Quebec's Truchon decision did more than strike down the "reasonable foreseeability of natural death" criterion in Canada's medical assistance in dying legislation. It also gutted two crucial legislative objectives.

While the Truchon decision is not yet available to the public in English, paragraph 555 can unofficially be translated as follows:

"The court cannot accept the... objectives put forth by the Attorney General relating to affirming the inherent and equal value of every person's life and preventing suicide. As in Carter the court considers these objectives to be overly broad and to serve mainly as value statements..."

When considered in light of the Vulnerable Persons Standard, these objectives cannot be so easily dismissed. Ensuring that all lives, however they are lived, have inherent dignity and are worthy of respect is not merely symbolic. The same stands for preventing suicide. These are real and consequential objectives that warrant weighty consideration.

Legal scholars Trudo Lemmens and Laverne Jacobs wrote, in an October 9 ^th submission to The Conversation, that

"As a result [of rejecting the explicitly stated goals of the law, Justice Baudouin] failed to evaluate whether the broader societal impact of an expansive MAiD regime could justify the current restriction of end-of-life. Parliament explicitly introduced this restriction to balance the autonomy of people requesting physician assisted deaths with the need to protect the interests of vulnerable people, as well as the broader societal interests of avoiding negative perceptions and preventing suicide."

The lower court decision in Truchon calls into question whether anything short of open and unfettered access to medically assisted death will be considered constitutionally compliant. For example, if Parliament were to tie an end-of-life criterion directly to the legislative objective of promoting the equal right to live with dignity and respect, could it stand? If Canada wanted to prevent the suicide of even the most marginalized or seemingly expendable Canadians through an end-of-life criterion, could it stand? An appeal of the decision, or a reference to the Supreme Court, could resolve this uncertainty.

Indeed, an open letter to the Attorney General signed by more than 70 community organizations cautioned:

"In fully rejecting [these objectives], the court has limited the authority of Parliament to govern toward an inclusive and equitable Canada. This is a dangerous precedent. Is it reasonable for Parliament to limit... autonomy in order to promote the interests of... equality and inclusion? Without an appeal, we may never know."