Quotes of the Day:
"For those looking for security, be forewarned that there's nothing more insecure than a political promise."
- Harry Browne (June 17, 1933 – March 1, 2006) was an American libertarian best-selling writer, politician, and free-market investment analyst.
"To improve is to change, so to be perfect is to have changed often."
- Winston Churchill
Expose yourself to your deepest fear. After that, fear has no power, and fear of freedom shrinks and vanishes. You are free.
- Jim Morrison
1. Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: February KOREA
2. South Korea’s ‘Doves’ Seek Peace Through Strength
3. A Primer on North Korea’s Hwasong-12 ‘Guam Killer’ Ballistic Missile
4. N. Korea renews call for U.S. to end 'hostile policy'
5. North's barrage of missile tests raises alarm bells
6. US asks UN to meet on North Korea’s long-range missile test
7. Why the Kim regime just won’t die: a primer
8. Kim Jong Un's wife Ri Sol Ju makes first public appearance in five months
9. N. Korean leader Kim attends concert glorifying his power
10. Why did Egypt choose to buy South Korea’s K9 howitzer?
11. Yearly ‘battle’ begins in North Korea over human waste for fertilizer
12. Blinken condemns N. Korean missile launch in call with Japanese counterpart
13. U.N. secretary-general condemns N. Korea's latest missile launch: statement
14. What North Korea’s Missile Testing Means for the Korean Peninsula
15. Opinion - North Korea, Perpetual Victim of the US Military-Industrial Complex
1. Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: February KOREA
Access the Korea section HERE.
Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: February
Korea
By David Maxwell
Previous Trend: Neutral
Pyongyang began 2022 by conducting seven separate tests of missiles designed to strike targets in South Korea and beyond. Continued testing is likely.
After the first test, the Biden administration responded by designating five North Koreans operating in China and Russia in support of Pyongyang’s missile development. China and Russia blocked the Security Council from joining the U.S. sanctions, so the administration settled for issuing a joint statement with five other council members. The U.S. designations may partly be a response to indications of Chinese and Russian support for North Korean missile testing.
Those new designations notwithstanding, U.S. sanctions enforcement remains insufficient. The de facto U.S. “red line” of no nuclear or intercontinental ballistic missile tests, touted as a success during the previous administration, has effectively granted North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un freedom of action to test myriad systems below that threshold.
Significantly, a January 20 statement by the Workers’ Party of Korea suggested the regime is reconsidering its moratorium on nuclear and missile testing. North Korea’s recent missile tests reflect Kim’s dual strategy of waging political warfare while developing warfighting capabilities. As next month’s South Korean presidential election approaches, some analysts speculate that the tests are intended to influence the outcome, though it is unclear which candidate Kim desires.
Some analysts recommend that the Biden administration reboot its North Korea sanctions because Kim refuses to negotiate and instead continues to conduct provocations. More broadly, the administration needs a superior political warfare strategy to defeat Kim’s, as well as a calculated response to North Korean blackmail diplomacy.
2. South Korea’s ‘Doves’ Seek Peace Through Strength
An interesting perspective with a concluding important reminder.
Excerpts:
The fact is, South Korea’s desire for autonomy and peace through strength will prove hard to realize. Irrespective of its wishes to be neutral, a powerful South Korea — or unified Korea — will constitute either an even greater prize or a source of fear for surrounding powers. And no matter how much strength Korea develops, her strategic location is immutable. Korea’s long-term security challenge is China. From a balance of power perspective, that will make South Korea’s alliance with the United States even more indispensable.
Beyond this, the shared democratic values that unite Seoul and Washington will prevent South Korea from ever choosing China over the United States. Thus, if South Korean progressives continue their military buildup, a strong South Korea is ultimately in America’s interests. However, South Korean progressives should realize that Korea will always be too important geopolitically — but never powerful enough vis-à-vis China — to be neutral. The past five years of South Korea “balancing” between China and the United States has only led to its international isolation. A better approach would be to pursue “peace through strength” not alone but together with the United States.
South Korea’s ‘Doves’ Seek Peace Through Strength - War on the Rocks
In trying to understand why South Korea’s dovish leader is presiding over a dramatic military buildup, analysts have ignored the obvious explanation: President Moon Jae-in is not actually a dove.
To be sure, South Korean progressives have not earned their reputation as doves for nothing. Their eagerness to engage North Korea at all costs — from turning a blind eye to Pyongyang’s atrocious human rights abuses, to desperately calling for an end-of-war declaration even as the North has been engaging in missile tests — is what has, over time, led to the widespread suspicion in both Seoul and Washington that South Korean progressives are weak on defense.
But weakness regarding North Korea should not be conflated with weakness on defense generally. This conflation has made it hard to remember and take seriously how self-sufficient defense and “peace through strength” have been consistent themes in South Korean progressive thought. In the past five years, nearly all of Moon Jae-in’s major speeches on national defense have identified “peace through strength” as his administration’s “unshakeable national security strategy.” Yet this is largely dismissed as mere lip service to deterrence against North Korea — even though this may not actually be the goal. The consequence is that analysts are left puzzling over the oxymoron of a “hawkish dove” who has spent more on defense than his conservative counterparts did.
To understand South Korea’s latest military buildup, and its broader ambitions for projecting power, analysts should look beyond the North Korean threat and take the grand strategy of South Korean progressives seriously. South Korea’s realpolitik strategic culture is based on the conviction that throughout Korean history, weakness has repeatedly brought great-power conflicts to the peninsula. South Korean progressives have embraced self-determination and unilateral military buildup in order to prevent this cycle from repeating itself in the future. With sufficient indigenous strength, progressives believe that South Korea — and eventually a unified Korea — can become a neutral peace broker among its powerful neighbors. Their vision of “peace through strength” is fundamentally a strategy of armed neutrality.
Seoul’s desire to achieve autonomy and peace through self-sufficient defense, however, will prove elusive. South Korea’s political alignment with the United States, its strategic position, and its relative power vis-à-vis China rule out the possibility of achieving strategic autonomy and peace through indigenous strength alone. South Korean progressives should realize that a strong defense integrated with, not autonomous from, the United States is in the interest of both countries.
Toward a Country That No One Can Shake
South Korean progressives are keenly aware of how Korea’s weakness opened the way for great-power conflicts on the peninsula in the 19th and 20th century, from the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War to the Korean War. Korea’s strategic location as a “great-power borderland” connecting mainland Asia to the Pacific meant that Korea’s weakness posed a threat to neighboring powers. For Beijing and Moscow, Korea was the bridge for Japanese militarism or American “imperialism.” For Tokyo, Korea was long seen as the “dagger pointed at Japan’s heart” — and then, during the Cold War, as a key buffer that allowed the United States to safeguard Japan from communism.
The conclusion Korean leaders drew from this experience was the need for strength. Political scientist Victor Cha has argued that this experience shaped a hard realpolitik strategic culture based on a belief in “‘time’s cycle’ rather than ‘time’s arrow.’” The result is a conviction that “security dynamics around the peninsula after watershed events like the end of the cold war or unification resemble the power struggles of the past.”
We have yet to become a “country that no one can shake.” For we are still not strong enough and remain a divided country. […] Geopolitically, there is no country in the world that is encompassed by four great powers. When we were shabby and weak, the Korean Peninsula, a great power borderland in both land and sea, became the arena of great power competition. That was the history that we experienced. But if we have power, we can become a country that connects the landmasses and sea-lanes, a country that leads the peace and prosperity of Northeast Asia.
According to Moon’s logic, if Korea is unified, strong, and autonomous, the great powers will no longer fear that she will again fall into another power’s sphere of influence. Korea’s strength will thus deter another conflict on the Peninsula, transforming its status from a great power borderland to a geostrategic connector and “balancer.” This strategy of peace through strength, which draws from a long tradition of armed neutrality in both South and North Korea, leads progressives to call for South Korea to play a “balancing” role between China and the United States. And it also leads Washington to wonder why South Korea, a treaty ally, cannot seem to take a clear side.
For Moon, however, this highly idealized transformation constitutes a “paradigm shift” from a “passive Cold-War order” to an “active peace order” — which he calls a New Korean Peninsula Regime. In his speech titled “The Greatness of the Ordinary: Toward a New World Order,” Moon explained how Korea’s geostrategic location and weakness meant suffering for Koreans condemned to passivity. Whereas Japanese imperialism and the Cold War meant Koreans could not decide their own fate, the emerging peace order is marked by activity insofar as “ordinary” Koreans would autonomously create and maintain peace, “a task wherein ordinary people can become the masters of their own fate.”
Seen from this perspective, South Korea’s pursuit of indigenous strength reflects hard realpolitik tendencies rooted in a deep sense of insecurity. South Korean liberals are defensive realists who want to be left alone, but whose painful experience of history has given them no other option but to participate in an arms race. The real difference between liberals and conservatives is not whether they are doves or hawks, but whether they have preferred to pursue power accretion unilaterally or bilaterally through allying with Washington.
Alternative Arguments
There are many factors that influence South Korea’s defense spending, including the North Korean threat, fear of abandonment caused by Donald Trump, and macroeconomic conditions. But these cannot explain the historic consistency with which progressives have pursued self-sufficient defense. Indeed, prior to Moon, the progressive Roh Moo-hyun administration increased defense spending by 79.4 percent over five years from 2003–2008. Even when there was a diminishing threat perception from the North due to the Sunshine Policy, the administration justified these spending increases under the slogan “self-sufficient defense.” While it is true that the 1997 Asian financial crisis forced the progressive Kim Dae-jung administration (1998–2003) to cut defense spending, key projects related to achieving autonomous force projection were protected from cuts, with any postponements being offset by accelerated timetables.
Another novel explanation for South Korea’s hawkish buildup was recently put forward by Lamy Kim, who argued that it was aimed at meeting the conditions necessary to reclaim wartime operational control from the United States. But linking operational control transfer and defense spending like this fails to account for the realities of the budget process in South Korea. More importantly, it also fails to situate both operational control transfer and military buildup in the larger context of South Korean progressive strategic thinking.
Kim argues that if South Korean progressives were using military purchases to improve deterrence, “demonstrating rather than hiding these new capabilities would be the more logical strategy.” As evidence of South Korea’s low-key signaling, she cites the case of the former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Harry Harris receiving pushback for tweeting about Korea’s acquisition of Global Hawks and F-35A fighter jets.
In fact, the South Korean government has been happy to signal its capabilities. In March 2020, a month before the Harris tweet, Moon said during a graduation ceremony for the Korean Air Force Academy that his government had acquired Global Hawks while F-35 jets flew in the background. To get a flavor of how transparent Moon’s government has been with military upgrades, just read his annual Armed Forces Day speeches, in which he explains his country’s military buildup in minute detail. The only way Moon could signal more strongly might be by engaging in North Korea-style military parades.
The operational control transfer argument is also incompatible with the realities of the defense budget process in South Korea. According to a recent conversation with a mid-senior-level official from the Ministry of Defense who served on the Moon National Security Council, the process is “top-down,” rather than “bottom-up.” Political leadership sets a top-line amount, and bureaucrats fill it with projects. Increased defense spending thus reflects the ruling party’s identity and threat perception, as was the case with Roh, rather than being reflective of specific operational control-related acquisition projects.
Operational control transfer and high defense spending are indeed closely related. However, instead of linking these two in a causal relationship, both should be seen as means to the larger end of achieving self-reliant defense.
The Future of the U.S.-South Korean Alliance?
Does the progressives’ desire for autonomy mean that the United States should be worried about their winning the upcoming March presidential elections? No matter who wins, the U.S.-South Korean alliance will prove resilient, but the answer depends, in part, on how clear-eyed progressives are about South Korea’s strategic constraints.
One reason to be hopeful is that there has been a positive shift in the way South Korean progressives view the United States, even if they have not been able to leave behind their suspicions entirely. For instance, the old progressive narrative of the Korean War espoused during the Roh administration emphasized Korea’s unilateral division and victimization by the United States. The new narrative, by contrast, emphasizes America’s sacrifice. Increasingly, the ravages of the Korean War are contrasted against South Korea’s incredible economic growth in a narrative that projects the country’s pride. The Korean War is thus still part of a nationalist narrative, but one that supports an alliance based on common values and a shared understanding of the past.
Still, South Korea’s conspicuous absence from Indo-Pacific groupings is deeply worrying. Even though this hesitancy is understandable given Korea’s historic experience of great-power competition, it should not lead Seoul to eschew cooperation with Washington on crucial regional threats.
The fact is, South Korea’s desire for autonomy and peace through strength will prove hard to realize. Irrespective of its wishes to be neutral, a powerful South Korea — or unified Korea — will constitute either an even greater prize or a source of fear for surrounding powers. And no matter how much strength Korea develops, her strategic location is immutable. Korea’s long-term security challenge is China. From a balance of power perspective, that will make South Korea’s alliance with the United States even more indispensable.
Beyond this, the shared democratic values that unite Seoul and Washington will prevent South Korea from ever choosing China over the United States. Thus, if South Korean progressives continue their military buildup, a strong South Korea is ultimately in America’s interests. However, South Korean progressives should realize that Korea will always be too important geopolitically — but never powerful enough vis-à-vis China — to be neutral. The past five years of South Korea “balancing” between China and the United States has only led to its international isolation. A better approach would be to pursue “peace through strength” not alone but together with the United States.
Jongsuk Jeong studies Asian affairs and international relations at Georgetown University. Previously, he worked at the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office, where he prosecuted violent crimes. He is a graduate of Williams College.
3. A Primer on North Korea’s Hwasong-12 ‘Guam Killer’ Ballistic Missile
Note the continued influence of the Korean War on north Korean doctrine. And we should note the this weapon supports the dual strategy of political warfare and warfighting capability development.
Excerpts:
The resumption of Hwasong-12 testing after a five-year pause could be intended for number of purposes. The last five years have almost certainly seen changes made to the missile, as the country’s technologies in the area have demonstrably advanced. The January 30 launch could allow North Korea to test new improvements ranging from guidance systems to fuel composites.
The possible benefits from testing are greater when considering that the first stage of the Hwasong-12 has reportedly been re-used with some modification as the first stage of the new Hwasong-8 missile, which was first tested in September 2021 and carries a hypersonic glide vehicle. When the Hwasong-8 enters service, this is likely to make North Korea only the second country after China to field such vehicles for tactical roles, and the third to field them in any capacity whatsoever, with Russia deploying the Avangard glide vehicle from its intercontinental range strategic missiles. It is possible that improvements to the first stage of the Hwasong-12 could be in testing with the intention of implementing the same changes on the Hwasong-8, or else that Hwasong-8 tests used an improved version of the Hwasong-12’s first stage, which is now being tested on the original missile. Once the Hwasong-8 enters service, however, likely after several more tests this year, the Hwasong-12 may well see production terminated as it is superseded by the new hypersonic platform. This could largely depend on whether the newer missile can fully match the range of its predecessor, which remains uncertain, as well as the discrepancy in cost between the two missiles.
The Hwasong-12 occupies an important role in the KPA’s arsenal, the doctrine and priorities of which continue to be very heavily influenced by the experience and historical memory of the Korean War. In the early 1950s, the United States Air Force launched a firebombing campaign across North Korea from the safety of bases in Japan, which were well beyond the range of any KPA asset to retaliate. That weakness left North Korea effectively helpless in the face of three years of continuous bombardment, with more ordinance dropped on the country by U.S. forces than on the entire Japanese Empire during the Pacific War.
A Primer on North Korea’s Hwasong-12 ‘Guam Killer’ Ballistic Missile
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On January 30, North Korea conducted its seventh missile launch of the year, firing an intermediate range ballistic missile from Jagang Province. The missile flew 800 kilometers and reached a 2,000 km altitude before landing in the sea to the east of North Korea. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on January 31 that the missile in question was the Hwasong-12, which was previously successfully tested three times in May to September 2017 and has an estimated range of 4,500 km.
By launching at extreme and abnormal altitudes, as is common for most North Korean strategic missile tests, missiles can be tested and their range demonstrated without them needing to land too far from Korean waters. This compensates for the country’s lack of breadth; missile programs in larger countries such Russia and the United States can fire strategic ballistic missiles on more normal trajectories that travel thousands of kilometers across their territory (such as Russia’s Kura test range, located thousands of kilometers from launch sites).
Regarding the Hwasong-12 test KCNA reported: “The test-fire was aimed to selectively evaluate the missile being produced and deployed and to verify the overall accuracy of the weapon system,” adding that it “confirmed the accuracy, security and effectiveness of the operation of the Hwasong-12-type weapon system under production.”
The Hwasong-12 was one of three high-profile new ballistic missiles first seen in 2017 alongside the intercontinental range Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15, which had estimated ranges of 10,000 km and 13,000 km. It has retained pride of place in North Korea’s military parades since, with several launchers driving through Kim Il Sung Square, indicating the missile remains the Korean People’s Army’s (KPA) prime intermediate range platform. The missile is a successor to the Hwasong-10, better known as the Musudan, which was last tested in 2016 and had an estimated 4,000 km range.
The resumption of Hwasong-12 testing after a five-year pause could be intended for number of purposes. The last five years have almost certainly seen changes made to the missile, as the country’s technologies in the area have demonstrably advanced. The January 30 launch could allow North Korea to test new improvements ranging from guidance systems to fuel composites.
The possible benefits from testing are greater when considering that the first stage of the Hwasong-12 has reportedly been re-used with some modification as the first stage of the new Hwasong-8 missile, which was first tested in September 2021 and carries a hypersonic glide vehicle. When the Hwasong-8 enters service, this is likely to make North Korea only the second country after China to field such vehicles for tactical roles, and the third to field them in any capacity whatsoever, with Russia deploying the Avangard glide vehicle from its intercontinental range strategic missiles. It is possible that improvements to the first stage of the Hwasong-12 could be in testing with the intention of implementing the same changes on the Hwasong-8, or else that Hwasong-8 tests used an improved version of the Hwasong-12’s first stage, which is now being tested on the original missile. Once the Hwasong-8 enters service, however, likely after several more tests this year, the Hwasong-12 may well see production terminated as it is superseded by the new hypersonic platform. This could largely depend on whether the newer missile can fully match the range of its predecessor, which remains uncertain, as well as the discrepancy in cost between the two missiles.
The Hwasong-12 occupies an important role in the KPA’s arsenal, the doctrine and priorities of which continue to be very heavily influenced by the experience and historical memory of the Korean War. In the early 1950s, the United States Air Force launched a firebombing campaign across North Korea from the safety of bases in Japan, which were well beyond the range of any KPA asset to retaliate. That weakness left North Korea effectively helpless in the face of three years of continuous bombardment, with more ordinance dropped on the country by U.S. forces than on the entire Japanese Empire during the Pacific War.
The difference between the global reach of American strikes and the KPA’s negligible ability to counterstrike provided the U.S. with considerable leverage during armistice negotiations and inevitably made a strong impression. The ability to strike back at American assets beyond the Korean Peninsula, and particularly airfields, has thus been highly valued by the KPA and became a central focus of its military modernization efforts. This includes not only targets in Japan but also Guam, which during the Korean War and since has served as a key staging ground for American power projection into East Asia.
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North Korean efforts culminated in the entry into service of the Hwasong-7, better known as the Rodong-1, from the mid-late 1990s, which was able to strike targets across Japan. North Korea subsequently expanded its capabilities with the development of the Hwasong-10 and Hwasong-12. The latter in particular has left both Andersen Air Force Base and Guam Naval Base, which are vital to the U.S. military’s ability to stage operations in East Asia, vulnerable to strikes including with nuclear warheads. The Hwasong-8 is set to further increase the vulnerability of these targets by providing a more effective countermeasure against the substantial U.S. air defenses guarding facilities on Guam, with the emergence of a defense system capable of reliably intercepting hypersonic glide vehicles in the foreseeable future remaining unlikely.
Beyond advancing the country’s strike capabilities, testing the Hwasong-12 represents a further escalation by North Korea. Even before the January 30 launch, the intensity of North Korea’s tests in January was unprecedented since 2017. Such tests were previously harshly criticized by Washington and its allies until 2019, when the Trump administration notably relaxed the official position by issuing statements that anything short of an intercontinental-range missile test would not be seen as a significant provocation breaking the post-2017 détente between the two countries. The Biden administration has similarly been relatively moderate in denouncing North Korean missile tests compared to the pre-2019 period, retaliating only with limited and largely symbolic economic sanctions against individuals seen to be aiding the country’s missile program in the second week of January. With the Biden administration bogged down by other foreign policy priorities, from Iran’s nuclear program to significant tensions with Russia over Ukraine, it was a very notable change from 2017 that the response to the Hwasong-12 test was a call for direct talks with Pyongyang, while the U.S. on the same day called for U.N. Security Council action – not against North Korea but rather against Russia.
Pyongyang may well seek to use missile testing not only to advance its capabilities but also to open the way to a deal that could limit its weapons programs in exchange for concessions from Washington. Such an agreement, should it be discussed, is expected to center on economic sanctions resolutions primarily pushed through by the United States at the UNSC in 2016 and 2017, which the Biden administration could potentially offer to relax if placed under pressure and offered concessions by Pyongyang. The Hwasong-12 test could well be a first step toward achieving such an outcome. North Korea may follow up with tests of longer-ranged missiles that could place more pressure on Washington to reach a deal.
4. N. Korea renews call for U.S. to end 'hostile policy'
I would like to see every government spokesperson and key administration officials, ambassadors as well as our allies, respond to this and call out the Kim family regime as the one with the demonstrated hostile policy.
Just ask these questions, over and over again:
1. Do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure the survival of the mafia like crime family cult known as Kim family regime?
2. In support of that strategy do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the objective to split the ROK/US Alliance and get US forces off the peninsula? Has KJU given up his divide to conquer strategy - divide the alliance to conquer the ROK?
Consider employing these methods:
Fundamental principles of influence operations – the information instrument of national power:
1. What we say we stand for
2. What we say we are doing
3. What we are actually doing
4. Key Point- what we are really doing is the actual message.
It turns out that there is a counter to adversary lies and disinformation – the “truth sandwich.”
How to use it?
1. Start with the truth. This is the frame.
2. Introduce the lie – clearly stating that it is a lie.
3. End with the truth.
N. Korea renews call for U.S. to end 'hostile policy' | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Feb. 2 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Wednesday renewed calls for Washington to drop its "hostile policy" against Pyongyang, amid the reclusive regime's series of saber-rattling since the start of the year.
"It is a universal knowledge that the failure of the situation on the Korean Peninsula to easily be out of the whirlwind of aggravated tension just lies in the U.S. hostile policy towards the DPRK," the North's foreign ministry said in an English statement.
DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the North's official name.
Pyongyang also condemned the United States for carrying out "joint war drills, claiming that the move has posed "a grave threat to the security" of the North.
"The U.S. would be well-advised to halt its military threat to our country and withdraw, before anything else, its hostile policy towards the DPRK rather than publicizing the so-called 'diplomatic solution' and 'dialogue,'" it added.
North Korea, meanwhile, launched on Sunday an intermediate-range ballistic missile that it later identified as a "Hwasong 12-type ground-to-ground intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile." The launch marked the North's seventh missile test this year.
It was also the longest-range missile test since the test-firing of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in November 2017.
colin@yna.co.kr
(END)
5. North's barrage of missile tests raises alarm bells
Wednesday
February 2, 2022
North's barrage of missile tests raises alarm bells
A photo of North Korea's hypersonic missile launch in Chagang Province on Jan. 5 was released by the state-run Korean Central News Agency on Thursday. [YONHAP]
North Korea test-fired Hwasong-12, an intermediate range ballistic missile, on Jan. 30. Sunday's launch marked the unpredictable North's seventh show of force this year.
North Korea launched long-range cruise missiles on Jan. 25 and surface-to-surface tactical guided missiles on Jan. 27.
The flurry of missile launches raised concerns in South Korea that the recalcitrant regime is ramping up the diversity of its missile arsenal to evade interception in case of war.
North Korea announced Monday it test-fired a Hwasong-12 "intermediate and long-range" ballistic missile the previous day.
The accuracy of the weapons system "being produced and deployed" has been confirmed, according to Pyongyang's state media.
The launch was aimed to "selectively evaluate the missile being produced and deployed and to verify the overall accuracy of the weapon system," it added.
The launch on Jan. 30 was its longest-range missile test since the test-firing of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in November 2017.
The North’s last known test of a cruise missile took place in September last year, when state media crowed about a “new-type long-range cruise missile,” which it described as a “strategic weapon of great significance.”
At the time, the KCNA said the cruise missiles tested flew 1,500 kilometers (932 miles) for 7,580 seconds.
By comparison, the long-range cruise missiles fired on Jan. 25 flew for 9,137 seconds and hit a target island 1,800 kilometers away, according to the KNCA.
According to the JCS, two surface-to-surface tactical guided missiles the North launched from the northeastern city of Hamhung, South Hamgyong Province, on Jan. 27 landed 190 kilometers away in the sea after reaching an altitude of 20 kilometers.
North Korea conducted two separate tests of what it claimed were hypersonic glide missiles on Jan. 5 and 10, followed by a test of train-launched missiles Jan. 14 and a tactical guided missile test from Sunan Airfield near Pyongyang on Jan. 17.
The flurry of 11 missiles launched over seven tests in January alone has raised alarm that the North is rapidly verifying the capabilities of its diverse missile arsenal to evade interception by South Korean and U.S. defense systems.
The gliding warheads on the hypersonic missiles tested on Jan. 5 and 11 have a distance range of 700 kilometers and are capable of reaching speeds of Mach 5, complicating interception by defense assets stationed in South Korea, such as the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (Thaad) system, which can intercept missiles up to 200 kilometers away.
The short-range ballistic missiles launched by the North’s moving train missile regiments can also avoid interception, not only because their launchers are hidden in railcars, but also because they only reach altitudes of 30 to 50 kilometers and are equipped to perform evasion maneuvers as they approach their targets.
The North’s hypersonic cruise missiles, which fly at extremely low altitudes and are capable of changing direction mid-flight, can possibly target and neutralize missile defense systems such as Thaad by flying under radar detection systems.
The KCNA reported just after the September tests that the cruise missiles it fired traveled for 7,580 seconds along an "oval and pattern-8 flight orbit."
Both South Korean and U.S. military authorities were reportedly unaware of the September tests before the KCNA’s report, with a South Korean government official who spoke to the JoongAng Ilbo on the condition of anonymity saying neither countries' military authorities were certain of the missiles’ trajectory or where exactly they fell into the sea.
A combined barrage of cruise and ballistic missiles from the North could overwhelm the South’s missile defense systems.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un was not present at this past week’s tests, instead inspecting a munitions factory responsible for manufacturing “a major weapons system,” the exact nature of which the KCNA did not specify. Kim was accompanied by his sister Kim Yo-jong, who is the deputy director of the ruling Workers’ Party’s propaganda department.
The KCNA’s report on the North Korean leader’s visit to the munitions factory took aim at the country’s foes, with the agency saying that officials at the factory lauded Kim’s “unwavering will” to “smash with his bold pluck the challenges of the U.S. imperialists and their vassal forces that try to violate in every direction our Republic's right to self-defense.”
The missile tests by Pyongyang were accompanied by a state media report which said the country was considering ending its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range ballistic missile testing.
Expressing “deep regrets and concerns” over the North’s missile launches, Seoul’s Unification Ministry, which handles relations with the regime, has urged Pyongyang to return to talks over its weapons program.
Cha Duck-chul, the ministry's deputy spokesman, said in a regular press briefing that the South “will continue efforts to keep the situation on the Korean Peninsula under peaceful and stable control.”
6. US asks UN to meet on North Korea’s long-range missile test
Sadly, China and Russia will ensure nothing comes of the meeting. But I agree we need to keep calling for meetings and pushing for action (Operation Sisyphus). We are actually building up evidence of Chinese and Russian compicty in protecting north Korea while it violates UN Security Council resolutions. This will support future influence operations as we expose how not only north Korea, but China dn RUssia, do not act as responsible members of the international community.
US asks UN to meet on North Korea’s long-range missile test
U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres condemned Sunday’s launch, saying it broke the North’s announced moratorium on such launches and clearly violated Security Council resolutions, U.N. deputy spokesman Farhan Haq said.
The U.N. chief urged North Korea “to desist from taking any further counter-productive actions,” expressing “great concern” that Pyongyang again “disregarded any consideration for international flight or maritime safety,” Haq said Tuesday. Guterres also called for all parties to seek a peaceful diplomatic solution.
The State Department confirmed late Tuesday that the U.S. Mission to the U.N. requested closed council consultations be held Thursday.
After Sunday’s launch, White House officials said they saw the latest missile test as part of an escalating series of provocations over the last several months by North Korea that have become increasingly concerning and are aimed at winning relief from sanctions.
The Hwasong-12 missile launched Sunday was the most powerful missile North Korea has tested since 2017. That’s when the country launched Hwasong-12 and longer-range missiles in a torrid run of weapons firings to acquire an ability to launch nuclear strikes on U.S. military bases in Northeast Asia and the Pacific and even the American homeland.
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Tuesday's launch was North Korea’s second test of its purported hypersonic missile in a week.
In recent months, North Korea has launched a variety of weapons systems and threatened to lift the four-year moratorium on more serious weapons tests such as nuclear explosions and ICBM launches. Sunday’s launch was the North’s seventh round of missile launches in January alone, and other weapons tested recently include a developmental hypersonic missile and a submarine-launched missile.
The Security Council initially imposed sanctions on North Korea after its first nuclear test explosion in 2006 and made them tougher in response to further nuclear tests and the country’s increasingly sophisticated nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
China and Russia, which border North Korea, circulated a draft resolution in November stressing the North’s economic difficulties. They called for lifting sanctions that include a ban on exports of seafood and textiles, a cap on imports of refined petroleum products, and a prohibition on its citizens working overseas and sending home their earnings.
Russian Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia, whose country took over the Security Council presidency Tuesday for the month of February, told reporters earlier Tuesday that the draft remains before the council though some members consider that “it is not yet timely.”
The Biden administration again called on North Korea to return to long-stalled talks on its nuclear and missile programs after the latest launch, but made clear it doesn’t at this time think it would be constructive to hold leader-to-leader meetings like those Donald Trump had with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.
Nebenzia told reporters that Russia has “repeatedly and continuously” called for resumption of negotiations between key parties on the North Korean nuclear issue.
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North Korea has been ramping up its testing activity in recent months, including six rounds of weapons launches so far in 2022.
Sung Kim, the U.S. special representative for North Korea, discussed Pyongyang’s latest ballistic missile launch with the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s director general for Asian and Oceanian affairs, Funakoshi Takehiro, and South Korean nuclear envoy Noh Kyu-duk during calls on Friday and Saturday, State Department spokesman Ned Price said Tuesday.
Kim condemned the North’s missile launches as violations of Security Council resolutions “and destabilizing to the region,” and reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to the defense of South Korea and Japan, Price said.
He also underscored “the United States’ continued readiness to engage in serious and sustained diplomacy” with North Korea “to make tangible progress” toward denuclearization, Price said.
The Security Council’s last meeting on North Korea was a closed-door discussion Jan. 10 on the North’s launch of what Pyongyang characterized as a hypersonic missile five days earlier.
There was no action by the 15-member council, but the United States and five allies urged North Korea to abandon its prohibited nuclear and ballistic missile programs. They also called on the Security Council to oppose Pyongyang’s “ongoing, destabilizing and unlawful actions,” including missile launches.
Associated Press writer Matthew Lee in Washington contributed to this report.
7. Why the Kim regime just won’t die: a primer
It is amazing that the regime continues to survive and it will probably continue to muddle through for some kind to come. But if it does collapse I believe it will be catastrophic and we must ensure we are ready (even though it is difficult to be ready for such a contingency).
Consequently, Beijing provides the regime with a living wage by continuing essential bilateral trade even in defiance of international economic sanctions. China also gives the Kim regime important diplomatic support, such as blocking the imposition of additional economic sanctions by the United Nations Security Council and arguing that the United States should respect the DPRK’s security concerns and make peace with the Kims.
How much longer the Kim regime can maintain its unchallenged supremacy in North Korea is unclear. There are no immediate visible threats to its monopoly on political power. Yet the outside world exerts a steady, gradual influence – particularly China’s economy and South Korea’s soft power.
Kim Jong Un may hang on, but hanging on will not get easier.
Why the Kim regime just won’t die: a primer
Ostensibly, the North Korean regime should have collapsed by now due to multiple governance failures
With a spate of missile test launches in January, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has moved back into the consciousness of the broader global community. Some observers may be asking, “You’re still here? Why?”
Seemingly against the odds, the Kim regime persists. The explanation of why involves several factors, both domestic and international. Ostensibly, the North Korean regime should have collapsed by now because of multiple governance failures.
The insistence on hereditary succession seems a serious if not fatal disadvantage. The Kim patriarch, Kim Il Sung, had considerable prestige. The Soviet government installed him in 1945 after deposing the Japanese colonial authorities in the northern half of the Peninsula.
Moscow wisely chose a leader with nationalist credentials. Although his claimed exploits are exaggerated, Kim was renowned as an anti-Japanese guerrilla leader during the Pacific War. Subsequently, he demonstrated skill and ruthlessness in eliminating his political rivals and making his own status unassailable.
The drop-off from Kim Il Sung to his son and successor Kim Jong Il was dramatic. The latter was an uninspiring, self-indulgent princeling who did nothing to earn paramount leadership on his own merits. He presided over a period of economic weakness and food scarcity.
People wearing face masks walk before the portraits of late North Korean leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il on Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang on April 9, 2020. Photo: AFP
But with his sudden death in 2011, the top post went to an even less qualified successor: his callow, overweight, 30-year-old son Kim Jong Un.
In contrast to his father’s long apprenticeship, the youngest Kim was largely unknown until a few months before his father’s death, when the regime introduced him as the equivalent of a four-star general despite his lack of military experience.
North Korea’s economy has sputtered since the 1970s. The country suffered a long-term contraction with the cessation of aid from the Soviet Union upon its breakup in 1991. Natural disasters have worsened the situation. Estimates of the death toll from a multi-year famine in the 1990s range from 600,000 to two million.
More recently, the Covid-19 pandemic caused the regime to cut off most trade with China, the DPRK’s main economic partner. The biggest problem, however, is chronic mismanagement. North Korea ranks dead last on the Heritage Foundation’s global Index of Economic Freedom.
Although a few well-connected elites get away with operating lucrative businesses, the government has generally tried to prevent private citizens from accumulating wealth, an example being the snap 2009 currency reform that required North Koreans to trade in 100 won worth of their old banknotes for every one won worth of the new banknotes.
In January 2021 Kim Jong Un observed that economic development was failing. Instead of hastening reforms, however, he called for an expansion of state control over the economy.
The DPRK’s GDP per capita of US$1,700 ranks 154th in the world. Most North Koreans know by now that South Korea (per capita GDP: $31,000) is much wealthier than the North. The Kim regime stands in the way of unification with the prosperous South.
To offset such failures, the Kims have implemented governance practices that can help undeserving despots stay in power.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un provides field guidance to Farm No 1116 under KPA Unit 810, in this undated photo released by North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency in Pyongyang, September 13, 2016. Photo: KCNA
Recognizing that dynastic power depends on the support of civilian and military elites, the Kims take care of them. Most of the elites live in Pyongyang, where they enjoy a standard of living markedly better than is found in the rest of the country.
Based on the country’s Songbun political caste system, perks such as access to the best employment and educational opportunities, the chance to acquire luxury goods and permission to reside in Pyongyang are reserved for families that demonstrate loyalty to the regime.
Although Kim Jong Un has elevated the Korean Workers Party over the military in the making of government policy, the Kims since the start have generally tried to keep the generals happy.
Since the 1960s the regime has officially pursued the Byungjin (parallel development) policy, which assures the military leadership that building up the country’s armed forces has at least as high priority as growing the civilian economy.
To this, the regime added the Songun (military first) policy in the 1990s. The Kims’ acquisition of nuclear weapons and continuous demands that the United States and South Korea halt their annual joint military training exercises accommodate the military’s agenda.
Most elites and high-ranking military officers are likely to conclude that their personal situations are well-off enough under the Kim regime that they do not favor rolling the dice of regime change. Therefore, they link their fortunes to the persistence of the regime. Kim Jong Un is their guy, regardless of his qualifications or lack thereof.
Finally, since Kim Il Sung’s era, the regime has promoted a personality cult that deifies the Kim family. Official commentary has endowed the grandfather, the father and now Kim Jong Un with ludicrously implausible superhuman attributes. This adds another layer of protection against internal overthrow, as a potential usurper could not easily justify fighting against national demigods.
The regime invests heavily in political oppression to prevent an insurgency. State regimentation and influence pervade North Korean society with the objective of precluding and, as necessary, quickly squelching dissent.
Punishment for even minor expressions of criticism of the government is severe. An estimated 120,000 people are incarcerated in prison camps for political offenses, some because they are family members of offenders.
Political Prison Camp No 25, Chongjin, North Hamgyong Province. Locational analysis by US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. Photo: Digital Globe / United Nations
In these circumstances, the likelihood that an organized and sufficiently armed grass-roots uprising could threaten the regime with overthrow is minimal.
The Kim regime also benefits from two fortuitous international circumstances. The first is the DPRK’s proximity to Seoul, which contains close to half South Korea’s population and a huge proportion of its wealth.
The DPRK has caused the international community abundant trouble. Even before it had the delivery capability, Pyongyang signaled a willingness to use nuclear weapons to destroy Tokyo, New York and Washington, DC. The DPRK has threatened for decades to destroy Seoul.
The regime’s harm to its own people, both intended and unintended, amply satisfies the criteria for outside intervention under the United Nations’ “responsibility to protect” (R2P) doctrine.
Since the Korean War, however, foreign governments could never seriously contemplate taking out the Kim regime. Seoul is within range of thousands of DPRK artillery and rocket tubes.
The fear of DRPK retaliation against Seoul has prevented significant South Korean and US military action against Pyongyang, even when missile tests showed the DPRK was getting close to perfecting a nuclear-armed ballistic missile.
The second favorable external circumstance is that China is supportive of the regime. Beijing strongly wants to avoid regime change in North Korea. With the Kim family in power, China has a buffer state that keeps US ally South Korea at a distance.
If the regime fell, China might face problems such as large numbers of Korean refugees and a breakdown of the command and control of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons.
A test-fire of a ‘newly developed’ anti-aircraft missile by the Academy of Defense Science of North Korea in January 2022. Photo: AFP / KCNA / KNS
Most importantly, the result might be the absorption of the northern half of the Peninsula into the Republic of Korea, creating a united and stronger Korean state on China’s border – one that could make irredentist demands on parts of what is now PRC territory and might continue to host US military bases.
Consequently, Beijing provides the regime with a living wage by continuing essential bilateral trade even in defiance of international economic sanctions. China also gives the Kim regime important diplomatic support, such as blocking the imposition of additional economic sanctions by the United Nations Security Council and arguing that the United States should respect the DPRK’s security concerns and make peace with the Kims.
How much longer the Kim regime can maintain its unchallenged supremacy in North Korea is unclear. There are no immediate visible threats to its monopoly on political power. Yet the outside world exerts a steady, gradual influence – particularly China’s economy and South Korea’s soft power.
Kim Jong Un may hang on, but hanging on will not get easier.
Denny Roy is a senior fellow at the East-West Center. Follow him on Twitter at @Denny_Roy808
8. Kim Jong Un's wife Ri Sol Ju makes first public appearance in five months
I wonder if she had another child. But I have not seen any reports speculating that.
Maybe Kim Jong-un had a bad hangnail.
Excerpt:
A bandage could be seen on the tip of Kim's finger, suggesting he had some sort of injury. He has appeared with bandages on his arms and fingers in the past, and more recently on the back of his head.
Kim Jong Un's wife Ri Sol Ju makes first public appearance in five months
Newsweek · by Brendan Cole · February 2, 2022
Ri Sol Ju, the wife of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, has appeared in public for the first time in nearly five months.
Ri and her husband attended a performance marking the Lunar New Year holiday at the Mansudae Art Theatre in the capital city Pyongyang on Tuesday, according to the official KCNA news agency.
The supreme leader and his wife appeared at the theater and "amid the playing of the welcome music, the audience raised stormy cheers of 'Hurrah!'" KCNA said.
Kim's aunt, Kim Kyong Hui, whose husband Jang Song Thaek was infamously executed by Kim in 2013, was also present at the event in her first public appearance in two years, according to a video of the concert released on state TV.
A screengrab published by South Korean news agency Yonhap shows the first couple applauding.
A bandage could be seen on the tip of Kim's finger, suggesting he had some sort of injury. He has appeared with bandages on his arms and fingers in the past, and more recently on the back of his head.
However, the party newspaper Rodong Sinmun did not run any images with its report on the appearance and said the concert mostly featured songs about the greatness of the ruling party, NK News reported.
After the performance, the first couple "went up to the stage, held the hands of the performers one by one, congratulated them on the performance, and took a commemorative photo of their love," Rodong reported, according to a translation.
Ri was last seen in public on September 9 last year, when she appeared with her husband to mark the anniversary of the secretive state's founding in a visit to the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, where the embalmed bodies of Kim's late grandfather and father lie.
North Korea's first lady has no political position and is not expected to appear at events alongside her husband, but she does play a more visible role than the wives of Kim's predecessors.
NEW: North Korean state TV released video Wednesday of Kim Jong Un and wife Ri Sol Ju attending a Lunar New Year's concert the previous day.
— NK NEWS (@nknewsorg) February 2, 2022
NK News reported state television released new footage of her riding horses near the "holy" Mount Paektu with Kim, the leader's sister Kim Yo Jong and other officials in a new documentary, titled "2021, A Great Victorious Year" which highlights the role she plays in state propaganda.
Ri had disappeared from public view for more than a year, sparking speculation over her health or a possible pregnancy.
South Korea's National Intelligence Service believes the couple has three children and said the risk of COVID-19 deterred her from spending time outside, however during that absence she was still "playing well with their kids," Reuters reported.
To mark the Lunar New Year, families in Pyongyang visited the Central Zoo and the statues of former leaders with concerts held in cities around the country. The capital also hosted a special horse race at the Mirim Riding Club.
North Korea has not confirmed a COVID-19 outbreak, but has imposed a strict border lockdown while state media report that it is facing considerable hardships, NK News reported.
In January, satellite images showed a train line bringing imports from China had re-opened after more than a year of no rail trade.
North Korean first lady Ri Sol Ju with Leader Kim Jong Un (R) on April 27, 2018 in Panmunjom, South Korea. Ri was seen for the first time in public since September 2021 when she appeared at a Lunar New Year holiday event. Getty
Newsweek · by Brendan Cole · February 2, 2022
9. N. Korean leader Kim attends concert glorifying his power
Glory be to the Kim family regime (note sarcasm).
My guess is that Kim will continue to act as a spoiler and may not halt testing during the Olympics. He might wait until the end so that every day the newscasters can speculate whether today will be the day that Kim tests another weapons system.
Excerpt:
Experts say the North could halt its testing spree after the start of the Beijing Winter Olympics this week out of respect for China, its major ally and economic lifeline. But there are also expectations it could significantly up the ante in weapons demonstrations once the Olympics end later this month to grab the attention of the Biden administration, which has been focusing more on confronting China and Russia over its conflict with Ukraine.
N. Korean leader Kim attends concert glorifying his power
AP · by KIM TONG-HYUNG · February 2, 2022
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and his wife attended a Lunar New Year’s Day concert in Pyongyang where he received thunderous cheers from audience members and artists who praised him for heralding a “new era” of national power, state media reported.
The North’s official media has been highlighting Kim’s authoritarian leadership following a spree of missile tests in January, which some experts see as an attempt to pressure Washington over deadlocked nuclear negotiations after two years of pandemic border closures and economic decay.
The Biden administration has called for the U.N. Security Council to meet Thursday to discuss North Korea’s most recent test of an intermediate-range missile potentially capable of reaching Guam, a key U.S. military hub in the Pacific. Sunday’s test signaled a resumption of major weapons testing that Kim had suspended in 2018 while initiating diplomacy with then-U.S. President Donald Trump.
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Talks between Washington and Pyongyang have stalled since the collapse of the second Kim-Trump meeting in 2019, when the Americans rejected North Korea’s demands for a major release of crippling U.S.-led sanctions in exchange for a partial surrender of its nuclear capabilities.
The Korean Central News Agency on Wednesday said Kim and his wife, Ri Sol Ju, were greeted with “stormy cheers” after arriving at Pyongyang’s massive Mansudae Art Theater for Tuesday’s concert. KCNA said the audience appreciated that Kim was “ushering in on this land a new world and a new era when the people’s ideals and happiness and desire for building a powerful country are comprehensively translated into reality.”
Artists performed songs and dances that demonstrated the “single-minded unity” of North Korean people and their devotion to build a socialist country “to be envied by the world,” the KCNA said.
Footage from state TV showed Kim and Ri smiling and talking at the theater while sitting near Kim Kyong Hui, the leader’s aunt who was making her first public appearance in two years.
Kim Kyong Hui’s fate had been in doubt after Kim Jong Un had her husband and the North’s then-No. 2 official, Jang Song Thaek, executed for treason and corruption in 2013. Rumors that she had been purged or executed by her nephew circulated for years before she was seen — also at a Lunar New Year’s concert — with Kim Jong Un in 2020.
Separately on Wednesday, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement accusing Washington of continued hostility against the North and questioning the sincerity of its dialogue offers. The ministry criticized the continuance of U.S.-South Korea military drills and repeated a dubious claim that the U.S. has been sending strategic military assets to the region to pressure the North.
The United States since 2018 has dramatically scaled down its combined exercises with South Korea, which have mostly been reduced to computer simulations, to make room for diplomacy with North Korea and because of COVID-19 concerns. Some experts say North Korean claims of U.S. hostility are a pretext for continuing testing as Kim aggressively expands his military capacities despite limited resources.
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The North’s accelerated weapons tests, which have come amid efforts to strengthen internal unity and tighten the government’s grip over the economy, possibly reflect a sense of urgency within Pyongyang’s leadership for outside relief, analysts say.
While tentatively reopening freight train traffic with China last month, Kim is also reviving his playbook in brinkmanship to wrest concessions from the Biden administration, which has offered open-ended talks but shown no willingness to ease sanctions unless Kim takes real steps to abandon his nuclear weapons program.
Sunday’s flight test of the Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missile marked the longest-distance weapon the North has tested since 2017, when it twice flew Hwasong-12s over Japan and, separately, three intercontinental ballistic missiles that demonstrated the potential to reach deep into the American homeland.
The launch came days after Kim called a ruling party meeting where officials issued a veiled threat to end the North’s 2018 moratorium on the testing of nuclear devices and longer-range missiles, citing U.S. hostility.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke with Japanese Foreign Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa by phone and condemned North Korea’s recent ballistic tests, which were in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, and vowed trilateral cooperation with South Korea to deal with the North Korean threat, State Department spokesperson Ned Price said.
Experts say the North could halt its testing spree after the start of the Beijing Winter Olympics this week out of respect for China, its major ally and economic lifeline. But there are also expectations it could significantly up the ante in weapons demonstrations once the Olympics end later this month to grab the attention of the Biden administration, which has been focusing more on confronting China and Russia over its conflict with Ukraine.
AP · by KIM TONG-HYUNG · February 2, 2022
10. Why did Egypt choose to buy South Korea’s K9 howitzer?
Why did Egypt choose to buy South Korea’s K9 howitzer?
A source with knowledge of the deal told Defense News that most of the artillery and vehicles are scheduled to be locally produced at Factory 200, a state-run defense manufacturing facility just outside the Egyptian capital, while an initial batch is to be delivered by Hanwha Defense.
South Korean company Hanwha, which makes the K9, showcased the system recently at the Egypt Defence Expo, which ran Nov. 29-Dec. 2. Defense News spoke to several experts during the negotiation process who said the firm was expected to launch production lines in Egypt with local companies to produce subsystems of the howitzer.
Mohamed al-Kenany, who leads the military studies unit at the Cairo-based Arab Forum for Analyzing Iranian Policies, noted that at least two Egyptian companies have experience in this field: “Abu Zaabal Company for Engineering Industries (Factory 100), which originally manufactures howitzer artillery systems for the Egyptian army and 120mm cannon for the Egyptian M1A1 tank,” and “Military Factory 200, which is an armored production and repair facility specializing in armored vehicles and tracked vehicles.”
The two organizations fall under the purview of Egypt’s Ministry of Military Production.
Why choose the K9?
Egypt expressed interest in updating its artillery systems in 2009, but efforts were postponed for nearly a decade as the country underwent a revolt — part of what was dubbed the Arab Spring, a wave of pro-democratic protests, revolutions and civil wars in the region that began in 2011.
“In 2017, there was a strong competition between French Nexter’s Caesar, South Korean K9 Thunder, Russian Koalitsiya-SV, and Chinese PLZ-45 for the Egyptian Armed Forces howitzer,” al-Kenany said.
Egypt hosted testing for the systems, he said, with a final competition between the Caesar and the K9, which the latter won.
Egypt’s land forces currently operate versions A2, A3 and A5 of the American-made M109 howitzer. Abdel Hamid Harfi, a military researcher and author, said the South Korean howitzers will replace Egypt’s aging fleet.
Egyptian M109 Paladins sit ready to engage the enemy in a simulated battle with U.S. and Egyptian forces working together. (Staff Sgt. Leah R. Kilpatrick/U.S. Army)
“Some of these [American] howitzers are first-generation systems and are either out of service or used by the Egyptian Ministry of Military Production to manufacture local artillery using Russian 122mm guns, but they don’t meet the field efficiency requirement levels the Armed Forces need. After local upgrade, they have become armored and not self-propelled,” he told Defense News.
But more significant than Egypt’s decision to purchase the K9 howitzer is its securing of a joint production deal, according to Ahmad Eliba, a defense expert at the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies.
“The K9 Thunder howitzer is very [similar] to the American howitzer. The particular choice of this system was made in accordance with the Egyptian armed forces specifications, like the cost and technology transfer,” Eliba told Defense News, adding that the latest deal is a sign of growth in Egyptian and South Korean defense cooperation.
Harfi agreed, emphasizing that the K9 Thunder used a German engine, American ammunition and an American-German gun. “Therefore, if the supply of one of the spare parts stops, the whole system will be out of service. But what the deal gives to Egypt is an example of technology transfer and building local knowledge and expertise to develop Egyptian weapons in the future.”
Diversified firepower
Locally performed maintenance and production of spare parts play a crucial role in Egypt’s effort to bolster its defense industry, and the K9 deal contributes to this national goal.
“The military doctrine of the Egyptian army is based on diversifying the suppliers of weapons to avoid any risk of [imposed] penalties or [the] embargo of weapons and spare parts supply,” Harfi said.
Added al-Kenany: “In the end, Egypt is moving toward what suits its operational needs, including its conditions, what suits the Egyptian combat environment and what is appropriate for maintenance costs and technical support, [and] the possibility of technology transfer.”
A man stands by a Caesar canon, center, display by Nexter at the 2016 Eurosatory expo in France. Egypt considered purchasing the weapon, before eventually deciding on a South Korean option. (Jacques Demarthon/AFP via Getty Images)
With only aging M109 howitzers in service, he noted, the country needs a new cannon with improved capabilities and a longer range for both its the land and naval forces. “It is expected that the naval forces will operate the howitzer also, as coastal defense is not limited to anti-ship missile systems,” he said.
That would give coastal defense forces a qualitative advantage over the currently operational M46, which is 130mm Soviet-era gun with a range around 30 kilometers.
“The firing range of K9 is up to 40 kilometers, and its extended range is up to 50-60 kilometers. This gives Egypt an unprecedented range, especially [given] the system can be equipped with laser-guided munitions and GPS-guided munitions and rocket boosters,” al-Kenany said.
DAPA did not disclose the details of the deal with Egypt valued around $1.7 billion, but the source privy to the deal said the number of the K9 artillery systems to be supplied to the Egyptian armed forces is expected to be around 200, along with scores of support vehicles, such as the K10 ammunition resupply vehicles.
Brian Kim in Seoul contributed to this report.
Agnes Helou is a Middle East correspondent for Defense News. Her interests include missile defense, cybersecurity, the interoperability of weapons systems and strategic issues in the Middle East and Gulf region.
11. Yearly ‘battle’ begins in North Korea over human waste for fertilizer
What a load of crap (note sarcasm).
Imagine stealing human waste from other people's homes. This is desperation on a scale we cannot fathom.
Excerpts:
The order to produce manure went out to every institution, company, school, and neighborhood watch unit according to the source.
“Both adults and children are participating in the ‘Battle for Manure Production,’” the source said. North Korea often stylizes public projects and campaigns as “battles” in the socialist revolution.
“It’s so pathetic that disputes break out over this, but they do this every year at about this time of year. Each family in the neighborhood has been organized into shifts to guard the communal toilet to keep the supply of human waste secure. Residents lament that they have to stand guard at a public toilet at night, then go to work the next day,” he said.
The source said each resident must deliver the 300 kilograms of manure by early March at the latest to a cooperative farm to use as fertilizer.
“The manure assignment is also put on the schools. Even though they are on winter break… students must come to school and pull carts loaded with human feces and soil… People are complaining that authorities had no problems closing school due to fears over COVID-19, but they can mobilize students to collect manure,” said the source.
Yearly ‘battle’ begins in North Korea over human waste for fertilizer
Citizens once again steal human feces from each other’s toilets to meet impossibly high quotas.
By Myung Chul Lee
2022.02.01
Competition for human feces has once again become cutthroat in North Korea, with mass public brawls breaking out as citizens begin the annual ritual of trying to fill unrealistic quotas to make fertilizer for the farming season.
In impoverished North Korea, farmland is fertilized using human waste, and the government tasks every household with yearly collection quotas.
RFA reported in January 2019 that households were struggling to meet an impossible quota amounting to 100 kilograms (220 pounds) per able-bodied citizen per day.
One source at that time told RFA the quota was intentionally unreasonable because the true purpose of the quota was to force the citizens to pay fines and bribes for failure to meet targets.
The quota is slightly more reasonable in 2022, as each citizen has until March to collect 300 kilograms of manure—human waste mixed with soil—per person, but the quota still means people must dip into their reserves, or find deposits elsewhere.
Those who don’t want to pay fines are fighting over night soil at public toilets and stealing it from each other. But individual fisticuffs are now giving way to group conflicts.
In the northeastern city of Chongjin, whole neighborhoods are mobilizing against each other, a resident who requested anonymity for security reasons told RFA’s Korean Service.
“On the 25th, several residents from Marum village in Sunam district had a dispute with the people of nearby Sinhyang village as the Marumers were trying to collect human feces from a communal toilet located within Sinhyang,” the source said.
“After the authorities imposed their orders for every citizen to produce manure, conflicts are erupting… as the people venture into other districts,” he said.
The order to produce manure went out to every institution, company, school, and neighborhood watch unit according to the source.
“Both adults and children are participating in the ‘Battle for Manure Production,’” the source said. North Korea often stylizes public projects and campaigns as “battles” in the socialist revolution.
“It’s so pathetic that disputes break out over this, but they do this every year at about this time of year. Each family in the neighborhood has been organized into shifts to guard the communal toilet to keep the supply of human waste secure. Residents lament that they have to stand guard at a public toilet at night, then go to work the next day,” he said.
The source said each resident must deliver the 300 kilograms of manure by early March at the latest to a cooperative farm to use as fertilizer.
“The manure assignment is also put on the schools. Even though they are on winter break… students must come to school and pull carts loaded with human feces and soil… People are complaining that authorities had no problems closing school due to fears over COVID-19, but they can mobilize students to collect manure,” said the source.
Elementary school students and seniors who have retired are exempt, according to the source.
Some regions of the country have more sources of human waste than others, a resident of North Pyongan province in the northwest told RFA.
“Residents are having significant difficulty in securing manure here in North Pyongan province, which is located on the plains and has less than other areas,” the second source said.
“Because the residents are having a significant difficulty in securing manure, they are scooping up the residue at the bottom of a sewage treatment plant in the city… causing conflicts with the community sewage management organizations,” he said.
Manure is human feces mixed with ash from firewood, and humus soil made from rotten leaves in a specific ratio, the second source explained.
“It is common for residents to bribe the cooperative farm officials to accept low-quality manure with a higher percentage of soil and ashes,” he said.
Fights over human waste are a sight burned into the memory of a former cooperative farm official who fled North Korean in 2014 and now lives in South Korea.
“When the new year begins, everyone in North Korea must make manure and bring it to a nearby cooperative farm using buckets and handcarts. When you deliver it, you must move as a group. After the manure is given to the official, you will receive a confirmation receipt, which you must submit to the unit manager to complete the assignment,” said the escapee, who requested anonymity for security reasons.
“The problem is that North Korea suffers from chronic food shortages, so it is difficult for each family to reach the manure quota,” he said. “Before I left North Korea, there were frequent fights between villages and their residents at the beginning of January each year.”
Translated by Claire Lee and Leejin Jun. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
12. Blinken condemns N. Korean missile launch in call with Japanese counterpart
(LEAD) Blinken condemns N. Korean missile launch in call with Japanese counterpart | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with reports of U.S. Secretary of State Blinken's call with Japanese counterpart in paras 2-3; RECASTS headline, lead; RESTRUCTURES)
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Feb. 1 (Yonhap) -- U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Tuesday condemned North Korea's recent missile tests in a telephone conversation with his Japanese counterpart Hayashi Yoshimasa.
The top U.S. diplomat also vowed cooperation with South Korea and Japan to completely denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, according to state department spokesperson Ned Price.
"Secretary Blinken condemned the DPRK's recent ballistic missile launches, which were in violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions, and committed to trilateral cooperation with Japan and the Republic of Korea towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," Price said in a press release.
The Blinken-Hayashi call came after North Korea launched an intermediate range ballistic missile on Sunday (Seoul time) that it later identified as a "Hwasong 12-type ground-to-ground intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile."
The launch marked the North's seventh missile test this year.
Price on Monday said the U.S. will continue to seek diplomacy with North Korea but also steps to hold the North accountable for its actions.
Earlier reports said the U.S. has called for a U.N. Security Council meeting to be held this week to discuss North Korea's recent series of missile tests.
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman also denounced the North's recent missile launches as "escalatory" and "destabilizing" in a three-way conversation with her Japanese and South Korean counterparts on the day.
"Deputy Secretary Sherman denounced the DPRK's recent and escalatory ballistic missile launches as violations of UN Security Council resolutions and destabilizing to the region and discussed ongoing efforts to achieve the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," Price said of Sherman's call with South Korea's First Vice Foreign Minister Choi Jong-kun and Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Mori Takeo.
"The Deputy Secretary highlighted the United States' continued readiness to engage in serious and sustained diplomacy with the DPRK in order to make tangible progress," he added in a press release.
DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the North's official name.
Sherman and her Japanese and South Korean counterparts highlighted the importance of cooperation between their countries in dealing with regional challenges, according to the department spokesperson.
"The Deputy Secretary and vice foreign ministers reaffirmed the importance of trilateral cooperation between the United States, the ROK, and Japan in tackling pressing challenges in the region and across the globe," he said, referring to South Korea by its official name, the Republic of Korea.
The three-way conversation also came after U.S. special representative for North Korea, Sung Kim, held discussions with his South Korean and Japanese counterparts, separately, over the weekend.
During his talks, the U.S. special envoy condemned North Korea's recent missile launch, but also stressed U.S. readiness for serious and sustained diplomacy with the North, the state department said.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
13. U.N. secretary-general condemns N. Korea's latest missile launch: statement
I guess it would be too much to ask that the Secretary General also call out Chinese and Russian complicity in north Korean malign activities and preventing UN Security Council actions against north Korea.
U.N. secretary-general condemns N. Korea's latest missile launch: statement
U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres attends a press conference at the end of a 5+1 Meeting in Cyprus, in this file photo taken April 29, 2021. AFP-Yonhap
U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres condemned North Korea's latest missile launch, Tuesday, and called on Pyongyang to refrain from further provocations.
North Korea test-fired what appeared to be an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) Sunday (KST).
"The Secretary-General condemns the launch of a ballistic missile of possible intermediate-range by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on Jan. 30," a spokesperson for the top U.N. official said in a released statement, referring to North Korea by its official name.
"This is a breaking of the DPRK's announced moratorium in 2018 on launches of this nature, and a clear violation of Security Council resolutions," added the statement.
North Korea has maintained a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear weapons long-range missile testing since November 2017.
Its leader Kim Jong-un, however, said in 2019 that he no longer felt bound by such restrictions. The North also said earlier this month that it would consider restarting "all temporarily-suspended activities."
The country has so far staged seven missile tests since the start of this year, mostly involving short-range missiles.
"It is of great concern that the DPRK has again disregarded any consideration for international flight or maritime safety," the U.N. spokesperson said.
"The Secretary-General urges the DPRK to desist from taking any further counter-productive actions and calls for all parties to seek a peaceful diplomatic solution."
North Korea has stayed away from denuclearization talks since late 2019, and has remained unresponsive to recent U.S. overtures for dialogue. (Yonhap)
14. What North Korea’s Missile Testing Means for the Korean Peninsula
Let me state clearly that regardless of what happens with north Korea, if we are to sustain the ROK/US alliance and continue to station US troops in Korea then they must train and the ROK and US military must sustain readiness through combined multi-echelon training all year around. Our exercise cannot be a bargaining chip because the failure to lead lead to a failure in readiness, deterrence, and the ability to defend the ROK (which is of course a key objective of the Kim family regime). We cannot sacrifice readiness and training. And we have proved since 2018 that cancelling, postponing, and scaling back exercises and training does not result in any reciprocity from the north. We must not be duped again.
Conclusion:
The only path forward in negotiations is likely to be difficult require compromise: to tacitly accept North Korean missile developments while pushing the North to reduce its nuclear capabilities. Further, in order to bring North Korea back to the nuclear negotiating table, the United States and South Korea should consider offering to scale back or suspend joint military exercises in exchange for the North agreeing to freeze its nuclear program and subject it to inspections. If the North begins nuclear force reductions, there is clearly a need to consider the cancellation of such exercises altogether. Most South Korean and U.S. experts think that joint exercises can be continued while the North is made to give up its nuclear weapons, but such an approach is completely unacceptable to the North.
If North Korea continues to reject denuclearization negotiations, then there is no way for it to obtain relief from international sanctions, and U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises will continue. Thus, the next South Korean government and the Biden administration must make these realities clear to the North. If the North Koreans persist in their refusal to engage in dialogue, the South Korean government should demonstrate its own capacity to operate a combined missile system incorporating ground forces, air force, and navy by establishing its own strategic command. In doing so, it can effectively counter North Korean missile deployments.
What North Korea’s Missile Testing Means for the Korean Peninsula
If North Korea continues to reject denuclearization negotiations, then there is no way for it to obtain relief from international sanctions, and U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises will continue.
Since January 5, in the space of less than a month, North Korea has launched missiles, including “hypersonic missiles” and medium-range ballistic missiles, on seven separate days. Last September it also tested missiles for five days. Thus, this is not the first time that Pyongyang has tested missiles for multiple days in the past year. However, this year’s launches are connected to the rapidly cooling relations with the United States, and this is what makes them different from those of last September.
North Korea’s Hypersonic Missile Tests
North Korea tested hypersonic missiles first back last September in Chagang Province. It followed up this test with another on January 5, launching a hypersonic missile from an inland location into the East Sea (Sea of Japan). Following this, on January 6, North Korea revealed through its Rodong Sinmun newspaper that Kim Jong-un was very pleased with the results and had sent “warm congratulations” to the national defense scientific research sector.
What is more, on January 11, Pyongyang again tested a hypersonic missile, launching a projectile from Chagang Province into the East Sea (Sea of Japan). The South Korean Ministry of National Defense said that the missile launched on January 5 had reached a maximum speed of Mach 6, an apogee of under 50 km, and flew for less than 700 km, while the missile launched on January 11 had flown for more than 700 km, had reached an apogee of around 60 km, and flew at a speed of around Mach 10. On January 7, a South Korean defense ministry official characterized the January 5 launch as “just a normal missile that they exaggerated the capabilities of,” this was the missile that Kim had publicly hailed. As if by way of a response, the North then tested another missile with more advanced capabilities.
Kim praised the development of the hypersonic missile on January 11 as “a great breakthrough.” However, there was much skepticism about North Korea’s claims in the South. Professor Chang Yeong-geun of South Korea’s Korea Aerospace University said, “it is doubtful that this missile system will be reliable enough to be battle ready after three test flights.” Wang Ya’nan, editor of the mainland Chinese magazine Aerospace Knowledge told the Chinese government newspaper the Global Times: “the terminal-phase guidance is the most challenging technology to make the weapon useful…It requires a very complex and coordinated work of sensors, hypersonic flight control and probably also data transfer from satellites, drones, and large reconnaissance aircraft to guide the weapon to its target.”
Hypersonic missiles are more difficult to incept than conventional missiles and have been dubbed a “game-changer.” But this is an exaggeration. The United States and South Korea possess the ability to precisely target and hit Kim’s office and his many mansions. Hence, even if the North proves successful in developing a hypersonic missile capability, unless Kim is mad, he will not use it to launch a preemptive strike on the South. Hence, these new missiles will not improve the North’s security vulnerabilities nor weaken South Korea’s security situation in particular. That said, the only countries that currently possess a hypersonic missile capability are the United States, China, and Russia. Hence, if North Korea has actually “succeeded” in these tests, then it will be a source of pride and yet stronger loyalty amongst its people, and further boost Kim’s authority.
This year, North Korea has two important anniversaries on February 16 (Kim Jong-il’s eightieth birthday) and April 15 (Kim Il-sung’s 110th), which the authorities are describing as a “great revolutionary occasion for celebration”. Kim Jong-un’s legitimacy as ruler is rooted in the fact that he is Kim Il-sung’s grandson and Kim Jong-il’s son. Thus, he must mark these two political anniversaries with requisite pomp and circumstance. The claimed “great breakthrough” with hypersonic missile technology is designed to show the country is capable of real successes, at least in the national defense sector. It would appear that the need to create a festive atmosphere in time for the April anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s birth is a major motivator.
U.S. Unilateral Sanctions and North Korean Missile Tests
North Korea’s claims were background to additional, tough unilateral sanctions from the United States. On January 12, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) unveiled sanctions targeting six North Koreans and one Russian national, as well as one Russian organization, which it accused of participating in North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs.
In response, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson statement attacked the United States, saying: “If the United States defiantly adopts such a confrontational stance, the DPRK can’t but show its stronger and clear reaction to it.” The North was saying that even though it had not tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of hitting the U.S. mainland, if the United States insisted upon responding with sanctions, it would follow up with a further show of strength.
On the afternoon of January 14, in the area of Uiju, North Pyongan, the North tested its own version of the Russian Iskander missile (the KN-23) launched from a railway carriage, firing two short-range ballistic missiles into the northeastern part of the East Sea (Sea of Japan). On the morning of January 17, the North tested two KN-24 missiles, dubbed the “North Korean ATACMS [Army Tactical Missile System],” firing them from the Sunan Airport into the northeastern part of the East Sea (Sea of Japan). The Korean Central News Agency (North Korea’s government wire service) reported on January 18 that the previous day’s test had been an “inspection fire test of a tactical guided warhead.” This implies that the KN-24 is in full-scale production and has been deployed.
Toward a Hardline in U.S. Relations
On January 19, Kim Jong-un convened the Sixth Politburo session of the Eighth Central Committee (CC) of the Workers’ Party of Korea. The United States was accused of denying North Korea’s rights to “exercise sovereignty,” and the sanctions imposed by the U.S. government on January 12 in the wake of the two “hypersonic missile” tests were strongly condemned. Further, it “gave an instruction to a sector concerned to reconsider on an overall scale the trust-building measures that we took on our own initiative on a preferential ground and to promptly examine the issue of restarting all temporarily-suspended activities.” Thus, the Politburo signaled that it was going to completely reconsider the decisions made at the CC plenary session in June 2018. In April 2018, the third plenary meeting of the Seventh CC announced the suspension of nuclear tests, medium and intercontinental ballistic missile tests, and the closure of the Punggye-ri nuclear test facility. Thus, Kim’s directive at the recent Politburo session can logically be interpreted as an order to reexamine the resumption of nuclear tests, ICBM tests, and even the restoration of the country’s shuttered nuclear testing facilities.
The United States had planned to convene a meeting of the UN Security Council (UNSC) on January 20 to confirm that the tests since last September had violated UNSC resolutions concerning North Korean missile tests, and to pass additional sanctions targeting the North. Thus, Kim convened the Politburo before this planned UNSC session to send the message that if the UNSC passed new sanctions, the North would respond aggressively with nuclear and ICBM tests. However, China and Russia indicated that they wanted to delay U.S. proposals to sanction additional individuals with links to North Korea’s ballistic missiles program. Thus, sanctions were not adopted, and the North no longer had reason to respond aggressively.
In such circumstances, the North had far more to lose than gain by restarting nuclear and ICBM tests, so it seems doubtful they would nonetheless proceed with such a foolish move. Already by 2017, following nuclear and missile tests, the North declared its “nuclear potential complete,” and thus additional tests are unlikely to give it real additional bargaining power in negotiations with the United States.
China is concerned that if the North continues to develop its nuclear capabilities, South Korea, Japan, and even Taiwan may begin developing their own nuclear capabilities, and that the United States will accept such moves in order to contain China. Hence, while China is happy to abide by North Korea’s non-nuclear tests, it is forced to participate in UNSC sanctions that target North Korean nuclear and ICBM tests.
Prospects for the Peninsula
North Korea again tested long-range cruise missiles twice on the morning of January 25, and on January 27, they tested two tactical guided surface-to-surface warheads in the Hamhung area. Further, on January 30, the North tested the Hwasong-12, a medium-range ballistic missile that is capable of hitting Guam, and hinted that if additional U.S. sanctions are imposed on Pyongyang, it will potentially proceed to test ICBMs.
Going forward, they may decide to show off strategic weaponry at a large-scale parade organized for Kim Jong-il’s eightieth birthday, and/or for a parade organized for Kim Il-sung’s 110th birthday. They could also launch more satellites, launch as yet untested submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and/or begin work to restore the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. Hence, the first half of the year is likely to bring further deterioration in U.S.-North Korean relations, and greater military tensions on the Korean peninsula.
Just as the United States and South Korea feel threatened by the North’s nuclear and missile programs, so too does the North perceive joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises and large increases in military spending by South Korea. Hence, going forward, a new government in Seoul (which will take office in May following the presidential election in March), the United States, and South Korea need to thoroughly reexamine their negotiating strategy toward the North. North Korea lacks the capacity to mount a sustained war, with its extremely weak air and ground force capabilities. Hence, to demand it completely surrender its missile and nuclear capabilities is tantamount to demanding it to completely disarm.
The only path forward in negotiations is likely to be difficult require compromise: to tacitly accept North Korean missile developments while pushing the North to reduce its nuclear capabilities. Further, in order to bring North Korea back to the nuclear negotiating table, the United States and South Korea should consider offering to scale back or suspend joint military exercises in exchange for the North agreeing to freeze its nuclear program and subject it to inspections. If the North begins nuclear force reductions, there is clearly a need to consider the cancellation of such exercises altogether. Most South Korean and U.S. experts think that joint exercises can be continued while the North is made to give up its nuclear weapons, but such an approach is completely unacceptable to the North.
If North Korea continues to reject denuclearization negotiations, then there is no way for it to obtain relief from international sanctions, and U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises will continue. Thus, the next South Korean government and the Biden administration must make these realities clear to the North. If the North Koreans persist in their refusal to engage in dialogue, the South Korean government should demonstrate its own capacity to operate a combined missile system incorporating ground forces, air force, and navy by establishing its own strategic command. In doing so, it can effectively counter North Korean missile deployments.
This article is a revised and abridged version of an article that appeared in Korean in the February 2022 Sejong Institute’s journal Current Issues & Policies.
Cheong Seong-Chang is the Director of the Center for North Korean Studies at the Sejong Institute.
Image: Reuters.
15. Opinion - North Korea, Perpetual Victim of the US Military-Industrial Complex
Carrying Kim Jong-un's water. Another example of pundits and analysts can only blame the US. It is all America's fault and specifically the US military industrial complex (I guess the world's boogeyman for some people).
Excerpts:
During the negotiations with Trump and South Korea, in 2019 North Korea was willing to agree to forego its nuclear bomb program if it could get a peace treaty instead of the truce it has been living under since 1953, faced with 38,000 U.S. troops situated near its border conducting war games with South Korea, not to mention the cruel and killing sanctions that deny food, fuel, medications to its people. Trump in his desire to look good and get a deal offered to withdraw 10,000 of the US troops stationed there all these years. Both the Democrats and Republicans in Congress blocked him from making that deal, Biden never followed up, and Kim is waving his missiles again to get our attention.
North Korea’s demands for an agreement to eliminate their nuclear weapons are to end the truce and sign a peace treaty, finally ending the Korean War after nearly 70 years, stop the war games on its borders, and lift the punishing sanctions that are so destructive to the health and wellbeing of its people. This would finally allow free travel back and forth from the U.S. and South Korea that has been so heartbreaking for separated families that haven’t been able to cross the line to visit and see relatives and friends for decades.
Opinion - North Korea, Perpetual Victim of the US Military-Industrial Complex - Alice Slater
Opinion | North Korea, Perpetual Victim of the US Military-Industrial Complex | Alice Slater Skip to main content
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A woman walks past a television screen showing a news broadcast with file footage of a North Korean missile test, at a railway station in Seoul on January 30, 2022, after North Korea fired a “suspected ballistic missile” in the country’s seventh weapons test this month according to the South’s military. (Photo: Jung Yeon-je/AFP via Getty Images)
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North Korea, Perpetual Victim of the US Military-Industrial Complex
North Korea’s demands for an agreement to eliminate their nuclear weapons are to end the truce and sign a peace treaty, finally ending the Korean War after nearly 70 years, stop the war games on its borders, and lift the punishing sanctions that are so destructive to the health and wellbeing of its people.
February 1, 2022
It seems hard to believe that in these possible end times in the midst of a global pandemic with an endless succession of catastrophic climate disasters and thousands of nuclear weapons poised and pointed in the U.S. and Russia, ready to destroy life on earth, we are beset by a bought, corrupted mainstream media that assaults us with the “wrongdoings” of Russia and China, and most recently North Korea, with barely a mention in their assaultive reporting of how the U.S. might be the cause in the matter. Nor do they report on the many remedies that have been rejected by the United States in its drive for global domination. Instead of promoting the critical opportunities we must now seize—all nations and peoples of the world—to work cooperatively to save Mother Earth, the western news reports serve up a steady daily diet of the harm that could be inflicted upon an innocent United States, echoing shades of the dreadful 1950s McCarthy Era in a new Cold War II and maybe World War III.
Kim is waving his missiles again to get our attention.
North Korea is a case in point. Recent reports in The New York Times noted a series of renewed missile tests by North Korea and reported that for the first time, a veto in the UN Security by Russia and China blocked additional harsh sanctions proposed by the U.S. on that poor, struggling nation. In its report, the Times quoted John Delury, professor of history at Yonsei University, South Korea as saying “no amount of sanctions could create the pressures that covid-19 created in the past two years. Yet do we see North Korea begging and saying, ‘take our weapons and give us some aid’…the North Koreans will eat grass,” he said, rather than give up their nuclear weapons. But this callous evaluation ignores the long, sorry history of failed negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea.
North Korea has been testing its missiles and developing nuclear weapons since it walked out of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1973 claiming that the U.S. had singled it out as a target of a pre-emptive nuclear attack and had threatened it with a blockade and military punishment. It now has about 40 to 50 nuclear weapons of the 14,000 nuclear weapons on the planet today, with 13,000 of them in the US and Russia, and the remainder in China, UK, France, India, Pakistan, and Israel. North Korea was the only nuclear-armed country to vote in the U.N. Committee for Disarmament in favor of negotiations to go forward on the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. At that historic meeting where the nations of the world voted 122 in favor of negotiations on a new treaty to ban the bomb, India, China, and Pakistan abstained and the U.S., Russia, U.K., France, Israel, and all the states under the U.S. nuclear umbrella voted No. This unique affirmative vote of North Korea, trying to get the world’s attention for ending the isolation and punishment it has suffered over the years, went totally unreported in the press.
During the negotiations with Trump and South Korea, in 2019 North Korea was willing to agree to forego its nuclear bomb program if it could get a peace treaty instead of the truce it has been living under since 1953, faced with 38,000 U.S. troops situated near its border conducting war games with South Korea, not to mention the cruel and killing sanctions that deny food, fuel, medications to its people. Trump in his desire to look good and get a deal offered to withdraw 10,000 of the US troops stationed there all these years. Both the Democrats and Republicans in Congress blocked him from making that deal, Biden never followed up, and Kim is waving his missiles again to get our attention.
North Korea’s demands for an agreement to eliminate their nuclear weapons are to end the truce and sign a peace treaty, finally ending the Korean War after nearly 70 years, stop the war games on its borders, and lift the punishing sanctions that are so destructive to the health and wellbeing of its people. This would finally allow free travel back and forth from the U.S. and South Korea that has been so heartbreaking for separated families that haven’t been able to cross the line to visit and see relatives and friends for decades.
Our work is licensed under Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0). Feel free to republish and share widely.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
