Quotes of the Day:
"If the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared...nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war."
- Kant, 1795
“All courses of action are risky, so prudence is not in avoiding danger, but in calculating risk and acting decisively.”
- Machiavelli
"To be seventy years young is sometimes far more cheerful and hopeful than to be forty years old."
- Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr.
1. North Korea Launches Suspected Cruise Missiles
2. North Korea's Threat to Test ICBMs and Nuclear Weapons: Just a Bluff?
3. N. Korea fires two apparent cruise missiles from land: Seoul official
4. Biden’s North Korea Policy Needs Rebooting
5. A lesson from Battle of Jipyeong-ri (AKA Battle of Chipyong-ni)
6. More signs of life at North's Punggye-ri testing site
7. Why Is North Korea Suddenly Launching So Many Missiles?
8. Kim’s own timetable
9. China denies alleged intervention in Korean presidential election
10. Japanese Embassy returns Moon's New Year gift over 'Dokdo image' on box
11. Another day, another North Korean missile launch
12. Americans More Worried About N.Korea's Missiles Than Ukraine Crisis
13. No signs of work to restore nuclear test tunnels at Punggye-ri site: Seoul official
14. North Korea’s security agency keeps close eye on “public trends” while cracking down on corrupt agents
15. North Korean film stars seen begging for food at Pyongsong’s Okjon Market
16. North Korean taffy seller in Kilju bashes officer on the head with taffy cutting board
1. North Korea Launches Suspected Cruise Missiles
The 5th event of 2022.
North Korea Launches Suspected Cruise Missiles
Kim Jong Un regime previously conducted four ballistic-missile tests this month
WSJ · by Timothy W. Martin
Cruise-missile launches aren’t covered by United Nations Security Council resolutions that govern Pyongyang’s weapons activity. The resolutions pertain to North Korea’s ballistic-missile tests.
Before the Tuesday launch, the Kim regime had conducted four ballistic-missile tests. It showcased what it said was hypersonic technology, plus launched missiles from a train and from an airfield. North Korea has never started a new year with so many weapons tests.
Such military activity is a sovereign right, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry said earlier this month. Mr. Kim, who recently attended his first weapons launch in nearly two years, has encouraged officials to keep strengthening the country’s military might.
Pyongyang’s recent series of ballistic-missile tests has drawn condemnation from the Biden administration, which recently blacklisted a handful of North Koreans involved in the regime’s arms program. The Kim regime criticized the move and accused the U.S. of intentionally raising tensions.
At a Politburo meeting last week, which Mr. Kim attended, North Korea suggested it might consider restarting long-range and nuclear-weapons tests, describing the U.S. threat as one that the country can no longer ignore. The Kim regime has refrained from such activity for more than four years.
The U.S. called on North Korea to cease provocations, abide by international law and find ways to de-escalate tensions, a Pentagon spokesman said at a Monday briefing. The Biden administration has repeatedly offered to meet with North Korea without preconditions. But Pyongyang has “shown no desire to move that forward,” the Pentagon spokesman said.
The U.S. and North Korea haven’t held formal denuclearization talks since October 2019.
In recent years, Pyongyang has done more than two dozen weapons tests, though the launches have focused on shorter-range technology. The advances have demonstrated increased accuracy, new launch systems and improved striking capability, weapons experts say.
North Korea is in the middle of its annual wintertime military exercises, which typically run from December to March. The shift to shorter-range weapons better equips the Kim regime for potential military conflicts near home, weapons experts say.
North Korea’s first weapons launch after President Biden took office was in March and involved two short-range cruise missiles. At the time, Mr. Biden said he didn’t consider the launch a provocation.
WSJ · by Timothy W. Martin
2. North Korea's Threat to Test ICBMs and Nuclear Weapons: Just a Bluff?
Conclusion:
The United States and its allies will anxiously await the upcoming North Korean birthday anniversaries for signs of impending nuclear or ICBM tests. In the meantime, Pyongyang will continue launching short- and medium-range ballistic missiles to demonstrate its growing military prowess while avoiding strong punitive responses from the international community. Doing so strengthens North Korea’s military capabilities as well as its leverage for the diplomatic battlefield.
North Korea's Threat to Test ICBMs and Nuclear Weapons: Just a Bluff?
North Korea Warns of Resuming Nuclear and ICBM Tests: Last week, Pyongyang implicitly threatened to resume highly provocative nuclear and ICBM tests while warning of “protracted confrontation” with the United States. Conducting such tests would significantly raise tensions on the Korean Peninsula, trigger calls for enhanced sanctions and allied security measures, and invigorate Japanese debate for acquiring enemy base strike capabilities. However, the lack of specifics or deadlines suggests the statement may be the opening move in a protracted campaign to alter U.S. policy and establish the parameters for negotiations. Pyongyang had similarly threatened to resume such tests after December 2019 but never did so.
During a January 19 Politburo meeting attended by leader Kim Jong-un, the regime declared that the U.S. “hostile policy” had “reached the line of danger,” necessitating a strong response. Though North Korea didn’t define its future actions, it affirmed existing policy to “strengthen and develop… more power physical mean” to counter U.S. actions deemed inimical to the regime. This was likely a reference to Kim Jong-un’s January 2021 directive to develop multiple-warhead ICBMs, hypersonic glide warheads, tactical nuclear weapons, nuclear-powered submarines, military reconnaissance satellites, and long-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
Pyongyang also vowed to reexamine its suspension of confidence-building measures, an indirect reference to Kim’s April 2018 statement that he would halt all nuclear tests as well as mid-range and intercontinental ballistic rocket tests since the programs were successfully completed. While some hailed the announcement as a tension reduction measure, North Korea is precluded by 11 UN resolutions from conducting any nuclear tests or ballistic missile launches, regardless of range.
The recent Politburo statement emphasized the importance of grandly celebrating the birthdays of previous leaders Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-sung (February 16 and April 15, respectively), suggesting the regime could conduct nuclear or missile tests on those dates.
North Korea justified any impending actions by blaming the United States for conducting military exercises and deploying strategic nuclear weapons in and around the Korean Peninsula. However, Washington and Seoul have cancelled, downsized, and constrained numerous military exercises during the past four years without reciprocal military or diplomatic actions by Pyongyang. Nor has the United States deployed any strategic assets, including aircraft carrier strike groups, strategic bombers, or fifth-generation fighters to the Korean Peninsula since May 2018.
Similarly, Pyongyang declared its January 14 launch of two KN-23 missiles was in response to Washington sanctioning six North Korean entities. However, North Korea’s previous 45 missile launches during 2019-2022 were not preceded by U.S. sanctions. Pyongyang habitually denounces others for precipitating regime actions that it was planning on implementing anyway.
Tension Serves Multiple Objectives
North Korea’s Politburo statement and the spate of missile testing in recent years serve several purposes. Pyongyang often projects a belligerent posture to rebuff any perceptions of weakness that opponents could exploit. Demonstrating continuing improvement in North Korean missile capabilities affirms leadership legitimacy. Raising tensions distracts the populace from domestic travails, validates the need to divert limited economic resources to the military, and justifies regime shortcomings in providing for the well-being of its citizens.
North Korea may also be seeking to influence U.S. policy. Pyongyang has raised brinksmanship to an art form by repeatedly escalating tensions to define negotiating parameters and extract maximum benefits. North Korea’s escalation is opportunistic rather than reactive to U.S. actions. By moving up the escalatory ladder, North Korea retains the initiative and controls the pace of the game, forcing the U.S. and others to respond. Raising tensions may gain Pyongyang what it desires—or at least expose fault lines in a coalition that North Korea can then exploit. Pyongyang believes it can force the United States to negotiate either by applying leverage directly on Washington or indirectly through its allies.
Repeated Warnings
Throughout 2019, North Korea warned that its patience for Washington to soften its policy would last only until the end of that year, when the prospect of settling issues would become “gloomy and very dangerous.” In late December 2019, Kim Jong-un announced that he no longer felt bound by his promise to President Trump to not conduct nuclear or ICBM tests. Instead, Kim warned that North Korea will “shift to a shocking actual action to make [the United States] pay for the pains sustained by our people” and counseled that “the world will witness a new strategic weapon to be possessed by the DPRK in the near future.”
Despite repeated threats, North Korea has not conducted a nuclear or long-range missile test since 2017. Uncharacteristically, the regime did not do so during the first year of the Biden administration, as it had during the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations. Such major provocations were intended to drive the United States back to the negotiating table in a more supplicant manner.
However, the regime may have refrained from doing so because its draconian COVID restrictions would preclude the return of any North Korean diplomat who left the country to participate in negotiations. As such, Pyongyang might continue to hold off on a nuclear or ICBM test until COVID conditions allow for face-to-face negotiations.
Launch or Bluff?
Pyongyang may carry through on its Politburo message warning by conducting another nuclear test or launching the large, multi-warhead ICBM seen in the October 2020 parade. But doing so could incur the wrath of Beijing – North Korea’s protector and benefactor. In the past, China has been willing to accept stronger UN resolutions after Pyongyang conducted nuclear and ICBM tests. A major provocation prior to South Korea’s March 9 presidential election might also undermine progressive candidate Lee Jae-myung, who intends to follow President Moon Jae-in’s efforts to reduce pressure and offer benefits to Pyongyang.
Alternatively, North Korea could follow the recent Politburo statement with subsequent messages that alternate between warnings of drastic action in increasingly dire tones and signals of a willingness to resume dialogue, though on highly conditional terms. In the past, the path to negotiations with North Korea often passed first through provocation or crisis.
Kim Jong-un’s increasingly powerful sister, Kim Yo-jong, could play a key role in determining what happens next. She has assumed the role of regime “bad cop” in recent years. In 2020, she advocated several hardline positions while coyly holding out the possibility of resumed negotiations. She strongly recommended against another summit with the United States, instead advocating that North Korea augment its nuclear arsenal. However, her unspoken message was that her brother could overrule her.
Hwasong 16 ICBM. Image Credit: KCNA Screenshot.
The United States and its allies will anxiously await the upcoming North Korean birthday anniversaries for signs of impending nuclear or ICBM tests. In the meantime, Pyongyang will continue launching short- and medium-range ballistic missiles to demonstrate its growing military prowess while avoiding strong punitive responses from the international community. Doing so strengthens North Korea’s military capabilities as well as its leverage for the diplomatic battlefield.
Bruce Klingner specializes in Korean and Japanese affairs as the senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center. Klingner’s analysis and writing about North Korea, South Korea, and Japan, as well as related issues, are informed by his 20 years of service at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. From 1996 to 2001, Klingner was CIA’s deputy division chief for Korea, responsible for the analysis of political, military, economic, and leadership issues for the president of the United States and other senior U.S. policymakers. In 1993-1994, he was the chief of the CIA’s Korea branch, which analyzed military developments during a nuclear crisis with North Korea.
3. N. Korea fires two apparent cruise missiles from land: Seoul official
Keep calm and do not overreact. Kim is trying to drive a reaction.
North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Test: A 6 Step Strategy To Respond
(LEAD) N. Korea fires two apparent cruise missiles from land: Seoul official | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with more details from 3rd para; MODIFIES headline; ADDS byline)
By Song Sang-ho
SEOUL, Jan. 25 (Yonhap) -- North Korea seems to have test-fired at least two cruise missiles from an inland area, a South Korean official said, in what would be Pyongyang's fifth known round of missile launches this year.
"We still need to conduct a detailed analysis (on the launches)," the military official told reporters on condition of anonymity. "But I want to say that should such a missile be launched southward, our detection and interception systems have no problem countering it."
The official did not offer details, including origins and targets.
The North conducted the last known test of a cruise missile in September last year. At the time, it claimed to have fired a "new-type long-range cruise missile," calling it a "strategic weapon of great significance."
A cruise missile test does not run afoul of U.N. Security Council resolutions banning any launch using ballistic missile technology.
Usually, the South's military does not make any formal announcement or statement in response to the North's cruise missile tests, versus swift public reaction against its ballistic missile activities.
The North fired what it called two tactical guided missiles on Jan. 17, just three days after its purported test-firing of two other missiles by its railway-borne unit.
It also shot what it claims to be hypersonic missiles on Jan. 5 and 11, raising concerns they could dodge South Korea's missile defense, though the authenticity of the assertions has yet to be vouched for.
In a sign the recalcitrant regime could engage in more provocative acts, Pyongyang made a thinly-veiled threat last Thursday to lift its yearslong self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile tests.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
4. Biden’s North Korea Policy Needs Rebooting
I am reminded of the wise words of a senior official from the previous administration who said when looking at north Korea policy, everything that could be tried with north Korea has already been tried and all that can be done is repackage old ideas. That thought is even more true now following the love letter summitry that was tried in 2018-2019.
I would make the argument until we understand that this is not a nuclear and missile problem, not a US policy problem, not even a north-South problem, we will not make progress. The problem rarely stated in Op Eds is that this is a Kim Jong-un problem and until we deal with Kim Jong-un as he really is and not as we would wish him to be (and understanding the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime) we will not make progress. We need to focus on the acceptable durable political arrangement that will protect, sustain, and advance US and ROK/US alliance national security interests. Unfortunately that means resolving the "Korea question."
Biden’s North Korea Policy Needs Rebooting
Foreign Policy · by Anthony Ruggiero, Matthew Zweig · January 24, 2022
An expert's point of view on a current event.
A series of missile tests make it plain that carrots don’t work without sticks.
By Anthony Ruggiero, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and Matthew Zweig, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
A man walks past a television screen broadcasting footage of a North Korean missile test at a railway station in Seoul on Jan. 14. ANTHONY WALLACE/AFP via Getty Images
North Korea fired two suspected ballistic missiles on Jan. 17, marking its fourth missile test this month and its seventh since September 2021. This spate of tests provides the final word on U.S. President Joe Biden’s engagement-only policy toward Pyongyang: It’s not working. While the administration has belatedly begun to tighten sanctions in response to the tests, Biden should get back on track by aggressively enforcing congressionally mandated sanctions against North Korea.
Upon concluding its North Korea policy review in April 2021, the Biden administration announced it would pursue a middle ground between the Obama administration’s “strategic patience” (diplomatese for doing nothing) and the Trump administration’s combination of “maximum pressure” and personal engagement with dictator Kim Jong Un. That month, White House press secretary Jen Psaki said that Biden seeks a “calibrated, practical approach that is open to and will explore diplomacy with the DPRK” and has reached out to Pyongyang both publicly and privately to offer talks. The United States reduced its economic pressure on North Korea as well. Kim, however, rejected the administration’s overtures and friendly gestures. Meanwhile, Pyongyang’s ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs march ahead, putting Washington and its East Asian allies in a worse position than before Biden took office.
With the administration distracted by other foreign-policy priorities—not least Russia’s preparations for war against Ukraine—North Korea has received little attention. The November 2021 readout of a virtual meeting between Biden and China’s Xi Jinping mentioned North Korea in a single short sentence, where it was lumped together with other “regional challenges” like Afghanistan and Iran.
North Korea fired two suspected ballistic missiles on Jan. 17, marking its fourth missile test this month and its seventh since September 2021. This spate of tests provides the final word on U.S. President Joe Biden’s engagement-only policy toward Pyongyang: It’s not working. While the administration has belatedly begun to tighten sanctions in response to the tests, Biden should get back on track by aggressively enforcing congressionally mandated sanctions against North Korea.
Upon concluding its North Korea policy review in April 2021, the Biden administration announced it would pursue a middle ground between the Obama administration’s “strategic patience” (diplomatese for doing nothing) and the Trump administration’s combination of “maximum pressure” and personal engagement with dictator Kim Jong Un. That month, White House press secretary Jen Psaki said that Biden seeks a “calibrated, practical approach that is open to and will explore diplomacy with the DPRK” and has reached out to Pyongyang both publicly and privately to offer talks. The United States reduced its economic pressure on North Korea as well. Kim, however, rejected the administration’s overtures and friendly gestures. Meanwhile, Pyongyang’s ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs march ahead, putting Washington and its East Asian allies in a worse position than before Biden took office.
With the administration distracted by other foreign-policy priorities—not least Russia’s preparations for war against Ukraine—North Korea has received little attention. The November 2021 readout of a virtual meeting between Biden and China’s Xi Jinping mentioned North Korea in a single short sentence, where it was lumped together with other “regional challenges” like Afghanistan and Iran.
This inattention has allowed the strict U.S. and United Nations sanctions imposed against North Korea since 2016 to atrophy. If not continually updated and enforced, sanctions are circumvented and lose their effectiveness. With such pressure lacking since Biden took office, the Kim regime has capitalized through a range of operations to evade sanctions, including covert ship-to-ship transfers to veil fuel imports and the use of front or shell companies and covert agents to access the international financial system.
Only a policy that convinces Kim that his nuclear program puts his regime itself at risk has the potential to bear fruit.
The Biden administration did not issue its first sanctions package against North Korea until Dec. 10, 2021, almost a year after taking office. Those sanctions rightly highlighted Pyongyang’s deplorable human rights record, including the mistreatment of Otto Warmbier, an American who was arbitrarily detained in North Korea in 2016 and died shortly after he was released. Yet the U.S. Treasury Department conspicuously failed to designate any of the financial institutions, particularly in China and Southeast Asia, aiding the North Korean regime, as mandated by the U.S. Congress since 2019. A separate U.S. sanctions package issued on Jan. 12 similarly failed to pack a significant punch.
Meanwhile, the Kim regime continues to advance its missile and nuclear capabilities, including intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of hitting the continental United States. Yet the Biden administration has done little in response. After North Korea resumed missile testing this past September following a six-month hiatus, the administration for months failed to issue sanctions over Pyongyang’s missile tests, each of which violated multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions, as the administration has acknowledged. Kim probably interpreted this soft U.S. stance as an indication that Biden would tolerate further testing.
Following last week’s missile test, for example, the administration was able to convince fewer than half the 15 countries currently represented on U.N. Security Council to support a strongly worded statement condemning the launch. While inevitable Russian and Chinese vetoes precluded a statement issued by the U.N. Security Council, the administration failed to convince India, Mexico, or Norway to join in condemning the Kim regime.
That Biden’s engagement-only policy has failed should come as no surprise. Each of Biden’s four most recent predecessors also tried and failed to convince Kim and his father before him to denuclearize. Leon Panetta, who served as defense secretary and CIA director during the Obama administration, urged Biden to not take a status quo approach to North Korea and noted Kim only responds to strength. Only a policy that convinces Kim that his nuclear program puts his regime itself at risk has the potential to bear fruit. Along with stronger diplomatic, military, cybersecurity, and informational efforts, accomplishing this will require sustained economic pressure.
To that end, the Biden administration needs to get serious about enforcing sanctions. Bipartisan majorities in Congress, working closely with both the Obama and Trump administrations, overwhelmingly passed mandatory North Korea sanctions in 2016, 2017, and 2019.
Those laws provide the administration with both a clear mandate and powerful tools to turn the screws on Kim and force him to return to the negotiating table. The administration should crack down on North Korea’s financial networks under the 2019 Otto Warmbier Act, including the financial institutions facilitating Pyongyang’s sanctions evasion. The administration should also better implement the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, which requires the U.S. government to impose restrictions on the shipping registries of countries that violate many U.S. or U.N. sanctions on North Korea.
Finally, the administration should rigorously enforce the panoply of mandatory sanctions contained in the 2016 North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act. That law requires sanctions for activities ranging from the purchase of North Korean minerals or seafood to the provision of jet fuel and luxury goods to the Kim regime. Proper sanctions enforcement will require a sustained effort to sanction anyone helping North Korea’s prohibited activities, including individuals and entities in China and Russia that enable Beijing and Moscow to ignore the U.N. sanctions they voted for.
Congress still has a role to play, too. Ensuring the Biden administration implements North Korea sanctions will require rigorous, bipartisan oversight from both houses of Congress. As a first step, the leaders of the House and Senate foreign affairs committees should hold hearings on the administration’s policy. The Biden administration, in turn, should proactively engage with lawmakers from both parties to chart a new, bipartisan North Korea policy.
While Biden has a full foreign-policy plate, the fact remains that the Kim regime poses a serious threat to the United States and its allies. Ignoring this threat will only make it grow.
Anthony Ruggiero is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former senior director for counterproliferation and biodefense on the U.S. National Security Council during the Trump administration. Twitter: @NatSecAnthony
Matthew Zweig is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Twitter: @MatthewZweig1
5. A lesson from Battle of Jipyeong-ri (AKA Battle of Chipyong-ni)
No author provided. This is an OpEd from the Donga Ilbo. Tactical actions can have strategic effects.
A lesson from Battle of Jipyeong-ri
On January 28 in 1951, a platoon from 23 Regiment of the 2nd Division of the U.S. military set off on a reconnaissance to the Ssanggul Tunnel in the southeastern part of Jipyeong-ri. During the mission, the platoon was attacked by the Chinese troops and isolated in heights. While the U.S. military managed to rescue them, the battle ended up triggering bigger trouble. Back then, the U.S. government was considering giving up on the Korean War. The discussion was suspended after President Harry Truman issued a statement on January 13, but they had to prove they can win the war with the actual results of a battle. Gen. Matthew Ridgway ordered to move north as he saw cracks in the eastern front.
The soldiers of the 2nd Division stumbled on the enemies while making their way towards Hoengseong, and the small skirmish escalated into a massive battle on a regiment level. Joined by a French battalion and the 3rd Battalion of 23 Regiment, the troops occupied the heights near the tunnel and had intense battles with the Chinese troops for days. After winning the battle, the 23rd Regiment made inroads into Jipyeong-ri for the Battle of Jipyeong-ri, a battle that went on from February 13 to 16 and shifted the tide of the Korean War.
For the last two days, this journalist visited the battlegrounds of Jipyeong-ri and Ssanggul Tunnel. Oddly enough, the team of explorers consisted of a military general, a field officer, a noncommissioned officer, and a former war correspondent. We had an interview with a veteran and traveled across the heights and ridges, following the traces of trenches and gunfire like crime scene investigators.
We discovered two things. First, we found the location of the battle where we could relive the moments of the fierce fight. The traces of the battlefield clearly told us where the ambush point was, why some died and why some lived, and which side was the winners. Another finding was the realization that no results come without reason.
The heights which got conquered were vulnerable from the beginning. Invaders found their way in where the defense was porous. The scintillating leadership was in fact a result of thorough preparations. That is how things are in real life. Instead of passing the buck to individuals and groups, one must understand the bigger picture of society and the tidal change of the times. Most survivors or saviors were those who saw the woods.
6. More signs of life at North's Punggye-ri testing site
No surprise. We are likely seeing what the regime wants us to see to underscore its words about considering to end the nuclear and ICBM test moratorium.
Tuesday
January 25, 2022
More signs of life at North's Punggye-ri testing site
The command center and workers' living quarters at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site are demolished on May 24, 2018. [YONHAP]
North Korea continues to conduct maintenance work at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, which the regime vowed to shut down in April 2018, according to a former International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) official interviewed by Voice of America (VoA).
The test site, located in a mountainous region in the country’s remote North Hamgyong Province, was the North’s only known nuclear test site and the location of six nuclear weapons tests between October 2006 and September 2017.
In a phone interview with Voice of America on Jan. 23, Oli Hainonen, a special researcher at the U.S. Stimson Center, who served as deputy director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said satellite analysis of the test site suggests North Korea is still maintaining facilities at the location.
“They are maintaining the site in such a way that you see trails of the cars, cleaning of snow, and things like that. So, they kind of maintain the buildings in some kind of conditions,” Hainonen said.
The former IAEA deputy director observed, “It looks like that they have kind of abandoned it but kind of maintained it somehow. It's more than just simple monitoring. You don't need to have this kind of continuous procedure. It's not a big crowd of people, but quite a few buildings seem to be in use.”
North Korea appeared to destroy at least three tunnels at the Punggye-ri site, as well as observation buildings, a metal foundry and living quarters in May 2018.
Foreign journalists were invited to watch the site’s destruction. No South Korean reporters were invited to that event.
However, North Korean analysis website 38 North, which is run by the Stimson Center, observed through satellite imagery in July 2019 that the site was well-maintained by people who continued living there, as evidenced by vegetables being grown in the greenhouse area.
Jacob Bugle, a North Korea satellite imagery analyst who runs the blog AccessDPRK, wrote in September 2019 that despite the demolition of tunnel entrances used for previous tests, the tunnels themselves were not destroyed, while the tunnels that were never used in testing were not part of the public demolition.
Tests were conducted under Mount Mantap using an extensive tunnel network, which was reportedly dug by political prisoners held at the nearby Hwasong penal labor colony. The last test in September 2017 reportedly caused earthquakes of magnitude 4.1, which led to extensive damage to the tunnels.
In October 2017 testimony before the National Assembly, Nam Jae-cheol, who was head of South Korea's Meteorological Administration, warned that further tests at Punggye-ri could cause the mountain to collapse and release radioactivity into the environment.
Earlier last week, North Korea suggested it could end its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile testing. An end to the moratorium, which started in 2017, could result in future tests at the Punggye-ri site, though it remains unknown in the regime harbors other underground nuclear test sites.
Writing for the Institute for Science and International Security in May 2018, nuclear physicist and the institute’s president David Albright said he considered the shuttering of active testing at Punggye-ri was like “many disabling steps” which the North could undo after weeks or months of work.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
7. Why Is North Korea Suddenly Launching So Many Missiles?
Because it can. The red line set by Trump and Moon at no nuclear and ICBM testing gives Kim freedom of action to do anything below that line. And this supports political warfare as well as warfighting strategies.
Why Is North Korea Suddenly Launching So Many Missiles?
Experience has shown Kim Jong-un that saber-rattling is the best way to get Washington’s attention, especially when global affairs are already in a precarious state.
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A photo provided by the North Korean government showing what it said was a test-fire of a tactical guided missile on Jan. 17.Credit...Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service, via Associated Press
By
Jan. 25, 2022, 12:22 a.m. ET
Kim Jong-un, the country’s ruler, has launched six ballistic missiles in four weapons tests since Jan. 5, almost as many missiles in one month as North Korea launched in all of last year. On Tuesday, the South Korean military confirmed that the North had fired two cruise missiles in its fifth test of 2022.
The message was clear: The North Korean leader feels he is being ignored and wants to push the Biden administration to re-engage and pay attention to his economically ailing nation.
Individually, the tests may not amount to much — they involved missiles that have already been tested or weapons that are still under development. But taken together, they signal that Mr. Kim plans to use 2022 to jolt the Biden administration out of its diplomatic slumber.
Mr. Kim needs Washington to engage with him on economic concessions so that he can fix his country’s devastated economy. Over the years, he has learned that the best way to grab the attention of an American president is with weapons. And that the best time to do it is when the world can least afford the instability.
According to that playbook, 2022 looks like a promising year.
During a Politburo meeting last Wednesday, Mr. Kim suggested that his government might once again begin testing long-range missiles and nuclear devices after suspending such tests before his 2018 summit meeting with President Donald J. Trump.
Kim Jong-un, the leader or North Korea, attending a meeting at the office building of the Party Central Committee, in Pyongyang last week.
“2022 calls for continued saber-rattling, punctuated by some major missile tests,” said Lee Sung-yoon, a North Korea expert at the Fletcher School at Tufts University. “Kim’s goal is to routinize short-range ballistic missile flights as a fact of life without any repercussions, after which he will move on to bigger provocations by resuming intermediate- and long-range missile tests punctuated by a nuclear test, as he did in 2017.”
That year, North Korea tested what it called a hydrogen bomb and also launched three intercontinental ballistic missiles. It was also the year Mr. Trump took office after a vicious campaign in the United States. South Korea had just impeached its president.
Wednesday was the second time Mr. Kim threatened to lift the moratorium on long-range missile and nuclear tests. After his diplomacy with Mr. Trump ended without an agreement in 2019, he said he no longer felt bound by the commitment. But he did not follow through with any such tests, and his country was soon plunged into the chaos of the coronavirus pandemic.
President Donald J. Trump and Mr. Kim during a signing ceremony in Singapore, in 2018.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times
This year also marks the beginning of Mr. Kim’s second decade in power, and a chance for him to reassert his authority.
Ever since taking over, he has focused on building the country’s arsenal to validate his family’s dynastic rule, calling his nuclear weapons a “treasured sword” that protects North Korea against foreign invasion.
During the meeting on Wednesday, he urged North Koreans to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the birth of his father and predecessor, Kim Jong-il, in February, as well as the 110th birthday of his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, in April.
Under his father and grandfather, North Korea had seemed open to shelving its nuclear ambitions. But those hopes have dissipated under Mr. Kim, who has rapidly expanded the country’s nuclear program, even as the United Nations piled on sanctions.
Though Mr. Kim has often been depicted abroad as a leader potentially capable of opening up his isolated country for the sake of economic development, his nuclear weapons are, as North Korea has put it, “not a bargaining chip.”
People in Pyongyang bowing before portraits of North Korea’s previous leaders Kim Il-sung, the nation’s founder, and Kim Jong-il to mark the 10th anniversary of the death of Kim Jong-il on Dec. 17.
Rather, the country sees them as tools to bring Washington to the negotiating table. And by that logic, the more powerful the arsenal, the more leverage Mr. Kim has.
Even when he vowed to focus on economic development in 2013, Mr. Kim stuck to his “parallel” goal of strengthening his nuclear force. The country has conducted more than 130 missile tests under him, compared with a total of 16 tests under his father and 15 under his grandfather. The last four of the North’s six nuclear tests all took place under his watch.
“By advancing its nuclear capabilities and weapons systems, North Korea is showing the United States and South Korea that the more time passes, the bigger the price will become that they have to pay,” Choi Yong-hwan, an analyst at the Institute for National Security Strategy in Seoul, wrote in a recent policy paper.
Watching footage in Seoul last week showing a file image of a recent North Korean missile launch.Credit...Ahn Young-Joon/Associated Press
Yet try as it may to flex its power, North Korea appears to be low on the Biden administration’s list of international priorities.
Washington has taken no steps to entice Mr. Kim, except to propose talks “without preconditions,” a lukewarm entreaty that North Korea has rebuffed.
But it has not resumed tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Instead, North Korea has focused on testing missiles that can carry what it calls “smaller, lighter and tactical” nuclear weapons. These kinds of weapons do not pose a direct threat to the United States, but they could boost Mr. Kim’s leverage with Washington by placing American allies such as South Korea and Japan under nuclear threat.
The Significance of North Korea’s Missile Tests
Card 1 of 5
An increase in activity. In recent months, North Korea has conducted several missile tests, hinting at an increasingly defiant attitude toward countries that oppose its growing military arsenal. Here’s what to know:
U.N. resolutions. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula started rising in 2017, when North Korea tested three intercontinental ballistic missiles and conducted a nuclear test. The United Nations imposed sanctions, and Pyongyang stopped testing nuclear and long-range missiles for a time.
An escalation. North Korea started a new round of testing in September after a six-month hiatus. It has since completed several missile tests, including the firing of two ballistic missiles on Jan. 14, that violated the 2017 U.N. resolutions.
In North Korea’s first two tests this month, the country launched short-range ballistic missiles with what it called “hypersonic gliding vehicles,” detachable warheads that make the weapons harder to intercept because they not only fly extremely fast but also change course during flight.
Solid-fuel missiles are easier to transport and launch. The KN-23 can perform low-altitude maneuvers, making them harder to intercept. North Korea has also begun launching KN-23 variants from a submarine, as it did in October, and from trains, as it did in September and again this month.
Mr. Kim observing a test launch of a hypersonic missile on Jan. 11 in North Korea, in a photo provided by the government.Credit...Korean Central News Agency via Korea News Service, via Associated Press
In its most recent test, North Korea fired a pair of solid-fuel missiles from a mobile launcher vehicle. When the North first launched such a pair in 2019, there was a 16-minute interval between the two missiles fired.
That gap was reduced to four minutes in the recent test, indicating that the military has improved its ability to fire multiple missiles and hide them from counterattacks by the United States and South Korea.
“North Korea hopes that if it continues to demonstrate its nuclear capabilities but confines them to the Korean Peninsula, it will not aggravate public opinion in the United States and will strengthen voices there calling for a compromise,” Cha Du-hyeogn, a principal fellow at the Seoul-based Asan Institute for Policy Studies, wrote in a recent paper.
For that strategy to work, Mr. Kim will need continued help from China in resisting any new international sanctions. North Korea’s economic challenges were deepened two years ago when it shut its border with China to fight the pandemic. This month, Beijing confirmed that “through friendly consultations,” China and North Korea reopened their border for freight trains.
“This timing suggests Beijing is more than complicit with Pyongyang’s provocations,” said Leif-Eric Easley, a professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul. “China is supporting North Korea economically and coordinating with it militarily.”
8. Kim’s own timetable
Excerpts:
South Korea will lose all negotiations with North Korea if it fails to understand Pyongyang’s long-term strategy. There are many pieces of evidence that our grasp of the situation over the past 30 years has been extremely naïve. Over the years, South Korean leaders changed their stances from one that North Korea has no ability or intention to develop nuclear programs to another that North Korea’s nuclear development is a way of self-defense. It is now changed to a stance that Kim Jong-un has a strong intention to denuclearize.
Did the North’s goal and intention really change over the years and did its intention to give up nuclear weapons program suddenly appear and then disappear?
After North Korea successfully tested the engine for an intercontinental ballistic missile in 2017, Kim abandoned his dignity as supreme leader and danced while piggybacking a military engineer. Kim’s facial expression captured in that photo is his true intention.
Now, the North’s next agenda will become an Israel or Pakistan in Northeast Asia by winning tacit approval as a nuclear power. The decision by the Politburo of the Workers’ Party on Jan. 19 to review its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and ICBM tests can be a strategic resolution to start the final stretch to realize this goal. Although it is still flexible, we must never flatly conclude that the North’s latest stance is just bluffing.
There is no need for North Korea to practice brinkmanship again, as it is no longer the country it once was. We must abandon the naïve belief that the North’s actions are to win food aid and that it will return to talks when the time comes.
Tuesday
January 25, 2022
Kim’s own timetable
Yeh Young-june
The author is an editorial writer of the JoongAng Ilbo.
After conducting four series of ballistic missile tests at the beginning of this year, North Korea has hinted that it will resume nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests. It is a warning that Pyongyang will end its quietness, which continued since the breakdown of the Hanoi summit in February 2019, and change its attitude to aggressiveness. Depending on the North’s moves, tension on the Korean Peninsula will likely deepen again.
The Moon Jae-in administration’s attitude toward North Korea issues is astonishingly consistent. Senior government officials and ruling party leaders said Pyongyang’s latest moves are aimed at attracting Washington’s attention or are simply a negotiation strategy to take the higher ground in anticipation of talks. Experts close to the administration are issuing similar analyses. Top officials frequently make absurd remarks that an end-of-war declaration is more necessary than ever because the North fires missiles repeatedly.
Such views are as deeply rooted as the history of the North Korean nuclear problem. According to government officials and North Korea experts, the North’s provocations are Pyongyang’s unique way of asking for talks. The interpretation seems valid based on the North’s pattern of behavior over the past decades.
The extreme confrontation in 2017 was a prelude to the North’s participation in the PyeongChang Winter Olympics and its Singapore summit with the United States. After its first nuclear test, North Korea quickly joined negotiations and reached the Sept. 19, 2005 joint declaration in six-party talks.
In a meeting with members of the Workers’ Party on January 19, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un threatens to end his self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and ICBM tests. [NEWS1]
North Korea has repeated a cycle of staging a provocation, brinkmanship, signaling its intention to talk, participating in a negotiation (and buying time), abandoning an agreement and resuming provocations. At a particular point, it could be a useful analysis method to understand the North’s intention or predicting its short-term movement.
But when we look at the situation from a long-term perspective, it is a different story. The most crucial fact is that North Korea has become a de facto nuclear state while repeating those cycles. Whether it was acting aggressively or extending an olive branch, the country has never given up its goal of becoming a nuclear power. Even at the moment of signing an agreement at an international negotiation, North Korea was secretly developing nuclear weapons.
The North’s behavior appears to us as a brinkmanship, but it has its own mid-term and long-term strategy. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is acting on this timetable. Without the timetable, there is no way to explain the four nuclear tests and 120 missile tests North Korea conducted during Kim’s 10-year rule. From the North Korean point of view, the inter-Korean and North-U.S. talks in 2018 were just a peace offensive following its successful completion of its nuclear arms program in 2017.
South Korea will lose all negotiations with North Korea if it fails to understand Pyongyang’s long-term strategy. There are many pieces of evidence that our grasp of the situation over the past 30 years has been extremely naïve. Over the years, South Korean leaders changed their stances from one that North Korea has no ability or intention to develop nuclear programs to another that North Korea’s nuclear development is a way of self-defense. It is now changed to a stance that Kim Jong-un has a strong intention to denuclearize.
Did the North’s goal and intention really change over the years and did its intention to give up nuclear weapons program suddenly appear and then disappear?
After North Korea successfully tested the engine for an intercontinental ballistic missile in 2017, Kim abandoned his dignity as supreme leader and danced while piggybacking a military engineer. Kim’s facial expression captured in that photo is his true intention.
Now, the North’s next agenda will become an Israel or Pakistan in Northeast Asia by winning tacit approval as a nuclear power. The decision by the Politburo of the Workers’ Party on Jan. 19 to review its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and ICBM tests can be a strategic resolution to start the final stretch to realize this goal. Although it is still flexible, we must never flatly conclude that the North’s latest stance is just bluffing.
There is no need for North Korea to practice brinkmanship again, as it is no longer the country it once was. We must abandon the naïve belief that the North’s actions are to win food aid and that it will return to talks when the time comes.
9. China denies alleged intervention in Korean presidential election
Doth China protest too much?
China denies alleged intervention in Korean presidential election
Former Chinese Ambassador to Korea Qiu Guohong speaks during a forum on Sino-Korea relations held at the National Assembly on Seoul's Yeouido in this Nov. 28, 2019, file photo. Yonhap
By Jung Da-min
The Chinese Embassy in Seoul has denied the allegation that China tried to meddle in Korea's upcoming presidential election.
In a statement released to Korean journalists on Monday, the embassy expressed regret that a JoongAng Ilbo newspaper column published on the same day accused China of trying to intervene in the presidential election based on several Chinese officials' remarks.
"China, like many other countries in the world, is watching the South Korean presidential election, but it has never intervened in it and will never do it," the press release reads. "China's announcing of its position and argument on China-related issues is aimed at protecting its interests and the overall development of Sino-Korea relations, and has nothing to do with the so-called interference in the Korean presidential election."
The Chinese Embassy's reaction came as the JoonAng Ilbo published a column titled, "China's attempt to 'intervene' in Korea's presidential election regretful." In the article written by its chief Beijing correspondent, the journalist cited former Chinese Ambassador to Korea Qiu Guohong's "inappropriate" comments about Korea during an online international academic conference held Jan. 20.
"I hope presidential candidates of Korea would not mention any sensitive issues related to China," Qiu was quoted as saying, adding he believes the bilateral relations between China and Korea should not be ruined by some politicians' remarks.
The JoongAng Ilbo column presented Qiu's remarks as being disrespectful to Korea, pointing out that the former ambassador was indirectly criticizing recent remarks made by Yoon Suk-yeol, the presidential candidate of Korea's main opposition conservative People Power Party (PPP).
Yoon Suk-yeol, the presidential candidate of the main opposition conservative People Power Party, speaks during a press conference on his diplomacy and security policies held at party headquarters in Seoul, Monday. Joint Press Corps
The article also mentioned several other Chinese scholars' remarks about how some conservative politicians in Korea tried to China-bash as a campaign tactic.
Sevral of Yoon's remarks have irked Chinese officials. Yoon said that many young Koreans don't like China, during his visit to the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea (AMCHAM Korea) in December.
Back in mid-July of last year, Yoon had said in a JoongAng Ilbo interview that if China wants to insist on withdrawal of a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile shield in Korea ― deployed in 2016 despite China's strong protest ― China should first withdraw the long-range radars deployed near its border.
Chinese Ambassador to Korea Xing Haiming immediately sent a contribution piece to the same paper to refute Yoon's statements, saying: "China respects Korea's foreign policy. However, the Korea-U.S. alliance should not harm China's interests."
Meanwhile, Yoon presented his diplomacy and security policy pledges, Monday, vowing to "rebuild" Korea's alliance with the U.S. to deal more effectively with both North Korea's nuclear threats and other regional security and economic cooperation issues.
The main opposition candidate said he would seek economic cooperation with China, while focusing on the security alliance with the U.S., amid the growing rivalry between the two global powers.
10. Japanese Embassy returns Moon's New Year gift over 'Dokdo image' on box
Japanese Embassy returns Moon's New Year gift over 'Dokdo image' on box
The Japanese Embassy in Seoul has refused to accept South Korean President Moon Jae-in's Lunar New Year gift, claiming the gift's box bears an image of South Korea's easternmost islets of Dokdo, Japanese news reports said Saturday.
Upon the refusal, the embassy lodged a protest and repeated Japan's territorial claim to the islets.
The presidential office did not make any specific comments on the issue.
11. Another day, another North Korean missile launch
There is more in the US and foreign press on today's cruise missile launch than there is in the Korea press. Yawn. Business as usual. This is meant for the Americans. Nothing to see here - oh and yes let's keep pushing the end of war declaration cause that will cause all of this to stop (note my sarcasm).
Another day, another North Korean missile launch
The latest firing in 2022’s accelerating barrage is most likely aimed at a domestic rather than US audience
SEOUL – North Korea launched at least two cruise missiles on Tuesday (January 25), South Korea’s military announced later in the day.
The missiles were fired from an inland area, a South Korean official told reporters, according to Yonhap news agency. That firing point suggests they were not tactical anti-shipping missiles.
Tuesday’s firings were Pyongyang’s fifth round of missile launches in what is becoming a very busy year for the technicians and troops of the North’s rocket units.
Experts argue that this barrage could be designed to test new weaponry and systems, or to showcase operational capabilities. Or, it could be designed to send a political message to audiences, either internal or external.
Of course, it could also be a multi-pronged strategy that is a blend of all these motivations.
Earlier launches this year were of ballistic missiles, including defense-baffling hypersonics, as well as mobile, and therefore more survivable, train-borne weapons. Though North Korea is banned by UN Security Council resolutions from owning ballistic missile technologies, the heavily sanctioned state routinely defies the restrictions.
Although North Korea is banned from owning ballistic missiles, it is not barred from owning cruise missiles. Ballistic missiles, that ascend and descend in a parabola, are generally larger, long-ranged and faster than cruise missiles, which fly on flat trajectories and are used to hit pinpoint, tactical targets.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un watches the launch of a missile in this undated photo released by North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency. Photo: KCNA
Internal motivations light up the sky
Tuesday’s test of cruise missiles lends credence to those who believe North Korea is testing or demonstrating its abilities for internal reasons, rather than making a political statement to overseas audiences, such as to the Joe Biden White House.
Buttressing this analysis is the likelihood that recent launches are generating “missile fatigue” at a time when global political, diplomatic, military and media attention is heavily focused upon Ukraine and Taiwan.
“Things are happening in Eastern Europe and the South China Sea, so you would think Kim Jong Un is taking this into account,” said Chun In-bum, a retired South Korean general. “The logical conclusion is that to do this now is against common sense, so it seems that rather than a political objective, this is normal readiness. They are working to their own timetable.”
Military professionals say it is essential that the full system – troops as well as technologies – need to be exercised. That means fueling, deploying and firing, while observing command and control and communications protocols.
Chun also warned against seeing the missile launches strictly as tests.
“They are not just testing, they are showing that these weapons systems are operational,” he told Asia Times. “These have passed the test stage.”
Michael Breen, the Seoul-based author of The New Koreans and a biographer of Kim Jong Il, the late father of current North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, suspects that the launches, which are covered by state media, aim to lift the spirits of the local populace.
North Koreans are suffering hardships caused by years of sanctions and ongoing Covid-19 restrictions that have impacted trade and market activities.
“I assume this is something that your average North Korean, far from questioning, would receive comfort from. He would be thinking, ‘we are a military power, we are being protected by our leadership’,” Breen told Asia Times. “I don’t see anyone saying ‘oh God, he is provoking the Americans.’”
This is particularly the case due to the closed borders and media firewalls that, while not entirely impermeable, largely isolate North Koreans from the outside world.
“They don’t have the information at their fingertips, or the context, to think differently,” Breen said.
US President Donald Trump meets North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at the Capella Hotel on Sentosa island in Singapore on June 12, 2018. Photo: WikiCommons
Aiming at American eyes
Still, it could indeed be the case that Pyongyang is bringing new systems to the attention of the Americans – albeit with a long-range goal in mind.
Since the implosion of leader-to-leader talks between North Korea and the US – when a summit between Kim and then-US president Donald Trump collapsed without any achievement in Hanoi in 2019 – bilateral negotiations have dwindled to nothing.
The US routinely states it is ready for talks with North Korea. But North Korea has not, since the Biden administration took office, taken up the offer.
Instead, in early 2021, North Korea announced a long new list of weapons set to be developed, including hypersonic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and tactical nuclear weapons.
Very few experts believe North Korea will ever give up its core nuclear deterrent – intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads. However, it could feasibly use its newly developed, non-core assets as bargaining tools to be deployed when it decides the time is right to return to talks with the US.
“They do draw attention to themselves, so maybe they are creating cards that can be negotiated away as they pursue their goals of ending the Korean War and getting the Americans off the peninsula,” said Breen.
12. Americans More Worried About N.Korea's Missiles Than Ukraine Crisis
Interesting data.
Americans More Worried About N.Korea's Missiles Than Ukraine Crisis
January 25, 2022 11:55
Americans are more concerned about North Korea conducting missile tests than about a possible invasion of Ukraine by Russia, a poll suggests.
In the poll of 1,001 American voters on Jan. 16-19 by Fox News, 68 percent of respondents said they are concerned about North Korea conducting missile tests, compared to 62 percent who worry about the standoff between Russia and Ukraine.
Thirty-one percent ticked they are "extremely concerned" about North Korea's missile tests and 37 percent "very concerned." Twenty-five percent said they are "not very concerned" and a mere seven percent "not concerned at all."
A missile is being fired in Pyongyang on Nov. 17, in this grab from [North] Korean Central Television the following day.
But only 24 percent said they are "extremely concerned" about the Ukrainian situation, 38 percent "very concerned," 27 percent "not very concerned," and nine percent "not concerned at all."
Americans are most concerned about things closer to home like inflation and higher prices with a whopping 85 percent, followed by higher crime rates (81 percent), political divisions (78 percent) and the coronavirus pandemic (72 percent).
Percentages were lower of those concerned about migrants at the southern border (59 percent) and voter fraud (53 percent), the hot issues of the Trump administration.
- Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com
13. No signs of work to restore nuclear test tunnels at Punggye-ri site: Seoul official
Seoul tries to counter Olli Heinonen's assessment.
No signs of work to restore nuclear test tunnels at Punggye-ri site: Seoul official | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Jan. 25 (Yonhap) -- South Korea has detected no signs of North Korea trying to restore underground tunnels at its purportedly demolished Punggye-ri nuclear test site despite indications of maintenance work there, a Seoul official said Tuesday.
The official's assessment came after Olli Heinonen, a former deputy director-general at the International Atomic Energy Agency, told the Voice of America (VOA) earlier this week that the North is maintaining the site as evidenced by "trails of the cars and cleaning of snow."
In May 2018, the North claimed to have demolished the site in a show of willingness to denuclearize. The following month, it committed to work toward the "complete denuclearization" of the Korean Peninsula at the first-ever summit with the United States in Singapore.
"We have identified the reported maintenance activities at part of the facilities there, but we have not detected any signs of activities to restore tunnels," the official told reporters on condition of anonymity.
Commenting on the VOA report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said that the intelligence authorities of South Korea and the United States are keeping close tabs on North Korean activities at the site.
"Since the closure of the nuclear testing site in Punggye-ri, we have been paying close attention to related activities there," a JCS official told reporters on condition of anonymity. "To date, there is no noteworthy change."
In the VOA report, Heinonen cited two possible reasons for the North's activities to maintain the site, including the monitoring of any release of radioactivity from it.
"The other function is that they probably maintain the site so that they make a decision at a later date to still do tests," he said. "They might use some tunnels, which were not destroyed in 2018. So, I think it's kind of dual purpose at this point of time."
The signs of activities at the Punggye-ri site came after Pyongyang issued an apparent threat to discard its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile tests amid a protracted impasse in nuclear negotiations with Washington.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
14. North Korea’s security agency keeps close eye on “public trends” while cracking down on corrupt agents
More indications of how the regime is trying to further oppress the Korean people living in the north through the implementation of draconian population and resources control measures.
North Korea’s security agency keeps close eye on “public trends” while cracking down on corrupt agents
Agents surround the homes of those on their watchlist, waiting for them to use phones for international calls
North Koreans are complaining about social controls imposed by their government under the pretext of curbing “problematic thought.” Meanwhile, the country’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) is keeping a close eye on public trends out of concern for ideological laxity and explosions of discontent.
A source in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on Monday that 10 agents sent by the MSS headquarters in Pyongyang have been conducting inspections in Hoeryong since arriving in the city last October.
He said they are conducting an intensive inspection of issues pertaining to the general state of the border region due to emergency quarantine efforts, activities to bust people who carry and use Chinese-made mobile phones, and measures to get people to turn themselves in for ideological wrongdoing.
Since last year, North Korea has been conducting widespread public crackdowns to “root out” so-called “anti-socialist and non-socialist” behavior. The three-month-long inspection in Hoeryong appears to be part of this crackdown.
However, local residents are complaining of significant distress due to the continuous tough crackdowns.
In fact, the source said lots of people have been arrested, and people who have illegal mobile phones are practically in hiding. He said almost nobody is calling China as the crackdown has been so severe that even ethnic Chinese avoid calling the country.
The source noted that agents surround the homes of those on their watchlist, waiting for them to use the phone. That makes it hard for people to place even a single international phone call.
The MSS has been arresting criminals or potential criminals by using frequency scanners to raid places when they get a hit, or placing mobile sentry posts in alleyways and using metal detectors to search the bags and persons of passersby. Recently, the security ministry is engaging in even more intense crackdowns.
A scene from Hoeryong taken back in 2013. / Image: Flickr, Creative Commons, Raymond Cunningham
The source claimed that the government gives its people nothing and rashly arrests even people struggling to put food on the table. He predicted that complaints and discontent will rise as people wonder how to make a living.
He further noted that agents in Hoeryong will complete their inspection shortly, but given that they are still in the city, nobody knows for sure when the crackdown will end. The source speculated that the inspections could continue, with crackdowns following more crackdowns.
As people express their discontent with more and more candor, the MSS is putting even more effort into scrutinizing “public trends.” They are apparently worried that public discontent could explode amid the crackdowns given that North Koreans have been suffering from severe economic difficulties due to the closure of the border.
During last month’s Fourth Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee, North Korean leaders announced that they would conduct emergency quarantine efforts in “more progressive, humane ways.” This may be because the authorities feel burdened by the intense public discontent that existing quarantine policies have created.
The MSS is using inspections to uncover corrupt enforcement agents, too. Indeed, the authorities blame corrupt cadres for the continued existence of “non-socialist phenomena” and violations of quarantine policy despite the crackdowns.
Within the MSS, the official line is that the organization is simply conducting a “yearly inspection of subordinate bodies,” the source said. He pointed out, however, that the security agency has been working really hard to bust agents taking bribes to look the other way at non-socialist activity and violations of quarantine policy.
Agents who have been taking bribes are complaining that they will “starve to death” if things continue as they are, the source added.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Mun Dong Hui is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about his articles to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
15. North Korean film stars seen begging for food at Pyongsong’s Okjon Market
Another indication of the extreme suffering.
North Korean film stars seen begging for food at Pyongsong’s Okjon Market
“I don’t know how I’m going to survive without any help from the government,” one of the actors said, according to a source
By Mun Dong Hui - 2022.01.25 4:43pm
Some North Korean film stars have been finding it difficult to make a living under the COVID-19 pandemic, Daily NK has learned.
“In early January, actors from the Korean Art Film Studio made an appearance at Pyongsong’s Okjon Market,” a Daily NK source in South Pyongan Province reported on Jan. 20. “They didn’t appear to have any money, and used their fame to beg for food all around the market.”
The Korean Art Film Studio, founded in 1947 under the name “National Film Studio,” is the largest film studio in North Korea.
In short, famous actors and actresses from the country’s largest film studio seem to be experiencing such dire financial difficulties that they have to beg for food in crowded markets.
“I don’t know how I’m going to survive without any help from the government,” one of the actors said, according to the source. “I can’t do business because I’m so famous.”
The actor went on, saying: “We have barely survived, and only because my wife and kids have been doing business. Because of the coronavirus, business hasn’t been going well. So, I had no choice but to come to Pyongsong Market [to beg].”
Once North Korean actors are assigned a workplace, they are ranked from levels one to six – based on their education and acting ability – and then provided government rations accordingly. Unless they are distinguished actors – such as those with the titles of “Meritorious Actor/Actress” or “People’s Actor/Actress” – it is difficult to survive on these rations alone.
Nonetheless, actors and actresses who became famous through TV or movies have generally avoided doing business to “save face,” and because they lack business experience. Family members of these actors have conducted business activities to serve as breadwinners.
As economic strife has worsened under the COVID-19 pandemic, however, businesses have been hit hard, leaving many actors and actresses unable to make a living. Facing severe threats to their livelihoods, some performers have risked tarnishing their reputations by going out to beg in the streets.
Moranbong Band / Image: Yonhap
North Koreans who witnessed these famous people begging expressed sadness that the performers’ are facing such difficulties.
“Singers are doing well these days because the Supreme Leader [Kim Jong Un]’s wife [Ri Sol Ju] is a vocalist,” the source explained, adding that, “There are a lot of people gossiping about how film stars could possibly fall to such ruin, being as esteemed as they are.”
In its heyday, the North Korean “art film industry” experienced significant development thanks to the active support of then-North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. In fact, Kim aimed to use the popularity and influence of art films as an instrument for political propaganda.
Since his son came to power, however, interest in art films has diminished considerably. In fact, there have been a lot less art films produced under the younger Kim than in the past. The last art film that was produced by North Korea is 2016’s “The Story of Our Home.”
On the other hand, there has been an increased interest in so-called “performance arts,” which include the “Moranbong Band” (also known as Moranbong Moran Hill Orchestra), “Chongbong Band,” and the “Band of the State Affairs Commission.”
Performers in these bands have experienced a jump in pay and in their social stature.
For example, singer-actor Kim Ok Ju, from the Band of the State Affairs Commission, received the title of “People’s Actress,” while Ri Myung Il and Bang Chul Jin (who serve as the leaders and conductors of the same group) received a first-class “Order of the National Flag.”
This all being said, North Korea is trying new production and film techniques in its TV dramas. This appears to signal that North Korea now intends to use dramas instead of art films to spread political propaganda. Drama actors and actresses will likely receive better treatment than art film actors as a result.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Mun Dong Hui is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about his articles to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
16. North Korean taffy seller in Kilju bashes officer on the head with taffy cutting board
Do not make a Korean business women angry. But note the subtitle. The Korean people are doing what they must to survive.
North Korean taffy seller in Kilju bashes officer on the head with taffy cutting board
“The fight might have been between just a police officer and a taffy merchant, but if you look deeper, it’s an example demonstrating how fiercely people have to struggle to survive," a source told Daily NK
A taffy seller in Kilju, North Hamgyong Province, recently bashed a police officer in the head with taffy cutting board. The incident demonstrates that tensions between streetside merchants and the police appear to be growing worse due to North Korea’s protracted COVID-19 quarantine efforts.
According to a Daily NK source in North Hamgyong Province, the taffy merchant — a man in his 50s identified by his family name of Kim — was selling his confections near the train station when he got into a tussle with a police officer cracking down on streetside commerce.
In this latest incident, the cop in question asked Kim to clear out before his goods got confiscated, but the merchant — desperate to sell just a bit more to earn enough to eat for the day — refused. He complained that the officer was asking him to “starve to death,” cracking down on him when he had nothing to eat.
A “grasshopper market,” or unofficial market, in a village near Pyongyang. / Image: Posted online by a Chinese blogger named Lóng Wǔ*Láng Zhī Wěn (龙五*狼之吻 )
When Kim refused to pack up, the police officer pulled him by his arm and kicked his cutting board. The merchant did not yield, however, grabbing the officer by the scruff of the neck. The situation immediately deteriorated into a donnybrook.
During the fracas, Kim used the taffy cutting board to bash the officer in the head.
“It’s not every day you see a police officer getting hit with a taffy board,” said the source. “The fight might have been between just a police officer and a taffy merchant, but if you look deeper, it’s an example demonstrating how fiercely people have to struggle to survive.”
The source said that assaulting a police officer is a punishable offense, even if you argue it was unavoidable. In the end, Kim was sentenced to three months of forced labor, and is currently doing time with a county labor brigade under the Ministry of Social Security.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
