Quotes of the Day:
"I never submitted the whole system of my opinions to the creed of any party of men whatever in religion, in philosophy, in politics, or in anything else where I was capable of thinking for myself. Such an addiction is the last degradation of a free and moral agent."
-Thomas Jefferson, letter to Francis Hopkinson, March 13, 1789
"The one who plants trees, knowing that he will never sit in their shade, has at least started to understand the meaning of life."
Rabindranath Tagore
We must always take sides. Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim. Silence encourages the tormentor, never the tormented.
- Elie Wiesel, 1986
1. U.S. focused on joint defense readiness with S. Korea: Pentagon
2. U.N. panel OKs yearlong sanctions waiver for S. Korean civic group's COVID-19 aid to N. Korea
3. Seoul keeps close eye on possible messages from N. Korea at parliamentary meeting: official
4. North Korea is Using Time to Perfect its Nuclear and Missile Programs
5. Biden Must Recalibrate Policy on North Korea
6. North Korea Hacked Him. So He Took Down Its Internet
7. Wendy Sherman denounces N. Korean missile tests in talks with S. Korean, Japanese counterparts
8. North Korea documentary makes rare admission that country is in the midst of ‘food crisis’
9. North Korea Is Becoming an Asset for China
10. South Korea’s Pursuit of an End of War Declaration Amidst the Unfinished Task of POW and Abductee Repatriation
11. Conventional forces a threat as dangerous as North Korea’s missiles, expert warns
12. North Korea mocks US overtures for diplomacy in wake of January missile tests
13. N.Korea Goes Missile-Crazy
14. S. Korea detects no notable sign of N.K. preparation for ICBM launch
15. High demand for illegal Chinese phones in North Korea as trade resumes
1. U.S. focused on joint defense readiness with S. Korea: Pentagon
The right message.
My words: No more cancelling, postponing, or scaling back exercises and training. There has been no reciprocity for nearly 4 years since we have cancelled exercises to "support diplomacy." We tested the concept and KimJong-un has been found wanting. We must make no more fantasy assumptions about using exercises to entice Kim ot the negotiating table.
Excerpts:
"We condemn these launches. We're monitoring as closely as you can. (We) certainly call on North Korea to meet their obligations under UN Security Council resolutions and stop these provocations," Kirby said when asked if the U.S. and South Korea may consider resuming or reinforcing their joint military exercises as part of steps against North Korea's missile provocations.
"In the meantime, here at the Department of Defense, we're going to do what we have to do to make sure our ROK-US alliance is as strong and as flexible and as capable as possible, and that's what our focus is on here," he added, referring to South Korea by its official name, the Republic of Korea.
That said, the decision to postpone the exercise from March to April should have been announced at the 53d Security Committee Meeting. I believe the decision was made to move the exercises in order to deconflict with the ROK Presidential election and try to prevent the exercises from becoming more of an election issue than it should be. But by waiting to make the announcement it now undermines any influence effects we might achieve. We should have made the announcement when there were no increased tensions on the peninsula.
We must do better thinking through influence operations.
U.S. focused on joint defense readiness with S. Korea: Pentagon | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Feb. 2 (Yonhap) -- The United States continues to remain focused on its joint defense capabilities with South Korea and will make any related decisions through close consultation with Seoul, a Pentagon spokesperson said Wednesday.
John Kirby made the remarks when asked if the U.S. and South Korea were considering postponing joint military exercises despite a recent series of missile launches by North Korea.
"As I've said many times, we take our readiness on the peninsula very, very seriously," he said in a press briefing.
"Decisions about how we preserve that readiness and maintain it are decisions we make in lockstep with our South Korean allies, and that includes training events," he added.
Earlier reports said the allies may be considering postponing their combined training exercises, scheduled to be held next month, but largely because of the South Korean presidential election slated to be held March 9.
"We constantly evaluate and review our training exercises, our training events, training and education, and adapt it as conditions warrant and that's no different than what you're seeing on the Korean Peninsula," Kirby said.
Seoul and Washington have delayed or even suspended some joint military drills when former U.S. President Donald Trump held the first-ever U.S.-North Korea summit with Kim Jong-un in June 2018, and also were forced to further delay or reduce joint training events due to the COVID-19 pandemic since early 2020.
Still, the consideration to delay upcoming military exercises follows multiple missile launches by North Korea, which the U.S. has repeatedly condemned as a serious violation of multiple U.N. Security Resolutions and a threat to South Korea and other countries in the region.
"We condemn these launches. We're monitoring as closely as you can. (We) certainly call on North Korea to meet their obligations under UN Security Council resolutions and stop these provocations," Kirby said when asked if the U.S. and South Korea may consider resuming or reinforcing their joint military exercises as part of steps against North Korea's missile provocations.
"In the meantime, here at the Department of Defense, we're going to do what we have to do to make sure our ROK-US alliance is as strong and as flexible and as capable as possible, and that's what our focus is on here," he added, referring to South Korea by its official name, the Republic of Korea.
North Korea has staged seven rounds of missile launches since the start of the year, with its last missile launch taking place on Sunday (Seoul time), involving what it has identified as a "Hwasong 12-type ground-to-ground intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile."
Many believe the launch, if confirmed, may indicate the North's departure from its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile testing that has been in place since late 2017.
Pyongyang said earlier this month that it will consider restarting all temporarily-suspended activities.
The U.S. is said to have called for a U.N. Security Council meeting to discuss the North Korean missile launches.
Washington earlier said it will take additional steps to hold North Korea responsible and accountable for its recent missile tests.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
2. U.N. panel OKs yearlong sanctions waiver for S. Korean civic group's COVID-19 aid to N. Korea
The question is will the regime allow COVID aid, and in particular vaccines. So far Kim has refused.
U.N. panel OKs yearlong sanctions waiver for S. Korean civic group's COVID-19 aid to N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Feb. 3 (Yonhap) -- A United Nations Security Council committee on North Korea sanctions has approved a sanctions exemption for a civic organization here to send anti-coronavirus equipment to the impoverished nation, according to its website Thursday.
Under the decision, the first of its kind for the North this year, the Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Research Center will be exempt from U.N. sanctions in place for a shipment of 20 thermal imaging cameras there as part of efforts to help Pyongyang stave off the spread of COVID-19. The U.N. panel, tasked with overseeing sanctions measures imposed against the North, issued the approval on Jan. 26, which will be effective for a year.
The civic organization's president, Kim Han-shin, told Yonhap News Agency by phone that it will have follow-up consultations with the North to decide when and how the goods will be delivered.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
3. Seoul keeps close eye on possible messages from N. Korea at parliamentary meeting: official
Yes they will likely provide us with their policy guidance. It is possible that another test could occur to coincide with the meeting.
Seoul keeps close eye on possible messages from N. Korea at parliamentary meeting: official | Yonhap News Agency
By Choi Soo-hyang
SEOUL, Feb. 3 (Yonhap) -- South Korea is keeping close tabs on an upcoming session of North Korea's rubber-stamp legislature over possible messages from its leader Kim Jong-un, a Seoul official said Thursday, following Pyongyang's barrage of missile tests since the start of the year.
The North's official Korean Central News Agency earlier reported the country will convene the 6th session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) on Sunday to discuss issues including "the work of the Cabinet" and the state budget.
The SPA is the highest organ of power under the North's constitution, but it rubber-stamps decisions by the ruling party. It usually holds a plenary session in March or April to deal mainly with budget and cabinet reshuffles.
But last year, the North held two SPA sessions in January and September, with leader Kim announcing at the latter that cross-border communication lines with South Korea will be restored as part of efforts to improve chilled inter-Korean relations.
"As Kim has a record of unveiling internal and external policy directions through a speech at the parliamentary meeting in the past, we are monitoring the possibility he will do so this year," a unification ministry official told reporters on background.
Yet the official said it's hard to predict Kim's attendance at the upcoming meeting as he participated in only eight of 14 SPA sessions held after he took the helm of the country in late 2011.
The parliamentary meeting comes amid heightening tensions on the Korean Peninsula with the North conducting seven missile tests -- including two of what it claims to be a hypersonic missile and an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) -- in January alone.
The North's launch of an IRBM on Sunday marked the country's longest-range missile test since the test-firing of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in November 2017, and the most projectiles the North has fired in a single month since Kim took power.
scaaet@yna.co.kr
(END)
4. North Korea is Using Time to Perfect its Nuclear and Missile Programs
Dual track strategy - political warfare and warfighting preparation. These are mutually supporting and reinforcing.
Conclusion:
As was done during the Six-Party Talks with North Korea before the Sept. 19, 2005, joint statement that committed North Korea to dismantle all nuclear weapons and facilities in return for sanctions relief, economic development assistance and a path to normal relations, the five countries — the United States, South Korea, Japan, China and Russia — would occasionally meet or share views when North Korea was escalating or threatening to escalate tension. This would be a perfect time for these five countries, ideally with seniors from the State Department and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, to meet, strategize and work together to get North Korea to refrain from any further escalation of tension and return to negotiations. Such an initiative by these five countries could prove productive. It certainly would have broad international support.
North Korea is Using Time to Perfect its Nuclear and Missile Programs
Ambassador Joseph DeTrani is former Special envoy for Six Party Talks with North Korea and the U.S. Representative to the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO), as well as former CIA director of East Asia Operations. He also served as the Associate Director of National Intelligence and Mission Manager for North Korea and the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center, while also serving as a Special Adviser to the Director of National Intelligence. He currently serves on the Board of Managers at Sandia National Laboratories. The views expressed represent those of the author.
OPINION — The six missiles North Korea launched in January was a statement — and proof — that North Korea is upgrading its arsenal of missiles to deliver nuclear weapons.
North quietly builds more nuclear weapons based on plutonium and highly enriched uranium. It publicly displayed its progress in January with hypersonic and cruise missiles and short-range ballistic missiles launched from rail cars. Indeed, North Korea’s advances with hypersonic missiles were demonstrated with the Jan. 11 hypersonic missile that flew 1000 kilometers at 10 times the speed of sound and reportedly successfully hit its target. A hypersonic missile that can cover vast distances in minutes, flying low and nimbly maneuvering, is challenging for any missile defense system.
Efforts of the United Nations Security Council to sanction North Korea for its January missile launches — which violated resolutions prohibiting the testing of ballistic missiles — were unsuccessful when China and Russia blocked the passage of the sanctions. North Korea may now believe that despite UNSC resolutions, it can move forward and conduct additional nuclear tests and missile launches with impunity, knowing China and Russia will block any effort to impose sanctions on them. This would be unfortunate and very dangerous.
Kim Jong-un made it clear one year ago, at the 8th Congress of the Workers Party, that North Korea would enhance its nuclear and missile capabilities, clearly stating that the focus would be on hypersonic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, tactical nuclear weapons and mobile, solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles. One year later, despite the country’s dire economic situation, due to the coronavirus, a closed border and biting sanctions, Mr. Kim has moved forward with his hypersonic, cruise missile and SLBM programs. And now that it appears the border with China has opened slightly, trade will resume. Despite UNSC resolutions, North Korea will get additional crude oil shipments from China to sustain its economy.
In short, if there are no consequences, it’s fair to assume that North Korea will move forward with its ICBM program. In 2017, the North launched two ICBMs — the Hwasong-14 and 15 — both theoretically capable of reaching the United States. On Oct. 10, 2020, North Korea, on the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party, displayed what would be the largest road-mobile ICBM in the world. It’s possible — and some say likely — that North Korea will launch an ICBM soon, in line with Mr. Kim’s pronouncement to advance his country’s nuclear and missile capabilities. Such a launch will get the international community’s attention and certainly the United States. At a Politburo meeting of the Workers’ Party in January, Mr. Kim reportedly said North Korea would consider restarting “all temporarily-suspended” activities, implying launches of ICBMs and nuclear tests.
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In 2017, we witnessed something similar to what we’re beginning to now see. North Korea had conducted its sixth nuclear test, assessed to have been a thermonuclear test. It launched two ICBMs — the Hwasong 14 and 15 — and the vitriol coming from Pyongyang was offensive. Former President Donald Trump responded with “fire and fury,” conducting and enhancing joint military exercises with South Korea and imposing crushing sanctions, supported by China and Russia. Tension was defused when Mr. Kim proffered an invitation, passed through South Korea, to meet personally with Mr. Trump. The invitation was accepted, and the June 2018 Singapore Summit was convened, with an upbeat joint statement, followed by a February 2019 Hanoi Summit that ended in failure. Since then, negotiations with North Korea have ceased, and while the North continues to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons and continues to upgrade its missile capabilities, the North has refrained from conducting another nuclear test or launching another ICBM. This may now change.
China has considerable leverage over North Korea. Over 90% of trade is with China, and over 90% of crude oil comes from China. It wouldn’t be too much of an exaggeration to say that North Korea’s economy is dependent on China. Given that leverage, China could and should try to convince Mr. Kim that resuming nuclear tests and ICBM launches would be inimical to North Korea’s interest. In fact, telling Mr. Kim that China would support sanctions, as it did in 2017, if North Korea escalated tension by conducting nuclear and ICBM tests would have an impact. There is reason to believe Mr. Kim would listen and comply with China’s request if this message came directly from President Xi Jinping.
As was done during the Six-Party Talks with North Korea before the Sept. 19, 2005, joint statement that committed North Korea to dismantle all nuclear weapons and facilities in return for sanctions relief, economic development assistance and a path to normal relations, the five countries — the United States, South Korea, Japan, China and Russia — would occasionally meet or share views when North Korea was escalating or threatening to escalate tension. This would be a perfect time for these five countries, ideally with seniors from the State Department and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, to meet, strategize and work together to get North Korea to refrain from any further escalation of tension and return to negotiations. Such an initiative by these five countries could prove productive. It certainly would have broad international support.
This piece by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joe Detrani was first published in The Washington Times
Ambassador Joseph DeTrani is former Special envoy for Six Party Talks with North Korea and the U.S. Representative to the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO), as well as former CIA director of East Asia Operations. He also served as the Associate Director of National Intelligence and Mission Manager for North Korea and the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center, while also serving as a Special Adviser to the Director of National Intelligence. He currently serves on the Board of Managers at Sandia National Laboratories. The views expressed represent those of the author.
5. Biden Must Recalibrate Policy on North Korea
Sigh... How about we give the policy a chance to work. Nine months is hardly enough time,. But it is typical of the press and pundits to expect immediate results.
That said there are some good recommendations in this piece, especially for South Korea, save for one. The South can get a lot more bang for its defense buck by investing ins something other than a nuclear powered submarine. There is no significant additional capability in a nuclear powered submarine for defense against north Korea. It is simply a vanity project.
Biden Must Recalibrate Policy on North Korea
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After North Korea notched a record-breaking month for missile tests in January, many experts have explained the series of launches by saying that North Korea is trying to draw attention from the United States, as Pyongyang has fallen out of the top priority list due to tensions with China and Russia.
However, this rationale leads the international community and North Korean watchers to misunderstand the intention of the North’s missile tests and what it is aiming to achieve this year.
North Korea is not preparing for future negotiations with the United States and South Korea, nor do its missile tests represent Kim’s desire to return to the negotiating table by enticing the U.S. to make concessions first. More clearly, North Korea will not suddenly come back to the table and respond to Washington’s offer for talks “anytime, anywhere, with no preconditions” this year.
Based on the results of the five-day plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea in December 2021 and Pyongyang’s latest remarks on the U.S. sanctions and its missile tests, North Korea’s intentions are clear. Pyongyang’s goal is building a concrete foundation for its five-year plan to develop its defense technology and military system. Under that plan – which was introduced in the Eighth Congress Party last year – North Korea seeks to significantly strengthen its nuclear and missile capabilities. By doing so, Pyongyang believes that the U.S. and South Korea would offer more attractive and favorable incentives, including lifting sanctions or partial removal of the so-called “hostile policy” first to deter its growing power and leverage in the region.
No matter how Washington and Seoul respond to the North’s January missile tests, Pyongyang will keep testing more missiles in the coming months while staying silent on the U.S. and South Korean calls for talks. The arms race on the Korean Peninsula will accelerate and the U.S. will impose more sanctions on North Korea when necessary. Consequentially, the U.S. and South Korea’s predictable follow-up measures would eventually trigger North Korea to conduct a nuclear or intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test. Pyongyang already opened the possibility of reconsidering Kim’s self-moratorium on testing these weapons, which was announced in 2018 in a bid to entice then U.S. President Donald Trump to lift the crippling sanctions against his country.
In the end, Washington and Seoul’s passive and clichéd responses to North Korea’s missile tests will only give more time to Pyongyang to complete its military build-up.
Diplomacy is clearly not working, as North Korea seems to showcase more and more advanced weapons. So what should the U.S. and South Korea do to respond to the North’s missile threats?
Say Goodbye to Strategic Patience and CVID
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First, U.S. President Joe Biden should immediately recalibrate his “calibrated and practical” policy on North Korea. It is clear that his policy on North Korea stems from the failed “strategic patience” approach adopted in the Obama administration, even though Biden’s administration has denied this accusation. The Biden administration has been trying to keep the status quo over the North Korea issue while showing rhetorical support for Seoul’s peace process and urging North Korea to come back to the table, without officially suggesting possible incentives North Korea could receive.
As North Korea will ramp up its missile capabilities according to its long-term plan, Biden should publicly announce his specific messages and guidelines for potential talks with Kim so that Pyongyang can reconsider negotiating with Biden’s officials through backchannels. In order to entice North Korea to respond to their messages, U.S. officials need to do more than just saying “We harbor no hostile intent toward” North Korea and expressing a willingness to meet North Korean counterparts “anytime, anywhere, without preconditions.” These vague assertions will never work as North Korea believes its leader was humiliated by Trump in Hanoi. Pyongyang holds the United States fully responsible for breaking the nuclear talks in 2019.
Along with this, Washington should also consider proposing a phased denuclearization process to North Korea. Washington’s CVID (complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement) approach to denuclearization is understandable, but it is also a third party’s approach on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It shows no sense of urgency and suggests the U.S. is not truly invested in a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. The CVID approach has no chance as long as Kim’s regime controls North Korea under the current autocratic system. Kim will never accept CVID, even if the U.S. offered to lift all of the sanctions imposed against North Korea. Meanwhile, China’s growing leverage in the region will also undermine a CVID approach.
Experts know that Kim will never give up his nuclear weapons and will not accept CVID, but both politicians and some North Korea watchers have consistently demanded that Washington to keep this stance toward North Korea. If the U.S. really hopes to achieve denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, it should work closely with South Korea to make a long-term plan for phased denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula – a plan that North Korea can also accept.
The U.S. should also bear in mind that it would eventually need to work with China to reach a deal in nuclear talks with North Korea. Amid deteriorating relations with Beijing, Washington should also attempt to seek a path for multilateral talks for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
South Korea: Time for a New Approach
For its part South Korea should beef up its own military and missile capabilities. As a part of enhancing asymmetric military power, South Korea needs to build a nuclear-powered submarine, but the U.S. has opposed this initiative for decades. Even though the leaders of the two countries agreed in 2021 to remove all restrictions on South Korea’s missile program, Washington’s skepticism toward South Korean moves to build more powerful weapons still lingers. In order to effectively deter North Korea’s growing missile threats, South Korea’s defense capabilities need to be significantly enhanced while being more independent from U.S. military assets. As North Korea is now demanding the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from the South’s soil and a complete halt of the joint South Korea-U.S. military drills, South Korea must develop its domestic missile technology and military capabilities. Through simulations and wargames focused on the South and North’s current military capabilities, Washington and Seoul should closely work together to find out what specific weapons and systems need to be deployed in South Korea – and when pre-emptive strikes should be considered as an option.
Some may argue that this approach would prevent any return to nuclear talks. Critics may also say that it could give a justifiable reason for North Korea to keep developing its own missile program and testing missiles for its self-defense. However, South Korean restraint has not had the desired impact thus far. Strengthen South Korean defense capabilities could add momentum for the two Koreas, the U.S., and China to feel a sense of urgency in disarming the Korean Peninsula. The countries can come to the table for arms control negotiations at some point when North Korea fears South Korea’s military assets alone.
The next South Korean president should consult with Biden to immediately set a new productive approach, including specific guidelines for countermeasures to the North’s missile tests, while reaffirming the importance of the South Korea-U.S. military alliance. Also, the next president should take time to reconsider current President Moon Jae-in’s peace process, such as Moon’s approach to the end-of-war declaration and wartime operational control (OPCON) transfer. South Korean progressive and conservative presidents have made these two security hot potatoes too political in past decades, and have not thoroughly handled these agendas from the perspective of national security. The proceeding timelines for the two initiatives have been changed over and over again. The next South Korean president should stake out a plan with Washington to proceed with these initiatives in an irreversible and coherent manner.
North Korea will keep testing missiles throughout 2022, based on its five-year plan to modernize and develop its military and missile system. With that in mind, strengthening the South’s military capabilities and the South Korea-U.S. military alliance should be considered as top priorities.
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Also, there should be a mature understanding of the rationale behind North Korea’s successive missile tests. At heart, the U.S. and its allies do not recognize North Korea as a legitimate country. Instead, many in Washington perceive the North’s missile tests as a childish act on Kim’s part, begging the U.S. for attention. No matter what experts and politicians of the U.S. and South Korea say, North Korea is testing missiles to fulfill its own military ambitions, not to draw attention from the United States. As long as this outdated perspective remains, the U.S. and South Korea will be continuously dragged on by Kim’s playbook.
The time is ticking on the U.S. and South Korea’s side, as North Korea has made clear its plan to conduct military activities regularly and strengthen its military capabilities while focusing on reviving its devastated economy. Therefore, Washington and Seoul should recalibrate their policies and overtures on North Korea in a timely manner.
6. North Korea Hacked Him. So He Took Down Its Internet
Interesting. I have no way to check the veracity of this report. But if it is true it is fascinating. Think about the potential effects of common citizens who have been affected by hacking fighting back against state and non-state actors.
Excerpts:
But responsibility for North Korea's ongoing internet outages doesn't lie with US Cyber Command or any other state-sponsored hacking agency. In fact, it was the work of one American man in a T-shirt, pajama pants, and slippers, sitting in his living room night after night, watching Alien movies and eating spicy corn snacks—and periodically walking over to his home office to check on the progress of the programs he was running to disrupt the internet of an entire country.
Just over a year ago, an independent hacker who goes by the handle P4x was himself hacked by North Korean spies. P4x was just one victim of a hacking campaign that targeted Western security researchers with the apparent aim of stealing their hacking tools and details about software vulnerabilities. He says he managed to prevent those hackers from swiping anything of value from him. But he nonetheless felt deeply unnerved by state-sponsored hackers targeting him personally—and by the lack of any visible response from the US government.
...
Aitel agrees, though, that the government response to North Korea's campaign has been lacking. He says he never received any contact from a government agency and lays the blame for that silence specifically at the feet of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. “This is one of the biggest balls CISA, in particular, has dropped,” Aitel says. “The United States is good at protecting the government, OK at protecting corporations, but does not protect individuals.” He points out that many of the targeted security researchers likely had significant access to software vulnerabilities, enterprise networks, and the code of widely used tools. That could result, he says, in “the next SolarWinds.”
When WIRED reached out to CISA, a spokesperson responded in a statement that the agency “is committed to supporting the cybersecurity community in detecting and protecting against malicious cyber actors,” adding that "as part of this work, we encourage any researcher that is being targeted by cyber threats to contact the US government so we can provide all possible assistance.”
US government criticisms aside, P4x is clear that his hacking aims primarily to send a message to the Kim regime, which he describes as carrying out “insane human rights abuses and complete control over their population.” While he acknowledges that his attacks likely violate US computer fraud and hacking laws, he argues he hasn't done anything ethically wrong. “My conscience is clear,” he says.
And what's the final goal of his cyberattacks on that totalitarian government's internet infrastructure? When will he end them?
“Regime change. No, I'm just kidding,” P4x says with a laugh. “I just want to prove a point. I want that point to be very squarely proven before I stop.”
North Korea Hacked Him. So He Took Down Its Internet
Disappointed with the lack of US response to the Hermit Kingdom's attacks against US security researchers, one hacker took matters into his own hands.
Wired · by Condé Nast · February 2, 2022
For the past two weeks, observers of North Korea's strange and tightly restricted corner of the internet began to notice that the country seemed to be dealing with some serious connectivity problems. On several different days, practically all of its websites—the notoriously isolated nation only has a few dozen—intermittently dropped offline en masse, from the booking site for its Air Koryo airline to Naenara, a page that serves as the official portal for dictator Kim Jong-un's government. At least one of the central routers that allow access to the country's networks appeared at one point to be paralyzed, crippling the Hermit Kingdom's digital connections to the outside world.
But responsibility for North Korea's ongoing internet outages doesn't lie with US Cyber Command or any other state-sponsored hacking agency. In fact, it was the work of one American man in a T-shirt, pajama pants, and slippers, sitting in his living room night after night, watching Alien movies and eating spicy corn snacks—and periodically walking over to his home office to check on the progress of the programs he was running to disrupt the internet of an entire country.
Just over a year ago, an independent hacker who goes by the handle P4x was himself hacked by North Korean spies. P4x was just one victim of a hacking campaign that targeted Western security researchers with the apparent aim of stealing their hacking tools and details about software vulnerabilities. He says he managed to prevent those hackers from swiping anything of value from him. But he nonetheless felt deeply unnerved by state-sponsored hackers targeting him personally—and by the lack of any visible response from the US government.
So after a year of letting his resentment simmer, P4x has taken matters into his own hands. “It felt like the right thing to do here. If they don’t see we have teeth, it’s just going to keep coming,” says the hacker. (P4x spoke to WIRED and shared screen recordings to verify his responsibility for the attacks but declined to use his real name for fear of prosecution or retaliation.) “I want them to understand that if you come at us, it means some of your infrastructure is going down for a while.”
P4x says he's found numerous known but unpatched vulnerabilities in North Korean systems that have allowed him to singlehandedly launch “denial-of-service” attacks on the servers and routers the country's few internet-connected networks depend on. For the most part, he declined to publicly reveal those vulnerabilities, which he argues would help the North Korean government defend against his attacks. But he named, as an example, a known bug in the web server software NginX that mishandles certain HTTP headers, allowing the servers that run the software to be overwhelmed and knocked offline. He also alluded to finding “ancient” versions of the web server software Apache, and says he's started to examine North Korea's own national homebrew operating system, known as Red Star OS, which he described as an old and likely vulnerable version of Linux.
P4x says he has largely automated his attacks on the North Korean systems, periodically running scripts that enumerate which systems remain online and then launching exploits to take them down. “For me, this is like the size of a small-to-medium pentest,” P4x says, using the abbreviation for a “penetration test,” the sort of whitehat hacking he's carried out in the past to reveal vulnerabilities in a client's network. “It's pretty interesting how easy it was to actually have some effect in there.”
“If they don’t see we have teeth, it’s just going to keep coming.”
P4x, Hacker
Those relatively simple hacking methods have had immediate effects. Records from the uptime-measuring service Pingdom show that at several points during P4x's hacking, almost every North Korean website was down. (Some of those that stayed up, like the news site Uriminzokkiri.com, are based outside the country.) Junade Ali, a cybersecurity researcher who monitors the North Korean internet, says he began to observe what appeared to be mysterious, mass-scale attacks on the country's internet starting two weeks ago and has since closely tracked the attacks without having any idea who was carrying them out.
Ali says he saw key routers for the country go down at times, taking with them not only access to the country's websites but also to its email and any other internet-based services. “As their routers fail, it would literally then be impossible for data to be routed into North Korea,” Ali says, describing the result as “effectively a total internet outage affecting the country.” (P4x notes that while his attacks at times disrupted all websites hosted in the country and access from abroad to any other internet services hosted there, they didn’t cut off North Koreans’ outbound access to the rest of the internet.)
As rare as it may be for a single pseudonymous hacker to cause an internet blackout on that scale, it's far from clear what real effects the attacks have had on the North Korean government. Only a tiny fraction of North Koreans have access to internet-connected systems to begin with, says Martyn Williams, a researcher for the Stimson Center think tank's North Korea-focused 38 North Project. The vast majority of residents are confined to the country's disconnected intranet. Williams says the dozens of sites P4x has repeatedly taken down are largely used for propaganda and other functions aimed at an international audience.
While knocking out those sites no doubt presents a nuisance to some regime officials, Williams points out that the hackers who targeted P4x last year—like almost all the country's hackers—are almost certainly based in other countries, such as China. “I would say, if he's going after those people, he's probably directing his attentions to the wrong place,” says Williams. “But if he just wants to annoy North Korea, then he is probably being annoying.”
For his part, P4x says he would count annoying the regime as a success, and that the vast majority of the country's population that lacks internet access was never his target. “I definitely wanted to affect the people as little as possible and the government as much as possible,” P4x says.
He acknowledges that his attacks amount to no more than “tearing down government banners or defacing buildings,” as he puts it. But he also says that his hacking has so far focused on testing and probing to find vulnerabilities. He now intends to try actually hacking into North Korean systems, he says, to steal information and share it with experts. At the same time, he's hoping to recruit more hacktivists to his cause with a dark website he launched Monday called the FUNK Project—i.e. “FU North Korea”—in the hopes of generating more collective firepower.
“This is a project to keep North Korea honest,” the FUNK Project site reads. “You can make a difference as one person. The goal is to perform proportional attacks and information-gathering in order to keep NK from hacking the western world completely unchecked.”
P4x says his hacktivist efforts are meant to send a message not only to the North Korean government, but also his own. His cyberattacks on North Korean networks are, he says, in part an attempt to draw attention to what he sees as a lack of government response to North Korean targeting of US individuals. “If no one ’s going to help me, I’m going to help myself,” he says.
P4x knows the exact moment last year when he was hit by North Korea's spies. In late January of 2021, he opened a file sent to him by a fellow hacker, who had described it as an exploitation tool. Just 24 hours later, he spotted a blog post from Google Threat Analysis Group warning that North Korean hackers were targeting security researchers. Sure enough, when P4x scrutinized the hacking tool he'd received from a stranger, he saw that it contained a backdoor designed to provide a remote foothold on his computer. P4x had opened the file in a virtual machine, digitally quarantining it from the rest of his system. But he was nonetheless shocked and appalled by the realization that he'd been personally targeted by North Korea.
P4x says he was later contacted by the FBI but was never offered any real help to assess the damage from North Korea's hacking or to protect himself in the future. Nor did he ever hear of any consequences for the hackers who targeted him, an open investigation into them, or even a formal recognition from a US agency that North Korea was responsible. It began to feel, as he put it, like “there’s really nobody on our side.”
When WIRED asked the FBI about its response to the North Korean targeting of US security researchers, it responded in a statement: “As the lead agency responsible for threat response we rely on the public and private sector to report suspicious activity and intrusions, and work together to ensure we understand what’s happening, prevent it from happening to others, and hold those responsible accountable,” the FBI statement reads. “The FBI is committed to pursuing the malicious actors and countries behind cyberattacks, and will not tolerate intellectual property theft or intimidation.”
After his experience as a target of state-sponsored cyberespionage, P4x spent much of the next year on other projects. But after a year had passed, still without public or private statements from the federal government about the targeting of security researchers and no offer of support from any US agency, P4x says he decided it was time to make his own statement to both the North Korean and American governments.
Other hackers targeted by North Korea don't all agree that P4x's hacking spree is the right way to make that statement. Dave Aitel, a former NSA hacker and the founder of security firm Immunity, was similarly targeted in the same espionage campaign. But he questions whether P4x has taken a productive approach to getting even, given that he may actually be getting in the way of stealthier intelligence efforts targeting the same North Korean computers.
“I would not want to disrupt real Western intelligence efforts that are already in place on those machines, assuming there is anything of value there,” Aitel says.
Aitel agrees, though, that the government response to North Korea's campaign has been lacking. He says he never received any contact from a government agency and lays the blame for that silence specifically at the feet of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. “This is one of the biggest balls CISA, in particular, has dropped,” Aitel says. “The United States is good at protecting the government, OK at protecting corporations, but does not protect individuals.” He points out that many of the targeted security researchers likely had significant access to software vulnerabilities, enterprise networks, and the code of widely used tools. That could result, he says, in “the next SolarWinds.”
When WIRED reached out to CISA, a spokesperson responded in a statement that the agency “is committed to supporting the cybersecurity community in detecting and protecting against malicious cyber actors,” adding that "as part of this work, we encourage any researcher that is being targeted by cyber threats to contact the US government so we can provide all possible assistance.”
US government criticisms aside, P4x is clear that his hacking aims primarily to send a message to the Kim regime, which he describes as carrying out “insane human rights abuses and complete control over their population.” While he acknowledges that his attacks likely violate US computer fraud and hacking laws, he argues he hasn't done anything ethically wrong. “My conscience is clear,” he says.
And what's the final goal of his cyberattacks on that totalitarian government's internet infrastructure? When will he end them?
“Regime change. No, I'm just kidding,” P4x says with a laugh. “I just want to prove a point. I want that point to be very squarely proven before I stop.”
More Great WIRED Stories
Wired · by Condé Nast · February 2, 2022
7. Wendy Sherman denounces N. Korean missile tests in talks with S. Korean, Japanese counterparts
Wendy Sherman denounces N. Korean missile tests in talks with S. Korean, Japanese counterparts | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Feb. 1 (Yonhap) -- U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman on Tuesday denounced North Korea's recent missile tests in a telephone conversation with her South Korean and Japanese counterparts.
The U.S. diplomat, however, also reiterated U.S. readiness to engage with North Korea in diplomacy, according to state department spokesperson Ned Price.
"Deputy Secretary Sherman denounced the DPRK's recent and escalatory ballistic missile launches as violations of UN Security Council resolutions and destabilizing to the region and discussed ongoing efforts to achieve the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," Price said of Sherman's call with South Korea's First Vice Foreign Minister Choi Jong-kun and Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Mori Takeo.
"The Deputy Secretary highlighted the United States' continued readiness to engage in serious and sustained diplomacy with the DPRK in order to make tangible progress," he added in a press release.
DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the North's official name.
The three-way call came after North Korea launched an intermediate range ballistic missile on Sunday (Seoul time) that it later identified as a "Hwasong 12-type ground-to-ground intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile."
The launch marked the North's seventh missile test this year.
Sherman and her Japanese and South Korean counterparts highlighted the importance of cooperation between their countries in dealing with regional challenges, according to the department spokesperson.
"The Deputy Secretary and vice foreign ministers reaffirmed the importance of trilateral cooperation between the United States, the ROK, and Japan in tackling pressing challenges in the region and across the globe," he said, referring to South Korea by its official name, the Republic of Korea.
Price on Monday said the U.S. will continue to seek diplomacy with North Korea but also steps to hold the North accountable for its actions.
Earlier reports said the U.S. has called for a U.N. Security Council meeting to be held this week to discuss North Korea's recent series of missile tests.
The three-way conversation between the U.S., Japanese and South Korean vice foreign ministers also came after U.S. special representative for North Korea, Sung Kim, held discussions with his South Korean and Japanese counterparts, separately, over the weekend.
During his talks, the U.S. special envoy condemned North Korea's recent missile launch, but also stressed U.S. readiness for serious and sustained diplomacy with the North, the state department said.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
8. North Korea documentary makes rare admission that country is in the midst of ‘food crisis’
We should not misinterpret the Propaganda and Agitation Department and Kim Jong-un "frankness" and candor about the food situation. Note that the message is that the suffering is due to external factors and this is actually about both glorifying Kim Jong-un and reinforcing the juche ideology and the need to defend the north against all comers.
This is not about admitting fault or an indication that change is on the horizon. There is a paradox "in reform to survive:" The regime and the entire country need to reform economically in order to survive. Unfortunately those reforms are an existential threat to the regime and to make the necessary reforms will likely lead to the end of the regime.
Sadly, Kim Jong-un is likely to double down on his dual strategy of political warfare and development of warfighting capabilities- at the expense of the suffering Korean people in the north.
North Korea documentary makes rare admission that country is in the midst of ‘food crisis’
TOKYO — A new North Korean state media documentary made a rare mention of the country’s “food crisis,” a glimpse into the realities on the ground amid mounting reports of pressures caused by the country’s prolonged covid border lockdown.
The two-hour documentary is an annual production recapping the previous year’s biggest achievements and praising leader Kim Jong Un. It showed Kim visiting housing complex projects in Pyongyang, holding leadership meetings and attending military parades. The theme of the film changes every year depending on the regime’s priorities.
This year’s film, titled “The Great Year of Victory 2021,” aired on Tuesday and emphasized Kim’s work on the economy. The film acknowledged that “the country’s situation is more difficult than ever,” a sign that the country’s food shortage may now be a problem that can’t be glossed over.
The narrator described a meeting where Kim expressed his concern that “what is urgently needed in stabilizing the people’s livelihood is to relieve the tension created by the food supply,” and he called on emergency measures for the country’s “food crisis,” noting the country had dipped into its emergency grain supply. In June, Kim explicitly called the country’s food situation “tense.”
Kim’s recent weight loss was visible throughout the film, which oscillated between footage from his plumper days and more recent images that showed him dramatically thinner. Kim stunned observers this summer when he appeared in state media looking noticeably slimmer. The cause of Kim’s weight loss has not been revealed.
The film’s frank description of the food situation is consistent with Kim’s tendency to more explicitly describe the country’s problems than his predecessors, said Rachel Minyoung Lee, a former intelligence analyst based in South Korea and an expert in North Korean media propaganda.
For example, she said, it would have been unthinkable for a propaganda piece to use the term “food crisis” during the 1990s famine, which is believed to have been more dire than the current situation. The language then was more vague, she said.
“I’m not so sure, if we were living in Kim Jong Il’s era, that it would’ve been addressed at all,” Lee said, referring to Kim’s father. “We [now] see more explicit formulations of the reality on the ground.”
North Korea has had a self-imposed border lockdown during the coronavirus pandemic. It has severely restricted trade with China, its biggest economic partner, which has exacerbated a shortage of food, supplies and cash, hurting the country’s most vulnerable, experts say. North Korea appears to have taken steps to resume some level of ground-based trade with China, but the extent remains unclear.
In addition, Kim has imposed new measures that have further restricted internal economic activity, including intensifying crackdowns on people moving between provinces and the illegal use of cellphones, both of which have severely limited people’s ability to trade food and goods.
Read more:
9. North Korea Is Becoming an Asset for China
Important analysis that highlights the common objective for the north and China (and one which I think Russia favors too) and that is splitting the ROK/US alliance. We can see by north Korean actions how it is trying to drive a wedge in the alliance. This is a key part of its political warfare strategy and is also a necessary condition to support warfighting.
Most important is the concluding call for the US to be able to fight and win two wars simultaneously. We are back to the future!
My recommendations for addressing provocations are here.
A Strategy for Dealing with North Korea’s Provocations (2013) http://icks.org/n/data/ijks/1482461222_add_file_4.pdf
North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Test: A 6 Step Strategy To Respond (2022) https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/01/north-koreas-ballistic-missile-test-a-6-step-strategy-to-respond/
Excerpts:
To counter North Korea’s new missile threats and prevent them from helping China, the Biden administration needs a stronger North Korea strategy—one that deters further provocations, reassures South Korea, and demonstrates Washington’s continued resolve and credibility to Beijing. That means Washington must support South Korea’s efforts to advance its offensive capabilities, such as the development of nuclear-powered submarines. South Korea, meanwhile, must scale up its combined exercises with the United States. A stronger U.S.–South Korean alliance will improve the two countries’ combat readiness, which is especially critical at a time when North Korea appears to be building up to another round of ICBM and nuclear tests. Finally, closer ties would make it easier for the United States to marshal allies in its competition against China, including in the Taiwan Strait.
The United States should also use the renewed tensions on the Korean Peninsula to encourage closer Japanese–South Korean cooperation. Seoul has long had highly fraught relations with its former colonial ruler, and the two states have especially struggled to get along in recent years. But for better or worse, the Korean Peninsula, East China Sea, and Taiwan Strait are increasingly intertwined in the current era of strategic competition. Pyongyang's provocations against the United States and its allies on the peninsula can embolden the Chinese Communist Party to act in other regions. And if Beijing can weaken or defeat the United States and its Asian allies anywhere, both the Chinese Communist Party and the Kim regime will be emboldened to act on the peninsula. To cope with this changing security environment, it makes sense for strategists in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo to package these issues together. By demonstrating greater coordination, the three countries would also make it harder for China or North Korea to fracture Washington’s East Asia alliances, regardless of the contingency.
Finally, these three states must prepare for simultaneous provocations in East Asia, including concurrent conflicts in Taiwan and on the Korean Peninsula. In consultation with one another, the United States and its allies must demonstrate a strong willingness to cooperate and take strategic risks. They should hold more trilateral defense minister meetings, more thoroughly review various contingency scenarios, and discuss how to enhance their combined capabilities. Hopefully, these countries will never need to put these plans and abilities into practice. But to deter Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping, they need to prove that they can fight two wars—and win both—if the need arises.
North Korea Is Becoming an Asset for China
Pyongyang’s Missiles Could Fracture America’s Alliances
Foreign Affairs · by Sungmin Cho and Oriana Skylar Mastro · February 3, 2022
On January 30, North Korea fired an intermediate-range ballistic missile from the north province of Jagang, its seventh rocket test this year. At first glance, this may not seem like a huge deal. The rockets are not, after all, the nuclear bombs and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that North Korea has tested in the past. Russia is currently massing troops on the Ukrainian border, and COVID-19 cases are surging around the world thanks to the Omicron variant. By comparison, the launches may look like a lesser concern—just another routine military provocation from Pyongyang.
But the tests aren’t coming at a routine moment. Instead, they are occurring at a time of stark, rising competition between the United States and the Pacific’s other great power: China. Washington sold nuclear submarines to Australia as part of a new, trilateral security arrangement along with the United Kingdom. U.S. assistant secretary of defense Ely Ratner declared that deterring China from attacking Taiwan is “an absolute priority.” In explaining the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, U.S. President Joe Biden argued Washington needed to refocus its energy and resources on the “serious competition with China.” The pivot to Asia, long elusive, is clearly underway.
In this context, North Korea’s tests take on a new meaning—and it is dangerous for U.S. ambitions. The heightened threat of North Korean missile attacks incentivizes both Japan and South Korea to avoid alienating Beijing, which they hope will help keep Pyongyang in check. (China is North Korea’s main patron and sole ally.) It also means both Japan and South Korea are likely to redouble their militaries’ focus on Pyongyang rather than support U.S. operations elsewhere in Asia. And if the United States has to bolster its armed posture on the Korean Peninsula, whether to assuage Seoul’s and Tokyo’s fears, better deter North Korea, or fight in an actual conflict, Washington will need to reposition forces designed to constrain China elsewhere. Pyongyang’s weapons program was long seen as a liability for Beijing, given the erratic and unpredictable behavior of North Korea’s leaders. Now, it is becoming an asset.
For China, this switch comes at an opportune time. Under President Xi Jinping, Beijing has grown more impatient, expansionist, and belligerent. It is increasingly possible that China will try to seize control of Taiwan, especially since the peaceful unification of the mainland and the island is clearly no longer an option. Xi is closely watching the U.S. response to North Korea’s provocations and drawing lessons about Washington’s credibility. To prevent conflict in the Korean Peninsula and keep pace in its competition with Beijing, the United States will need to come up with new ways to unite its allies and prove its resolve in the region.
CRACKING THROUGH
North Korea’s latest rockets may not be capable of reaching the continental United States, but that hardly means they aren’t dangerous. Missile defense systems cannot see low-flying objects until they are near their targets, and this year’s first and second tests were of hypersonic advanced boost-glide vehicle missiles, which can travel at low altitudes, evade radar, and maneuver to avoid last-second interception. In the third test, the North Korean military successfully launched a missile off a moving train, indicating that Pyongyang can fire rockets from a mobile system, in turn making both tracking and targeting even more difficult (especially given the country’s vast railway system). In other words, these recent tests may have neutralized U.S. missile defense capabilities, such as the U.S.-deployed Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile system and the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system.
These capabilities were designed to protect Japan and, especially, South Korea. Their erosion comes at a tricky time for the United States’ relations with the latter. Biden has yet to designate a U.S. ambassador to Seoul, and he appointed a special envoy for North Korea only in May of last year. The president placed new sanctions on North Korea in December 2021, but they were human rights related and largely viewed as symbolic. In response to January’s missile threats, the Biden administration implemented its first weapons-related sanctions, but they were relatively limited in scope. Some South Korean analysts now believe that the administration discusses North Korean issues with Seoul not because it seriously intends to resolve them but more to persuade the South Korean government to help the United States compete against Beijing. South Koreans fear that the Biden administration’s prioritization of China comes at the expense of the denuclearization of North Korea.
North Korea has explicitly tied its missiles to U.S. involvement in Taiwan.
This is a welcome development for Beijing. Chinese analysts view South Korea as a weak link in the United States’ East Asian alliances, and Beijing is trying to divide Washington and Seoul through a combination of compliments and threats. In August 2020, Chinese media praised South Korea’s efforts to "be objective and keep its friendship with China," and several weeks later, Chinese scholars commended South Korea’s “kindness to China” in a time of “U.S. suppression.” But after South Korean President Moon Jae-in discussed Taiwan with Biden at their May 2021 summit, China’s Foreign Ministry warned South Korea not to “play with fire.” It is telling that Chinese scholars at a government-affiliated institute are arguing openly that China needs to raise the cost of South Korea’s cooperation with the United States on Taiwan.
North Korea’s missile capabilities are helping accomplish this task. The newer rockets more effectively threaten South Korea, and they increase Seoul’s doubts about the efficacy of U.S. deterrence. North Korea has explicitly tied its menacing assets to the issues surrounding the island. Pyongyang has publicly criticized the United States policies’ on Taiwan and threatened that “tragic consequences” will result from U.S. support. “The indiscreet meddling by the U.S. into the issue of Taiwan entails a potential danger of touching off a delicate situation on the Korean peninsula,” North Korea’s vice foreign minister said in a statement. These words could make Seoul think twice about backing the United States in the Taiwan Strait.
Japan is more difficult to split from Washington. But North Korea’s activities can certainly draw some of Japan’s attention away from Beijing. Although Tokyo was getting onboard with playing a greater role in deterring China and defending Taiwan, Japan’s Ministry of Defense has identified North Korea’s military capabilities as a “grave and imminent” threat, and there is no doubt that the government’s focus will shift if Pyongyang escalates its provocations. In the White House’s statement regarding Biden’s January 21 meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, Taiwan was mentioned only once. In comparison, the two leaders cited North Korea three times, condemned the country’s recent missile tests, and committed to work with South Korea more closely. Although Tokyo could theoretically focus on both North Korea and China, in practice it might struggle. Pyongyang poses a far more direct threat to Japanese lives and territory than does Beijing, and it would be hard for Japanese leaders to concentrate on China if North Korea grows more belligerent.
DRAWING THE HEAT
North Korea’s new capabilities don’t help Beijing just diplomatically. The tests provide tangible, military benefits. The United States has been attempting to enlist South Korea in its efforts to strengthen deterrence across the Taiwan Strait. But Pyongyang’s new missiles mean Seoul is less likely to focus its military somewhere other than North Korea, especially if it continues the provocations. Indeed, a South Korean expert on Chinese politics has argued that when Washington asks for support in its contest with Beijing, Seoul should explain that it is too busy handling Pyongyang.
To reassure its allies, the United States may also need to refocus military attention on the Korean Peninsula, reducing its ability to operate in other parts of Asia. In 2017, when North Korea conducted ICBM and nuclear tests, the United States responded by sending more strategic assets, including heavy naval power, near the Korean Peninsula. If tensions rise high enough, Washington may have to do so again, including by shifting the Seventh Fleet’s operational focus to the area. Stationed in the middle of Japan, this fleet has been one of the United States’ primary tools for deterring Beijing, conducting patrols near the Taiwan Strait and promoting freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. But given past positioning patterns, a crisis on the Korean Peninsula would also most certainly drag the fleet farther north, undermining Washington’s ability to carry out operations elsewhere.
A major war on the Korean Peninsula would prove particularly devastating to the United States’ competition with Beijing. In addition to the Seventh Fleet, the United States Forces Korea’s 28,000 soldiers, 40 F-16 fighters, 90 military aircrafts, 40 attack helicopters, and other assets would immediately become unavailable for operations beyond the peninsula. A majority of the United States Forces Japan’s aircraft, ships, and approximately 55,000 military personnel would also be deployed to Korea. Japan’s own military, which could help the United States if it needed to fight China, would grow busy providing combat support to protect U.S. naval forces—including antisubmarine operations and sea minesweeping—as U.S. troops prepared for an amphibious landing on the peninsula.
For China, a crisis on the Korean Peninsula would be a golden opportunity.
Beijing, by comparison, is in a better position. The United States has to worry that China will use a North Korea–spurred crisis to invade Taiwan, but the inverse isn’t true: Beijing isn’t concerned that Seoul or Washington will start a war over Taiwan if Pyongyang launches an attack. China’s commitment to North Korea is also not as comprehensive as the United States’ is to Seoul. In the event of a renewed Korean war, China plans to send mostly ground forces into the North. Its air and naval assets would remain focused across the Taiwan Strait.
For China, therefore, a crisis on the peninsula—especially one that evolves into a conflict—would be a golden opportunity to expand its power. It may even make it possible to defeat Taipei. With U.S. intelligence assets supporting troops in Korea, a Chinese amphibious force might be able to move on the island without giving the United States advanced warning. China could establish beachheads on Taiwan long before U.S. forces, bogged down on the peninsula, have time to arrive. The war’s eventual outcome would be a fait accompli.
North Korea’s latest tests may have already made a Chinese attack more likely. As Chinese media happily pointed out, Pyongyang’s January 11 missile launch briefly confused the United States Northern Command’s warning system, grounding some commercial airplanes for 15 minutes. China has the most advanced ballistic and cruise missile program in the world. If North Korea’s offensive strike capability can jeopardize the U.S. early warning system, it surely bodes well for Beijing’s ability to surprise and defeat Washington’s forces.
BETTER TOGETHER
To counter North Korea’s new missile threats and prevent them from helping China, the Biden administration needs a stronger North Korea strategy—one that deters further provocations, reassures South Korea, and demonstrates Washington’s continued resolve and credibility to Beijing. That means Washington must support South Korea’s efforts to advance its offensive capabilities, such as the development of nuclear-powered submarines. South Korea, meanwhile, must scale up its combined exercises with the United States. A stronger U.S.–South Korean alliance will improve the two countries’ combat readiness, which is especially critical at a time when North Korea appears to be building up to another round of ICBM and nuclear tests. Finally, closer ties would make it easier for the United States to marshal allies in its competition against China, including in the Taiwan Strait.
The United States should also use the renewed tensions on the Korean Peninsula to encourage closer Japanese–South Korean cooperation. Seoul has long had highly fraught relations with its former colonial ruler, and the two states have especially struggled to get along in recent years. But for better or worse, the Korean Peninsula, East China Sea, and Taiwan Strait are increasingly intertwined in the current era of strategic competition. Pyongyang's provocations against the United States and its allies on the peninsula can embolden the Chinese Communist Party to act in other regions. And if Beijing can weaken or defeat the United States and its Asian allies anywhere, both the Chinese Communist Party and the Kim regime will be emboldened to act on the peninsula. To cope with this changing security environment, it makes sense for strategists in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo to package these issues together. By demonstrating greater coordination, the three countries would also make it harder for China or North Korea to fracture Washington’s East Asia alliances, regardless of the contingency.
Finally, these three states must prepare for simultaneous provocations in East Asia, including concurrent conflicts in Taiwan and on the Korean Peninsula. In consultation with one another, the United States and its allies must demonstrate a strong willingness to cooperate and take strategic risks. They should hold more trilateral defense minister meetings, more thoroughly review various contingency scenarios, and discuss how to enhance their combined capabilities. Hopefully, these countries will never need to put these plans and abilities into practice. But to deter Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping, they need to prove that they can fight two wars—and win both—if the need arises.
Foreign Affairs · by Sungmin Cho and Oriana Skylar Mastro · February 3, 2022
10. South Korea’s Pursuit of an End of War Declaration Amidst the Unfinished Task of POW and Abductee Repatriation
Not enough people stay focused on the ROK POW and abduction issue. Thank you to Dr. O for highlighting these issues.
South Korea’s Pursuit of an End of War Declaration Amidst the Unfinished Task of POW and Abductee Repatriation - by Tara O
The Moon Jae-in Administration, despite most South Koreans not supporting this position, has been lobbying the US to declare a formal end to the Korean War and to sign a “peace treaty” with North Korea, without North Korea reducing its threats or complying with the existing armistice. Such a declaration is hasty and dangerous. One of the key issues during the armistice negotiations was the prisoner of war (POW) issue. This essay will focus on the need for accountability and the return of POWs and missing personnel from the Korean War as well as those abducted by North Korea.
The Korean War began when North Korea, under Kim Il-sung, attacked South Korea on June 25, 1950, with the permission of the USSR’s Joseph Stalin and China’s Mao Zedong. The UN quickly passed a resolution to defend South Korea from communist aggression, and the UN Command, led by the US, was formed. Sixteen Sending States sent combat forces to the UN Command, and more countries sent additional support to defend the Republic of Korea (ROK) or South Korea.
Initially, well equipped with Soviet-supplied tanks and weapons, North Korea’s Korean People’s Army (KPA) almost overran all of South Korea, pushing the UN forces to the Busan Perimeter in the southeast corner of the Korean peninsula. After the successful amphibious Marine landing in Incheon on September 15, 1950, the UN forces advanced northward almost to the Yalu River, on the border with China. By November, China sent poorly equipped but numerous armed Chinese—the so-called Chinese Volunteer Force—to Korea, pushing the UN forces back. Ceasefire began when an armistice was signed on July 27, 1953 by the military representatives of the UN Command on one side and the KPA and Chinese Volunteer Force on the other side.
A major issue on the agenda during the armistice talks was the POW exchange. The negotiating parties agreed to exchange a list of the names of POWs first. The UN Command provided 132,000 names, which include some 20,000 Chinese. The communist side (China and North Korea) provided only 11,559 names (ROK: 7,142, US: 3,198, UK: 919, other Sending States: 300), which was a gross undercount, shocking and outraging the American public.
Admiral C. Turner Joy, in his book How Communists Negotiate, wrote that in the earlier part of the war, North Korean and Chinese communists captured about 100,000 UN Command POWs, and they even claimed that they captured 65,000 UN soldiers, as they bragged on their propaganda radio broadcast during the early part of the war. So 11,559 was a major understatement and revealed their intention of not returning the majority of POWs.
The official US figure for missing personnel (MIA) at that time was 11,224 and for South Korea, it was about 82,000. The UN Commission of Inquiry’s report on human rights in North Korea shows the ROK POW estimate to be 50,000-70,000, far higher than the 7,142 that North Korea provided.
If the North Korean figures are to be believed, more than 8,000 American troops and about 73,000 South Korean soldiers died after they were captured. But is it the case? What happened to over 70% (8,000/11,224) of missing American troops and almost 90% (73,000/82,000) of missing South Korean soldiers, not to mention other UN MIAs?
Certainly, many POWs did die in the hands of North Koreans and Chinese during the Korean War, and the atrocities are recorded in Philip Chinnery’s book Korean Atrocity! Forgotten War Crimes 1950-1953 as well as in war crimes records of the US government. For instance, the Korean War Crimes case number 75 (KWC 75) describes numerous American soldiers losing their lives during the “death march” from Seoul to Pyongyang from September 26 to October 10, 1950 due to starvation, lack of medical care, beatings, and summary executions by the North Korean military. Of 376 men, only 296 survived in this instance. In another war crimes case, this time by the Chinese (KWC 113), a lieutenant survivor described what he witnessed on November 8, 1950: the Chinese took his wounded men, hung them up by their hands, and set their clothes on fire, and when they became unconscious or died, stuck bayonets and sticks into their eyes. Even assuming some died in battles with their remains unrecovered, it is highly unlikely that such a large percentage died by the time the list of POW names was exchanged.
The explanation for this discrepancy is simple: North Korea did not return the majority of POWs. Chinnery writes that some POWs, such as F-86 pilots, were handed over to the Soviet military as soon as they were captured for intelligence purposes, and after that, they were sent to gulags for hard labor or used for chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons testing. Some of the POWs were sent to China. For instance, a compound with two camps in China held about 900 non-Korean POWs, mostly from the US, the UK, and Turkey. The majority of POWs languished and suffered in camps in North Korea.
According to the US Defense POW/MIA Accountability Agency, 7,554 US military personnel are still missing from the Korean War, after the return of some of the POWs’ remains. In the case of the ROK POWs, North Korea returned only 8,300 as part of a POW exchange. That means North Korea did not return about 42,000-74,000 ROK POWs. Those POWs were forced into the North Korean military during the war, and after the armistice, forced into hard labor in mines. According to the ROK Ministry of Defense estimate, about 500 ROK POWs are believed to be still alive in North Korea.
An ROK soldier, Yoo Young-bok, who was captured by the KPA in June 1953, escaped from North Korea after 47 years of hard labor working in mines. He is one of over 80 ROK POWs who escaped from North Korea to South Korea. The majority of them have since passed away, and there were about 11 remaining in South Korea as of March 2021. Yoo said some of the ROK POWs were absorbed into construction units within North Korea’s Department of Interior and sent to work in mines. There were nine construction units with 400-600 in each unit, which would equate to as many as 5,400 ROK POWs. He and other POWs working in harsh mine conditions believed that they would not be forgotten, that their country would bring them back. That was not to be.
In addition to the POWs, North Korea abducted over 80,000 ROK civilians during the war, forcing many of them into the North Korean military or using them for the skills that North Korea lacked after it purged the “class enemies” from its own ranks of skilled personnel. The Korean War Abductees Research Institute has compiled the names of 112,625 South Koreans whom North Korea abducted prior to the armistice and afterward. North Korea also abducted Japanese citizens, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, and the Japanese government has been demanding their return. Since the Korean War is technically not over, all these kidnappings are war crimes. During the armistice negotiations, North Korea denied there were any civilian abductees. None taken during the 1950-53 period were returned after the armistice was signed.
Before any discussions about an end of war declaration, the matters of the UN POWs and the civilians abducted by North Korea should be resolved. These are unfinished issues of the armistice and the Korean War. Families still await to see their loved ones if they are alive, and want closure if they are deceased. The POWs and abductees deserve to be remembered.
11. Conventional forces a threat as dangerous as North Korea’s missiles, expert warns
LTG Champoux reminds of the need to focus on the other half of the regime's dual strategy of political warfare and development of advanced military capabilities to support warfighting. We must not overlook the regime's conventional forces and the threat they pose to the security of the ROK.
Excerpts:
“A lot of direct fire weapons could cause catastrophic casualties, because [Seoul’s] size, proximity and population density to North Korea,” Mr. Champoux told “The Washington Brief,” a virtual, monthly event series hosted by The Washington Times Foundation.
The former general stressed that the damage from a North Korean attack has been amplified by Seoul’s dramatic population and economic growth. The city had just more than a million residents when the Korean War was frozen by an early-1950s armistice. It has since expanded in all directions, including northward toward the DMZ, to a metropolitan area of nearly 27 million people.
“The threat is not only North Korea ICBMs, but also the presence and closeness of a very large [North Korean] army and its conventional weapons staring into Seoul’s backyard,” he said. “The alliance … could not respond in a time of crisis, without the U.S. force presence on the Korean peninsula.”
Conventional forces a threat as dangerous as North Korea’s missiles, expert warns
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North Korea last month sparked global fears with renewed testing of hypersonic projectiles and ballistic missiles capable of targeting American cities, but a former top U.S. military official in the region warns that Pyongyang’s less flashy, conventional forces also pose an urgent threat to South Korea that Washington must not ignore.
Retired Army Lt. Gen. Bernard Champoux, a former chief of staff of U.S. troops in South Korea, emphasized during a panel discussion this week that North Korea’s conventional forces near the demilitarized zone dividing the Korean peninsula still pose a massive threat to millions living in and around the South Korean capital of Seoul.
“A lot of direct fire weapons could cause catastrophic casualties, because [Seoul’s] size, proximity and population density to North Korea,” Mr. Champoux told “The Washington Brief,” a virtual, monthly event series hosted by The Washington Times Foundation.
The former general stressed that the damage from a North Korean attack has been amplified by Seoul’s dramatic population and economic growth. The city had just more than a million residents when the Korean War was frozen by an early-1950s armistice. It has since expanded in all directions, including northward toward the DMZ, to a metropolitan area of nearly 27 million people.
“The threat is not only North Korea ICBMs, but also the presence and closeness of a very large [North Korean] army and its conventional weapons staring into Seoul’s backyard,” he said. “The alliance … could not respond in a time of crisis, without the U.S. force presence on the Korean peninsula.”
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has used a battery of missile firings to remind the world of the threat he poses and give President Biden, who has tried to keep the Korean problem on the back burner in his first year in office, a fresh foreign policy headache to address.
Pyongyang on Sunday test-fired what experts are calling the most powerful missile since Mr. Biden took office more than a year ago.
Analysts described the projectile as an intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of reaching the U.S. territory of Guam.
The Associated Press reported that flight details suggested the launch was North Korea‘s longest-range missile test since 2017, when Pyongyang twice flew intermediate-range ballistic missiles over Japan and separately flight-tested three intercontinental-range ballistic missiles that demonstrated the potential range to reach deep into the American homeland.
Sunday’s launch followed two recent tests that analysts have described as “hypersonic” missiles by North Korea, and was the seventh launch in January after a period of quiet and diplomatic drift as the Biden administration has settled into office.
Others who spoke during Tuesday’s “Washington Brief” event emphasized that the Kim regime has continued developing ICBM and nuclear capabilities in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, all while keeping up North Korea’s conventional forces that directly threaten South Korea.
The Washington Brief’s regular panel includes former CIA official and longtime U.S. diplomatic adviser Joseph DeTrani; Alexandre Mansourov, an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies; and former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Christopher Hill, who moderates the monthly event series and has been nominated by Mr. Biden to be the next ambassador to Serbia.
“What [North Korea] could do to Seoul within a period of a few hours, even shorter than a few hours, could be horrific,” said Mr. DeTrani.
However, the former CIA official stressed that Pyongyang’s advanced weapons program and testing are particularly destabilizing for the U.S. and the region. Mr. Kim, he said, is moving toward ending an informal moratorium on ICBM and nuclear weapons tests that the North Korean leader has had in place since his 2018 Singapore summit with former President Donald Trump. The North’s more recent development of “hypersonics” is particularly disturbing, Mr. DeTrani said.
“This is a capability, a missile, that could prove to be very challenging for any missile defense system, whether it’s [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system] THAAD or Patriot Missiles,” he said, in reference to missile defense batteries U.S. forces have positioned in the region.
“North Korea is moving very, very quickly into these areas,” said Mr. DeTrani, expressing frustration that China and Russia are not pressing Pyongyang more forcefully to pull back.
“My personal sense is they will be moving toward an ICBM launch and another nuclear test and we will go to the U.N. Security Council for additional sanctions, and there will be no unanimity because I think China and Russia will say, ‘No, we’re not there,’” he said, adding that the U.S., South Korea and Japan should be pushing for a five-way meeting with China and Russia present to discuss danger posed to all by the North Korean provocations.
“We need to come together with some sort of unanimity because I don’t think anybody wants to see, if you will, greater escalation on the Korean peninsula,” Mr. DeTrani said.
Mr. Champoux, meanwhile, called on U.S. officials to publicly renounce the idea of removing American forces from South Korea, a prospect Mr. Trump floated as he pressed South Korea to pay more of the cost of housing the U.S. troops and hinted that their presence could be a bargaining chip in negotiations with the North.
“I just don’t think we should barter the U.S. presence on the peninsula,” said Mr. Champoux. “… A capable alliance, with competent military leadership, a trained and ready, combined U.S.[-South Korean] force, a credible extended deterrent, and a prepared U.S.-joint force on the peninsula to rapidly meet crisis timelines, are essential to keeping the [North Korea] at bay.”
He added that U.S. forces should be prepared to stay in South Korea until the day that North and South are reunited. “In my humble opinion,” the former general said, “the perfect time to start considering the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean peninsula is after reunification and not a minute before.”
• David R. Sands contributed to this report.
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12. North Korea mocks US overtures for diplomacy in wake of January missile tests
I know it is unsatisfying for me to say this and will likely be criticized since it is not part of the bandwagon criticizing Biden administration Korea policy but this may be an indication that Kim fears diplomacy as a threat to the regime. The Biden administration has been occupying the high ground with its consistent offers of talks anywhere, anytime, without pre-conditions. While pundits criticize this for not achieving results in the short term, I think the conditions may be created that drive internal pressure on Kim. His statements and those of the Propaganda and Agitation Department are meant to try to undermine the legitimacy of the US position and actions. Some ROK and US pundits and the press may unwittingly be supporting KJU objectives (but their critiques remain important not just because they reinforce our values of freedom of the press/expression but because the critiques sharpen the policy - "that which does not kill me makes me stronger-" Nietzsche)
North Korea mocks US overtures for diplomacy in wake of January missile tests
A North Korean missile is launched in this image released by the state-run Korean Central News Agency, Friday, Jan. 28, 2022. (KCNA)
The North Korean Foreign Ministry scorned diplomatic overtures from Washington, D.C., this week and advised it “to halt its military threat to our country."
The ministry’s Wednesday statement mocked the “so-called ‘diplomatic solution’ and ‘dialogue,’” called for by the United States after a burst of missile tests by North Korea in January. The statement cited the presence of U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula and their joint military drills with South Korea.
“It is a universal knowledge that the failure of the situation on the Korean Peninsula to easily be out of the whirlwind of aggravated tension just lies in the U.S. hostile policy towards [North Korea],” the ministry’s statement said.
U.S. officials have invited Pyongyang to negotiations without preconditions throughout seven rounds of missile tests by the communist regime so far this year.
The U.S. is concerned about North Korea’s ballistic missile and weapons programs, and imposed further sanctions because of the continuing weapons tests, State Department spokesman Ned Price said Monday. But a door remains open to diplomatic talks, he added.
The U.S. “developed an approach that, at its center, seeks to find a diplomatic means by which to achieve the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” Price said at a press briefing.
The White House repeated the message the next day. “The door to diplomacy remains open and we have conveyed that clearly,” spokeswoman Jen Psaki said at a media briefing.
Their comments followed North Korea’s latest test of an intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of reaching the U.S. territory of Guam.
The North fired a Hwasong-12 missile on Sunday, its first launch of that type since 2017, the state-run Korean Central News Agency said. The missile flew about 500 miles at an altitude of 1,240 miles, according to South Korean military officials.
The test was a success, according to KCNA, which called the missile a defensive weapon.
The launch earned a reprimand from South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who has stopped short in recent months of fully criticizing the regime amid ongoing talks to formally end the 1950-53 Korean War.
“North Korea must immediately stop actions that create tensions,” South Korea’s presidential Blue House said in a statement Sunday.
The U.N. Secretary-General also condemned the missile launch as “a clear violation” of Security Council resolutions.
“It is of great concern that [North Korea] has again disregarded any consideration for international flight or maritime safety,” Farhan Haq, the deputy spokesperson for the Secretary-General, said in a statement Tuesday. “The Secretary-General urges [North Korea] to desist from taking any further counter-productive actions and calls for all parties to seek a peaceful diplomatic solution.”
David Choi
13. N.Korea Goes Missile-Crazy
Maybe Kim is pining for some Patsy Cline:
Crazy
Crazy, I'm crazy for feeling so lonely
I'm crazy, crazy for feeling so blue
I knew you'd love me as long as you wanted
And then someday you'd leave me for somebody new
Worry, why do I let myself worry?
Wondering what in the world did I do?
Crazy for thinking that my love could hold you
I'm crazy for trying and crazy for crying
And I'm crazy for loving you
Crazy for thinking that my love could hold you
I'm crazy for trying and crazy for crying
And I'm crazy for loving you
N.Korea Goes Missile-Crazy
February 03, 2022 13:17
North Korea fired seven different types of missiles last month in a frenzy of fireworks to show off its capability to strike South Korea.
Early this week, the North fired a Hwasong-12 mid-range ballistic missile for the first time in four years. Experts believe it is only a matter of time before it launches an intercontinental ballistic missile as well.
North Korean state media said the launch was a random test aimed at checking the quality of its missile arsenal. The Hwasong-12 is believed to have a range of 4,500 km to 5,000 km. The latest one flew to an altitude of 2,000 km and traveled 800 km.
A missile is being fired on Jan. 30, in this photo from the North's official Rodong Sinmun the following day.
Earlier the North also fired two supposedly hypersonic KN-23 missiles and a long-range cruise missile, a KN-24 surface-to-surface missile and a Hwasong-12.
In January of 2021, North Korea set as its key military objectives the development of a hypersonic missile, solid-fuel ICBM, multi-warhead ICBM, submarine-launched ballistic missile, long-range rocket and unmanned surveillance drone.
The North's official Korean Central News Agency said Tuesday that defense scientists "completed the most important core objective" of developing a hypersonic missile.
North Korea's tactic of mixing the types of missiles it launches could make it extremely difficult for the U.S.' Patriot PAC-3 missiles and Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system and South Korea's Cheongung surface-to-air missile defenses to thwart an attack.
South Korea and the U.S. are on alert for further provocations by North Korea marking the 80th birthday of former leader Kim Jong-il on Feb. 16 and the 100th birthday of nation founder Kim Il-sung on April 15.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (second from right), his wife Ri Sol-ju (third from right) and his aunt Kim Kyong-hui (second from left) attend a performance marking the Lunar New Year, in this grab from [North] Korean Central Television on Wednesday.
Meanwhile, state TV showed leader Kim Jong-un's aunt Kim Kyong-hui re-emerging to watch a Lunar New Year performance with Kim and his wife, Ri Sol-ju. It was the first time in two years that Kim Kyong-hui has appeared in public. Her husband, Jang Song-thaek, was notoriously executed in 2013.
- Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com
14. S. Korea detects no notable sign of N.K. preparation for ICBM launch
Yet.
S. Korea detects no notable sign of N.K. preparation for ICBM launch | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Feb. 3 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's military has detected no notable sign of North Korea preparing for an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test, a Seoul official said Thursday, amid concerns about the nuclear-armed nation's veiled threat to break its moratorium on strategic provocation.
The recalcitrant and unpredictable Kim Jong-un regime launched what it calls the "Hwasong 12-type intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile" on Sunday, stoking worries it could engage in more provocative actions down the road, such as an ICBM test likely under the disguise of a satellite launch.
"At this point, there isn't any notable change or activity (in the North)," the military official said on condition of anonymity, when asked if there have been any indications of preparations for an ICBM launch.
Since the start of this year, Pyongyang has conducted seven known rounds of missile tests. Sunday's launch marked the North's biggest weapons test since its ICBM test in November 2017.
Some observers said that the North could stage a major show of force in time for its key national holidays -- the 80th birthday of current North Korean leader's late father Kim Jong-il, on Feb. 16 and the 110th birthday of his late grandfather Kim Il-sung on April 15.
Instead of firing a long-range missile launch, the North could also stage a military parade to showcase an assortment of formidable weapons systems during either of the two national holidays, observers said.
Last month, another South Korean military official told reporters that the North appears to be making preparations for a military parade, which he said were in their "early stage."
During Thursday's regular press briefing, Joint Chiefs of Staff spokesperson Col. Kim Jun-rak said the intelligence authorities of South Korea and the United States are keeping close tabs on North Korea's military movements related to its nuclear military facilities.
"But there has been no noteworthy change thus far," Kim said.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
15. High demand for illegal Chinese phones in North Korea as trade resumes
This bodes well for those who think we should focus on influence activities.
High demand for illegal Chinese phones in North Korea as trade resumes
Prices fell dramatically during the pandemic but now used phones can cost more than $1,500.
By Jieun Kim
2022.02.02
As trade between North Korea and China begins to reopen, demand for illegal Chinese cellular phones is skyrocketing in areas near the Yalu River border, sources there told RFA.
Mobile phones that are sold legally in North Korea cannot make international calls, creating a huge market for phones that can get a signal from Chinese cell towers on the other side of the border.
The phones were particularly popular with people who made their living by importing Chinese goods. But demand dropped precipitously when the border closed and trade stopped in January 2020 as a prevention against COVID’s spread.
Now that rail freight between the two countries has resumed, the Chinese phones are once again hot-ticket items in Sinuiju, a North Korean city that lies across the Yalu River from China’s Dandong.
“No new Chinese mobile phones have come in since the start of the pandemic,” a resident of Sinuiju told RFA’s Korean Service on Jan. 29.
“There is suddenly a large market for older mobile phones that were imported before the pandemic. Depending on the year of release and how well the phone works, prices can range from 4,000 to 10,000 yuan [U.S. $630-$1,570],” said the source, who requested anonymity for security reasons.
With fewer people trying to call China over the past two years, Chinese phones could be bought relatively cheaply up until the end of 2021, the source said.
“Even phones on sale for less than $300 on the black market did not sell,” he said. “But when news spread that trade between our two countries would soon resume, traders and smugglers were now looking to get their hands on a Chinese phone, so now the price for the cheapest used one is more than like $650,” he said.
The steep price increase was jarring for a trader who visited Sinuiju from South Pyongan, the next province to the south.
“Demand for illegal Chinese phones shot up. Things had been quiet for a long while in the Sinuiju area,” the trader said on condition of anonymity.
“The crackdown on these illegal phones has not been relaxed at all, but so many people are looking for them because freight trade has resumed,” she said. The source confirmed the approximate price range as quoted by the first source.
South Korean phones that work on the Chinese towers are also available, the business traveler from South Pyongan said, but prices are even higher, ranging from $1,700 to $3,000.
“If they find a South Korean mobile phone in a crackdown, people may be subject for severe punishment, because they are using South Korean products. Traders and smugglers, though, prefer the South Korean phones over the Chinese ones because they have various additional functions and better call quality,” she said.
“Telephone brokers are starting to resume their business. They have several Chinese mobile phones and North Korean escapees contact them from abroad to get in touch with their families still living here, and they act as go-betweens when the escapees wire money to their families,” she said.
The resumption of trade between North Korea and China can’t come faster for North Koreans who have struggled under their country’s dire economic circumstances over the past two years, the trader said.
“Once trade is normalized the lives of the people will get better. Trade in smuggled black-market goods will increase and people will be able to receive overseas wire transfers thanks to these illegal mobile phones. People are eagerly awaiting,” she said.
While the exact number of illegal phone users in North Korea is unknown, the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, which interviewed 414 North Koreans in the South, reported that 47% of them were in constant contact with their families in the North in 2018. Of those, about 93% said they called their families on the phone.
In the same survey, 62% said they had sent money to North Korea. Based on their answers, the center estimated that refugees in the South send about 2.7 million South Korean won (U.S. $2,260) back home about twice per year.
According to South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, about 33,000 North Koreans have settled in South Korea since 1998.
Translated by Claire Lee and Leejin Jun. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
