraqi and Kurdish areas above the 36th parallel in northern Iraq. U.S. forces were in direct conflict with Iraqi forces.
Southern Watch began in 1992, following the success in the north. It was later expanded in 1996 to include a “no-drive zone” that prevented Iraqi military operations in much the same way that an (undeclared) military-free zone was enforced in northern Iraq. Southern Watch also served as cover for an undeclared campaign called Southern Focus, intended to dismantle all Iraqi air defenses in the zone prior to the 2003 invasion. Again, U.S. forces were in direct conflict with Iraqi forces.
In Bosnia, Operation Deny Flight was also intended to protect vulnerable populations from air attack, although it did not provide Bosnian civilians with the same protective umbrella against ground force incursions as the Iraqi no fly zones had. By the end of the 1990s, no-fly zones were embraced as a practical policy measure — provided that the goal was containment and that the adversary was massively overmatched. In retrospect, the cost of the Iraqi no-fly zones was a bargain: $1–2 billion per year and no casualties from hostile action. However, once again, U.S. forces were in direct conflict with Iraqi forces.
Drawing Insights from Kosovo
A key principle in the American way of war is first to gain and maintain air superiority, which gives ground forces the freedom from attack — and the freedom to attack. The difference between this and a no-fly zone is that the latter emerged as a policy tool to protect vulnerable populations — not a military tool to achieve operational ends. To establish a no-fly zone, one must first gain and maintain air supremacy — not merely air superiority. Air supremacy means not only control of the air, but also the elimination of threats to air operations from the ground.
As discussed, the no-fly zone was born in a post-Cold War era when the United States possessed such a lopsided military advantage that a political aversion to risk coupled with relatively low demand on airpower resources could still pull it off. However, there is no historical precedent to establishing and maintaining a no-fly zone against any meaningful resistance, and meaningful resistance doesn’t simply mean enemy fighters anymore. In the new era of air warfare wherein the lethality of modern proliferated Russian or Chinese air defenses easily trumps the threat from fighters, a no-fly zone must prioritize negating threats to friendly aircraft first to be successful.
Operation Allied Force provides a glimpse of the magnitude of what this endeavor might entail and shows that this is much more difficult than the casual strategist or armchair operational planner realizes. During the 1999 operation, U.S. planners knew of 44 surface-to-air missile systems in a theater the size of Connecticut, supported by a smattering of 40 millimeter antiaircraft guns and ubiquitous SA-7 and SA-9 heat-seeking missiles. The newest system, the SA-6, was already 30-year-old technology at the time.
The air threat posed by the Serbian Air Force was minimal, and it was rapidly reduced by U.S. Air Force F-15Cs and Dutch F-16AMs on those rare occasions when a Serbian MiG-29 took flight. To maintain freedom of maneuver during the 78-day campaign, 743 high-speed anti-radiation missiles were shot by U.S. and NATO aircraft against an obsolescent but credible missile threat. Combined with a robust compilation of electronic jamming, the use of almost 1,500 towed decoys and counter-tactics largely negated the threat to aircraft (though they were also mostly restricted to higher altitudes to minimize risk). Those missiles were not just attacking radar sites, they were attacking the opposition soldiers manning those radar sites.
Still, the U.S. Air Force lost two aircraft (an F-117 and F-16) to these threats, and a handful of others sustained damage. The suppression of enemy air defense effort was effective at forcing air defenders to keep their heads down while F-15E and F-16C aircraft engaged in a destruction effort, but it was a continual cat-and-mouse game. As always, the suppression of enemy air defenses was a team effort. Navy and Marine Corps EA-6B Prowlers, Spanish and U.S. Navy F-18s, and Air Force F-16CMs would suppress enemy air defenses by jamming radars and shooting antiradiation missiles, while F-15Es and F-16CGs attacked the missile batteries with much heavier ordnance, often in the 2000-lb class, sufficient to turn a missile battery and its radar into finely distributed metal scraps. As a RAND study noted, despite a world-class air force’s best effort against a second-rate defense, the United States never gained air supremacy. High-value intelligence platforms such as the E-8 Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System were prohibited from flying over land where their sensors were most useful and instead had to stand off outside the threat region. Though Slobodan Milosevic did eventually capitulate, Operation Allied Force is generally viewed as an operational failure that happened to succeed — and that was over 20 years ago.
Today’s Reality
The success of a no-fly zone relies on the premise of conventional deterrence backed by the resolve to swiftly and ferociously enforce it if challenged. Attempting this today against a nation with any semblance of artillery, man-portable air defense systems, and/or advanced surface-to-air missiles tends to indicate that a no-fly zone is neither operationally feasible nor politically appetizing.
And by “advanced,” we mean anything built since the 1980s that boasts digital processing, multi-targeting, longer-range missiles, and higher maneuverability. The proliferation of modern air defenses since the 1990s dictates that more sortie apportionment and resources are required to negate these threats — much more so than counter-air fighters. That’s the way it was in the Iraqi no-fly zones, where Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses assets were available alongside aircraft tasked for defensive counter-air or reconnaissance missions.
Compounding this, the fog and friction of war dictate that there will always be ambiguity of timely, accurate, and correct intelligence in operations. Therefore, it is not only conceivable, but highly likely, that the conventional surveillance and reconnaissance constellation of aircraft will always remain at stand-off distances during a nation-state conflict, just as they did in Kosovo to negate this uncertain threat risk — though at exponentially further ranges.
In Syria, the idea of establishing a no-fly zone regularly surfaced, a misguided response to the use of Syrian (and later Russian) airpower. The eventual solution was not so much a no-fly zone as a defensive counterair effort over areas held by friendly forces. There, a no-fly zone was problematic for both practical and policy reasons since the majority of civilian casualties did not occur from air attack. The challenges of protecting civilian populations in a multi-faceted civil war were far more comprehensive than anything seen before, and the direct involvement of Russian airpower in Syria totally changed the nature of the conflict. Then, as now, any no-fly zone would have involved direct combat with Russian forces.
A No-Fly Zone in Ukraine?
Today, in Ukraine, the air defense threat does not appear to have materialized against Ukrainian aircraft, at least in terms of ground-based threat. That may be because, at this time, Russian forces still only control a small part of Ukraine, and they cannot emplace air defenses in the territory they do not control. Army air defenses move along with the forces that they defend and require some degree of protection against ground threats. Nevertheless, the Russian Aerospace Forces do possess long-range air defenses that can reach well into Ukraine from Russia (and perhaps Belarus). The Russian air force operate long-ranged S-300 and S-400 variants. These mobile systems can cover large swathes of Ukrainian airspace without entering Ukraine, although low-altitude coverage would be spotty and limited.
Escalation
The establishment of a no-fly zone over Ukraine would unquestionably be a major escalation in the conflict and would bring NATO and possibly other European forces into direct conflict with Russian forces. It’s also not clear what military advantage might accrue. The majority of Ukrainian civilian casualties seem not to be inflicted by airpower but by artillery. Russian precision strikes seem to be inflicted by ballistic and cruise missiles, which once fired cannot be interdicted by aircraft in a no-fly zone.
The fact that Russia does not yet have air superiority has not significantly impeded its advance. Ukraine does not control its skies either — the two sides have air parity. Enforcement of a no-fly zone would require overflight of Ukrainian airspace, putting coalition forces directly in the air space both sides are fighting over — and at extreme risk from both Russian and Ukrainian air defenses. Surface-based air defenses in bordering nations could only command airspace where Russian aircraft aren’t flying, having no practical effect except to commit NATO. The obvious Russian response, attacking aircraft over Ukraine from outside Ukraine, would be yet another escalatory element that would render Russian air defenses politically immune from counterattack.
From a distant viewpoint, the no-fly zone might seem like a somewhat impersonal option for the employment of military force. The reality is that effective enforcement involves flying over territory where fighting is occurring, and enforcing a no-fly zone means the intent to kill anything that opposes it — whether a fighter in the air or a missile system on the ground.
In Ukraine, the potential no-fly zone is fundamentally a political statement. In this case, the political statement is much more than the threat of escalation — it is a direct escalation against Russia and a general widening of the conflict to include NATO as a direct combatant.
As such, a no-fly zone imposition serves only Ukraine, which would gain NATO as a co-belligerent without the precursor of a formal alliance. In effect, this political use of airpower would mirror the entangling alliances that brought Europe into World War I. The no-fly zone is the wrong tool for the wrong job and would create dangerous and destructive outcomes for the United States and its NATO allies.
Mike “Starbaby” Pietrucha retired from the Air Force as a colonel. He was an instructor electronic warfare officer in the F-4G Wild Weasel and the F-15E Strike Eagle, amassing 156 combat missions and taking part in 2.5 SAM kills over 10 combat deployments. As an irregular warfare operations officer, he has two additional combat deployments in the company of U.S. Army infantry, combat engineer, and military police units in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Mike Benitez is a retiring active-duty officer with over 25 years of service in the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force. He has served in various operational, training and staff positions and has held fellowships in the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Congress, and Silicon Valley. He is also a founder of the Merge, a defense newsletter.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policies or positions of the Department of the Air Force or the U.S. government.
warontherocks.com · by Mike Pietrucha · March 4, 2022



20. China’s Strategic Assessment of Russia: More Complicated Than You Think

Excerpts:

What’s Next?
How can we square the circle between the Chinese policy community’s negative and critical view of Russia, and the seemingly ever-growing alignment between the two countries? Indeed, as the Feb. 4 joint statement seems to suggest, China and Russia are leaning on each other in many domains of international politics. The declaration of a “no limits” partnership between China and Russia seems to be playing out in the Ukraine crisis, where China has refrained from opposing Russia.
The joint statement and China’s acquiescence (or even tacit support) in the Ukraine crisis illustrates a difficult reality: In response to increasing strategic competition with the United States, China is turning to Russia for support, despite misalignment between Beijing and Moscow’s national interests, as well as Russia’s history as a destructive and exploitative neighbor. There is no better example of “marriage of convenience” than this, and China will pay dearly for this choice.
It’s hard to predict the longevity and stability of the current Sino-Russian alignment. It begins and ends with China’s anti-U.S. agenda and is strengthened by Xi’s personal preferences. There is a famous Chinese saying among Russia hands that China and Russia can only share miseries, but not happiness (中俄只能共苦，不能同甘). Without shared visions, goals, and approaches, China and Russia will align against a common enemy. Yet it will split, in a destructive way, when that delicate equilibrium is disrupted by any structural change.
China’s Strategic Assessment of Russia: More Complicated Than You Think - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Yun Sun · March 4, 2022
Editor’s note: Don’t miss our comprehensive guide to Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Western observers of international affairs sounded the alarm after a seemingly enthusiastic joint statement by President Vladimir Putin and General Secretary Xi Jinping. Released during the Russian president’s visit to China — the first time Xi has met with a foreign head of state since before the pandemic — the statement seemed to signal increasing alignment between two powers against the United States and its allies. Based on the document, one could assume China would be supportive of Russia’s assault on Ukraine. The truth, however, is quite different, both on this particular issue (in which China was played by Russia) and in China’s general assessment of Russia, its largest neighbor.
The nature of the Sino-Russian relationship has been difficult to define and there is much disagreement over its characteristics. Is it as sturdy as an alliance? Or as flimsy as a marriage of convenience? The truth is the relationship is neither and both. This paradox is the result of both an alignment and misalignment in different areas of their national interests. While certain factors innate to the Sino-Russian relationship drive them apart, the two are currently glued together by their shared view that the United States poses a threat to their core interests. An accurate assessment of the depth, strengths, and weaknesses of Sino-Russian relations is thus key to mapping out where the two countries do and do not collude in international affairs, especially in Europe and Asia. This includes an understanding of how China views its past, present, and future relationship with Russia.
How can we understand China’s evaluation of Russia’s comprehensive power, and consequently, the alignment of China and Russia’s political, strategic, and economic visions? I find that a close alignment to counter the United States between Beijing and Moscow is primarily driven by their perceived “hostility by the U.S.” Meanwhile, leadership preferences — especially Xi’s personal affinity toward Russia and Putin — also play a key role in driving alignment with Russia, arguably beyond China’s national interests. However, these factors do not negate the fact that China and Russia differ fundamentally in their visions and approaches to the international system. Their alignment is based solely on their shared anti-U.S. agenda and leadership preferences. As such, the Chinese assessment of the long-term prospects of Sino-Russian relations is not as glorified as it seems.
How to Understand What Beijing Thinks
Given current travel restrictions and general censorship in China, my analysis relies on more than a dozen private roundtables in the past 12 months (including four in the past month), conversations with Chinese strategists and experts, and desktop research of Chinese academic papers, commentary, and reports. I also lean on the works of long-time Russia experts, such as Feng Yujun and Ji Zhiye, the former vice president and former president of China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), respectively. CICIR is the most authoritative international relations think tank in China and plays an unrivaled role in the Chinese security apparatus. As such, their views carry significant weight.
There are also voices in China that sing high praise for the Sino-Russia relation and its value. These voices cater to Xi’s preferences and are politically expedient, but they obstruct a clear reading of Chinese assessments and intentions. Still, I find that both “bear-huggers” and “bear-critics” share the same basic assessment: that Russia is a destructive power, and that there is a fundamental difference in Russian and Chinese goals and approaches to the international system. In China, what separates supporters and critics of a strong Sino-Russian relationship is whether one believes that the opportunities and benefits of partnering with Russia outweighs the risks and costs, and for how long.
Brought Together by a Mutual Adversary
China and Russia are pushed together by two factors. The first is the shared threat the United States poses. The second is a leader-level nostalgia for the Sino-Soviet partnership. The most salient characteristic of the Sino-Russian alignment today is their shared threat perception of the United States. This does not mean that China and Russia would not have any relationship absent this shared perspective — they always have and always will. But it does mean that the shape and health of their relationship would be completely different if the shared threat perception of the United States was not present.
Prior to the 2014 crisis over Ukraine, China and Russia had a lukewarm relationship. However, the crisis created a watershed event that led Chinese government experts to designate 2014 as “a year of abnormal acceleration of Sino-Russia relations,” although, this acceleration needs to be qualified since China has not yet recognized Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Still, around that time, China’s strategic anxiety over the U.S. strategy of “rebalancing to Asia” coincided with Russia’s fear over NATO’s potential expansion. As such, China made a determination that “China and Russia face the same international pressure from the U.S. bully on a wide range of issues from global governance to their neighborhood and to their domestic affairs.” For Beijing, China and Russia are both identified as revisionist powers in the international order (although the common title disguises critical distinctions of their desired goals). Furthermore, the United States constitutes the most important threat to both countries in their primary theaters — China in the West Pacific and Russia in Eastern Europe. Alignment and cooperation is thus sought, almost instinctively, to mitigate Chinese and Russian isolation by the West, to divide American attention and resources, and to complicate U.S. military planning in both theaters.
Such an alignment is significant for alleviating strategic pressure on China, at least psychologically. At a minimum, it provides a reassurance that China is not countering U.S. hegemony alone. As long as the United States pursues “dual containment” of both China and Russia, the alignment will have motivation and justification. Given the overarching theme in the Chinese national security strategy that defines the United States as China’s primary threat, any disagreements with Russia are seen as secondary and Russian diplomatic and military capabilities will be seen as a valuable asset.
Yet Russia’s fondness for strategic maneuver, such as the utilization of hybrid warfare, also constitutes a major risk for China. Four hundred years of Sino-Russian relations has taught the Chinese that during China’s conflicts with others, the Russian modus operandi is to maximize its own benefits in the name of mediation and assistance for China. For example, Russia carved out one million square kilometers of Chinese territory through its mediation of the Second Opium War. Therefore, the assessment by China’s Russia hands is that Moscow not only sees the “new Cold War” between Washington and Beijing as beneficial for Russia, but that Russia is also responsible for “exploiting and deepening the suspicion, hostility and fear” between Washington and Beijing through diplomatic maneuvers and manipulations. Yet, these experts also vigorously warn about Russian acts of “balancing and coalescing” with both America and China.
So long as the United States remains the biggest threat to China and Russia, the latter will manage their differences to serve the more important goal of countering U.S. pressure. However, while such alignment is strong in terms of words and postures, it is weak on actions. As attested by the joint statement by China and Russia during Putin’s most recent visit of Beijing, the two countries are adept at verbally expressing their shared positions and mutual support, but they are short on concrete policies to be adopted. For example, as China tries to gauge Russia’s substantive support in the South China Sea and on Taiwan, nothing but tepid statements have emerged, along with one joint military exercise in the South China Sea in 2016. While support in this limited domain does not do justice to China and Russia’s coordination on the global scale, the authenticity of the Sino-Russian friendship is tested by how Russia will act toward China’s most important security concerns, such as Taiwan and the South China Sea.
Sino-Russian alignment is also vulnerable to shifts in the balance of relations between the United States, China, and Russia. This is the core weakness of a relationship driven by external factors, in the eyes of Chinese analysts. As put by Ji Zhiye, former president of CICIR, , the Sino-Russian relationship is “temporary, uncertain, vulnerable and could be severely weakened by even slight changes in the external factor (the U.S. policy toward both).” Improvement of relations with the United States, by either China or Russia, will undermine the confidence by the other party. Furthermore, overwhelming Russian dependence on China from sweeping Western sanctions will sow the seeds of Russian discontent against China and result in efforts to distance and counterbalance.
Brought Together from the Top
Although the U.S. factor is the primary driver of the Sino-Russian relationship, there is a less-known and more obscure driver on the Chinese side: Xi’s “Russia complex.” After 1949, the new China adopted complete Sovietization in its ideological, political, economic, and military systems. Soviet mentality and culture was admired, embraced, and absorbed in China “deep to the bones.” Xi’s educational background was profoundly shaped by Russian culture, which he acknowledged during his visit to Russia in 2014. The nostalgia and preference for Russian history and culture is a broad phenomenon observed among people who grew up in the 1950 and 1960s. Xi, as a princeling from that generation, is among the most saturated by Soviet influence. Furthermore, according to my private conversations with Chinese experts, Xi’s “Russia complex” includes a strong admiration of Putin as a strongman leader and a deep desire to be Putin’s peer. Xi is powerful because China is powerful, but Putin is seen as powerful even when Russia is weak. In the Chinese popular culture, Putin is nicknamed, “the Great Emperor” (大帝), who is intelligent, decisive, manipulative, and powerful. This is a status that Xi deeply desires.
The primary result of Xi’s “Russia complex” and admiration of Putin is a selective bias in his judgement about Russia’s national power. Xi is prone to overestimating Russia’s strengths and reliability, while underestimating its weaknesses and the risks posed to China. It means that Xi is more likely to see Russia in a favorable light, just like he sees the United States through a hostile lens. Consequently, he favors alignment with Russia, especially given his “struggles with the U.S.” to reclaim China’s rightful place in the world. As a domestic factor, Xi’s “Russia complex” both accelerates and aggravates China’s alignment with Russia, and some Chinese experts have privately argued the growing Sino-Russian relationship is against China’s national interests.
China’s Assessment of Russia’s National Power
Regardless of the circumstantial drivers, the most important determinant of Sino-Russian relations is how China views Russia as a power, its strength, weaknesses, and how they affect China. That is where An analysis of China’s relationship with Russia must begin with. In China, Russia is regarded as one of only three world powers with global influence, alongside the United States and China. This assessment is not based on singular factors such as economic wealth or military assets, but rather a judgement about Russia’s comprehensive national power.
When China looks at Russia, it sees a nation torn between great-power ambitions and weak capabilities. That tension, in the Chinese view, is the fundamental origin of Russia’s insecurity, anxiety, and strategic choices today. Yet, judging by most domestic indicators, Russia is not a great power. Its economy has stagnated, with an average annual growth rate of 1 percent since 2009. Additionally, the Russian economy shrank by 3.1 percent in 2020 due to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Russia’s gross domestic product ranks 11th in the world, which is just 7 percent and 10 percent of the U.S. and Chinese economies, respectively. In 2021, Russian research and development spending amounted to $60.57 billion, or about 10 percent of the Chinese and American spending, respectively. In 2020, Russia’s military spending was $61 billion, which was about 24 percent and 7.8 percent of Chinese and American defense spending, respectively. If spending is the most convincing indicator of the country’s strength and future trajectory, Russia’s does not inspire confidence.
Although Russia’s economic growth rate was as high as 4.7 percent in 2021, China does not see a positive trajectory for the Russian economy in the years to come. Efforts to curb carbon emission will reduce Russia’s energy export revenue and the government lags in domestic investment. Capital flight continues to worsen, along with the brain drain of Russian intellectuals and elites. No matter how China looks at it — from domestic regulations to international competitiveness, from quantity and education level of the population to the shrinking high-tech capability — the Russian economy does not boast a winning prospect.
China also views Russia’s external environment as having deteriorated significantly since the recent Ukraine crisis, especially in its relations with the West. Global governance, including the international financial system, trade, and climate change, are not Russia’s strong suit, and its role in global governance is limited to U.N. Security Council veto power. Russia has worked vigorously to consolidate its dominant influence in Eurasia, although the result is at best mixed when all 11 states of the Commonwealth of Independent States are considered.
Traditionally, China has high regards for Russia as a military power, but such respect is diminishing. China’s military spending is currently four times that of Russia. In the Chinese discourse, if Russia does not have the budget for military research and development and system upgrades, it will increasingly lag behind and become a “gas station disguised as a nuclear power”.
But there is one aspect of Russia’s national power that elicits the highest respect from Chinese strategists: Russia’s strategic vision and its strong will and ability to utilize, combine, and integrate military power, diplomatic maneuver, and hybrid warfare to advance such a vision. Russia combines various tools to create chaos, helping it to achieve geopolitical goals that otherwise would not have been tenable for a country of its size and means. The ability to combine diplomatic skills, strategic manipulation, and hybrid warfare to achieve geopolitical goals is the one trait that China has admired and does not have.
Compared to all countries except the United States, Russia enjoys superior strength in diplomatic, military, and intelligence capabilities, but is inferior on technological, economic, and financial power. According to prominent Chinese experts on Russia, this discrepancy is the fundamental reason why Russia “should not be underestimated.” Russia’s strength does not lie in its ability to construct, but in its ability to destroy. Russia is not able to cooperate or lead global cooperation, but it can undermine and destroy others’ efforts. This is the essence of Putin’s “strategy of chaos” in the Western narrative. Understanding this aspect of Russian power, China continues to reject an alliance with Russia as of Feb. 28, 2022, days into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The Fundamental Misalignment
In assessing Sino-Russian alignment, it is important to examine their grand strategic goals, not their short-term postures. Simply put, do China and Russia share the same endgame vision and approach to the international system? With this question in mind, the prospects for long-term Sino-Russian cooperation are ultimately limited by four important factors. First, China and Russia have different visions of international order. Second, as argued in the previous section, China believes that Russia’s ambitions outpace their capabilities. Third, China fears a Russian betrayal of China (just as China betrayed the Soviet Union during the Cold War). Fourth, the two economies are not mutually complementary in the long run. Digging into these factors should disappoint enthusiasts of a Sino-Russian alliance.
China and Russia differ significantly in how they view their roles in, and relationship with, the international system. As Xi Jinping has indicated, China has been a beneficiary of the international system since the end of the Cold War. Xi therefore seeks to reform the system, but he does not seek to replace it. Many observers have found this statement incredulous, seeing Xi’s vision — such as the Community of Common Destiny — to be a replacement of the current international order as we know it. However, the fact remains that China has benefited tremendously from the international system, and Beijing would not want to lose its permanent seat at the U.N. Security Council and free trade with the West.
In comparison, Putin calls the dissolution of the Soviet Union a tragedy and sees Russia as a victim of the same international system that China has benefited from. As such, China’s strategy has largely been a “peaceful rise” — bidding for global supremacy by surpassing the United States without a war or major disruption. This is the essence of the “new model of major power relations,” proposed by Xi as a peaceful mechanism to manage the power transition and avoid a clash. In contrast, Russia’s comparative advantage — its military and diplomatic power, and hybrid warfare approach — lies in its strategy of chaos to maximize Russian leverage and bargaining power. In other words, Russia benefits from instability, while China prefers stability. They both seek to revise the international order, but differ in the process by which they want to change it and the magnitude of changes they prefer.
There is no denying that China also benefits to a certain extent from the chaos Russia creates. At a minimum, Russia could distract the United States and blunt the impact of Washington’s strategic competition on China. However, beyond their shared anti-U.S. agenda, China and Russia differ in their grand vision of international order. China’s desired international order is hierarchical, with China on the top. Within that order, Russia is inferior to China and would need to pay deference. However, this is not Russia’s desired future. Russia is seeking peer status with China and is actively aligning its positions with India, Japan, and Southeast Asia to counterbalance China’s geopolitical influence.
In the Chinese view, Russia is not only seeking to become the “third pole” in the international system and leader of a new Non-Aligned Movement, it also wants to lead that movement to counterbalance both the United States and China. Consequently, Beijing believes Moscow will not side with Beijing to confront Washington, but that it will exploit U.S.-Chinese competition to pave Russia’s leadership in a new world order. This is where China and Russia part ways, and why Russia pursues arms sales and defense cooperation with India and Vietnam, two major headaches for China.
The misalignment between China and Russia is also reflected in their low level of bilateral trade, quantitatively and qualitatively. Chinese-Russian trade increased by an impressive $146.9 billion, or 38.5 percent, in 2021. However, the majority of this increase came from the inflation of energy prices. The volume of trade only grew by less than 6 percent. To put this in perspective, Chinese-Russian trade is smaller than China’s $166 billion in trade with Vietnam. Furthermore, the trade is still unbalanced as natural resources make up more than 70 percent of Russia’s total exports to China.
Imbalance by itself does not suggest misalignment, but Russia’s primary role as a raw materials supplier does. China’s economic transformation is based on high technologies, such as AI and new energy resources. As mentioned, China’s research and development spending is 10 times that of Russia. On new energy, China’s commitment to reduce carbon emission will eventually lead to a decline of energy imports from Russia. In other words, Russia will play a minor role in this economic transformation.
In the context of U.S.-Chinese decoupling, Russia plays no role in substituting China’s losses in high-tech products, and Russia’s position in the global high-tech industry is lagged far behind China, perhaps with the only exception of military technologies. For example, after the 2014 Ukraine crisis, Russia has relied on China to import semi-conductor chips. In another example, during the recent U.S.-Chinese trade war, the two countries hoped that Russian soybeans could make up for China’s loss in American soybeans. However, they soon realized that Russia’s total soybean production (less than five million tons per year) was less than 20 percent of China’s imports from the United States (32 million tons in 2021). Overall, due to the size and structure of Russian economy, Russia is not a likely candidate for bigger roles in the future of Chinese economy.
What’s Next?
How can we square the circle between the Chinese policy community’s negative and critical view of Russia, and the seemingly ever-growing alignment between the two countries? Indeed, as the Feb. 4 joint statement seems to suggest, China and Russia are leaning on each other in many domains of international politics. The declaration of a “no limits” partnership between China and Russia seems to be playing out in the Ukraine crisis, where China has refrained from opposing Russia.
The joint statement and China’s acquiescence (or even tacit support) in the Ukraine crisis illustrates a difficult reality: In response to increasing strategic competition with the United States, China is turning to Russia for support, despite misalignment between Beijing and Moscow’s national interests, as well as Russia’s history as a destructive and exploitative neighbor. There is no better example of “marriage of convenience” than this, and China will pay dearly for this choice.
It’s hard to predict the longevity and stability of the current Sino-Russian alignment. It begins and ends with China’s anti-U.S. agenda and is strengthened by Xi’s personal preferences. There is a famous Chinese saying among Russia hands that China and Russia can only share miseries, but not happiness (中俄只能共苦，不能同甘). Without shared visions, goals, and approaches, China and Russia will align against a common enemy. Yet it will split, in a destructive way, when that delicate equilibrium is disrupted by any structural change.
Yun Sun is the director of the China Program at the Stimson Center.
warontherocks.com · by Yun Sun · March 4, 2022







21. The War in Ukraine Is Keeping Chinese Social Media Censors Busy
JENNIFER CONRADBUSINESSMAR 4, 2022 7:00 AM
The War in Ukraine Is Keeping Chinese Social Media Censors Busy


Posts that glorify war and those that criticize Russia are getting quietly deleted, as platforms are pressured to walk a thin line. 

“ARTILLERY FIRE LIGHTS up the sky and breaks my heart. I hope my compatriots in Ukraine are taking care of themselves and their families,” said a user on Weibo, often called China’s Twitter, on February 27. The message was quickly blocked, according to Free Weibo, a service of Great Fire, which tracks Chinese censorship online.
Two days later, a very different message appeared on Weibo: “I support fighting! America and Taiwan have gone too far.” That, too, was blocked, according to Free Weibo.
The messages—and their quick disappearance—show how Chinese social media platforms find themselves in the crosshairs of the Russia-Ukraine war. The platforms must be sure to toe the official line amid subtle shifts in China’s position. Their responses could be an early test of new rules governing how companies use algorithms, which may make them responsible for trending topics and fake news appearing on their sites.
In general, Chinese online platforms receive daily guidance from the government about what sort of content to remove, says Yuqi Na, a researcher in media and communications at the University of Westminster.
A hint of how that works emerged in the days leading up to the invasion. On February 22, a Chinese outlet called Horizon News briefly posted, probably by accident, what appear to be internal instructions for how to spin the Ukraine crisis on its official Weibo account. Among the supposed rules: “Do not post anything unfavorable to Russia or pro-Western.”
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The instructions also said to monitor comments and only use hashtags started by state outlets Xinhua, CCTV, or People’s Daily, according to China Digital Times. That sort of direction to follow the lead of major state outlets is common, says Maria Repnikova, an assistant professor in global communication at Georgia State University and author of Chinese Soft Power.

Prior to the invasion, Chinese state media outlets and officials’ Twitter accounts repeated a drumbeat of US warmongering, and brushed off the possibility of an invasion. Once the assault began, China was put in the awkward position of having to reconcile its long-standing policy of noninterference and respecting national sovereignty with its ties to Russia. Just weeks earlier, the two countries reaffirmed their relationship when Russian president Vladimir Putin was a VIP guest at the Beijing Winter Olympics.
In the early days of the war, Chinese state media seemed surprised and took a cautious approach. The relatively sparse coverage largely echoed Russian outlets, calling the conflict a “special military operation” and placing the blame on the US and NATO. “It’s quite intentional,” says Na. “A lot of internet users buy into that narrative when it's their main information source.”
“You’ve got the official narrative, but you’ve got a lot of counternarratives circulating even if they get shut down as quickly as they go up.”
ANTHONY SAICH, DIRECTOR, ASH CENTER FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INNOVATION
In that environment, pro-Russia and nationalist discourse flourished. Putin’s February 24 speech justifying the invasion went viral, says Aliaksandr Herasimenka, director of research at the Oxford Internet Institute’s Program on Democracy and Technology. Social media companies let pro-war posts thrive, as well as some sexist posts by Chinese men pining for Ukrainian refugee brides.
At the same time, there was an outpouring of sympathy for Ukrainians on platforms such as Weibo and Weixin, a widely used chat and news app—but many of those posts disappeared once they became popular. Twitter users documented posts that were taken down, including posts depicting antiwar protests in other countries.
“Across Chinese social media, you’ve got the official narrative, but you’ve also got a lot of counternarratives circulating, even if they get shut down as quickly as they go up,” Anthony Saich, director of Harvard’s Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, said at a talk on Thursday. “It clearly shows that people in China have a varied view of this. Some are disturbed about the long-term consequences.”
Saich noted that a February 26 statement by five Chinese professors condemning the war circulated widely before it was taken down. The statement offered a surprisingly direct challenge to the official position, saying in part, “Regardless of Russia's myriad reasons and all kinds of excuses, the use of force to invade a sovereign country is trampling on the norms of international relations based on the UN Charter.”
Since then, social media companies appear to be walking a thin line, trying to cool the most bellicose rhetoric without crossing any red lines, in particular with criticism of Russia.
Over the weekend, China began casting itself as a mediator and calling for a peaceful resolution in public statements. Some official coverage became more sympathetic to Ukraine, says Repnikova. CGTN, China’s international TV station, has aired coverage of the destruction in Ukraine and the impact on civilians.
On Sunday, several social media platforms took measures to turn down the volume, saying they had removed fake news and inappropriate speech, including posts promoting war. Weibo, for example, said it temporarily suspended or deleted 10,000 accounts, and said users should be “objective” and “reasonable,” because “a peaceful environment is hard to come by.”
There’s still plenty of blame shifted to the West, in particular the US and NATO, and open criticism of Russia appears to be off the table. On Tuesday, popular TV host and transgender artist Jin Xing said her Weibo account was blocked after she spoke out against the war and called Putin “crazy.” And some netizens have argued, echoing reports in official media, that the foreign media’s portrayal of China as pro-Russia is endangering the safety of Chinese citizens who remain in Ukraine.
“The state is now trying to tone down the pro-war sentiments, but it would be difficult for them to condemn Russia. The message is consistent: Condemn the US hegemony and dominance, especially regarding human rights issues,” says Na. “This is some kind of bottom line.”
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Jennifer Conrad is a writer in Brooklyn. She has written for Vogue, SupChina, and Newsweek.com. She recently received an MA from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. 


22. Ukraine a Case for Hypocrisy and Political Diversion?

Excerpts:
Moscow maintains it aims to demilitarize Ukraine, stressing Kyiv has nuclear ambitions. Last year, Ukrainian ambassador to Germany Andriy Melnyk, hinted at nuclear options barring Western support for NATO admission. Any prospects for renegotiating Minsk Agreements have dimmed as Western leaders condemn Putin with harsher sanctions. Barring Russian banks from the Swift payment system may stoke global market fears and volatility, upsetting vulnerabilities associated with economic recovery from the pandemic. Amid Russian strikes on Kyiv and other cities, Ukraine has appealed to the European Parliament to advance its application for candidate status for EU membership.
Ordinary Russians will suffer effects of economic fallout as the ruble weakens. Hundreds of thousands displaced Ukrainians had fled to neighboring countries by the end of February, with the UN Refugee Agency also reporting that “a sizeable number has moved to the Russian Federation.” Military incursion and economic warfare hurt civilians. When public infrastructure suffers assaults and collapse, humanitarian crises develop and follow with population displacement and destabilization. Intervention in Libya and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan stand out as reminders.




Ukraine a Case for Hypocrisy and Political Diversion? | Small Wars Journal
Ukraine a Case for Hypocrisy and Political Diversion?
By Allyson Christy
Jan/Feb 2022
The Ukraine crisis may be a moment for reasserting U.S. power and allied unity, but it serves public distraction and hints of hypocrisy. Proposed legislation authorizing assistance to Ukraine connects “national security interests” with defending Ukraine’s sovereignty, border security, and territorial integrity. Bills in the House and Senate also support extending media outreach to Russian-speaking audiences. The House version includes a $155,500,000 appropriation to support Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty with its reach “inside the Russian Federation and surrounding countries.” Guided by such principles, it may be worth revisiting the nearly 300-year old Monroe Doctrine, a founding tenet of U.S. foreign policy restricting European interference in the Western Hemisphere and justification for U.S. authority.
As the United States expanded westward in the nineteenth-century, involvement in Latin American affairs increased significantly, giving rise in 1904 to the Roosevelt Corollary, the harbinger of “Big Stick” views that forged even greater control over the region and often under the banner of security and overseer. And following the Spanish-American War, Congress passed the Platt Amendment which enacted protectorate status over Cuba. It also secured an indefinite land lease and U.S. military presence at Guantanamo Bay. The amendment was later repealed, but the base at Guantanamo continues serving a U.S. regional sea power platform.
Recalling the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion and Operation Mongoose the next year, draws attention to interventionism—covert activities devised to destabilize the Cuban government. These events led to the Cuban Missile Crisis which escalated confrontation with the Soviet Union and a direct threat to U.S. security. Similarly, the Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missiles deployed to Italy and Turkey and the delivery of nuclear warheads to Britain’s Thor missiles in the late fifties, were in effect, direct nuclear threats against the Soviet Union. And consequent to the Cuban crisis, President Kennedy quietly negotiated the removal of Jupiter during the tense standoff.
Russian presence in Latin America constitutes persistent backyard posturing; whether diplomatic and economic outreach or expanding a military presence, it is tit for tat for what Moscow sees as encroachment at its borders, including American warships in the Black Sea and an enlarged NATO presence. Moreover, Russia’s foreign policy approach elsewhere on the globe has long troubled Washington and Western powers. The associated fearmongering has also never ended. Perhaps it is partly a habituated Cold War preoccupation, although media exacerbates public fears with a perpetual drumbeat of frightful shadows, including Russia. Lawmakers and politicians gauge public concerns, often reacting with agendas that will assert policy. But government sometimes initiates the fear factor for taking specific actions with the media playing along.
Russia is the notorious state in West versus East rivalry—-long the rationale that has driven American global strategies with international policing. A standoff over security is now at the core of heightened alerts and warmongering over the possibility of a showdown on the eastern periphery of Europe. Vladimir Putin personifies the omnipresence of strong-arm bogeyman—perhaps an unfaltering Cold War code in need of an unrelenting villain and the raison d'être that drives NATO ambitions with limiting Kremlin influence across the globe.
President Joe Biden ordered a readied 8,500 troop deployment in January, ostensibly for defending Ukraine against Russian aggression and coupled with persistent warnings of a pending invasion. France and Germany purportedly expressed doubts last year over U.S. intelligence reports about a possible Russian attack. Although Moscow repeatedly denied plans to invade Ukraine, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated statements that his country does not want war. Russia has, however, consistently insisted on enforceable security guarantees that would restrict NATO enlargement and exclude membership to Ukraine, as well as bilateral agreements over military exercises and limitations on missile deployments, including nuclear weapons.
Russia has been massing an alarming troop and equipment deployment at its borders with Ukraine since early 2021, with many observers suggesting it was more show rather than intent to invade. Movements intensified in recent weeks, and satellite images indicated a surge in activity at its border with Belarus, augmenting the rotation of Russian forces and regular drills with the Belarusian military. Russian President Putin has adamantly blamed tensions on NATO’s eastward expansion, largely spurred on from the Clinton era.
The Cold War ended in 1989 and membership in NATO has, in fact, nearly doubled. The alliance has not only welcomed former Soviet satellite states that directly border Russia, but Ukraine has made no secret of its intent to join as it has engaged in military drills with alliance forces, yielding Kyiv an abundant supply of weapons and equipment. According to the NATO website, relations have gradually developed since the early nineties with increasingly active participation in NATO-led operations and missions. Formalities edged closer in 2020, with NATO granting an enhanced opportunity partner status—one of six members including Australia. Members of the alliance have also suggested establishing military training centres in Ukraine. Putin drew an emphatic red line last year, restating security concerns.
Although Russia’s 2014 annexation of the Crimea drew wide-spread condemnation, attention to the sensitivities of sovereignty and autonomy and Russian support of separatists in the Donbas, necessitates diplomatic interfacing over the two breakaway regions in eastern Ukraine; Donetsk and Luhansk are a critical part of that geo-political puzzle. Ethnic-Russians make up the largest minority while Ukrainians are still the majority. Yet historic ties with Ukraine are not only ethnic, language, and cultural, Russia sees the area, including the Black Sea, as a crucial buffer against further Western encroachment, but also a means for securing its influence and security oversight. Historically the region, counting the Caucasus, is vulnerable and hard-hit with ethnic tensions and the ongoing threat of destabilization.
And while the United States and allies continued proliferating military support to Kyiv, the Pentagon directed 3,000 extra troops in early February to Poland, Germany, and Romania in a show to reinforce deterrence. There are already about 74,000 U.S. personnel permanently stationed in Europe with 7,000 additional troop rotations supporting NATO through Atlantic Resolve—joint training missions that include “Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania.” Although the continuation of supplying weapons to Ukraine is meant to bolster preemptive efforts, diplomatic intervention appeared to be moving towards a European-centered approach with French President Emmanuel Macron underscoring greater reliance on European dialogue with Russia.
A significant meeting of advisors met in Paris at the end of January, representing France, Germany, Ukraine, and Russia over discussions to uphold a ceasefire. Subsequent talks in
Moscow between Macron and Putin concluded with an unsteady, yet hopeful takeaway that there would be no further escalation at the Ukraine border. The meeting left no guarantee of resolution but signified hope for a constructive first step. There is a growing consensus for reviving the Normandy format that supports revisiting the Minsk Agreements and bilateral negotiations which were brokered between France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine in 2014 and 2015, respectively. However, implementing revisions to the ceasefire agreements will not be easy; a legal plan to transition a special status could be the impetus in restarting negotiations between Ukrainian forces and Russian separatists over the contentious Donbas region.
Joe Biden escalated warnings of a Russian attack in mid-February, evoking NATO’s Article 5 on the collective defense of member states. Yet even as NATO countries seem poised to step up actions beyond high-impact sanctions, several Western leaders are facing elections and are contending with domestic troubles, notwithstanding failed attempts at rallying their citizens into full pandemic compliance. The latter issue has elevated frustration and protests against lockdowns and vaccine mandates in the face of economic distress and irregular migration. And therein lies another sobering issue of border security, at least according to some European Union states that have stepped up efforts with fences and patrols, seeking EU financial support and to readdress migration rules.
Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Poland continue to reject the compulsory mechanism for refugee relocation. Tensions between EU member states and non-member states have raised diplomatic stakes over refugee routes. Blame is pointed at Putin for the migrant influx through Belarus to its border fence with Poland. The situation also underscores high migrant flows from Turkey, over which disproportions are borne by other EU member states, including Italy and Greece. Meanwhile, diplomatic strain between Britain and France over illegal migrant crossings in the English Channel spiked last year, with both sides at odds over collaborative border patrols and sovereignty.
The ability to lead and manage conflicts links to maintaining political power, or not. In the face of squaring off security differences and increasingly serious tensions with Russia, policymakers in Europe must face upcoming elections that include challenges associated with pandemic and economic recovery, unemployment and inflation, high energy costs, climate policies, and sustaining EU unity. Issues are just as critical in the United States. Inflation and economic downturns, rising healthcare costs, education, crime, border security, illegal immigration, and inconsistent messaging over Covid-19 continue to tax public confidence.
Political leaders are facing the realities that public discontent may translate into losing key political seats later this year. Just as Europe must grapple with domestic troubles, Macron recently hinted that security and border troubles with Russia are a European issue. And many Americans might not support sending troops to defend Ukraine.
Joe Biden is in trouble at the polls and he knows it. So do his supporters and advisors. The president’s approval rating continues to drop as the latest polls highlight public dissatisfaction. While most Americans recognize the familiar virtue touted for protecting democracy against a rogue state and evil leader, many have not forgotten the fiasco in Kabul last year. And the majority instead see China as a top threat to national security. Already
there are fears circulating that the situation in Ukraine may bolster Beijing’s claims on Taiwan.
In the interim, Putin advanced diplomatic recognition over Donetsk and Lugansk in a stated move to support a peacekeeping operation. Superpower grandiloquence is sometimes the mechanism used for exploiting diversionary campaigns while beating loud the war drums. President Biden, however, directed an initial executive order for sanctions against the separatist region. Within a day, NATO announced evidence of Russian troops entering Donbas, followed with media resounding imminent war as troops entered Kyiv.
Moscow maintains it aims to demilitarize Ukraine, stressing Kyiv has nuclear ambitions. Last year, Ukrainian ambassador to Germany Andriy Melnyk, hinted at nuclear options barring Western support for NATO admission. Any prospects for renegotiating Minsk Agreements have dimmed as Western leaders condemn Putin with harsher sanctions. Barring Russian banks from the Swift payment system may stoke global market fears and volatility, upsetting vulnerabilities associated with economic recovery from the pandemic. Amid Russian strikes on Kyiv and other cities, Ukraine has appealed to the European Parliament to advance its application for candidate status for EU membership.
Ordinary Russians will suffer effects of economic fallout as the ruble weakens. Hundreds of thousands displaced Ukrainians had fled to neighboring countries by the end of February, with the UN Refugee Agency also reporting that “a sizeable number has moved to the Russian Federation.” Military incursion and economic warfare hurt civilians. When public infrastructure suffers assaults and collapse, humanitarian crises develop and follow with population displacement and destabilization. Intervention in Libya and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan stand out as reminders.
About the Author(s)

Allyson Christy holds an M.A. in Intelligence and Terrorism Studies from American Military University and an Executive Certificate in Counter-Terrorism from the ICT Herzliya.




23. FDD | Iran Approaches the Nuclear Threshold

Excerpts:
The most potent tool currently at the disposal of Congress is the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, or INARA, which gives Congress statutory review authority over any deal. Specifically, INARA requires the president to submit to Congress within five days any agreement with Iran and “all related materials and annexes.” There is then a 90-day review period during which the House and Senate hold hearings on the agreement and then debate it. Finally, INARA ensures a vote on whether to lift sanctions. Since the president can veto a resolution prohibiting him from lifting sanctions, a two-thirds majority in both chambers can block a deal. Thus, bipartisanship is essential. Even so, significant opposition sends a clear message to Tehran that a deal may last only as long as Biden remains in the White House. If the administration prefers an enduring agreement, it should stop relying on a partisan minority and submit a stronger accord to the Senate for ratification as a formal treaty. Ratification by the Senate would necessitate a bipartisan consensus on the merits of an accord and render it far less susceptible to cancellation by the next president.
Finally, the United States should continue — on its own and together with Israel — to increase the credible threat of military action should Iran move closer to the nuclear threshold or sprint to nuclear weapons. Specifically, Washington and Jerusalem should continue U.S.-Israeli military exercises practicing the destruction of Iran’s nuclear facilities. The United States and Israel should also consider actions short of military strikes, such as cyber-attacks and sabotage of nuclear or nuclear-related sites, to delay the Islamic Republic’s progress and remind the regime that its malign activity will not come without cost.
Still, it would be far better to avoid the risk war of war by discarding the JCPOA framework and implementing a comprehensive pressure campaign that confronts Tehran with the prospect of bankruptcy and isolation unless it dismantles its enrichment program. The Biden administration should take all related measures necessary to ensure that the world’s most prolific state sponsor of terrorism can never reach the nuclear weapons threshold.
FDD | Iran Approaches the Nuclear Threshold
Washington’s Narrowing Policy Options

Andrea Stricker
Research Fellow

Anthony Ruggiero
Senior Fellow
fdd.org · by Andrea Stricker Research Fellow · March 3, 2022
The clerical regime in Iran is approaching the point at which no outside power could prevent it from building nuclear weapons. Iran would then be a nuclear threshold state. As Tehran approaches that threshold, the United States will face an increasingly difficult choice between allowing the regime to cross over it or taking assertive measures — including potential military strikes — to stop Iran from going nuclear.
In an effort to revive a watered-down version of the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Biden administration has relaxed pressure on the Islamic Republic and fully committed itself to negotiations. Senior U.S. officials have criticized Iranian negotiators for obstructionism and delay, but the administration does not acknowledge that by drawing out the talks, Tehran can position itself to reach the nuclear threshold. At present, if the regime decides to make its first nuclear weapon, it may need as little as three weeks to produce enough fissile material.
This memorandum documents the acceleration of Tehran’s nuclear program since Joe Biden’s election. The clerical regime understands that it can provoke the United States at minimal cost, since Biden is committed to a conciliatory policy that relies on goodwill, not leverage, to advance negotiations. To reverse this dynamic, the United States and its European partners will have to discard the JCPOA framework and implement a full-spectrum pressure campaign that confronts Tehran with the prospect of bankruptcy and isolation unless it relinquishes all pathways to a nuclear weapons capability.
Defining Threshold Status
To reach the nuclear threshold, a state requires fissile material and the ability to weaponize it. In addition, a threshold state must be able to dash to nuclear weapons quickly enough that foreign powers would not be able to disrupt its breakout efforts.
The Islamic Republic has already enriched enough uranium that it could produce weapons-grade uranium (WGU) for at least four bombs. The short dash to producing WGU shows that Tehran has overcome the most difficult challenge that faces an aspiring threshold state. If Iran decided to produce WGU, the clerical regime would likely need additional time to build a functional warhead, but the technical challenges are not prohibitive given the regime’s past and possibly ongoing weaponization work. Iran is also expanding its ballistic missile program, which it could adapt for use as delivery vehicles.
Behavior and intentions often distinguish aspiring threshold states from latent powers. Several states, like Germany, Brazil, and the Netherlands, produce fissile material and could launch a nuclear weapons program, but have chosen instead to adhere firmly to their non-proliferation commitments. Scholars refer to this group as latent nuclear states. Tehran, by contrast, has pursued clandestine enrichment and weaponization programs, indicating a lack of peaceful intent. The Iranian program is also the subject of an ongoing investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which Tehran persistently obstructs.
Iran is currently the only state actively advancing toward threshold status. The IAEA has investigated Tehran’s nuclear activities since 2002 but has never been able to assure the international community of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. The Islamic Republic had a nuclear weapons program known as the Amad Plan until 2003, after which the clerical regime planned to downsize and disperse parts of the program to better camouflage it. Tehran likely continued weaponization activities at both civilian and military institutions. The entity reportedly in charge of such efforts is the U.S.-sanctioned Organization of Defense Innovation and Research, whose Persian acronym is SPND. Given the regime’s obstruction of IAEA inspections, it is not known how close Iran has come to weaponization.
Determining the point at which a state reaches the threshold is not a purely technical exercise, since it also depends on the intent of a government — specifically, whether it has decided to pursue a weapons program or whether ambiguity offers the government better advantages. Another factor is the defensive measures in place to protect the program and the offensive capabilities of those who wish to disrupt it. U.S. military leaders have expressed readiness to destroy the clerical regime’s nuclear capabilities if the president directed them to do so, but the estimated time necessary to carry out such a mission remains classified.
Additional uncertainty stems from the potential for incomplete intelligence reporting about a potential decision by Tehran to pursue a breakout. States may gather information indicating that Iran has begun producing WGU, yet the intelligence may be vague or unreliable overall, including key details about timing and the facilities that Tehran would use. In such a scenario, Iran may restrict IAEA monitoring or delay IAEA access to declared nuclear sites in order to divert fissile material for further enrichment at a clandestine plant. The regime could also pursue enrichment and weaponization at highly fortified military sites. For example, it could make WGU at its underground Fordow enrichment plant.
The JCPOA: Iran’s Patient Pathway to the Nuclear Threshold
The imperative of keeping Tehran away from the nuclear threshold drove the Obama administration’s negotiation of the JCPOA, even though the administration’s efforts were ultimately insufficient. U.S. negotiators sought to ensure that Iran would remain at least 12 months away from producing enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Independent calculations put Iran’s breakout time under the JCPOA closer to seven months. Yet even this achievement would be temporary; the scheduled expiration (or “sunset”) of the JCPOA’s key restrictions would eventually bring Tehran’s breakout time close to zero.
Details aside, the JCPOA legitimized Iran’s advance toward the nuclear threshold despite the regime’s extensive record of illicit nuclear activities. Previously, there had been an international consensus enshrined in UN Security Council resolutions that Iran should stop enriching uranium completely. The JCPOA not only allowed the Islamic Republic to maintain an enrichment program with a breakout time of 12 months or less, but also paved the way toward a breakout time of zero, since restrictions on enrichment would gradually phase out from 2024 to 2031. Nor did the JCPOA prohibit Iran from carrying out research and development on advanced centrifuges, stockpiling materiel and equipment for advanced machine production, and, in 2027, enriching uranium in large numbers of advanced centrifuges.
Under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran could also manufacture up to 2,400 of its fastest advanced centrifuges — the IR-6 and IR-8 — by 2029. In 2025, the “snapback” mechanism that permits JCPOA member states to reimpose prior UN Security Council sanctions on Iran is slated to terminate; Iran would be freed from international oversight of its nuclear-related imports. All told, the nuclear accord ensures that by 2031, when the last of its sunsets takes effect, Iran would have a massive enrichment capability and an unstoppable ability to break out of its nonproliferation commitments or even sneak out by using nuclear assets at covert facilities, undetected by international monitors.
The JCPOA prohibited weaponization activities, but the deal’s weak monitoring and verification provisions made this irrelevant. The Islamic Republic insisted it would never allow inspections of its military facilities, regardless of what the deal stated. Neither the IAEA nor other parties to the deal challenged this assertion. The Obama administration and its JCPOA partners also quashed the IAEA’s ongoing investigation of Tehran’s previous nuclear weapons activities. The deal even left intact the fortified underground enrichment facility at Fordow, designed to protect Iran’s nuclear program during a potential dash toward the threshold and beyond. Under the JCPOA, Tehran’s economic and military power was set to grow in the absence of sanctions, further adding to the difficulty of keeping it away from the nuclear threshold.
Iran’s Muted Response to Trump, Escalation of Pressure on Biden
In May 2018, citing, among other objections, the JCPOA’s failure to stop Iran’s nuclear research and development, President Donald Trump withdrew from the deal. Tehran responded with graduated, incremental nuclear advances. In May 2019, the regime announced a plan to incrementally surpass JCPOA limits on a range of nuclear activities, with new advances every 90 days. The clerical regime began installing more and different types of centrifuges than permitted by the JCPOA, gradually increased its stockpile of low-enriched uranium, and increased uranium enrichment to 4.5 percent purity — exceeding the deal’s cap of 3.67 percent. These incremental steps continued through the U.S. presidential election in November 2020.
The regime likely refrained from major advances to preserve the option of reviving the nuclear deal under a future administration. Tehran may also have wanted to avoid provoking a crisis during Trump’s tenure, given his unpredictability and his readiness to impose harsh economic sanctions. The value of patience also became clear when Biden pledged as a presidential candidate to reverse Trump’s Iran policy, which Biden characterized as a “dangerous failure.” Instead, Biden proposed that both Washington and Tehran return to the JCPOA, a move that would yield relief for Tehran from the most punishing U.S. sanctions.
The clerical regime began testing Biden even before he formally took office. In January 2021, Iran began enriching uranium to 20 percent purity at the Fordow enrichment plant. Enrichment to 20 percent requires 90 percent of the effort to reach weapons-grade purity. In February, Tehran began producing uranium metal, a material used in the cores of nuclear weapons. That same month, the Islamic Republic stopped implementing the IAEA’s Additional Protocol (AP), a set of enhanced verification measures integral to the agency’s monitoring of nuclear programs. Tehran had agreed to implement the AP as part of the JCPOA. The regime also halted most JCPOA monitoring measures. In April, Iran started enriching uranium to the highest level ever achieved by the regime: 60 percent. This level constitutes 99 percent of the effort necessary to produce WGU.
These unmistakable moves toward a nuclear weapons capability should have provoked a strong reaction from the Biden administration and the IAEA’s Board of Governors, which has responsibility for holding member states accountable to their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. The United States and its key allies hold seats on the board. Yet the Biden administration made sure the board would not punish or even censure Iran at any of its quarterly meetings in 2021. Tehran saw that it could advance with impunity toward threshold status.
In November 2021, the Institute for Science and International Security assessed that following a decision to produce enough WGU for one nuclear weapon, Iran could do so within three weeks by further enriching — using currently operating centrifuges — its stockpile of near-20 percent and 60 percent enriched uranium. Within three-and-a-half months, the institute found, Iran could produce enough material for three weapons, and after six months, it would have enough WGU for a fourth. By prolonging negotiations in Vienna, the Islamic Republic brought its breakout time close to zero while earning billions of dollars from oil exports thanks to Biden’s relaxation of sanctions as a goodwill gesture.
The U.S. negotiating team now acknowledges that restoring the JCPOA’s breakout time of 7-12 months is no longer feasible, given Iran’s advances. Washington reportedly estimates a breakout time of six-to-nine months under a revived accord, while Israel’s estimate is reportedly four-to-six months. These lower estimates are likely based on Tehran’s production and operation of hundreds of advanced centrifuge machines in violation of the JCPOA.
Tehran reportedly refuses to destroy these advanced centrifuges as part of a new agreement, instead proposing their retention in storage, from which the regime could remove them at any time. If the Biden administration accepts that demand as part of its bid to revive a watered-down JCPOA, the administration would solidify a shorter breakout time for Tehran. This timeline could shorten further as Iran, per the JCPOA’s terms, manufactures and operates additional advanced centrifuges.
In fact, the administration’s reason for not demanding that Iran destroy advanced centrifuges likely stems from the fact that the JCPOA permits their redeployment in just a few years. Moreover, because of Iran’s reduction of the IAEA’s monitoring, the Biden administration cannot assert with confidence that Tehran does not have clandestine stockpiles of advanced centrifuges that it could deploy to a covert enrichment facility. With its deficient monitoring and verification protocols, the JCPOA or an even weaker version is unlikely to facilitate the IAEA’s detection of such activity.
Becoming a nuclear threshold state requires weaponization capabilities in addition to fissile material. Iran’s stonewalling of the IAEA has ensured there are no reliable estimates of its weaponization timeline. David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security calculates that Tehran could explode its first crude nuclear test device within six months. The Islamic Republic has also continued to develop potentially nuclear-capable missiles, since the JCPOA imposes no restrictions on its missile program. According to Israeli estimates, Iran may be able to field a missile-deliverable nuclear weapon in one to two years.
Policy Recommendations
Policy options narrow considerably when responding to a state that is advancing rapidly toward the nuclear threshold. Only senior officials in the U.S. government know how much time the Pentagon needs to prepare and carry out sufficient military strikes to prevent Iran from successfully sprinting toward a nuclear weapon. If the Islamic Republic chooses to move closer to threshold status — or dash to nuclear weapons — there would likely be substantial uncertainty surrounding its precise intentions and activities. In such a scenario, Tehran may not withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a move that could solidify Western resolve against the regime. Amid this uncertainty, President Biden might have to choose between carrying out military strikes based on incomplete or conflicting information or acquiescing to Iran’s development of nuclear weapons. It would be preferable to keep Tehran far away from the threshold so that an American president never reaches this wrenching decision point.
The Israeli response to the Vienna negotiations is revealing, given Tehran’s professed interest in destroying the Jewish state. Jerusalem has at least as strong an interest as Washington has in extending Iran’s nuclear breakout timeline. Yet even as Tehran approaches the nuclear threshold, Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett reportedly told President Biden in February that Israel prefers a no-deal scenario and a campaign of multilateral pressure on Tehran. Bennett almost certainly wants to avoid a rift in U.S.-Israel relations like the one that emerged in 2015 when Israel opposed the JCPOA. Yet Bennett would still reject a deal that temporarily increased Iran’s breakout time, only to let it approach zero once again after a few years, which would be all but inevitable with the deal’s expiring provisions.
The flawed premise of the JCPOA and of the Biden administration’s Iran policy is that Iran can both keep its uranium enrichment program — which the JCPOA allows to expand again starting in 2024 and to grow substantially from 2027 to 2031 — and be kept away from the nuclear weapons threshold. Instead of pursuing a defective and temporary accord, the United States should seek to restore the international consensus — embodied in successive UN Security Council resolutions from 2006 to 2010 — that the world cannot trust the Islamic Republic with an enrichment program. The regime’s relentless stonewalling of IAEA investigations demonstrates its bad faith. Furthermore, an energy-rich country like Iran has no economic need for an enrichment program. The purpose of Iran’s enrichment program has always been to build nuclear weapons.
If and when the United States and the E3 (Britain, France, and Germany) recognize the need for a fundamental rethinking of their Iran policy, they should relaunch the kind of comprehensive economic, financial, and political pressure campaign that forced Iran back to the negotiating table during Barack Obama’s tenure. This time, however, the campaign should persist until Tehran accepts the dismantling of its enrichment program and related measures to permanently cut off all pathways to a nuclear weapon. The Iranian economy has begun a tentative recovery thanks to Biden’s relaxation of sanctions, but it remains vulnerable after a deep multi-year recession. The United States and the E3 should invite Russia and China to support their efforts, but only if they accept the premise of a permanent end to the Iranian nuclear threat and do not act as spoilers.
Even without Russian and Chinese support, the United States and the E3 can restore prior UN sanctions by invoking the snapback clause of UN Security Council Resolution 2231. Doing so would also restore all prior UN resolutions against Iran, which codify the principle of zero enrichment. Restoring multilateral sanctions would present Russia and China with a fait accompli regarding sanctions enforcement and provide a basis for further action by the United States and E3 to penalize non-compliance.
Congress can play an important role in encouraging the Biden administration to support a renewed pressure campaign. From 2009 through 2012, a bipartisan coalition in Congress played an indispensable role in creating the statutory framework for the pressure campaign that forced Iran back to the negotiating table. If there is renewed bipartisanship, Congress can prove similarly effective once again.
The most potent tool currently at the disposal of Congress is the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, or INARA, which gives Congress statutory review authority over any deal. Specifically, INARA requires the president to submit to Congress within five days any agreement with Iran and “all related materials and annexes.” There is then a 90-day review period during which the House and Senate hold hearings on the agreement and then debate it. Finally, INARA ensures a vote on whether to lift sanctions. Since the president can veto a resolution prohibiting him from lifting sanctions, a two-thirds majority in both chambers can block a deal. Thus, bipartisanship is essential. Even so, significant opposition sends a clear message to Tehran that a deal may last only as long as Biden remains in the White House. If the administration prefers an enduring agreement, it should stop relying on a partisan minority and submit a stronger accord to the Senate for ratification as a formal treaty. Ratification by the Senate would necessitate a bipartisan consensus on the merits of an accord and render it far less susceptible to cancellation by the next president.
Finally, the United States should continue — on its own and together with Israel — to increase the credible threat of military action should Iran move closer to the nuclear threshold or sprint to nuclear weapons. Specifically, Washington and Jerusalem should continue U.S.-Israeli military exercises practicing the destruction of Iran’s nuclear facilities. The United States and Israel should also consider actions short of military strikes, such as cyber-attacks and sabotage of nuclear or nuclear-related sites, to delay the Islamic Republic’s progress and remind the regime that its malign activity will not come without cost.
Still, it would be far better to avoid the risk war of war by discarding the JCPOA framework and implementing a comprehensive pressure campaign that confronts Tehran with the prospect of bankruptcy and isolation unless it dismantles its enrichment program. The Biden administration should take all related measures necessary to ensure that the world’s most prolific state sponsor of terrorism can never reach the nuclear weapons threshold.
fdd.org · by Andrea Stricker Research Fellow · March 3, 2022


24. Erdogan’s Balancing Act Between Russia and Ukraine


Conclusion:

As for Erdogan — if he wants to prove the veracity of his statements of support for Ukraine — the least he can do is to allow Western broadcasters to continue to reach Turkish audiences unhindered so that they can push back against the propaganda spouted by Russia’s and China’s Turkish services.

The Ukraine war is a unique opportunity for Erdogan to correct course and position Turkey on the right side of history.

Erdogan appears to be becoming cognizant of the threat Putin’s irredentism poses to all of Russia’s neighbors. This is precisely the right moment to join forces with NATO allies and strengthen the alliance’s deterrence of the Kremlin.
Erdogan’s Balancing Act Between Russia and Ukraine - The Globalist
Turkey’s strongman leader has expressed support for the besieged country. He has also joined Putin’s assault on the Western media.

theglobalist.com · by Aykan Erdemir · March 3, 2022
One day after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan criticized the West “for being late in offering its concrete support” to Kyiv.
“The EU and all the rest of the West have failed to display a decisive and serious stance,” he said.
Since then, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union have introduced sweeping sanctions against Russia and provided weapons to Ukraine.
Erdogan on the fence
Yet Erdogan has not taken any punitive action against Moscow, and only provided humanitarian aid to Kyiv.
But Ankara joined Moscow’s crackdown on Western media outlets, the latest episode of his balancing act designed to preserve his ties to both sides.
Hostile strongmen
Erdogan has drawn closer to his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, since surviving an attempted coup in 2016.
The two strongmen share an ideological hostility to the West and a common interest in ensuring their own impunity amid Western efforts to counter illicit finance and human rights violations.
Reckless policies
Meanwhile, Ukraine has emerged as Ankara’s leading defense industry partner in aviation and engine technologies.
The Turkish government intensified its efforts to find alternative suppliers following a long list of arms export restrictions by Western governments worried about Turkey’s reckless policies at home and abroad, including its purchase of the S-400 air defense system from Russia.
Drones for Ukraine
Turkey’s turn to Ukraine to skirt Western defense restrictions, however, has complicated Erdogan’s relationship with Putin.
Since 2019, Turkey’s Baykar defense company exported over a dozen armed drones to Ukraine and took steps for joint production in the country, drawing Moscow’s ire.
Kyiv has already used these drones to strike Russian targets and praised them publicly.
Erdogan stays mum on the role of these drones produced by his son-in-law’s company.
Turkey’s deputy foreign minister stressed on March 3 that these drones do not constitute Ankara’s military aid to Ukraine and added, “these are products Ukraine purchased from a private Turkish company.”
Erdogan continues his balancing act by reiterating that he can neither abandon Russia nor Ukraine.
Ankara aiding the Kremlin
The Erdogan government continues to oppose sanctions against Russia, just as it challenged sanctions against Iran and Venezuela.
Ankara also aided the Kremlin by abstaining in the Council of Europe’s February 25 vote to suspend Russia.
Following the strong global reaction to Russia’s invasion, Turkey started to correct course. It joined 140 other countries on March 2 in condemning Moscow at the UN General Assembly.
Delayed response
The Turkish airspace is one of the last NATO airspaces that remains open to Russia.
It took Ankara three days following Ukraine’s request to recognize that Russia’s invasion constitutes war.
A day later it started implementing the 1936 Montreux Convention which restricts the passage of warships through the Turkish Straits.
Ironically, Ankara’s restrictions target not only the warships of the belligerent parties, Russia and Ukraine, under Article 19, but all warships, apparently under Article 21.
This would also block U.S. and NATO warships from entering the Black Sea.
Furthermore, Russian and Ukrainian warships returning to their Black Sea ports still retain their rights of passage.
Turkey’s spoiler role
Erdogan’s fence-sitting in Ukraine is in line with his previous enabling of Russia by playing a spoiler role within NATO. Ankara reportedly watered down the wording of NATO’s April 15, 2021 statement expressing solidarity with the United States following Russia’s cyberattacks on U.S. government agencies.
An emerging pattern
The Erdogan government did the same to NATO’s April 22, 2021 statement voicing concern over Russian military intelligence’s blowing up of ammunition storage depots in Czechia in 2014.
Ankara also blocked a NATO defense plan for Poland and the Baltic states for over six months until June 2020, prompting The New York Times to label Turkey “NATO’s ‘Elephant in the Room.”
Banning Western broadcasters
In the run up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Erdogan has also joined Putin’s assault on the Western media.
Turkey’s media regulator, RTUK, posted three official notifications on February 21 threatening to block Western broadcasters.
Deutsche Welle (DW), Euronews, and Voice of America (VOA), were reportedly banned unless they obtained internet broadcast licenses within 72 hours.
Coming on the heels of Russia’s move to withdraw the press credentials of all DW staff and shutter the German public broadcaster’s Moscow studio, Ankara’s threat is facilitating the Kremlin’s campaign to silence Western media outlets.
Foreign media bans
RTUK’s move against these American, French, and German broadcasters marks the first time Turkey’s media regulator has targeted international media outlets using an authority created in 2019.
The media regulator used an authority the country’s Islamist-ultranationalist ruling coalition created with a 2019 regulation aimed at silencing critical online reporting
Russian and Chinese media exempt
Ankara has not made similar demands of either Russia’s public broadcaster Sputnik, whose Turkish service has thrived while pushing Kremlin propaganda.
Beijing’s propaganda channel, China Radio International has also remained untouched.
Censorship pushback
Both DW and VOA pushed back against Ankara by declaring they will appeal RTUK’s threatened ban.
Acting VOA Director Yolanda López said, “Voice of America’s independent journalism cannot be subject to this or any government’s control which results either in censorship or even the perception of it.”
DW Director General Peter Limbourg warned that RTUK’s move “does not relate to formal aspects of broadcasting, but to the journalistic content itself.”
He added that the 2019 regulation “gives the Turkish authorities the option to block the entire service based on individual, critical reports unless these reports are deleted. This would open up the possibility of censorship.”
Biden’s silence
In response to the Erdogan government’s targeting of Western broadcasters, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 23 tweeted, “A free and independent media is critical and must not be subjected to government control or censorship. Turkey has to respect and ensure freedom of expression.”
The Biden administration, however, continued its radio silence over Turkey’s democratic backsliding and abysmal human rights record.
Erdogan’s impunity
If Erdogan knows that there will be no real consequences, he will persist with his plans to block Western media outlets.
Their independent reporting continues to embarrass him and his fellow autocrat Putin.
Much needed consequences
If the Biden administration wants to fulfill its promise of a human rights-centered foreign policy, it needs to stand behind the U.S. public broadcaster VOA and other Western media outlets threatened by autocratic regimes.
The European Union should also stand behind these outlets by warning Erdogan that there will be consequences for such hostile action.
Conclusion
As for Erdogan — if he wants to prove the veracity of his statements of support for Ukraine — the least he can do is to allow Western broadcasters to continue to reach Turkish audiences unhindered so that they can push back against the propaganda spouted by Russia’s and China’s Turkish services.
The Ukraine war is a unique opportunity for Erdogan to correct course and position Turkey on the right side of history.
Erdogan appears to be becoming cognizant of the threat Putin’s irredentism poses to all of Russia’s neighbors. This is precisely the right moment to join forces with NATO allies and strengthen the alliance’s deterrence of the Kremlin.
About Aykan Erdemir
Aykan Erdemir is the senior director of the Turkey Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and former member of the Turkish Parliament.
theglobalist.com · by Aykan Erdemir · March 3, 2022

25. Accommodating Iran Will Be No More Successful Than Accommodating Russia

Excerpts:
Tehran makes no secret of its aspiration to become the node for all anti-Western and anti-global movements. Today’s Iran dreams of transforming itself into a Soviet Union redux, racing to the aid of anti-Western revolutionaries. Tomorrow’s nuclear Iran will be able to fulfill that dream. It will back a network of radical, violent groups that will rush to Tehran in search for a powerful patron. Tehran will then be only a small step away from becoming as potent a sponsor of subversion throughout the world as Putin’s Russia.
This scenario is not as far-fetched as it might appear. Iran already has important friends in Europe and stirs up revolutionary fantasies among hardcore Western Marxists. Links between Europe’s far left and Iran’s brand of radical Islam are well-established. Their mutual loathing for Western capitalism and democracy trumps differences they might have on issues like gender and homosexuality. At the opposite end of the political spectrum, expressions of sympathy and support for Iran are also evident among the far right, especially since the beginning of the civil war in Syria, which spurred numerous far-right organizations in Europe to idolize Russia, Hezbollah, and Iran as supposed defenders of Christian minorities and bulwarks against Sunni Salafists. Iran has since cultivated this image through foreign propaganda channels.
Nor would an emboldened, nuclear-capable Iran not stop at supporting anti-global political forces on the extremes of our political systems. It would consolidate an already existing international coalition of states that share Iran’s ideological antagonism toward the West. Iran’s alliances with Bolivia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba in Latin America have strengthened over the past decade. Whenever elections flip pro-Western governments across the developing world, Iran will have an easier time offering itself as their paladin—investing in their economies, topping up the bank accounts of compliant leaders, training and supplying their armies, and providing political support in international forums. Russia and China will be more than happy to use Iran as a hammer to strike at Western interests and security arrangements that interfere with their own ambitions.
As we watch Putin’s Russia destroy Ukraine, we should realize we are about to cross a similar threshold with Iran.
Accommodating Iran Will Be No More Successful Than Accommodating Russia
Putin’s horrifying war in Ukraine shows the likely results of the West continuing to ignore Iran’s nuclear quest
BY
MARCH 02, 2022
Tablet · by Emanuele Ottolenghi · March 3, 2022
Vladimir Putin has opened the gates of hell by invading Ukraine at the end of his 23-year journey to destroy Europe’s post-Cold War security architecture and reestablish Russia’s lost imperial glory. As the civilized world confronts a threat that we should have seen coming at us from the moment, more than 20 years ago, when Putin turned Grozny into Stalingrad and got away with it, our response is constrained by the fact that Putin’s Russia has a formidable nuclear arsenal, which the Russian tyrant has proclaimed himself willing to use. The shocking and horrifying scenes we witness on our television screens—and our inability to do anything about them—should be foremost in the minds of Western leaders as they blindly embrace a new nuclear deal with Tehran.
We should know better. Like Putin’s Russia, the Islamic Republic is a non-status quo power whose actions are driven more than anything else by ideology. Sooner or later, a revolutionary power aims to export its revolution, both as an instrument of radical change and as a tool to establish its hegemonic rule. In an article titled “A Powder Keg Named Islam,” published in Italy’s daily Corriere della Sera on Feb. 13, 1979, a few days after the Islamic Revolution’s founder, the late Imam Ruhollah Khomeini, returned to Iran from his Paris exile, the French philosopher Michel Foucault wrote that,
Maybe [its] historical significance will be found, not in its conformity to a recognized “revolutionary” model, but instead in its potential to overturn the existing political situation in the Middle East and thus the global strategic equilibrium. Its singularity, which has up to now constituted its force, consequently, threatens to give it the power to expand. Thus, it is true that as an “Islamic” movement, it can set the entire region afire, overturn the most unstable regimes, and disturb the most solid ones. Islam—which is not simply a religion, but an entire way of life, an adherence to a history and a civilization—risks becoming a gigantic powder keg, at the level of hundreds of millions of men. Since yesterday, any Muslim state can be revolutionized from the inside, based on its time-honored traditions.
At the time, at least, Foucault was a fan of Iran’s revolution. But he was not wrong.
The ayatollahs’ Iran aspires to reassert Shiite predominance over the Sunni world, much like Putin’s Russia seeks to resuscitate the czarist empire. Iranian mullahs hope to become the beacon of Islam beyond the region, much like Putin dreams of a pan-Slavic awakening; to emerge as leader of the oppressed of the earth, much like Russia seeks to undermine Western global dominance; and to persuade the downtrodden to embrace Khomeini’s vision as a banner of resistance against the Western-dominated international order, much like Putin appeals to Christianity, anti-capitalism, and anti-wokeness in his battle against America’s “Empire of Lies.”
Yet even after Putin upended all our illusions about resetting relations with Moscow and solving disputes amicably; even after he unleashed an unprovoked war of aggression against a defenseless neighbor; even after he has green-lighted the rape of cities and the wanton destruction of an entire nation; Washington’s Iran policy debate remains focused on the misguided belief—which the Biden administration shares with its Democratic predecessors—that well-placed safeguards (which the JCPOA is lacking in any case) in exchange for economic dividends will not only constrain Iran’s nuclear quest but also potentially change Iran’s behavior. We tell ourselves that Iran is not Russia. It does not need to be, to aspire to a greatness that will upend our world.
Yet our policy is still guided by the basic cost-benefit analysis that premised every sanctions regime adopted in the past and which also guided the West’s Russia policy since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet bloc: Faced with increasing isolation, costs, and damages to their economies, adversaries will barter the imagined rewards of bad behavior for economic opportunities. Even when they act irrationally—at least by the standards of Western, 21st-century rationality—we mistake their madness for a ruse, which we can defang through a calculated mixture of blandishments and punishments. We tried the same combination of carrots and sticks with Mussolini in Ethiopia and Hitler in Munich. Hollywood notwithstanding, it has never worked, because what ultimately motivates Tehran (and Moscow) is not rational calculations of national self-interest, as Barack Obama insisted back in 2015, but a burning desire to spread its revolutionary ideology and a determination to tirelessly wage a battle of ideas to undermine and destroy the Western rules-based international liberal order. The addition of nuclear power status ensures that existing constraints on those ambitions, however feeble, will wither away.
The Iranian regime as a whole may not be wedded to the kind of apocalyptic politics that the rhetoric of some of its leaders frequently suggests—but Iran remains, at heart, a revolutionary power driven by an ideology that successfully blends Persian nationalism, Shiite revivalism, Third World-ism, and revolutionary Marxist-Leninist theories. The revolution’s devastating potential always derived from the explosive combination of the subversive with the divine. The desire to push this agenda more aggressively and more successfully is what drives its quest for nuclear weapons.
The fact that Iran lacks the might of, say, the former Soviet Union in its revolutionary pursuit, does not make its efforts laughable or its position more vulnerable to pressure. It is what motivates Iran to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, no matter what sacrifices that effort entails. A nuclear arsenal, or even the prestige derived from becoming a nuclear threshold state after prolonged and successful defiance of Western economic pressure, is a force multiplier we underestimate at our own peril. Allowing Tehran to acquire this capability, which the JCPOA is designed to allow under U.S. protection, is the diplomatic equivalent of flicking a lit cigarette into dry brush.
That contemporary Iran is a revolutionary power whose decision-makers are virtually impervious to pressure should be obvious by now. Forty-three years after the overthrow of the shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Tehran continues to invest considerable resources, even under extreme economic duress, to export its revolution to every corner of the globe. The financial and military undertakings required to save the regime of Bashar Assad in Syria, enhance Hezbollah’s hegemony in Lebanon, and proliferate pro-Iran Shiite militias that fan the flames of violence from Yemen to Iraq, are only the most newsworthy, expensive, and nearby examples of how Iran prioritizes exporting its revolution abroad over public welfare at home.
Iran shares no border or personal territorial disputes with Israel, but it does nurse a pathological obsession with destroying it, which it cultivates through its support for Palestinian Islamists, worldwide terror plots against Jews, and relentless diplomatic pressure. Iran also bears considerable costs to sustain far-flung alliances (see: Venezuela) that yield little financial benefit and bring no domestic dividends. And then there’s Iran’s worldwide outreach to win acolytes through missionary work—a fool’s errand perhaps, but one Iran pursues with economic profligacy. Liberal democracies might view all this as the irresponsible squandering of precious national resources; Iran considers it a sacred duty.
That the cost-benefit analysis spurred by sanctions isn’t panning out the way it did with, say, apartheid South Africa, should also be obvious by now. Iran is not acting like an insolvent debtor trying to restore its credibility, but like an unrepentant thief who prefers to constantly improve its ability to crack ever more sophisticated security systems. With the example of Putin’s Russia before its eyes, the Biden administration needs to radically rethink America’s long game vis-à-vis Iran.
It is entirely reasonable to assume that Iran is seeking the protection that nuclear weapons clearly provide Russia to impose its will on its neighborhood—and to do so with impunity. And the new world that Iran seeks to create will be dominated by Tehran: It will be characterized by fierce competition with the United States for hegemony over the Persian Gulf and by efforts to cement alliances to confront Iran’s ideological and geopolitical antagonists in Riyadh, Ankara, Jerusalem, and Cairo. This will apply to a range of issues, including Iran’s all-consuming hostility to the existence of Israel or to any political accommodation with it.
But it will hardly stop at the Jewish state. Emboldened by its nuclear breakout, Iran’s revolutionary leadership will seek to cement partnerships and dependencies and establish its dominance far beyond the Middle East, using a new power and prestige to turn the tables on Western powers. The consequences will be severe, and the possibility for conflict far deadlier than what we are seeing in Ukraine can hardly be excluded.
Tehran makes no secret of its aspiration to become the node for all anti-Western and anti-global movements. Today’s Iran dreams of transforming itself into a Soviet Union redux, racing to the aid of anti-Western revolutionaries. Tomorrow’s nuclear Iran will be able to fulfill that dream. It will back a network of radical, violent groups that will rush to Tehran in search for a powerful patron. Tehran will then be only a small step away from becoming as potent a sponsor of subversion throughout the world as Putin’s Russia.
This scenario is not as far-fetched as it might appear. Iran already has important friends in Europe and stirs up revolutionary fantasies among hardcore Western Marxists. Links between Europe’s far left and Iran’s brand of radical Islam are well-established. Their mutual loathing for Western capitalism and democracy trumps differences they might have on issues like gender and homosexuality. At the opposite end of the political spectrum, expressions of sympathy and support for Iran are also evident among the far right, especially since the beginning of the civil war in Syria, which spurred numerous far-right organizations in Europe to idolize Russia, Hezbollah, and Iran as supposed defenders of Christian minorities and bulwarks against Sunni Salafists. Iran has since cultivated this image through foreign propaganda channels.
Nor would an emboldened, nuclear-capable Iran not stop at supporting anti-global political forces on the extremes of our political systems. It would consolidate an already existing international coalition of states that share Iran’s ideological antagonism toward the West. Iran’s alliances with Bolivia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba in Latin America have strengthened over the past decade. Whenever elections flip pro-Western governments across the developing world, Iran will have an easier time offering itself as their paladin—investing in their economies, topping up the bank accounts of compliant leaders, training and supplying their armies, and providing political support in international forums. Russia and China will be more than happy to use Iran as a hammer to strike at Western interests and security arrangements that interfere with their own ambitions.
As we watch Putin’s Russia destroy Ukraine, we should realize we are about to cross a similar threshold with Iran.
Tablet · by Emanuele Ottolenghi · March 3, 2022



26. US, Russia Agree to Deconfliction Hotline As Putin’s Attack On Ukraine Escalates


US, Russia Agree to Deconfliction Hotline As Putin’s Attack On Ukraine Escalates
Russia has fired almost 500 missiles at Ukrainian targets.
defenseone.com · by Tara Copp
As Russia’s aerial attack on Ukrainian cities intensifies, U.S. European Command and Moscow have agreed to a deconfliction hotline to avoid any miscalculation that could drag both countries into a larger conflict.
“The United States retains a number of channels to discuss critical security issues with the Russians during a contingency or emergency. The Department of the Defense recently established a deconfliction line with the Russian Ministry of Defense on March 1 for the purposes of preventing miscalculation, military incidents, and escalation,” a senior defense official confirmed in a statement to Defense One.
News of the deconfliction line was first reported by NBC News.
The U.S. and Russia started a similar phone line as both conducted air operations over Syria in 2017, but had not been in communication in the days leading up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
In the week since, the U.S. has pulled all manned and unmanned aircraft from Ukrainian airspace and has said repeatedly it would not put forces on the ground or in the air, to avoid any possibility of a situation where it would have to fire onRussian aircraft or troops and escalate the invasion of Ukraine into a direct war. But the U.S. continues to provide intelligence and weapons to Ukraine to help the country defend itself.
The deconfliction line comes as a humanitarian effort to help civilians fleeing Ukraine and those under siege ramps up, and Russia’s bombing of Ukrainian cities intensifies. In the week since the invasion, Russia has fired more than 480 missiles or munitions at Ukrainian targets, most of which have been fired from inside Ukraine.
As of March 2, the United Nations Human Rights agency reported at least 802 civilian casualties: At least 249 killed, including 17 children and 553 injured from “shelling and airstrikes.”
But the agency cautioned these numbers are just the start. The “real toll is much higher,” UN Human Rights tweeted.
defenseone.com · by Tara Copp


27. Opinion: The world’s fault lines show in response to Russian invasion of Ukraine


Opinion: The world’s fault lines show in response to Russian invasion of Ukraine
bangordailynews.com · by More by Michael Cianchette, Opinion columnist · March 4, 2022
The BDN Opinion section operates independently and does not set newsroom policies or contribute to reporting or editing articles elsewhere in the newspaper or on bangordailynews.com.
Through the fog of war, some things can become clear.
We know who the “good guys” were during World War II. The Allies were engaged in a “just war,” even if the nations themselves were not always just. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the world knew who was in the wrong.
Other conflicts had more gray. Whatever criticisms exist about the 2003 Iraq War, there is no credible argument that Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime occupied some moral high ground. Korea and Afghanistan, each with the United Nation’s imprimatur, shaded to the good side. The war between North and South Vietnam was complicated, to say the least.

But now we have the first quintessential “good guy, bad guy” conflict of the 21st century. And nations are making clear where they stand.
Vladimir Putin’s regime is on the “bad” side of history, joined by his lackeys in Belarus. Both nations voted against a U.N. resolution condemning Russia’s invasion this week.
Also on the “no” side? North Korea and Syria.

Venezuela didn’t bother to attend the vote, but loudly proclaimed Russia a victim in the situation. Cuba officially “abstained” in the U.N. all while shouting that the invasion is America’s fault.
The fault lines are showing.
Earlier this week, 141 nations stood with Ukraine in the U.N. Essentially all of Europe, East Asia’s democracies, and most of the American continents voted “yes” on the resolution. Africa was a mixed bag with many countries there abstaining from the vote, but the Arabian Peninsula was fairly pro-Ukraine.
Two rising world powers — India and China — officially abstained from the vote. So too did Iran and Pakistan. All of these nations have strong relations with Moscow, whether because of affinity or convenience. Reports indicate that China’s Xi Jinping asked Putin to hold off on invading until the Olympics were over.
The situation in Ukraine is changing hourly. The “fog of war” obscures the facts on the ground.
But, like real fog, once you gain altitude and take a broader view, things can come into focus. And we’re witnessing a realignment of the world order.
There are two lessons most countries will learn from Russia’s invasion. The first is that, to resist strong, aggressive neighbors, you should align yourself with a defensive pact. Putin has not yet challenged NATO directly because of the near-certain doom that would follow that course of action.
The popularity of joining NATO has surged in both Finland and Sweden, Russia’s nordic neighbors, despite decades of pseudo-neutrality. There is safety in numbers.
The second lesson is that nuclear weapons are the ultimate trump card in international affairs. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1991, the world recoiled. After that, a coalition sprung forth to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty.
The dynamic is remarkably similar to today. The difference is that Russia remains a nuclear power, which prevents Ukraine’s supporters from acting directly. Mutually Assured Destruction remains a real threat.
Ukraine had nukes after the fall of the Soviet Union. They gave them up as part of the Budapest Memorandum, where several world powers — including Russia — promised to respect their territorial integrity. The words on paper did not bother Putin. But nuclear weapons might have.
Other nations are watching. Kim Jong Un will likely feel emboldened in North Korea, believing his weapons of mass destruction will permit him to remain a dictator with impunity from external threats. In the months ahead, we may hear near-nuclear powers — Iran and Syria — are stepping up their efforts to obtain these horrific weapons.
They have all watched the world’s outrage in response to Russia’s actions and the incredibly severe sanctions eviscerating the ruble. But they have also seen that no western nation is willing to risk nuclear war.
North Korea, Syria and Iran all stand with Russia on the wrong side of this historical moment. As the fog of war lifts in Ukraine, hopefully we will see the challenges ahead of us with clear eyes. The solutions remain opaque.
To borrow President Joe Biden’s closing from his State of the Union, as Lent begins, may God bless us all.
More articles from the BDN
bangordailynews.com · by More by Michael Cianchette, Opinion columnist · March 4, 2022




28. Putin’s war, as seen in Russia: Protests, arrests and alternate reality

Excerpts:
And at the U.N. this week, Ukraine’s ambassador, Sergiy Kyslytsya, publicly read what he said were text messages from a slain Russian soldier to his mother. “Mama, I’m in Ukraine. There is a real war raging here. I’m afraid. We are bombing all of the cities … even targeting civilians.” There was no independent verification of the texts; all that was clear was that Ukraine was joining the information war.
The fate of Russian soldiers has been used in this fashion before. Last week, the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia, a grassroots group that rose to prominence with its opposition to the war in Chechnya in the mid-1990s, said it was preparing a legal complaint alleging that Moscow had tricked young men fulfilling military service at home into going to the front in Ukraine.
Back in the ’90s, the group organized anti-war protests by soldiers’ mothers, sending many to Chechnya to bring their sons back from the conflict. “We’ve had a flurry of calls from scared mothers all over Russia,” Andrey Kurochkin, the group’s deputy chairman, told the Russian website Takim Dela last week, just as Putin’s invasion began.
As the conflict drags on, the questions for Russia’s leaders are only likely to multiply, Georgetown University’s Stent said: “The groundswell is there, and I think once Russians see body bags coming from Ukraine … they really are going to question, what is the point of this?”

Putin’s war, as seen in Russia: Protests, arrests and alternate reality
As the fighting in Ukraine drags on and economic pain hits Russians, signs of dissent are mounting. Can they make a difference?

Deputy Global Editor
March 3, 2022
grid.news · by Nikhil Kumar
It is like going through the looking glass: For Kremlin-backed media outlets such as RT, Sputnik and Channel One, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is, above all, Ukraine’s fault, a culmination, as one recent report put it, of “a crisis which began in 2014″ — the year a Ukrainian uprising ousted a pro-Moscow leader. In this parallel universe of Russian media, a prominent TV pundit insisted last week that it was the Ukrainian authorities who were waging war on their own population. Another popular host said people in the eastern Ukrainian city of Kharkiv — currently under heavy Russian bombardment — “only have one issue with the Russian army: ‘What took you so long?’”
Hear more from Nikhil Kumar about this story:
What did not take long, as Moscow’s attack unfolded, were new orders from Russia’s media regulator, instructing newsrooms around the country to remove reports that described the invasion as an invasion.
Under the rules, calling Russia’s actions a “declaration of war” or even an “assault” could lead to media outlets being fined or blocked. The Kremlin, facing economically ruinous sanctions and an unexpectedly robust Ukrainian resistance, has moved to reinforce one of its choicest weapons: an expansive reality distortion field, powered by state media broadcasts that hew to the official — and increasingly fictional — Russian line.
Growing dissent
The media directives came as Russians took to the streets in Moscow, St. Petersburg and beyond. The gatherings were often small and quickly silenced, but according to OVD-Info, an independent tracker of Russian anti-government demonstrations, there were protests in 48 cities on Sunday alone. That’s a high number in President Vladimir Putin’s Russia, which has a long record of stifling dissent with a mix of media control and security clampdowns.
More than 2,000 people were detained by police on Sunday alone; nearly four times that many have been arrested since Putin launched his attack — and when authorities in Moscow ominously warned citizens of “the negative legal consequences” of coming out against the Kremlin’s war.
Even before Putin announced his so-called special military operation in Ukraine, a considerable proportion of Russians was convinced war would damage his authority. In fact, only 16 percent of those surveyed last May by the Levada Center, regarded as the country’s only independent pollster, said that Putin’s standing would grow in the event of a full-scale war. Close to a third thought it would cause dissatisfaction with the Russian strongman, with more than 40 percent saying it would not change attitudes.
Andrey Deryabin, a movie producer in St. Petersburg, told Grid that while years of “rabid propaganda” had colored public attitudes across the country, younger Russians were increasingly “ready to express openly their dissatisfaction” with those in power. “Almost all young people are aware of what is happening in Ukraine and actively follow social networks,” he said.
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The cracks are showing among some influential Russian voices. While ordinary citizens take to the streets, several Russian celebrities have taken to social media to push anti-war messages. The country’s most famous rapper, Oxxxymiron, posted a video declaring that he was “against this war that Russia is unleashing against Ukraine.”
Tennis star Andrey Rublev made the point in dramatic fashion, writing “No War Please” on a television camera after a semifinal win in the Dubai Tennis Championships. Several other musicians, TV stars and academics, as well as scores of independent-minded journalists, have all publicly opposed the war.
“This adventure will bring grief to the families of thousands of people in Ukraine and Russia,” a coalition of independent media outlets said in a statement posted to the investigative website Meduza. The war, they wrote — though they did not give their names — was a “massacre started by the Russian leadership.”
Rare voices of dissent have also risen from within state-controlled organs. A popular Channel One talk show host reacted to the invasion by posting a black square on Instagram, captioned: “Fear and pain. No to war.” He hasn’t been back on air since; the network put his absence down to scheduling issues. Lyudmila Narusova, a member of the Russian parliament, told the independent Dozhd television channel, “I do not identify myself with those representatives of the state that speak out in favor of the war. I think they themselves do not know what they are doing.” And Andrey Kortunov, an adviser to the Kremlin, questioned Putin’s reasoning for launching the invasion.
“I was shocked because for a long time, I thought that a military operation was not feasible. It was not plausible,” Kortunov, a member of a Kremlin panel of foreign policy experts, told Sky News. “I do not understand the logic he currently has, his own rationale that justifies the actions that he made.”
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Perhaps the most meaningful show of dissent came from in the form of a rare “open letter” to Putin signed by 1,200 students, faculty and staff of the prestigious Moscow State Institute of International Relations. The Institute is closely affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has been a training ground for Russia’s government and foreign service elite.
were “categorically against the Russian Federation’s military actions in Ukraine,” and blasted the invasion on what they called “moral” terms:
“We consider it morally unacceptable to stay on the sidelines and keep silent when people are dying in a neighboring state. They are dying through the fault of those who preferred weapons instead of peaceful diplomacy. Many of us have friends and relatives living in the territories where military action is being carried out. But war has come not only to them, war has come home to each of us, and our children and our grandchildren will feel the repercussions. Many generations of future diplomats will have to rebuild the trust in Russia and the good relations with our neighbors that have been lost.”
Then there are the ultrarich Russians who have spoken out against Putin’s war — either for moral reasons or because the Western sanctions will hit them hard. Perhaps it’s a combination of both.
Calls for peace have come from some of the country’s billionaire oligarchs, including Oleg Deripaska, founder of the aluminum giant Rusal. Deripaska, who was sanctioned by the U.S. for his ties to Putin after alleged Russian interference in the 2016 election, called for peace talks to begin “as fast as possible” in a post on the Telegram messaging app. Billionaire banker Oleg Tinkov wrote on Instagram: “Now in Ukraine innocent people are killed, every day, it is unimaginable and unacceptable! States should be spending money on treating people, on research to beat cancer, not war. We are against this war!”
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Mikhail Fridman, another Russian billionaire who founded the country’s largest private bank, called the war a “tragedy” in an email to staff at his London-based private equity firm. “I was born in Western Ukraine and lived there until I was 17. My parents are Ukrainian citizens and live in Lviv, my favorite city,” Fridman wrote in the email, which was seen by the Financial Times. “But I have also spent much of my life as a citizen of Russia, building and growing businesses. I am deeply attached to Ukrainian and Russian peoples and see the current conflict as a tragedy for them both.”
Russia’s economy, battered
These early examples of dissent come as the U.S., European Union and other nations crack down on Russian economic interests around the world — and deliver a hammer blow to the Russian economy at home.
In the U.K., the oil giant BP said it would move to offload its almost 20 percent stake in Russia’s Rosneft, while Norway’s Equinor is exiting its Russian energy joint ventures. The former, in particular, was striking — BP is the biggest foreign investor in Russia.
The most impactful measures were two that hit the very heart of the Russian economy: sanctions that restrict Moscow’s ability to deploy its more than $600 billion in foreign reserves, combined with the expulsion of certain Russian banks from SWIFT, an international payments mechanism that allows them to move money around the world. The action against Russia’s reserves targets what was a critical part of the Kremlin’s economic insurance policy: Those hundreds of billions had been collected to protect the Russian economy in an emergency like the one that is unfolding now, as sanctions take effect.
The fallout has come quickly: The Russian ruble lost roughly a third of its value Monday, the Moscow stock exchange shut down trading, and the cost of insurance against the possibility that Russia might default on its debts rose sharply — a clear sign that international investors were now preparing for the possibility of a crushing Russian economic collapse.
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Even the Kremlin’s official spokesman was forced to admit — in understated fashion — that his country’s “economic reality has considerably changed.”
“These are heavy sanctions, they are problematic,” Dmitry Peskov said, even as he added that Russia had “potential to offset the harm.”
The assurances haven’t stopped the anxiety from spreading beyond financial markets. Many ordinary Russians were rushing to ATMs, waiting in long queues to secure whatever cash they could. Muscovites were warned that they might not be able to use certain payment methods on the city’s metro, buses and trams. The reason? The bank that city authorities use to process those payments was facing sanctions.
Almost no sector is being spared. Air travel has been hit, with Europe and Canada closing their skies to Russian planes. The carmaker Volvo is suspending shipments to Russia, and the German press reported that Mercedes-Benz is also re-evaluating its business in the country. And on Monday, FIFA, the global governing organization for soccer, banned Russia from competition.
Will dissent matter?
The protests and crushing economic reality raise fundamental questions as to how the Kremlin will deal with both. The first is easier to answer; certainly Russia will crack down on protesters and double down on state propaganda. It is also clamping down on social media: Access to Facebook has been restricted, and Twitter users in the country have also encountered problems logging on to the microblogging service.
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The restrictions are only likely to be tightened as the sanctions wrecking ball tears through the economy. A stronger-than-expected Ukrainian resistance further complicates the landscape for the Kremlin — and not just militarily.
Already, although the numbers have not been independently verified, Ukraine says it has killed more than 5,000 Russian personnel, and nearly a week after the war began, the Russian Defense Ministry acknowledged combat deaths, saying 498 Russian soldiers had been killed. Even this lower figure is the largest in any of its military operations since the war in Chechnya, more than two decades ago.
What happens next and how attitudes shift is of course hard to predict. Experts say the pressure on Russia — on the economy from sanctions, on its military from the Ukrainian pushback — is unlikely to cause any sudden shifts.
“We should be under no illusion that this is going to immediately change the course of the war or topple the Putin regime,” Angela Stent, a Russian foreign policy expert at Georgetown University and the Brookings Institution, said during a Twitter Spaces conversation with Grid, adding: “Depending on what the casualties are, and then the impact of the sanctions on Russian people, I think you will get least more questioning in Russia of the wisdom of this policy.”
It’s a prospect not lost on Ukraine, which has already started making efforts to pierce the Putin propaganda wall: A new hotline has been set up for family members of Russian soldiers called “Come Back Alive from Ukraine,” according to the Guardian. It is an effort to win Russian hearts and minds: Russians worried about their relatives at the front can phone to check whether they were among the casualties. Meanwhile, a Telegram channel that went live over the weekend is publishing videos of what the Interior Ministry in Kyiv says are captured Russian soldiers.
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And at the U.N. this week, Ukraine’s ambassador, Sergiy Kyslytsya, publicly read what he said were text messages from a slain Russian soldier to his mother. “Mama, I’m in Ukraine. There is a real war raging here. I’m afraid. We are bombing all of the cities … even targeting civilians.” There was no independent verification of the texts; all that was clear was that Ukraine was joining the information war.
The fate of Russian soldiers has been used in this fashion before. Last week, the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia, a grassroots group that rose to prominence with its opposition to the war in Chechnya in the mid-1990s, said it was preparing a legal complaint alleging that Moscow had tricked young men fulfilling military service at home into going to the front in Ukraine.
Back in the ’90s, the group organized anti-war protests by soldiers’ mothers, sending many to Chechnya to bring their sons back from the conflict. “We’ve had a flurry of calls from scared mothers all over Russia,” Andrey Kurochkin, the group’s deputy chairman, told the Russian website Takim Dela last week, just as Putin’s invasion began.
As the conflict drags on, the questions for Russia’s leaders are only likely to multiply, Georgetown University’s Stent said: “The groundswell is there, and I think once Russians see body bags coming from Ukraine … they really are going to question, what is the point of this?”
This story has been updated.
grid.news · by Nikhil Kumar


29.  China seeks to unify public in support for Russia

Will this put China on the wrong slide of history?

China seeks to unify public in support for Russia
AP · by ZEN SOO · March 4, 2022
SINGAPORE (AP) — As the West condemns Russia, President Vladimir Putin has vocal supporters in China, where the ruling Communist Party tells its people they are fellow targets of U.S.-led harassment.
“If Russia is destroyed, we will be next. This is for sure,” said Wang Yongchun, a retiree in Beijing. “The United States wants to dominate the world.”
Such comments reflect the stance of a ruling party that is the closest thing Putin has to a major ally: The war should stop but the United States is to blame.
President Xi Jinping’s government has tried to distance itself from Russia’s offensive but avoided criticizing Moscow. The government has offered to act as mediator and denounced trade and financial sanctions against Russia.
Ruling party control of all Chinese media and intensive internet censorship make it hard to gauge public opinion. But what the party allows online and requires media to publish make clear what it wants the public to think.
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Media outlets were told last week to post only pro-Russian content and to censor anti-Russian or pro-Western views, according to a copy of instructions posted on the social media account of the newspaper Beijing News. The post was later deleted.
Online and in social media, expressions of sympathy for Ukraine and support for Russia appear but not criticism of Moscow.
“When a war begins, is it not the children of ordinary people who serve as cannon fodder?” said a post signed Da Ke Ming Yi on the Weibo social media platform. “Those who died were the children of ordinary people.”
A letter signed by five professors from prominent universities that criticized Russia for attacking a weaker neighbor appeared briefly on social media before being deleted.
“We stand against unjust wars,” said the academics from schools including Tsinghua University in Beijing, alma mater of many ruling party leaders.
Comments posted by nationalists criticized the professors for failing to stick to the ruling party’s official position of neutrality.
The ruling party has spent decades using school textbooks and the entirely state-controlled media to nurture a sense of nationalist grievance. It accuses the United States of trying to block China’s rise to its rightful position of global leadership.
State media repeat Beijing’s position that the United States and its European allies are to blame for the Ukraine war because they failed to respond to Russian concerns that its democratic neighbor should be barred from joining NATO, the Western military alliance.
That echoes Chinese complaints that Washington and its allies are interfering in its domestic affairs and issues of national sovereignty, including its claim over Taiwan, territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and in Xinjiang, the far-western region where China has been accused of detaining over a million Uyghurs.
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Russia’s attack, as a historical event, “is not a good one,” but “people think the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is because the United States stirred up trouble,” said Zheng Bowen, a 38-year-old engineer.
The state-run newspaper Capital News exhorted the public to line up with the ruling party: “The nation’s attitude is our attitude.”
“China has always upheld a fair and responsible attitude, calling on all parties to exercise restraint and ease the situation, and return to dialogue and negotiation,” it said.
However, the newspaper appeared to support Putin’s demand that Ukraine become a neutral buffer between Russia and Europe and give up the possibility of NATO membership.
“Ultimately, Ukraine should be a bridge between East and West, rather than a frontier of confrontation between major powers,” the Capital News said.
Comments online have called for China to support Russia by purchasing its exports of oil, gas and other goods.
“Let the Russian Embassy sell their goods on livestream. Let’s show them China’s buying power,” said a comment signed Bao Zou Guang Xiao Pang on Weibo. It received 42,000 likes.
A separate comment advocating that China maintain normal trade with Russia, an implicit rejection of sanctions, received nearly 80,000 likes.
Social media platforms have urged users to act responsibly and say they have removed thousands of postings about the attack on Ukraine.
Douyin, a short-video service operated by the Chinese owner of TikTok, said it deleted more than 3,500 videos and 12,100 comments due to “vulgar, war belittling, sensationalist and unfriendly comments.”
The popular WeChat message service also complained about “vulgar posts” that it said have a “negative impact on cyberspace.”
It said some users “took the opportunity to publish bad information about international current affairs,” including comments belittling the war such as crass jokes about “gaining course credits by going to Ukraine and fighting in the war” and asking “Ukrainian beauties to come to China,” the platform said.
WeChat’s post was later shared by a unit of China’s internet watchdog, the Cyberspace Administration of China.
Weibo said it removed more than 4,000 posts that were vulgar and ridiculed war. It said more than 10,000 accounts were closed.
“Peaceful environments do not come easily,” the company said in a social media post. It called on users to “maintain an objective and rational attitude” and take part in discussion “in a reasonable manner.”
___
AP video producer Olivia Zhang in Beijing contributed to this report.
AP · by ZEN SOO · March 4, 2022


30. Russia should be cut off from the world and treated like North Korea

We do not need another Kim Jong-un and Kim family regime. But there are clear lines being drawn between players and teams on the geopolitical chessboard.

I concur with this cautionary note. At some point the Russian military will shift to employing a key principle of war: mass - firepower and forces.

But many caution that Russia's initial failures could simply pre-sage a secondary phase of the fighting in which it uses superior numbers and force of arms to surround and bomb Ukrainian troops into submission, causing large civilian casualties.

Russia should be cut off from the world and treated like North Korea, says Scott Morrison as he blasts Vladimir Putin from his Covid sickbed
  • Russia invaded its neighbour Ukraine last Thursday with missiles and tanks 
  • Scott Morrison said Russia should be treated like outcast North Korea 
  • He said financial sanctions imposed on Russia were already having an effect 
PUBLISHED: 21:34 EST, 3 March 2022 | UPDATED: 21:35 EST, 3 March 2022
Daily Mail · by Charlie Moore, Political Reporter For Daily Mail Australia · March 4, 2022
Scott Morrison has said Russia should be treated as an international outcast like North Korea after invading Ukraine.
The Prime Minister said Russia 'self-nominated as a pariah state' when Vladimir Putin illegally launched an unprovoked invasion of his neighbour with missiles and tanks last Thursday.
'We can line them up with North Korea and others and they should be treated accordingly,' Mr Morrison told Perth's Radio 6PR from Sydney where he's isolating with Covid-19.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un takes part in an event to plant trees on Wednesday
North Korea is an isolated and nuclear-armed totalitarian dictatorship ruled by Kim Jong-Un. It has very few allies and its economy is crippled by sanctions imposed by the United Nations.
The Prime Minister said international financial sanctions on Russia in response to the invasion were hurting the nation's economy.
'They are paying a high price… this is having a very damaging impact on their economy, the targeted sanctions on individuals, it's having an impact on their oligarchs, and the whole support system to President Putin,' he said.
Mr Morrison said Russia's economic pain warned China not to invade Taiwan, a self-governing island which Beijing claims.
'This all sends a very clear message to any other autocratic regime, and we know about a few of those in our own region,' Mr Morrison said without naming China.
'It should be a clear message to not take the wrong lesson out of this… there will be a heavy transactional cost in reputation and in economic terms and potentially militarily.'

Scott Morrison has said Russia should be treated as an international outcast like North Korea after invading Ukraine. Pictured: Putin on Thursday
While the West has condemned Russia's invasion, India and China are sitting on the fence.
But the Prime Minister said he didn't blame quad ally India for not condemning Moscow.
India and Russia signed a defence co-operation pact last year and Russia is supplying long-range S-400 surface-to-air missile defense systems to New Delhi.
'I think we've got to work patiently with our partners who have the same objectives as we do in the Indo Pacific,' Mr Morrison said.
'I don't draw an equivalence between India and China whatsoever, and I do know from discussions we had last need that India is seeking to ensure that this violence ends.
'They have some very real concerns right now… there are 16,000 Indian students in the Ukraine we're trying to get out safely. So they have a lot of issues… we will work closely with them.'
On Thursday night Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky called on his Putin to sit down with him at the negotiating table in person during another impassioned television appearance.
Zelensky's comments came as Putin's forces continued their brutal assault on several of Ukraine's cities, and on the same day negotiations between the two sides made little progress in deescalating the deadly war.


Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky gestures as he speaks during a press conference in Kyiv on March 3, 2022. He made a plea to Russian President Valdimir Putin to sit down with him in person for negotiations
In an appeal to his Russian counterpart, Zelensky said: 'Get off our land. You don't want to leave now? Then sit down with me at the negotiation table. I'm available. Sit. Just not 30 metres away like with Macron or Scholz etc. I am your neighbour. You don't need to keep me 30 metres away.
'I don't bite. I'm a normal bloke. Sit down with me and talk. What are you afraid of? We aren't threatening anyone, we're not terrorists, we aren't seizing banks and seizing foreign land.'
Earlier, Putin branded Ukrainians 'extreme gangsters', claimed their army is using civilians as 'human shields', hailed his soldiers as heroes who are fighting to save innocent lives and said his invasion is going exactly to plan and schedule in a stunning act of hypocrisy and outright denial.
The Russian leader, who eight days ago declared all-out war against Ukraine in a bid to topple its elected government and reunify it with Russia by force, denied that his troops are deliberately targeting civilians - despite reams of evidence to the contrary - and instead blamed 'neo-Nazis' holding citizens hostage.


Kherson, a city of 300,000 on the Black Sea, appears to have fallen under Russian control after the mayor said 'armed visitors' had taken over a council meeting and imposed curfews. If Putin's men are in full control then it opens up the city of Odessa, home to Ukraine's main naval port, to attack - with amphibious assault ships seen forming up near Crimea on Thursday
Referring to the invasion as a 'special operation' aimed only at protecting the eastern Donbass region, he acknowledged that some Russian forces including a senior commander had died in the fighting - but claimed the officer had blown himself up in a heroic act of sacrifice while taking out several Ukrainian soldiers.
The address, one of the first Putin has made in public since announcing the start of his 'special operation' eight days ago - will do little to reassure anyone that the war is close to being over, or that Russia can be brought to the negotiating table without more blood being shed.
But it also hints that Putin is rattled as the fighting proves harder than Russian commanders anticipated, and western sanctions go harder and deeper than even European or American observers predicted. All hope of a swift victory has now been dashed, leaving Putin facing a long, bloody and expensive war to achieve his aims.
Zelensky's subsequent comments came in during a press conference in Kyiv and in response to a reporter's question on what 'guarantees' Ukraine can offer.
'Guarantees for what?' Zelensky fired back at the interviewer in Russian. 'We aren't attacking Russia and we have no intention of doing so. Guarantee what? We aren't in NATO. We don't have nuclear weapons. What am I supposed to say, what am I supposed to give, and to whom?
'You must understand - this is also a huge thing that everybody is talking about - what am I supposed to give? Jesus, what do you want from us?!'
Ukraine's president, who has become an inspirational figure both at home and abroad for his defiance in the face of Russian aggression, also called on the West to supply planes to help his military control the skies. It came after NATO members ruled out enforcing a no-fly zone over Ukraine for fear of igniting World War Three.


Putin (pictured on Thursday) branded Ukrainians 'extreme gangsters', claimed their army is using civilians as 'human shields'
'If you do not have the power to close the skies, then give me planes!' Zelensky told a news conference. 'If we are no more then, God forbid, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia will be next,' he said, adding that direct talks with Putin were 'the only way to stop this war'.
Zelensky - who just weeks ago sought to calm Ukrainians over US allegations that Russia was planning to invade his country - said: 'Nobody thought that in the modern world a man can behave like a beast.'
Soon after Putin's address, Ukraine announced that it has agreed with Russia to create safe corridors - backed by ceasefires - to evacuate civilians and deliver aid to areas under attack by Russian forces. Russian negotiator Vladimir Medinsky also said the agreement had been made during talks, describing it as 'substantial progress'.
The agreement was the only tangible progress from a second round of talks between Moscow and Kyiv, according to an adviser to Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky, and it was not immediately clear how they would work.
Negotiators from Ukraine and Russia said afterwards that a third round of talks on the war will be held shortly.
So far, more than one million people have fled Ukraine as Putin's armies have laid waste to key cities.
Meanwhile the Russian economy is tanking with the ruble at record lows, the stock market unable to open because it faces near-total collapse, and European countries seizing assets from billionaire oligarchs. Protests have also sprung up in Russia, coupled with high-profile political figures and celebrities calling for the war to end.
Just hours before the TV address, Putin had phoned Emmanuel Macron to tell the French President that he has no intention of pulling back from Ukraine or watering down his security demands, will achieve his aims 'whatever happens' and will continue fighting until 'the end'.
Macron's aides said after the call that they believe Putin intends to take the whole country, and that the 'worst is yet to come' as the Russian attacks step up, and that 'there was nothing in what President Putin told us that should reassure us.'
Mr Macron is said to have told Putin he is making a 'major mistake' and 'lying to himself'. Macron said Russia would end up poor, weakened and under sanctions for a very long time.
'There was nothing in what President Putin told us that should reassure us. He showed great determination to continue the operation,' Macron's aide said, before adding that Putin 'wanted to seize control of the whole of Ukraine'.
Putin's two statements on Thursady - the first he has made in public since announcing the start of his 'special operation' eight days ago - will do little to reassure anyone that the war is close to being over, or that Russia could be brought to the negotiating table without more blood being shed.
News that the convoy has been at least partially damaged or destroyed will come as a huge boon to the people of Kyiv, as it was feared the vehicles would be used to surround and bomb the city into submission. The Ukrainian capital is still under attack by Russian rockets and missiles, but has largely escaped the intense fire being rained down on other locations.
Perhaps the hardest-hit has been the city of Mariupol, on Ukraine's eastern Black Sea coast, which came under bombardment by Russian forces surrounding it yesterday - with the fire kept up near-continuously. Local officials say the city is without water, heat, or electricity, and cannot clear the dead from the streets.


Units of Russian Armed Forces enter Kyiv region, Ukraine, in this screengrab obtained from a video by Reuters on Thursday
Harrowing pictures revealed at least part of the civilian death toll, with a father seen weeping over the body of his son who was killed when a Russian shell destroyed his legs. Two elderly women were also pictured being evacuated from their homes and covered in blood after Russian attacks.
Despite the vicious shelling, the city still remains in the hands of Ukrainian forces - as a defiant Zelensky vowed that Ukraine will be rebuilt with Russian money as he praised his troops' 'heroic' defence.
Kharkiv, in the east, and Chernihiv, in the north west, also remained under Ukrainian control despite coming under heavy rocket fire. Nine people died in Chernihiv after Russian rockets hit a school and nearby apartments. There were also fears the Russians were about to launch a major amphibious assault against the port city of Odessa after a large fleet of ships was spotted near Crimea in the early hours.
The Ukrainian president said that 'all lines of defence are holding' with the cities of Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy and Mykolaiv all resisting Russian attacks. He even claimed the city of Kherson remains in Ukrainian hands, despite the mayor seeming to confirm overnight that it had been taken by Russian forces.
'They wanted to destroy us. They failed. We've been through so much. And if anyone thinks that, having overcome all this, Ukrainians will be frightened, broken or surrender, they know nothing about Ukraine,' Zelensky said, adding: 'We will restore every house, every street, every city and we say to Russia: learn the word 'reparations'.
'You will reimburse us for everything you did against our state, against every Ukrainian, in full.'
Separately, one of his presidential advisers said the Ukrainian army is now getting ready to launch counter-attacks on Russian forces after their initial assault on the country stalled - amid reported of fuel and food shortages, heavy casualties, and mismanagement of the operation.
'Help to us is increasing every minute and the strength of the enemy is decreasing every minute. We're not only defending but also counter-attacking,' the adviser said in a televised briefing.
President Zelensky's office said a second round of negotiations had concluded. A first round of talks on Monday ended without an agreement.


KYIV: A firefighter works to extinguish fire at a warehouse that caught flames, according to local authorities, after shelling, as Russia's invasion of Ukraine continues, in the village of Chaiky in the Kyiv region, Ukraine March 3, 2022


Pictured: A map showing the Kyiv region and the area occupied by Russian troops as they close in on Ukraine's capital
Ahead of the invasion, Washington had warned that Russia's superior forces would be able to quickly overwhelm Ukraine's 200,000-strong army - taking out air defences, achieving superiority in the skies, and then raining death down on those below.
But none of that has come to pass. Ukraine's skies remain contested, US intelligence says, while attacks have been piecemeal with troops under-supplied and not fighting in a coordinated fashion, leading to large numbers of dead along with some abandoning their vehicles which have then been captured.
'This is a colossal intelligence failure that vastly underestimated Ukrainian resistance, and military execution has been terrible,' Michael Vickers, former US Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, said at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
'[Putin's] main attack has been underweighted. It's been piecemeal. His reconnaissance elements have been captured, columns have been destroyed,' he said. 'It's just a disaster, through and through.'
But many caution that Russia's initial failures could simply pre-sage a secondary phase of the fighting in which it uses superior numbers and force of arms to surround and bomb Ukrainian troops into submission, causing large civilian casualties.
Daily Mail · by Charlie Moore, Political Reporter For Daily Mail Australia · March 4, 2022
31. International Cat Federation bans Russian cats from competitions
True whole of society effort. Hitting Putin where it hurts. Perhaps this will be the tipping point that causes Putin to back off.  

International Cat Federation bans Russian cats from competitions
The Washington Post · by Jennifer HassanYesterday at 6:26 a.m. EST · March 3, 2022
The International Cat Federation says it has banned Russian cats from its international competitions in the latest rebuke to Russia since it invaded Ukraine last week.
The federation, which considers itself “the United Nations of Cat Federations,” said in a statement that it was “shocked and horrified” that Russian forces had invaded Ukraine and “started a war.” Known as FIFe (for its French name, Fédération Internationale Féline), it said that the measures were decided Tuesday and that officials could not “witness these atrocities and do nothing.”
It said the rule would remain in place until the end of May and would then be reviewed.
“No cat belonging to exhibitors living in Russia may be entered at any FIFe show outside Russia, regardless of which organization these exhibitors hold their membership in,” said the organization, which spans almost 40 countries.
Explosions continue to rock Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv, where air raid sirens blare into the night. Fierce battles are raging across the country, and a U.N. agency says 1 million people have been displaced.
Photos taken across Ukraine have shown families abandoning their homes, carrying their children and pets as they flee.
The federation, which was established more than 70 years ago, also said it would not allow cats bred in Russia to be imported or registered in any of its pedigree books. Officials said they would be donating funds to assist cat breeders in Ukraine and thanked neighboring countries for their efforts to help Ukrainian refugees.
According to its website, the federation holds more than 700 shows globally each year, with more than 200,000 cats exhibited from Brazil to the United Kingdom.
Countries around the world have imposed sweeping sanctions on Russia following President Vladimir Putin’s invasion. In the days since the war began, Russia has been banned from numerous events and is becoming increasingly isolated on the world stage.
In a bid to showcase solidarity with Ukraine and its people, countries worldwide have united in their efforts to impose crippling measures on Putin and his allies in Europe and the United States.
Sports federations and leagues have aggressively sidelined Russia’s teams and athletes, and boycotts have also rocked Russia’s cultural, entertainment and travel industries.
On social media Thursday, reactions to the federation’s ban — deemed by some as “cat sanctions” — were mixed. Some critics called the move “ridiculous.”
“Russian breeders should not be punished for a war that isn’t of their making,” one user wrote on the federation’s Facebook page.
Others, however, said that any act of solidarity — no matter how small — should be applauded.
“Russian athletes are currently banned from virtually every event. Why should cat breeders/exhibitors not be banned as well?” read one tweet.
The Washington Post · by Jennifer HassanYesterday at 6:26 a.m. EST · March 3, 2022






V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
VIDEO "WHEREBY" Link: https://whereby.com/david-maxwell
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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