Challenges in Reforming the Ukrainian Defense and Security Sector
By Volodymyr Havrylov
Major-General (Ret.)
April
,
2020
The coronavirus pandemic has temporarily distracted the attention of experts and society from the problems of the Ukrainian defense and security sector even though there is much to be concerned about in this area.
For example, Ukraine still has to adopt formally a national security strategy. Article 26 of the 2018 law “On National Security” requires that a strategy be developed within six months of a new president taking office (November 20, 2019, in President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s case). But a draft of the strategy document was only reviewed at a meeting of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC) on January 17, 2020, and there has been no further news about its progress.
Former Minister of Defense, Andriy Zahorodniuk, served for an unprecedentedly short term (from August 29, 2019 to March 4, 2020) and the president provided no explanation for his removal from office.
The formation of the state defense procurement order for 2020 has ground to a halt somewhere within the government bodies responsible for the process. This is hurting companies in the military-industrial sector which have been forced to halt production.
The Ukrainian media is actively discussing the conflict between the new defense minister, Andriy Taran, and the Reform Projects Office of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. Since its inception in 2015 this volunteer initiative has been the sole generator of ideas for the comprehensive reform of the ministry.
The office was abolished on April 10.
All of this reveals the lack of a systematic approach and a well-prepared mechanism for the exercise of the President of Ukraine’s authority in the sphere of national defense and security. Furthermore, it should be understood that reform of these sectors will become increasingly necessary in the context of the economic crisis that is gradually enveloping every country in the world as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Ukraine’s Western partners are interested that under these circumstances Ukraine should be fully capable of countering Russian military aggression without being critically dependent on Western military aid. This relates both to the military and the defense industrial complex, especially since over the next two or three years neither the US or Europe will have the capacity to provide substantial assistance to Ukraine.
The inevitable reduction of the Ukrainian budget will sooner or later also affect the defense sector. Questions will arise over how to provide military security in an environment of diminished resources. Should, for example, funds be spent on supporting 260,000 service personnel with minimum social provisions and basic equipment or should the same amount be spent on a military of 100,000 but with an appropriate, motivational level of social support, modern weaponry and training?
A reduction of the armed forces with a simultaneous increase in their quality and effectiveness should be fundamental to any reform of the defense and security sector. But this will require more than simply fulfilling the annual national programs developed under the aegis of the Ukraine-NATO Commission.
Such a change will require a rе-evaluation of the model for confronting the military threat from Russia, and the adoption of creative steps regarding the methods and means of conducting combat operations that take into consideration new technologies and, accordingly, new calculations of the numbers, composition and structure of the way by which the armed forces are equipped.
All of this will require a different quality of leadership within the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and, accordingly, an understanding of the issues at stake by the President, Government, and Parliament of Ukraine.
The President of Ukraine as Supreme Commander in Chief of the Armed forces of Ukraine should provide the principal impulse for these reforms. Previous experience reveals that delegating responsibility and the initiative for implementing reform to the military leadership and the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) will not produce the desired results. The process requires strict vertical management.
Reform of the defense and security sector over the past five years was carried out not so much at the initiative of the country’s political leadership as by representatives of civil society, individual mid-level military officers and under pressure from NATO member countries, especially the US. That was the case with the development of the Concept for a Ukraine-US Defense Partnership for the period to 2021 (signed in 2016), the passage of law on the national security of Ukraine in 2018, the reform of the State Concern “Ukroboronprom”, and changes to the weapons procurement system.
The basic challenges holding back reform in the Ukrainian defense and security during that time were:
- The absence of political will and a clear understanding by the highest state leadership regarding the need for deep defense sector reforms, especially under conditions of war with Russia.
- The appointment to leading positions in the defense ministry of individuals on the basis of political expediency. These people, as a rule, were not interested in implementing radical reforms that brought with them risks of damaging their political image or reputation.
- The absence in the Administration (and later Office) of the President of Ukraine of an official with the strategic vision and necessary authority for promoting defense sector reforms. The NSDC, as a presidential organ for coordinating national security and defense policy, cannot perform this function.
- A passive government position and the absence of a deputy prime minister responsible for defense policy.
- The unpreparedness of the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces for radical changes in personnel that would have seen the appointment to key positions officers displaying initiative, such as those trained in NATO and US military institutions.
- A lack of personnel, especially in the higher ranks, familiar with contemporary planning methods and management in the defense and security sector. The current Ukrainian system of military education has not yet adapted to the real challenges facing the armed forces and is not able to address this shortage.
All of these problems are still very real. Their resolution will require political will and decisive steps at the highest state level. However, at present there is a continuation of the tendency to distance the Office of the President from direct management of reforms in the defense and security sector and to delegate initiatives in this area to the services and the NSDC.
Experience shows that this inevitably leads to an imbalance in the system, the slowing of already adopted reform measures, a deterioration in the number of staff initiatives and, as a result, an irrational use of already limited resources. The Supreme Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine should know about this, understand the consequences - and act accordingly.
Major General Volodymyr Havrylov served as Defense Attaché at the Ukrainian Embassy to the United States in 2015-2018. He is currently a Director of the Veterans Dozen Foundation and serves on the Board of Advisors to the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation.
