3/3/22 National Security News and Commentary

[12] https://www dot mil.gov.ua/news/2022/03/01/volodimir-zelenskij-svit-uzhe-rozumie-shho-prezidenta-rf-treba-sadzhati-za-stil-peremovin-poki-z-nim-gotovi-govoriti/

Institute for the Study of War, Russia Team

with the Critical Threats Project, AEI

March 2, 2022

ISW published its most recent Russian campaign assessment at 4:30 pm EST on March 2.

This daily synthetic product covers key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine.

Key Takeaways March 2

Russian forces resumed offensive operations against Kyiv’s western outskirts on March 2 after pausing for resupply from February 27 to March 1 but failed to secure any additional territory.
Russian forces launched offensive operations in Zhytomyr Oblast, expanding their envelopment of Kyiv further west than ISW previously assessed—likely to outflank stronger-than-anticipated Ukrainian resistance and limited Ukrainian counterattacks in Kyiv’s outskirts.
Russian forces renewed advances toward northeastern Kyiv on March 2, reaching a line approximately 65km from the city center on that axis.
Russian forces assaulted central Kharkiv and continued to heavily bombard the city on March 2, likely increasing civilian casualties.
Russian forces fully encircled Mariupol as of March 2 and are conducting a deliberate campaign to destroy critical civilian infrastructure and residential areas in a likely attempt to force the city to surrender.
Russian forces continued to reduce pockets of Ukrainian resistance in Kherson on March 2 and will likely secure the city in the next 24 hours if they have not done so already.
The Russian Ministry of Defense released implausibly low Russian fatality counts for the first time on March 2, preparing the Russian population for the arrival of injured and killed service members back to Russia.
The Kremlin made inconsistent statements regarding negotiations with Ukraine but agreed to a second round of talks scheduled for March 3.
The Kremlin continued trying to control the domestic and international narrative around the invasion by restricting Russian citizens’ freedom of speech and access to information while framing Ukraine and the West as aggressors.
The Kremlin continued to struggle with Western sanctions while it set conditions for longer-term domestic capabilities.
Ukrainian defense officials claimed Ukrainian forces thwarted an assassination attempt targeting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky after a tip from anti-war Russian intelligence officers on March 1.
Western states announced additional sanctions targeting Russia and Belarus while more private companies suspended operations in Russia.
NATO and EU countries continued delivering lethal military aid to Ukraine on March 2.
International organizations and Western leaders are increasingly concerned about Russia’s indiscriminate targeting of civilians and use of banned weapons as civilian casualties rise.
The UN General Assembly voted on March 2 overwhelmingly in favor of a motion demanding Russia stop military operations in Ukraine; China and India abstained.
Record-setting refugee flows began to strain the support structures in states neighboring Ukraine on March 2.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Ukrainian officials urged caution as Russian forces advanced toward another Ukrainian nuclear power plant on March 1 and 2.
Global oil and gas prices continued to skyrocket despite Western efforts to avoid sanctioning Russia’s energy sector.

Key Events March 1, 4:00 pm EST – March 2, 4:00 pm EST

Military Events:

Russian forces resumed offensive operations in support of their envelopment of Kyiv on March 2 but made few territorial advances. Russian forces resumed offensive operations on both axes of advance toward Kyiv after largely pausing for 72 hours to reinforce and resupply their troops north and west of Kyiv. Russian operations to envelop Kyiv are Moscow’s main effort. Russian troops are also undertaking three supporting efforts, one to seize Kharkiv, one to take Mariupol and secure the “land bridge” connecting Rostov-on-Don to Crimea, and one to secure Kherson and set conditions for a drive west toward Mykolayiv and Odesa. The three supporting operations were active in the last 24 hours; Russian forces likely captured Kherson and began a bombardment of critical civilian infrastructure in Mariupol in a likely effort to force the city to surrender while making few territorial gains in Kharkiv.

The Russian attack on Kyiv likely consists of a main effort aimed at enveloping and ultimately encircling the city from the west and a supporting effort along the axes from Chernihiv and Sumy to encircle it from the east. The long Russian column of combat and logistics vehicles observed north of Kyiv in the last 48 hours is likely now supporting attacks directly into the city from positions Russian forces maintain in Kyiv’s northwestern outskirts. However, Russian forces are more likely to prioritize the envelopment/encirclement in the coming days, rather than a direct assault into the city.

Russian forces resumed frontal assaults on Kharkiv on March 2 and continued using area-attack weapons, dramatically increasing the damage to civilian infrastructure and civilian casualties. Russian ground forces appear to be conducting another frontal assault on Kharkiv from the northeast rather than enveloping the city and will likely face protracted Ukrainian resistance.

Russian forces in the south likely secured Kherson, began bombarding civilian infrastructure in Mariupol in a likely attempt to force the city to surrender without a direct assault, and appear to be holding their positions south of Zaporizhia. Russian forces will likely resume offensive operations toward Mykolayiv in the next 24 hours but do not appear to pose an imminent danger to Odesa. Russian forces likely seek to force Mariupol to capitulate by destroying critical civilian infrastructure and killing civilians to create a humanitarian catastrophe – an approach Russian forces have repeatedly taken in Syria. A Russian drive north through or near Zaprozhya to cut off Ukrainian forces fighting along the line of contact appears very unlikely in the next 24-72 hours.

Russian forces are engaged in four primary efforts at this time. The description of these efforts differs from previous reports’ discussion of axes because of the dynamic nature of the Russian military campaign

1) Main effort—Kyiv;

2) Supporting effort #1—Kharkiv;

3) Supporting effort #2—Mariupol; and

4) Supporting effort #3—Kherson and west.

1) Main effort—Kyiv axis: Russian forces resumed offensive operations against Kyiv’s western outskirts on March 2 but failed to secure any additional territory. Russian forces additionally launched offensive operations in Zhytomyr Oblast, expanding their envelopment of Kyiv deeper west than ISW previously assessed, likely to outflank stronger-than-anticipated Ukrainian resistance and limited Ukrainian counterattacks in Kyiv’s outskirts. Russian forces additionally successfully renewed advances toward Kyiv along the Chernihiv axis on March 2. Russian operations on the Kyiv axis consist of a main effort aimed at enveloping and ultimately encircling the city from the west and supporting efforts along the Chernihiv and Sumy axes to encircle it from the northeast and east.

2) Supporting effort #1—Kharkiv: Russian forces resumed assaults on central Kharkiv and continued to heavily bombard the city on March 2. The Russian air, artillery, and missile barrage may be intended to generate panic and reduce the morale of Ukrainian defenders in Kharkiv and elsewhere. It is not likely to achieve that effect. It is too early to evaluate the likelihood that a renewed Russian ground offensive will succeed in taking the city.

3) Supporting Effort #2—Mariupol: Russian forces fully encircled Mariupol as of March 2 and are conducting a deliberate campaign to destroy critical civilian infrastructure and residential areas in a likely attempt to force the city to surrender.

4) Supporting Effort #3—Kherson and West: Russian forces continued to reduce pockets of Ukrainian resistance in Kherson on March 2 and will likely secure the city in the next 24 hours if they have not done so already. Russian forces are likely deprioritizing the axis of advance north from Crimea in favor of operations west towards Miykolayiv and east towards Mariupol.

Russian Activity

Russia’s Defense Ministry (MoD) released falsely deflated numbers of Russian casualties in Ukraine for the first time on March 2 after previously refusing to disclose any Russian casualties. The MoD is likely preparing the Russian public for Russian casualties as injured servicemembers and caskets begin to return to Russia. Russian MoD Spokesperson Major General Igor Konashenkov claimed that over 2,870 Ukrainians and 498 Russians have died in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as of March 2.[1] Konashenkov claimed that Russian forces have captured 572 Ukrainian troops as of March 2.[2] Konashenkov denied claims that Russian conscripts and university cadets are participating in the war in Ukraine.[3] A senior Western intelligence official told CNN that Western intelligence counted around 5,800 Russian deaths as of March 1.[4] A Ukrainian military advisor told Reuters that Russian fatalities exceeded 7,000 as of March 2.[5] Locals in Belarus’s southern Gomel Oblast described an influx of Russian servicemembers to civilian hospitals on March 2.[6] Ukraine announced on March 2 that Russian prisoners of war may return to Russia if their mothers meet them at the Russian-Ukrainian border.[7]

The Kremlin continued to make inconsistent statements regarding negotiations with Ukraine on March 2 but reportedly agreed to a second round of negotiations to take place on March 3. The Russian and Ukrainian delegations will meet in the Brest region of Belarus, near the Polish border.[8] The Russian delegation includes Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko, Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin, State Duma member Leonid Slutsky, and Russian Ambassador to Belarus Boris Gryzlov.[9] Head Russian negotiator Vladimir Medinsky claimed that Russia wants to discuss the possibility of a ceasefire and establishing a humanitarian corridor through which refugees and aid might safely travel. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that parameters for demilitarization have not been announced.[10] Lavrov falsely claimed that the main objective of Russian operations in Ukraine continues to be the “denazification” of the Ukrainian government. Lavrov falsely claimed that Russian forces are using high-precision weapons to avoid civilian casualties. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov accused the Ukrainian delegation of stalling negotiations “at the behest of the Americans.”[11] Ukrainian President Zelensky stated he does not have high expectations for the negotiations and stressed the importance of “concrete steps” such as an immediate ceasefire in addition to the diplomatic dialogue.[12] Zelensky emphasized that negotiations will be ineffective unless Putin himself is present at the negotiating table.

The Kremlin continued to further restrict Russian citizens’ freedom of speech and access to information on March 2, attempting to retain control of the domestic narrative surrounding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Peskov stated Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings have risen since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, noting that Putin “draws strength from the [Russian population’s] support.”[13] Peskov refused to comment on the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office’s call for Russian censoring agency Roskomnadzor to restrict access to the independent radio station Echo Mosckvy but acknowledged that the Kremlin was aware of the situation on March 2.[14] The popular Russian social media site VK blocked Echo Mosckvy and the Dozhd TV channel to avoid state restrictions on VK’s entire platform on March 2 after the Prosecutor General’s Office accused both outlets of publishing false information on Russia’s actions in Ukraine and encouraging illegal protests in Russia on March 2.[15] Roskomnadzor also restricted internet access to The Village on March 2, accusing the outlet of publishing false information about Russian activities in Ukraine and calling for "extremist activities” and mass riots.[16] Jailed Kremlin critic Alexei Navalny urged Russians around the world to protest Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, arguing it is not enough to “be against the war” but they must also “fight against it” on March 2.[17]

Kremlin media sought to portray the Ukrainian government as racist and made false claims of Ukrainian abuses of civilians on March 2. Putin falsely told Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi that Ukrainian security services are taking Indian students hostage and using them as a “human shield.”[18] Putin claimed that Russia is “trying to organize an urgent evacuation of a group of Indian students from the war zone and their return to their homeland.” Kremlin-sponsored TV Russia 24 claimed Ukrainian “nationalists” purposely discriminate against and threaten foreigners on border crossings.[19] Russia 24 broadcast Russian State Duma Chairwoman Valentina Matvienko’s article comparing Western involvement in Russia’s war in Ukraine to Hitler’s occupation, Russophobia, and persecution of freedom of speech.[20] The Kremlin likely seeks to exaggerate claims of racism in Ukraine for Western audiences. The Ukrainian Foreign Minister refuted Putin’s claim and called on Russia to immediately cease fire in Sumy and Kharkiv so that civilians, including foreign students, would be able to evacuate immediately. Poland additionally condemned Russian ”false information about the alleged mistreatment of particular countries’ citizens by Polish and Ukrainian services.”[21] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov continued to peddle misinformation about the “denazification” of Ukraine and claimed that a “huge number of nationalist military units” continue to operate.[22] Peskov called for the ”punishment” of ”Nazi associations operating in the country.”[23] Peskov also claimed that Putin’s speech about the historic lack of Ukrainian sovereignty and its Soviet creation of the state did not apply to other post-Soviet countries.[24] Russian talk shows claimed that Moscow can finally show Ukrainians that Russians are not “nomads“ and can reclaim Kyiv as their historic birthplace.[25] The Kremlin continues to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity to justify further Russian invasion.

The Kremlin began setting conditions to invest in its domestic technology sector and kept Russia’s stock exchange closed for a third day but is unlikely to mitigate Western sanctions. The Russian Central Bank kept Russia’s stock exchange closed for a third day on March 2 in a likely attempt to defer selloffs.[26] The central bank also blocked coupon payments to foreign bondholders on March 2, risking a default.[27] Russia’s largest bank, Sberbank, withdrew from the European market and announced that its Austrian branch will soon close on March 2.[28] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that despite the Russian economy experiencing a serious blow due to Western sanctions, “there is a margin of safety, there is potential, there are plans.”[29] Peskov added that the “hostile” sanctions aim to undermine the integrity of the Russian economy.[30]

The Kremlin is also taking measures to prop up Russian businesses and targeted sectors. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree to accelerate Russia’s domestic IT development on March 2, likely to minimize future Russian reliance on Western technology and imports following the withdrawals of Western tech companies from the Russian market.[31] Mishustin also announced additional government provisions including preferential interest rates and tax and inspection exemptions for Russia’s IT sector.[32] State Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin created the Council for Social Protection and Support of Citizens under Sanctions on March 2.[33] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov emphasized that Russia can withstand any pressure because “Russia has many friends, and it is impossible to isolate it” on March 2.[34] Lavrov said that sanctions against Russia are not in states’ interests.[35] Russian businesspeople and kleptocrats with ties to Putin have resigned from the boards of many international companies and are reportedly trying to sell off luxury real estate and other assets before European sanctions kick in.[36]

Belarusian Activity

N/A

Ukrainian Activity

Ukrainian National Security Council Head Oleksiy Danilov said Ukraine foiled an attempted Russian assassination of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on March 2, allegedly after receiving a tip from anti-war Russian anti-war intelligence officers.[37]Danilov said that two Chechen assassin groups participated in the plot.[38] Ukrainian newspaper Ukrainskaya Pravda reported Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the attempt to liquidate Ukrainian leadership during a February 3 meeting with Chechnya’s head, Ramzan Kadyrov.[39] Kadyrov confirmed on his Telegram channel on March 1 that two Chechen servicemen had died and six were injured but did not directly respond to claims that Chechen servicemembers aimed to kill Zelensky.[40]

US, NATO, and EU Activity

The United States and the European Union (EU) implemented additional sanctions targeting Russia and Belarus while more companies suspended their operations in Russia on March 2.

The United States announced new sanctions against Russia and Belarus on March 2 to “hold Belarus accountable, weaken the Russian defense sector… [and] target Russia’s most important sources of wealth.”[41] The United States imposed export controls targeting Russian oil refining revenues and Belarus’s ability to move technological goods to Russia. The United States sanctioned 22 Russian defense-related entities and entities supporting the Russian and Belarusian Military.[42] The United States also banned Russian aircraft “owned, certified, operated, registered, chartered, leased, or controlled by, for, or for the benefit of a person who is a citizen of Russia” from US airspace.[43] US Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg told a US Senate panel on March 2 that the United States can do with regards to infrastructure and transportation to sanction Russia if necessary.[44]
The United States escalated efforts to target Russian businesspeople and kleptocrats through additional sanctions and a new task force. Anonymous US officials told The Washington Post that the United States is preparing to sanction additional Russian businessmen close to Russian President Vladimir Putin.[45] Task Force “KleptoCapture” will target the assets of Russian businessmen and examine Russia’s use of cryptocurrency to evade sanctions, among other efforts.[46]
The EU sanctioned Belarusian military officials and banned more Russian banks from the SWIFT financial network on March 2. The Belarusian sanctions targeted 22 high-ranking members of the Belarusian military and placed further restrictions on Belarusian trade.[47] The EU also removed seven additional Russian banks from the SWIFT financial network: Russia's second-largest bank VTB, Bank Otrkitie, Novikombank, Promsvyazbank, Bank Rossiya, Sovcombank, and VEB.[48] None of the banks handle energy payments.[49]
More private companies from the aviation and technology sectors suspended their operations in Russia. Software maker Oracle and plane manufacturers Airbus and Boeing Co. suspended their operations in Russia on March 2.[50] An anonymous Ukrainian government official told Reuters on March 2 that Ukraine plans to urge around 50 more tech companies to suspend operations in Russia.[51]
Malta suspended its “golden passport” program for Russian and Belarusian applicants.[52] The program allowed wealthy foreigners to obtain a Maltese passport after investing an average of 1.1 million USD.[53]
UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson warned on March 2 that law firms working with Russian businessmen to evade sanctions could face legal consequences.[54]
[Correction] Nord Stream 2 AG denied a March 1 report by Swiss outlet SRF that it filed for bankruptcy.[55] The Nord Stream 2 AG base economy director affirmed that it has not yet filed for bankruptcy with the Zug Commercial Registry Office.[56] Reuters published a separate source on March 1 claiming that Nord Stream 2 AG may fold later in the week.

NATO and EU countries delivered more shipments of lethal defense equipment to Ukraine on March 2.

Estonia delivered an unspecified number of Javelin anti-tank missile systems, Germany delivered 1,000 anti-tank weapons and 500 ground-to-air Stinger missiles, and Turkey delivered an unspecified number of Bayraktar TB2 drones.[57]
The EU opened a logistical hub in Poland on March 2 to coordinate weapon shipments to Ukraine.[58]
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba emphasized Ukraine’s need for additional anti-air weapons in a phone call with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on March 2. US Senate Foreign Relations Chair Bob Menendez stated the US will continue to provide lethal defense assistance to Ukraine.[59]

Other International Organization Activity

The UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly in favor of a motion demanding Russia stop military operations in Ukraine on March 2. Belarus, Syria, North Korea, and Cuba joined Russia in voting against the motion. China, India, and 33 other countries abstained from the vote.[60] Russian Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzya claimed on March 1 that the West coerced the UN into condemning Russia.[61]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) closely monitored the safety and security of Ukrainian nuclear facilities as Russian forces advanced towards another Ukrainian nuclear power plant on March 2.[62]

The State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) requested assistance from the IAEA to coordinate the safety of all Ukrainian nuclear power plant facilities on March 1.[63]
Hundreds of workers blocked access roads to the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant to prevent Russian military forces from advancing toward it on March 2.[64] Russia informed the IAEA it seized control of the territory around the nuclear facility on March 2.[65]
The IAEA emphasized on March 2 that they are “working with all sides” to ensure the safety of all Ukrainian nuclear facilities.[66] IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi stressed that all parties must avoid “any military or other action” that could jeopardize the safety and security of Ukrainian nuclear facilities.[67]
The IAEA revised a draft resolution condemning the Kremlin’s aggression in Ukraine to gain more consensus in a vote scheduled for March 3.[68] It is unclear if the final resolution will outright condemn all Russian action in Ukraine or limit the scope to concern for nuclear accidents at Ukraine’s nuclear power plants.[69]
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated on March 2 that “Russia’s military operation is aimed at disarming Ukraine” and preventing Ukraine from obtaining nuclear weapons.[70] IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi dismissed Russia’s unsubstantiated claim that Ukraine was seeking to obtain nuclear weapons.[71] Ukraine’s nuclear program has been under IAEA oversight for several years, allowing the agency to conduct extensive inspections of the country’s facilities and reactors.
Ukrainian atomic agency Energoatom stated that Russian and Belarusian soldiers at Chernobyl exposed themselves to dangerous radiation levels by using heavy equipment in forbidden areas.[72]

Humanitarian Efforts

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has likely killed hundreds of Ukrainian civilians as of March 2. International organizations and Western leaders are increasingly voicing concerns about Russia’s indiscriminate targeting of civilians and alleged use of banned weaponry.

Regional Ukrainian officials outlined the dire circumstances of civilians in war-torn towns on March 2. The mayor of Mariupol said civilians are suffering mass casualties due to water shortages, Russian attacks, and the absence of a humanitarian exit corridor for trapped civilians.[73] Kharkiv Regional Governor Oleg Synegubov said Russian shelling has killed 21 people and wounded a further 112 as of March 2.[74] The Chernihiv mayor called on civilians to prepare for urban warfare.[75] A senior US defense official told Reuters on March 2 that Russia is increasingly targeting Kyiv’s infrastructure with artillery and rockets.[76]
Western leaders raised alarms on March 1 and 2 that Russia may escalate its use of indiscriminate and illegal weapons against civilians and cities. UK Defense Secretary Ben Wallace warned on March 1 that Russia may begin to “carpet-bomb” urban areas.[77] US Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield said Russia is moving weaponry such as cluster munitions and vacuum bombs, which are banned under the Geneva convention, into Ukraine on March 2.[78] The UK Presidency of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) also expressed its concern on March 2.[79]
The Ukrainian Emergency Service said that Russian attacks have killed more than 2,000 civilians between February 24 and March 2. The United Nations reported on March 1 that at least 406 civilians have been reported hurt or killed in Ukraine.[80]
UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson and US President Joe Biden accused Russia on March 2 of indiscriminately targeting civilians.[81] Johnson called Russian targeting of civilians a “war crime.”[82]

Ukrainians continued to flee the conflict in record numbers, straining support structures in neighboring states.

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) said on March 2 that over 835,000 refugees have fled Ukraine since February 24, with more than half fleeing to Poland.[83]
The World Health Organization (WHO) warned of challenges in distributing medical aid to Ukraine and called for better humanitarian access to Ukraine to mitigate supply shortages on March 2.[84]

Individual Western Allies’ Activity

N/A

Other International Activity

Global oil and gas prices skyrocketed despite Russia’s energy sector remaining largely unsanctioned as of March 2. White House press secretary Jen Psaki stated on March 2 that a future US ban on Russian oil exports is “not off the table.”[85] However, Principal Deputy Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre told reporters the US does not have a “strategic interest in reducing the global supply of energy.”[86] Multiple US Republican officials called on US President Joe Biden to stop oil imports from Russia to the United States and to boost domestic production.[87] The OPEC+ alliance, which includes Russia, said it would not alter a July 2021 agreement to increase monthly production of oil by 400,000 barrels a day, despite the disruption to Russian oil exports. The United States and other major oil consumers have repeatedly called on OPEC+ to boost output to help calm inflation as oil prices have risen to an eight-year high.[88] Gas prices in Europe rose to a new high at 2,260 USD per thousand cubic meters according to data from the London Stock Exchange.[89]

[1] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/13938043

[3] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/13938111

[7] https://t dot me/stranaua/28258; https://twitter.com/IAPonomarenko/status/1499023988701466626

[8] https://tass dot ru/politika/13937455

[9] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/13938167

[10] https://tass dot ru/politika/13937939

[11] https://tass dot ru/politika/13928889; https://tass dot ru/politika/13929173

[13] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/13929693

[14] https://tass dot ru/politika/13929181

[15] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/13930511

[16] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/13936291

[18] https://tass dot ru/politika/13938465

[22] https://tass dot ru/politika/13928881

[23] https://tvzvezda dpt ru/news/2022321236-aI7zq.html

[24] https://meduza dot io/news/2022/03/02/putin-zayavil-chto-sovremennuyu-ukrainu-sozdali-bolsheviki-peskov-utochnil-chto-k-drugim-respublikam-byvshego-sssr-eti-slova-ne-otnosyatsya

[29] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/13928853

[30] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/13928853

[31] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/13931985

[32] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/13933575

[33] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/13934645

[34] https://tass dot ru/politika/13929481

[35] https://tass dot ru/politika/13936879

[36] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/13939533

https://www dot pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/2/7327353/; https://www.espn.com/soccer/chelsea-engchelsea/story/4606808/chelsea-for...; https://bleacherreport.com/articles/10028397-report-roman-abramovich-ope....

[39] https://www dot pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2022/03/1/7327224/

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/airbus-halts-russia-p...

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/boeing-suspends-parts...

[58] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/03/02/world/ukraine-russia-war - no direct link

[61] https://tass dot ru/politika/13938095

[70] https://tass dot ru/politika/13929625; https://www dot pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/2/7327409/; https://www.reuters.com/world/russias-lavrov-says-third-world-war-would-...

[72] https://t dot co/4rUm9qD0Fu

[75] https://www dot ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3417875-chernihiv-mayor-to-residents-no-other-choice-but-to-brace-for-urban-warfare.html

[89] https://www dot epravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/2/683075/

2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 2

Grpahic at the link: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-2

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 2

Mar 2, 2022 - Press ISW

Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko

March 2, 4:30 pm EST

Russian forces in the south likely secured Kherson, began bombarding civilian infrastructure in Mariupol in a likely attempt to force the city to surrender without a direct assault, and appear to be holding their positions south of Zaporizhya. Russian forces will likely resume offensive operations towards Mikolayiv in the next 24 hours but do not appear to pose an imminent danger to Odesa. Russian forces likely seek to force Mariupol to capitulate by destroying critical civilian infrastructure and killing civilians to create a humanitarian catastrophe – an approach Russian forces have repeatedly taken in Syria.[1] A Russian drive north through or near Zaprozhya to cut off Ukrainian forces fighting along the line of contact appears very unlikely in the next 24-72 hours.

Russian forces are receiving needed supplies and reinforcements that may facilitate much more rapid and effective operations in the coming 24-72 hours. The Russian effort around Kyiv remains poorly organized, however, with elements of many different battalions combined into what seem to be ad hoc groupings rather than operating under standing regiment or brigade headquarters. The initial errors in the Russian force composition and organization in Belarus and western Russia that ISW has previously reported on, which contributed to Russian logistical and operational failures around Kyiv, will be difficult to remedy quickly and will likely continue to cause friction and reduce the effectiveness of Russian operations even as supply issues are addressed and reinforcements come into the fight.[2] It remains too early to evaluate the likely effective combat power the added Russian troops will bring.

Key Takeaways

Russian forces resumed offensive operations against Kyiv’s western outskirts on March 2 after pausing for resupply February 27-March 1 but failed to secure any additional territory.
Russian forces launched offensive operations in Zhytomyr Oblast, expanding their envelopment of Kyiv further west than ISW previously assessed—likely to outflank stronger-than-anticipated Ukrainian resistance and limited Ukrainian counterattacks in Kyiv’s outskirts.
Russian forces renewed advances towards northeastern Kyiv on March 2, reaching a line approximately 65km from the city center on that axis.
Russian forces assaulted central Kharkiv and continued to heavily bombard the city on March 2.
Russian forces fully encircled Mariupol as of March 2 and are conducting a deliberate campaign to destroy critical civilian infrastructure and residential areas in a likely attempt to force the city to surrender.
Russian forces continued to reduce pockets of Ukrainian resistance in Kherson on March 2 and will likely secure the city in the next 24 hours if they have not done so already.

Russian forces are engaged in four primary efforts at this time:

Main effort—Kyiv (comprised of three subordinate supporting efforts);
Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv;
Supporting effort 2—Mariupol; and
Supporting effort 3—Kherson and advances westward.

Main effort—Kyiv axis: Russian forces resumed offensive operations against Kyiv’s western outskirts on March 2 but failed to secure any additional territory.[3] Russian forces additionally launched offensive operations in Zhytomyr Oblast, expanding their envelopment of Kyiv deeper west than ISW previously assessed, likely to outflank stronger-than-anticipated Ukrainian resistance and limited Ukrainian counterattacks in Kyiv’s outskirts. Russian forces additionally successfully renewed advances toward Kyiv along the Chernihiv axis on March 2. Russian operations on the Kyiv axis consist of a main effort aimed at enveloping and ultimately encircling the city from the west and supporting efforts along the Chernihiv and Sumy axes to encircle it from the northeast and east.

Subordinate Main Effort along The West Bank of The Dnipro

Russian forces began establishing forward logistics camps in Borodyanka, Katyuzhanka, and Gavronshchyna to support this axis of advance on March 2, likely drawing from the convoys observed in northern Ukraine on February 28 and March 1.[4] ISW is unable to assess the overall combat power Russia may have additionally deployed at this time.
Russian forces steadily advanced into the northwest outskirts of Kyiv to a line extending through Horenychi, Hostomel, and Demidiv, approximately 30-40km from the city center.[5] Ukrainian forces repelled assaults on Demydiv and Irpin as of noon local time on March 2.[6] Kyiv’s regional administration reported that Ukrainian forces control all of Bucha as of 9:00 am local time on March 2, and social media depicted several destroyed Russian vehicles in the area following a failed assault.[7] Russian forces have not yet advanced south of Horenychi, roughly parallel east-west with central Kyiv. Russian forces continued to shell residential areas and inflict civilian casualties on March 2.[8] Russian forces will likely continue to assemble supplies to resume assaults on northern Kyiv in the next 24-48 hours.
Russian forces may be attempting a deeper envelopment of Kyiv from the west than ISW previously assessed, attacking into Zhytomyr Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that up to three Russian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) from the 5th Combined Arms Army are active at an unspecified location in Zhytomyr Oblast. Russia’s envelopment of Kyiv has previously only extended as far west as Makariv, approximately 60km west of Kyiv, which Ukraine’s 14th Mechanized Brigade recaptured on March 2.[9] Russia may assess it necessary to conduct a deeper envelopment further west of Kyiv to retain the ability to conduct operational maneuvers if Ukrainian forces retain the capability to conduct local counterattacks closer to Kyiv. An envelopment or encirclement so far from central Kyiv would require considerable Russian combat power to complete and to maintain against Ukrainian counterattacks. ISW is unable to assess whether Russia has concentrated enough combat power north of Kyiv to complete such an operation.
The Ukrainian Air Force reportedly remains active over Kyiv. The Ukrainian General Staff claimed two Ukrainian Mig-29s shot down two Russian SU-35s over Kyiv the night of March 1.[10]
Russian efforts within and in the immediate vicinity of Kyiv have reportedly relied on saboteurs and reconnaissance elements, often out of uniform or wearing Ukrainian uniforms, rather than on attacks by regular combat forces. ISW cannot confirm any new developments in central Kyiv on March 2.

Subordinate Supporting Effort—Chernihiv Axis

Russian forces continued to shell Chernihiv but do not appear to have launched assaults on the bypassed city as of March 2. Chernihiv Mayor Vladyslav Atroshenko called on residents to prepare for possible urban warfare and organize round-the-clock patrols on March 2.[11] Russian forces continued to shell Chernihiv, including residential areas, on March 2.[12] Chernihiv is an important road junction on the Desna River, and Russian forces may intend to capture rather than bypass it to open up the arterial highway leading southwest toward Kyiv on the east bank of the Desna.
Russian forces renewed advances toward northeastern Kyiv on March 2, reaching a line approximately 65km from the city center. The Ukrainian General Staff reported halting up to 17 Russian BTGs in Kozelets, Bobrovytsia, and Makiiv—a front approximately 50km wide.[13] ISW previously incorrectly reported this movement as a likely effort to link up with Russian forces from the Sumy axis. ISW now assesses these forces are advancing directly southwest on Kyiv, not pivoting east from Russia’s existing axis of advance.
Russia is likely deploying additional forces from Belarus to reinforce the Chernihiv axis. Belarusian social media users filmed a column of Russian light vehicles and trucks equipment marked “V,” likely Russian Naval Infantry from the Pacific Fleet, moving from Gomel, Belarus towards Chernihiv on March 2.[14]
ISW cannot confirm the presence of any Belarusian forces in operations on the Chernihiv axis. Ukrainian Territorial Defense authorities claimed on March 1 that Belarusian combat troops have entered Chernihiv district in support of the Russian offensive.[15]

Subordinate Supporting Effort—Sumy Axis (approximately 115 kilometers from Kyiv)

Ukrainian forces halted Russian advances from Sumy at Nova Basan and Kozelets as of noon local time on March 2.[16]
Russian forces continued operations to reduce pockets of Ukrainian resistance around Sumy on March 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported Ukrainian forces continue to defend Sumy, Lebedyn, and Okhtyrka from Russian assaults as of 6:00 am local time on March 2.[17] Residents of Konotop, 120km northwest of Sumy, filmed a Russian delegation arriving in the city to demand its surrender.[18]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv: Russian forces resumed assaults on central Kharkiv and continued to heavily bombard the city on March 2. Local Ukrainian authorities reported repelling a Russian assault on the Kharkiv Military Medical Center, near the city center, as of 6:00 pm local time on March 2.[19] Early reports of a Russian airborne landing in the city were likely incorrect. Russian forces continued to deliberately target civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv with MLRS systems, tube artillery, cluster munitions, and Kalibr cruise missiles on March 2, inflicting numerous civilian casualties.[20] The Russian air, artillery, and missile barrage may also be intended to generate panic and reduce the morale of Ukrainian defenders in Kharkiv and elsewhere. It is not likely to achieve that effect. It is too early to evaluate the likelihood that a renewed Russian ground offensive will succeed in taking the city.

Supporting Effort #2—Mariupol: Russian forces fully encircled Mariupol as of March 2 and are conducting a deliberate campaign to destroy critical civilian infrastructure and residential areas in a likely attempt to force the city to surrender. Deputy Mayor of Mariupol Serhiy Orlov informed the BBC that the city is "near to a humanitarian catastrophe" after 15 hours of Russian bombardment on March 2.[21] Orlov confirmed Russian forces have advanced to within several kilometers of the city on all sides and are particularly targeting critical civilian infrastructure. Russian forces have taken a similar approach of creating a humanitarian catastrophe by deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure throughout the Russian intervention in the Syrian Civil War. Russian forces claim to have completed the encirclement of Mariupol by land and sea on March 1, though the Ukrainian General Staff claimed Russian forces have failed to “block” Mariupol as of March 2.[22]

Ukrainian forces separately claimed to have launched two separate counterattacks in Donbas that ISW cannot confirm at this time. A Ukrainian Presidential representative stated on March 2 that Ukrainian forces plan to retake Horlivka in Donetsk Oblast, describing it as Ukraine’s first offensive operation “in a different direction” since the war began.[23] The Ukrainian 95th Airborne Brigade assaulted Horlivka on March 1 but has failed to secure it as of 7:00 pm local time on March 2. The Ukrainian 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade separately claimed to have pushed Russian forces ”back to the Russian border” at an unspecified location on March 1, stating it would later provide pictures and details.[24] ISW cannot confirm this advance as of publication.

Supporting Effort #3—Kherson and West: Russian forces continued to reduce pockets of Ukrainian resistance in Kherson on March 2 and will likely secure the city in the next 24 hours if they have not done so already. A Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Spokesperson stated Ukrainian forces retain control of portions of Kherson city as of 11:00 am local time on March 2.[25] Multiple sources reported elements likely of the 7th Airborne Division and SPETSNAZ units throughout Kherson City on March 1, including a VDV assault on the city SBU building, and Ukrainian forces will likely lose control over the city within the next 24 hours.[26]

Ukrainian forces likely repelled Russian advances towards Mykolayiv on March 2. Ukrainian forces took Russian prisoners at several locations on the outskirts of Mykolayiv.[27] Russian forces will likely consolidate following the capture of Kherson before resuming advances west towards Mykolayiv and Odesa. Russian forces additionally launched limited attacks north toward Zaporizhya on March 2 but did not make territorial advances.[28] Russian forces are likely deprioritizing the axis of advance north from Crimea in favor of operations west towards Miykolayiv and east towards Mariupol.

Immediate items to watch

Russian forces maneuvering to the west and southwest of Kyiv to envelop and then encircle it
Russian forces securing the crossings over the Desna near Chernihiv and/or linking up with forces advancing from the Sumy axis to open a new front against Kyiv from the east
Belarusian ground forces might begin actively participating in the Russian offensive campaign
Russian ground offensive against Kharkiv following the air/missile/artillery attacks
Russian forces around Kherson resuming their advance toward Mykolayiv and Odesa
Russian and proxy force offensive to take Mariupol or continued air/missile/artillery campaign to force the city to surrender.

[7] https://www.koda.gov dot ua/operatyvna-informacziya-stanom-na-900-2-03-2022-shhodo-sytuacziyi-na-kyyivshhyni/; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1498989441154703365; https://t.me/uniannet/34163; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1498914470600527876.

[11] https://www.ukrinform dot net/rubric-ato/3417875-chernihiv-mayor-to-residents-no-other-choice-but-to-brace-for-urban-warfare.html.

[15] https://t dot me/suspilnechernihiv/6484, https://gur.gov dot ua/content/spysky-kerivnoho-skladu-viiskovykh-chastyn-viiskovo-povitrianykh-syl-respubliky-belarus.html; https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine/posts/261783329466428

[23] https://www.pravda.com dot ua/rus/news/2022/03/2/7327458/; https://twitter.com/komitet2012/status/1498777305686106121; https://www.032 dot ua/news/3341348/zsu-vzali-pid-svij-kontrol-castinu-okupovanoi-gorlivki.

[24] https://www.pravda.com dot ua/rus/news/2022/03/2/7327350/; https://nv dot ua/ukraine/events/boycy-93-ya-ombr-zahvatili-rossiyskih-razvedchikov-video-novosti-ukrainy-50221696.html https://www.facebook.com/93OMBr/posts/1789154617947987.

Kharkiv police building in Ukraine struck by Russian missile

3. Combat operations in Ukraine are coming to a critical inflection point and Congress must act now

MG Repass has had an OpEd in the Washington Post, an interview with CNN, and now with Stu Bradin an OpEd with Fox News. His message needs to get out and be heard by policy makers.

Combat operations in Ukraine are coming to a critical inflection point and Congress must act now

By Stuart W. Bradin Michael S. Repass Fox News4 min

View Original

Video

Fox News correspondent Mike Tobin reports on the latest from Lviv, Ukraine.

Congress needs to expedite approval and delivery of a new significant package of military aid to Ukraine. We are both employees of or advisors to the Global Special Operations Force Foundation, the professional association for special operations, and we understand that we can’t wait until the middle of March for the United States to send aid.

Congress has an opportunity to quickly craft a proposal to send to the president this week. Time is of the essence. The battle for freedom and democracy in Ukraine is happening now and at a critical stage. This is the most consequential war since World War II because the outcome will shape international security structures for the next century, especially in Europe and Central Asia.

The conflict in Ukraine is a campaign that can’t be funded piecemeal. The required military material for Ukraine will exceed the $2.9 billion that is proposed in the $6.5 billion request from President Biden. Congress must approve $16.2 billion ($2.7 billion monthly for six months) to cover the required military and humanitarian aid.

Combat operations are coming to a critical inflection point whereby both sides need to replenish supplies to the fighting forces and sustain the civilian populace. The question for both sides is who will run out of supplies logistically first, thus providing either the attacker or defender a substantial, if not decisive, advantage.

The most urgent needs are to resupply the Ukrainians to defend themselves against unrestricted Russian aggression. The Ukrainian Armed Forces and populace are fighting effectively in many places but are outnumbered and often outgunned. The Russians have superior mobility and firepower but lack the essential local knowledge and the will to fight this fight.

Once major cities are surrounded, and the eastern half of the Dnipro is secured, it will become attrition warfare after that. It is a matter of time before Kyiv runs out of ammunition, water, food, power, and civil necessities to keep society functioning.

The United States has the capabilities to provide decisive aid to Ukrainian resistance forces. Ukrainian armed forces and defenders need to have the power, material, and capabilities to deny Russian resupply ground and air routes. They need the capabilities to break Russian encirclement perimeters. They need the resources to sustain the population’s basic needs during the length of the conflict while preparing for Russian occupation. Finally, they need to have the aid to expel Russian invasion forces from Ukraine’s territory.

There is a long list of general combat, armed forces, and supporting territorial needs, including ammunition for small arms, crew-serviced, and vehicle-mounted weapons of which the Ukrainian resistance has a need. The resistance needs tank and artillery ammunition of various calibers. They also need anti-tank munitions such as the Javelin missile and launchers with spare batteries, the AT-4, NLAW, and Karl Gustav weapon system.

An aid package should help them secure night vision devices to include individual night vision goggles and aiming devices, and night vision and thermal/infrared sights for crew-served weapons. Finally, they need Stinger anti-aircraft systems, hand-held (secure) communications, small tactical drones, individual protective equipment, field rations, and field medical kits. All of these are immediate military needs that should be sent as quickly as possible to the resistance in Ukraine through reliable supply routes.

There is another bucket of aid in the form of support for the command and leadership in Ukraine. They need secure, long-range communications base stations and associated antennas. There needs to be aid to reconstitute the Ukrainian psychological operations facilities destroyed by Russian missile strikes. Remote portable TVs, radios, and an alternative secure internet communications system that do not have to rely on land-based communications that transit through Russia are needed. Finally, there needs to be an information and broadcast center that can reach into Russia to counter the Kremlin’s disinformation.

An aid package should designate funds for humanitarian support for Ukraine, Poland and Romania to deal with the humanitarian crisis. Emergency communications, pioneer equipment, hand tools, sensors, urban rescue supplies, temporary shelter materials, use of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance warehouse supplies, and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp sets and kits will help the victims of this aggression.

Resistance forces need aid to be armed and trained with lethal munitions, weapons, secure communications, supporting equipment, secure basing, infrastructure, basic life support for developing, training to support Ukrainian resistance forces. Clothing, equipment, weapons, and ammunition for training and employment should also be a part of the lethal aid provided that should also provide secure communications and transportation capabilities.

Congress is working on a supplemental that could be added to the FY22 appropriations package. That plan should be comprehensive and specific. The problem with this plan is that it will not be signed until March 11, 2022, at the earliest. That is too late. Without immediate support, the Ukrainian resistance will be doomed.

Congress and our federal government need to move at the speed of war if we wish to see democracy protected in Ukraine. Excessive bureaucratic burdens and processes will potentially cause the provision of this support to arrive late or well after Russia has defeated Ukrainian forces.

Col. Stuart W. Bradin established the NATO Special Operations Forces headquarters and is president and CEO of The Global Special Operations Forces (GSOF). Maj. Gen. Michael S. Repass was the commander of Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) and is CEO of Able Global Solutions.

4. The Beginning of the End for Putin?

We cannot predict the end and downfall. But we need to be prepared for it. The proverbial question for when Putin falls: "What do you do now Lieutenant?"

Excerpts:

Predicting the downfall of an authoritarian leader is a fool’s errand. Weak and embattled autocrats can limp along far longer than analysts expect. Former Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe survived hyperinflation and electoral defeat, staying in power until just two years before his death. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro remains in office, even though Venezuela’s economy has utterly collapsed. Similarly, leaders that appear strong can be suddenly ousted, as happened to former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 2011 and Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali that same year.

But analysts do know that personalist leaders such as Putin are more likely to make foreign policy mistakes than are other autocrats. They surround themselves with yes men who only tell them what they want to hear and withhold bad news, making it difficult for these dictators to make well-informed decisions. Whether or not Putin’s war of choice becomes the mistake that unseats him from power is an open question. But Russia is experiencing rising dissatisfaction from the public, fissures among its elite, and broad-based international punishment. Putin’s downfall may not come tomorrow or the day after, but his grip on power is certainly more tenuous than it was before he invaded Ukraine.

The Beginning of the End for Putin?

Dictatorships Look Stable—Until They Aren’t

By Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Erica Frantz

March 2, 2022

Foreign Affairs · by Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Erica Frantz · March 2, 2022

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attack on Ukraine has been a clarifying moment. Since he came to power in 2000, various Western leaders have tried to cooperate, accommodate, or negotiate with him. But by embarking on a war of choice against a country he claims doesn’t have a right to exist, Putin has forced the international community to see him for what he is: a belligerent leader with a remarkable capacity for destruction. The result has been sweeping new measures designed to constrict and constrain him—punishing sanctions against Russia’s financial institutions, bans on Russian planes over EU airspace, and increased weapons shipments to Ukraine. Even Germany, long reluctant to confront Putin, agreed to exclude Russian banks from the SWIFT financial messaging system, reversed its long-standing prohibition on providing arms to conflict zones, and substantially increased its military spending. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has sparked nothing less than a sea change in international perceptions of Putin and what must be done to confront him.

Such a sea change could well be underway inside Russia, too. Throughout his tenure, Putin has maintained relatively high levels of public support thanks in large part to his ability to restore economic growth and stability after the turmoil of the 1990s. While most Russians have few illusions about their leader, recognizing the corruption that benefits him and the elite around him, it remained all but unfathomable to most Russians that Putin would launch a major conventional war against their Ukrainian neighbors. For months, many Russian analysts, commentators, and citizens alike were convinced that Putin would not engage in such an act of aggression. The news of the war and the economic ramifications that followed have led Russians to see both Putin and Russia differently; Russia is not the same today as it was last week.

The prevailing wisdom holds that Putin will be able to survive any domestic backlash. That is most likely true. In personalist authoritarian regimes—where power is concentrated in the hands of an individual rather than shared by a party, military junta, or royal family—the leader is rarely driven from office by wars, even when they experience defeat. That’s both because other elites are not strong enough to hold the dictator to account and because domestic audiences have few opportunities to punish leaders for their actions. But the thing about repressive regimes like Putin’s Russia is that they often look stable right up to the point that they are not. Putin has taken a major risk in attacking Ukraine, and there is a chance—one that seems to be growing—that it could mark the beginning of his end.

FORTRESS RUSSIA

There are good reasons to believe that Putin can withstand the backlash from his war. He has gone to great lengths in the last year to crack down on Russian civil society, political opposition, journalists, and the information environment. The regime’s brazen poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny and banning of Memorial, the country’s most important post-Soviet human rights civic institution underscore the regime’s commitment to using repression to maintain control. Russians have gotten the message. According to polling by the Levada Center in 2021, 52 percent of Russians fear mass repression, and 58 percent are scared they will be arbitrarily arrested or otherwise harmed by the authorities—the highest these indicators have been since 1994. Such an uptick in repression is common late in the tenures of longtime autocrats. The longer these authoritarians remain in power, the more they lose touch with their societies and the less they have to offer their citizens. As a result, they have few other ways to sustain their rule.

Along with repression, Putin can manipulate Russia’s information environment, shaping the way many Russians understand events in Ukraine. Already, Russia’s security actors are harassing individuals who post antiwar messages on social media and censoring facts and details about the war. The authorities also moved to shut down Echo Moskvy, an independent radio station broadcasting in Russia since 1990. Although younger generations get more information from non-state-controlled outlets, the regime remains dominant in the information space. Before Russia invaded Ukraine, polls show that large majorities of Russians supported recognizing the Russian-backed breakaway regions in eastern Ukraine as independent countries and that they blamed Ukraine and NATO for the conflict.

Together, repression and information control could help prevent Russia’s antiwar protests from catching on. So far, the regime has arrested more than 5,000 people for actively demonstrating against Russia’s invasion, which may deter others from joining. While other Russians may be willing to risk arrest if they think the demonstrations will snowball, censorship makes it difficult for potential protesters to know how many citizens are upset with the war. Most likely, the Putin regime will only further ratchet up repression to deal with a more restive Russian public. Personalist regimes are more likely to use repression in response to protests than are other autocracies, and they are especially likely to do so when engaging in expansionist territorial conflicts (as Putin has with Ukraine). Moreover, many of the Russians fed up with Putin will opt to leave Russia, as some already have, reducing the pressure mounting against the regime.

Putin has also gone to great lengths to inoculate himself against another threat: elite defection. In a highly choreographed meeting of his national security council, Russia’s president forced each member of his team to publicly pledge their support for his decision to recognize the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk, the two separatist regions in eastern Ukraine. This reduced the council members’ ability to credibly defect and claim that Putin is taking Russia in the wrong direction. Likewise, Putin convened his country’s most powerful businessmen the day after the campaign against Ukraine began to discuss the economic shocks that would follow. Putin’s goal was clear—remind them that their fates are tied to his continuation in power.

ALL FALLS DOWN

But there are also good reasons that the tides might turn. Despite the repression, protests have taken place in more than 58 cities across Russia. The early demonstrations are remarkable not just for the bravery that they reflect, but also for the potential that they hold—protests in highly repressive regimes are more likely to be successful than protests in less repressive environments. That is because when people take to the streets even when the costs of doing so are high, it sends a powerful signal to other citizens that their dissent is shared. In this way, these early antiwar protests have the potential to trigger cascading opposition. The fact that Russians view Putin’s war as being unjust and egregious makes it especially likely to prompt widespread backlash. It is moments of acute injustice that have the greatest ability to mobilize people—as when Tunisian fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire after local officials humiliated him and confiscated his wares, launching the Arab Spring in 2011.

The war also has famous and influential domestic opponents—and they are not just known dissidents. Several Russian celebrities have signed letters opposing the war. Russian tennis star Andrei Rublev wrote “no war please” on a TV camera. The Russian head of a delegation at a major UN climate conference apologized for his country's invasion of Ukraine, and the daughter of Putin’s press secretary reportedly posted “no war” on her Instagram account. (She deleted it hours later.) There are even signs that Putin’s cozy oligarchs are getting uncomfortable. Former energy magnate Anatoly Chubais posted a picture of Boris Nemtsov, a Russian opposition leader murdered in front of the Kremlin, on his Facebook page. Russian billionaire Oleg Deripaska called for peace and negotiations.

Even if Putin’s actions don’t immediately push him from power, the war in Ukraine creates long-term vulnerabilities. Punishing economic sanctions are already shredding the value of the ruble, and the economic damage is expected to intensify. Over time, this could weaken Putin domestically. Personalist dictatorships generally cut government spending when faced with sanctions, making life even harder for average citizens and increasing the odds of growing unrest. Sanctions also tend to be more effective when targeted at personalist authoritarian regimes than when aimed at other types of autocracies because personalist dictators are the most dependent on patronage to keep power. So far, Russia’s elite have never had to choose between the life they wanted and Putin. But Chubais’s and Deripaska’s comments hint that could change as the effect of the sanctions sets in, especially if they are coupled with stepped-up anticorruption efforts by the United States and Europe. If they are squeezed tight enough, Russia’s elites may come to decide that Putin can no longer guarantee their future interests and try to replace him with a leader who would withdraw from Ukraine and prompt the West to unfreeze their assets.

Finally, the conflict in Ukraine may well evolve into a drawn-out insurgency that slowly saps the patience of the Russian public. Research shows that personalist dictators are more willing than other authoritarians to tolerate military disputes with high casualties, but that doesn’t mean their citizens are. In Libya, for example, former leader Muammar al-Qaddafi engaged in heavy-handed repression to maintain control of the country as the costs of his wars increased. But eventually, when faced with dire economic conditions, ordinary citizens violently overthrew his government. In the Soviet Union, a lengthy and expensive invasion of Afghanistan helped drain faith in the Communist Party’s regime. It is not inconceivable that Putin’s grip on Russia will slip if Ukraine becomes a morass.

LOSING TOUCH

Foreign Affairs · by Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Erica Frantz · March 2, 2022

5. We Followed a Foreign Fighter on His Way to Join the War in Ukraine

Video at the link: https://www.vice.com/en/article/m7vxy8/joining-foreign-legion-ukraine

We Followed a Foreign Fighter on His Way to Join the War in Ukraine

Foreign fighters are flocking to the Ukrainian border to join the war effort against Russia.

By Ben Makuch

Vice

PRZEMYŚL, Poland — In the dead of night outside the Polish town of Przemyśl, an ex-British soldier named Luke hopped into a taxi after flying from Birmingham, England, earlier in the day, and made his way to a nearby border checkpoint with one goal in mind: joining the Ukrainian war effort.

“It’s important that we remember the war might be in Ukraine, but tomorrow it might be in Western Europe,” he said to VICE World News as the cab sped to the border, driven by a Ukrainian national who’d been helping fighters to the border the whole day.

“I think there’s obviously a lot of Western bullets going into the war, but there’s probably not enough people to fire the bullets. It’s important everybody does their bit to help, really,” said Luke, who asked not to be identified for security reasons, but showed VICE World News his passport and service record along with photos of himself in uniform. “I’ve been speaking to some contacts and I’m hoping to help use my skill set with air defense.”

Luke, who took a few hours’ flight from England and then a three-hour train ride from Kraków, is an example of just how easy it has been for foreign volunteers to go to the borders of Ukraine and attempt to enter the war as a combatant. He simply walked across a precarious border that has a refugee crisis on the other side.

While many so-called “war tourists” and mercenaries have already found their way to the war in Ukraine—something that began long before the Russian invasion last week—Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelenskyy’s government made the process for foreign fighters to enter the war even easier by lifting temporary-visa requirements for them and opening up an “international legion.”

As NATO member states and other governments have provided weapons to Ukraine, but no troops, the call for volunteer fighters has already attracted veterans from the U.S. and Canada, with more from all over the world expected. After posting several articles looking at the role of foreign fighters in Ukraine, VICE World News has been inundated with dozens of emails from individuals saying they’re interested in going to the conflict.

“I’m a 24-year-old American with some weapons training who is trying to join the Ukrainian effort to defend their country,” said one email sent in late February. “I’m wondering what transportation is available from the Polish border into Ukraine and if Kyiv is still accessible at this stage.”

Another message came from a man who claimed to be a military veteran.

“I wish to join the fight for Ukraine… Ex-British army officer and highly trained machine gunner, experienced in tactics and overseas deployments.”

“Please let me know who to contact.”

Before this iteration of the war, as the eight-year conflict in Donbas continued to percolate, experts worried that Ukraine would become an international war front for far-right foreign fighters. Both the Azov Battalion, a Ukrainian National Guard unit with neo-Nazi links under fire for a racist video posted last weekend, and the Right Sector, an ultranationalist militia, had previously taken foreign volunteers, and many of them were linked to the far-right. American terror group The Base had one member join the Ukrainian war effort (and then was subsequently kicked out of the country by Ukrainian authorities).

Mollie Saltskog, a senior intelligence analyst at the Soufan Group, a global intelligence and security consultancy based in New York City, said the rush of fighters is nothing new.

“Our research has shown that since 2014, the conflict in eastern Ukraine has emerged as a hub in the broader network of transnational white supremacy extremism,” she said, pointing out that in the past far-right volunteers have gone to fight on both sides of the war, “with white supremacists traveling to fight on the pro-Russian side as well.”

Many of the foreign volunteers, like those who have joined the Georgian National Legion, are not linked to any extremist movements. But whether these intended combatants are actually going to fight, or going for the right reasons (one email cited a recent divorce as a cause for joining the war) is another question.

As for Luke, some time after VICE World News saw him disappear toward the Ukrainian border through groups of refugees, he said he’d made his way to a base in Lviv. He said he was asked to sign a “two-year commitment” to the Ukrainian military, which he was unwilling to do, and said he was headed back to the Polish border to help with refugee repatriation. (VICE World News was unable to verify independently that Luke made it to Lviv. Before the war began last week, the Ukrainian military did require a three-year commitment from any foreign fighter wishing to join up.)

Monday night, before Luke departed, he said his family knew about his plans to go to Ukraine and didn’t try to stop him.

“They're supportive, but think it's a bit crazy,” he said. “It's a crazy situation.”

Follow Ben Makuch on Twitter.

Vice

6. Ukraine revealed secret battle plans left behind by Russian troops and claimed they show Russia planned a 15-day war

This was reported in the War Bulletin on 2 MAR at 7pm I forwarded.

Ukraine revealed secret battle plans left behind by Russian troops and claimed they show Russia planned a 15-day war

Business Insider · by Natalie Musumeci

The "classified" documents left behind by Russian troops were posted to Facebook the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.Ministry of Defense of Ukraine

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Ukraine's defense ministry said that its armed forces have seized secret battle plans left behind by Russian troops.
The ministry says the documents suggest Russia's war with Ukraine would last 15 days.
An invasion map, a table of callsigns and a list of personnel were among the documents, according to the Ukrainian defense ministry.

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Ukraine's defense ministry said on Wednesday that its armed forces have seized secret battle plans left behind by Russian soldiers that it says suggest Russia's war with Ukraine would last 15 days.

The seized "classified" documents were posted to Facebook by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and show the war plans of one of the units of the battalion tactical group of the 810th Separate Guards Naval Infantry Brigade of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the ministry said.

An invasion map, a table of callsigns and a list of personnel were among the documents, according to the Ukrainian defense ministry.

The defense ministry's Facebook post followed a similar disclosure on the social media site by Ukraine's Joint Forces Operation.

"Thanks to the successful actions of one of the Armed Forces of Ukraine's [units] Russian occupiers are losing not only equipment and manpower," the defense ministry said. "In panic attacks, they are leaving classified documents."

The defense ministry said that based on the documents, Russia approved its invasion of Ukraine on January 18, 2022.

"The operation itself should last 15 days" from February 20 to March 6, the ministry said based on its review of the documents. Insider could not independently verify this conclusion.

One of the documents posted by the defense ministry appears to be dated "18.01.22," — or January 18, 2022, a full month before the Russians attacked — while another planning document of callsigns for different units spans the dates February 20 to March 6, with daily code name changes for different Russian commands to contact each other without disclosing their identity.

The documents do not appear to reveal any information about Russian forces taking any Ukrainian city.

Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his country's invasion of Ukraine in the early morning hours of February 24. The full extent of Putin's plan to assault and possibly occupy Ukraine has been unclear, but a former Russian deputy foreign minister told Al Jazeera that he had information that the Russian leader wanted to declare victory within a week — a goal that now appears extremely unlikely, with Russian forces only having seized one major Ukrainian city after six days of fighting.

The Ukrainian defense ministry said that the "final objective" by these Russian forces who had the planning documents "was to block and seize" the southeastern Ukrainian city of Melitopol.

"That is why you should not trust when a prisoner of war is saying again that he or she came to the exercises and got lost! They knew, they planned precisely and they had been preparing," the Ukrainian defense ministry said on Facebook.

It added, "Our response to the Russian occupiers is the following: keep leaving your vehicles and classified documents, they will be useful for our defenders and The Hague."

Business Insider · by Natalie Musumeci

7. A War the Kremlin Tried to Disguise Becomes a Hard Reality for Russians

Again, all our information influence capabilities need to be brought to bear on informing the Russian people with the main effort from our Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

A War the Kremlin Tried to Disguise Becomes a Hard Reality for Russians

By Ivan Nechepurenko and Anton Troianovski

March 2, 2022, 5:35 p.m. ET

The New York Times · by Anton Troianovski · March 2, 2022

Moscow posted a death toll from its attack on Ukraine for the first time, and Russians who long avoided politics are now grappling with the fact that their country is fighting a deadly conflict.

A Russian tank burning next to an unidentified soldier’s body during a fight with the Ukrainian armed forces in Kharkiv, Ukraine, on Sunday.

By Ivan Nechepurenko and

March 2, 2022, 5:35 p.m. ET

SOCHI, Russia — On Feb. 23, Razil Malikov, a tank driver in the Russian Army, called his family and said he would be home soon; his unit’s military drills in Crimea were just about wrapping up.

The next morning, Russia invaded Ukraine, and Mr. Malikov hasn’t been heard from since. On Monday, Ukraine published a video of a captured soldier in his unit, apologizing for taking part in the invasion.

“He had no idea they could send him to Ukraine,” Mr. Malikov’s brother, Rashid Allaberganov, said in a phone interview from the south-central Russian region of Bashkortostan. “Everyone is in a state of shock.”

The reality of war is dawning across Russia.

On Wednesday, the Russian Defense Ministry for the first time announced a death toll for Russian servicemen in the conflict. While casualty figures in wartime are notoriously unreliable — and Ukraine has put the total of Russian dead in the thousands — the 498 Moscow acknowledged in the seven days of fighting is the largest in any of its military operations since the war in Chechnya, which marked the beginning of President Vladimir V. Putin’s tenure in 1999.

Russians who long avoided engaging with politics are now realizing that their country is fighting a deadly conflict, even as the Kremlin gets ever more aggressive in trying to shape the narrative. Its slow-motion crackdown on freedoms has become a whirlwind of repression of late, as the last vestiges of a free press faced extinction.

This week, lawmakers proposed a 15-year prison sentence for people who post “fakes” about the war, and rumors are swirling about soon-to-be-closed borders or martial law. The Education Ministry scheduled a video lesson to be shown in schools nationwide on Thursday that described the war against Ukraine as a “liberation mission.”

Police officers detained an anti-war protester in central Moscow on Friday.Credit...Sergey Ponomarev for The New York Times

And in Moscow, the regional office of the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia has been fielding 2,000 calls a day since last Thursday.

“The parents’ first question is: What happened to my child?” said Aleksandr Latynin, a senior committee official. “Is he alive?”

Seizing on the worries of Russian families, Ukraine has pushed to publicize the fact that many young Russian soldiers were dying or being taken prisoner — a reality that the Russian military did not acknowledge until Sunday, the fourth day of the war. Ukrainian government agencies and volunteers have published videos of disoriented Russian prisoners of war saying they had no idea they were about to be part of an invasion until just before it began, and photographs and footage showed the bodies of Russian soldiers strewn on streets and fields.

The videos are reaching some Russians directly. Yevgeniya A. Ivanova, for instance, identified a friend of hers, Viktor A. Golubev, who appeared in one of the videos. In it, Mr. Golubev said he “feels guilty for his wrong actions” on Ukrainian soil and calls on President Vladimir V. Putin “to find a compromise to avoid war.”

To some Russians, the toll in human lives is reason enough to oppose the war, and OVD-Info, an activist group that tallies arrests, has counted at least 7,359 Russians detained during seven days of protests in scores of cities across the country.

“It’s the third decade of the 21st century, and we are watching news about people burning in tanks and bombed-out buildings,” Aleksei A. Navalny, the opposition leader, wrote in a social media post from prison on Wednesday, calling on Russians to continue to rally despite the withering police crackdown. “Let’s not ‘be against war.’ Let’s fight against war.”

The Russian opposition leader Aleksei Navalny in a glass cell during a court hearing in Moscow last year.

Members of the Russian elite also continued to speak out. Lyudmila Narusova, a member of Russia’s upper house of Parliament, told the independent Dozhd television channel on Sunday that dead Russian soldiers in Ukraine lay “unburied; wild, stray dogs gnawing on bodies that in some cases cannot be identified because they are burned.”

“I do not identify myself with those representatives of the state that speak out in favor of the war,” Ms. Narusova said. “I think they themselves do not know what they are doing. They are following orders without thinking.”

The Russian International Affairs Council, a government-funded think tank, published an article by a prominent expert describing the war as a strategic debacle. The expert, Ivan Timofeev, said Ukrainian society would now “see Russia as an enemy for several decades to come.” He added a veiled warning directed at government officials who were now cracking down on people speaking out against the war.

“History shows that those who look for ‘traitors’ sooner or later themselves become victims of ‘enthusiasts’ and ‘well-wishers,’” Mr. Timofeev, the council’s program director, wrote.

But the discontent showed no sign of affecting Mr. Putin’s campaign, as Russia’s assault on Ukraine widened, with heavy fighting reported for the port city of Mariupol on the Sea of Azov. The government signaled it would only intensify its crackdown against the war’s critics — including those who called it a “war” rather than, in the Kremlin’s anodyne term, a “special military operation.”

“Individuals who carry out falsification must be punished in the most severe way,” said Vasily Piskaryov, a senior lawmaker in Mr. Putin’s party. “They are discrediting the absolutely rightful and understandable actions of our armed forces.”

His proposed punishment: 15 years in prison. The Parliament, which is controlled by the Kremlin, will take up the law on Friday.

Some feared that Mr. Putin could go even further, repressing dissent to an extent unseen in Russia since Soviet times. Tatiana Stanovaya, a scholar who has long studied Mr. Putin, wrote it was “more than logical” to expect that lawmakers this week would approve the imposition of martial law in order to block the open internet, ban all protests and restrict Russians from being able to leave the country.

Shopping at a luxury department store in Moscow on Saturday.Credit...Sergey Ponomarev for The New York Times

Such speculation, fed by how quickly the Kremlin was moving to block access to individual news media outlets and arrest protesters, has led increasing numbers of Russians to flee the country.

Russia-Ukraine War: Key Things to Know

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A city is captured. Russian troops gained control of Kherson, the first Ukrainian city to be overcome during the war. The overtaking of Kherson is significant as it allows the Russians to control more of Ukraine’s southern coastline and to push west toward the city of Odessa.

Military aid. Several countries are funneling arms into Ukraine, while NATO is moving military equipment and troops into member states bordering Russia and Belarus, amid rising fears that Russia might try to reclaim its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.

American airspace ban. President Biden announced that the U.S. will ban Russian aircraft from flying through American airspace. The ban follows similar moves by the E.U. and Canada to shut airspace to passenger flights from Russia and to planes used by Russian oligarchs.

Russian convoy. Satellite images show a Russian military convoy stretching 40 miles long on a roadway north of Kyiv, with a number of homes and buildings seen burning nearby. Experts fear the convoy could be used to encircle and cut off the capital or to launch a full-on assault.

Echo of Moscow, Russia’s flagship liberal-leaning radio station, was taken off the air on Tuesday for the first time since the Soviet coup attempt of 1991. Leading staff members of Dozhd, Russia’s only remaining independent television channel, left the country on Wednesday after access to its website was blocked.

“It’s clear that the personal security of some of us is under threat,” Tikhon Dzyadko, the channel’s editor in chief, wrote, explaining why he had decided to “temporarily” depart.

There was also evidence that, even though the war took many Russians by surprise, significant numbers had come to accept it as unavoidable or forced upon Russia by an aggressive NATO. The economic crisis touched off by the West’s harsh sanctions reinforced that narrative for some. On Wednesday, the ruble plumbed new lows as more companies like Siemens and Oracle announced they would reduce their operations in Russia and as the central bank ordered the Moscow stock exchange to remain shut on Thursday for the fourth straight day.

At a Moscow shopping mall on Wednesday, a young couple lining up for cash at an A.T.M. said they opposed the war. And yet they said that the way the world was punishing them for it was not fair, either, considering that the United States had fought its own wars in recent decades without coming under harsh international sanctions.

“Just as you can criticize the government, you can criticize Western countries,” said Maksim Filatov, 25, who manages a hookah-bar business. “When there were analogous situations in other countries involving the United States, there were no such attacks, and they didn’t drive the country into crisis.”

And the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, despite being a firsthand witness to the tragedy wrought by the war, had decided to support it, according to Mr. Latynin, the senior official. He echoed the words of Mr. Putin, who last week described his “special military operation” as one of “self-defense.”

“We understand that no armed conflict comes without victims,” Mr. Latynin said. “But this was a necessary step, because it was impossible to go on like this.”

An interior view shows a destroyed Russian Army all-terrain infantry mobility vehicle on a road in Kharkiv, Ukraine, on Sunday.Credit...Vitaliy Gnidyi/Reuters

Ivan Nechepurenko reported from Sochi, Russia, and Anton Troianovski from Dubai. Alina Lobzina contributed reporting from Moscow and Marc Santora contributed from Lviv, Ukraine.

The New York Times · by Anton Troianovski · March 2, 2022

8. China Asked Russia to Delay Ukraine War Until After Olympics, U.S. Officials Say

It should be no surprise that China is complicit. I hope China thinks delaying the attack for the Olympics was worth it!

China Asked Russia to Delay Ukraine War Until After Olympics, U.S. Officials Say

By Edward Wong and Julian E. Barnes

March 2, 2022

Updated 6:02 p.m. ET

The New York Times · by Julian E. Barnes · March 2, 2022

A Western intelligence report indicates that Chinese officials had some level of direct knowledge about President Vladimir V. Putin’s war plans or intentions.

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, left, and President Xi Jinping of China meeting last month on the day of the Olympics opening ceremony in Beijing.Credit...Sputnik, via Reuters

By Edward Wong and

March 2, 2022Updated 6:02 p.m. ET

WASHINGTON — A Western intelligence report said senior Chinese officials told senior Russian officials in early February not to invade Ukraine before the end of the Winter Olympics in Beijing, according to senior Biden administration officials and a European official.

The report indicates that senior Chinese officials had some level of direct knowledge about Russia’s war plans or intentions before the invasion started last week. President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia met with President Xi Jinping of China in Beijing on Feb. 4 before the opening ceremony of the Olympics. Moscow and Beijing issued a 5,000-word statement at the time declaring that their partnership had “no limits,” denouncing NATO enlargement and asserting that they would establish a new global order with true “democracy.”

The intelligence on the exchange between the Chinese and Russian officials was classified. It was collected by a Western intelligence service and considered credible by officials. Senior officials in the United States and allied governments passed it around as they discussed when Mr. Putin might attack Ukraine.

However, different intelligence services had varying interpretations, and it is not clear how widely the information was shared.

One official familiar with the intelligence said the material did not necessarily indicate the conversations about an invasion took place at the level of Mr. Xi and Mr. Putin. Other officials briefed on the intelligence declined to give further details. The officials spoke about the report on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the intelligence.

When asked by email on Wednesday whether Chinese officials had urged Russian officials to delay an invasion of Ukraine until after the Olympics, Liu Pengyu, the Chinese Embassy spokesman in Washington, said, “These claims are speculation without any basis, and are intended to blame-shift and smear China.”

China held the closing ceremony of the Olympics on Feb. 20. The next day, Mr. Putin ordered more Russian troops to enter an insurgent-controlled area of eastern Ukraine after state television broadcast a meeting between him and his national security council and, separately, a furious speech in which he said Ukraine should be a part of Russia. Early on Feb. 24, the Russian military began a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, including carrying out attacks on cities with ballistic missiles, artillery and tanks.

American and European officials have said they find it hard to believe it is mere coincidence that Mr. Putin’s invasion did not start until right after the Olympics. In August 2008, Russia invaded Georgia during the Summer Olympics in Beijing, which upset some Chinese officials.

This winter, Russia moved military units from its border with China and other parts of the east to near Ukraine and to Belarus to prepare for the invasion. The movements indicated a high level of trust between Russian and Chinese officials.

China and Russia have been strengthening their economic, diplomatic and military ties for years. Mr. Xi and Mr. Putin met 37 times as national leaders before their latest conclave in Beijing. The ambitious joint statement that the two nations issued during that meeting alarmed American and European officials, especially because it was the first time China had explicitly sided with Russia on issues concerning NATO and European security. European leaders have denounced China and Russia since then.

Representative Mike Gallagher, Republican of Wisconsin and a member of the House Intelligence Committee, said he was not familiar with the intelligence on discussions between Russia and China over Ukraine, but Beijing’s support of Moscow was clear.

“The Chinese support all of Putin’s narrative to blame the West for provoking Russia,” Mr. Gallagher said. “I see no change in the Chinese views on Russia. They remain in a de facto alliance against the West at this point.”

For months, some American officials tried to recruit China to help avert the war.

Days after President Biden spoke to Mr. Xi in a video summit on Nov. 15, senior American officials decided to present intelligence on the Russian troop buildup around Ukraine to senior Chinese officials to try to get them to persuade Mr. Putin to stand down. The Americans talked to Qin Gang, the Chinese ambassador in Washington, and to Wang Yi, the foreign minister. In a half-dozen meetings, including one in Washington between U.S. officials and the Chinese ambassador just hours before the Russian invasion, Chinese officials expressed skepticism that Mr. Putin would invade Ukraine, American officials said.

After one diplomatic exchange in December, U.S. officials received intelligence showing Beijing had shared the information with Moscow, telling the Russians that the United States was trying to sow discord and that China would not try to impede Russian plans, American officials said.

U.S. intelligence findings and assessments of Russian plans for an invasion of Ukraine have generally been accurate. The Americans began a campaign last fall to share intelligence with mainly ally and partner nations and to present declassified material to the public to build pressure on Russia to halt any planned invasion. William J. Burns, the C.I.A. director, flew to Moscow on Nov. 2 to confront the Russians with the information, and on Nov. 17, American intelligence officials shared their findings with NATO.

British officials had assessed that an attack by Mr. Putin before the Olympics was possible but unlikely, according to multiple officials briefed on London’s intelligence. That was partly based on the Western intelligence report, but mostly on an analytic assessment that Russia’s plan to overcome Western sanctions was highly dependent on China’s support and the notion that Mr. Putin would not risk angering Mr. Xi.

British officials also assessed that the joint statement issued by Mr. Putin and Mr. Xi was a clear sign of China’s support, something that Beijing would have been reluctant to give if Mr. Putin was willing to overshadow the Olympics by beginning his assault before the end of the Games, according to people familiar with the British thinking.

American intelligence officials observed Moscow making final preparations around Feb. 10, the kinds of movements that immediately precede an attack.

Russia-Ukraine War: Key Things to Know

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Allied intelligence services learned from intercepted communications that senior Russian commanders were being brought together for a meeting, which some Western governments believed was the key decision point for commanders to begin the attack. This intelligence was part of what led Jake Sullivan, the White House national security adviser, to warn on Feb. 11 that a Russian attack could come before the end of the Olympics. Multiple officials also said at the time that U.S. officials had picked up intelligence that Russia was considering Feb. 16 as the possible start date for the invasion. That prediction turned out to be wrong, though only by a few days.

In assessing that Russia could ignore China’s widely understood desire that peace be maintained through the Olympics, intelligence agencies took into account multiple considerations. While U.S. officials acknowledged that Mr. Putin’s relationship with Mr. Xi was important, they believed Russia wanted to quickly begin, and complete, an attack before the readiness of its troops declined. Mr. Putin, American officials assessed, also did not want to be seen as overly deferential to another leader.

Both U.S. and British intelligence officials also wrongly assessed that supply problems that had plagued Russian forces in Belarus during exercises had been fixed, allowing an invasion to proceed, according to a person briefed on the assessment. In reality, the supply problems have continued to hamper Russian forces as they moved into Ukraine.

Since the war began, Chinese officials have consistently sided with Russia. They have expressed support for Russia’s concerns about NATO and spoken of “sovereignty” in ambiguous terms. A Chinese government readout of a telephone conversation last Friday between Mr. Xi and Mr. Putin reiterated those points. Spokespeople for the Chinese Foreign Ministry have refused to call Russia’s actions an “invasion” and blamed the United States for inflaming tensions around Ukraine.

China has also criticized the sanctions imposed on Russia by the United States and European nations.

On Wednesday, Wang Wenbin, a Foreign Ministry spokesman, said at a news conference in Beijing that Russia and Ukraine should “seek a political solution that accommodates the legitimate security concerns of both sides.”

China is trying to evacuate thousands of its citizens, including diplomats, from Ukraine. About 6,000 citizens were in Ukraine before those efforts began. At least one Chinese citizen was injured by gunfire on Tuesday while trying to leave Ukraine, Mr. Wang said.

The Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, spoke with the Ukrainian foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, on Tuesday about the Chinese citizens in the country, according to an official Chinese readout.

It is not clear what assurances, if any, Russian officials gave Chinese officials about the invasion. On Feb. 24, the day the full-scale invasion began, Hua Chunying, a Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, said: “We noted that today Russia announced its launch of a special military operation in eastern Ukraine. Russia’s Defense Ministry said that its armed forces will not conduct missile, air or artillery strikes on cities.” That promise turned to be false from the start.

American and European officials are watching China to see whether it will help Russia evade sanctions or salvage the Russian economy. Before the invasion, Beijing and Moscow announced a 30-year contract for China to buy gas through a new pipeline. China has also lifted restrictions on the import of Russian wheat. But U.S. officials expect Chinese state-owned banks to avoid openly violating the sanctions for fear of jeopardizing their global commerce.

The New York Times · by Julian E. Barnes · March 2, 2022

9. International Criminal Court begins war crime investigation in Ukraine

A good mission of the ICC.

International Criminal Court begins war crime investigation in Ukraine

CNN · March 2, 2022

2 hr 58 min ago

From CNN’s Josh Campbell

The Hague, The Netherlands (Adobe Stock/FILE)

The International Criminal Court in The Hague, Netherlands said on Wednesday it would immediately proceed with an active investigation following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan said in a statement 39 of the court’s member states had requested for the investigation to proceed.

“Our work in the collection of evidence has now commenced,” Khan said, noting the investigation will cover incidents in Ukraine from 2013 to the present.

Khan said his office "had already found a reasonable basis to believe crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court had been committed, and had identified potential cases that would be admissible."

The ICC's chief prosecutor implored all parties engaged in conflict to adhere to international humanitarian law.

2 hr 58 min ago

10. Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Karim A.A. Khan QC, on the Situation in Ukraine: Receipt of Referrals from 39 States Parties and the Opening of an Investigation

To the fullest extent of the law.

The US is not part of the ICC as we never ratified the treaty. I am surprised I do not see Japan's name on the list of countries as it is one of the larger financial supporters of the ICC.

Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Karim A.A. Khan QC, on the Situation in Ukraine: Receipt of Referrals from 39 States Parties and the Opening of an Investigation

icc-cpi.int · March 2, 2022

On 28 February, I announced my decision to seek authorisation to open an investigation into the Situation in Ukraine, on the basis of my Office's earlier conclusions arising from its preliminary examination, and encompassing any new alleged crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court ("ICC" or "the Court").

In the same statement, I indicated that active investigations by my Office would be significantly expedited if a State Party to the Rome Statute (the "Statute") were to refer the situation to my Office, as provided in article 14 of the Statute.

Today, I can confirm that, my Office has received referrals of the Situation in Ukraine from the following 39 ICC States Parties: Republic of Albania, Commonwealth of Australia, Republic of Austria, Kingdom of Belgium, Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, Republic of Colombia, Republic of Costa Rica, Republic of Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Kingdom of Denmark, Republic of Estonia, Republic of Finland, Republic of France, Georgia, Federal Republic of Germany, Hellenic Republic, Hungary, Republic of Iceland, Ireland, Republic of Italy, Republic of Latvia, Principality of Liechtenstein, Republic of Lithuania, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Republic of Malta, New Zealand, Kingdom of Norway, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Republic of Poland, Republic of Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Republic of Slovenia, Kingdom of Spain, Kingdom of Sweden, Swiss Confederation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. These referrals enable my Office to proceed with opening an investigation into the Situation in Ukraine from 21 November 2013 onwards, thereby encompassing within its scope any past and present allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide committed on any part of the territory of Ukraine by any person.

I have notified the ICC Presidency a few moments ago of my decision to immediately proceed with active investigations in the Situation. Our work in the collection of evidence has now commenced.

As mentioned in my statement of 28 February, in its preliminary examination of the Situation in Ukraine, my Office had already found a reasonable basis to believe crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court had been committed, and had identified potential cases that would be admissible.

As I proceed to discharge my responsibilities, I will seek to engage with all relevant stakeholders and parties to the conflict, ensuring that investigations by my Office are conducted objectively and independently, with full respect for the principle of complementarity. In doing so, we will remain focused on our core objective: ensuring accountability for crimes falling within ICC jurisdiction.

The support of States Parties and the international community more broadly will be essential as we seek to meet the inherent challenges faced in the conduct of these investigations. I will therefore seek the partnership and contributions of all States in order to address our need for additional resources across all situations addressed by my Office.

With an active investigation now underway, I repeat my call to all those engaged in hostilities in Ukraine to adhere strictly to the applicable rules of international humanitarian law. No individual in the Ukraine situation has a licence to commit crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.

If anyone has information relevant to the Situation, this can be submitted to the Office of the Prosecutor via: [email protected].

For further details on "preliminary examinations" and "situations and cases" before the Court, click here, and here.

Source : Office of the Prosecutor

icc-cpi.int · March 2, 2022

11. Biden administration launches new 'KleptoCapture' task force to go after Russian oligarchs

A great name for the task force.

Biden administration launches new 'KleptoCapture' task force to go after Russian oligarchs

CNBC · by Amanda Macias,Brian Schwartz · March 2, 2022

KEY POINTS

The Biden administration announced a new task force that will enforce sweeping U.S. and allied sanctions imposed on Russia for its unprovoked war in Ukraine.
Task Force KleptoCapture was teased by Biden in his State of the Union address Tuesday evening.
“The U.S. Department of Justice is assembling a dedicated task force to go after the crimes of Russian oligarchs. ... We are coming for your ill-begotten gains,” Biden said.
The unit will seek to deprive Russian oligarchs of assets and other tools used to evade sanctions.

VIDEO0:5100:51

Justice Dept. launches new task force to hold Russian oligarchs accountable, says AG Merrick Garland

News Videos

WASHINGTON – The Biden administration announced a new task force Wednesday that will enforce sweeping U.S. and allied sanctions imposed on Russian officials and oligarchs that have helped finance President Vladimir Putin's unprovoked war in Ukraine.

The new task force, comprised of interagency law enforcement officers from the FBI, Marshals Service, IRS, Postal Inspection, Homeland Security Investigations and Secret Service, will target "the crimes of Russian officials, government-aligned elites, and those who aid or conceal their unlawful conduct."

The task force will use various tools at its disposable, including cryptocurrency tracing, to track down and prosecute those who violate the sanctions and seize assets.

Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco, who will oversee the new task force, said in a statement, "Oligarchs be warned: we will use every tool to freeze and seize your criminal proceeds."

A police officer patrols a deserted Red Square during the pandemic of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19).

Valery Sharifulin

Teased by President Joe Biden in his State of the Union address Tuesday evening, the new Department of Justice task force, dubbed Task Force KleptoCapture, will seek to deprive Russian oligarchs of assets and other tools used to evade sanctions.

"The U.S. Department of Justice is assembling a dedicated task force to go after the crimes of Russian oligarchs," Biden said. "We are coming for your ill-begotten gains," the president added.

Superyachts owned by Russian billionaires have been on the move ever since the U.S. and their allies started previewing possible sanctions against these types of properties.

CNBC previously reported that at least four massive yachts owned by Russian business leaders have been moving toward the Maldives and Montenegro. The Maldives doesn't have an extradition treaty with the U.S., according to Nomad Capitalist.

VIDEO2:1202:12

President Biden to Russian oligarchs: We are coming for your ill-begotten gains

News Videos

Since that report, one of the yachts started to shift its position. Vagit Alekperov, who is president of Russia-based Lukoil, sailed his yacht named Galactica Super Nova into a port in Montenegro, according to data from Marine Traffic.

Yet on Wednesday, it was last seen heading out to sea from the Montenegro docking area.

As of late Tuesday, it was docked near a yacht named Trident that's said to be owned by sanctioned Ukrainian oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskyy. He was marked last year by the U.S. State Department, which accused Kolomoyskyy of "significant corruption." Kolomoyskyy's yacht has been parked at the Montenegro port since mid-February, according to Marine Traffic.

The Ukrainian billionaire has also previously suggested that Ukraine should start aligning itself more with Russia, even though he helped finance equipment for Ukrainian fighters when they defended Crimea from the Russians in 2014.

A giant yacht known to be owned by Putin is on track to enter Kaliningrad, Russia's only ice-free port, after spending time in Hamburg, Germany.

The task force is yet another approach the Biden administration has taken in lockstep with trans-Atlantic allies to hold Putin and complicit Russian elites to account.

"The Justice Department will use all of its authorities to seize the assets of individuals and entities who violate these sanctions," wrote Attorney General Merrick Garland in a statement announcing the new unit.

"We will leave no stone unturned in our efforts to investigate, arrest and prosecute those whose criminal acts enable the Russian government to continue this unjust war," Garland added.

The State Department said Secretary of State Antony Blinken discussed the new task force with his Ukrainian counterpart on Wednesday.

CNBC · by Amanda Macias,Brian Schwartz · March 2, 2022

12. 141 countries vote to condemn Russia at UN

But 35 abstentions.

141 countries vote to condemn Russia at UN

Axios · by Ivana Saric,Zachary Basu · March 2, 2022

1 hour ago - World

Data: United Nations; Map: Danielle Alberti/Axios

141 countries voted in favor of a UN General Assembly resolution "deploring" Russia's aggression against Ukraine and demanding the immediate and complete withdrawal of all Russian forces from Ukrainian territory.

Why it matters: The resolution is non-binding, but reflects Russia's historic isolation on the world stage just one week into its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

The full UNGA vote came after Russia vetoed a similar resolution in the 15-member UN Security Council.
Four countries joined Russia in voting against the resolution — Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea and Syria — while 35 abstained.

Between the lines: Serbia, which has close historical ties with Russia, surprised many observers by voting in favor of the resolution.

The United Arab Emirates and Israel, two U.S. security partners that have been criticized for declined to speak out against Russia's aggression, also chose to vote for the resolution.
India, however, abstained. The world's largest democracy has longstanding military ties with Russia from the Soviet era, causing headaches for the U.S.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky praised the outcome of the vote, tweeting, "I’m grateful to everyone & every state that voted in favor. You have chosen the right side of history."

The results "convincingly show that a global anti-Putin coalition has been formed and is functioning. The world is with us. The truth is on our side," he added.

Editor's note: This post has been updated with additional details throughout.

Go deeper

Axios · by Ivana Saric,Zachary Basu · March 2, 2022

13. Russia Crisis Military Assessment: Why did Russia's invasion stumble?Russia Crisis Military Assessment: Why did Russia's invasion stumble?

A lot of assessments are coming out daily. This will probably be the most observed war in history.

I just wonder if all this is Master Sun Tzu and that we will see the hell unleashed in the near future. Is Putin feigning disorder? Is he testing the responses? Has he discovered weaknesses? Could he be that good? Probably not but we should not totally disount him.

"All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him."

-Sun Tzu

Russia Crisis Military Assessment: Why did Russia's invasion stumble?

atlanticcouncil.org · March 3, 2022

In light of the ongoing Russia crisis, the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense (FD) practice will share weekly assessments of the latest force developments surrounding Ukraine, leveraging the expert perspectives of our senior military fellows. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied here are solely those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Department of Defense or any other US government agency.

The bottom line

During the first week of the war, Russian ground forces have become bogged down outside of the northern Ukrainian cities of Kharkiv and Kyiv due to their failure to establish air superiority (which has resulted in significant aircraft and helicopter losses), too few troops to execute three simultaneous thrusts (toward Kyiv and Kharkiv, and north from Crimea), poor coordination of fires and maneuver, significant logistical issues, and stronger than expected Ukrainian resistance. Russia’s naval superiority in the Black Sea has contributed to success in its southern area of operations, with Russian forces breaking out from the Crimean Peninsula and taking territory in southern Ukraine. Although Ukraine has fought well and disrupted plans for a quick and decisive Russian victory, the situation is still perilous. Russia is moving to encircle Kyiv and Kharkiv and appears to have switched to indiscriminate long-range fires—resulting in significant collateral damage in residential areas—and is making significant progress in the south.

Russian military progress

Air and air defense: Russia has failed to establish air superiority and is unable to provide required air support to its ground forces.

Battle for Hostomel (the Battle of Antonov Airport). On February 24 and 25, Russia and Ukraine fought a ferocious battle for Antonov Airport in Hostomel, just ten kilometers northwest of Kyiv. Russia conducted a large air assault to take control of the airfield, but Ukrainian forces held throughout February 24. According to Ukrainian sources, during the battle, eighteen IL-76 Candid cargo aircraft took off from Pskov Airport in Russia and were heading to Antonov Airport, likely loaded with either paratroopers or heavy equipment to support the paratroopers. We surmise the airlifted force was designed to help spearhead the Russian attack on Kyiv. The Ukrainian defense of the airfield on February 24 slowed the advance on Kyiv, possibly preventing a rapid capture of the capital. The Russians eventually took control of the airfield on February 25, but reporting indicated that the airfield was heavily damaged and nonoperational.
Russia’s has failed to establish air superiority and is suffering long aircraft and helicopter losses. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, Russia lost thirty-one planes and thirty helicopters in the first week of the conflict. Though all the Ukrainian kill claims cannot be independently verified, it is clear to us that Russia is losing aircraft and helicopters at a damaging rate. We believe that a root cause of these Russian losses is the Kremlin’s failure to secure even localized air superiority over Kyiv. As a result, Russian aircraft and helicopter losses have been surprisingly high and unsustainable, Russian attack aircraft and helicopters do not have the freedom of movement to provide close air support to their columns of mechanized forces, and Ukraine’s Turkish-made TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles have been able to operate and destroy a shocking number of Russian vehicles. There are a multitude of reasons why the Russian air campaign has failed to develop air superiority:

Limited effectiveness of the stand-off weapons (SOW) strike. According to the US Department of Defense, Russia launched approximately one hundred cruise and ballistic missiles and employed seventy-five bombers in attacks on the first night of the conflict against critical governmental and military targets throughout the country, including command and control (C2), communications, airfields, radars, and surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems and sites. Though they appeared to score some hits, we do not see devasting effects of the SOW strike: Ukrainian military systems were still up and operating after the initial volley of missiles strikes. The pace of Russian SOW strikes has decreased significantly since the first night. The failure to concentrate fires has allowed Ukraine to weather the SOW strikes.
Poor integration of non-kinetic fires and electronic warfare. The Russian cyberattacks kickstarting the conflict were more limited than we expected and did not support the greater air-superiority objective. Were the Russians able to cut off Ukrainian military leaders from those they are commanding, or at least disrupt their C2 and communications to the tactical forces, Ukrainian air and air-defense forces would have been forced to fight in an uncoordinated fashion, making them less lethal and more susceptible to attack. Russia deployed numerous electronic attack vehicles to the front, and we expected it would attack across the electromagnetic spectrum, including denying or disrupting communications (space-based and terrestrial), airborne- and ground-based radars, and satellite precision navigation and timing (PNT). So far, there has been no reporting of large-scale communication, radar, or PNT disruption, allowing Ukrainian air and air defenses to communicate, navigate, and build an intelligence picture of the battlespace.
Poor Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) doctrine, training, and execution. The Russian forces have failed to effectively execute the SEAD mission. From our perspective, Russia has not learned from the 2008 Georgia conflict, the vital importance of finding and destroying radars, air defense C2, and SAMs at the onset of hostilities. Russia has not developed a dedicated SEAD force, and its unsuccessful execution implies significant issues with the SEAD doctrine, training, or (more likely) both. The Kremlin’s inability to suppress or destroy Ukrainian SAMs has led to an unknown number of aircraft and helicopter losses and has limited the number of sorties—operational flights made by a single aircraft—flown by their attack aircraft and helicopters, likely because the operating environment has not been cleared of surface-to-air threats.
Limited effectiveness in destroying Ukrainian fighter aircraft. Russia did target Ukrainian airfields with its initial air and missile strikes, and, though confirmed photos and videos display hits to multiple airfields, they were not rendered inoperable, and Russia destroyed few fighter aircraft. As a result, the Ukrainian air force has continued to generate sorties, contesting Russian air superiority.
Poor integration of battlefield intelligence. Russia appears to have failed to provide near-real-time intelligence to enable attacks on mobile targets, specifically the S-300 SAM. Because the Russian air force has been unable to find and these mobile SAMs, they remain a deadly threat to Russian aircraft and helicopters.
Failure to concentrate effects. Russia has failed to execute an effective combined arms, multi-domain campaign to enable air superiority. So far in the conflict, Russia has used airborne, ground-, and sea-launched cruise and ballistic missiles, and Russian forces have conducted cyberattacks and potentially leveraged electronic warfare. These attacks have failed, however, in concentrating effects on the battlespace, particularly in the battle to gain air superiority over the Ukrainians.

Navy: In the first few days of the war, the Russian navy achieved its aims of establishing sea control in the northern Black Sea from Sevastopol to the southern Ukrainian border and in the Sea of Azov. The Black Sea Fleet will remain a supporting arm of Russian combat operations ashore and cut off any Ukrainian approaches from the Black Sea.

Black Sea. According to Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, nearly all commercial traffic has departed from the northern Black Sea and the Sea of Azov or are at anchor. Additionally, likely as part of the effort to establish sea control, as of February 25, two cargo ships (one Turkish-owned and one Moldova-flagged) were attacked. Russian efforts to control merchant traffic in the Black Sea effectively cut off any international resupply efforts to reach Ukraine from the sea.
Amphibious operations. Russia has two amphibious groups. The first group in the Sea of Azov conducted an amphibious landing west of Mariupol, with its ground units splitting into two groups. One of these groups assisted with the attack on Mariupol, and the other moved west in support of ground forces along the southern route. The second amphibious group remains in the northern Black Sea and is likely waiting for the right military and weather conditions to conduct an amphibious landing in the vicinity of Odesa.
Turkish Straits. On February 25, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu responded to a request from Ukraine to close the Dardanelles to Russian warships by stating that “Turkey can stop the passage of warships through the straits. But there is something else in the Montreux Convention. If there is a demand to [let] the ships of countries at war to return to their bases, it must be allowed.” That means Turkey will block any warships entering the Black Sea except for Russian ships that are returning to their home port in Sevastopol or Novorossiysk. Another development that we believe could impact Russian naval operations is the possible movement of the six amphibious ships currently in the Black Sea. If these ships depart for resupply in their home ports in the Baltic or North seas, they would then be barred from returning to the Black Sea.

Nuclear-capable forces: Over the weekend, Putin made a televised statement ordering his defense minister and general staff chief to put Russia’s deterrence forces on a “special regime of combat duty.” This decision may be reflective of the “escalate to deescalate” strategy, the Russian military doctrine that calls for threatening to use tactical nuclear strikes early enough that the confrontation ends on favorable terms for Moscow. Nevertheless, for the United States and its allies, it was alarming that Putin decided to elevate nuclear weapons. Despite concerns over the threat, according to the US Department of Defense, Putin’s words have yet to be matched by any “noticeable muscle movements” that would indicate unusual nuclear deployments by Russia.

Putin is likely playing the nuclear card to divide NATO. Putin’s desire to raise the salience of nuclear weapons is driven, in part, by an expectation that such rhetoric may divide what has been a remarkably unified NATO response thus far.
We have not seen Russian movements to mobilize their strategic forces. Typically, moving to a nuclear alert involves strategic bombers being rolled out of hangars and put on flight patrols, ballistic missile submarines being flushed out to sea for deterrence patrols, and road-mobile missiles being driven away from garrison shelters. These moves are highly—and intentionally—visible, signaling nuclear readiness to one’s adversary. We have seen none of this from Russia.
US nuclear posture remains steady in response. US Strategic Command (the military organization which commands and controls US nuclear forces at the direction of the president) issued a statement saying that the United States “remains at an appropriate posture,” while White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki said this alert was in-keeping with Putin’s pattern of “manufacturing threats that don’t exist.” When asked if Americans should be worried about the possibility of nuclear war with Russia, US President Joe Biden said, “no.” This is a measured and calibrated response to avoid escalation.

Ground forces: Russian advances have been slowed primarily by strong Ukrainian resistance, the fact that its forces are mainly limited to roads, and logistical problems. The Russians have plenty of combat power to regain the initiative and defeat Ukrainian resistance, but they may have to resort to more indiscriminate aerial bombing and artillery barrages.

Ukrainian resistance. Viewed as the underdog, Ukraine has rallied to put up a fierce fight in the early days of war. However, Russia still holds the overwhelming combat power advantages that will eventually grind down Ukrainian forces as the war continues.
Russian maneuver limitations. The spring thaw has already started, so the Russians remain primarily on roads to enable quick advances. This funneling through choke points makes Russian forces vulnerable to Ukrainian drones and hunter-killer teams with Javelins. The Russians could increase maneuver off-road as they start siege tactics and work to encircle major cities.
Logistical problems slowing Russian advances. We have seen several reports of Russian armored forces running out of fuel, which is to be expected considering that Ukrainians have targeted the lengthening Russian supply lines and have destroyed approximately sixty fuel tankers. As Russia commits more forces to the conflict, it will focus on hardening its supply lines.

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US, allied, and partner deployments

For the first time in its history, NATO activated the NATO Response Force (NRF)—a high-readiness force with land, air, sea, and special-forces units capable of being deployed quickly on operations—to improve defensive posture in the Baltic states. The United States is sending another seven thousand soldiers, primarily an Armored Brigade Combat Team from the 3rd Infantry Division and various enabler units. The United States has also placed an additional five thousand soldiers on high alert for potential deployment to Europe.

Supplying materiel to Ukraine: Multiple nations and organizations have committed to sending more equipment and money to support Ukraine. Germany, Sweden, Finland, and the United States all pledged more money and equipment. Aerial resupply of equipment into Ukraine is severely restricted due to Russian air patrols and defenses. Sea supply routes are completely cut off by the Russian navy. Ground resupply routes into Ukraine, through bordering NATO countries, appear open for now. If Russia moves to shut down these resupply routes, Ukraine could lose access to materiel to continue its resistance.

NATO allies reaffirm commitment to nuclear deterrence: Key NATO allies made public statements in an important show of unity in the face of the Kremlin’s nuclear saber-rattling. In a major speech, German Chancellor Olaf Scholtz re-committed Germany to NATO’s nuclear sharing program alongside other major defense and foreign-policy moves, including promises to increase Germany’s defense spending. This is notable given indications just last year that Germany was considering ending its nuclear sharing arrangement with the United States. Meanwhile, the French foreign minister reminded the world that Putin needs to understand that NATO has nuclear weapons. Strong statements like these show that NATO is standing firm in the face of Russian nuclear threats.

FD’s conclusion

Russia’s invasion has been rife with tactical, operational, and strategic errors and, as a result, we assess that the Kremlin appears to be behind its own timelines for the invasion. In particular, Russia’s air campaign has so far been an abject failure. Russian forces have been unable to establish air superiority over Ukraine, and they are suffering huge and unsustainable aircraft losses. The failure to win air superiority has prevented Russia from fully leveraging its impressive arsenal of ground-attack aircraft and helicopters. On the ground, Russia is bogged down in the north, stopped outside of both Kyiv and Kharkiv. That said, Russian forces have begun to encircle both cities and may begin siege tactics against them. In the south, the Russians have been much more successful, as they have broken out of the Crimean Peninsula, are threatening to take the port of Mariupol, and claim that they have captured the southern Ukrainian city of Kherson. Russia has also established naval superiority in the northern Black Sea.

Over the next week, we predict that Russia will increase the pressure on Kyiv and Kharkiv and will reinforce both thrusts. As resupply becomes more difficult, the pressure on Kyiv will increase, leading us to believe that this week will be crucial in determining whether the capital will fall to Russian forces. Russia is likely to change tactics and make a renewed push to establish air superiority over the coming week. Although it is unlikely Russia will knock out the Ukrainian air and air-defense forces, Russia is likely to expand its freedom of movement in the air domain, enabling greater air support to the ground offensive. While Ukraine has fought bravely and effectively, Russia still enjoys significant equipment and localized numerical advantages. The Kremlin is likely to revise tactics based on its disastrous first week of the conflict and will likely be more successful in the coming week.

Meet the FD team

Today’s briefing is brought to you by senior US Army fellow COL Benjamin Johnson, senior US Navy fellow CDR Daniel Vardiman, senior US Air Force fellow Lt Col Tyson Wetzel, senior US Marine Corps fellow Col J.B. Barranco, FD assistant director Mark J. Massa, and FD project assistant Alyxandra Marine. The Scowcroft Center Military Fellows Program, housed by the Forward Defense practice, hosts military fellows from participating branches of the US military and the armed forces of US allies and partners each year as part of a twelve-month fellowship program.

14. Biden administration does not 'have a strategic interest' in sanctioning Russian oil, White House says

Biden administration does not 'have a strategic interest' in sanctioning Russian oil, White House says

CNN · by Betsy Klein and Devan Cole, CNN

Washington (CNN)The White House on Wednesday appeared to downplay its openness to sanctioning Russian oil as a means of punishing Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The administration declined to rule it out entirely but said doing so was not in US strategic interests, citing disruptions to the global oil supply and the effect it would have on gas prices.

"We don't have a strategic interest in reducing the global supply of energy," principal deputy press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre told reporters aboard Air Force One.

Jean-Pierre said that sanctions like that "would raise prices at the gas pump for Americans," something that the White House is "very aware of."

She lauded US companies that have cut ties with Russia, and said the administration welcomes those announcements.

But, Jean-Pierre said, the administration is more strategically focused on impacting Russia's energy status over time.

Brutal onslaught rages in Ukraine as Russia expands assaults on key cities

"We and our allies and partners have a strong collective interest to degrade Russia's status as a leading energy supplier over time. That's why we've been talking about diversification. That's why we shut down Nord Stream 2. That's why we're helping to accelerate diversification for Russian gas. And that's why we're denying critical technology inputs that Russia needs to maintain its production capacity in oil and gas," she said.

These more tempered comments come after President Joe Biden Biden said sanctioning Russian oil exports remained a possibility.

"Nothing is off the table," Biden said when specifically pressed on sanctioning Russian oil exports earlier Wednesday.

White House press secretary Jen Psaki had also said the possibility of the US sanctioning Russian oil exports was "still on the table" earlier Wednesday.

Taking such a step would be an extraordinary measure that could have an intense effect on domestic gas prices, however, and Psaki made clear that the White House's top priority is to minimize the impact at home.

"What (Biden) does not want to do is topple the global oil markets or the global marketplace or impact the American people more with higher energy and gas prices," Psaki told CNN's John Berman on "New Day."

"That's something we heavily weigh. It's still on the table. It's not off the table. But again, that's how the President looks at this as we're announcing and pursuing additional steps," she added.

The US has already announced a slew of sanctions against Russia and President Vladimir Putin since the country's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine last week. But the unprecedented step of sanctioning its oil experts would likely send prices skyrocketing, dealing a painful blow to consumers around the world as Russia is the world's No. 2 oil producer.

Though the US consumes very little Russian oil -- oil imports from Russia stood at just 90,000 barrels per day in December -- the interconnected global market means supply shocks in one part of the world can impact prices everywhere.

Biden's State of the Union sends potent messages to Zelensky and Putin

The comments come as the US and other countries scramble to steady gas prices at home as the crisis enters its second week. On Tuesday, the White House and International Energy Agency announced that the US and its allies agreed to a release of 60 million barrels of oil from their reserves, a move the IEA said was meant to send a "strong message to global oil markets that there will be no shortfall" as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Prices surged even higher Wednesday, as global crude oil prices rose to more than $110 per barrel and the cost of natural gas skyrocketed to a new record in Europe as Russia's escalating military campaign in Ukraine stoked fear in markets.

Despite soaring prices, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries members and Russia agreed to stick to their current plan of gradually increasing output by just 400,000 barrels per day per month.

The cartel said in a statement "that current oil market fundamentals and the consensus on its outlook pointed to a well-balanced market, and that current volatility is not caused by changes in market fundamentals but by current geopolitical developments," adding that its next meeting will be March 31.

Echoing Psaki, Vice President Kamala Harris said Wednesday that "everything is on the table" as the US assesses economic sanctions on Russia and continued to stress the US will not send troops to fight Russian forces in Ukraine.

"What we are going to continue to do is stand firm with our allies in terms of reassessing what we are doing with sanctions. Everything is on the table for consideration, frankly," she told NBC News.

This story has been updated with additional developments Tuesday morning.

CORRECTION: An earlier version of this story and its headline misstated the nature of the possible actions the White House may take on Russian oil.

CNN's Kate Sullivan and Matt Egan contributed to this report.

CNN · by Betsy Klein and Devan Cole, CNN

15. Russia Appears To Be Preparing Its Ancient An-2 Biplanes For War In Ukraine

If they use these effectively I will recommit to my efforts to get the South Korea military to buy these for ROK SOF infiltration into north Korea.

Russia Appears To Be Preparing Its Ancient An-2 Biplanes For War In Ukraine

thedrive.com · by Thomas Newdick · March 2, 2022

Igor Dvurekov /Wikimedia Commons

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@CombatAir

While the air war in the first week of the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine has been dominated by apparent cruise missile strikes launched from bombers, extensive rotary-wing activity, and multiple, unconfirmed reports of air combat involving Russian and Ukrainian jets, one surprising participant looks to be waiting in the wings. The Russian Aerospace Forces’ (VKS) An-2 Colt biplane, a rugged, agricultural-looking design first flown in 1947, could well be getting ready for action over Ukraine, although the exact role it might fulfill remains puzzling.

Although designed primarily for crop-dusting, the An-2 proved to be a highly adaptable aircraft for both civilian and military operators. Even today it remains in frontline service both for various types of special operations work, including in an armed configuration. More commonly, however, it’s used as a training aircraft, especially for paratroopers.

Aerial imagery and accompanying analysis from the satellite imagery and space technology firm Maxar Technologies indicates that a considerable number of An-2s have now been moved to Seshcha Air Base in Bryansk Oblast, a region in western Russia, which shares a border to northern Ukraine.

Artem Katranzhi/Wikimedia Commons

A pair of Russian Aerospace Forces An-2 Colts.

Maxar satellite photos since February 28, which have been obtained by The Aviationist website, record 42 An-2s at the base, which is normally home to the 566th Military Transport Aviation Regiment (566 VTAP), operating the VKS fleet of giant An-124 Condor heavy transport aircraft. The regiment also flies a squadron of Il-76 Candid airlifters from the same base. The number of An-2s now there is significant, considering a total of around 60 thought to be in VKS service today.

Dmitry Terekhov/Wikimedia Commons

A VKS An-124 Condor heavy transport aircraft, home-based at Seshcha.

The Colts can now also be seen arranged on the airbase’s unique layout, which includes a 10,000-foot runway that bisects the circular aircraft parking area.

GOOGLE EARTH

Seshcha Air Base in Bryansk Oblast.

The latest situation report from Maxar, also shared by The Aviationist, posits that the An-2s “have likely been converted to drones and could be used as decoys to simulate helicopter or UAV formations to draw out Ukraine’s air defenses.” This could also be related to the reported appearance of undisclosed electronic warfare aircraft that arrived at Seshcha in the middle of last month. Those aircraft could potentially be used together with the An-2s as part of a wider assault on Ukraine’s ground-based air defense network which has remained relatively intact against great odds.

That, however, is not confirmed and we don’t know for sure that Russia plans to use the An-2s in this way.

It’s also been reported that the VKS has been conducting sorties with its forward-deployed An-2s in proximity to the Ukrainian border, perhaps within the last month.

In a February 7 post, blogger Dylan Malyasov pointed to footage of nine An-2s in formation “in Russia’s border areas with Ukraine.”

Malyasov also suggested that the veteran aircraft would be used for “simulating a breakthrough of a helicopter group or attack drones,” basically serving as decoys to not only overwhelm Ukrainian defenses but potentially also to reveal the location of radar emitters that could then be hit by anti-radiation weapons, attacked with standoff munitions, or jammed with countermeasures.

Indeed, it seems it was this theory from Malyasov that led to the findings in the Maxar situation report. However, we don’t know for sure that the An-2s in the video were examples from Seshcha.

Either way, that report was apparently picked up by U.S. Senator Marco Rubio, the top Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee, who also raised the prospect of Russia using the same 42 An-2s in an unmanned configuration:

Of course, using An-2s for this type of mission is not new. Indeed, it’s possible it could closely replicate the tactics employed by Azerbaijan during its war with Armenia in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020.

During that conflict, Azerbaijan rigged up An-2s with basic modifications to the flight controls. The biplanes were then flown by pilots and put on a course that would take them over the relevant Armenian positions. The pilot would then lock the controls and bail out, leaving it to fly pilotless, triggering the defenses before its ultimate demise, either shot down, running out of fuel, or otherwise crashing.

Footage reportedly showing an Azerbaijani An-2 shot down by Armenian air defenses:

It’s possible that there is already a precedent for Russia employing unmanned aircraft to probe or perhaps try and alert Ukrainian air defenses. Earlier today, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense released a series of photos showing a Russian-made ENICS E95M pulse-jet target drone, the implication being it had been brought down, or at least recovered, by Ukrainian forces.

One role for this type of drone in the current conflict could be as some form of decoy or otherwise to reveal the presence of certain air defense systems. At this stage, it’s hard to say, but there is no record of this type of target drone in Ukrainian service.

As well as this apparent decoy drone, Russia could potentially convert a number of other drones for the role, as well. It also has other means of disrupting Ukrainian air defense systems, including tactical aircraft configured for defense suppression, standoff jamming platforms, and other electronic warfare means. Taken together, this suggests that the An-2 might not be envisaged for this specific mission. However, there’s at least one other possibility of how the An-2 could contribute to the ongoing Russian offensive.

It’s important to note that the type’s main role with the Russian Armed Forces nowadays is parachute training on behalf of the Airborne Troops, or VDV. Previously operated by the VDV itself, An-2s are now part of the VKS, which has several squadrons of the type, each with around 10 aircraft, at various different bases — but not normally at Seshcha.

This role reflects the fact that the An-2 is an ideal paratrooper platform — it’s even used for jump training by some NATO air forces. Moreover, paratrooping is a role that could also be undertaken in wartime.

Russian VKS paratroopers train with an An-2:

Indeed, depending on the progress of the Russian forces on the ground, the ability to deliver paratroopers relatively discretely from the air, while flying at low level, could be of particular use in assaults on key objectives, or encirclements. Notably, Seshcha is only around 250 miles away from Kyiv, the Ukrainian capital.

GOOGLE EARTH

The general location of Seshcha Air Base.

At the same time, the An-2s short takeoff and rough-field capabilities mean that it could also be used for insertion of troops close to other targets, whether to capture them or conduct sabotage, forward reconnaissance, or other covert missions.

In the past, we have looked specifically at the An-2’s wartime role with the North Korean military, which is widely expected to include delivering special forces troops directed against key targets in the South via low-level infiltration at night.

NORTH KOREA STATE MEDIA

North Korean An-2s drop paratroopers at low level during an exercise.

Such is the An-2’s potential for causing havoc in this way that South Korea has built up a fleet of these aircraft which are used as aggressors to train how best to defend against these tricky targets — after all, this is an aircraft for which the manual has no stall speed.

Flying low and slow, the An-2 would present a tricky target for Ukrainian air defenses, although there is no evidence that Russian Colts are armed with freefall bombs and rockets like their North Korean counterparts.

More importantly, the fabric-winged An-2 has a small radar cross-section for its size, which, coupled with its slow speed, makes it hard for enemy fighters to spot it using their radars. In fact, some air defense radars would be set to filter out such targets entirely. Meanwhile, its low-level capabilities, which can be implemented at night, mean traditional surface-to-air missile systems can struggle to detect and engage these aircraft.

Talking to The War Zone, Justin Bronk, a research fellow for airpower at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) judged it unlikely that the Russian An-2s would be used in some kind of defense-suppression scenario, but did point out that “they might be used to help alleviate some of the worst supply shortages at key points in the Russian advance caused by the ground forces appalling logistics failures.” Again, the type’s short- and rough-field performance would be very useful for this kind of work.

So, there are at least three different mission sets that the An-2 could feasibly undertake on behalf of Russia as its war in Ukraine grinds on. For now, we simply have no idea what the Russian military has planned for its forward-deployed Colts and it remains a possibility that these aircraft have moved to Seshcha for entirely unrelated reasons. Considering they are normally based on different airfields across Russia, that would seem less likely, however, pointing to the very real possibility that the Kremlin might commit the An-2 to battle a full 75 years after its first flight.

Contact the author: thomas@thedrive.com

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thedrive.com · by Thomas Newdick · March 2, 2022

16. VOA Responds to Russian Government Plans to Block VOA Russian Website

Information is an existential threat to Putin.

VOA Responds to Russian Government Plans to Block VOA Russian Website

insidevoa.com

Today the Russian government warned the Voice of America of its intention to block the VOA Russian language service’s news website, www.golosameriki.com, unless it removes coverage of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Russian government’s media regulator, Roskomnadzor, claims the news site “contains false messages about terrorist attacks or other kind (sic) of information of public concern.”

The media regulator demands that the VOA Russian service remove a news story from its site that provided factual reporting on the second day of the Russian invasion. The article included widely reported facts regarding Russian bombardment of cities, a Russian claim to have captured an airport close to Kyiv, and statements from witnesses as well as reporters inside Ukraine.

“Any attempts to interfere with the free flow of news and information are deeply troubling. We find this order to be in direct opposition to the values of all democratic societies,” says Acting VOA Director Yolanda López.

The warning to VOA follows a broader crackdown on the press by the Russian government. The same regulators also moved to shut down two Russian news organizations that reach large audiences, Ekho Moskvy and Dozhd, as well as Current Time’s website, a joint production of Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

“The Russian people deserve unfettered access to a free press and, therefore, we cannot comply with the Roskomnadzor's request,” said Acting Director López.

insidevoa.com

17. Opinion | Republicans are so eager to see Biden fail that they’d let Putin succeed

This is why Putin and the PRC, Iran, and north Korea think they can "win."

Yes the headline is. partisan tribe and it calls out some representatives and senators for outrageous comments.

But Liz Cheney's statement is critically important.

“Do we hate our political adversaries more than we love our country?”

This actually applies to both sides of the political spectrum. I think everyone should ask themselves whether they hate their political opponents in the US more than Putin. If the answer is yes then I think we need to think long and hard about whether we actually support and defend our constitution and beleive in our federal democratic republic.

Excerpts:

The dictator is betting that division within the United States will sap American resolve and thereby sow disunity between the United States and European democracies — allowing him to crush Ukraine’s democracy and potentially others. And Republicans are giving him what he wants. They are so determined to see President Biden fail that they would let President Putin succeed.

Why are we supporting Putin's strategy?

Opinion | Republicans are so eager to see Biden fail that they’d let Putin succeed

The Washington Post · March 2, 2022

After her fellow Republicans booted her from party leadership last year, Rep. Liz Cheney posed a question: “Do we hate our political adversaries more than we love our country?”

Now, with Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, Republicans are answering that question — in the affirmative.

Tuesday night’s State of the Union address, coming six days after Russia started the biggest war in Europe since 1944, offered a timely opportunity to showcase national unity for Putin, and the world. During a similar address to Congress after the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush enveloped Democratic congressional leaders in bear hugs. But this time, a number of Republicans boycotted Biden’s address, ostensibly because they objected to getting tested for the coronavirus.

Those in the chamber rose to applaud the Ukrainian ambassador, and many wore Ukraine’s yellow and blue. But as Biden extolled national unity — “He thought he could divide us at home, in this chamber, in this nation. … But Putin was wrong." — Republican lawmakers sniped at him on Twitter.

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“Joe Biden sought to appease Vladimir Putin from the very beginning,” wrote Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.). “Biden is empowering our enemies.”

“The United States is back to leading from behind under President Biden,” tweeted Sen. Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.). “This is the second time Putin has invaded a foreign country while Joe Biden has been in the White House.”

How deep was the contempt? As Biden mentioned the cancers that kill many U.S. veterans, including his own son Beau, Rep. Lauren Boebert (R-Colo.) heckled the president.

GOP leaders had set the blame-Biden tone earlier in the day. Rep. Michael McCaul (Tex.), the top Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, likened Biden’s actions toward Russia to Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler, saying, “We have a weak president, and he’s creating a very dangerous world.”

Also Tuesday, Rep. Elise Stefanik (N.Y.), the No. 3 House GOP leader, said Biden “failed to engage in meaningful deterrence against Russian aggression,” and asserted that “the war on Ukraine represents one of the greatest foreign policy failures in modern history.”

House GOP leader Kevin McCarthy (Calif.) and Rep. Steve Scalise (La.), the House GOP whip, amplified the attacks on Biden over Ukraine. And Sen. John Barrasso (Wyo.), head of the Senate Republican Conference, said Biden’s “policies from Day One have enabled, emboldened Vladimir Putin to do what he has done,” adding that it’s “as if Vladimir Putin were Joe Biden’s secretary of energy.”

Some Republican candidates have even been fundraising off calling Biden “weak” on Ukraine.

The relentless assault no doubt undermines Biden — but it also weakens America. Biden’s response — the U.S. response — can be only as strong as Republicans allow. By sabotaging the commander in chief, Republican leaders have made it more difficult to rally the nation to accept wartime sacrifices (accepting higher energy prices or, potentially, lost American lives).

A poll released Monday by Yahoo News-YouGov shows how corrosive the Republican assaults on Biden have been. Though Americans overwhelmingly call the Ukraine invasion unjustified, Trump voters actually had a more favorable opinion of Putin than of Biden. Ninety-five percent of Trump voters expressed an unfavorable view of Biden (including 87 percent holding a very unfavorable view), compared with 78 percent of Trump voters expressing an unfavorable view of Putin (60 percent very unfavorable). Only 3 percent of Trump voters said Biden is “doing a better job leading his country” than Putin, while 47 percent said the dictator, who has brought isolation and economic crisis to Russia, is doing a better job than Biden.

This shouldn’t be surprising. Trump, while opposing the Ukraine invasion, has called “peacekeeper” Putin’s actions “very savvy,” “genius” and “smart,” while “our leaders are dumb.”

That’s a bit rich, after Trump threatened to blow up NATO, unsuccessfully tried to persuade other world leaders to readmit Russia to the Group of Seven and infamously tried to condition military aid to Ukraine on the country’s willingness to provide Trump with political dirt on Democrats. Republican lawmakers defended Trump by parroting Russian propaganda falsely blaming Ukraine for 2016 U.S. election sabotage, which Russia actually did.

But this isn’t the time to point fingers at political opponents. It’s time to confront the real enemy. Do Republican leaders know the difference?

In the official GOP response to the State of the Union, Iowa Gov. Kim Reynolds picked up the blame-Biden theme, accusing him of “focusing on political correctness rather than military readiness” before the Ukraine invasion. “Weakness on the world stage has a cost," she charged.

It does. And Republicans, by undermining Biden in a time of war, risk making America pay.

The Washington Post · March 2, 2022

18. Ukraine Conflict Update - March 3, 2022 | SOF News

Ukraine Conflict Update - March 3, 2022 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · March 3, 2022

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, tactical situation on the ground, Ukrainian defense, and NATO.

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Russian Campaign Update. Russian casualties have been in the thousands. Some estimates say that there have been 5,800 casualties. It may be less. Russian troops are grappling with shortages of food, fuel, and morale in Ukraine. Road conditions and vehicle maintenance is having an effect on the ability of the Russians to move; this is affecting their logistics and sustainment operations. Over the past few days the Russians have been consolidating and resupplying their units – so in some areas of the conflict there has been an operational pause. Russia has reported that the invasion has cost its military almost 500 killed and 1,600 wounded. Ukraine’s Defense Ministry puts the Russian casualties at ten times that number.

Air Dominance. Many military analysts are wondering what happened to Russia’s Air Force – U.S. officials and other national security experts are stumped. The inability to rapidly win Ukraine’s airspace has limited the Russian war gains thus far. The Russian air force has played a surprisingly limited role in the first week of the Ukraine invasion. However, many experts believe that the Russians will assume a more prominent role in the air in the coming days. Most of the Russian aircraft attacking Ukraine are coming out of Belarus from the north. The Russians have launched (as of Mar 2) roughly 450 short-range and medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles since the start of the war.

Kyiv. The Russians continued their advance on Kyiv along two axes. One approach has been from Belarus, moving south along the west bank of the Dnieper River and the other from Russia moving south along the east bank of the Dnieper River. The capital city appears to be Russia’s main effort. The intent of the Russians is to take the capital and then announce the establishment of a puppet regime. Kyiv experienced some heavy shelling in the early morning hours of Thursday (Mar 3). The forward elements of the long convoy watched by the world has reached the outskirts of Kyiv.

Kharkiv and Mariupol. The border city of Kharkiv in the northeast of the country also was subjected to shelling by the Russians and is almost encircled. The coastal city of Mariupol is also besieged, being attacked from the south by forces coming from Russian-occupied Crimea and from Donetsk in the east. The capture of Mariupol would go a long way to establishing a ‘land bridge’ between Russia and Crimea – surely one of the main goals of the Russian invasion. The siege of Kharkiv is tying down Ukrainian forces in the east.

Kherson. A city north of the Crimea peninsular has fallen to the Russians. The mayor of Kherson has met with the Russian commander who plans to set up a military administration. This city on the coast of the Black Sea is a jumping off point to the city of Odessa further west along the coast of the Black Sea. After heavy fighting Ukrainian forces pulled out of the city toward Mykolaiv, a city to the northwest of Kherson. The Russians, once reinforced with more troops, fuel, food, and ammunition, may strike out towards Mykolayiv and Odessa. There is a Russian amphibious landing force posed to strike the Odessa region consisting of four large landing ships and three missile boats. It is unknown if this poses a real threat or if it is just a feint to tie down Ukrainian forces in the Odessa region.

Current Russian Disposition and Future Operations. The farther the Russians get into Ukraine the longer its supply lines are. Ammunition, fuel, food, and reinforcements will take longer to get to the center of Ukraine. Along the way they will be subject to attacks and ambushes by cutoff Ukrainian soldiers. Many Russian advances are constrained to main avenues of approach because of the muddy conditions of the countryside. The Russians have deployed about 82% of the combat power that was initially staged on the Ukraine borders into Ukraine.

Russian EW Capabilities. A recent article provides details on Russian Army electronic warfare capabilities, doctrine, and activities in Ukraine at the operational and tactical levels. The Russians are attempting to electronically attack Ukrainian airborne radars, military radio nets, civilian cell phone networks, and civilian radio traffic. Currently, it appears that cellphone coverage in Ukraine has not been diminished to a great extent. The author of this article concludes that “So far, the Russian Army’s electronic warfare acumen seems a shadow of its former self. Russian Army EW equipment maybe under-performing and may not have the confidence of army commanders.” “Rah Rah Rash Putin?”, by Dr. Thomas Withington, Armada International, March 2, 2022.

More Ukrainian News. Civilians, when they can, are being evacuated from the battle zone areas. All trains from eastern and southern Ukraine are evacuation trains and people can travel for free. Ukrainian authorities say citizens don’t need to declare captured tanks and military equipment for tax purposes. Seized tanks and other military equipment would not be counted as part of a citizen’s income. (Business Insider, Mar 2, 2022).

Maps and Other Resources

Russia-Ukraine Monitor Map. This map is a crowdsourced effort by the Centre for Information Resilience (CIR) and the wider open source community to provide reliable information for policymakers, journalists, and justice organizations about the evolving situations both on the ground and online.

https://maphub.net/Cen4infoRes/russian-ukraine-monitor

UK Ministry of Defence. Check out the map posted by @DefenceHQ on Twitter.

https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ

Ukraine Graphics by Reuters. “Russia Invades Ukraine”

https://graphics.reuters.com/UKRAINE-CRISIS/zdpxokdxzvx/

Ukraine Conflict Info. The Ukrainians have launched a new website that will provide information about the war. It is entitled Russia Invaded Ukraine and can be found at https://war.ukraine.ua/.

Janes Equipment Profile – Ukraine Conflict. An 81-page PDF provides information on the military equipment of the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces. Covers naval, air, electronic warfare, C4ISR, communications, night vision, radar, and armored fighting vehicles, Ukraine Conflict Equipment Profile, February 28, 2022.

https://www.janes.com/docs/default-source/ukraine-conflict/equipment-profile_report_280222.pdf

The Resistance

Ukraine’s Territorial Defense Forces. A former commander of Special Operations Command – Europe (SOCEUR), Mike Repass, provides us his thoughts on the many Ukrainian civilians that are stepping up to fight the Russian invasion. Repass says that this didn’t ‘just happen’ – careful planning, coordination, and training took place over the past several years to ensure this would happen. Read “Ukraine’s stirring self-defense is no accident”, The Washington Post, March 1, 2022.

The Resistance and Legal Status. A lot of print is being given to a future Russian occupation and growth of a Ukrainian insurgency. A recent article explores the legal questions of a resistance comprised of civilian volunteers. Two Army officers who work in the Department of Law at the United States Military Academy at West Point provide some answers. “Legal Status of Ukraine’s Resistance Forces”, Lieber Institute West Point, February 28, 2022.

A Miscalculation. Alan Malcher reaches back into history to set the stage for what awaits Russia if it stays on as an occupying force in Ukraine. “Resistance in Ukraine: Putin’s dangerous miscalculation”, LinkedIn, March 2, 2022.

Cyber and Information Operations

Starlink is Active. Elon Musk promised to supply Starlink kits to Ukraine to provide an internet capability via satellite. It didn’t take long to make good on his promise. The country is facing some connectivity problems but the SpaceX founder says that his satellites will help out a bit. Starlink has a network of about 2,000 satellites in low earth orbit that provide high-speed broadband internet by connecting with user terminals around the world. “Elon Musk says Starlink is active in Ukraine amid internet disruptions”, Fox Business, February 26, 2022.

VOA – Not Welcome. The Voice of America Russian-language news site may be blocked. It has received notice to remove content that Moscow deems ‘illegal’. “Russia Media Regulator Moves to Block VOA”, Voice of America, March 2, 2022. Read more about the Russian lid on social media in “Media Crackdown in Russia”, U.S. Department of State, March 2, 2022. 45 minutes.

British Shortwave Radio Service. The BBC is launching a shortwave radio service for Russia and Ukraine. The service will reach audiences with a daily shortwave transmission for two hours in the evening and two hours in the morning. It will be difficult to disrupt this type of radio signal.

Podcast – Waging War in a Networked Age. A podcast aired that was devoted to how modern networks and media are influencing what has become a major shooting war between Russia and Ukraine. Cyberlaw Podcast – Lawfare, March 1, 2022,

World Response

UN Vote. The United Nations Assembly voted on a resolution demanding that Russia withdraw from Ukraine. 141 nations voted for the resolution. The countries of North Korea, Eritrea, Syria, and Belarus voted against the resolution.

New DOJ Task Force. The U.S. Justice Department has established a task force to enforce U.S. sanctions against Russia. The new interagency law enforcement effort would enforce the sweeping sanctions, export restrictions, and economic countermeasures aimed at Moscow. This new organization would be targeting the crimes of Russian officials, government-aligned elites, and those who aid or conceal their unlawful conduct. “DOJ launches ‘KelptoCapture’ task force to target Russian oligarchs”, Washington Examiner, March 2, 2022.

U.S. Missile Test Postponed. The Pentagon has delayed a long-planned test launch of an American Minuteman III rocket. The SECDEF has decided on this action so that the launch could not be misunderstood or misconstrued. Air Force crews test four Minuteman III rockets per year from Vandenberg Space Force Base, California. The tests are planned years in advance and publicized to avoid miscalculations. The dummy warheads splash down near Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. “Austin Postpones Test of Minuteman III Missile”, DoD News, March 2, 2022.

Russian Billionaire Loses Yacht. A very rich Russian is one yacht short now. His 512-foot long boat, valued at $600 million, has been seized by the Germans in the northern city of Hamburg. European Union sanctions are what set in motion the seizure. “Germans Seize Russian Billionaire Alisher Usmanov’s Mega-Yacht”, Forbes, March 2, 2022.

Commentary

Waltz on Ukraine. Representative Mike Waltz (R-FL) provides his perspective on the likelihood of Ukraine’s success in stopping the Russians. He says that the west “. . . must continue the flow of food, medical supplies, small armaments, stinger missiles, night vision, secure communications, body armor, and deployable radar systems to stall Russian armor in the cities and cut off their supply lines”, “Ukraine vs. Russia: Here’s How Zelensky and his country win”, Fox News, March 2, 2022.

Rubio on Ukraine and Twitter. The senator from Florida is doing a lot of tweeting about the Ukraine and people are following his Twitter account to stay abreast of the changing situation of the conflict. “Marco Rubio is tweeting through the Russia-Ukraine war – for a reason”, Politico, March 2, 2022.

Seth Jones – What the West Should Provide. Sanctions and diplomacy alone will not save Ukraine. It needs weapons and intelligence to oppose the Russians and ultimately, down the road, Russian-installed puppet rulers. Read more in “How the U.S. Can Back Its Promises to Ukraine”, The Wall Street Journal, March 1, 2022.

Intel and Putin. Many observers are speculating on the intentions of Putin with regard to Ukraine. Is it possible that the U.S. intelligence community knows what’s up? “Can Intelligence Tell How Far Putin Will Go?”, War on the Rocks, February 28, 2022.

OSINT and Ukraine. From high-resolution satellite images to TikTok videos, governments no longer control information from the front lines. Open source intelligence has changed the geopolitical and military environment. Governments no longer control the technology that puts eyes on the battlefield, which means they no longer can control the narrative. Read more in “How Open-Source Intelligence is Helping Clear the Fog of War in Ukraine”, BuzzFeed.News, March 2, 2022.

Russia’s Economy and Military Power. There have been various academic efforts to measure military power based on economic strength. David Uren, a senior fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, breaks this down for us in “Measuring Russia’s Economic and Military Power”, The Strategist, March 3, 2022.

Wishful Thinking. The editor of FDD’s Long War Journal, Bill Roggio, has some disquieting news to share. He believes that “Wishful thinking has the upper hand in the battle to shape Western perceptions of the war in Ukraine”. He says the sympathy for the Ukrainians has blinded people to the fact that the Ukrainians are outnumbered in troops and outgunned in weapons. While Russia may have hoped for a knockout punch, they will quickly transition to careful follow-on assaults following Russian doctrine. “The West’s delusions about this war”, FDD Long War Journal, March 2, 2022.

Declassifying Intel. Jack Harrington, an intelligence fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in D.C., provides us with an informative article about the pros and cons of revealing intelligence information in an attempt to shape world events. “Intelligence Disclosures in the Ukraine Crisis and Beyond”, War on the Rocks, March 1, 2022.

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Photo: F-35 Lightning II on patrol in eastern Europe. USAF Senior Airman Ali Stewart.

sof.news · by SOF News · March 3, 2022

19. The Wargame Before the War: Russia Attacks Ukraine

Resistance is mentioned 6 times in this article but there is no indication that resistance was wargamed to any significant extent.

My question is have any of our wargames ever looked at wargaming significant resistance among the population? Do we have wargaming capabilities to wargame resistance as well as information and influence activities? Can we look at these activities with anything more than a hand wave and then dismissal because they get in the way of real warfighting?

Do we have expertise in our service wargaming organizations for wargaming resistance?

The Wargame Before the War: Russia Attacks Ukraine - War on the Rocks

JAMES LACEY, TIM BARRICK, AND NATHAN BARRICK

warontherocks.com · by James Lacey · March 2, 2022

Editor’s note: Don’t miss our comprehensive guide to Russia’s war against Ukraine.

In the two weeks prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Marine Corps University ran a four-day wargame to simulate the first several days of just such an invasion. One of us ran the wargame while the others played the Ukrainian and Russian forces. Despite a few stark differences, the current Russian offensive is playing out in ways eerily similar to that simulation.

By the time the wargame ended, the overall situation appeared very much as it does on the ground in Ukraine, with only two major deviations. First, the Russians have pushed harder out of Belarus to the west of the Dneiper — north of Kyiv — to strike the city from the rear. And secondly, the Russian assault in Kherson was temporarily halted, as the axis of advance in the south for a time turned northeast toward Mariupol. Both of these actions were, however, discussed by the players in the wargame.

Another difference was in the impact of the Russian air and missile campaign. In the game, Russian operations began with a series of missile and airstrikes, aimed at eliminating Ukraine’s air force and destroying the country’s integrated air defense system. Thus, the Russian players’ primary focus, during the first few days of the campaign, was aimed at gaining freedom of maneuver in the skies — air dominance — along with destroying Ukraine’s coastal defense systems. So, although the number of actual strikes made by the Russians in the conflict’s first 24-hours tracked almost exactly to what was employed by the Russians in the wargame, the impact was substantially different. In the wargame, every strike was focused on eliminating Ukraine’s air force and air defense network. In real life, the Russian strikes appear to have been more widely spread over a range of targets. Thus, the Russians employed far fewer munitions than required to cripple Ukraine’s air defenses or to significantly degrade their ability to control forces in the field. In short, unlike in the game, the Russian attacks were damaging but insufficient to overwhelm Ukraine’s defenses.

Figure 1

Much of the Ukrainian air force was destroyed on the ground as a result of Kalibr and Kh-101 cruise missile strikes, special operations-enabled targeting and direct action, and air strikes. The surviving remnants were overwhelmed and destroyed in the air, some being shot down by long-range air defense systems in Russia, with ranges extending into Ukrainian airspace. This stands in stark contrast to what Russia has achieved in its actual operations. Going into the fifth day of the war, Ukraine’s air defenses are still functioning, even if at a reduced level of effectiveness. Moreover, by all accounts, the Ukrainian air force remains in the fight, and in combination with the remaining air defenses is having some success in contesting Ukraine’s airspace. At present, the Russians appear to possess air superiority, but the reported 30+ sorties the Ukrainians are launching daily have denied the Russians the level of air dominance that they achieved in the wargame. Primary initial targets in the wargame were Ukrainian S-300 systems around Kyiv, the Dnieper River bend, Kherson, and Odessa. Secondary targets were Ukraine’s dozens of BUK (SA-17) systems. The damage done to Ukraine’s air defense system was extensive, neutralizing the core integrated air defense network in the first two days, although the dispersion of Ukraine’s BUK systems assured a residual anti-air capability. Moreover, at the cost of 30 to 40 aircraft, in the wargame, the Russians gained air dominance, as the Ukrainian air force was virtually wiped out by day three of the wargame. There were likely some residual survivors, but Ukraine’s ability to operate at the squadron level was neutralized.

In the wargame, the main Russian ground offensive was purposely delayed, as the Russian players focused on several days of shaping fires aimed at destroying critical enemy capabilities before committing the bulk of their ground forces. Russia’s plan was to conduct an even longer period of shaping, but the game was time-limited, forcing the players to begin ground operations earlier than they wished. Still, the impact of the wargame’s shaping fires was profound, as once the ground forces advanced, they had strong support from Russian airpower, now flying in uncontested skies. At this time, the Russian fires complex (artillery, air, and missiles) switched its priority to destroying Ukrainian fire support systems.

Much of this is what one would expect based on what we know about the Russian way of war. But the game differed in several major aspects from what most analysts expected prior to the war. First, the amount of fires employed in the wargame was only a fraction of what the Russians had available. Also, at the start of the campaign, the Russians avoided striking at the four regional Ukrainian command and control headquarters, in order to allow them to communicate their surrender if the government collapsed. Consequently, throughout the wargame, these headquarters remained functional and effective, as the Russians focused much of their available long-range strikes on gaining air dominance. These headquarters were just starting to come under intense pressure when the game ended.

In diverging from Western interpretations of the Russian way of war, the wargame closely mimicked what we mostly saw in the first few days of Russia’s actual military operations. Russia’s apparent reticence to bury Ukraine’s military under a blanket of fire has surprised many Western observers. But it was almost the precise course of action the Russians undertook in the wargame. The only difference was that in the wargame these strikes were focused on eliminating Ukraine’s air force and air defense network, whereas the actual distribution of Russian strikes has been more varied. Also, in the game, the air and missile strikes took place before the ground offensive began, whereas in real life the Russians appear to have forgone a strike phase of operations in favor of launching their strike campaign simultaneously with the ground offensive. But as the conflict continues and Russian frustrations grow over their failure to rapidly collapse Ukrainian resistance, one can expect the Russians to revert to type and start employing their overwhelming superiority in artillery and airpower much more indiscriminately. In fact, news reports indicate that is already happening.

Figure 2

The map above shows the prewar garrison positions of Ukraine’s land forces. As the Ukrainian government made a political calculation not to mobilize or move units into defensive positions, this map likely represents where most Ukrainian military formations started the war. The crucial early decision for Ukraine was what to do with the 17 to 20 battalions arrayed on the line of control in the Donbas area. Realizing that these forces were at high risk of envelopment and could not withstand an all-out assault by Russia’s 8th Combined Arms Army, the decision was made to withdraw to the Dnieper River, with the exception of the Ukrainian 92nd Mechanized Brigade plus parts of the 53rd and 54th Mechanized Brigades, which were sent to consolidate positions in and around Kharkiv.

The intent of these orders was to lure Russia’s 8th Combined Arms Army into expending vast amounts of resources hitting empty positions, as the Ukrainians would have already fallen back to the Dnieper River. At the same time, the Ukrainian team hoped to make Kharkiv a second Stalingrad, which would suck ever-increasing numbers of Russian forces into a bloody attritional fight. In the game, moving away from the line of control proved difficult, as retreats under pressure always are. At least six Ukrainian battalions were overrun, and the remainder endured serious losses to aerial interdiction en route to the Dnieper. In the actual conflict, there are recent reports of Ukrainian units moving off these lines suffering large losses, as the wargame predicted. Still, the retreat was necessary in the wargame to ensure those forces were not encircled from the north and by forces moving out of Crimea. These same concerns appear to be driving the Ukrainians in the real fight.

The wargame also generated substantial discussion of what to do with the five brigades Ukraine has in the western part of the country. Some of that force was moved north to the Belarussian border in case of a secondary Russian assault out of western Belarus, but most of it was ordered east to help defend Kyiv and to bolster the Dnieper defense. At present, there is very little public discussion of how the Ukrainians are actually employing these forces.

In the wargame, the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army attacked on an axis aimed at the Dnieper River bend, intent on bypassing Kharkiv to the north while the 20th Combined Arms Army approached the outskirts of Kharkiv. This appears to be exactly what the Russian forces have been attempting in the first 96-hours of the war. Once again, the wargame matched actual Russian moves with uncanny accuracy.

The Ukrainian commander, in the wargame, decided to send three brigades from the city to counterattack into the flank of Russian armored forces. This led to a major engagement about 40 kilometers northwest of Kharkiv against the Russian 27th Guards Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade. In the ensuing battle, both the 27th SMRB and the Ukrainian 92nd Mechanized Brigade were destroyed. A post game analysis decided that it would have been better to keep the Ukrainian force in the city per the original plan and turn Kharkiv into a fortress city. If the Russians bypassed the city, the Ukrainians could have looked for counterattack opportunities after Russia’s leading combat formations had gone past. If they attacked the city in force with the 20th Combined Arms Army, the Ukrainians could have turned it into another Stalingrad. In real life, the Ukrainians appear to have opted to do as our after-action analysis tells us was the best course of action, and Kharkiv continues to hold out against increasingly ferocious Russian assaults.

Figure 3: Wargame Situation — End of Game Day 3 — Eastern Front

In the wargame, the Ukraine team screened the bottleneck to the north of the Crimean Peninsula but could not contain a powerful Russian attack that pushed through and advanced on Kherson. On the third day of the wargame, the Russians launched a combined ground, air, and amphibious assault on the Ukrainian defenses around Kherson — accelerated in execution due to the short time available to play the game. There are just two bridges on the southern sector of the Dnieper River which are key terrain. Both were targets of the Russian ground and air assault, as a separate combined air and amphibious assault landed on the west side of the Dnieper to envelop Ukrainian defensive positions along the river line. At the time the game ended, this major ground fight all along the river in the vicinity of Kherson and along the shores of the Black Sea just to the south and west of Kherson was still developing.

In the game the Russian advance out of the Crimea was their most rapid and successful operation. When the game ended, the Russians were poised to strike in one or more of three directions — west to Odessa, east to envelop the Ukrainians retreat out of the defensive lines along the separatist regions, or north to dislocate the Ukraine’s defense of the Dnieper line. On the fifth day of the war, we find a similar situation, with the Russian forces having flowed out of the Crimea into close to the same positions they occupied in the wargame, and with the same choices before them as we found in the wargame.

Figure 4: Wargame Situation — End of Game Day 3 — Southern Front

In the north, a Ukrainian brigade conducted a spoiling attack against Russian forces across the border in Belarus. This was a controversial move that achieved limited tactical results. These Ukrainian forces were soon cut off as the Russian 41st Combined Arms Army attacked south into Ukraine on both sides of the Dnieper River at the same time. When the game ended, Ukraine’s forces in the north were under heavy pressure (see map below) but aside from one brigade were largely unengaged and remained astride the approaches to Kyiv. The defenses north of Kyiv had not broken and if supported they may have held for a considerable period.

Figure 5: Wargame Situation — End of Game Day 3 — Northern Front

As the wargame ended, the Ukrainians were under pressure in the north, with Russian forces closing in on the eastern approaches to Kyiv and the Dnieper River, while also beginning to cross the border from Belarus into the northwest through the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone. In the east, the Russians were starting to encircle Kharkiv and the 8th Combined Arms Army was emerging from the Donetsk area to attack towards Melitopol and the Dnieper River. Again, this is almost precisely what we are seeing on the ground in Ukraine on the war’s fifth day.

Figure 6

In the actual conflict, Russia’s attempt at a rapid move to Kyiv aiming to decapitate the government appears to have backfired. While many observers were surprised by the Russian approach, it was the course of action chosen by the Russian player in the game. Moreover, when the Ukrainians failed to roll over and surrender the Russians are increasingly opting for their preferred firepower-heavy method of warfare. Ukraine’s ability to score some early wins and demonstrate incredible acts of courage from President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on down have generated an inspired defense, similar to Ukraine’s course in the wargame. While the wargame did not simulate the strategic level of warfare, the international support garnered by Ukraine’s heroic resistance may, in the end, prove fatal to Russia achieving its aims.

One wonders if the Russian failure to employ their massive fires capacity to deliberately shape the battlefield over an extended period before the ground advance began will be marked by historians as a blunder. In the wargame, this constraint on fires was deliberate, based upon a strategy to compel a rapid Ukrainian surrender. An excellent case can be made that the Russians made similar calculations at the start of the current war. Putin, and those advisers who still have his ear, may have been convinced many Ukrainians would welcome them as liberators and the march to Kyiv would be an easy one. Thus, they have held back much of their overwhelming fires complex to avoid destroying significant amounts of infrastructure and killing too many of their Ukrainian “brothers.” This was the reasoning employed in the game, and most current reporting shows it was the thinking dominating the Kremlin.

It must now be dawning upon senior commanders and possibly even Putin that they have grossly miscalculated, and are now in violation of Clausewitz’s most important dictum: “The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgement that the statesman and a commander have to make is to establish … the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.” What Ukraine must figure out now is Russia’s likely next moves, as Putin concludes that his invasion is not going to be a modern day Anschluss.

Russia must also now be considering next steps. The Ukrainian military and people are putting up much stouter resistance than Putin or any of his senior-most commanders anticipated. This situation is worsened by something becoming more apparent by the day; the Russian military’s capacity to conduct a vast joint and combined arms assault may not be quite as good as advertised. Ukrainian resistance is not yet at the point where one can make comparisons to Finland’s courageous stand against Stalin’s Red Army in the 1940 Winter War, but the possibility of Ukraine holding out for weeks or months must now be part of everyone’s calculations, including the Russians.

That Zelenskyy remains capable of talking to his commanders and the outside world is encouraging and clearly has provided a strategic level boost in the information war and in Ukrainian morale. By still being able to communicate to the outside world, Zelenskyy has single-handedly changed the strategic balance rallied Western support beyond what anyone could have foreseen, to include anti-tank weapon support from both Germany and Sweden.

During the wargame, there was a lot of discussion about the employment of information weapons, including cyber. It is therefore noteworthy that aside from Anonymous’ declaring cyber war on Russia, there is very little public reporting of actual cyberattacks by either side. Prior to the conflict one of the West’s great concerns was Russia’s much-vaunted cyber capabilities. So, either the Russians are holding a number of zero-day exploits in reserve, or it is time to closely examine how dangerous cyber operations truly are. Moreover, for all the heated talk about hybrid and grey zone warfare, this is a fight of blood and iron, in which Otto von Bismarck would have felt at home, something wargames are spectacularly good at simulating.

Still, even if one accepts that the Russians are trying to limit Ukrainian casualties and infrastructure damage, it is difficult to ignore the fact the Russians have been slow off the mark. Once the Russian offensive began to roll there was a wide expectation of a rapid armored descent on Ukraine’s key cities — Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Odessa. At present, none of these cities have fallen, and the Russian ground offensive appears to be slowing, as it faces stiffening resistance and logistic challenges. It may turn out the Russian advance was slowed due to political directives, but, at the moment, many observers can fairly attribute much of what is being reported from the battlefield to general Russian incompetence.

Only in the south have we seen the Russians making the kind of rapid advances that were expected to take place throughout Ukraine. The Russians attacking out of the Crimea are already advancing on Mykolaiv, a distance of approximately 150 miles from their line of departure in Crimea. Other Russians forces appear to have captured the key town of Melitopol, and are advancing on the port of Berdyansk and Mariupol. On the other side of the ledger, Ukrainian forces have counterattacked and retaken Kherson. Also, as of yet, the Russians have not forced the Dnieper in the south, and the forces in the east, pushing forward north of Kharkiv, are still some distances from the Dnieper crossings. Only to the north of Kyiv have the Russians made dangerous gains. But as this is being written, even here the Russian initial advances toward Kyiv appear to have been stymied some miles north of the city.

The Value of Wargaming

Our Ukraine wargame is part of a series of operational level wargames designed by Marine Corps University to support professional military education and help students develop an understanding of the many operational challenges associated with all domain warfare and Great Power conflict. The hope is that students will develop insights from these wargames that help them better understand joint warfighting. In the case of this particular wargame, its near concurrent use with the actual start of the war presents an opportunity to make constructive comparisons and contrasts. Actual events also highlight the importance of the human domain and how difficult it is to effectively model or assess prior to conflict. While the game does make allowance for aspects of the human domain, it is hard to factor in things like the courageous leadership being demonstrated by Zelenskyy and its impact on the will of the fighting forces and the Ukrainian people.

One must be very careful when using a wargame for predictive purposes. But, on the other hand, no one involved in this wargame has been much surprised by anything unfolding on the ground. Almost all of it took place within the game or was discussed at length among the players. This is in contrast with nearly every expert and pundit on the airwaves, who are expressing astonishment at how this conflict is unfolding. If this wargame had been played at the Pentagon or the White House in the weeks leading up to the war, no strategist or policymaker would be shocked by any event so far seen in the war.

The heroic resistance of the Ukrainians inspires awe and admiration. Still, their forces are greatly outnumbered, particularly in the air. Moreover, Russia’s capacity to concentrate vast ground fires — artillery, rockets, and missiles — still allows the Russian army to overwhelm the Ukrainians at any chosen point. If history provides any glimpse into the future, the Russian army will eventually uncoil, absorb the war’s early lessons, and renew its advance with grim determination. Russia was preparing to do precisely that when the wargame ended. Still, one hopes that Western pressure, and the infliction of unacceptable losses upon Putin’s legions will create an opening for a negotiated peace.

James Lacey, Ph.D., holds the Horner Chair of War Studies at Marine Corps University.

Tim Barrick is a retired Marine Corps colonel and the director of wargaming at Marine Corps University.

Nathan Barrick, Ph.D., a strategist at US Special Operations Command, is currently a student at the Marine Corps War College and a former U.S. Army Russian foreign area officer.

The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do not express the views or positions of Marine Corps University, the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by James Lacey · March 2, 2022

20. How Might the War in Ukraine End? Five Factors Will Shape the Outcome

What evidence is there that the Ukrainian military will crack? It may be defeated by overwhelming firepower and mass but will it crack? I think that is a poor description of what might happen.

How Might the War in Ukraine End? Five Factors Will Shape the Outcome

Russian forces have performed poorly thus far, but Ukraine’s military is expected to eventually crack. What then?

WSJ · by Stephen Fidler

Although predictions are next to impossible, military strategists are focusing on several factors to provide clues, including the performance of the armies on the ground and the impact of sanctions.

One thing becoming clear is that the performance of Russia’s military thus far is delivering Mr. Putin a reality check and potentially scrambling the range of outcomes. “Every day the Ukrainians don’t lose, they win politically,” said Michael Clarke, former director of the Royal United Services Institute, a London think tank. “And the political cost for him is going up on a daily basis.”

Lawrence Freedman, a professor emeritus of war studies at King’s College, London, doesn’t think the Russians will succeed in installing a puppet government in Ukraine. “They can’t occupy the whole country,” he said. “A puppet government in Kyiv not backed by Russian arms wouldn’t have any legitimacy and wouldn’t survive.”

That will likely make it difficult for Mr. Putin to convincingly declare victory. James Sherr, senior fellow of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, predicted that Mr. Putin won’t take the rational step of seeking an off ramp, but will “double down.”

Here are five variables military analysts say could determine the course of the war:

A Ukrainian serviceman on an armored vehicle in the Kyiv region.

Photo: Manu Brabo for The Wall Street Journal

Invading forces

Western military analysts have expressed shock at how badly Russia’s forces performed during the early days of the invasion. They had expected that a military that had been modernized over more than a decade would quell the first phase of Ukrainian resistance fairly easily.

But Russia hasn’t undertaken a military operation combining different branches of the military since the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, and that wasn’t as complex.

“We’ve all been astonished that this new Russian army looks like the old Red Army—not very well trained, not very well commanded, with really quite poor logistics—which implies either a big failure of planning or…a big underestimation of the enemy,” said Mr. Clarke, the former director of the Royal United Services Institute.

Russia’s air force, navy and nuclear force have been partly or completely modernized, he said, but the army looks as though it hasn’t overcome past weaknesses.

“The Russians will learn,” said Richard Shirreff, a British former deputy military commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “They’ll learn the hard way, by getting killed, that they’ll have to coordinate their…all-arms offense in a much more professional way than they have done so far.” he said, referring to their ability to bring together different elements of the operation.

It is possible that Moscow deliberately restrained its campaign early in the war, expecting significantly less resistance than they have met. It could continue with those tactics, expecting to eventually exhaust the opposition.

The more likely scenario, according to some military analysts, is for the Russians to use significantly more firepower to drive farther into Ukraine, laying siege to cities or using heavy weaponry against them.

“It’s going to cause Putin to lash out, to get really vicious, to use indiscriminate fire and mass artillery in urban areas and flatten Ukrainian cities, and the consequence will be a terrible cost in human casualties,” predicted Gen. Shirreff.

Russian military vehicles in Armyansk, Crimea, in late February.

Photo: stringer/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Defending forces

So far, the Ukrainian forces have made the most of their military assets in the face of a larger and more advanced adversary.

Russia’s slow progress is “first and foremost a testament to the courage and tenacity of the Ukrainian army and the volunteers who are fighting incredibly impressively and well,” said Gen. Shirreff. Morale is a huge factor in war, he said, and the Ukrainians believe they have the moral force.

President Volodymyr Zelensky’s stated determination to remain in office has helped sustain the Ukrainian campaign. His appearances on social media—along with video footage of resistance by ordinary Ukrainians—have helped Kyiv garner sympathy at home and in the West. Russia, however, has already begun attacking cellphone masts and television towers to stop the spread of such information.

The longer Ukraine’s formal military can hold out, the more it increases Mr. Putin’s troubles, military analysts said.

Most analysts think the Ukrainian military will sooner or later crack. It is fighting with all it has all the time, with no respite. Russia can keep reinforcing its front lines with fresh troops.

The question is: What then? The common assumption is that Moscow will seek to install an obedient government in Kyiv, leaving it to run the west of the country, while annexing a large part of the country east of the Dnipro River.

One possibility is that Ukraine’s formal military will melt away and an insurrection will start. Analysts said they expected that Western nations would support such an insurgency, as the U.S. supported the resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s.

If a strong insurgency materializes, Russia might need to devote many more troops to battle it. Expert estimates for how many troops would be needed to control and occupy a rebellious Ukraine number upward of 500,000. “Putin doesn’t have that, and he will run out people, and it will turn into a Soviet-Afghanistan redux,” said Gen. Shirreff.

Ukrainian servicemen gather near a battle against Russian forces along the road connecting Kyiv to western Ukraine.

Photo: Christopher Occhicone for the Wall Street Journal

Western response

Western governments have ruled out direct military involvement in Ukraine, including the possibility of a no-fly zone that would bring them into direct conflict with the Russian air force. They have opted instead for arms shipments to help the Ukrainians defend themselves and have bolstered troop numbers in the easternmost countries of NATO.

There is a possibility, analysts said, that Russia will seek to close the Ukrainian-Polish border to stop Western weapons flowing in—a step that would increase the risk of the conflict escalating to involve NATO countries, of which Poland is one.

The biggest weapon deployed by Western nations has been an array of economic sanctions aimed at Russia’s economy and elements of its leadership. The sanctions have targeted Russia’s central bank, commercial banks and political and business leaders. Russians have waited in long lines outside banks to withdraw currency, and inflation is likely to soar. Many Russians will feel economic hardship.

Those sanctions can be ratcheted up or down depending on Russian actions. They aren’t without cost for the West. They are likely to intensify an existing inflation problem and, if Russia retaliates by cutting off energy supplies, could lead to electricity rationing in Europe.

Mr. Sherr of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute doesn’t expect those measures to change Mr. Putin’s mind. “Putin and the people around him, at least the political and security people around him, have never bowed to the logic of sanctions,” he said.

For the moment, there appears to be wide popular support in the West for Ukraine, whose people are seen as the victims of an unjustified and unprovoked war. That could strengthen the hands of governments in sustaining the measures. Over time, though, such unity could erode in the face of economic difficulties.

Any ambiguous peace imposed on Ukraine by Moscow might leave the West debating how to calibrate any lifting of sanctions. Some could be lifted quickly, but others, such as those against the Russian leadership, might be trickier in the event of potential war-crimes trials.

Analysts said one country that could be more influential on Russia is China, whose leaders are likely concerned about the prospect of military escalation.

Russian reaction

This is a big unknown. Not only is it hard for Westerners to read Russian opinion, it is hard to know what effect it has on decision making in Moscow, particularly on a president who is viewed as becoming more isolated and out of touch.

A majority of Russians get their information from censored television broadcasts, so many will believe that the economic difficulties they are suffering aren’t the fault of their government but of the West.

Russian authorities have cracked down on demonstrations against the war. There already are some signs of disquiet among the Russian elites whose luxury lifestyles they have enjoyed in the West are now under threat. Whether Mr. Putin cares is another matter.

Police officers in Moscow detain a man amid an antiwar protest.

Photo: EVGENIA NOVOZHENINA/REUTERS

“I have no doubt that this is unsettling, even frightening, for some significant people in Russia itself,” said Mr. Sherr.

The economic difficulties that already have arisen undermine a pillar of Mr. Putin’s presidency—that he brought stability to a country that was chaotic in the 1990s under his predecessor Boris Yeltsin.

Added to that, any long campaign against an insurgency in Ukraine would cost the lives of many Russian soldiers, a factor that in the past has stirred even conservative elements of the population that would normally support Mr. Putin.

“Putin doesn’t have indefinite time to sort this out,” says Mr. Freedman of King’s College. “The economic hardship is just now starting to be felt. He can’t let this drag on for weeks and months, which is how long sieges, let alone insurgencies, can go on. So time’s a real problem for him.”

Peace talks

Russia and Ukraine have begun peace talks. Many strategists are pessimistic they will lead to a rapid resolution.

Any peace agreement with Mr. Zelensky might involve a loss of face for Mr. Putin because he has branded the Ukrainian administration, falsely, as a group of neo-Nazis. But an agreement with any government the Russians install would have no legitimacy inside or outside Ukraine.

The variables in the talks are over two Russian objectives: Ukrainian neutrality and Ukrainian territory.

Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and likely would seek Ukrainian acceptance of that. It also might seek to absorb further territory east of the Dnipro River.

A Ukrainian serviceman in the aftermath of a shelling in downtown Kharkiv.

Photo: sergey kozlov/Shutterstock

It is possible that Russia will try to “break Ukraine into parts and leave Western Ukraine alone,” said Angela Stent, a specialist in Russia affairs at Georgetown University. But because that would leave a West-leaning government in Kyiv that Mr. Putin has previously depicted as illegitimate, she said, “I find it hard to imagine that.”

More likely, analysts said, is for Russia, at a minimum, to seek a constitution of Ukraine that grants significant independence to the east of the country, and an effective veto over Ukrainian government action.

The Ukrainians could agree to further elections—but the risk for Russia is that, even in the east, it wouldn’t like the outcome.

Mr. Clarke said one model of Ukrainian neutrality that might appeal to Russia is that of Austria in 1955. The Soviets pulled out of Austria in return for a constitutional guarantee of neutrality that exists today.

Rather than persuade Ukrainians that neutrality is an attractive option, the invasion is likely to harden opinion in the opposite direction.

“I don’t think Ukraine after all this would accept itself being helpless,” said Mr. Freedman. “They can make some assurances about foreign forces and missiles [but], if I was a Ukrainian, I don’t think this would put me off wanting to join NATO.”

Write to Stephen Fidler at stephen.fidler@wsj.com

WSJ · by Stephen Fidler

21. Ukraine and a Guide to Avoiding World War III

In the end I fear mass (of forces and firepower) will be the decisive principle of war that influences the outcome.

Excerpts:

While the threat of a nuclear exchange is low, the United States and Europe must grapple with the secondary challenges of military support for Ukraine. Russian warnings have suggested that it intends to limit actions to Ukraine, while the Biden administration has insisted it will not send troops into the conflict. The line, however, is becoming increasingly blurred with the increasing pledges to support the Ukrainian armed forces. Foreign supplied man-portable weapons are already tearing into Russian supply lines and killing Russians in numbers larger than what the Kremlin may have accepted before the invasion, and the networks being set up to supply these weapons could easily be used to support a Ukrainian insurgency indefinitely. How will Moscow react once these arms flows from Poland turn from trickles to torrents, or kill Russian soldiers tasked with patrolling conquered urban areas?

...

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has gone poorly thus far, but the correlation of forces still slants heavily in Moscow’s favor. And Putin will likely increase the brutality of his campaign, substituting mass for operational cleverness in his effort to subdue Ukraine. The West needs to be prepared for this fact, and the potential that the war will move westward. If Putin chooses this course of action, bringing the two sides into far closer contact, it will be important to manage force-on-force friction to keep the conflict limited and to ensure that it does not spill over into Europe. The United States and NATO can manage escalatory risks, but it is important to think clearly about what is at stake, proactively increase transparency with Moscow about certain NATO actions in Poland, and explore a clear deconfliction mechanism to manage flights in certain air corridors. The West has stood remarkably united in the face of Russian aggression, but all parties involved should be thinking about how to manage spillover from what may turn out to be a longer and bloodier war than Moscow planned for.

Ukraine and a Guide to Avoiding World War III - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Aaron Stein · March 3, 2022

Editor’s note: Don’t miss our comprehensive guide to Russia’s war against Ukraine.

After a few days, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has stumbled amid reports of low troop morale and poor logistics. The bungled Russian invasion has given space for different European countries to increase lethal assistance to the Ukrainian government, but this raises the risk of escalation beyond Ukraine. Such overt assistance has prompted Moscow to warn that it would strike any arms convoys inside Ukrainian territory, presumably with airstrikes near the Ukrainian-Polish border. There is a non-trivial risk of conventional escalation that could turn a contained, regional conflict into a much larger regional war. The United States and Europe ought to take action to reduce these risks even as they supply Ukraine with lethal and non-lethal supplies. The West cannot afford to be sanguine about the increased risk of direct conflict with Russia.

The United States and its NATO allies are also flying in close, daily contact with the Russian and Belarusian air forces while NATO troops are deployed in Poland and Romania. Additionally, the primary route for Western weapons to reach Ukraine is via Poland. Western policymakers would be wise to consider that Russian aerospace forces may bomb convoys entering Ukraine from Poland, raising the possibility that they or their munitions could strike targets just outside the border, or even cross into Polish airspace. And as the war moves west, Russian fighters could pursue Ukrainian aircraft fleeing the conflict and, perhaps, violate Polish air space. Hot pursuit of aircraft over international borders invites retaliation, potentially bringing NATO and Russian forces into combat. As such, policymakers ought to be clear and deliberate about how to manage potential escalation spirals.

While both sides have professional militaries that are governed by rules managing these interactions, NATO air forces will almost certainly be operating in ever-closer proximity to Russian aircraft, at the very least. The airspace surrounding Romania and Poland is already congested, with different NATO forces patrolling over the Black and Baltic Seas, as well as in the tri-border area between Belarus, Ukraine, and Poland. To complicate matters further, Ukrainian air assets have fled to Poland and Romania. This means that Soviet-designed aircraft are flying at NATO members’ borders, which requires NATO air forces to identify them and escort them to an appropriate air base. As of now, Russian fighters are not pursuing these aircrafts, perhaps because they have not gained air superiority over Ukraine and are not patrolling in the far west of the country.

If the conflict was to escalate or were NATO to decide to reassess its aims and rules of engagement — perhaps in response to Russian forces pushing westward after taking or encircling Kyiv, driving a tide of fleeing refugees before them — things could get much more dangerous. The risk of spillover from the conflict is an urgent topic for discussion precisely because it could lead to a war involving up to four nuclear-armed powers: Russia, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. President Vladimir Putin has already put his nuclear forces on “a special mode of combat duty” in an attempt to coerce the Western powers. This order has puzzled observers of Russian nuclear forces, but the signaling appears to be designed to warn NATO to stay out of the conflict, something Biden has pledged to do, rather than signal Moscow’s willingness to use nuclear force first.

While the threat of a nuclear exchange is low, the United States and Europe must grapple with the secondary challenges of military support for Ukraine. Russian warnings have suggested that it intends to limit actions to Ukraine, while the Biden administration has insisted it will not send troops into the conflict. The line, however, is becoming increasingly blurred with the increasing pledges to support the Ukrainian armed forces. Foreign supplied man-portable weapons are already tearing into Russian supply lines and killing Russians in numbers larger than what the Kremlin may have accepted before the invasion, and the networks being set up to supply these weapons could easily be used to support a Ukrainian insurgency indefinitely. How will Moscow react once these arms flows from Poland turn from trickles to torrents, or kill Russian soldiers tasked with patrolling conquered urban areas?

NATO aerial patrols over Poland are well within the engagement zone of Belarusian surface-to-air missiles. In the event of increased tensions, Belarus, under instructions from the Kremlin, could use its surface-to-air missiles to harass NATO fighters, or consider trying to interfere by jamming aircraft. The other, and perhaps most likely, pressure point will be on the supply convoys from Poland into Ukraine. In Syria, Russia used tactical bombers to strike weapons and food supplies from Turkey, as part of its siege campaign of Aleppo. This tactic led to Russian bombing directly on the border. In the air, Russian fighters would also use aggressive tactics to warn away coalition fighters during times of tension (often with little effect), as well as Turkish Air Force fighters patrolling near the border.

If the war drags on, and Western supplies do start to make it into the country in larger numbers, NATO should expect Ukrainian-driven convoys with Western aid to be bombed. Russia has pledged to do this, and it would be wise to take Putin seriously. The Russian strategy now, it seems, is to mass forces to besiege Ukrainian cities. As part of this strategy, one should assume Moscow will attempt to cut weapons supplies to Ukraine, even if those supplies come from Poland.

The Russian military has performed poorly in Ukraine, but there is little reason to do doubt that Moscow can use mass to overcome challenges and take terrain from the Ukrainian military. If this were to happen, Russian military forces could soon link different fronts in the south and east, besiege Kyiv, and be in a position to expand the war in the western part of the country. This reality, while unsettling, requires that the United States and NATO think through the risks of increased Russian activity on the Ukrainian-Polish border. To manage this risk, the United States and NATO should announce that no member-state’s territory will be used to launch attacks against the Russian armed forces. The two sides should also continue to push for increased transparency about air operations on the border with Belarus, decreasing the risk of miscalculation on the border. Finally, the United States and Europe should decide how to respond if convoys are bombed. The easiest answer is to do nothing. However, the pressure to do “something” to protect these convoys is likely to grow, leading to pressures on leaders to extend some sort of protection to aid and weapons convoys that enter Ukraine, even when any such action could be escalatory.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has gone poorly thus far, but the correlation of forces still slants heavily in Moscow’s favor. And Putin will likely increase the brutality of his campaign, substituting mass for operational cleverness in his effort to subdue Ukraine. The West needs to be prepared for this fact, and the potential that the war will move westward. If Putin chooses this course of action, bringing the two sides into far closer contact, it will be important to manage force-on-force friction to keep the conflict limited and to ensure that it does not spill over into Europe. The United States and NATO can manage escalatory risks, but it is important to think clearly about what is at stake, proactively increase transparency with Moscow about certain NATO actions in Poland, and explore a clear deconfliction mechanism to manage flights in certain air corridors. The West has stood remarkably united in the face of Russian aggression, but all parties involved should be thinking about how to manage spillover from what may turn out to be a longer and bloodier war than Moscow planned for.

Read our ongoing coverage of the Russian invasion in Ukraine

Aaron Stein is the director of research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and is the author of the forthcoming book The US War Against ISIS: How America and its Allies Defeated the Caliphate.

Image: U.S. Air Force

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Aaron Stein · March 3, 2022

22. How to protect the world from Putin: Put him before a war crimes tribunal

Looks like the ICC is paying attention to Joe Bosco.

How to protect the world from Putin: Put him before a war crimes tribunal

The Hill · by Joseph Bosco, opinion contributor · March 3, 2022

During the Korean War, Gen. Douglas MacArthur wanted to achieve the same unconditional surrender and permanent regime change in North Korea that America and its allies had just won over Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany. He was even willing to take U.S. forces into China to threaten the communist government there. But President Truman decided enough was enough and that completing the minimum task of defending South Korea’s territorial integrity already had cost enough American blood and treasure. The two regimes that the United Nations had condemned as criminal aggressors under the Nuremberg standards remained in power, and we are where we are with North Korea and China today.

When the George H.W. Bush administration repelled Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 to defend the sanctity of internationally recognized borders, many called for U.S. forces to continue pushing north to Baghdad to topple the murderous dictator once and for all. Bush, who had been hesitant about getting America involved in the first place, refused either to go beyond the United Nations authorization to use force or at least to try to persuade the U.N. Security Council to broaden its mandate against the nation it had proclaimed the aggressor under the international law of war.

There followed a dozen more years of Hussein’s evil rule; his intermittent development of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs; and the West’s focus on the war on terrorism after the 9/11 attacks on the United States. The George W. Bush administration determined that the Iraqi people, the region, and the world no longer could tolerate the danger posed by that vicious, unpredictable regime and launched the second Iraq war.

Eventually, burned by the Iraq experience and the protracted war in Afghanistan, neither Bush nor America’s allies — even those more directly threatened by regional proximity — had any appetite to challenge Russian President Vladimir Putin’s opportunistic aggression against Georgia in 2008.

NATO effectively had painted a target on the backs of Georgia and Ukraine by explicitly promising them membership in 1997 — infuriating Putin, but then yielding to his demands for an indefinite delay in fulfilling that promise. Simultaneously, the West withheld the weapons that the NATO aspirants needed to defend themselves as Putin built his military power to attack them and his cash reserves to offset the West’s economic sanctions.

When President Obama, then-Vice President Joe Biden, and their national security team arrived on the scene in 2009, they were ideologically predisposed against the use of American force for any cause other than a direct threat to the homeland. After Obama promised “flexibility” toward Russia’s interests in 2012, Putin was ready to press his advantage in 2014 by invading eastern Ukraine and seizing and annexing Crimea.

Although the Donald Trump administration increased economic sanctions on Russia, they were insufficient to reverse Putin’s gains from his earlier aggression or to deter him from continued moves against Ukraine. Trump delivered lethal weapons to Ukraine that Obama had delayed, but again, it was too little too late to deter Putin’s expansionist aims. The Biden administration continued the same dilatory practices on Russia sanctions and Ukraine arms transfers, even after Putin’s invasion was clearly imminent.

The worst has now happened to Ukraine, and four U.S. administrations — and the West, generally — bear their share of responsibility for the human catastrophe that has befallen that democratic country at the hands of Putin and his accomplices. Additionally, Trump’s praise for Putin’s actions as “genius” and “wonderful” are appalling.

The Nuremberg Tribunal recognized aggressive war, or “war against peace,” as a crime under international law. It declared certain practices in the conduct of war — such as the deliberate bombing of schools and hospitals and the indiscriminate bombing of civilians — as “war crimes.” And it established the category of “crimes against humanity” — that is, inhuman actions committed against civilians. For his actions in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria, an international tribunal would have no difficulty finding Putin guilty of all categories of international crimes, just as the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia did against Slobodan Milošević, Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadžić.

The mere calling of such an international tribunal would convey a powerful moral and legal message of support to the people of Russia — who are demonstrating in surprising numbers their opposition to Putin’s vicious, entirely unprovoked war — that their honor should not be smeared by the actions of Putin and his cohorts. The Kremlin is blocking broadcasts from Radio Free Europe (REF) and Radio Liberty (RL), which are valiantly trying to inform the Russian public of the grotesque human costs of Putin’s war on the Ukrainian people and on Russian soldiers. Congress and the Biden administration should dramatically increase RFE/RL funding to help the truth get into Russia and help the Russian people decide if they want to keep the man responsible for the wanton killing of Ukrainian women and children and the unnecessary deaths of young Russian soldiers as their leader. It also could strengthen the hand of the oligarchs who have begun to chafe under the pain of the U.S.-led international sanctions caused by Putin’s criminal actions.

If Putin is not held to account and brought to justice, he will be free — as Adolph Hitler was — to continue his marauding of the European order and Western civilization. That would mean that “never again” indeed has happened again.

Joseph Bosco served as China country director for the secretary of Defense from 2005 to 2006 and as Asia-Pacific director of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from 2009 to 2010. He served in the Pentagon when Vladimir Putin invaded Georgia and was involved in Department of Defense discussions about the U.S. response. Follow him on Twitter @BoscoJosephA.

The Hill · by Joseph Bosco, opinion contributor · March 3, 2022

23. How the Finns Deter Russian Invasion

This is critically important advice. It also points out shortfalls in Ukrainian preparation of the information environment.

Just as one of the SOF truths is you cannot create competent special operations forces after emergencies occur, a resistance well prepared before a crisis will make a more effective contribution after the crisis arises.

There is only one force in the US military that is organized, trained, equipped, educated, and optimized to help friends, partners, allies, to develop resistance capabilities. We need to strategically implement the resistance operating concept in key locations to thwart authoritarian powers. A related effect to developing resistance capabilities is that it also develops resilience among the populations and hardens the population against a wide range of malign activities from authoritarian powers, short of invasion, who seek to subvert the democracies of friends, partners, and allies.

Conclusion:

The Ukrainian government tried to keep its people calm, and it convinced them that the invasion would not happen. (Indeed, it convinced itself.) The resulting lack of preparation, which goes far beyond the training of civilian reserves—why no food stockpiles? why no physical obstacles littered around Kharkov and Kyiv to slow down Russian armor and make the invaders easier to kill?—will be criticized bitterly, just as the esprit and personal bravery of Zelensky and other Ukrainians will be admired. Free societies do not militarize their population casually. Conscription is an encroachment on freedom. But the same could be said about an invasion by Vladimir Putin. And if I were in a country between Berlin and St. Petersburg right now, I would be considering which encroachment to fear more.

How the Finns Deter Russian Invasion

If you want ordinary people to make your society occupation-proof, you have to teach them to kill well before they need to do so.

By Graeme Wood

The Atlantic · by Graeme Wood · March 2, 2022

In the past few days, the Ukrainian government has handed out tens of thousands of rifles to ordinary, untrained citizens, and it has encouraged anyone capable of striking a Zippo flint to learn how to prepare and throw Molotov cocktails. In perhaps related news, Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko has forbidden the sale of booze, historically a poor accompaniment for automatic weapons and improvised firebombs. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced the release from prison of certain criminals, also to take up arms against Russian invaders. Ukraine’s territorial-defense force, a citizen army, has trained sporadically for months but has only now opened its ranks, frantically, to everyone physically capable of serving. This truly universal force is a few days old, the youngest armed group on the planet, and in a few more days we may see whether its members mostly kill Russians or are mostly killed by them.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been a strategic failure because it assumed and required a quick and decisive victory, and at best it will get victory slow and Pyrrhic. But the Ukrainians have failed badly as well, by waiting too long to arm and train their citizens. If you want ordinary people to make your society occupation-proof, you have to teach them to kill well before they need to do so.

The strategist Edward N. Luttwak has proposed that countries aligned with NATO shift in this direction preemptively, as a matter of policy. Instead of buying heavy, technologically advanced equipment, Luttwak told me, they should adopt the Finnish model. In Finland, adolescent males report for a short and intense period of military training, followed by shorter refreshers for most of their adult life. The training is not, as in the Israeli model, a few years of dedicated service. Nor does it emphasize military discipline, such as keeping one’s bunk tidy and shoes polished, or the Prussian-style transformation of citizen-recruit into fighting machine. Instead, it prepares civilians to be ready to join their unit and harass and kill invaders. A country of Finland’s size can rapidly field nearly 1 million trained soldiers. “Ukraine could have done this,” Luttwak said, “and they should have.”

The Finno-Soviet Winter War of 1939 ended with Soviet withdrawal, and Luttwak said it should now be a deterrent model for other countries, including Poland and the Baltic nations. “Do not try to stop the invasion,” Luttwak said. “Wait for them to enter your country. Once the tank stops rolling forward, let the soldiers come out to cook or to pee, and then kill them.” Finland suffered during the invasion and conceded territory in the peace treaty that ended the war three months later. But the Soviets lost about seven times as many men, and when they withdrew, they knew that occupying Finland again would mean frostbite, fear, and the chance of getting shot dead in the snow with your pants down.

A Finnish defense official I spoke with stressed that the Finnish model incorporates a technologically advanced professional military and would not work without it. But a territorial-defense reserve can deter occupation in the first place—particularly if it has training and enjoys the logistical support of other countries. The Ukrainians have only the latter, and it may be too late for the former. Kyiv was distributing about 10,000 rifles a day. “Ten thousand [rifles] is not a serious number,” Luttwak said. “We have to talk about a million for Kyiv alone. There are NATO warehouses full of these, and we could easily just send them to the border and give them to whoever wants them.” Western Ukraine, where those rifles would presumably arrive, is anti-Russian and nearly half the area of Germany.

Moreover, since the Winter War, technological innovations have tilted the balance even further in favor of a moderately trained civilian reserve. The Finnish model is much more deadly when combined with modern point-and-shoot anti-tank weaponry, such as the Javelin system already on the ground in Ukraine. The Javelin is expensive—each missile costs about as much as a small American suburban house—but since money and weapons are just about the only things Ukraine’s allies are ready to provide, that might not be such a big issue. Javelins can destroy a tank and its occupants from far away; the operator does not need to hide in a hole and wait for a tank’s hatches to open. Instead, he locks on to its infrared signature, then fires a rocket from his shoulder. It flies 150 yards up and nearly two miles horizontally, then arcs down to hit the tank from above, where armor is thinnest. Javelins are simple to use. Two weeks of training is standard in nonemergency conditions, and the Ukrainians are motivated learners.

But they might not have that long. Instead of convening defense units weeks or months ago, Ukraine is hastily teaching clerks and accountants and babushkas to throw old beer bottles full of gas—a useful skill, but coming awfully late. Scenes of civilians throwing such devices at a piece of towed Russian armor (and briefly setting themselves ablaze in the process) are good for Ukrainian morale but worrisome overall. Guerrilla tactics are not instinctive to most people. Is it better to toss a Molotov cocktail sideways out of your sedan window as you drive past your target, or better to drop it from a second-story window as the target passes? What do you do when the target shoots back? The advice “Here’s a gun and an incendiary device; go forth and do what comes naturally” will turn a few of its recipients into Ho Chi Minh and many others into corpses. The risks are not only to these fresh-baked Ukrainian guerrillas themselves. Right now in Kyiv, suspicion of Russian spies and saboteurs is understandably high, and checkpoints will be operated by Ukrainians who just learned how to find the safety on their rifle. Mistakes will be made, and friends shot.

Read: The long weekend that changed history

Where these efforts undoubtedly count is in the propaganda war, which Ukraine is winning overwhelmingly. Russians will see images of people ardent with desire to kill them, and these people will include Ukrainians whom in other circumstances the Russians might want to help cross the street, play soccer with, or date. This is demoralizing. For some men, the thought of being shot by a girl is particularly sickening. (In the Second Chechen War, one potent image was of the semi-mythical mercenaries known as “White Stockings”—blond Estonian female ex-biathletes recruited by Chechens to snipe at Russians, and aim at the groin.)

The Ukrainian government tried to keep its people calm, and it convinced them that the invasion would not happen. (Indeed, it convinced itself.) The resulting lack of preparation, which goes far beyond the training of civilian reserves—why no food stockpiles? why no physical obstacles littered around Kharkov and Kyiv to slow down Russian armor and make the invaders easier to kill?—will be criticized bitterly, just as the esprit and personal bravery of Zelensky and other Ukrainians will be admired. Free societies do not militarize their population casually. Conscription is an encroachment on freedom. But the same could be said about an invasion by Vladimir Putin. And if I were in a country between Berlin and St. Petersburg right now, I would be considering which encroachment to fear more.

The Atlantic · by Graeme Wood · March 2, 2022

24. Reimagining Homeland Defense

Hmmm.... you would think ASD SO/LIC would have expertise in asymmetric warfare and the gray zone. If not then we should question its efficacy.

Excerpt:

Establish an office of asymmetric defense of the homeland as an element of the assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense and global security. The office’s first task should be to develop a standalone DoD strategy for homeland defense in the gray zone.

Reimagining Homeland Defense - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu · by John Borek · March 1, 2022

This article is part of the contribution made by the US Army War College to the series “Compete and Win: Envisioning a Competitive Strategy for the Twenty-First Century.” The series endeavors to present expert commentary on diverse issues surrounding US competitive strategy and irregular warfare with peer and near-peer competitors in the physical, cyber, and information spaces. The series is part of the Competition in Cyberspace Project (C2P), a joint initiative by the Army Cyber Institute and the Modern War Institute. Read all articles in the series here.

As American citizens watched the inexorable buildup of Russian forces on the Ukrainian borders over months, culminating in an attack against that nation from land, sea, and air, they sleep at night believing their nation is safe from a similar fate. Despite having over seven thousand miles of land border and twelve thousand miles of coastline the American homeland is still considered a sanctuary from external aggression. Americans are accustomed to the safety and deterrent effect provided by its geography and can’t imagine the alternative that other nations face daily.

The concept of homeland defense and what it specifically entails has evolved over time as adversaries, technologies, and the geographic boundaries of the homeland itself have changed. From the first colonial militias to the frontier wars and war with Mexico, through the world wars, the Cold War, and the post-9/11 wars, the armed forces have adapted to deny adversaries the opportunity to threaten the nation’s sovereignty, territory, and population. However, the United States presently faces an unconventional threat to the homeland as gray zone tactics—actions below the threshold of armed conflict—are persistently employed by our adversaries. The adoption of this approach requires a reimagination of current homeland defense strategy.

Defending the Homeland

Homeland defense is defined in joint doctrine as “the protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President.” As the lead federal agency for homeland defense, the Department of Defense is responsible for “detecting, deterring, preventing, and defeating threats . . . as far forward from the homeland as possible.” Concurrently, the Department of Homeland Security, the lead federal agency for homeland security, is responsible for law enforcement functions such as border control and infrastructure security, as well as national preparedness, resilience, and recovery. Integrated with homeland defense, the Department of Defense also has the mission to act in a supporting role to other lead agencies and provide defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) during national emergencies or disasters when the capacity of local governments to respond are overwhelmed.

As a continental nation bordered by two oceans and two generally benevolent neighbors, for most of the United States’ history its strategy for homeland defense rested on maritime dominance and the ability to mobilize and project land forces. Not until the end of World War II and the advent of nuclear weapons and their accompanying intercontinental delivery systems was the homeland itself seriously threatened.

In response the US military developed air and missile defense systems, a robust naval force, and a redundant offensive capability suitable for responding to aggression with overwhelming destructive power. The combination of deterrence through a credible defense, the ability to impose a cost that exceeded any benefit to an attacker, and a network of alliances bound by strategic mutual defense treaties created a US strategy for homeland defense that proved adequate to the task.

The end of the Cold War prompted a review of homeland defense strategy. As the sole remaining superpower the threat of a nuclear attack on the homeland was greatly reduced; instead of an existential threat, nuclear weapons became the basis of the threat-making behavior of rogue states intent on destabilizing world politics. Further, a series of high-profile terrorist attacks in the 1990s, culminating with the attacks on September 11, 2001, shifted the focus of homeland defense strategy to one of counterterrorism.

An Evolution of Strategy

The Department of Defense has developed two iterations of a homeland defense strategy since the end of the Cold War—first issued in 2005 and then updated in 2013. Both versions focus on terrorism and on maintaining credible air defense and maritime security against state and nonstate actors. The 2005 version was a more aggressive and holistic strategy, focusing on all aspects of homeland defense and framing the DSCA mission in context of counterterrorism support and recovery. The 2013 version, coming more than a decade after the attacks on September 11 and after Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, shifted the emphasis toward DSCA and post hoc response efforts. Countering air and maritime threats was the only dedicated homeland defense objective and three of the four strategic approaches identified in the document as necessary to achieve a successful end state were DSCA oriented, while the fourth focused on DoD continuity of operations and mission assurance.

The evolution in strategy from 2005 to 2013 was not unexpected and reflects changes in the global environment and national priorities. However, in the decade since the 2013 strategy for homeland defense was released the operational environment has changed again. A broad consensus reflected in current defense strategy and emerging multi-domain warfighting operations identifies that peer and near-peer competitors observed US and allied operations from Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm through the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq and developed strategies to confront the United States and threaten our national interests. The US Army TRADOC G-2 publication The Operating Environment (2021–2030) identifies that, based on these observations, our adversaries “determined that the best way to defeat the United States is to win without fighting.” As a result, our adversaries have chosen to avoid challenging the United States directly, and instead look to exploit our weaknesses and neuter our strengths. Gray zone warfare—alternatively asymmetric, hybrid, or irregular warfare—is acknowledged as our adversaries’ preferred strategy.

Characterizing the Gray Zone

The gray zone is recognized as an arena of warfare that falls below the threshold of open conflict and does not directly challenge US military superiority or trigger mutual defense treaties. Actions that are ambiguous, are nonattributable (or deniable), are limited in scope and duration, and target civilian infrastructure, morale, public and private institutions, and the economy are the preferred method. Gray zone warfare does not seek victory through a swift campaign of shock and awe, but is instead a tool of coercive gradualism to erode resistance to an adversary’s actions, to limit response options if and when the choice is made to resist, and to weaken both intra- and international support relationships. Our adversaries have used and honed these tactics over decades, documented in Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine, as well as in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, Taiwan, Syria, South Korea, and Japan.

Even as we readily acknowledge that our adversaries are employing gray zone tactics in our areas of interest globally, we are less likely to concede that gray zone warfare is occurring in the homeland. Adversarial tactics are taken as individual incidents and are parsed and catalogued without considering their strategic intent or assessing their impact as a whole. As a nation we are more likely to view election interference through a partisan lens instead of the intelligence community’s finding that it is part of desire to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order,” specifically intended faith in the US democratic process.” Malign foreign influence is characterized as a crime warranting a Justice Department investigation or an inevitable consequence of the information age—a threat similar to a hurricane or other natural disaster to build resilience to rather than an assault on the nation requiring a credible deterrence. Data thefts—from credit companies, government agencies, banks, and other crucial components of social infrastructure—are considered isolated criminal incidents instead of gray zone attacks conducted in preparation for targeted information attacks and coercion. Initial efforts to build up the necessary intelligence to characterize and develop the threat of gray zone activities and to put attacks in the context of a broader gray zone strategy are stalled due to a lack of focus and guidance.

To say “the homeland is no longer a sanctuary” or that the homeland will be a contested space is more than a planning assumption. Instead, it is a recognition that the current strategy for homeland defense is failing to address the current threat environment. Our adversaries do not fear a US response to their actions in the gray zone and are not hindered or deterred by existing defenses. Current scenarios envision a homeland that comes under attack during a period of heightened tensions abroad to disrupt mobilization and deployment efforts. But we must recognize how those projected scenarios represent the culmination of ongoing gray zone attacks, not the initiation of a new conflict.

Reimagining Homeland Defense

Presently, there is a critical need to reimagine the concept of homeland defense and develop a new strategy. Air and missile defense, along with a strong maritime presence, can only be one element of a twenty-first-century homeland defense strategy. Intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and hypersonic missiles may represent a low-probability/high-impact scenario requiring defensive preparation. On the other hand, not only do gray zone attacks on the homeland represent a high-probability scenario, but it is our current reality. And while individual attacks may appear to have a low impact, the sum of gray zone activities—the intelligence gathered, the proxies recruited and influenced, the societal divisions and mistrust of authorities magnified—represent an adversary fait accompli in the homeland, not overseas.

When published in 2013, the current DoD strategy for homeland defense was envisioned as viable through 2020. Already two years overdue, the next iteration must consider defense against gray zone attacks as a primary mission. With no silver bullet solution, a successful update to our homeland defense strategy requires a concerted multi-domain, multi-agency, and multi-disciplinary approach that is consistent with our nation’s constitutional principles and values. While there are indications that capabilities are being developed and actions taken to respond to gray zone threats, a comprehensive threat-based strategy is needed to centralize and coordinate response efforts into a meaningful defense of the homeland.

The following is a list of potential actions the United States could take to initiate efforts toward developing an effective DoD strategy for homeland defense:

Establish an office of asymmetric defense of the homeland as an element of the assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense and global security. The office’s first task should be to develop a standalone DoD strategy for homeland defense in the gray zone.
Update the overall DoD strategy for homeland defense, ensuring that threat assumptions guiding the strategy include ongoing gray zone and asymmetric attacks against the homeland.
Ensure the updated strategy for homeland defense is a multi-domain strategy and is not bound to twentieth-century limitations of air and maritime defense as the sole guarantors of homeland sovereignty.
Work to ensure that the secretary of defense, as head of the lead federal agency for homeland defense, takes the initiative to establish a whole-of-government awareness of the ongoing activities occurring in the gray zone and leads the development of a national strategy for homeland defense for the twenty-first to address those threats.
Direct the Joint Chiefs of Staff J-2 and Defense Intelligence Agency to conduct a holistic (threat-agnostic) review of the gray zone threat to the US homeland to guide future planning and include adversary asymmetric and gray zone intentions, capabilities, and strategies in future editions of the Military Power series of publications.

The failure of the September 11, 2001 attacks was not the inability to recognize terrorism as a threat to the nation, but the inability to see the adversary’s intentions, capabilities, and actions. We face a similar dynamic today. As reports of suspicious flight training and overstayed visas were observed but the implications unimagined, we now witness state-sponsored ransomware attacks, election interference, influence operations, and social engineering. At best we are failing to acknowledge the implications of these attacks; at worst we are ignoring them. Unlike a catastrophic and psychologically devastating terrorist attack that kills thousands and galvanizes a united response, gray zone assaults slowly erode US capabilities and resolve under the very radars we currently rely on for homeland defense. DoD has the responsibility for homeland defense, and to be successful it must develop a new strategy for it that acknowledges and responds to gray zone threats.

Dr. John Borek is a postdoctoral fellow in the Homeland Defense and Security Issues Group at the US Army War College and an adjunct instructor in the National Security Intelligence Analysis program at the University of New Hampshire. He is a former Army strategic intelligence officer and civilian intelligence analyst.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Lisa Ferdinando, DoD

mwi.usma.edu · by John Borek · March 1, 2022

25. The Two Debates in Military Circles the War in Ukraine Could Help Settle

The two debates:

Urban Warfare: Inevitable Challenge or Avoidable Distraction?

Civilian Resistance: Winning Strategy or Dangerous Delusion?

Regarding civilian resistance it is not an either/or. Civilian resistance is not a war winner alone and while there are potentially dangerous effects, in the right conditions it can make an important contribution to strategy across the spectrum of conflict and myriad conditions. It is dangerous to assume that resistance can be a war winner but it should also be understand that it can be a cost effective investment to deter deterrence (the unconventional deterrence capability to integrated deterrence) , to providing an economy of force, to supporting political and information warfare and to harden the resilience of the populations.

The Two Debates in Military Circles the War in Ukraine Could Help Settle - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu · by John Amble · March 2, 2022

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a blatant violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is a tragedy for those on the receiving end of what appear to be increasingly indiscriminate attacks. It is a clarion call for nations to choose sides, and it is strengthening the resolve of European political and defense institutions. It’s also set to settle longstanding debates in Western military circles.

Militaries make assumptions about the adversaries they will face in the future, the characteristics of the environments in which they will operate, and the weapons and systems that will be required. This is natural and is why professional military forces develop future-looking concepts. As retired General David Perkins often explained when he commanded US Army Training and Doctrine Command, doctrine describes how we train and fight today, while concepts describe how we expect to fight in the future. And while those concepts rest on a wide range of assumptions, many of these assumptions remain untested—and debated.

This is why learning from our experiences of war is so important. But just as important is learning from others’ experience—watching, assessing, analyzing, and deriving insights to refine our expectations of the future of conflict. Russia’s attack against Ukraine is an opportunity to do so, and it is bringing two debates in particular into focus.

Urban Warfare: Inevitable Challenge or Avoidable Distraction?

In 2017, we launched the Urban Warfare Project at MWI. We have published dozens and dozens of articles, a podcast series, and historical case studies—all aimed at exploring and conceptualizing urban warfare and the unique challenges posed by cities as operational environments. John Spencer, MWI’s chair of urban warfare studies, is arguably the leading expert on the subject and has challenged the US military to consider a range of important questions. What are the tactical challenges of fighting in cities? What about the strategic implications? How is a military force’s ability to maneuver degraded by dense structural complexity? What would a unit optimized to operate in large cities look like? What types of training are most useful? Can modern warfare be conducted in a city without causing massive destruction?

And yet, all of these questions assume the unavoidability of urban warfare. There are good reasons to believe this assumption. The world is becoming increasingly urban. Cities hold political, economic, and symbolic value, so an aggressor seeking to diminish an adversary state’s political stability, economic vitality, social cohesion, and national will might naturally see cities as attractive targets. Urban environments lend considerable advantages to a defending force, inviting a militarily weaker side in a conflict to seek sanctuary in cities and turn them into fortresses that provide protection, not only from enemy fires but also enemy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms. The list goes on.

But not everyone agrees. Given the challenges cities pose, they argue, urban warfare can—and should—simply be avoided. Military forces should isolate cities and bypass them, not get pulled into an unnecessary street-to-street, building-to-building fight.

Today, as Russian forces approach Ukraine’s capital, this debate is as relevant as ever. To be sure, Ukraine’s military is preparing to defend the capital city (as is its civilian population—more on that below). For Ukraine, avoiding urban warfare is clearly not an option. Whether doing so is an option for Russia is the salient question—and its decisions in the near future will be telling. Russian forces’ drive toward Kyiv and its encirclement and targeting with rockets and artillery of Kharkiv and Mariupol make clear that cities represent primary objectives of Russia’s military campaign. Russia has signaled its belief that achieving its operational goals—namely, isolating Ukrainian forces in the east and establishing a land connection between Crimea and the Donbas—and its strategic goals—whatever they are—center on cities.

What remains to be seen, however, is what Russian forces do next. Will they escalate indirect fire attacks and employ airstrikes in order to extract political submission on Moscow’s terms? Or will they enter Kyiv (and other cities) and accept the enormous risks of seeking to forcibly dislodge the Ukrainian defenders? Either way, the current conflict reinforces the strategic and operational importance of cities and necessitates their consideration in any serious conversation about large-scale combat operations. But if Russian forces do in fact enter the city intent on fighting, it will provide a powerful piece of evidence that the future of warfare is urban—and that we must prepare for it.

Civilian Resistance: Winning Strategy or Dangerous Delusion?

As Russian revanchism has built in recent years and the small states closest to Russia have felt increasingly threatened, an obvious question has arisen: How can those states, militarily weaker by an overwhelming degree, deter aggression and defend against attacking forces should deterrence fail?

One option is to incorporate nonmilitary and paramilitary personnel into an integrated defense plan. Indeed, several of the small states under threat have done so. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Sweden, and Norway have all adopted approaches that combine conventional military capabilities with civilian resilience and resistance—a concept sometimes called total defense. But the appropriate balance between those capabilities is the subject of debate. Given the overwhelming military superiority of Russian forces vis-à-vis those of Russia’s smaller neighbors, the argument can be—and has been—made that jettisoning the majority or even all conventional capabilities is not only a legitimate strategy, but the smartest one. Sandor Fabian, a former Hungarian special forces officer and MWI nonresident fellow, explains the logic of this view. “If the conventional military capabilities of the Scandinavian and Baltic states were combined in a single military force,” he writes, “they would still be outweighed by Russian capabilities in the Western Military District.” The result of any force-on-force conventional fight pitting one of these states’ militaries against that of Russia would be, he concludes, “the quick and complete destruction of the defenders’ military force and full occupation of the attacked country.” Why, then, maintain a conventional military capability not strong enough to deter aggression on its own and likely to be destroyed in the event of conflict? Instead, those resources should be directed toward establishing a professional irregular defense force and building a broad, society-wide capability to resist both invasion and occupation through irregular tactics.

Placing a bet on irregular forces and civilian resistance as a primary means of national defense, however, is not without critics. After MWI published an article advocating for such an approach, Jeroen Verhaeghe, a Belgian infantry officer, responded by describing the several reasons why even small states need conventional military forces. He argued, among other reasons, that even limited conventional capabilities will necessarily have a larger deterrent effect than a wholly irregular, resistance-based approach. Moreover, there is a domestic reassurance component to consider, since a conventional military is more readily visible. And of course, for NATO members, maintaining alliance cohesion is dependent on burden sharing—even if the portion any country shares is proportionate to its size—and that requires conventional capabilities.

Ultimately, the questions are whether civilian resistance is a credible means of defending against aggression and, if so, what balance between such an approach and conventional capabilities is appropriate. The war in Ukraine is shaping up to help illuminate both questions. Ukraine’s military forces have performed extraordinarily well since Russia’s invasion—better than most observers anticipated and almost certainly better than Moscow expected. Civilians have also already adopted a resistance posture, the effects of which remain unknown in an operational sense but have certainly been symbolically powerful. In a war with a significant information warfare component, that matters.

Moreover, as Russian forces approach Kyiv and other strategic cities, two prongs of unconventional defensive forces are taking shape: the Territorial Defense Forces are an organized reserve component of the Ukrainian military already being deployed, while individuals and small groups are equipping themselves to resist Russian forces by whatever means are at their disposal. Some are establishing obstacles to block the progress of Russian vehicles, while others are arming themselves with homemade Molotov cocktails.

We will learn a lot in the days to come about the ability of a militarily weaker state to withstand the aggression of stronger state. Based on the contributions of both Ukraine’s conventional military forces and its legions of volunteers, we will also learn a lot about the viability of civilian resistance as a means of national defense.

The world is watching the war in Ukraine unfold on TV, TikTok, and Twitter. Underneath the deluge of rapid-fire analysis and between the mountains of mis- and disinformation is a learning opportunity—one that military and defense professionals have an obligation to take. Will we eliminate the need for assumptions and conclusively settle ongoing debates about our future adversaries and the environments in which we will operate? No. But by closely watching this conflict and honestly and soberly assessing its conduct, we can get closer—and we should.

John Amble is the editorial director of the Modern War Institute at West Point and a veteran of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: ZomBear

mwi.usma.edu · by John Amble · March 2, 2022

26. FDD | US unreliability makes regional allies cautious on Ukraine

A critique we have to be concerned with but we also have the opportunity in the Ukraine crisis to counter it.

FDD | US unreliability makes regional allies cautious on Ukraine

fdd.org · by Hussain Abdul-Hussain Research Fellow · March 2, 2022

As Europe led the world in denouncing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and imposing sanctions on Moscow, America followed, while its Middle Eastern allies did not. Arab countries and Israel voiced concern over war and called for a peaceful settlement, but fell short of criticizing Russia.

At the UN Security Council, the UAE abstained on the American draft resolution that denounced Russia’s invasion. The UAE was in no mood for granting America any favors. Since Yemen’s Houthis struck Abu Dhabi with missiles and explosive drones weeks ago, it has tried to convince President Joe Biden’s administration to redesignate the Houthis as a terrorist organization. Washington has yet to oblige, reasoning that reclassifying the Houthis might offend Tehran and obstruct the return to the flawed Iran nuclear deal.

In Cairo on Monday, the Arab League held a meeting, during which deputy foreign ministers said “respecting international law” was important and pleaded for “restraint” and “a diplomatic solution,” but did not criticize Russia.

In Israel, dual Russian-Israeli nationals burned their Russian passports at protests in support of Ukraine. Yet the Israeli government’s position was more measured. Because America has no influence in Syria, where Iran is trying to build a military infrastructure with which it can threaten Israel, Tel Aviv has had to coordinate its strikes on Iranian targets with Russia, and hence has to maintain a working relationship with Moscow.

In 1991, Israel did not respond to Saddam Hussein’s firing of missiles on Israeli cities, mainly because Tel Aviv trusted that Washington was in charge. But now that the US is “pivoting away” from the Middle East, Israel and all other American allies in the region have to navigate international relations on their own, including calculating how far they can go against Russia, a regional player.

America’s Middle Eastern allies do not view Washington as a reliable partner today, and therefore cannot put all their eggs in the American basket. Instead, they have been hedging, aware that, when the dust settles, Vladimir Putin will likely remain the ruler of Russia and will probably outlast Biden and most other European heads of state. Middle Eastern countries play the long game.

Meanwhile, Washington’s convoluted position on Russia has not helped its regional allies jump off the fence. Even though Biden announced that Putin has now become an international pariah, State Department spokesperson Ned Price added a caveat. “Our relationship with Moscow is very different today than it was last week or even a few days ago,” Price said in describing how relations between the two capitals have quickly deteriorated. “At the same time, we have national security priorities, national security imperatives… (and) some areas in which the fulfillment of our national security priorities and imperatives require us to engage, to coexist at some level, with the Russian Federation.”

As long as Russia remains a player, with America’s blessing, no Middle Eastern capital will see any benefits in getting on Putin’s bad side.

Even though the Biden administration has not yet spelled it out, it is understood that America’s “national security priorities” mean engaging with Moscow over Iran’s nuclear program. Biden might have proclaimed Putin a pariah but, in the Middle East, the Biden administration believes he will remain in the game.

As long as Russia remains a player, with America’s blessing, no Middle Eastern capital will see any benefits in getting on Putin’s bad side.

And because America cannot show a steady hand, its leadership has been compromised. America’s Middle Eastern allies do not look up to Washington for guidance anymore, but rather see the US as an unreliable partner whose default reaction to global conflagrations is often appeasement.

Had America’s leadership been bold and assertive, its Middle Eastern allies might have lined up behind Washington in countering Russia’s belligerent behavior. Those allies might have found in a global coalition a great tool for confronting another dictatorship whose behavior is destabilizing their own region: The Iran regime.

But America’s Middle East allies are aware that Biden’s foreign policy is run by those who want a nuclear deal with Iran at any price. US allies understand that, when confronting Iran, they cannot rely on Washington, but only on themselves and on other powers, including Moscow.

Until America goes back to showing reliable leadership, do not expect its allies to toe its line.

Hussain Abdul-Hussain is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy. Twitter: @hahussain. FDD is a nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

fdd.org · by Hussain Abdul-Hussain Research Fellow · March 2, 2022

27. FDD | Putin is not crazy and the Russian invasion is not failing. The West's delusions about this war - and its failure to understand the enemy - will prevent it from saving Ukraine

An important critique with which some will disagree. But we need this kind of analysis to sharpen the strategy and avoid the pitfalls and prevent failure.

FDD | Putin is not crazy and the Russian invasion is not failing. The West's delusions about this war - and its failure to understand the enemy - will prevent it from saving Ukraine

fdd.org · by Bill Roggio Senior Fellow and Editor of FDD's Long War Journal · March 2, 2022

Wishful thinking has the upper hand in the battle to shape Western perceptions of the war in Ukraine.

Sympathy for the outnumbered and outgunned defenders of Kyiv has led to the exaggeration of Russian setbacks, misunderstanding of Russian strategy, and even baseless claims from amateur psychoanalysts that Putin has lost his mind.

A more sober analysis shows that Russia may have sought a knockout blow, but always had well-laid plans for follow-on assaults if its initial moves proved insufficient.

The world has underestimated Putin before and those mistakes have led, in part, to this tragedy in Ukraine.

We must be clear-eyed now that the war is underway.

Yet even the professionals at the Pentagon are letting sympathy cloud their judgement.

Just two days into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, U.S. Department of Defense briefers were quick to claim that failing to take Kyiv in the opening days of the war amounted to a serious setback.

DoD briefers implied that Russia’s offensive was well behind schedule or had even failed because the capital had not fallen.

But U.S. leaders should have learned to restrain their hopes after their catastrophic withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Once again, U.S. and Western officials are falling into the trap of failing to understand the enemy and his objectives.

Allegedly, Putin believed that the Ukrainian government would collapse once Russian troops crossed the frontier and pushed to Kyiv, and that the operation has failed because the Ukrainian government remains in place.

Putin certainly hoped for a swift victory, but he clearly was not relying on his opening salvo as the only plan for success.

Rather, the Russian military was prepared to take the country by force if a swift decapitation strike fell short.

This kind of plan should be familiar to Americans who remember the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

In the first hours of the war, the U.S. Air Force launched its ‘shock and awe’ campaign in an attempt to kill Saddam Hussein and other key leaders and bring down the government. Saddam survived, but the U.S. military was fully prepared to follow up with a ground assault.

A look at the Russian military offensive demonstrates there was a plan for a full-scale invasion, which Russia is now executing.

Conventional, mechanized warfare is a time and resource consuming enterprise, and an operation of this scope isn’t cobbled together in days.

The Russian offensive is taking place on four separate fronts. On a fifth front, in eastern Ukraine, which Putin declared independent last week, Russian forces are tying down Ukrainian troops that are needed elsewhere.

The bulk of the Russian forces are advancing southward from Belarus to Kyiv.

Russian advance forces, including air, mobile and reconnaissance troops, have been engaged with Ukrainian troops outside of Kyiv since the start of the war.

A massive column of Russian troops, estimated at over 40 miles long, is just 20 miles north of Kyiv, and is likely assembling to surround the capital.

If Russian forces can take Kyiv and push southward to link up with forces on the Crimean front, thus splitting Ukraine in two, it would be a major blow to the Zelensky government.

What matters more than a handful of setbacks is that Russian forces have pushed 70 miles into contested terrain in less than a week and are on the outskirts of the capital.

This is not a sign of a disorganized, poorly assembled, and failed offensive.

The southward push from Belarus to Kyiv is supported by another Russian column, launched from the east in the vicinity of Kursk.

If this column can link up with Russian troops near Kyiv, it will envelop Ukrainian forces in most of Chernihiv and Sumy provinces, depriving the Ukrainian military of much needed soldiers and war material needed elsewhere, and cutting off the government from two northern provinces.

Further east, Russian forces have launched a broad offensive aimed at Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second largest city, which is now under siege.

In the south, Russian forces, supported by amphibious assaults from the Sea of Azov, have poured into Ukraine from Crimea.

On this front, Russian forces have branched out along two main axes, one northwest along the Pivdennyi Buh River, and another northeast along the coast and inland towards the Donbas region, which Russia annexed shortly before the invasion.

If Russian columns from either southern front can link up with forces further north, they would cut off many Ukrainian troops from reinforcement—one of the two columns has already advanced roughly 160 miles.

Russian generals have often chosen to bypass towns and cities that are putting up stiff opposition and isolating them to deal with later.

There are reports that Russian forces have escalated attacks on civilians, particularly in Kharkiv.

At the moment, the artillery and rocket attacks there have been limited, perhaps to send a message to the citizens as a warning of what may come.

Putin appears to want to take Ukraine intact, but will not hesitate to increase the level of brutality if needed.

The systematic nature of the Russian assault is at odds with speculation that Putin has lost control of his senses.

Nobody knows for sure, but Putin’s actions appear to be that of a cold and calculating adversary.

Dismissing his decision to invade Ukraine as a form of madness is effectively an excuse to ignore Putin’s likely motivations and future actions.

Strategically, Putin’s advance on Ukraine began well over a decade ago, when he invaded and Balkanized Georgia by recognizing the Kremlin’s puppet regimes in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

In 2014, Putin occupied and annexed the strategic Ukrainian region of Crimea, which served as a launchpad for the current invasion.

Putin paid little price for either action.

The United States and Europe imposed limited sanctions but continued to engage with him on the Iranian nuclear deal and other top issues.

Today, Putin has calculated that taking Ukraine by force is in his and Russia’s interest.

He no doubt anticipated that the West would impose diplomatic and economic sanctions, which U.S. and European leaders threatened beforehand.

Putin may have miscalculated Ukrainian resistance and the intensity of the West’s opposition, but it doesn’t mean he is crazy, or didn’t consider the possibilities and chose to invade regardless.

It remains to be seen if Putin’s plan will succeed or fail, but what is clear is that there was a plan to invade Ukraine in force, and that plan has been executed since day one.

Ukrainian troops are putting up a valiant fight facing long odds and difficult conditions. Russia holds most if not all of the advantages.

It can, and has, attacked Ukraine from three different directions. The Russian military holds a decided advantage in manpower, as well as air, naval and armor superiority.

It has vast resources to draw on. While Ukraine has the support of much of the international community, which is providing weapons, Ukraine is fighting alone.

Believing Russia’s assault is going poorly may make us feel better but is at odds with the facts.

We cannot help Ukraine if we cannot be honest about its predicament.

Bill Roggio is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and editor of FDD’s Long war Journal. From 1991 to 1997, Roggio served as a signalman and infantryman in the U.S. Army and New Jersey National Guard. Follow him on Twitter @billroggio. FDD is a nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

fdd.org · by Bill Roggio Senior Fellow and Editor of FDD's Long War Journal · March 2, 2022

28. A Ukrainian Insurgency Will Be Long and Bloody

The title is an assessment that unfortunately is very likely to come to fruition.

We have to think this through and we have to avoid cutting away the resistance and throwing them under the bus. And we need to prepare the American public to be able to support the resistance for the duration until Putin is defeated.

A Ukrainian Insurgency Will Be Long and Bloody - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu · by Thomas B. Pepinsky · March 3, 2022

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has proven to be a turning point in European security. As Ukrainians mount a stiff defense against a more heavily armed Russian invasion force, analysts and observers have raised the prospect of an ongoing resistance, one led not only by Ukrainian army units but also by civilian defense forces and ordinary citizens. This would amount to the first case of insurgent warfare within Europe in recent memory.

Anticipating the outcome of such a conflict is difficult. But if the history of modern insurgent warfare around the world is any guide, then the conflict is likely to be exceedingly violent and protracted, with difficult political implications. An insurgency may be unavoidable. But even if it does lead to a Russian defeat, Ukrainians—and the Western policymakers who are backing them—should not deceive themselves about just how awful insurgent warfare will be.

An Insurgency Will Be Violent

Insurgent warfare is asymmetric. Although there are widespread reports of supply chain interruptions and underprovisioned troops, the Russians have superior armaments than do the Ukrainians, and a larger army as well (although it is unclear how many Russian and Ukrainian soldiers are actively engaged in the present combat). This is what leads most analysts to conclude that the Ukrainians are unlikely to defeat the Russians on the battlefield. Insurgent warfare adapts to this asymmetric distribution of armaments and personnel by making any occupation acutely painful to the occupying force.

Specifically, an insurgency will be most successful if Russian soldiers are constantly frightened. To date, the Ukrainian resistance has shown great forbearance in its treatment of captured Russian soldiers, even reportedly allowing them to call their parents. If the war shifts to a hard-fought insurgency, their tactics are likely to become more brutal and violent.

Such a turn in the character of the violence would not occur because Ukrainians are by nature brutal, nor because their leadership seeks to inflict maximum casualties on their enemy as a war aim. Rather, this turn to violence would reflect the core logic of insurgency, which is to defeat enemy forces by making their occupation intolerable. The Ukrainian resistance will be most effective if Russians are on edge, sleepless, and prone to overreactions. Russian fear and disorganization will not only make the Russian occupying force vulnerable, but also harden the resolve of the Ukrainian resistance.

An Insurgency Will Be Long and Protracted

Insurgent warfare is designed to grind down the occupying force’s resolve. This does not happen in weeks or months, especially when Russian soldiers have the option of rotating back to Russia for some respite. Successful insurgent actions often take years to bear fruit.

In the meantime, the Russians may “control” Kyiv and other major cities during the day. They may install a puppet government, like the Soviet occupying force did in Afghanistan. And they may even declare an end to military operations to create the illusion of order, and hence to portray the insurgency as a threat to the postconflict peace. But asymmetric warfare and the Ukrainians’ total defense posture—which mobilizes not only active troops but also the whole of society to defend Ukrainian territory—together mean that the Ukrainian forces will seek to engage the enemy on their own terms, not the Russians’. This is how occupying forces come to pretend that they control an entire territory, when they actually only control the main roads in the main cities during daylight hours, a central problem facing US occupying forces in both Afghanistan and Vietnam.

The Politics of Insurgency Will Be Complicated

This may be the hardest truth for Western audiences who wish to see the Ukrainian resistance defeat the Russian occupying force. It is one thing to see former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko take up arms alongside his local self-defense force, or to see retired heavyweight boxer and Kyiv mayor Vitali Klitschko don combat gear. It is quite another to realize that Ukrainian civil society—like civil societies the world over—contains both liberal and illiberal elements.

This means that just as the Ukrainian government is encouraging citizens to take up arms in self-defense and distributing weapons to the population, it is providing arms to illiberal elements and criminal syndicates within Ukrainian society, including the Azov Battalion, a group that has attracted far-right elements, some of whom are self-professed neo-Nazis, but that forms part of Ukraine’s civil defense. Russia’s information campaign has already begun portraying the government in Kyiv as criminal and spoken of a campaign of “denazification” of Ukrainian society; it will seize on the presence of illiberal elements within Ukrainian society to further justify its occupation. Meanwhile, of course, the Russians will probably be courting the same groups that they are vilifying, trying to enlist them as Russian allies.

This means that supporting an insurgency means supporting—indirectly—illiberal elements and antidemocratic forces in Ukrainian society for the purpose of defending Ukrainian independence. This tragic choice is inevitable. And it will have far-reaching implications for Ukrainian politics and society even if Ukrainian forces are successful in expelling the Russian occupying force from their territory.

Looking Ahead

If the ongoing invasion of Ukraine ends up becoming a Russian occupation, Ukraine’s supporters will find themselves supporting what is likely to be a long, violent, politically messy insurgency. It is essential for anyone supporting the Ukrainian insurgency to confront this uncomfortable reality now. But does knowing this likely future offer any hope for avoiding it?

Ideally, supporters of the Ukrainian resistance would find mechanisms to channel money and weapons only to like-minded groups who reject extremism and crime. But a clear-eyed planner should realize that in irregular wars, Ukrainian forces will seek broad cooperation with any element that shares their strategic goals. As is often the case during war, common enemies make for allies of convenience. And war planners must also remember that the Russian occupiers may seek support from such extremist elements as well. There are no easy solutions to this difficult political calculation.

The most straightforward way to avoid a terrible insurgency in Ukraine is to avoid the occupation in the first place. In principle, Ukraine’s leaders could accomplish this by capitulating to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s demands now and surrendering Ukraine to Russia. But even if President Volodymyr Zelenskyy were to give in to Russia’s demands, allowing Putin to pick a pliable client government and demobilizing all armed elements within Ukraine, just one week of warfare seems to have hardened Ukrainian civil society against the Russian invading force. There may no longer be a negotiated solution to this war, even if Zelenskyy wishes to find one.

The other way to avoid such an insurgency is for someone—either the Ukrainians themselves, or an international coalition—to force the Russians out of Ukraine. At the moment, this seems unlikely, although the combination of robust economic sanctions and stiff resistance is making an ongoing occupation very costly. If Ukrainian forces and their international backers fail to prevent this occupation, they should steel themselves for a long and difficult insurgency in the months and years ahead.

Thomas B. Pepinsky is the Walter F. LaFeber professor of government and public policy at Cornell University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Sgt. Alexander Rector, US Army