Quotes of the Day:
"Science is the great antidote to the poison of enthusiasm and superstition."
- Adam Smith
There is only one way to happiness and that is to cease worrying about things which are beyond the power of our will.
- Epictetus
The more man meditates upon good thoughts, the better will be his world and the world at large.
- Confucius
1. How Joe Biden Can Push Back Against North Korea’s Political Warfare Strategy
2. Biden Picks Former Sanctions Enforcer as S.Korea Ambassador - Source
3. North fires two more missiles, JCS reacts a day later
4. North Korea recently disappeared from the internet for a little while, and it looks like it has happened again
5. Conflict between Korea, USFK simmers
6. U.S. remains prepared to engage in dialogue with N. Korea: State Dept.
7. Did Seoul Miss Another N.Korea Missile Launch?
8. North Korea remains silent on cruise missile test
9. Seoul faces conundrum over option of North Korea preemptive strike
10. Why Is North Korea Firing So Many Missiles?
11. North Korean officials fight over cargo space on trains from China
12. North Korea orders border patrol to fire flares instead of live ammunition at border intruders
13. Expectations on the rise in North Korea that trade with China will increase soon
14. Asean sees Korea as K-pop nation and most trusted regional power
15. Why Is North Korea Suddenly Launching So Many Missiles?
1. How Joe Biden Can Push Back Against North Korea’s Political Warfare Strategy
My latest essay.
My proposed title was this: "Kim Jong-un’s New Year Missiles versus The Biden Administration North Korea Policy" which was obviously too bland!
How Joe Biden Can Push Back Against North Korea’s Political Warfare Strategy
Kim Jong-un is executing a political warfare strategy against the ROK, the U.S., and the international community, as well as domestically. It is also preparing its warfighting campaign to be able to attack South Korea. These two lines of effort are not mutually exclusive, they are in fact mutually supporting and reinforcing. The more capable military systems the regime possesses, the more likely it can negotiate from a perceived position of strength. These actions and negotiations can contribute to driving a wedge in the ROK/U.S. alliance to try to achieve one of the regime’s key objectives: to force U.S. forces from the peninsula. Kim is likely to use the Moon administration’s end of war declaration proposal to further this objective.
When the conditions are favorable to Kim Jong-un or if he is threatened and he feels he has no other options he may decide to execute his campaign plan to dominate the peninsula and ensure regime survival. The recently tested missile systems will make important contributions to warfighting when they are fielded. If the political warfare strategy is successful and U.S. forces are driven from the peninsula Kim Jong-un may assess he has the combat power to successfully conduct a deliberate attack of the South. Therefore, political warfare and warfighting strategies are inextricably linked.
A criticism of the Biden administration is that it has not sufficiently articulated its North Korea policy so that the press and public can adequately understand it, and it leads to assessments that disparage it for being “engagement only.” The administration never “named” the policy just as the Obama administration did not and that leads the press and pundits to reprise the idea of “strategic patience.”
A criticism of the press and pundits is that the blame seems to always be on whatever U.S. administration is in office while insufficient blame is placed on the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. Perhaps they take it for granted that “everyone” knows that the root of all problems in Korea is the existence of the evilest mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime that has the objective of dominating the Korean Peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State. However, no one should take it for granted that people understand this. This is especially true among those pundits who call for maximum engagement (and appeasement) – they refuse to call out the regime’s evil nature and instead dream of making a diplomatic breakthrough through the lifting of sanctions.
We should also recall that during the Trump administration the U.S. set a very high red line for Kim – no nuclear tests and no ICBM testing. This has provided Kim freedom of action for anything below that. There were no significant responses to the sustained missile and rocket testing activity in 2019-2020 – with some 30 launches and tests. The ROK/U.S. alliance ceded the initiative to Kim so long as he did not test a nuclear weapon or ICBM. The alliance is now in a position of having to now find a way to lower that red line. It must begin with what we know of the Biden administration policy
The policy consists of five parts or lines of effort that are rarely addressed comprehensively:
Principled and practical diplomacy: This is the focus of the press and pundits. What the Biden administration is doing in this line of effort is offering Kim the chance to act as a responsible member of the international community. However, the administration is not banking on that as it is employing the other four lines of effort that are too often overlooked by the press and pundits.
“Stern deterrence“: This is about revitalizing the ROK/U.S. military alliance and strengthening defense capabilities to include returning exercises to a level that will sustain readiness (and support OPCON transition) and reverse the dangerous trend established by the previous administration that was welcomed by the current Moon administration. The ROK/U.S. alliance cannot back down in the face of North Korean increased tension, threats, and provocations.
A human rights upfront approach: Unfortunately, so far this has only been words with no significant action. The administration has failed to nominate an ambassador for North Korean human rights. Much more work needs to be done on human rights. Kim Jong-un must deny the human rights of the Korean power in the North to remain in power.
Full implementation of all relevant UN Security Council resolutions: This provides the “end state” objectives for an end to the North’s nuclear and missile programs, human rights abuses and crimes against humanity, the proliferation of weapons to conflict areas around the world, cyber-attacks, and global illicit activities. It also underscores one element that the current administration has in common with the previous one and that is sanctions will not be lifted until there is substantive progress toward compliance with the UNSCRs. Both Trump and Biden deserve credit for not giving in to the pressure in Seoul and among some in Washington who believe we need to lift sanctions to bring Kim to the negotiating table.
One thing that engagers overlook is that the President does not have the authority to make a unilateral decision to lift UN sanctions or stop enforcing U.S. laws as they pertain to North Korea. However, as noted, both presidents should have done more and hopefully, the Biden administration will do more in the future specifically by expending more effort on sanctions enforcement. The recent designation of the five Koreans from the North operating in Russia and China is a good start. However, due to Chinese and Russian complicity in sanctions evasion and preventing any further UN action the U.S. cannot count on U.N sanctions. It must act against not only North Korean entities by using U.S. laws but also implement secondary sanctions against Chinese and Russian banks and businesses.
When we discuss the administration policy, we should consider all five lines of effort. The administration also needs a pithy name to describe the policy otherwise the press and pundits will make one up or lazily continue to call it strategic patience. This needs to come from the administration so that it can control the narrative of its own policy.
These five lines of effort need to be synthesized into a comprehensive ROK/U.S. alliance political warfare strategy. To defeat the regime’s political warfare strategy the alliance must execute a superior form of political warfare. What is necessary is the sixth line of effort to tie the other five lines together. The alliance must develop and execute a comprehensive information and influence activities campaign as the foundation of the political warfare strategy.
To review, there are likely multiple reasons for the recent missile tests. First and foremost, the military requires them to advance these missile programs. These missile systems are designed for warfighting so we should interpret from this that Kim Jong-un continues to develop capabilities that can support his campaign plan to dominate the Korean peninsula.
Another reason is to send messages to the ROK, the U.S., and the international community. These are likely to support the regime’s blackmail diplomacy, which is the use of threats, increased tension, and provocations to gain political and economic concessions. The most important concession the regime demands is lifting of sanctions. However, to do so would allow Kim to assess that his strategy is a success and rather than come to the negotiating table in good faith he will likely double down with continued provocations.
Kim may also be conducting these tests to drive a wedge in the ROK/U.S. alliance. Given President Moon’s effort to have an end of war declaration and the apparent U.S. reluctance to do so, Kim senses that he can use provocations to weaken the ROK/U.S. alliance and undermine trilateral ROK, Japan, and U.S. cooperation.
The bottom line is Kim is executing a political warfare strategy and developing the capabilities to fight and win a war. These lines of effort are mutually supporting and reinforcing. Another way to describe the regime’s strategy is that is based on subversion, coercion/extortion, and when conditions are right, the use of force to dominate the Korean peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State to ensure the survival of the Kim family regime.
It is against this context that the comprehensive Biden Korean policy must be executed. Ultimately, what the Biden administration and the ROK/U.S. alliance must determine is the acceptable durable political arrangement on the Korean peninsula that will protect, sustain, and advance U.S. and alliance national security interests. Denuclearization is a step forward, but it is not sufficient and likely not achievable as long as the Kim family regime remains in power. The Korea question (per paragraph 60 of the Armistice) must be resolved. The only way we are going to see an end to the nuclear and missile programs and military threats, as well as the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people living in the North by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime, is through the achievement of unification. That means the establishment of a United Republic of Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, and human rights as determined by the Korean people.
In short, a United Republic of Korea or UROK.
David Maxwell, a 1945 Contributing Editor, is a retired US Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 20 years in Asia and specializes in North Korea and East Asia Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is the editor of Small Wars Journal and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
2. Biden Picks Former Sanctions Enforcer as S.Korea Ambassador - Source
I do not know Ambassador Goldberg. Seems to be well qualified as a career Foreign Service Officer.
I do like the headline (note sarcasm). It will be easy to choose a code name or nickname for him as "The Enforcer." (Or maybe Dirty Harry).
Biden Picks Former Sanctions Enforcer as S.Korea Ambassador - Source
By U.S. News Staff U.S. News & World Report2 min
FILE PHOTO: U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Philip Goldberg speaks during the announcement of the granting of legal status of temporary protection to Venezuelan migrants, in Bogota, Colombia February 8, 2021. REUTERS/Luisa GonzalezReuters
By Hyonhee Shin
SEOUL (Reuters) - U.S. President Joe Biden has picked a longtime career diplomat and former North Korea sanctions enforcer as ambassador to South Korea, a diplomatic source in Seoul said on Wednesday.
Philip Goldberg, serving since 2019 as ambassador to Colombia, will be nominated to the post in Seoul, the source said, speaking on condition on anonymity.
The Chosun Ilbo newspaper, citing multiple unnamed diplomatic sources, reported that the United States has asked for Seoul's agreement after deciding to nominate Goldberg late last year and that an official announcement was imminent.
A spokesman for the U.S. Embassy in Seoul said they had no announcements to make at this time, and that any formal notification would come from the White House.
South Korea's foreign ministry said it could not confirm the reports.
Goldberg, who recently served as ambassador to the Philippines and Bolivia, among other posts, also worked as coordinator for the implementation of United Nations sanctions on North Korea from 2009 to 2010.
While Seoul and Washington insist their alliance is "iron-clad," the sanctions have been a source of controversy as they blocked South Korea's plans for more economic engagement with the North.
The post in one of the United States' key allies has been filled by a charge d'affaires ad interim for more than a year since the last ambassador to South Korea, former navy admiral Harry Harris, stepped down as Biden took office in January 2021.
Harris' tenure was marked by tension in the alliance as then-President Donald Trump pressed Seoul to pay billions of dollars more toward supporting the roughly 28,500 U.S. troops stationed there, while South Korea chafed https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-usa-idUSKBN1ZF0RT at the United State's push for strict sanctions enforcement.
(Additional reporting by Josh Smith; Writing by Josh Smith; Editing by Raju Gopalakrishnan)
Copyright 2022 Thomson Reuters.
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3. North fires two more missiles, JCS reacts a day later
Wednesday
January 26, 2022
North fires two more missiles, JCS reacts a day later
Footage run by the North's state-run Korean Central Television on Jan. 12 shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un viewing what is suspected to be a cruise missile similar to the one tested on Tuesday at a special defense exhibition marking the 76th anniversary of the founding of the ruling Korean Workers' Party in Pyongyang. [YONHAP]
North Korea fired two suspected cruise missiles from an inland area Tuesday in its fifth such test this year, South Korean military officials said Wednesday.
The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) acknowledged the launches in a press briefing convened a day after they took place, only after media outlets had already reported their occurrence.
A military official, speaking to reporters on condition of anonymity, said the missiles were launched from an inland area, without specifying where, and landed in the eastern waters off the Korean Peninsula.
"We still need to conduct a detailed analysis," the military official said at the briefing.
The official assured, however, should North Korea launch a missile southward, “our detection and interception systems will have no problem countering it.”
While the JCS said that it could not make public the exact launch site, range or other details of the cruise missiles in order to guard the surveillance capabilities of the United States and South Korea, the late acknowledgement of the tests — as well as the fact that South Korea military authorities called the briefing after media reports — suggests that the military failed to detect the launches at the time.
North Korean state media have not yet issued a report on Tuesday’s cruise missile tests.
The North’s last known test of a cruise missile took place in September last year, when state media crowed about a “new-type long-range cruise missile,” which it described as a “strategic weapon of great significance.”
At the time, the reclusive regime's Korean Central New Agency (KCNA) said the cruise missiles tested flew 1,500 kilometers (932 miles).
The news agency's report made no secret of Pyongyang's target audience in conducting the tests — the United States and South Korea — as it described the missiles as a "core project" and "special interest" of the North's ruling Workers' Party.
“[The missiles] have special significance as it represents another effective deterrent to ensure the safety of our country and strongly suppress the anti-Republican military agitation,” the agency said.
North Korea’s September tests of cruise missiles left South Korean officials in shock over their failure to detect them, before or even immediately after the fact. That previous failure heightens speculation that military authorities again failed to detect the cruise missile tests that took place on Tuesday.
Cruise missile tests do not violate United Nations Security Council resolutions, which do forbid the North from launching projectiles that make use of ballistic missile technology.
Much to the alarm of South Korea and neighboring Japan, North Korea has now conducted five missile tests in quick succession since the new year, beginning with two separate tests of what it claimed were hypersonic glide missiles on Jan. 5 and 10, followed by a test of train-launched missiles Jan. 14 and a tactical guided missile test from Sunan Airfield near Pyongyang on Jan. 17.
Through its state media, Pyongyang also suggested on Jan. 20 it was considering re-starting “previously suspended activities” — a statement widely interpreted as an end to its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile testing, which has been in place since 2017.
4. North Korea recently disappeared from the internet for a little while, and it looks like it has happened again
Hmmm... Are we conducting offensive cyber operations? (I hope so - though I would really like to see the cyber attacks come from within north Korea - an attack by indigenous forces would be very significant but it is unlikely that they have the capabilities (yet))).
Excerpts:
"If it was an electricity outage, I think the routes would have gone immediately as the router lost power,"Ali told NK News.
"There were connection timeouts issues, high data loss — then the routers dropped," he explained. "That would suggest to me that some form of network stress caused this to happen."
Another research, Nicholas Roy, told the outlet that "someone either messed something up really bad, like Facebook did a couple weeks ago, or it could be some kind of attack."
While there has been some speculation that the outages could be the result of actions taken by the US, China, or someone else at odds with North Korea, experts have been reluctant to assign any responsibility given the unknowns surrounding them.
North Korea recently disappeared from the internet for a little while, and it looks like it has happened again
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un speaks at a meeting of the Workers' Party of Korea, in a photo released by the Korean Central News Agency.
KCNA/REUTERS
- For at least the second time this month, all of North Korea's websites appear to have gone down.
- Experts have said the outages may be the result of cyberattacks against North Korea, though there are other possible explanations.
- North Korea saw intermittent outages around Jan. 14 that crippled all of the country's websites.
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North Korea seemed to disappear from the web for a period on Tuesday, an NK News reporter first noticed. Insider also found that several North Korean sites appeared to be down.
North Korean domain names ending in ".kp," which include websites for North Korea's state-run media outlets, apparently first went down sometime before six in the morning, NK News senior analytic correspondent Colin Zwirko reported.
—Colin Zwirko (@ColinZwirko) January 25, 2022
This outage follows a period of intermittent outages that began on Jan. 14 and continued into the following weekend, with outages lasting several hours.
During those outages, North Korean servers were unreachable, according to NK News, a news organization dedicated to following developments involving North Korea.
"North Korea suffered a total internet outage," he said.
Internet outages are not exactly uncommon in North Korea, which knocked government and state media sites offline with a botched software update last year. Outages can also be the result of domestic power outages or other local infrastructure issues, but the nature of the recent outages struck experts as unusual.
"If it was an electricity outage, I think the routes would have gone immediately as the router lost power,"Ali told NK News.
"There were connection timeouts issues, high data loss — then the routers dropped," he explained. "That would suggest to me that some form of network stress caused this to happen."
Another research, Nicholas Roy, told the outlet that "someone either messed something up really bad, like Facebook did a couple weeks ago, or it could be some kind of attack."
While there has been some speculation that the outages could be the result of actions taken by the US, China, or someone else at odds with North Korea, experts have been reluctant to assign any responsibility given the unknowns surrounding them.
5. Conflict between Korea, USFK simmers
I will say in defense of USFK that both the previous US administration and the current Moon administration have made things difficult for the ROK and US military and especially the ROK/US CFC in Korea. The cancellation, postponement, and scaling back of training and exercises in pursuit of north Korean engagement has had a significant readiness effect. And it pains me to see how the ROK government does not how its actions regarding readiness impact the OPCON transition process.
Conflict between Korea, USFK simmers
President Moon Jae-in poses with outgoing U.S. Forces Korea Commander Gen. Robert Abrams after conferring the Tongil Medal of the Order, the highest national security merit, on Abrams at Cheong Wa Dae in this July 1 photo. Joint Press Corps
By Kang Seung-woo
Deep-seated tension between the South Korean government and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) is coming into public view, as a former American four-star general has belittled the Moon Jae-in administration's security pledges, struck back by Cheong Wa Dae and the defense ministry.
Robert Abrams, who led the USFK from 2018 to 2021, told Voice of America, Saturday (local time), that South Korea's military capabilities were not sufficient to take over wartime operational control (OPCON) of South Korean forces from the United States, while questioning the intentions of the Moon administration's push for an end-of-war declaration.
In 2014, Seoul and Washington agreed upon a conditions-based OPCON transition, and President Moon had sought to complete the task before his term ends in May 2022, although the plan has fallen through due to a lack of adequate assessment caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
"What we do say publicly is that condition one is the Republic of Korea must acquire the critical military capabilities to lead the combined defense that translates into 26 discrete systems. In addition, there's a couple of additional tasks for condition one, which includes certifying that the future CFC (Combined Forces Command) led by a Korean four-star general would be capable of leading the combined defense," Abrams said. The Republic of Korea is the official name of South Korea.
"Condition two is the Republic of Korea must acquire a strategic strength capability and develop and field a Korean integrated air and missile defense capability. And that one frankly, we're furthest behind on."
Regarding the suggestion to formally declare an end to the 1950-53 Korean War, the retired general called the plan into question, saying, "I'm very unclear what it is we're trying to accomplish by declaring an end of war, but I think, any premature declaration of an end of war, you open up the possibility for people who will then claim if the war is ended, then it's time for us to revisit some of those Security Council resolutions from the summer of 1950. And, and then, then it becomes what we call here a slippery slope."
Since Moon resurrected his proposal about the declaration in September, South Korean and U.S. diplomats have met with each other frequently to discuss the move, but some are critical of the Moon administration being too hasty in its drive.
In response, Park Soo-hyun, senior presidential secretary for public communication, expressed displeasure, Sunday, with the former USFK commander's criticism.
"I am confident that the Moon administration has worked harder on boosting military capabilities than any other government, as illustrated by Korea being the world's sixth-most powerful military and its nurturing of the local defense industry," he wrote on Facebook.
Defense ministry spokesman Boo Seung-chan also said, "While South Korea and the U.S. came up with tangible results from their latest Security Consultative Meeting (on Dec. 2) through close coordination between the allies, we cannot figure out his intentions."
He added that it was not appropriate for the ministry to comment on the private opinions of a retired general.
Tensions between the South Korean government and Abrams are nothing new, as he frequently spoke against the Moon administration's OPCON plan and complained of a lack of combined training between the allies, scaled down in part due to both sides' hopes to engage North Korea diplomatically.
Gen. Paul LaCamera, Abrams' successor, also expressed his objection in November, saying the OPCON plan needs some adjustment.
6. U.S. remains prepared to engage in dialogue with N. Korea: State Dept.
Translation: We look forward to when Kim Jong-un decides to become a responsible member of the international community. (of course we need the weather to turn cold enough to make hell freeze over).
(LEAD) U.S. remains prepared to engage in dialogue with N. Korea: State Dept. | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with remarks from state department spokesperson Price in paras 2-6, 13-15, minor edits throughout; CHANGES lead; ADDS photo)
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Jan. 25 (Yonhap) -- The United States remains committed to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through diplomacy and dialogue, state department press secretary Ned Price said Tuesday.
The spokesperson also reiterated that the U.S. harbors no hostile intent toward North Korea.
"We have no hostile intent. We harbor no hostile intent towards the DPRK. We are open to dialogue. We're open to diplomacy," Price said in a press briefing, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
His remarks come after North Korea launched what appeared to be two cruise missiles on Tuesday (Seoul time), marking its fifth missile launch so far this year.
"We think dialogue and diplomacy is the most effective means to help us reach that overarching goal and that is the complete new denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," said Price.
North Korea has ignored U.S. overtures for dialogue for over a year since Joe Biden took office as president in January 2021, citing what it claims to be U.S. hostility toward the North. Pyongyang has also stayed away from denuclearization talks with the U.S. since late 2019.
Another state department spokesperson earlier said the U.S. was aware of the reports regarding North Korea's latest missile launch and that it was assessing the event with South Korea and Japan.
"Broadly speaking, as we have said our goal remains the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We remain prepared to engage in serious and sustained diplomacy without preconditions to make tangible progress," the spokesperson told Yonhap News Agency, while asking not to be identified.
Unlike developing or testing ballistic missiles, cruise missile launches are not in direct violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions against North Korea.
North Korea claimed to have test fired a new "long-range cruise missile" in September, calling it a "strategic weapon of great significance."
Four previous missile launches by the North this year included two test firings of a self-claimed hypersonic missile.
Pyongyang has yet to comment on its latest missile launch.
Price highlighted the importance of working with U.S. allies, as well as cooperation between U.S. allies, to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.
"You have heard us speak to our approach to the DPRK. It is a policy that was formulated in the early days of this administration that we developed in close coordination with our allies and partners, especially the ROK and Japan," he said, referring to South Korea by its official name, the Republic of Korea.
"We've had a number of engagements with them in the trilateral format, knowing the importance of trilateral cooperation when it comes to that ultimate goal, and that's the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," he added.
(END)
7. Did Seoul Miss Another N.Korea Missile Launch?
Did Seoul Miss Another N.Korea Missile Launch?
January 26, 2022 10:12
North Korea fired two projectiles that are presumed to be long-range cruise missiles on Tuesday morning.
It was the regime's fifth missile provocation this year and the first show of force since it threatened to resume nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile testing on Jan. 20.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff here called a press briefing only after media outlets already covered the launch and about six hours after the missiles were fired. "It's customary to let the public know only about the North's firing of ballistic missiles," a military spokesman claimed.
The JCS added it cannot make public "their exact launch site, range, and the direction in which they were fired" for the purpose of protecting the surveillance assets of South Korea and the U.S. But there is speculation that the military here actually failed to detect them.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (front) and officials look around an arms expo in October 2021, in this grab from [North] Korean Central Television.
The cruise missiles launched Tuesday are highly likely North Korean-version Tomahawk cruise missiles, which the regime claimed it succeeded in test-firing last September, or an improved version, experts speculate. Last September, the North claimed its long-range cruise missile hit a target 1,500 km away in two hours and six minutes.
Cruise missiles fly more slowly than ballistic missiles but can evade radar as they can fly at an altitude of only dozens of meters and have high accuracy.
A government source implied that the military failed to detect the launch with South Korea's own surveillance assets, saying, "It is difficult to detect the North’s launch of cruise missiles flying at a low altitude with our assets."
The North's launches of long-range cruise missiles last year seems to have been detected by U.S. intelligence assets.
8. North Korea remains silent on cruise missile test
Because actions speak louder than words?
We could also speculate that the regime wants to now make testing routine and no longer newsworthy so it can continue to advance its military capabilities (short of nuclear weapons and ICBMs).
I checked KCNA and the Rodong Sinmun this morning and as Yonhap notes there is still no statement on the cruise missile launchers.
North Korea remains silent on cruise missile test
This combined photo, released by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on Sept. 13, 2021, shows a long-range cruise missile being fired, as Pyongyang test-fired new long-range cruise missiles on Sept. 11 and 12.
Yonhap
By Kang Seung-woo
The absence of coverage of North Korea's cruise missile launch by its state media is largely due to its lower strategic importance than that of ballistic missiles, according to Pyongyang watchers.
However, others also assume that the test may have ended in failure.
According to the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), North Korea launched two cruise missiles, Tuesday, marking its fifth show of force for 2022, following its firing of ballistic missiles on Jan. 5, 11, 14 and 17.
Traditionally, North Korea has broken the news of its missile launches the following day through the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) or the Rodong Sinmun, a North Korean newspaper and mouthpiece of the ruling Workers' Party, but neither of them covered the incident, sparking speculation here.
"The North Korean military is currently holding winter drills and it seems to have fired cruise missiles as part of them. In addition, cruise missiles are of less interior and exterior influence than ballistic missiles in terms of strategic value. In that respect, the North Korean regime appears to have decided not to report the launches," said Hong Min, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification.
"When the KCNA or the Rodong Sinmun report military activities, the coverage is aimed at showing off its new military weapons under development or military hardware that has strategic or tactical value."
In fact, North Korea did not report its cruise missile tests in April 2020 and March 2021, but its latest launch of cruise missiles was publicized.
However, Cheong Seong-chang, the director of the Center for North Korean Studies at the Sejong Institute, said North Korea may have failed its missile test, so the regime did not make it public.
"Ahead of the 80th birthday anniversary of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's late father Kim Jong-il on Feb. 16, North Korea needs to create a festive mood and extend it until that time. For this reason, the country should have promoted the successful test-firing albeit briefly," Cheong said.
"No coverage of the missile test means that it did not live up to expectations or ended in failure."
Experts believe that North Korea will continue to test-fire its missiles, but its frequency would decline during the upcoming Beijing Winter Olympics, scheduled to kick off, Feb. 4, in order not to irk China, the North's lone economic pipeline and diplomatic protector.
"Although North Korean missiles will be launched, they will not be as frequent as now," said Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University.
"Along with the KN-23 and KN-24 missiles that it launched earlier this year, North Korea may also test-fire a long-range cruise missile and the KN-25."
The KN-23 is a variant of Russia's Iskander, while the KN-24 is the North Korean version of the U.S.' Army Tactical Missile System. The KN-25 is a super-large caliber multiple rocket launcher.
Hong also said North Korea's missiles are likely to be on full display in April.
"North Korea will mark the 110th birthday anniversary of North Korea founder Kim Il-sung on April 16 and to mark the event, it is expected to carry out a weapons test," Hong said.
"In addition, the U.S. government is engrossed in other diplomatic issues such as Ukraine and China, while China and Russia still stand up for North Korea against the United States at the United Nations Security Council, so the North is expected to take advantage of the 'strategic vacuum' in developing and testing its missiles."
9. Seoul faces conundrum over option of North Korea preemptive strike
Note the discussion difference between preventative and preemptive.
My questions for those who advocate preemptive or preventative strikes:
Under what conditions would you recommend conducting a preventative strike?
What would be your recommended priority targets for such a strike?
What effects do you expect would be achieved by a preventative strike?
What kind of response would anticipate from north Korea following a preventative strike?
For the US, would you order a NEO prior to a preventative strike or conduct one simultaneously with a pre-emptive strike? (If you would not order a NEO in conjunction with a pre-emptive strike then is the threat o north Korean attack really imminent?)
Seoul faces conundrum over option of North Korea preemptive strike
N. Korea’s mounting threats increase necessity of preemptive plan
Published : Jan 26, 2022 - 17:18 Updated : Jan 26, 2022 - 19:15
(123rf)
If South Korea faces an imminent attack from nuclear-armed North Korea, what is the most viable military option to defend the country and prevent incalculable and irreparable damage?
Seoul-based experts say South Korea would have no option but to consider launching a preemptive strike, although the anticipatory use of force would come with a certain price. That price could far outweigh potential gains, experts say.
But the bigger problem is Pyongyang‘s mounting artillery, missile and nuclear threats that not only make a preemptive strike plan more indispensable, but also restrain Seoul’s preemptive strike capabilities.
As North Korea’s nuclear and missile prowess is proportional to the threat of preemptive nuclear attack, South Korea cannot and should not give up on a preemptive strike plan.
The correlation clearly depicts South Korea’s deteriorating security situation and the conundrum concerning a preemptive strike that the country has long wrestled with.
Heated debate on preemptive strike
A preemptive strike has drawn public attention in Seoul, as the issue is at the center of political disagreement with around 40 days left until the presidential election.
The main opposition People Power Party’s presidential candidate Yoon Suk-yeol this month raised the necessity of launching a preemptive strike with the Kill Chain system, when asked how to prevent missile threats by North Korea.
Yoon said it was virtually impossible to intercept a missile carrying a nuclear weapon if it travels at a speed of Mach 5 or greater, reaching the Seoul area within just a minute.
The campaign of the ruling Democratic Party of Korea’s Lee Jae-myung launched blistering criticism and maintained that “there has been no leader who directly and publicly addressed a preemptive strike on North Korea.” The camp said a preemptive strike was an “extremely risky scenario” given that “there are high chances that it would turn into an all-out war.”
But not surprisingly, South Korea has continued to develop and secure independent preemptive strike capabilities while developing the Kill Chain system as part of a three-axis system since 2012.
The triad consisted of the Kill Chain, the Korea Air and Missile Defense and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation, which has since been renamed the “Nuclear-WMD Response System.”
The Moon Jae-in administration has incorporated the Kill Chain and the KMPR into a “strategic strike system,” which seeks “deterrence by both denial and punishment to deter and counter omnidirectional, asymmetric threats,” the 2020 Defense White Paper said.
To that end, the military has continued to build “forces equipped with long-distance surveillance capabilities and precision strike capabilities.”
Preemptive vs. Preventive strike
Then, what is a preemptive strike? And what is its significance?
In general, a preemptive strike is recognized as an anticipatory use of force to defend a country against a perceived imminent but not actually armed attack.
The US Defense Department defined a preemptive strike as an “attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent,” as part of the Bush Doctrine of the George W. Bush administration.
But a preventive strike is initiated based on the belief that “military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk.”
The Six-Day War between Israel and neighboring Arab states in June 1967 is a rare example of such a preemptive attack, conducted by Israel. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a preventive war to destroy Saddam Hussein’s purported weapons of mass destruction.
It is crucial to recognize the difference between a preemptive and preventive strike. A preemptive strike can be justified as an act of preemptive self-defense under certain circumstances, although there has been no universal and undisputed yardstick for judging the legitimacy.
Article 51 of the UN Charter stipulates that the charter does not proscribe the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.”
But as there have been divergent interpretations of an armed attack, questions still remain on the morality and legitimacy of a preemptive war.
Feasibility of preemptive strike plan
There are multitudinous factors that restrain Seoul’s preemptive strike capabilities, including tardy progress in the transfer of wartime operational control.
Yang Uk, an associate research fellow at the Asan Institute, pointed out that there are three main pillars -- “detect first, decide first and strike first” -- that would enable South Korea to launch a preemptive attack against North Korea’s imminent attacks.
But South Korea’s weakness in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, or ISR, capabilities against North Korea and its overdependence on the US’ ISR assets pose major hindrances.
More importantly, the South Korean president’s ability to decide to launch a preemptive strike, which would entail a heavy political burden, is also a key determinant.
“The stage of making a decision is also greatly instrumental,” Yang said. “This is not just a military determination, but both a military and a political resolution.”
Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University, pointed to North Korea’s development of solid-propellant missiles with enhanced survivability as one of the major restraints.
Solid-fuel ballistic missiles can be stored, transported and fired with a shorter-preparation time from transporter-erector-launchers, giving South Korea only a 15-minute window to respond.
“Seoul has to detect signs (of imminent attacks), identify targets, make a decision and launch a strike within less than 15 minutes,” Park said. “It would be immensely difficult to carry out an attack on the actual battlefield.”
Additionally, North Korea’s pursuit to miniaturize nuclear warheads and develop and variegate dual-capable missiles able to deliver both conventional and nuclear payloads has made it extremely challenging for Seoul to discern whether Pyongyang intends to launch nuclear attacks.
“Seoul would be unable to identify whether missiles deliver conventional or tactical nuclear warheads even when signs of imminent missile launches are detected,” Park said, pointing to the KN-23 and KN-24 short-range ballistic missiles launched this month as an example of newly developed dual-capable missiles.
The geographical proximity between the two Koreas and thousands of artillery and rocket systems deployed across the full length of the Demilitarized Zone would impose another restriction, said Choi Hyun-ho, a military columnist at the JoongAng Ilbo.
American think tank Rand Corp. estimated that North Korea has deployed 4,800 medium-range artillery pieces with a maximum range of 25 kilometers across the DMZ in its “North Korean Conventional Artillery” report in 2020.
Approximately 950 long-range artillery pieces that can reach Seoul with its population of around 10 million people and the surrounding area are deployed near the North’s city of Kaesong.
The US think tank warned that North Korean artillery strikes “could cause thousands of casualties in just a minute and more than 100,000 in an hour.”
“We must completely and simultaneously neutralize medium- and long-range artillery threats if we launch a preemptive strike. But it doesn’t seem feasible,” Choi said.
Choi also pointed out it is practically improbable to incapacitate or destroy innumerable missiles in North Korea at one go.
North Korea’s strategic placing of long-range missiles along its border with China would also aggravate South Korea and the US’ decision-making process.
“Pyongyang has deployed most of the long-range missiles along the North Korea-China border, which makes it extremely tough and complicated for South Korea and the US to launch a preemptive strike,” Choi said.
“In a word, North Korea has multifarious options (to deter South Korea’s preemptive strike),” Choi added. “But Seoul has countless constraints.”
Sole military option against N.Korea’s attacks
Then, should South Korea abandon a preemptive strike plan?
Experts view a preemptive strike as the sole military option in the case of an imminent attack from Pyongyang, especially since North Korea has diversified its delivery vehicles to carry nuclear weapons.
“It is not feasible yet. But we have to prepare for a preemptive strike as there are no other military options,” Park said. “It is inevitable and imperative to develop the feasibility (of the plan).”
Yang underlined that a preemptive strike would be the one and only option against North Korea’s imminent asymmetric and nuclear attacks on South Korea, which would inflict irreparable and incalculable damage.
“If North Korea uses weapons capable of delivering nuclear warheads, we ought to assume that the country will launch a nuclear attack,” Yang said. “North Korea should take the risk as a nuclear-armed state.”
Political leader’s public endorsement
But opinions diverge as to whether it is appropriate for a presidential candidate to explicitly support a preemptive strike plan.
Kim Young-jun, a professor at the Korea National Defense University, pointed to the peril of Yoon capitalizing on a preemptive strike for “political gains” in the electoral race.
An influential politician or a political leader’s public endorsement of a preemptive strike would cause disadvantages to their foreign policy direction, particularly at this point. In short, the costs of such a move would far exceed its benefits.
“Presidential candidate Yoon Suk-yeol limits his diplomatic options at a time when South Korea is preparing for the next five years,” Kim said. “Yoon seems to be seeking to win people’s votes, but he is now giving up his diplomatic tools.”
Kim explained the US and the former Soviet Union had not threatened each other with preemptive strikes during the Cold War, although both sides prepared for a plan.
Park underscored that Seoul should face up to reality. Pyongyang has pursued development of dual-capable missiles and tactical nuclear weapons, as well as more survivable and maneuverable ballistic missiles that can penetrate and incapacitate missile defenses.
South Korea should look at the big picture and have a comprehensive discussion of North Korea’s mounting missile and nuclear threats, rather than clouding the picture and making a preemptive strike a political issue.
Park pointed out that it was essential to assess North Korea’s intention and threats and South Korea’s missile defense capabilities, and seek ways to reinforce military capabilities at this juncture.
“It is very regrettable that the ruling and opposition political parties argue over the statement while such discussion is absent.”
Nonetheless, experts say stressing the need to launch a preemptive strike to deter North Korea’s existential and rapidly growing threats to defend the country is unavoidable.
“We are asking the question equivalent to whether the US president can press a nuclear button in case of nuclear attacks by an enemy,” Yang said.
“No one wants to go ahead with the option. But at the end of the day, we will be attacked or face another war unless we demonstrate our capability of launching (a preemptive) strike at any moment.”
10. Why Is North Korea Firing So Many Missiles?
Because they can.
Unfortunately "inducements" for north Korea would be sanctions relief or concessions and appeasement and it would not achieve the effects proponents desire.
Excerpts:
"We are open to diplomacy," he added.
But the likelihood of any actual progress on that front is slim to none, said Jenny Town, senior fellow at the Stimson Center.
"The US has really missed opportunities to try to get ahead of the game and try to induce the North Koreans back to the table," she said.
"There isn't the political appetite in the US to make those moves. They're not willing to expend political capital on North Korea."
Why Is North Korea Firing So Many Missiles?
Text size
From hypersonic to cruise missiles, North Korea started 2022 with its most intensive spate of weapons testing in years, but analysts said the barrage is more domestic political ploy than a diplomatic gambit.
After a decade in power, leader Kim Jong Un has little to celebrate, with a Covid-battered economy causing food shortages at home, diplomacy with the United States stalled and biting sanctions taking their toll.
That may explain why North Korea has carried out five weapons tests in the last three weeks, analysts said -- and a dramatic demonstration of the nuclear-armed country's military prowess offers a quick win ahead of important domestic anniversaries.
"Missiles and weapon developments are probably the only things Kim Jong Un can confidently display as achievements," said defector-turned-researcher Ahn Chan-il.
"He's not got much to offer the North Korean people right now."
This is particularly important as the country prepares to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the birth of Kim's father, late leader Kim Jong Il, in February, as well as the 110th birthday of the country's founding leader Kim Il Sung in April.
Under North Korea's dynastic system, marking his forefather's birthdays with appropriate "grandeur" is politically crucial for Kim, Cheong Seong-chang of the Center for North Korea Studies at the Sejong Institute told AFP.
"For such important anniversaries, North Korea likes to hold a military parade to show off their new weapons," he said.
The country often test fires new weaponry before wheeling it out publicly, which both demonstrates their capability and adds to the general festivities, he added.
Pyongyang has not tested intercontinental ballistic missiles or nukes since 2017, putting launches on hold as Kim embarked on a blitz of high-level diplomacy through three meetings with then-US president Donald Trump and other top leaders.
But last week, the regime said it would examine restarting all temporarily-suspended activities, in response to what it called the "provocation" of new US sanctions imposed after this year's tests.
The last time North Korea tested this many weapons in a month was in 2019, after high-profile negotiations collapsed between Kim and Trump.
With reports of soaring food prices and worsening hunger, an economically-reeling Pyongyang earlier this month restarted cross-border trade with neighbouring China.
And Pyongyang's recent decision to accept Chinese aid -- a first since the beginning of the pandemic -- may have motivated the recent military show of force "to avoid looking weak," said Leif-Eric Easley, a professor at Seoul's Ewha University.
And with Beijing set to host the Winter Olympics from early February, North Korea has a narrow window for sabre-rattling ahead of South Korea's upcoming election if it doesn't want to anger its sole major ally by raining missiles on their parade.
"To the extent the North Koreans have missiles to test for improving military capabilities and sending signals before South Korea's presidential election on March 9, they should probably do so before the Beijing Olympics opening ceremonies on February 4," Easley added.
But it's unlikely that the recent string of launches are directly aimed at goading the administration of US President Joe Biden into talks, he said.
Pyongyang doesn't "appear interested in negotiations while self-isolating from Covid".
The diplomatic cost to Kim of the recent tests is also minimal thanks to strong backing from Beijing, which views North Korea as a useful "buffer" in a region full of US allies like Tokyo and Seoul, said Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies.
China will block any efforts to impose new sanctions over short-range missile tests, but if North Korea follows through on a threat to restart long-range or nuclear tests, it will be "nearly impossible" for Beijing to help.
Washington, for its part, has repeatedly emphasised that it is prepared to restart talks.
The Biden administration has been "very clear about our intent: number one, we have no hostile intent. We harbor no hostile intent, towards the DPRK," State Department spokesman Ned Price told reporters Tuesday, referring to North Korea by its official name.
"We are open to diplomacy," he added.
But the likelihood of any actual progress on that front is slim to none, said Jenny Town, senior fellow at the Stimson Center.
"The US has really missed opportunities to try to get ahead of the game and try to induce the North Koreans back to the table," she said.
"There isn't the political appetite in the US to make those moves. They're not willing to expend political capital on North Korea."
cdl/ceb/oho/lb
11. North Korean officials fight over cargo space on trains from China
Singun - military first politics. It never went away as some have speculated. It is a critical component of the regime's system of rule (and control).
North Korean officials fight over cargo space on trains from China
The military gets priority over state agencies executing economy policies.
North Korean agencies are fighting with the military and one another over cargo space on trains that are now once again bringing in goods from China, after two years of closed borders left a vast shortage of supplies, officials told RFA.
In January 2020, Pyongyang and Beijing stopped bilateral trade in an effort to stop the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. The move effectively cut North Korea off from the rest of the world and devastated its economy.
Rail freight briefly resumed on Nov. 1, 2021, but was shut down again a week later due to surges of confirmed cases in China. Pyongyang and Beijing reopened the border to rail freight only last week.
Government agencies under the control of North Korea’s Cabinet are working to bring in necessities for the country’s citizens and rebuild its economy. But the military, which is not controlled by the Cabinet, needs its own resources and is taking up most of the space there is on the freight trains to bring them in.
“The sudden reopening has led to a growing conflict between government administrative agencies,” a trading company official from the northwestern province of North Pyongan, who requested anonymity for security reasons, told RFA’s Korean Service Jan. 23.
“The allocation of the cargo compartments is under the direct control of the Central Party, and it looks like priority is given to the Second Economy Committee,” the source said, referring to trading companies affiliated with the military.
Trading companies for the ministries under the Cabinet are classified under the First Economy Committee.
“In the end, the trading companies affiliated with the Cabinet offices are likely to lose space to the military’s needs,” the source said. “The non-military-affiliated trading companies urgently need to bring in daily necessities for the people to survive, but they have not been able to do anything because they have been pushed to lower priorities.”
Cabinet officials are unhappy that the Central Committee would give all the space to the more privileged organizations like the military and the Party, while still telling them they are responsible for reviving the country’s moribund economy, the source said.
Some of the officials are even griping that the central government does not care about its citizens and only restarted trade to help the privileged elite and the military, according to the source.
“It’s not like in the past, where both you and I share power. Now the more powerful one can just say, ‘All 15 cargo compartments are mine,’ Regular companies can do nothing,” the source said.
On the morning of Jan. 17, a train with more than 10 cars crossed the Yalu River from the North Korean border city of Sinuiju, headed for China’s Dandong on the other side, an official from another trading company in the capital Pyongyang told RFA.
“Most of the cargo spaces on the train were designated for the Second Economy Committee,” said the second source, who requested anonymity to speak freely.
“They want to supply materials for the military … ahead of the Lunar New Year on Feb. 1. The authorities are only interested in munitions, so it will be impossible for them to recover the people’s economy, which since the pandemic has been severely deteriorated,” the second source said.
Translated by Claire Lee and Leejin Jun. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
12. North Korea orders border patrol to fire flares instead of live ammunition at border intruders
A kinder, gentler regime and nKPA? I think not.
North Korea orders border patrol to fire flares instead of live ammunition at border intruders
A recent government review found that threatening people with guns worsens relations between the military and civilians and damages the nation’s international image
By Jong So Yong - 2022.01.26 3:43pm
North Korea has ordered border patrol troops to fire flares instead of live ammunition out of fear that “unconditionally firing on” intruders along the border is harming the country’s international image.
A source in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on Tuesday that the government had ordered that all border patrol units along the Tumen River from Hoeryong to Musan – and all the way to Hujang (Kimhyongjik County) and Sinpa (Kimjongsuk County) in Yanggang Province – to use flares to “reduce incidents of reckless firing.”
According to the source, during a recent review of the border patrol’s performance over the last two years, North Korea’s leadership took serious issue with the troops, who have recklessly opened fire whenever they “sensed a human presence” along the China-North Korea border, which has remained closed for the past two years due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
A border patrol checkpoint in Pungso County, Yanggang Province. This photo was taken in February 2019. / Image: Daily NK
That is, the government pointed out that threatening people with guns worsens relations between the military and civilians, intensifies public hostility towards the government, and damages the nation’s international image.
On Jan. 17, the government ordered all border patrol units in North Hamgyong and Yanggang provinces to stop randomly opening fire and switch to flares from Jan. 18, concluding that the “grave behavior” on the part of the troops could not continue.
According to the source, concerns remain among North Korean leaders, however, that slackening crackdowns and control over the border could make it more difficult for the border patrol to conduct surveillance and lead to an increase in defections, smuggling, and other illegal activity.
Moreover, North Korea’s leadership ordered the border patrol to “properly analyze their targets” when they have no choice but to use their weapons, and to “mercilessly kill” those who refuse to comply with orders or resist to the very end.
Based on the source’s report, the leadership emphasized that border patrol troops should not rely solely on guns and other weaponry, but conduct “prompt surveillance” using cameras and in line with the communist party’s policies and intentions. The leadership further emphasized that troops should react quickly but “without the sound of gunfire” when they detect something out of the ordinary on the border.
Jong So Yong is one of Daily NK’s freelance reporters. Questions about her articles can be directed to [email protected].
13. Expectations on the rise in North Korea that trade with China will increase soon
Will it be enough? Will they also turn a blind eye to smuggling? I think the 400+ markets are dependent on smuggling as well.
Expectations on the rise in North Korea that trade with China will increase soon
A growing number of people are buying up foreign currency and preparing to take part in trade, even if the restart of China-North Korea freight train service proves temporary
By Seulkee Jang - 2022.01.26 3:57pm
Exchange rates in North Korea have been skyrocketing since the recent restart of China-North Korea freight train service. Even though North Korean authorities have not issued any specific orders regarding the restart of broader trade, traders and donju (wealthy entrepreneurs) are expecting imports to expand and are buying up foreign currency.
According to Daily NK’s regular survey of market prices in North Korea, the yuan was trading at KPW 860 in Pyongyang, KPW 870 in Sinuiju, and KPW 890 in Hyesan on Monday.
In the case of Sinuiju, the yuan had shot up KPW 170 in just four days from Jan. 20, just after the restart of China-North Korea freight train service, when it was trading at KPW 700.
The yuan has spiked 45% compared to Jan. 11, several days before a North Korean freight train pulled into the Chinese city of Dandong, when it was trading at KPW 590 in Pyongyang, KWP 600 in Sinuiju, and KPW 620 in Hyesan.
The dollar has similarly strengthened against the North Korean won. The dollar was trading at KPW 6,750 in Pyongyang, KPW 6,730 in Sinuiju, and KPW 6,675 in Hyesan on Monday. This was 43% higher than on Jan. 11.
This increase in exchange rates appears due to expectations that China-North Korean trade will begin again.
Traders in North Korea speculate that with freight trains in operation, the border might be gradually reopening, even if small trading bases and private traders may not be able to take part in trade as freely as they did prior to January 2020.
Moreover, North Korean tradeexpect the authorities to continue issuing temporary trade permits at least through Apr. 25 as they have designated the period between late North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s 80th birthday on Feb. 16 to the 130th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Army on Apr. 25 as the “greatest celebratory period of the nation.”
Statues of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il inside the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun. / Image: Rodong Sinmun
The “greatest celebratory period of the nation” also includes Kim Jong Un’s appointment as first party secretary on Apr. 11, the anniversary of his appointment as first chairperson of the Central Military Commission on Apr. 13, and late national founder Kim Il Sung’s 110th birthday on Apr. 15.
North Korean authorities will apparently focus on supplying gifts to cadres and ordinary citizens and stabilizing prices to highlight the accomplishments of Kim’s predecessors and emphasize his leadership based on “love for the people.”
To do this, they must move to expand imports of foodstuffs, daily necessities, industrial goods, and other items.
As a result, a growing number of people are reportedly buying up foreign currency and preparing to take part in trade, even if the restart of China-North Korea freight train service proves temporary.
Meanwhile, the price of gasoline and diesel oil has also spiked in the country. As of Monday, gasoline cost KPW 9,700 a kilogram in Pyongyang, KPW 10,100 in Sinuiju, and KPW 10,680 in Hyesan.
This was about 45% more than it cost on Jan. 11, when it was KPW 6,680 in Pyongyang, KPW 6,970 in Sinuiju, and KPW 7,440 in Hyesan.
Diesel prices have likewise skyrocketed. As of Monday, a kilogram of diesel cost KPW 6,440 in Pyongyang, KPW 6,620 in Sinuiju, and KPW 7,000 in Hyesan, an increase of 41-45% compared to Jan. 11.
However, the spike in North Korean oil prices appears due to rising exchange rates rather than reductions in imports.
A source in North Korea said that a lot of transportation fuel is needed to carry the goods currently stored at the Uiju quarantine facility across the country, but that is not why oil prices are climbing. According to him, the price of oil was naturally climbing as the dollar strengthened against the North Korean won, and that oil entered the country from China just a few days ago.
Seulkee Jang is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about her articles to [email protected].
14. Asean sees Korea as K-pop nation and most trusted regional power
South Korean soft power rules!
Wednesday
January 26, 2022
Asean sees Korea as K-pop nation and most trusted regional power
Members of the ASEAN-Korea Centre including its Secretary General Kim Hae-yong, fourth from right; members of the diplomatic community including Dk Nooriyah Pg Yussof, ambassador of Brunei to Korea, fifth from right; members of the media including Cheong Chul-gun, CEO of the Korea JoongAng Daily, third from right; and members of educational institutes including Kim Young-gon, president of the National Institute for International Education, fourth form left, join hands in opening a roundtable discussion on the results of the ASEAN-Korea Centre's survey on Asean-Korean young adults' mutual perceptions at the Korea Press Center in Seoul on Wednesday. [PARK SANG-MOON]
Over the past five years, the image of Korea in the minds of Asean young adults went from a developed country to K-pop nation, and its people from friendly and nice to pretty and beautiful, possibly due to the increasing popularity of Korean dramas and TV series, according to a recent survey by the ASEAN-Korea Centre in Seoul.
“K-pop was the top word associated with Korea among Asean young adults, both those residing in Asean and in Korea, followed closely by K-drama and Korean food,” said the center in releasing its report on Wednesday. “The top words the Asean young adults used to describe Koreans were pretty, beautiful and light-skinned.”
The center surveyed 1,800 Asean citizens aged between 19 and 34 living in the Asean region, excluding Myanmar, 519 additional Asean citizens of the same age spectrum residing in Korea, and 1,000 Koreans of the same ages, from last August to September. Myanmar was left out of the survey due to difficulties reaching the residents over the ongoing political turmoil.
Last time the center conducted the survey in 2017 with the Asean young adults — only those residing in Korea — the top words they associated with Korea were “developed” and “economic,” and the top words they associated with Koreans were “nice” and “friendly,” according to the center.
In both years, the survey respondents were not given a roster of words to choose from, but were asked to write the first words that come to their mind in answering the question.
Infographic on survey results provided by the ASEAN-Korea Centre. [ASEAN-KOREA CENTRE]
Comparing surveys from both the Asean young adults residing in Korea and those in the Asean region also led to some interesting results, including some major differences in their perception of Koreans.
While the top most commonly used word to describe Koreans by young adults residing in the Asean region was “pretty,” the Asean young adults residing in Korea most often used the word “diligent” to describe Koreans, which was followed by “kind” and “fast.”
“We observed the differences could stem from the fact that most young adults in Asean would access information about Korea through the TV shows and online media and may form an impression on Koreans through Hallyu stars and celebrities,” the center said in its report about the survey results. “On the other hand, the Asean young adults residing in Korea would probably think of their friends, professors, bosses and colleagues in Korea, with whom they meet and interact regularly, when asked this question about how they perceive Koreans.”
On the contrary, the Korean respondents’ perception of Asean did not change much over the years.
The Korean respondents in the latest survey used phrases such as “developing countries,” “hot temperature” and “poor” to describe Asean, which did not differ much from the those they had selected in 2017 to describe Asean.
“While most Asean young adults based their answers from their experiences with Korean media and Hallyu [Korean Wave], most Korean young adults appear to have based their answers on their experience visiting the country,” said the report.
A total of 63.3 percent of the Korean respondents had visited an Asean country, while 34.3 percent of the Asean respondents had visited Korea, according to the study.
Korea No. 1 trusted regional power
The Korean and Asean respondents also contrasted in their level of interest in each other.
While 90.4 percent of the Asean respondents living in the Asean region and 97.7 percent of the Asean respondents living in Korea said they’re interested in Korea, 52.8 percent of Korean respondents said they’re interested in Asean.
Siti Maisarah Haji Majid, deputy head of the Information and Data Unit of the ASEAN-Korea Centre, said the gap in this perception is the place to start for anyone wishing to enhance Asean-Korean ties.
“To bridge the gaps in perceptions between Korean and Asean young adults, it is first important to acknowledge that such gaps do exist, so that meaningful outcomes can be realized,” said Majid. “This will allow relevant agencies and stakeholders to ensure that measures and approaches can be undertaken to appropriately address these gaps toward establishing a more cohesive relationship in the future.”
The Asean young adults’ interest in Korea was also portrayed through their level of trust in Korea over other regional powers.
The Asean respondents living in Southeast Asia and Korea all selected Korea as the No. 1 regional power they trust the most, among other regional powers including the United States, Japan, China, Australia and Asean.
The Asean young adults trusted China the least out of the regional powers, which was the same for Korean young adults, who said they trusted the United States the most, followed by Australia, Asean, Japan and China.
Trends by nation
The study also broke down the results by each Asean country, yielding several interesting trends.
Of the Asean respondents residing in Southeast Asia, those in Cambodia were found to have been the least interested in Korea. Of the Cambodian respondents in Cambodia, 65.5 percent said they’re interested in Korea — the other Asean respondents all surpassed 88 percent in the same index.
“If there was one anomaly we could find with the respondents in Cambodia, we found that while many had experienced Korea through its culture and the arts, or even through studying the Korean language, they had had comparatively less experiences buying Korean goods or meeting Korean people,” said the report. “We intend to conduct focus-group interviews with the young adults in the Asean region to find out more about what these data may be telling us.”
When the Korean respondents were asked to choose Asean countries that they have good sentiments for, Singapore came in first, at 45.2 percent, followed by Thailand and Vietnam.
But when it came to choosing a country that the Korean respondents felt was closest to Korea in economic, social and diplomatic contexts, Vietnam came in first, followed by Singapore and Thailand.
The report pointed out several factors, including the bilateral trade level, that could be behind the result.
“It may have to do with the fact that Vietnam-Korea trade took up 48 percent of Asean-Korea trade in 2020 […] and that 92 percent of Asean students studying in Korea were Vietnamese in the same year,” said the report.
Vietnam was also the No. 1 most visited Asean country by the Korean respondents. In the 2017 survey, it came in fourth.
From right, Cheong Chul-gun, CEO of the Korea JoongAng Daily; Kim Su-youn, deputy head of the Information and Data Unit of ASEAN-Korea Centre; and Lim Yun-suk, Seoul bureau chief of Channel News Asia, take part in a panel discussion on the role of media for raising awareness on Asean-Korea ties at the Korea Press Center in Seoul on Wednesday. [PARK SANG-MOON]
Future cooperation
Respondents did not differ much when it came to how they envisioned future cooperation.
Both groups chose the fourth industrial revolution as the top area where Asean and Korea should work more together, out of other categories including education, health care, social welfare, cybersecurity and climate change.
“Prior to the pandemic, major Asean countries had growth momentum of more than 5 percent and were planning policies around the fourth industrial revolution, including introduction of the relevant technology to its economy,” said the center in its report. “Against this backdrop, Korea and its advanced IT sector made it an attractive partner to many in the Asean and there have been budding projects such as the Vietnam-Korea Institute of Science and Technology.”
The report added that the fourth industrial revolution technology only became more relevant with the onset of the pandemic, likely leading to the heightened interest among both Korean and Asean young adults to see more Asean-Korean cooperation in the field.
The survey results were released at a forum the center hosted at the Korea Press Center in Seoul on Wednesday. Held under the title "Enhancing Mutual Perceptions for a Sustainable Partnership," the roundtable heard from experts including from the ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Foundation, National Institute for International Education and Channel News Asia.
“The development of a mutually sustainable and beneficial relationship for Asean and Korea cannot be achieved through efforts from only one side. It is a role that everyone needs to take a part in, and this can only start when there are favorable feelings for one another,” said Kim Hae-yong, secretary general of the ASEAN-Korea Centre. “And as the survey results have shown, leveraging on opportunities through education, media and people-to-people exchange programs could be a way to bridge the existing gap in perceptions.”
Yoon Jin-pyo, professor of political science at Sungshin Women's University and a panelist at the roundtable, addressed the need to pay attention to the experiences of the Asean young adults in Korea.
"The survey results were encouraging in that many Asean young adults, after they experienced Korea themselves, had even better images of the country," said Yoon. "But there are cases of discrimination that they face in Korean society, which needs serious attention. The educational programs, media and other institutions have a big role to play here."
There are around 560,000 citizens of Asean living in Korea as of 2020, of whom around 180,000 are migrant workers, 60,000 are those who decided to settle down in Korea after getting married to a Korean, and another 60,000 are students, according to the center. They consist of about 27 percent of the foreigner population in Korea.
The center plans to launch a qualitative study via focus group interviews with Korean and Asean young adults later this year, to put the raw data into context and make recommendations on the future of Asean-Korean cooperation.
15. Why Is North Korea Suddenly Launching So Many Missiles?
Professor Lee provides an ominous forecast.:
Kim Jong-un, the leader or North Korea, attending a meeting at the office building of the Party Central Committee, in Pyongyang last week.
“2022 calls for continued saber-rattling, punctuated by some major missile tests,” said Lee Sung-yoon, a North Korea expert at the Fletcher School at Tufts University. “Kim’s goal is to routinize short-range ballistic missile flights as a fact of life without any repercussions, after which he will move on to bigger provocations by resuming intermediate- and long-range missile tests punctuated by a nuclear test, as he did in 2017.”
That year, North Korea tested what it called a hydrogen bomb and also launched three intercontinental ballistic missiles. It was also the year Mr. Trump took office after a vicious campaign in the United States. South Korea had just impeached its president.
Why Is North Korea Suddenly Launching So Many Missiles?
Experience has shown Kim Jong-un that saber-rattling is the best way to get Washington’s attention, especially when global affairs are already in a precarious state.
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A photo provided by the North Korean government showing what it said was a test-fire of a tactical guided missile on Jan. 17.Credit...Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service, via Associated Press
By
Jan. 25, 2022
Kim Jong-un, the country’s ruler, has launched six ballistic missiles in four weapons tests since Jan. 5, almost as many missiles in one month as North Korea launched in all of last year. On Tuesday, the South Korean military confirmed that the North had fired two cruise missiles in its fifth test of 2022.
The message was clear: The North Korean leader feels he is being ignored and wants to push the Biden administration to re-engage and pay attention to his economically ailing nation.
Individually, the tests may not amount to much — they involved missiles that have already been tested or weapons that are still under development. But taken together, they signal that Mr. Kim plans to use 2022 to jolt the Biden administration out of its diplomatic slumber.
Mr. Kim needs Washington to engage with him on economic concessions so that he can fix his country’s devastated economy. Over the years, he has learned that the best way to grab the attention of an American president is with weapons. And that the best time to do it is when the world can least afford the instability.
According to that playbook, 2022 looks like a promising year.
During a Politburo meeting last Wednesday, Mr. Kim suggested that his government might once again begin testing long-range missiles and nuclear devices after suspending such tests before his 2018 summit meeting with President Donald J. Trump.
Kim Jong-un, the leader or North Korea, attending a meeting at the office building of the Party Central Committee, in Pyongyang last week.
“2022 calls for continued saber-rattling, punctuated by some major missile tests,” said Lee Sung-yoon, a North Korea expert at the Fletcher School at Tufts University. “Kim’s goal is to routinize short-range ballistic missile flights as a fact of life without any repercussions, after which he will move on to bigger provocations by resuming intermediate- and long-range missile tests punctuated by a nuclear test, as he did in 2017.”
That year, North Korea tested what it called a hydrogen bomb and also launched three intercontinental ballistic missiles. It was also the year Mr. Trump took office after a vicious campaign in the United States. South Korea had just impeached its president.
Wednesday was the second time Mr. Kim threatened to lift the moratorium on long-range missile and nuclear tests. After his diplomacy with Mr. Trump ended without an agreement in 2019, he said he no longer felt bound by the commitment. But he did not follow through with any such tests, and his country was soon plunged into the chaos of the coronavirus pandemic.
President Donald J. Trump and Mr. Kim during a signing ceremony in Singapore, in 2018.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times
This year also marks the beginning of Mr. Kim’s second decade in power, and a chance for him to reassert his authority.
Ever since taking over, he has focused on building the country’s arsenal to validate his family’s dynastic rule, calling his nuclear weapons a “treasured sword” that protects North Korea against foreign invasion.
During the meeting on Wednesday, he urged North Koreans to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the birth of his father and predecessor, Kim Jong-il, in February, as well as the 110th birthday of his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, in April.
Under his father and grandfather, North Korea had seemed open to shelving its nuclear ambitions. But those hopes have dissipated under Mr. Kim, who has rapidly expanded the country’s nuclear program, even as the United Nations piled on sanctions.
Though Mr. Kim has often been depicted abroad as a leader potentially capable of opening up his isolated country for the sake of economic development, his nuclear weapons are, as North Korea has put it, “not a bargaining chip.”
People in Pyongyang bowing before portraits of North Korea’s previous leaders Kim Il-sung, the nation’s founder, and Kim Jong-il to mark the 10th anniversary of the death of Kim Jong-il on Dec. 17.
Rather, the country sees them as tools to bring Washington to the negotiating table. And by that logic, the more powerful the arsenal, the more leverage Mr. Kim has.
Even when he vowed to focus on economic development in 2013, Mr. Kim stuck to his “parallel” goal of strengthening his nuclear force. The country has conducted more than 130 missile tests under him, compared with a total of 16 tests under his father and 15 under his grandfather. The last four of the North’s six nuclear tests all took place under his watch.
“By advancing its nuclear capabilities and weapons systems, North Korea is showing the United States and South Korea that the more time passes, the bigger the price will become that they have to pay,” Choi Yong-hwan, an analyst at the Institute for National Security Strategy in Seoul, wrote in a recent policy paper.
Watching footage in Seoul last week showing a file image of a recent North Korean missile launch.Credit...Ahn Young-Joon/Associated Press
Yet try as it may to flex its power, North Korea appears to be low on the Biden administration’s list of international priorities.
Washington has taken no steps to entice Mr. Kim, except to propose talks “without preconditions,” a lukewarm entreaty that North Korea has rebuffed.
But it has not resumed tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Instead, North Korea has focused on testing missiles that can carry what it calls “smaller, lighter and tactical” nuclear weapons. These kinds of weapons do not pose a direct threat to the United States, but they could boost Mr. Kim’s leverage with Washington by placing American allies such as South Korea and Japan under nuclear threat.
The Significance of North Korea’s Missile Tests
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U.N. resolutions. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula started rising in 2017, when North Korea tested three intercontinental ballistic missiles and conducted a nuclear test. The United Nations imposed sanctions, and Pyongyang stopped testing nuclear and long-range missiles for a time.
An escalation. North Korea started a new round of testing in September after a six-month hiatus. It has since completed several missile tests, including the firing of two ballistic missiles on Jan. 14, that violated the 2017 U.N. resolutions.
In North Korea’s first two tests this month, the country launched short-range ballistic missiles with what it called “hypersonic gliding vehicles,” detachable warheads that make the weapons harder to intercept because they not only fly extremely fast but also change course during flight.
Solid-fuel missiles are easier to transport and launch. The KN-23 can perform low-altitude maneuvers, making them harder to intercept. North Korea has also begun launching KN-23 variants from a submarine, as it did in October, and from trains, as it did in September and again this month.
Mr. Kim observing a test launch of a hypersonic missile on Jan. 11 in North Korea, in a photo provided by the government.Credit...Korean Central News Agency via Korea News Service, via Associated Press
In its most recent test, North Korea fired a pair of solid-fuel missiles from a mobile launcher vehicle. When the North first launched such a pair in 2019, there was a 16-minute interval between the two missiles fired.
That gap was reduced to four minutes in the recent test, indicating that the military has improved its ability to fire multiple missiles and hide them from counterattacks by the United States and South Korea.
“North Korea hopes that if it continues to demonstrate its nuclear capabilities but confines them to the Korean Peninsula, it will not aggravate public opinion in the United States and will strengthen voices there calling for a compromise,” Cha Du-hyeogn, a principal fellow at the Seoul-based Asan Institute for Policy Studies, wrote in a recent paper.
For that strategy to work, Mr. Kim will need continued help from China in resisting any new international sanctions. North Korea’s economic challenges were deepened two years ago when it shut its border with China to fight the pandemic. This month, Beijing confirmed that “through friendly consultations,” China and North Korea reopened their border for freight trains.
“This timing suggests Beijing is more than complicit with Pyongyang’s provocations,” said Leif-Eric Easley, a professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul. “China is supporting North Korea economically and coordinating with it militarily.”
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
