Quotes of the Day:
"Show me that age and country where the rights and liberties of the people were placed on the sole chance of their rulers being good men, without a consequent loss of liberty?"
- Patrick Henry
“Conformity is the jailer of freedom and the enemy of growth.”
- President John F. Kennedy, 1961 address to the United Nations
"Whenever a separation is made between liberty and justice, neither…is safe."
- Edmund Burke
1. Guam, America’s Forgotten Territory, Is New Front Line Against China
2. Afghans push through snowy Alps toward new lives in Europe
3. More Than 60,000 Interpreters, Visa Applicants Remain in Afghanistan
4. Russia hands draft security pacts to US, expects quick talks
5. Army vax deadline: 2 battalion commanders relieved, discharges begin January, 98% comply
6. Morality, Duty, and Military Ethics: The Case of Lieutenant Colonel Scheller
7. All-out war or ‘creeping occupation’ among Putin options, says Ukraine MoD
8. Army announces 3 unit rotations to Mideast, Europe and Korea
9. Swedish commander: U.S. should add troops in Europe if Russia-Ukraine crisis deepens
10. Biden’s Stand on Ukraine Is a Wider Test of U.S. Credibility Abroad
11. Pakistani Taliban emir says his group “is a branch of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”
12. FDD | Exploiting America’s Declining Pressure: Iran’s Nuclear Escalation Over Time
13. France wants to transform its 'beautiful' army for high-intensity warfare
14. Washington shouldn't pat itself on the back for its cybersecurity spending just yet
15. Cyber Challenges for the New National Defense Strategy
16. Strategic Outpost Brings You Santa’s 2021 National Security Gift List
17. A World Without Trust - The Insidious Cyberthreat
18. No Mere Mistake - A Review of "Exiled Emissary"
19. Strength in Numbers: The Future of Coalition Building and Irregular Warfare
1. Guam, America’s Forgotten Territory, Is New Front Line Against China
I have always enjoyed our trips to Guam.
Guam, America’s Forgotten Territory, Is New Front Line Against China
The remote Pacific island, better known for beaches, is seen as a potential staging ground in any future Asian conflicts
WSJ · by Alastair Gale in Dededo, Guam
U.S. military officials say that the island, already home to Air Force and Navy bases, would be a major staging point for bombers, submarines and troops in any conflict involving the U.S. in the Pacific, including any clash over Taiwan if the U.S. were to become involved.
Hotels line the beaches of Guam, which is better known as a tourist destination for Japanese and South Korean honeymooners.
Photo: Anthony Henri Oftana for The Wall Street Journal
It’s also becoming more vulnerable, U.S. officials say, as China expands its military capabilities.
Around six years ago, China revealed a new missile, described by U.S. defense analysts as the “Guam Killer,” that could reach the Chicago-sized island about 1,500 miles east of the Philippines. Since then, China’s stockpile has grown from a few dozen to around 300, according to a recent Pentagon estimate.
In a propaganda video last year, China showed a simulated attack on Guam, with dramatic music and slow-motion explosions.
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs referred a request for comment to China’s Ministry of National Defense, which didn’t respond.
U.S. military leaders are seeking hundreds of millions of dollars to add more hardware for Guam to destroy incoming missiles and protect its bases and the roughly 150,000 U.S. civilians there. In its latest review of global resources, the Pentagon highlighted the importance of Guam by pledging to upgrade its air base and other assets on the island.
The DF-26 missiles, which can reach Guam, were shown off in a military parade in Beijing in 2015.
Photo: greg baker/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
“It will cost money, granted, but the people here are United States citizens. This is sovereign United States territory, and we want to make sure that the people here and in this region are protected,” Rear Adm. Ben Nicholson, commander of U.S. forces on Guam and surrounding islands, said.
U.S. officials say China’s missile threat to Guam is part of a broader surge in Chinese weaponry production that has become one of Washington’s top security concerns. The recent annual Pentagon assessment of China’s military cited accelerated output of military ships, airplanes and nuclear weapons.
This summer, U.S. officials say China tested two hypersonic missiles, including one that fired an additional projectile while close to its target, demonstrating technology no other nation has tested.
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President Biden has appealed to Chinese President Xi Jinping for arms control talks, although Beijing hasn’t made any clear commitments.
American military officials and analysts say China wants to deter the U.S. and its allies from operating in the western Pacific by making it more dangerous for them, with the goal of preventing them from intervening in any conflict—including if Beijing follows through on threats to seize Taiwan, a self-ruling island that China claims.
While the U.S. hasn’t said whether it would intervene in any attack on Taiwan—part of a “strategic ambiguity” policy aimed at discouraging conflict—many military strategists believe the U.S. might do so.
Guam would be especially important in any potential conflict in part because Andersen Air Force Base, occupying much of the northern part of the island, is the only U.S. base in the western Pacific capable of hosting heavy bombers for prolonged periods. Submarines leaving Guam’s Navy base can quickly dive into deep water to lessen the chances of detection.
The U.S. military also has far more freedom in terms of when and where it can train on Guam than it does at other major U.S. outposts in Asia.
Tokyo has pressed the U.S. for years to reduce its presence in Okinawa, where most of the roughly 50,000 American troops in Japan are stationed, while South Korea, which hosts almost 30,000 U.S. troops, is wary of antagonizing China.
Guam, by contrast, has been controlled by the U.S. since the end of the 19th century, except for a few years when Japan occupied the island after its attack on Pearl Harbor. U.S. Marines retook the island and used it as a major military hub and supply center in the final stages of the war.
A Thaad missile-defense system stood at the ready during a demonstration at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam.
Photo: Anthony Henri Oftana for The Wall Street Journal
Today, its residents are U.S. citizens, though they don’t have the right to vote in presidential elections. While the island is mainly known as a tourist destination for Japanese and South Korean honeymooners, just over one-fourth of its land is owned by the U.S. Department of Defense. About 22,000 military personnel are already based there.
“Guam plays a role regardless of where operations might take place or who the adversaries are,” Rear Adm. Nicholson said.
The U.S. has been gradually expanding its presence on Guam over the past decade. In 2013, the U.S. moved a system to shoot down ballistic missiles known as Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense, or Thaad, to Guam after North Korea threatened to fire missiles at the island.
The new Marine base is scheduled to receive the transfer of around 5,000 troops from Okinawa from the middle of the decade, as part of Washington’s pledges to draw down troop levels in Japan.
With the expansions, however, come more anxiety about Guam’s future.
When Beijing first revealed its Dong Feng-26 missile, which can reach Guam, U.S. officials were confident missile threats to the island could be stopped by Thaad.
“Guam is very well protected,” Gen. John Hyten said in 2017 while head of U.S. strategic command.
In its recent annual assessment of China’s military, the Pentagon estimated Beijing’s DF-26 missile stockpile had roughly tripled from around 100 in its estimate a year earlier, increasing the risk that China could overwhelm Guam’s defenses. It also said for the first time that the missile could possibly be used to deliver low-yield nuclear payloads.
“We are a target. That’s how it is,” said Guam Gov. Lou Leon Guerrero. “It’s very nerve-racking.”
The U.S. military’s goal is to create layers of protection for Guam to stop ballistic missiles that descend from space, and cruise missiles that fly close to the earth’s surface on a flat course. The Army recently tested the Israeli-built Iron Dome system on Guam as one option to counter cruise missiles.
“‘We are a target. That’s how it is.’”
— Guam Gov. Lou Leon Guerrero
Military leaders say the introduction of something similar to the ship-based Aegis system is needed to provide additional defenses from ballistic missiles, but they haven’t settled on a clear proposal.
Congress has held off on approving most of the request, saying more clarity is needed in how the money would be spent.
Brig. Gen. Mark Holler, U.S. commander of Army missile defense for the Asia-Pacific region, said other existing missile-defense systems such as Patriot batteries in the Pacific region could be moved to Guam overnight in a crisis, but additional capabilities were needed for the island.
A core concern is how to ensure any new system is effective against expected advances in Chinese missile threats. Beijing’s rapid technical progress has made that more challenging.
The Missile Defense Agency has submitted a report on options that is under review by the Pentagon.
U.S. Air Force mechanics took selfies as a B-1B bomber flew overhead at Andersen Air Force Base in May.
Photo: us air force/Reuters
WSJ · by Alastair Gale in Dededo, Guam
2. Afghans push through snowy Alps toward new lives in Europe
The will to survive to live in freedom.
Afghans push through snowy Alps toward new lives in Europe | AP News
AP · by JOHN LEICESTER and DANIEL COLE · December 17, 2021
Afghans push through snowy Alps toward new lives in Europe
December 17, 2021 GMT
CLAVIERE, Italy (AP) — When suicide attackers and gunmen massacred crowds flocking to Kabul’s airport, they also severed the escape route that Ali Rezaie hoped would take him to a new life abroad, far from the Taliban and their suspicions of well-educated, middle-class people who worked with foreigners in Afghanistan.
In the chaos, Rezaie couldn’t reach the airport where flight after flight took off without him. The 27-year-old was left with no choice but to take his future into his own leathery hands. Like many other Afghans, he resolved to find another way out and embarked on a forbidding journey of thousands of kilometers to Europe, large parts of it on foot.
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More than three months later, Rezaie’s odyssey through five countries has carried him high into the French-Italian Alps, where he is pushing through knee-deep snow to evade border guards, with a journalist from The Associated Press in tow.
Migrants walk in the Alps
The Afghan exodus that some feared would flood Europe with migrants after the Taliban swept to power hasn’t materialized. And amid the toothy Alpine crags bristling with icicles, it quickly becomes apparent why: Only the hardiest, most driven and most resourceful exiles make it this far.
Ahead of Rezaie in the snowscape is the French border, unmarked but guarded around the clock by police who peer through thermal binoculars for heat signatures. Rezaie’s companion, another Afghan bearing scars from a suicide bombing that prompted him to flee, had already tried — and failed — to reach France via this wintry route.
So the Afghans advance carefully. They pause to listen for sounds in the frozen silence, to consult a map on Rezaie’s phone before the chill kills its battery and to munch on jam-filled croissants they bought in the frontier village of Claviere in Italy. If caught by French guards patrolling the border on foot, ski-bikes and in vans, Italy is where they’ll be forced to return.
The Taliban takeover and the swift collapse of Afghanistan’s economy has sent people streaming illegally into neighboring Iran, which is often the first stepping stone for Afghans — including Rezaie — who push on into the European Union.
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Afghans are now on course to overtake Syrians as Europe’s leading asylum-seekers in 2021. Internal EU reporting on migration trends shows that more than 80,000 Afghans applied for asylum through November. That’s a surge of 96% over the same span last year, and the increase was partly driven by the evacuations from Kabul airport.
Rezaie, from Herat in western Afghanistan, says he traveled to Kabul in search of a flight but then doubled back after the suicide bomb and gun attack in the waning days of the airlift. He believes he would have been killed had he stayed in Afghanistan because of work he did with foreign aid groups.
So he emptied out his savings, borrowed money and left behind his printing company, friends and comfortable life.
The quest took him first to Iran and Turkey, then onward by boat and for 25 days on foot into Greece. Next came Italy and then the French border.
Rezaie figures that crossing it will be easy, compared to all he’s been through. But it’s easier still for the European vacationers he suddenly encounters on a ski run that crosses his mountain path. They zoom past, paying him no heed, not having to worry about police patrols.
Feeling conspicuous on the manicured slope, Rezaie is struck by how sharply their carefree joy contrasts with his urgent need to get back in the camouflage of trees.
“Some people go down happy,” he says, lungs heaving in the thin air. “Other people go up sad.”
By finding paths deep into Europe, Rezaie and other migrants offer hope to those sure to follow. Their knowledge about the obstacles, their contacts and their travel tips will trickle back to Afghanistan. Migrants attempting the Alpine crossing share phone maps with GPS markers pointing the way.
Rezaie is aiming for the fortified French town of Briancon. Sayed and Mortaza, cousins and both 16, passed through Briancon hours earlier. They, too, fled in the days after Kabul fell and traveled through Iran to Turkey. From there, they were smuggled aboard a cramped boat to Italy, a brutal six-day voyage that left them too weak to stand.
Caught at the French border, they were allowed to continue because they are minors. Seven adult Afghans they crossed with were sent back.
The Taliban takeover scattered Sayed’s family. His father and older brother worked as police officers. They’ve fled, and Sayed thinks they’re hiding in Pakistan. Without their salaries, Sayed and his mother had no income, so they left, too. She is staying with a sister in Iran. He’s aiming for Germany.
“Maybe Dortmund, because I like Dortmund football club,” he said. “We just want to escape.”
Others who left long before the Taliban takeover say they no longer hope to return.
“It’s finished for us now, for everyone who is in Europe,” said Abdul Almazai, 26, who left Afghanistan as a teenager. Turned away at the French border with eight other Afghans, he planned to try again.
“We have crossed so many mountains,” he said. “I have to make my future.”
Aid workers worry that Afghans more accustomed to mountains and winter’s perils are taking riskier routes through the snow than migrants from warmer climes.
“They are confident, and sometimes being confident is not helpful,” said Luca Guglielmetto, a volunteer worker at a refuge on the Italian side that equips migrants with warm clothes and boots for the crossing.
With darkness falling, the battery on Rezaie’s phone dies. He and his companion forge on through the snow.
Rare are those who manage to cross on their first attempt. Rezaie pulled off that feat and glowed with pride the next morning as he tucked into breakfast at a refuge for migrants in Briancon.
He sent a video of himself wading through snow to his mother and brother in Iran.
He has his sights set on Germany. But he hopes one day to go home.
“I had a car. I had a job, work.” he said. “I had a good life.”
___
AP · by JOHN LEICESTER and DANIEL COLE · December 17, 2021
3. More Than 60,000 Interpreters, Visa Applicants Remain in Afghanistan
How can we immediately evacuate them?
Excerpts:
The State Department official said that the remaining 29,000 visa applicants are in earlier stages of the application process. The figure doesn’t include their family members at this stage. The vetting steps aim to verify their employment history and check for connections to U.S.-designated terrorist groups.
The U.S. is co-organizing a couple of flights a week, but scheduling depends on conditions at Kabul airport—which is only partly operational—and the weather. It could take until well into 2022 to complete the evacuation of those who already qualify for flights. If the other 29,000 visa applicants pass vetting, they too would become eligible for evacuation along with their immediate family members.
The Special Immigrant Visa program was set up in 2009 to help those at risk of Taliban reprisal for helping the U.S., including interpreters for the U.S. military and diplomatic and foreign-aid workers.
More Than 60,000 Interpreters, Visa Applicants Remain in Afghanistan
About 33,000 of those could be eligible for immediate evacuation, State Department says
A total of 62,000 Afghans are believed to have been left behind, the official said.
U.S. evacuation flights, facilitated by Qatar and local organizers on the ground, have stepped up in recent weeks. Seats are prioritized for Americans and U.S. residents, but some are available for Afghans who have cleared vetting in the visa application process.
The State Department official said that the remaining 29,000 visa applicants are in earlier stages of the application process. The figure doesn’t include their family members at this stage. The vetting steps aim to verify their employment history and check for connections to U.S.-designated terrorist groups.
The U.S. is co-organizing a couple of flights a week, but scheduling depends on conditions at Kabul airport—which is only partly operational—and the weather. It could take until well into 2022 to complete the evacuation of those who already qualify for flights. If the other 29,000 visa applicants pass vetting, they too would become eligible for evacuation along with their immediate family members.
The Special Immigrant Visa program was set up in 2009 to help those at risk of Taliban reprisal for helping the U.S., including interpreters for the U.S. military and diplomatic and foreign-aid workers.
The Biden administration came under intense pressure this summer to do more to evacuate applicants, beginning emergency flights out for those who had cleared vetting in July. The premature collapse of the Kabul administration meant that most were left behind.
Kianoush, who was approved for an evacuation flight that was scheduled to take place the week that Kabul collapsed in August, is among the thousands waiting for news of a flight. He has been hiding after working on sensitive projects alongside U.S. forces at the Afghan interior ministry.
“We are jobless and the winter is coming. There is no food, or clear future,” he said a telephone interview.
In the chaotic evacuation effort that took place in the summer, thousands of Afghans crowded Kabul’s airport seeking a way to flee the country. Some made it through without paperwork, while American citizens and visa applicants were unable to enter and board flights.
The State Department said afterward it believed the majority of Afghans who worked alongside the U.S.-led NATO coalition had been left behind.
The Biden administration promised to evacuate all Americans from Afghanistan after the collapse, but stopped short of offering the same assurances to Afghan allies at risk of retribution.
Since the fall of Kabul the U.S. has relocated 479 Americans and 450 U.S. residents with their families, the State Department said in an update this week. It has also evacuated 2,200 Afghan visa applicants and family members since the fall of Kabul.
Fewer than a dozen U.S. citizens who are ready to leave Afghanistan remain in the country, the State Department said.
Groups of volunteers that have organized private evacuation flights say the true number of Americans who remain and want to leave is higher. This is because the U.S. won’t let them bring dependent family members.
Mustafa, 33 years old, is an American who worked as a translator for U.S. forces. He took on responsibility for his sister and six children after her husband was believed killed in the bombing at Kabul’s airport. He is staying behind with hope that a private volunteer organization will evacuate him with his sister and children because she would struggle to survive on her own without a male guardian.
“Mustafa could have left long ago as an American citizen,” said a spokeswoman for Task Force Argo, a volunteer group trying to help him. “He is staying back to protect his family and they are all waiting together in Kabul for an evacuation option that helps non-passport-holders.”
The State Department said it must follow U.S. immigration law in regard to evacuations and that only those eligible to enter the U.S. can be evacuated.
The U.S. no longer has a diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, a factor adding to the difficulty in processing cases.
Last month, the U.S. signed an accord with Qatar that established the Gulf nation as the U.S. protecting power in Afghanistan. As part of the agreement, the Qataris agreed to establish a U.S. interests section within its embassy to provide consular services and monitor U.S. diplomatic facilities in Afghanistan. There is no date set for reopening an embassy.
Corrections & Amplifications
More than 60,000 Afghan interpreters and others who have applied for visas to seek shelter in the U.S. after working alongside American forces remain in Afghanistan. An earlier version of this article incorrectly said they are seeking asylum, a different immigrant status requiring that an applicant already be in the U.S. (Corrected on Dec. 16)
4. Russia hands draft security pacts to US, expects quick talks
Russia hands draft security pacts to US, expects quick talks
armytimes.com · by Vladimir Isachenkov, The Associated Press · December 16, 2021
MOSCOW — The Kremlin said Thursday that Russia submitted draft documents outlining security arrangements it wants to negotiate with the United States and its NATO allies amid spiraling tensions over Ukraine.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said a senior Russian envoy stood ready to immediately depart for talks in a neutral country on the proposal.
Peskov told reporters that Russian President Vladimir Putin may have another call with U.S. President Joe Biden before the year’s end to discuss the security issue, but he said it hasn’t been agreed to yet.
Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a meeting with members of the Presidential Council for Strategic Development and National Projects via teleconference at the Novo-Ogaryovo residence outside Moscow, Russia, Wednesday, Dec. 15, 2021. (Mikhail Metzel, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)
Putin has denied plans of launching an invasion and reversed the conversation by prodding Western leaders to provide legally binding guarantees precluding NATO’s expansion to Ukraine and the deployment of the alliance’s weapons there, calling such actions a “red line” for Moscow.
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The U.S. and its allies have refused to provide such pledges, but Biden and Putin agreed last week on further talks to discuss Russia’s concerns.
Peskov said Thursday that Russia has submitted drafts of a treaty and an agreement to the United States, but he refused to specify what specific arrangements they contained and who could be the signatories.
He said Putin’s foreign affairs adviser, Yuri Ushakov, discussed the Russian drafts with U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan during a call Wednesday, and that Moscow was ready to start negotiations.
Moscow’s proposals were passed on to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Karen Donfried, who visited Moscow on Wednesday and met with Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov.
Ryabkov would be ready to depart for talks on prospective agreements in a neutral country, Peskov said without giving details.
Speaking last week, Ryabkov warned that the failure to stem mounting Russia-West tensions could push them to a showdown similar to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis that put the world on the verge of a nuclear war.
A European Union summit on Thursday was set to focus on avoiding a Russian military invasion in Ukraine with threats of unprecedented sanctions for Moscow and the promise of diplomatic talks.
U.S. intelligence officials say Russia has moved 70,000 troops to its border with Ukraine and is preparing for a possible invasion early next year. Moscow has denied an intention to attack and accused Ukrainian authorities of planning an offensive to reclaim control of rebel-held eastern Ukraine — an allegation Ukraine has rejected.
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Fighting between Ukrainian forces and Russia-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine began after Russia’s 2014 annexation of UKraine’s Crimean Peninsula. It has killed over 14,000 people and devastated Ukraine’s industrial heartland called Donbas.
Ukraine and the West have accused Russia of sending troops and weapons into eastern Ukraine to back up separatists, but Moscow denied the accusations, charging that Russians who fought in the east were there on their own as volunteers.
A recent ruling by a district court in the southern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don, located near the border with Ukraine, challenged Moscow’s denials. The city’s Kirov District Court last week found a local businessman guilty of offering a military officer bribes to procure contracts to supply food to Russian troops deployed to eastern Ukraine.
The verdict, posted on the court’s website, said a convoy of 70 trucks delivered 1,300 metric tons (1,433 tons) of food supplies once every two weeks in 2018-2019 to the separatist-controlled areas of Ukraine.
The supplies, which were worth an equivalent of about $1.8 million, included canned food, flour and fresh vegetables and were intended “for units of the Russian armed forces” deployed “on combat duty” to the rebel-held territory, according to the verdict.
Asked to comment on the court’s findings, Kremlin spokesman Peskov reaffirmed a strong denial of any Russian troops presence in the rebel-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine, saying the judge who wrote the ruling must have made an error.
“It’s probably a mistake by those who wrote it,” Peskov said. “It’s impossible - there are no Russian troops on the territory of self-proclaimed republics, and there haven’t been any. The Russian troops stay on the territory of the Russian Federation.”
5. Army vax deadline: 2 battalion commanders relieved, discharges begin January, 98% comply
Army vax deadline: 2 battalion commanders relieved, discharges begin January, 98% comply
The Army’s deadline for active duty troops to be vaccinated against COVID-19 passed Wednesday, and Army officials offered a snapshot of the service’s data and next steps in a Thursday morning release.
The vast majority of the Army’s approximately 485,900 active duty soldiers have complied with the Pentagon’s vaccine requirement, the release said — 96% of troops are fully vaccinated, and an additional 2% have received at least one dose.
Only 3,864 soldiers have “refused the vaccination order without a pending or approved exemption,” the release said. That includes two battalion commanders and an additional four “leaders” who have been relieved, but the release didn’t specify the rank or echelon of the latter four.
In January, commanders will begin involuntarily discharging soldiers who have refused the shot. Most of them — 2,767 — have already received a general officer memorandum of reprimand, an adverse administrative action that could end their careers even if they now opt to get the shot.
According to a provision in the fiscal 2022 defense bill, which was passed by the Senate Wednesday and now awaits President Joe Biden’s signature, troops discharged solely for refusing the COVID-19 vaccine will receive either an honorable or general discharge.
“Thank you to the medical staff who have been supporting the pandemic response at home and to the vaccinated Soldiers who put the health and welfare of their fellow Soldiers and families first,” said Army Secretary Christine Wormuth in the release. “To those who continue to refuse the vaccine and are not pending a final decision on a medical or administrative exemption, I strongly encourage you to get the vaccine. If not, we will begin involuntary separation proceedings.”
Exemptions and accommodations
As of Dec. 16, the Army has approved thousands of temporary medical and administrative exemptions, but virtually no permanent medical exemptions or religious accommodations.
More than 6,200 active duty soldiers have temporary administrative or medical exemptions from getting the shot, including some troops who have pending permanent exemption requests.
Only four active duty soldiers have received permanent medical exemptions to date.
The service is moving slowly on religious accommodation requests. Out of the 1,746 active duty troops who requested accommodation, none have received approval, and only 85 have been denied, according to the release.
But even if all exemptions are denied, and all troops who requested exemptions leave the Army, the doomsday scenario predicted by some critics of the Defense Department’s mandatory vaccination campaign won’t come to fruition — only two percent of the active duty force would face discharge.
Davis Winkie is a staff reporter covering the Army. He originally joined Military Times as a reporting intern in 2020. Before journalism, Davis worked as a military historian. He is also a human resources officer in the Army National Guard.
6. Morality, Duty, and Military Ethics: The Case of Lieutenant Colonel Scheller
I personally think Scheller was wrong and acted contrary to good order and discipline. That said he has provided the opportunity to discuss and debate a number of important decisions from the policy itself and how to stand up for your beliefs and what actions should be taken when there is a disagreement with policy based on one's principles and beliefs.
Excerpts:
Personally, I can sympathize with how Scheller felt. I disagreed with many of the policies that were implemented during the Global War on Terror (GWOT), including the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the U.S. detention and interrogation policy. But I was obligated by my oath to obey lawful orders and not to publicly question lawful policy. Nothing that the Bush administration did was unlawful. Therefore, I continued to do my duty.
A Change in Perspective
My perspective on GWOT policy and strategy changed when the commander-in-chief, President George W. Bush, communicated to the American people his goals and his commitment to their accomplishment. In 2006, I heard him speak at the Naval War College. The President had come to talk about the “surge,” a significant course change in Iraq. As he spoke, he projected great honesty and certainty of purpose regarding Iraq. He took full personal responsibility for failures in the war. He also expressed a determination to succeed that conveyed that he believed what he was doing was right. He didn’t change my personal opinion about the policies, but I left the auditorium with a respect for him as a leader. President Bush accepted responsibility for his failures, spoke honestly about the challenges ahead, and conveyed an endearing humility and a conviction of the justice of his cause. Having heard him speak in this fashion made it much easier to do my own duty and convey to my sailors what we were all striving for.
Accountability Above All
Military leaders are often confronted with dilemmas like the ones Lieutenant Colonel Scheller and I faced. At all times, however, we must act to enhance the military effectiveness of sailors and Marines by training them and holding them accountable for acting lawfully, morally, and ethically. We must model that behavior every minute of every day. Our mission and the law require nothing less.
Morality, Duty, and Military Ethics: The Case of Lieutenant Colonel Scheller
By Captain Thomas R. Beall, U.S. Navy (Retired)
December 2021 Proceedings Vol. 147/12/1426
Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Scheller has been much in the news of late. While on active duty as commanding officer of the Advanced Infantry Training Battalion at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, Scheller, in uniform, posted a video on social media in which he criticized senior military and civilian leaders for incompetence in their management of the military withdrawal from Afghanistan and demanded accountability for their failures. Previously, according to the Washington Post, Scheller had been ordered to cease posting critical and controversial items on social media before he made the post that resulted in his relief and court-martial.1
To his credit, Scheller has publicly embraced responsibility for his actions, accepting removal from command and the judgment of a court martial. He will leave the Marine Corps without complaint in the near future. Where Scheller gets it wrong, however, is his belief that he was right to disobey orders and “speak truth to power” while still in uniform and still in command. In fact, he or any officer has the option to act insubordinately only when given an unlawful order. Scheller may disagree strongly with his government’s policy, but he has no right to undermine that policy by publicly criticizing it while holding a commission on active duty. He also had other, legal options to act on his beliefs. He could have resigned his commission and run for public office, as many members of Congress have done. From this political platform, he could have expressed his views and even influenced the policy with which he disagrees. Instead, he chose to leverage his exemplary military career to lend credibility to his views. Such insubordination is not only illegal but is a violation of our core values. Ultimately, Lieutenant Colonel Scheller’s actions were dishonorable, reflected misplaced courage, and demonstrated a lack of commitment to his Marines, to the naval service, and to the nation and the Constitution.
Scheller’s case is closely related to the conflict disrupting the political life of our society today as evidenced by the erosion of meaningful public discourse, extremist actions by political partisans, and even violence not seen in decades. It exemplifies these developments because it indicates there are signs that good order and discipline are being undermined by partisan politics in the U.S. armed forces. The case of Navy Chief Eddie Gallagher is one example. That of Lieutenant Colonel Scheller is another. Both cases raise questions about how military personnel in leadership positions execute lawful orders and live up to core values. Both examples make us question how leaders are held accountable and how they model and impart core values to the sailors and Marines they lead.
The Core Values of the Naval Services
When the Navy and Marine Corps instituted the core values in 1992, many of my contemporaries I and gave them little thought. In some ways, they seemed like the latest Navy “pet rock,” a passing fad that would soon be forgotten. It wasn’t until I took command that I fully recognized their importance. Honor, Courage, and Commitment became pillars of my command philosophy and those of many of my peers. The curricula at the Command Leadership School in Newport, Rhode Island, was developed with these values as their foundation. Likewise, the Sailor’s Creed includes the statement, “I proudly serve my country's Navy combat team with Honor, Courage and Commitment.” The Marine Corps defines the core values as:
Honor: Integrity, Responsibility, Accountability
Courage: Do the right thing, in the right way, for the right reasons
Commitment: Devotion to the Corps and fellow Marines
Each service highlights their importance in different ways.
The Consequences of Scheller’s Actions
Sending service people into combat with lower military effectiveness than the enemy is an abrogation of officer and enlisted leader responsibility to their troops. The most important resource contributing to military effectiveness is manpower. Concerning men and women in battle, the late John Keegan wrote:
What battles have in common is human: the behavior of men struggling to reconcile their instinct for self-preservation, their sense of honor and the achievement of some aim over which other men are ready to kill them.2
Preparing and sustaining men and women to maximize their individual effectiveness despite battle’s stresses is the key to sustaining a state’s military effectiveness. One of the most significant stressors is morale. High morale correlates to high effectiveness, while low morale correlates to low effectiveness. Time and again, military forces with low morale have suffered defeat even if they have physically outmatched their opponents.3
The importance of morale cannot be overstated because its manifestation as “the will to fight” is essential to military victory and because it is sensitive to influences not always under the control of a service person’s superiors. Morale’s sensitivity to outside influences is more pronounced today than in the past because of social media. Comments such as Scheller’s are easily accessible to greater numbers of service people and much of it goes beyond legitimate critique, becoming a means of promoting radical views that can undermine military discipline and esprit de corps.
Military leaders must promote good order and discipline, service core values, and obedience to lawful orders, in part through honest communication between leaders and their sailors and Marines to offset the radicalizing influence of some social media material. They must also model that behavior every minute of every day.4 Failure to execute these obligations or seeking to undermine them damages morale, which in turn undermines military effectiveness. In the end, this puts the lives of sailors and Marines at much greater risk. This is where Scheller’s behavior falls short.
Personally, I can sympathize with how Scheller felt. I disagreed with many of the policies that were implemented during the Global War on Terror (GWOT), including the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the U.S. detention and interrogation policy. But I was obligated by my oath to obey lawful orders and not to publicly question lawful policy. Nothing that the Bush administration did was unlawful. Therefore, I continued to do my duty.
A Change in Perspective
My perspective on GWOT policy and strategy changed when the commander-in-chief, President George W. Bush, communicated to the American people his goals and his commitment to their accomplishment. In 2006, I heard him speak at the Naval War College. The President had come to talk about the “surge,” a significant course change in Iraq. As he spoke, he projected great honesty and certainty of purpose regarding Iraq. He took full personal responsibility for failures in the war. He also expressed a determination to succeed that conveyed that he believed what he was doing was right. He didn’t change my personal opinion about the policies, but I left the auditorium with a respect for him as a leader. President Bush accepted responsibility for his failures, spoke honestly about the challenges ahead, and conveyed an endearing humility and a conviction of the justice of his cause. Having heard him speak in this fashion made it much easier to do my own duty and convey to my sailors what we were all striving for.
Accountability Above All
Military leaders are often confronted with dilemmas like the ones Lieutenant Colonel Scheller and I faced. At all times, however, we must act to enhance the military effectiveness of sailors and Marines by training them and holding them accountable for acting lawfully, morally, and ethically. We must model that behavior every minute of every day. Our mission and the law require nothing less.
7. All-out war or ‘creeping occupation’ among Putin options, says Ukraine MoD
Bring on the "creeping occupation!" I would think the Ukrainian resistance would have a field day attacking the slow creep of occupation forces. But there is likely to be a quagmire from either scenario.
All-out war or ‘creeping occupation’ among Putin options, says Ukraine MoD
Should Russian President Vladimir Putin decide to attack Ukraine, he will have about 220,000 troops at his disposal, including about 120,000 already deployed near Ukraine’s borders, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense told Military Times Thursday morning.
But whether he will attack still remains unknown, according to the MoD, which charts two potential courses of action Putin could take — either all-out war or a “creeping occupation” of Ukraine.
While Russia would be prepared to launch an attack by February at the latest, according to the MoD, Ukraine officials are still uncertain if Putin will give the go-ahead.
“According to our data V. Putin has not yet made the decision,” according to the MoD. “It will depend upon many factors.”
FILE - In this photo released by the Russian Defense Ministry Press Service, flames rise over the Mulino training ground in the Nizhny Novgorod region during the joint strategic exercise of the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus Zapad-2021 in the Nizhny Novgorod region, Russia, on Sept. 11, 2021. Ukrainian and Western officials are worried that a Russian military buildup near Ukraine could signal plans by Moscow to invade its ex-Soviet neighbor. The Kremlin insists it has no such intention and has accused Ukraine and its Western backers of making the claims to cover up their own allegedly aggressive designs. (Vadim Savitskiy/Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP, File)
Before making the decision to attack, Putin will factor in the economic and political situation in Ukraine, support for Ukraine from the international community, “strict reaction (in the form of so-called hellish sanctions, military assistance, etc.) of the world leading countries on the Kremlin’s aggressive policy towards Ukraine,” and the situation in Russia itself, according to the MoD.
President Joe Biden has spoken to both Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in an effort to calm the situation. He promised both that Russia would face “severe consequences” if Russian military forces advance into Ukraine, but he also said that he would not deploy U.S. combat forces to the region to push back any such assault. Other western leaders have made similar statements. New German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said Russia would face “massive consequences” if it attacked, according to Reuters.
In addition to the 120,000 Russian troops currently arrayed around Ukraine’s borders, Russia would deploy troops from its Western and Southern military districts, as well as airborne units should it decide to attack, according to the assessment.
“The full strength of all Russian troops ... which may be involved into the large scale invasion against our country makes up around 220,000 servicemen,” according to the MoD.
The Russian embassy did not immediately respond to a request for comment. However, Putin has denied plans of launching an invasion and reversed the conversation by prodding Western leaders to provide legally binding guarantees precluding NATO’s expansion to Ukraine and the deployment of the alliance’s weapons there, calling such actions a “red line” for Moscow, according to The Associated Press.
“The Kremlin said Thursday that Russia submitted draft documents outlining security arrangements it wants to negotiate with the United States and its NATO allies amid spiraling tensions over Ukraine,” according to AP.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said a senior Russian envoy stood ready to immediately depart for talks in a neutral country on the proposal, according to AP.
RELATED
Russia is building toward the ability to carry out an attack on Ukraine, the head of it's defense intelligence agency told Military Times.
While Ukrainian morale remains high, the MoD says it is under no illusions how bad things could get.
“There is no doubt about high morale and patriotic spirit of our citizens to defend our sovereignty and territorial integrity,” the MoD said. “At the same time, Russia has one of the biggest armies in the world by strength and armaments. If the decision to enlarge the scale of armed aggression against Ukraine is made, Russia will use all available arsenal of modern armament.”
That arsenal includes operational-tactical and army aviation, high-accuracy weapons belonging to its air, naval and ground components and electronic warfare weapons, according to the MoD. Ships from Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and the Caspian Flotilla will activate in the Black Sea and in the Sea of Azov.
While it is unknown what Putin will do, Ukraine’s MoD told Military Times there are a couple of courses of action he could take.
“We expect that Russian leadership has enough sense to avoid war,” the MoD said. “In its turn the most real scenario of the situation development is creeping occupation of Ukraine.:”
Similar to how Russia was able to annex Crimea and invade eastern Ukraine with the help of local separatists, an ongoing fight that has claimed more than 14,000 lives since 2014, Ukraine’s MoD says Russia could expand on that effort, using “special services/Russian agents of influence.”
Thus, Russia would “create favorable conditions for combat actions intensification” in eastern Ukraine, according to the MoD.
“Provocations made by Russia on the temporary occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts with numerous victims of local population … (locals with Russian passports) will be excuse for the renewal of hostilities. It will be used by the Kremlin for protection Russian citizens. Under favorable conditions Russia will continue further occupation of Ukraine.”
FILE - This photo released by Russian Defense Ministry Press Service, shows Russian Su-24 bombers parked at an air base in Crimea in preparation for maneuvers. Ukrainian and Western officials are worried that a Russian military buildup near Ukraine could signal plans by Moscow to invade its ex-Soviet neighbor. The Kremlin insists it has no such intention and has accused Ukraine and its Western backers of making the claims to cover up their own allegedly aggressive designs. (Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP, File)
To date, the U.S. has committed more than $2.5 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since 2014, according to the Pentagon. That support “includes but is not limited to the provision of air surveillance radars, counter-artillery radars, counter-unmanned aerial systems, secure communications, military medical gear, armed patrol boats, and Javelin anti-tank systems.”
Given the scope of Russia’s arsenal, Ukraine is seeking more.
“Ukraine first of all needs modern aircraft, including UAVs (attack and reconnaissance versions); air defense resources of short-range and long-range, modern reconnaissance and electronic warfare systems, antitank and anti-ship systems, etc.,” the assessment states.
The Ukraine military is working to rapidly field the weapons the U.S. is providing, like Javelin man-portable anti-tank missiles.
“We will solve this task in the shortest period of time with the assistance of Western instructors,” according to the MoD. “We’ve already got this experience in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.”
Should the Russians invade and overwhelm Ukraine’s military, officials there are planning for a potential insurgency to fight back.
“In case of [Russian Federation] attempts to enlarge scales of armed aggression against Ukraine the answer is yes,” the MoD answered in response to a question of whether it would distribute arms to its citizens. “Nowadays measures on formation troops of territorial defense are being conducted.”
Howard Altman is an award-winning editor and reporter who was previously the military reporter for the Tampa Bay Times and before that the Tampa Tribune, where he covered USCENTCOM, USSOCOM and SOF writ large among many other topics.
8. Army announces 3 unit rotations to Mideast, Europe and Korea
Army announces 3 unit rotations to Mideast, Europe and Korea
The Army has announced three brigade combat team deployments in the coming months as part of a regular rotation of forces around the globe.
Major combat operations ended when ISIS lost its territorial caliphate in 2019, but the group remains active as an insurgency. Tensions between the U.S. and Iran-backed militias in the region also continue to garner headlines.
The 1st Armored BCT, 1st Armored Division, stationed at Fort Bliss, Texas, will deploy this spring to support the U.S. commitment to South Korea.
Army units regularly rotate to the Korean peninsula, though there are also about 28,500 U.S. troops permanently assigned there. Many of the U.S. forces in the country are located 40 miles south of Seoul at Camp Humphreys.
RELATED
Experts told Military Times to expect a "permanently" militarized border between Russia and Ukraine, and an invasion could be triggered if Ukraine attains advanced weapons.
The 3rd Armored BCT, 4th Infantry Division, stationed at Fort Carson, Colorado, will deploy to Europe this spring to support “the U.S. commitment to NATO allies and partners,” a unit press release reads.
In recent years, NATO has also helped supply Ukrainian forces with better weaponry, including anti-tank missiles and some drone technology.
9. Swedish commander: U.S. should add troops in Europe if Russia-Ukraine crisis deepens
I was surprised by the announcement we would not send troops to Ukraine. Seems like we just sacrificed diplomatic leverage and undermined deterrence.
Swedish commander: U.S. should add troops in Europe if Russia-Ukraine crisis deepens
Biden has all but ruled out sending American forces directly to fight.
President Joe Biden has indicated that he won’t send American troops to directly fight in that ongoing war. | Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
12/16/2021 02:47 PM EST
If the conflict between Russia and Ukraine deepens, the United States should send more troops to reinforce its military presence in Europe, the head of Sweden’s armed forces says.
Gen. Micael Bydén, the Swedish supreme commander, spoke to POLITICO Thursday amid a visit to Washington where he met with counterparts including Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Russia’s menacing of Ukraine is top of mind for Sweden as well as neighboring countries. President Vladimir Putin has amassed nearly 100,000 troops along the border with Ukraine, which Moscow earlier invaded in 2014.
The United States and its European allies have warned Putin that Russia will face severe sanctions and other penalties should he attempt another incursion, and that they will not waver in their military support for Ukraine.
President Joe Biden has indicated, however, that he won’t send American troops to directly fight in that ongoing war.
Bydén, whose country is not part of NATO but works closely with the military alliance, said America should send military reinforcements to Europe if the Russia-Ukraine crisis takes a turn for the worse.
He didn’t define what he meant by that, but responded affirmatively when asked if he’d like to see more U.S. troops in his neighborhood should Russia take the step of once again invading Ukraine.
“If the situation — I wouldn’t say ‘require’ because that’s the wrong word — but if the situation would worsen, I do believe it would be good to have a bigger footprint,” Bydén said.
Asked where the troops should go, the Swede said, “probably where they are today. Because you have bases in Europe. It’s not like you’re not there. It’s more it’s more like… reinforce what you have… More people, more capabilities.”
Sweden does not host any U.S. military bases.
Poland has long been eager to add more U.S. troops to the 5,500 it already hosts under an agreement struck during the Trump administration. Latvia also has appealed for a bigger U.S. presence, either on a rotational basis or permanent, and has suggested it would pay some of the costs to base them there.
Bydén declined to say how many more troops the United States should send. He also declined to give details about his meetings with U.S. officials and what each side pledged to the other.
Asked for comment, a Pentagon spokesperson said: “The Department of Defense and the Sweden Ministry of Defense enjoy long-standing cooperation as highlighted in the 2016 Bilateral Statement of Intent. We also enjoy strong trilateral cooperation with Sweden and Finland, both of which are Nordic NATO Enhanced Opportunity Partners.”
The Swedish military leader stressed that European countries should step up their own coordination and actions in the event of a Russian move against Ukraine. But when asked if Sweden would join NATO, he noted that was not in his country’s current government’s plans.
“If we show that we are able to take care of what we should do, the chance to get support from [the] U.S. to a greater extent, more, a bigger footprint in Europe, I think… the chance would be much better,” he said.
“I don’t take it for granted,” he added. “But the support from your country, the relationship, it’s one of the most important parts also for European security.”
Bydén expressed confidence in the ongoing intelligence sharing between the United States and his country. He also said he believes the United States is capable of maintaining strong ties with Europe even as it infuses more resources toward dealing with an increasingly assertive China.
“It’s not either/or for us,” he said. “And I wouldn’t expect the U.S. just to withdraw from Europe because of China, but it’s obvious that you also need to put more effort in that part of the world. I think you can do both.”
He also noted that China and Russia appear to be deepening their military relationship. “We see more of it than before, and it’s a very good question how far they have come,” he said.
Paul McLeary contributed to this report.
10. Biden’s Stand on Ukraine Is a Wider Test of U.S. Credibility Abroad
Yes it is.
Biden’s Stand on Ukraine Is a Wider Test of U.S. Credibility Abroad
News Analysis
President Barack Obama also warned of severe consequences if Russia took action against its neighbor. Vladimir Putin annexed Crimea anyway.
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President Biden has warned Russia not to send the troops it has amassed along Ukraine’s eastern border into the country.Credit...Associated Press
By
Dec. 16, 2021
WASHINGTON — The American president had issued a stern warning to Russia’s leader, Vladimir V. Putin: Keep your troops out of Ukraine, or face harsh economic reprisals.
The warning went unheeded. Two weeks after that call, from President Barack Obama, Russian special forces moved into Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula and, after a dubious local referendum, Mr. Putin claimed it as Russian territory.
That was March 2014. More than seven years later, President Biden is now the one threatening Mr. Putin with “severe consequences” should Russia send some of the tens of thousands of troops it has massed along Ukraine’s eastern border into the country.
Mr. Biden hopes to have more influence over Mr. Putin through an explicit threat to take more punishing economic action than Mr. Obama did after the annexation of Crimea, and Mr. Putin’s subsequent instigation of a separatist insurgency in eastern Ukraine that has since left as many as 13,000 people dead.
There is no guarantee that Mr. Putin will listen any more carefully this time, particularly given that Mr. Biden has ruled out direct U.S. military action. And the stakes are even higher: Another failure to deter Mr. Putin, Biden officials and their critics agree, would deal a severe blow to an international system of rules and borders that the administration has worked hard to reaffirm in the wake of President Donald J. Trump’s “America First” foreign policy, which raised questions about how far the United States would go to defend its allies and enforce its vision of international rules.
Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken made that point in a Dec. 12 appearance on NBC’s “Meet the Press,” arguing that the current crisis is about more than Ukraine’s sovereignty. Mr. Blinken said that “there is something even bigger at stake here, and it’s the basic rules of the road of the international system — rules that say that one country can’t change the borders of another by force.”
But Mr. Obama said much the same in 2014, warning “that in the 21st century, the borders of Europe cannot be redrawn with force, that international law matters.” Mr. Putin paid little attention to such talk when he seized Crimea and spoke passionately — as he does now about all of Ukraine — of the region’s historical ties to Russia.
Compounding the challenge for Mr. Biden is the possibility that Mr. Putin may perceive American weakness after Mr. Biden’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, which critics say signaled waning U.S. resolve overseas.
Richard Fontaine, the chief executive of the nonpartisan Center for a New American Security, said the standoff amounted to a test of American credibility.
“If the United States says, ‘Don’t do this, you will regret it, there will be very serious costs,’ and the Russians do it anyway, it does raise questions about America’s ability to achieve outcomes, at least in the Russian immediate periphery,” he said.
To counter such dangers, members of Congress and former U.S. officials are urging Mr. Biden to bolster his economic threats by sending more military aid to Kyiv right away as a deterrent. At the same time, they are imploring him to resist any hint that he is accommodating the Russian leader in hopes of making the crisis quietly go away.
“Vladimir Putin has invaded two democratic neighbors in just over a decade. Letting him do it a third time would set the global system back decades,” said James R. Stavridis, a retired four-star Navy admiral who served as the supreme allied commander at NATO. “Appeasement does not work any better now than it worked for Neville Chamberlain in the late 1930s.”
Biden officials are clearly sensitive to such fears, particularly from Ukraine and other Eastern European nations. Those alarms were stoked the day after the American president’s two-hour call with Mr. Putin on Dec. 7. Mr. Biden told reporters that he wanted to “discuss the future of Russia’s concerns relative to NATO writ large, and whether or not we can work out any accommodations as it relates to bringing down the temperature along the eastern front.”
President Biden spoke with President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine last week.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times
In a video posted on Twitter from Kyiv this week, Karen Donfried, the State Department’s assistant secretary for European and Eurasian affairs, confronted head-on the idea that Washington might meet Mr. Putin’s demands, which include legal guarantees that NATO will never station offensive weapons on Ukraine’s soil or admit the country into the military alliance.
“The notion that we would push Ukraine to make concessions in discussions and dialogue with Russia is pure disinformation and should be treated as such,” Ms. Donfried said. She was in Kyiv for meetings before heading on to Moscow.
In another video message from Moscow on Wednesday, Ms. Donfried said she had met there with Russian officials, including the deputy Russian foreign minister, Sergey A. Ryabkov, “to share Moscow’s proposals on European security.” Ms. Donfried said she would relay the ideas to Washington as well as to NATO allies during a stop in Brussels this week.
Some critics of the Afghanistan withdrawal also objected to Mr. Biden’s decision to waive some congressional sanctions against the Nord Stream 2 project, a natural gas pipeline from Russia to Germany.
“I strongly urge President Biden not to make concessions at the expense of our strategic partner Ukraine in response to the Putin regime’s provocative military buildup,” Representative Mike McCaul of Texas, the top Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said in a statement.
“This would not only fail to de-escalate tensions, it would also embolden Vladimir Putin and his fellow autocrats by demonstrating the United States will surrender in the face of saber-rattling,” Mr. McCaul added. “Particularly in the aftermath of the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Nord Stream 2 capitulation, U.S. credibility from Kyiv to Taipei cannot withstand another blow of this nature.”
There is some evidence that Russia sees things this way. Days after the fall of Kabul in August, Nikolai Patrushev, the head of the Kremlin’s Security Council, told the Russian newspaper Izvestia that “a similar situation awaits those who are banking on America in Ukraine.”
“Did the fact that Afghanistan having the status of a main U.S. ally outside of NATO save the ousted pro-American regime in Kabul?” Mr. Patrushev asked.
And Maxim Samorukov, a fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center, wrote in an analysis published last week that Mr. Putin had threatened Mr. Biden with “an especially humiliating rerun of recent events in Afghanistan.”
Afghanistan showed Mr. Biden’s desire “to scale back U.S. commitments in order to adapt his foreign policy to new global realities,” Mr. Samorukov said. “In the Kremlin’s view, it is now time for the United States to make a similar rational choice about Ukraine.”
Then there is China, which U.S. officials warn has been equipping and training for a possible invasion of Taiwan, which Beijing considers a rogue province, sometime in the coming years.
“China will be watching U.S. support to Ukraine, and it will inform their calculus regarding Taiwan,” Mr. Stavridis said. “All the more reason we need to support Ukraine with intelligence, cyber, defensive but lethal weapons, economic sanctions and — above all — alliance solidarity.”
But at least one prominent China expert doubts that Beijing will infer much from either the U.S. exit from Afghanistan or America’s response to Mr. Putin over Ukraine.
“I think the Chinese would be ill-advised to assume that if the United States did not intervene militarily in a Ukraine crisis, that means the United States would not intervene militarily in a Taiwan crisis,” said Bonnie Glaser, the director of the Asia program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. “They really are different.”
11. Pakistani Taliban emir says his group “is a branch of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”
Excerpts:
Lastly, Mujahid demanded Pakistan to “look into their [TTP’s] demands for the better of the region and Pakistan.”
The Afghan Taliban has good reasons for separating itself from the TTP at this moment in time.
The Afghan Taliban is mediating peace talks between the TTP and the Pakistani government, which supported the Afghan Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan. The Pakistan Taliban’s video and claim came just days before the group also officially rejected the ceasefire with the Pakistani state.
Additionally, the Afghan Taliban is attempting to secure the release of funds frozen after the fall of the previous government in order to finance its nascent government. Admitting close ties with the TTP would sabotage both efforts.
Pakistani Taliban emir says his group “is a branch of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” | FDD's Long War Journal
TTP emir Noor Wali Mehsud addresses Pakistanis in a video.
The leader of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan (TTP) said that his group “is a branch of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” during a tour of several of the group’s bases across Pakistan’s tribal areas and northern districts.
The Afghan Taliban, however, has denied Mehsud’s statement.
TTP emir Noor Wali Mehsud made the statement in a nearly hour-long video that documented his entourage’s travels in a large military convoy across what the TTP claims is significant swaths of Pakistan’s northern areas. The large TTP convoy openly flew its flag in broad daylight while traveling through the countryside.
The large TTP convoy openly flies its flag while traveling throughout the countryside.
According to the video, the Taliban emir visited TTP headquarters in various districts and towns of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, including: Malakand, Bajaur, Peshawar, Mardan, Khyber, Dara Adamkhel, and Hazara.
Peshawar is the provincial capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Bajaur is one of several TTP strongholds in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Many of the areas visited by Mehsud were controlled at one time by the TTP between 2007 and 2012.
Hundreds of TTP members and fighters can be seen throughout the video, including dozens riding on Afghan police vehicles in Mehsud’s convoy.
One of several police vehicles from the now-defunct Afghan National Police.
If the video was recorded in Afghanistan, it is yet further evidence of the close relationship between the TTP and the Afghan Taliban. Several top level TTP leaders were killed or captured in Afghanistan before the Afghan Taliban seized control of the country on Aug. 15, 2021. Thousands of TTP fighters fought alongside the Afghan Taliban during its campaign to conquer the country.
If the video was recorded in Pakistan, which is far more likely, it is evidence that the TTP is not as weak as claimed by the Pakistani military and government, which is currently attempting to negotiate a peace deal with the terror group.
At each TTP group headquarters, Mehsud can be seen greeting and praying with his fighters before preaching to the men. One speech, in particular, however, stands out.
At one point in the video, Mehsud very clearly stated that “the [TTP] is a branch of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan [the Taliban’s name for itself] and is part of that umbrella on this land.” He continued by saying that the TTP will fight until Pakistan, like Afghanistan, is also under Shari’a law.
Mehsud’s comment is unsurprising. The jihadist leader reaffirmed his allegiance to Afghan Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada earlier this year following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban never rejected Mehsud’s oath of allegiance.
Other jihadist groups in the region, including the majority ethnic Uzbek Islamic Jihad Union, which has fought alongside the Afghan Taliban, have celebrated Mehsud’s statement on social media.
The Afghan Taliban, however, has insisted on downplaying Mehsud’s comment. Zabihullah Mujahid, the official spokesman of the Taliban, officially rejected Mehsud’s comment in an interview with Arab News late last week.
“They are not, as an organization, part of [the Islamic Emirate] and we don’t share the same objectives,” Mujahid said. “We advise TTP to focus on peace and stability in their country. This is very important so they can prevent any chance for enemies to interfere in the region and in Pakistan.”
Lastly, Mujahid demanded Pakistan to “look into their [TTP’s] demands for the better of the region and Pakistan.”
The Afghan Taliban has good reasons for separating itself from the TTP at this moment in time.
The Afghan Taliban is mediating peace talks between the TTP and the Pakistani government, which supported the Afghan Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan. The Pakistan Taliban’s video and claim came just days before the group also officially rejected the ceasefire with the Pakistani state.
Additionally, the Afghan Taliban is attempting to secure the release of funds frozen after the fall of the previous government in order to finance its nascent government. Admitting close ties with the TTP would sabotage both efforts.
Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD's Long War Journal.
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12. FDD | Exploiting America’s Declining Pressure: Iran’s Nuclear Escalation Over Time
FDD | Exploiting America’s Declining Pressure: Iran’s Nuclear Escalation Over Time
Behnam Ben Taleblu
Senior Fellow
Andrea Stricker
Research Fellow
Iran’s nuclear advances have grown in scale and scope since it began overtly violating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2019. As the timeline below indicates, Tehran has made its most significant nuclear moves since the election of President Joe Biden, who has softened U.S. policy toward Iran and seeks re-entry into the JCPOA. Many of these steps, such as enriching uranium to 20 and 60 percent purity, producing uranium metal, and operating advanced centrifuges, provide Iran with irreversible knowledge relevant to atomic weapons production. In addition to sanctions relief, Tehran now appears to seek nuclear-threshold status, a position that may render other states unable or unwilling to prevent Iran from producing a nuclear weapon should it decide to do so.
Sources
POLITICAL TIMELINE:
NUCLEAR TIMELINE:
13. France wants to transform its 'beautiful' army for high-intensity warfare
"He, general or mere captain, who employs every one in the storming of a position can be sure of seeing it retaken by an organized counterattack of four men and a corporal."
- Ardant du Picq
"If one does not wish bonds broken, one should make them elastic and thereby strengthen them."
- Ardant du Picq
"The instruments of battle are valuable only if one knows how to use them."
- Ardant du Picq
"A force engaged is out of the hand of its commander."
- Ardant du Picq
"Frederick liked to say that three men behind the enemy were worth fifty in front of him."
-Ardant du Picq
France wants to transform its 'beautiful' army for high-intensity warfare - Breaking Defense
As Gen. Eric Laval recently put it, "Today the French Army is beautiful, but in a high intensity conflict, would it be able to hold beyond 48 hours?"
French soldiers participate in a training exercise in late 2021. (French Army)
PARIS: Just as the US military has come to understand that the ‘’long wars’’ of Iraq and Afghanistan diverted forces from training for future full-spectrum peer-to-peer conflicts, the French military has been increasingly warning about the risks involved with two decades of heavy focus on overseas operations at the expense of incoming threats.
So it is no surprise that in his first national assembly testimony as Chief of staff of the French armed forces, Gen. Thierry Burkhard in October forcefully stressed the necessity for France to ‘’win the war before the war’’ and to be ready for high intensity warfare.
How that actually happens, of course, is the bigger question.
The current 2019-2025 program law, meant to catch up with the renewal of French armed forces equipment across the board, has been considered by many to be a good start towards refocusing France’s military. In an Oct. 7 presentation of the Army new capabilities at Versailles-Satory (referred to as PCAT 2021 for Présentation des capacités de l’armée de Terre), the new Chief of the French Army, Gen. Pierre Schill, referred to the current process of transformation as the “most important modernization undergone since World War II.”
However, given the recent evolution of the geostrategic environment, French military chiefs all advocate that there is a need to rebalance quality with quantity. No future peer-to-peer conflict will be won without operational superiority, they argue, which today has to mix modern high technology, digitalization, AI, robots while maintaining a more traditional mass of people and equipment.
In a recent study by the French think tank IFRI (French Institute for International Relations) entitled “Mass in the French armed forces: a challenge for high intensity,” the authors highlight the fact that “between 1999 and 2014, European countries have shrunk their tank fleet by 66%, their fighters’ by 45% and their surface fleets’ by 25%.”
France is no different. In fact, during the 30 year period between 1991 and 2021, the number of battle tanks dropped from 1,349 to 222, the number of fighters from 686 to 254, the number of large surface ships from 41 to 19 and its active-duty manpower from 453,000 to 203,000, the study points out.
The end-result is that Operation Barkhane, an operation meant to fight terrorism in Sahel that has run since 2014, with 5,100 French troops and 76% of French Army equipment deployed in operation, tends to divert resources and time away from properly preparing for larger and tougher contingencies. In the past six years, the French Army has been losing two war-damaged vehicles a month and having a hard time keeping readiness rates at the required levels.
If applied in a context of high intensity peer-to-peer conflict, such a level of attrition could lead to some real nightmare scenarios, according to the FED 2021 (for Forum Entreprise Défense), held on this issue at Versailles-Satory Army base Oct. 13-14. When the Army did its early planning for “a symmetric division level engagement for a period of six months,” it found very strong and rapid attrition rates with “36% of the deployed equipment destroyed each month” and — not surprisingly — the inability of the support system to repair and provide spares fast enough to be able to win.
The commander of French Army military schools (Ecoles militaires de Bourges et Ecole du Matériel), Gen. Eric Laval, wonders whether the French armed forces would be able to last more than 48 hours in a high intensity conflict.
”Today the French Army is beautiful, but in a high intensity conflict, would it be able to hold beyond 48 hours? High intensity would imply potentially very tough battles which could last between 72 to 96 hours and which we are not allowed to lose,” he said at FED. Support and maintenance in such an environment will have to face access denial and enhanced insecurity, he said, adding, “On the frontline it will be necessary to bring back means to the force as fast as possible, and in the rear it will be necessary to remain credible and competitive over time.”
Laval compared the impact of high intensity combat on equipment to the one it could have on human losses, with mass casualties affecting both human and material resources. ”Today a maintenance unit may deal with about 20 equipment immobilized because of lack of spares. In a high intensity scenario, you are talking 40 or 60 damaged pieces of equipment, overwhelming that same unit.’’ To deal with such a forecast, the general identified several potential reforms, including:
- adjusting surge capabilities by including ”reserved means” deployable if/when needed
- improving information feedback from the field via new technologies such as self-diagnostic system or tele-maintenance, via the use of drones, for rare and expensive equipment
- evolving the curriculum of the 3,600 maintainers he teaches each year by throwing in the mix a new ”non-conventional repair kit,” pushing trainees to move quickly. ”From now on, most training programs will end with the following challenge: ‘you have 24-48 hours to fix this equipment. What can you do?’ To win this decisive battle of the 96 hours, we shall need to know how to repair in time, rather than know how to repair well…’’, he concluded in his presentation.
Combined, it’s becoming clear the French military is reflecting on ways to gain strategic depth, including going back to the good old Cold War stock policy and industrial mobilization initiatives, while maintaining its current deployments and ability to fight against asymmetric threats.
Several paths have been identified as a way to start such a process. The director of operations of the Army maintenance Directorate (SIMMT for Structure intégrée du maintien en condition opérationnelle des matériels terrestres), Gen. Olivier Cornefert, pointed out during the FED seminars that the goal was to keep improving the readiness rate with an objective of 72% in 2022 and 75% in 2024 and a yearly volume of regeneration of 1,600 equipment in 2022 and 1,800 in 2024. In order to achieve such “depth,” the solution is to rely increasingly on the defense industrial base. “The private sector should inherit 40% of the hourly industrial maintenance workload by 2024-2025,” he said.
French military forces during a 2021 exercise. (French Army)
The French defense industrial base includes eight large firms and 4,000 small and medium-size firms and is worth €28.5 billion ($32 billion) in terms of revenue, 80% of which is dual-use. According to experts, in case of 1914-like mobilization scenario, activating this dual-use sector would be particularly vital for a surge. Of course, there is still a long way to go given France’s import dependencies and the current long cycles of production. (Currently, it can take three years to build a single missile.) Hence the need for a thorough supply chain analysis, which the COVID-19 crisis has rendered even more relevant.
The latter has however been relatively good news as far as the responsiveness of defense industries and military overall resilience have been concerned. According to Gen. François Mestre, director for industrial affairs at DGA, the French procurement agency (DGA stands for Direction générale de l’armement), Even though the Covid crisis led to a 20% drop in French GDP, industries performed rather well with only a two week period of supply chain issues for the armed forces thanks to a constant dialogue.”
‘’Winning the war before the war’’ not only means preparing to deter and to be ready on D-Day, it also means being able to deal with the new, large variety and mix of symmetric and asymmetric threats. While France has always tried to invest in the ‘’full spectrum’’ of capabilities and be present in multiple theaters from Europe and Africa, to the Middle-East and the Indo-Pacific region, the emerging threats are increasingly hybrid, as the latest Belarus-Polish stalemate illustrates.
New skillsets, whether in the cyber, space or information fields, are being pursued in order to deal with the ever blurry concept of thresholds — the infamous ‘’grey area’’ — and having the ability to de-escalate from contest back to competition is considered the key to prevent high intensity wars to occur.
The French chief of the armed forces describes this paradigm shift as a transition from the old triptic “peace-crisis-war” to “competition-dispute-showdown.” For him, one of the best ways to remain or regain operational superiority over the enemy is to train with allies in high intensity scenario-based exercises, such as Orion 2023, a major joint exercise planned in Champagne-Ardenne with US, Belgian and maybe British armed forces.
14. Washington shouldn't pat itself on the back for its cybersecurity spending just yet
Excerpts:
The infrastructure bill and the BBB Act also missed opportunities to fund similar cybersecurity improvements in the transportation sectors (like pipeline, maritime transport, and aviation) and the healthcare and public health sectors.
The Senate is now considering the BBB Act. Some senators have already indicated their intent to amend the provision heavily. This provides a critical and perhaps final opportunity to address some of these outstanding cybersecurity issues.
The interconnectivity of American critical infrastructures is such that if Washington addresses only select infrastructures (as the Infrastructure Act and the House’s BBB Act have done), it actually does little to reduce the country’s overall vulnerabilities. Let’s hope the Senate can get this right.
Washington shouldn't pat itself on the back for its cybersecurity spending just yet
The Hill · by Retired Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery, opinion contributor · December 16, 2021
October was “cybersecurity awareness month,” but November and December are shaping up to be cybersecurity spending season on Capitol Hill. Last month, the House approved the Build Back Better (BBB) Act, and President Biden signed the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021 into law. Together, these bills contain nearly $2.5 billion in cybersecurity-specific spending, buying some cybersecurity wins — but Congress missed a number of opportunities to improve U.S. critical infrastructure security.
As the BBB Act moves to the Senate, and assuming the Senate clears a path to pass the bill, lawmakers will have an opportunity to address some key cybersecurity gaps.
The White House specifically extolled the infrastructure bill for making “our infrastructure more resilient to the impacts of climate change and cyber-attacks.” For example, the $1 billion grant program to address cybersecurity risks to information systems owned and operated by state and local governments is long overdue. These governments will use the grants to develop and implement cybersecurity plans to address imminent threats. Meanwhile, for the energy sector, there are two $250 million cybersecurity-specific grant programs: one for support to rural and municipal utilities to address known cybersecurity issues, the other for support to developing cybersecurity technologies in the energy sector.
The Infrastructure Act also includes some much-needed policy direction and appropriations for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). These consist of granting authority to the federal government — along with $100 million in financing — to establish a “response and recovery” fund that would provide government assistance to remediate and recover from a significant cyber incident. CISA also receives $35 million in funding for its sector risk management responsibilities and another $157 million for research and development efforts. Finally, the Infrastructure Act provides $21 million in initial funding for the national cyber director, Chris Inglis, to fully staff and equip his office, which Congress created in last year’s National Defense Authorization Act.
The version of the BBB Act passed by the House, meanwhile, funds additional important cybersecurity efforts. Nearly half of its $500 million in cybersecurity funding goes to awareness, education, and training efforts. Specific funding for the Cybersecurity Education and Training Assistance Program (CETAP) and for state and local workforce initiatives is particularly well-deserved. In the past, CISA has underfunded the CETAP effort in its annual budget, relying on “congressional cover” to keep the program running. The BBB Act provides that cover.
An assessment of the two bills’ impact on cybersecurity inevitably comes down to the money. Congressional inclusion of cybersecurity-specific spending in a large omnibus bill is a major win. This development reflects both the severity of the cybersecurity challenges over the past 12 months and the identification of cybersecurity as an important issue by congressional leadership.
However, while the cybersecurity-specific funding in the bills — $2 billion in the Infrastructure Act and another $500 million in the BBB Act — is significant, it constitutes less than 0.1 percent of the total funds provided in these bills. What is missing in the infrastructure bill and the House’s BBB Act are well-funded cybersecurity efforts across other vulnerable critical infrastructures.
The shortcomings are particularly glaring in the water sector. Structurally, the water sector is most similar to the energy sector, with thousands of public utilities involved. Yet the water utilities receive just a fraction of the cybersecurity support that the bills provide to their energy counterparts. Additionally, the Environmental Protection Agency, which is the government lead for water sector utilities, needs significant budget increases in its cybersecurity support programs to hire more personnel and provide increased technical assistance.
Water sector utilities also need access to cybersecurity-specific grant programs that resemble the grants that energy utilities get. The numerous water infrastructure grant programs in the infrastructure bill total nearly $33 billion. However, the bill requires cybersecurity grant requests to compete with funding requests that address climate change, drought, sea level rise, and natural disasters. It should surprise no one that cybersecurity historically does not compete well with requests rooted in emergency scenarios. A cybersecurity carve-out from this large pie would ensure utilities can invest in resolving cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
The Water Information Sharing & Analysis Center and water associations, meanwhile, need funding to continue providing technical assistance to nearly 70,000 utilities. A new report I authored for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies provides specific recommendations for Congress and the executive branch to address these water sector shortcomings.
The infrastructure bill and the BBB Act also missed opportunities to fund similar cybersecurity improvements in the transportation sectors (like pipeline, maritime transport, and aviation) and the healthcare and public health sectors.
The Senate is now considering the BBB Act. Some senators have already indicated their intent to amend the provision heavily. This provides a critical and perhaps final opportunity to address some of these outstanding cybersecurity issues.
The interconnectivity of American critical infrastructures is such that if Washington addresses only select infrastructures (as the Infrastructure Act and the House’s BBB Act have done), it actually does little to reduce the country’s overall vulnerabilities. Let’s hope the Senate can get this right.
Retired Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery is senior director of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (@FDD) and serves as a senior advisor to the co-chairs of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission. FDD is a Washington, D.C.-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy. Follow the author on Twitter @MarkCMontgomery
The Hill · by Retired Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery, opinion contributor · December 16, 2021
15. Cyber Challenges for the New National Defense Strategy
Conclusion:
What might a resilient cyber strategy look like? While a comprehensive take is beyond the scope of this article — indeed, it represents a significant research agenda in its own right — we offer a few initial suggestions for policymakers to consider. First, it would require the joint force to identify the critical functions and processes that are essential for core missions. Second, it would incentivize (and punish) the services for creating highly centralized or exquisite and fragile networks and platforms — recognizing that cyber security is less likely to succeed when these types of capabilities are built. Third, it would require the services to build manual workarounds and back-up solutions to limit adversary impact to critical systems and functions and to prioritize recovery efforts. Finally, a cyber strategy based on resiliency would measure success not by how many attacks occur but instead by the effects of cyber attacks on America’s ability to conduct operations across domains and achieve key military objectives. Together, these initiatives towards resilience would both require and create a more integrated force.
Cyber Challenges for the New National Defense Strategy - War on the Rocks
A major moment for America’s approach for cyberspace might be just around the corner. It’s hard to make a new national defense strategy an exciting watershed, especially when a curious and ill-defined term — “integrated deterrence” — is at the center of it. But skeptics should be a little more open to the idea that the Pentagon is on the verge of pushing out a key idea that could solve many of its struggles in cyberspace. According to defense officials, integrated deterrence includes incorporating military capabilities across domains, theaters, and phases of conflict; rebuilding alliances; and fostering innovation and technological development, all with an eye towards creating a more resilient military. This list sounds good in theory. But, gauging from some expert reactions so far, it’s not clear what successful integration (or deterrence) would look like in practice.
Recently, Assistant Secretary of Defense Mara Karlin emphasized that the Pentagon is “stress-testing ideas…so that everybody knows what we’re talking about.” In the spirit of this stress test and, since the Defense Department has a well-known track record with vague deterrence strategies and neologisms that seem designed to justify defense budgets, below we conduct our own stress test for cyber and the new strategy.
What does integration look like for cyberspace? What will the strategy have to overcome in order to be successful? Is deterrence the right frame for strategic success, or should the new strategy focus more squarely on resilience? The answers to these questions can help guide the Department of Defense as they make the final tweaks to their new strategy and, hopefully, make the United States more successful not just in cyberspace but across domains.
How Would “Integrated Deterrence” Actually Integrate Cyber?
Cyberspace is an important component of the Defense Department’s integrated deterrence efforts. As Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin noted in his remarks, this new strategic approach involves “integrating our efforts across domains and across the spectrum of conflict” as well as “the elimination of stovepipes between services and their capabilities, and coordinated operations on land, in the air, on the sea, in space and in cyberspace.”
So, integrating cyber operations across theaters, domains, and phases of conflict is a good thing. Why does the Department of Defense need a new concept to do this? Cyber operations have been difficult to incorporate into the normal defense planning process. This process, a highly formulaic procedure (usually focused on a single theater) of allotting troops and weapons by phases of conflict, is unwieldy for cyberspace operations. This is because cyber operations struggle with assured access, good estimates of effectiveness or extent of damage, or even certainty about for how long they will work (or even if they will work as intended). Though using a cyber operation, for instance, to blind air defenses before an airstrike sounds good on paper, in practice mission commanders would rather rely on cruise missiles or electronic jamming that can meet time on target needs and have better estimates of effectiveness than cyber operations. Further, cyber accesses for conventional conflicts (for instance, access to an adversary’s weapons networks or military command systems) are difficult to obtain and retain, meaning that cyber capabilities rarely “sit on a shelf” for an extended period, available to use at a whim when an operational plan is executed. That said, substituting cyber for conventional capabilities comes with some unique benefits, such as the temporary and reversible nature of the damage inflicted and the ability to operate in a more deniable fashion. Discerning how to capitalize on these aspects of cyber capabilities while addressing their limitations represents a central challenge for planners.
For years, the solution was to invest in systems (like Cyber Command’s Unified Platform) that were supposed to provide greater certainty about cyber effects. However, these efforts have struggled to create certainty in a domain where uncertainty is a fixture, not a temporary defect. Perhaps, therefore, a better approach is to instead assimilate other domains and capabilities into processes in which cyber operations have been innovative and successful. In particular, event-based task forces increasingly used for cyber events (such as Joint Task Force-Ares or the inter-agency task force to combat election interference) provide an alternative planning mechanism that is dynamic, works across government agencies, and fits nicely within the infamous “phase 0” of competition where most gray zone operations take place (and the joint planning process is notoriously unsatisfying).
Commanders also need to think about cyber effects in conflict as more than just replacements for things they could otherwise do with conventional capabilities. Cyber operations are at their best not when they are designed to create an effect in a moment in time, but instead when they are part of a larger strategy of obfuscation, deception, and sabotage. These can be extremely useful complements to conventional missions but how they are targeted, tasked, and executed will likely not fit best within the “tasking order” cycle or even in service silos that disproportionately focus on single platforms versus network effects.
Finally, planning and process integration will ultimately fail if the Defense Department does not make good on innovation. Currently, the program of record and acquisition process makes acquiring cyber capabilities (especially on the defensive side where commercial software solutions far outpace the Department of Defense) extremely difficult. Software, unlike most defense acquisition widgets, requires constant development, patching, and updating — all tasks the current acquisition process is not designed to accommodate. Even worse is the Pentagon’s record of investing in software through research or small businesses and getting it across the valley of death and implemented on its own networks. Further, the lack of information technology integration between the armed services means that networks, software, even data are owned and more often than not administered separately by each service. This is a nightmare for acquiring cyber capabilities — whether defensive or offensive — and large enterprise-wide solutions (even from Cyber Command) are almost impossible to implement without an advocate from one of the armed services spearheading the effort.
Challenges (and Opportunities) of Alliances
Integrated deterrence goes beyond what is already a very difficult challenge of making cyberspace work better within the U.S. military. Alliances also seem to play a huge role in the Department of Defense’s new deterrence concept. As Undersecretary of Defense Colin Kahl explained, the new strategy requires that the Department of Defense be “integrated across our allies and partners, which are the real asymmetric advantage that the United States has over any other competitor or potential adversary.”
Cyberspace presents a unique challenge for alliances. For years, Washington’s traditional alliance relationships struggled to even agree on basic cyber terms and attempts to share information were complicated by cyber operations’ close relationship with the highly classified world of signals intelligence. Moreover, U.S. actions in cyberspace have, in some cases, strained alliance relationships. Two prominent examples include the backlash over the Edward Snowden leaks as well as concerns about the implications of persistent engagement and defend forward for allied-owned networks.
These were considerable challenges. However, as cyber incidents have escalated over the last few years, there has also been an increasing recognition across these relationships that cyberspace matters. This joint recognition spurred new information-sharing mechanisms and partner efforts to find and root out adversary infiltration attempts on allied networks. Most recently, joint attribution by NATO and E.U. partners called out China for the Microsoft Exchange Hack — a rare reaction from these organizations. This comes on the heels of public statements at the NATO summit in Geneva in June that reaffirmed the applicability of the mutual defense clause of the alliance agreement to cyberspace. Further, despite the aforementioned alliance tensions, the Defense Department has conducted 24 “hunt forward” operations in which U.S. cyber protection teams partnered with 14 countries to root out adversary activity on allied networks.
Building on this forward momentum, perhaps the greatest opportunity for the Biden administration’s national defense strategy is to use military alliances and partnerships to facilitate norm development. Norms are shared understandings about appropriate behavior. Some norms are written down and formalized in agreements, while others are more informal and emerge as a result of state practice over time. Moreover, norms are agnostic with respect to morality: there could be “good” norms that facilitate cooperation, but also “bad” norms that make the international system less stable.
In the past, particularly under the Obama administration, norms were considered the realm of the State Department while the Department of Defense focused on deterrence by punishment and denial. This changed under the Trump administration, when the State Department’s norms efforts took a back seat to Department of Defense efforts to defend forward. The initial foundational work done by the Obama administration on cyber norms, paired with four years of experimentation and more risk-acceptant cyber authorities under the Trump administration, have created a track record for cyber norms that is far more heterogeneous than policymakers have let on. While there are certainly many areas where states disagree, norms do exist in cyberspace. For instance, a diverse set of states — beyond just the United States and “like minded” nations — has come to formal agreements about “rules of the road” for cyberspace through various international institution-driven processes, most notably the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts and the Open-Ended Working Group. To the surprise of many observers, earlier this year both of these processes resulted in consensus reports where parties agreed to a set of cyber norms. And from a bilateral perspective, rivals such as Russia have been willing to engage the United States in discussions about cyber norms, even if the prospects for cooperation remain uncertain. And beyond formalized agreements, there is a range of unwritten, implied norms that shape mutual expectations of behavior in cyberspace. These include a firebreak between cyber and conventional operations, such that states to not respond to cyber attacks with the use of kinetic military force; the idea that cyber espionage is generally treated as other forms of espionage (with some exceptions); and a pattern of tit-for-tat responses in cyberspace that have led to a nascent sense of what counts as “proportional.”
The Defense Department plays a large role in this process — though in the past this hasn’t been a formal effort. Specifically, how the Department of Defense uses its own cyber capabilities or threatens to respond to cyber capabilities can play an outsized role in whether cyberspace norms proliferate. Some have argued that employing military cyber power can, through a tacit process, contribute to the development of cyber norms. However, the ambiguous signaling strategies that this line of argument generates are often overly complicated and obtuse. Strategic documents are some of the clearest articulations of norms that adversaries receive. Given that, the U.S. military should use the opportunity of a new national defense strategy to voice clearly what the U.S. believes are appropriate norms of behavior in cyberspace. In particular, it should consider making unambiguous statements about what the Pentagon won’t do in cyberspace — in effect, a declaratory policy of restraint. This may be as important to norm propagation as efforts by the State Department to codify international agreements.
Are the Assumptions Correct?
We have previewed what integrated deterrence might look like in practice and how difficult it can be to actually integrate. Knowing whether deterrence can work is even more difficult. For cyber, we are concerned that previews of cyber deterrence assumptions rest on shaky assumptions. In particular, Austin’s remarks about the strategic environment in cyberspace suggest some faulty assumptions about escalation and deterrence in cyberspace. Austin described cyberspace as a domain in which “norms of behavior aren’t well established and the risks of escalation and miscalculation are high.” Implied in this statement is a link between the former and the latter — in other words, one of the reasons cyberspace may be a dangerous domain is due to the purported absence of meaningful norms of behavior. However, this is problematic for two reasons.
First, (as we alluded to before) cyberspace is not an ungoverned “Wild West” bereft of norms. When U.S. policymakers lament the absence of norms in cyberspace (or in other domains), they almost always mean the lack of norms that the United States perceives to be in its own interests or consistent with its values — but this does not mean that norms do not exist.
Second, despite fears among scholars and practitioners, there is little empirical support for the notion that cyberspace is a uniquely escalatory domain (or that cyber operations are effective signals for cross-domain deterrence). Academics have systematically explored this question through deductive analysis, wargames, and statistical analysis and rarely find evidence of escalation from cyberspace to violence. The reality is that escalation in cyberspace is neither rampant, nor wholly impossible — that’s because escalation is an inherently political phenomenon driven by the perceptions and risk calculations of adversarial actors. Therefore, sweeping pronouncements about cyber escalation do little to aid policymakers in developing reasonable assessments of escalation risks (and may actually handcuff otherwise useful below-violent options for decision-makers).
Assumptions matter because they guide strategy development and implementation, even if not explicitly. Therefore, reexamining long-held but erroneous understandings of the nature of strategic competition in cyberspace can provide a stronger basis for discerning how to incorporate cyber operations into defense strategy. Specifically, policymakers should set aside truisms about cyber escalation and instead focus on more granular discussions about a set of plausible scenarios that could give rise to different forms of escalation risks, and the mitigation strategies that follow from them.
Looking Ahead: Resilience!
Finally, Austin’s speech hints at what we see as a compelling opportunity to reimagine cyber strategy in a resilience context, potentially making progress in an environment of seemingly intractable debates among policymakers about the feasibility of cyber deterrence. The main difference between strategies of resilience versus other strategies that focus on deterrence or even defense is that resilience is about perseverance over time while responding to disruptive attacks. Whereas deterrence fails when states attack, resilience assumes that states will attack but instead predicates success on the ability to absorb these attacks and recoup, retrench, and conduct sustained campaigns. One of the limitations of previous cyber strategy has been the caging of ideas like persistent engagement in offensive or defensive language. Instead, the value of persistence is in resilience and survival.
What might a resilient cyber strategy look like? While a comprehensive take is beyond the scope of this article — indeed, it represents a significant research agenda in its own right — we offer a few initial suggestions for policymakers to consider. First, it would require the joint force to identify the critical functions and processes that are essential for core missions. Second, it would incentivize (and punish) the services for creating highly centralized or exquisite and fragile networks and platforms — recognizing that cyber security is less likely to succeed when these types of capabilities are built. Third, it would require the services to build manual workarounds and back-up solutions to limit adversary impact to critical systems and functions and to prioritize recovery efforts. Finally, a cyber strategy based on resiliency would measure success not by how many attacks occur but instead by the effects of cyber attacks on America’s ability to conduct operations across domains and achieve key military objectives. Together, these initiatives towards resilience would both require and create a more integrated force.
Erica Lonergan, Ph.D., is an assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute and a research scholar in the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. The views expressed in this article are personal and do not reflect the policy or position of any U.S. government organization or entity. Follow her on Twitter @eborghard.
Jacquelyn Schneider, Ph.D., is a Hoover Fellow at Stanford University and an affiliate at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. Follow her on Twitter @jackiegschneid.
16. Strategic Outpost Brings You Santa’s 2021 National Security Gift List
Strategic Outpost Brings You Santa’s 2021 National Security Gift List - War on the Rocks
Happy Christmas to all my favorite national security nerds! Sadly, it’s been yet another “year from you-know-where” with troubles and tragedies seemingly gripping us at every corner. Even Santa’s “ho-ho-ho” is getting a little shaky. But that’s why we have to step back at this time of year, take a deep breath, and find some ways to help each other smile, and maybe even chuckle out loud a bit during this special season.
The elves reminded me how much you enjoyed the past leaks from my top secret holiday shopping list for all of those naughty and nice members of your community. I know everyone really loves getting the coolest new toys and latest hot gizmos from Santa, but with all the supply chain headaches this year, I’ve had to focus on items that are already in our warehouse here at the North Pole. Like most of you, I’m still working on a few of my last-minute gifts, but here goes:
Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Since you’ve made clear that China is your top priority, Santa has just what you need: a copy of Milton Bradley’s 1965 classic board game “Hit the Beach!” Airplanes, warships, and troops assaulting small defended islands in the Pacific — what could be more useful? And all that analog gameplay will help you immensely when the U.S. military’s hi-tech command and control system crashes or gets spoofed by a future adversary. (Just make sure that your staff updates the rules so that they don’t accidentally replay a World War II attack against Japan!)
National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. One year ago, The Economist loudly proclaimed “Jake Sullivan to the rescue,” and dubbed you “the Democrats’ foreign-policy golden boy.” Yet just a couple of weeks ago, the New York Times wrote a feature story about your status as a fallen star under a headline that included the word schadenfreude. Santa has just the fix: A case of professional-grade silver polish, guaranteed to remove that pesky first-year tarnish and restore your always-the-brightest-person-in-the-room luster! You’ll also find some Eye Concealer for Men in your stocking, to help cover up those growing bags under your eyes. Hang in there!
Secretary of State Antony Blinken. I know, I know…who? Most of you have barely heard of Tony Blinken, much less that he is leading U.S. diplomacy all around the world. But that might be because he doesn’t have any help, since the State Department is still waiting for the Senate to confirm more than 70 ambassadors — including those for such obscure backwaters like China, France, India, and Japan. So Santa will be giving Senators Ted Cruz, Josh Hawley, and Marco Rubio a package of the most competitive three-person board games, to encourage them to release all their ambassadorial holds and focus on beating each other rather than paralyzing the nation’s diplomacy.
Russian President Vladimir Putin. What’s the right gift for a man who perpetually stays at the top of Santa’s naughty list? Since you snag most of your own gifts (often by force), Santa is hoping to soothe your anger, and convince you to stay within your own borders, with a deluxe Staycation Spa Day gift box.
General Secretary Xi Jinping. On the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, Santa knows you’re having a pretty awesome year. But 2022 may not be as good for you, since the abysmal Chinese men’s hockey team is about to embarrass itself on the world stage. Despite spending millions, hiring international coaches, and luring players of Chinese descent from around the world, its pitiful international ranking remains stuck at 32nd — and the team just narrowly escaped being disqualified from the Beijing Winter Olympics despite the usual automatic bid for the host country. And now you’re facing almost-certain humiliation, since the team is stuck in a group with top-ranked Canada, the United States, and Germany. So, Santa has quietly arranged for you to add a secret new member to your squad. He’s a versatile and experienced guy who can both coach and play, and can still deliver one of the meanest checks on the ice: former Princeton hockey player and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley. But you must keep this top secret — he’s already gotten in trouble for even talking with you guys!
Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville. Okay, that Army-Navy game didn’t turn out quite like you had planned. But Santa’s been watching what you’ve been up to in the real world, and is really excited about your new idea of an Arctic brigade combat team! Now you need a superstar commander to lead it, and I have just the guy for you! Someone who knows the High North like the back of his crinkly hand and has always hankered for command: Santa himself! Look, I may be a bit out of shape, but I can bring my own reindeer recon platoon and I’m available to work every day of the year but Christmas! Whaddya say?
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday. It’s good to see that rosy holiday glow in your cheeks again after that upset football victory over Army, but Santa hasn’t forgotten your worst moment of the year: almost losing a $3 billion Seawolf submarine that plowed into an underwater Pacific mountain. Really? So here is Santa’s gift for you this year: a new submarine design, based on the SSRN Seaview from Voyage to the Bottom of the Sea (the greatest submarine television series ever!). Check out the panoramic glass bow and its awesome undersea visibility! No way you are gonna drive into a South China Sea seamount with those big front windows! Make sure this feature gets built into your newest subs pronto!
Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. David Berger. Santa’s been impressed with all the changes you’ve been painfully forcing upon the Marine Corps to bring it into this century. Your latest initiative on changing Talent Management in the Marine Corps has the potential to be one of the most revolutionary — including bringing in an older, more diverse cohort of recruits. Your plan to overhaul recruit training and “treat people like human beings instead of inventory” really caught Santa’s eye. So this year, you’ll be getting enough yoga mats, incense, and scented candles to furnish your famously harsh boot camps at Parris Island and Camp Pendleton, to help implement your considerate new focus on the individual marine!
Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen. Charles Q. Brown, Jr. We know that the Space Force was created before your tenure, but that you (and lots of your airmen) are still grieving over the loss of that high-visibility mission — and especially the resources that go with it! So, Santa will be dropping off Adele’s new album, 30. It’s all about going through a breakup and divorce, and trying to reemerge stronger on the other side. It will help you sort through all those complex feelings to help you develop a better relationship with your ex.
Chief of Space Operations Gen. John “Jay” Raymond. Okay, Santa is really sorry he confused you with General Naird last year. But I’ll definitely make up for it by getting you the biggest, best-est present of all this season: a Bird 1 multi-stage rocket and orbiter from James Bond’s 1967 film You Only Live Twice. This awesome baby slides up to enemy spacecraft and wraps its giant arms around them to suck them inside to their doom. Since your space buddies in Beijing and Moscow seem to be blasting way out in front with their anti-satellite capabilities, Santa wants you to get hopping on this bandwagon quick!
Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Karl Schultz. Melting icecaps, rising sea levels, coastal flooding, crazy storm patterns, stronger hurricanes — you’re gonna be one busy dude! Santa is not happy about wearing short sleeves at the North Pole in December, so this year the elves are working on getting you a big budget increase and a whole lot of new Coasties in the ranks (hear that, Congress?). You and your folks are going to be in ultra-high demand for as long into the future as I can see. Just make sure to come say hi when you’re floating around the newly navigable waters of the High North!
U.S. Cyber Command Commander Gen. Paul Nakasone. Well, even Santa knows that it’s been a banner year for bad actors in cyberspace. And yes, I know that everything that happens in that domain is not your problem, but…come on! A ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline that shuts down U.S. oil distribution on the East Coast? Holy reindeer crap! So here’s my special gift to bring you up to speed in cyber security: an institutional subscription to 1Password, to replace all those supposedly strong passwords in your command that are actually just Cybercom1234. You’re welcome.
U.S. Central Command Commander Gen. Frank McKenzie. With no more troops in Afghanistan, and the Pentagon seriously focusing on China, you now have a whole lot of time on your hands! Who woulda thought that even a year ago? Santa has just the gift for you: The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy! So what if it’s a thousand pages long and weighs almost four pounds? Use your new free time and wide-open schedule to learn how to win friends and gain influence in the region without using up most of the Defense Department’s military resources! You could even form a study group with U.S. Southern Command Commander Gen. Laura Richardson, who has to live that way all the time. Enjoy!
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Commander Adm. John Aquilino. Looking out to the Western Pacific, even Santa can see that you have a big problem with the time-space continuum out there — you just can’t get a lot of your stuff there nearly as quickly as the other guy. So, Santa has just the right gift: the warp drive from the Starship Enterprise that suspends the laws of physics! Get this baby working and — zap! Four carrier strike groups from San Diego to the South China Sea just like that! Or — wham! The whole Marine Corps occupying the first island chain! That’s the only way that Santa can help you overcome the otherwise mind-blowing predicament of time and distance you’ve got in the Western Pacific. Good luck!
And that’s it for this year’s holiday season! I hope you enjoy Santa’s light-hearted picks for your favorite national security luminaries this year and find ways to share our holiday joy with all of the special elves throughout your world. This year in particular, we all need to share a smile, a laugh, and a bit of joy with those around us. So from all of us here at the slushy North Pole (and from your loyal Strategic Outpost columnists), we hope you have a safe, healthy, and joyous 2021 holiday season!
Yours in social distancing,
Santa
Lt. Gen. David W. Barno, U.S. Army (ret.) and Dr. Nora Bensahel are visiting professors of strategic studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and senior fellows at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies. They are also contributing editors at War on the Rocks, where their column appears regularly. Sign up for Barno and Bensahel’s Strategic Outpost newsletter to track their articles as well as their public events.
17. A World Without Trust - The Insidious Cyberthreat
Excerpts:
Will cyberattacks ever cause the kind of serious physical effects that were feared over the last two decades? Will a strategy focused more on trust and resilience leave states uniquely vulnerable to this? It is of course impossible to say that no cyberattack will ever produce large-scale physical effects similar to those that resulted from the bombing of Pearl Harbor. But it is unlikely—because the nature of cyberspace, its virtual, transient, and ever-changing character, makes it difficult for attacks on it to create lasting physical effects. Strategies that focus on trust and resilience by investing in networks and relationships make these kinds of attacks yet more difficult. Therefore, focusing on building networks that can survive incessant, smaller attacks has a fortuitous byproduct: additional resilience against one-off, large-scale attacks. But this isn’t easy, and there is a significant tradeoff in both efficiency and cost for strategies that focus on resilience, redundancy, and perseverance over convenience or deterring and defeating cyberthreats. And the initial cost of these measures to foster trust falls disproportionately on democracies, which must cultivate generalized trust, as opposed to the particularized trust that autocracies rely on for power. This can seem like a tough pill to swallow, especially as China and the United States appear to be racing toward an increasingly competitive relationship.
Despite the difficulties and the cost, democracies and modern economies (such as the United States) must prioritize building trust in the systems that make societies run—whether that’s the electric grid, banks, schools, voting machines, or the media. That means creating backup plans and fail-safes, making strategic decisions about what should be online or digital and what needs to stay analog or physical, and building networks—both online and in society—that can survive even when one node is attacked. If a stolen password can still take out an oil pipeline or a fake social media account can continue to sway the political opinions of thousands of voters, then cyberattacks will remain too lucrative for autocracies and criminal actors to resist. Failing to build in more resilience—both technical and human—will mean that the cycle of cyberattacks and the distrust they give rise to will continue to threaten the foundations of democratic society.
A World Without Trust
The Insidious Cyberthreat
When sounding the alarm over cyberthreats, policymakers and analysts have typically employed a vocabulary of conflict and catastrophe. As early as 2001, James Adams, a co-founder of the cybersecurity firm iDefense, warned in these pages that cyberspace was “a new international battlefield,” where future military campaigns would be won or lost. In subsequent years, U.S. defense officials warned of a “cyber–Pearl Harbor,” in the words of then Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, and a “cyber 9/11,” according to then Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano. In 2015, James Clapper, then the director of national intelligence, said the United States must prepare for a “cyber Armageddon” but acknowledged it was not the most likely scenario. In response to the threat, officials argued that cyberspace should be understood as a “domain” of conflict, with “key terrain” that the United States needed to take or defend.
The 20 years since Adams’s warning have revealed that cyberthreats and cyberattacks are hugely consequential—but not in the way most predictions suggested. Spying and theft in cyberspace have garnered peta-, exa-, even zettabytes of sensitive and proprietary data. Cyber-enabled information operations have threatened elections and incited mass social movements. Cyberattacks on businesses have cost hundreds of billions of dollars. But while the cyberthreat is real and growing, expectations that cyberattacks would create large-scale physical effects akin to those caused by surprise bombings on U.S. soil, or that they would hurtle states into violent conflict, or even that what happened in the domain of cyberspace would define who won or lost on the battlefield haven’t been borne out. In trying to analogize the cyberthreat to the world of physical warfare, policymakers missed the far more insidious danger that cyber-operations pose: how they erode the trust people place in markets, governments, and even national power.
Correctly diagnosing the threat is essential, in part because it shapes how states invest in cybersecurity. Focusing on single, potentially catastrophic events, and thinking mostly about the possible physical effects of cyberattacks, unduly prioritizes capabilities that will protect against “the big one”: large-scale responses to disastrous cyberattacks, offensive measures that produce physical violence, or punishments only for the kinds of attacks that cross a strategic threshold. Such capabilities and responses are mostly ineffective at protecting against the way cyberattacks undermine the trust that undergirds modern economies, societies, governments, and militaries.
If trust is what’s at stake—and it has already been deeply eroded—then the steps states must take to survive and operate in this new world are different. The solution to a “cyber–Pearl Harbor” is to do everything possible to ensure it doesn’t happen, but the way to retain trust in a digital world despite the inevitability of cyberattacks is to build resilience and thereby promote confidence in today’s systems of commerce, governance, military power, and international cooperation. States can develop this resilience by restoring links between humans and within networks, by strategically distributing analog systems where needed, and by investing in processes that allow for manual and human intervention. The key to success in cyberspace over the long term is not finding a way to defeat all cyberattacks but learning how to survive despite the disruption and destruction they cause.
The United States has not so far experienced a “cyber 9/11,” and a cyberattack that causes immediate catastrophic physical effects isn’t likely in the future, either. But Americans’ trust in their government, their institutions, and even their fellow citizens is declining rapidly—weakening the very foundations of society. Cyberattacks prey on these weak points, sowing distrust in information, creating confusion and anxiety, and exacerbating hatred and misinformation. As people’s digital dependencies grow and the links among technologies, people, and institutions become more tenuous, this cyberthreat to trust will only become more existential. It is this creeping dystopian future that policymakers should worry about—and do everything possible to avert.
THE TIES THAT BIND
Trust, defined as “the firm belief in the reliability, truth, ability, or strength of someone or something,” plays a central role in economies, societies, and the international system. It allows individuals, organizations, and states to delegate tasks or responsibilities, thereby freeing up time and resources to accomplish other jobs, or to cooperate instead of acting alone. It is the glue that allows complex relationships to survive—permitting markets to become more complex, governance to extend over a broader population or set of issues, and states to trade, cooperate, and exist within more complicated alliance relationships. “Extensions of trust . . . enable coordination of actions over large domains of space and time, which in turn permits the benefits of more complex, differentiated, and diverse societies,” explains the political scientist Mark Warren.
Those extensions of trust have played an essential role in human progress across all dimensions. Primitive, isolated, and autocratic societies function with what sociologists call “particularized trust”—a trust of only known others. Modern and interconnected states require what’s called “generalized trust,” which extends beyond known circles and allows actors to delegate trust relationships to individuals, organizations, and processes with whom the truster is not intimately familiar. Particularized trust leads to allegiance within small groups, distrust of others, and wariness of unfamiliar processes or institutions; generalized trust enables complicated market interactions, community involvement, and trade and cooperation among states.
The modern market, for example, could not exist without the trust that allows for the delegation of responsibility to another entity. People trust that currencies have value, that banks can secure and safeguard assets, and that IOUs in the form of checks, credit cards, or loans will be fulfilled. When individuals and entities have trust in a financial system, wages, profits, and employment increase. Trust in laws about property rights facilitates trade and economic prosperity. The digital economy makes this generalized trust even more important. No longer do people deposit gold in a bank vault. Instead, modern economies consist of complicated sets of digital transactions in which users must trust not only that banks are securing and safeguarding their assets but also that the digital medium—a series of ones and zeros linked together in code—translates to an actual value that can be used to buy goods and services.
The digitally dependent economy is particularly vulnerable to degradations of trust.
Trust is a basic ingredient of social capital—the shared norms and interconnected networks that, as the political scientist Robert Putnam has famously argued, lead to more peaceful and prosperous communities. The generalized trust at the heart of social capital allows voters to delegate responsibility to proxies and institutions to represent their interests. Voters must trust that a representative will promote their interests, that votes will be logged and counted properly, and that the institutions that write and uphold laws will do so fairly.
Finally, trust is at the heart of how states generate national power and, ultimately, how they interact within the international system. It allows civilian heads of state to delegate command of armed forces to military leaders and enables those military leaders to execute decentralized control of lower-level military operations and tactics. States characterized by civil-military distrust are less likely to win wars, partly because of how trust affects a regime’s willingness to give control to lower levels of military units in warfare. For example, the political scientist Caitlin Talmadge notes how Saddam Hussein’s efforts to coup-proof his military through the frequent cycling of officers through assignments, the restriction of foreign travel and training, and perverse regime loyalty promotion incentives handicapped the otherwise well-equipped Iraqi military. Trust also enables militaries to experiment and train with new technologies, making them more likely to innovate and develop revolutionary advancements in military power.
Trust also dictates the stability of the international system. States rely on it to build trade and arms control agreements and, most important, to feel confident that other states will not launch a surprise attack or invasion. It enables international cooperation and thwarts arms races by creating the conditions to share information—thus defeating the suboptimal outcome of a prisoner’s dilemma, wherein states choose conflict because they are unable to share the information required for cooperation. The Russian proverb “Doveryai, no proveryai”—“Trust, but verify”—has guided arms control negotiations and agreements since the Cold War.
In short, the world today is more dependent on trust than ever before. This is, in large part, because of the way information and digital technologies have proliferated across modern economies, societies, governments, and militaries, their virtual nature amplifying the role that trust plays in daily activities. This occurs in a few ways. First, the rise of automation and autonomous technologies—whether in traffic systems, financial markets, health care, or military weapons—necessitates a delegation of trust whereby the user is trusting that the machine can accomplish a task safely and appropriately. Second, digital information requires the user to trust that data are stored in the right place, that their values are what the user believes them to be, and that the data won’t be manipulated. Additionally, digital social media platforms create new trust dynamics around identity, privacy, and validity. How do you trust the creators of information or that your social interactions are with an actual person? How do you trust that the information you provide others will be kept private? These are relatively complex relationships with trust, all the result of users’ dependence on digital technologies and information in the modern world.
SUSPICION SPREADS
All the trust that is needed to carry out these online interactions and exchanges creates an enormous target. In the most dramatic way, cyber-operations generate distrust in how or whether a system operates. For instance, an exploit, which is a cyberattack that takes advantage of a security flaw in a computer system, can hack and control a pacemaker, causing distrust on the part of the patient using the device. Or a microchip backdoor can allow bad actors to access smart weapons, sowing distrust about who is in control of those weapons. Cyber-operations can lead to distrust in the integrity of data or the algorithms that make sense of data. Are voter logs accurate? Is that artificial-intelligence-enabled strategic warning system showing a real missile launch, or is it a blip in the computer code? Additionally, operating in a digital world can produce distrust in ownership or control of information: Are your photos private? Is your company’s intellectual property secure? Did government secrets about nuclear weapons make it into an adversary’s hands? Finally, cyber-operations create distrust by manipulating social networks and relationships and ultimately deteriorating social capital. Online personas, bots, and disinformation campaigns all complicate whether individuals can trust both information and one another. All these cyberthreats have implications that can erode the foundations on which markets, societies, governments, and the international system were built.
The digitally dependent economy is particularly vulnerable to degradations of trust. As the modern market has become more interconnected online, cyberthreats have grown more sophisticated and ubiquitous. Yearly estimates of the total economic cost of cyberattacks range from hundreds of billions to trillions of dollars. But it isn’t the financial cost of these attacks alone that threatens the modern economy. Instead, it is how these persistent attacks create distrust in the integrity of the system as a whole.
Nowhere was this more evident than in the public’s response to the ransomware attack on the American oil provider Colonial Pipeline. In May 2021, a criminal gang known as DarkSide shut down the pipeline, which provides about 45 percent of the fuel to the East Coast of the United States, and demanded a ransom, which the company ultimately paid. Despite the limited impact of the attack on the company’s ability to provide oil to its customers, people panicked and flocked to gas stations with oil tanks and plastic bags to stock up on gas, leading to an artificial shortage at the pump. This kind of distrust, and the chaos it causes, threatens the foundations not just of the digital economy but also of the entire economy.
Stockpiling gas after the Colonial Pipeline cyberattack, Tampa, Florida, May 2021
Octavio Jones / Reuters
The inability to safeguard intellectual property from cybertheft is similarly consequential. The practice of stealing intellectual property or trade secrets by hacking into a company’s network and taking sensitive data has become a lucrative criminal enterprise—one that states including China and North Korea use to catch up with the United States and other countries that have the most innovative technology. North Korea famously hacked the pharmaceutical company Pfizer in an attempt to steal its COVID-19 vaccine technology, and Chinese exfiltrations of U.S. defense industrial base research has led to copycat technological advances in aircraft and missile development. The more extensive and sophisticated such attacks become, the less companies can trust that their investments in research and development will lead to profit—ultimately destroying knowledge-based economies. And nowhere are the threats to trust more existential than in online banking. If users no longer trust that their digital data and their money can be safeguarded, then the entire complicated modern financial system could collapse. Perversely, the turn toward cryptocurrencies, most of which are not backed by government guarantees, makes trust in the value of digital information all the more critical.
Societies and governments are also vulnerable to attacks on trust. Schools, courts, and municipal governments have all become ransomware targets—whereby systems are taken offline or rendered useless until the victim pays up. In the cross hairs are virtual classrooms, access to judicial records, and local emergency services. And while the immediate impact of these attacks can temporarily degrade some governance and social functions, the greater danger is that over the long term, a lack of faith in the integrity of data stored by governments—whether marriage records, birth certificates, criminal records, or property divisions—can erode trust in the basic functions of a society. Democracy’s reliance on information and social capital to build trust in institutions has proved remarkably vulnerable to cyber-enabled information operations. State-sponsored campaigns that provoke questions about the integrity of governance data (such as vote tallies) or that fracture communities into small groups of particularized trust give rise to the kind of forces that foment civil unrest and threaten democracy.
Cyber-operations can also jeopardize military power, by attacking trust in modern weapons. With the rise of digital capabilities, starting with the microprocessor, states began to rely on smart weapons, networked sensors, and autonomous platforms for their militaries. As those militaries became more digitally capable, they also became susceptible to cyber-operations that threatened the reliability and functionality of these smart weapons systems. Whereas a previous focus on cyberthreats fixated on how cyber-operations could act like a bomb, the true danger occurs when cyberattacks make it difficult to trust that actual bombs will work as expected. As militaries move farther away from the battlefield through remote operations and commanders delegate responsibility to autonomous systems, this trust becomes all the more important. Can militaries have faith that cyberattacks on autonomous systems will not render them ineffective or, worse, cause fratricide or kill civilians? Furthermore, for highly networked militaries (such as that of the United States), lessons taken from the early information age led to doctrines, campaigns, and weapons that rely on complex distributions of information. Absent trust in information or the means by which it is being disseminated, militaries will be stymied—awaiting new orders, unsure of how to proceed.
Together, these factors threaten the fragile systems of trust that facilitate peace and stability within the international system. They make trade less likely, arms control more difficult, and states more uncertain about one another’s intentions. The introduction of cybertools for spying, attacks, and theft has only exacerbated the effects of distrust. Offensive cyber-capabilities are difficult to monitor, and the lack of norms about the appropriate uses of cyber-operations makes it difficult for states to trust that others will use restraint. Are Russian hackers exploring U.S. power networks to launch an imminent cyberattack, or are they merely probing for vulnerabilities, with no future plans to use them? Are U.S. “defend forward” cyber-operations truly to prevent attacks on U.S. networks or instead a guise to justify offensive cyberattacks on Chinese or Russian command-and-control systems? Meanwhile, the use of mercenaries, intermediaries, and gray-zone operations in cyberspace makes attribution and determining intent harder, further threatening trust and cooperation in the international system. For example, Israeli spyware aiding Saudi government efforts to repress dissent, off-duty Chinese military hacktivists, criminal organizations the Russian state allows but does not officially sponsor—all make it difficult to establish a clear chain of attribution for an intentional state action. Such intermediaries also threaten the usefulness of official agreements among states about what is appropriate behavior in cyberspace.
LIVING WITH FAILURE
To date, U.S. solutions to dangers in cyberspace have focused on the cyberspace part of the question—deterring, defending against, and defeating cyberthreats as they attack their targets. But these cyber-focused strategies have struggled and even failed: cyberattacks are on the rise, the efficacy of deterrence is questionable, and offensive approaches cannot stem the tide of small-scale attacks that threaten the world’s modern, digital foundations. Massive exploits—such as the recent hacks of SolarWinds’ network management software and Microsoft Exchange Server’s email software—are less a failure of U.S. cyberdefenses than a symptom of how the targeted systems were conceived and constructed in the first place. The goal should be not to stop all cyber-intrusions but to build systems that are able to withstand incoming attacks. This is not a new lesson. When cannons and gunpowder debuted in Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, cities struggled to survive the onslaught of the new firepower. So states adapted their fortifications—dug ditches, built bastions, organized cavaliers, constructed extensive polygonal edifices—all with the idea of creating cities that could survive a siege, not stop the cannon fire from ever occurring. The best fortifications were designed to enable active defense, wearing the attackers down until a counterattack could defeat the forces remaining outside the city.
The fortification analogy invites an alternative cyberstrategy in which the focus is on the system itself—whether that’s a smart weapon, an electric grid, or the mind of an American voter. How does one build systems that can continue to operate in a world of degraded trust? Here, network theory—the study of how networks succeed, fail, and survive—offers guidance. Studies on network robustness find that the strongest networks are those with a high density of small nodes and multiple pathways between nodes. Highly resilient networks can withstand the removal of multiple nodes and linkages without decomposing, whereas less resilient, centralized networks, with few pathways and sparser nodes, have a much lower critical threshold for degradation and failure. If economies, societies, governments, and the international system are going to survive serious erosions of trust, they will need more bonds and links, fewer dependencies on central nodes, and new ways to reconstitute network components even as they are under attack. Together, these qualities will lead to generalized trust in the integrity of the systems. How can states build such networks?
If users no longer trust that their data and money can be safeguarded, then the modern financial system could collapse.
First, at the technical level, networks and data structures that undergird the economy, critical infrastructure, and military power must prioritize resilience. This requires decentralized and dense networks, hybrid cloud structures, redundant applications, and backup processes. It implies planning and training for network failure so that individuals can adapt and continue to provide services even in the midst of an offensive cyber-campaign. It means relying on physical backups for the most important data (such as votes) and manual options for operating systems when digital capabilities are unavailable. For some highly sensitive systems (for instance, nuclear command and control), it may be that analog options, even when less efficient, produce remarkable resilience. Users need to trust that digital capabilities and networks have been designed to gracefully degrade, as opposed to catastrophically fail: the distinction between binary trust (that is, trusting the system will work perfectly or not trusting the system at all) and a continuum of trust (trusting the system to function at some percentage between zero and 100 percent) should drive the design of digital capabilities and networks. These design choices will not only increase users’ trust but also decrease the incentives for criminal and state-based actors to launch cyberattacks.
Making critical infrastructure and military power more resilient to cyberattacks would have positive effects on international stability. More resilient infrastructure and populations are less susceptible to systemic and long-lasting effects from cyberattacks because they can bounce back quickly. This resilience, in turn, decreases the incentives for states to preemptively strike an adversary online, since they would question the efficacy of their cyberattacks and their ability to coerce the target population. Faced with a difficult, costly, and potentially ineffective attack, aggressors are less likely to see the benefits of chancing the cyberattack in the first place. Furthermore, states that focus on building resilience and perseverance in their digitally enabled military forces are less likely to double down on first-strike or offensive operations, such as long-range missile strikes or campaigns of preemption. The security dilemma—when states that would otherwise not go to war with each other find themselves in conflict because they are uncertain about each other’s intentions—suggests that when states focus more on defense than offense, they are less likely to spiral into conflicts caused by distrust and uncertainty.
HUMAN RESOURCES
Solving the technical side, however, is only part of the solution. The most important trust relationships that cyberspace threatens are society’s human networks—that is, the bonds and links that people have as individuals, neighbors, and citizens so that they can work together to solve problems. Solutions for making these human networks more durable are even more complicated and difficult than any technical fixes. Cyber-enabled information operations target the links that build trust between people and communities. They undermine these broader connections by creating incentives to form clustered networks of particularized trust—for example, social media platforms that organize groups of like-minded individuals or disinformation campaigns that promote in-group and out-group divisions. Algorithms and clickbait designed to promote outrage only galvanize these divisions and decrease trust of those outside the group.
Governments can try to regulate these forces on social media, but those virtual enclaves reflect actual divisions within society. And there’s a feedback loop: the distrust that is building online leaks out into the real world, separating people further into groups of “us” and “them.” Combating this requires education and civic engagement—the bowling leagues that Putnam said were necessary to rebuild Americans’ social capital (Putnam’s book Bowling Alone, coincidentally, came out in 2000, just as the Internet was beginning to take off). After two years of a global pandemic and a further splintering of Americans into virtual enclaves, it is time to reenergize physical communities, time for neighborhoods, school districts, and towns to come together to rebuild the links and bonds that were severed to save lives during the pandemic. The fact is that these divisions were festering in American communities even before the pandemic or the Internet accelerated their consolidation and amplified their power. The solution, therefore, the way to do this kind of rebuilding, will not come from social media, the CEOs of those platforms, or digital tools. Instead, it will take courageous local leaders who can rebuild trust from the ground up, finding ways to bring together communities that have been driven apart. It will take more frequent disconnecting from the Internet, and from the synthetic groups of particularized trust that were formed there, in order to reconnect in person. Civic education could help by reminding communities of their commonalities and shared goals and by creating critical thinkers who can work for change within democratic institutions.
BOWLING TOGETHER
There’s a saying that cyber-operations lead to death by a thousand cuts, but perhaps a better analogy is termites, hidden in the recesses of foundations, that gradually eat away at the very structures designed to support people’s lives. The previous strategic focus on one-off, large-scale cyber-operations led to bigger and better cyber-capabilities, but it never addressed the fragility within the foundations and networks themselves.
Will cyberattacks ever cause the kind of serious physical effects that were feared over the last two decades? Will a strategy focused more on trust and resilience leave states uniquely vulnerable to this? It is of course impossible to say that no cyberattack will ever produce large-scale physical effects similar to those that resulted from the bombing of Pearl Harbor. But it is unlikely—because the nature of cyberspace, its virtual, transient, and ever-changing character, makes it difficult for attacks on it to create lasting physical effects. Strategies that focus on trust and resilience by investing in networks and relationships make these kinds of attacks yet more difficult. Therefore, focusing on building networks that can survive incessant, smaller attacks has a fortuitous byproduct: additional resilience against one-off, large-scale attacks. But this isn’t easy, and there is a significant tradeoff in both efficiency and cost for strategies that focus on resilience, redundancy, and perseverance over convenience or deterring and defeating cyberthreats. And the initial cost of these measures to foster trust falls disproportionately on democracies, which must cultivate generalized trust, as opposed to the particularized trust that autocracies rely on for power. This can seem like a tough pill to swallow, especially as China and the United States appear to be racing toward an increasingly competitive relationship.
Despite the difficulties and the cost, democracies and modern economies (such as the United States) must prioritize building trust in the systems that make societies run—whether that’s the electric grid, banks, schools, voting machines, or the media. That means creating backup plans and fail-safes, making strategic decisions about what should be online or digital and what needs to stay analog or physical, and building networks—both online and in society—that can survive even when one node is attacked. If a stolen password can still take out an oil pipeline or a fake social media account can continue to sway the political opinions of thousands of voters, then cyberattacks will remain too lucrative for autocracies and criminal actors to resist. Failing to build in more resilience—both technical and human—will mean that the cycle of cyberattacks and the distrust they give rise to will continue to threaten the foundations of democratic society.
18. No Mere Mistake - A Review of "Exiled Emissary"
A fascinating review of an alternative history of WWII. A lot to unpack. I wonder what other historical analyses cover this.
No Mere Mistake
A Review of "Exiled Emissary" by Christopher J. Farrell
December 15, 2021
On March 24, 1960, the small though influential biweekly Human Events published the following earthshaking claim: “Millions of American men and women would gladly have given their lives if it meant ending World War II a day sooner than it did. I believe one man had a chance to shorten the conflict by more than 18 months – and brushed it off.” Seventeen years had passed. But the next sentence delivered the shocker: “His name? President Franklin D. Roosevelt.” The exclamation mark after the title “FDR’s Tragic Mistake!” failed to mitigate the understatement.
The claim sounded so preposterous it would have been dismissed out of hand were it not for its author’s impeccable reputation: former Pennsylvania governor George H. Earle was no crank. Appointed U.S. Minister to Austria and Bulgaria by FDR, and later assistant U.S. Naval Attaché in Istanbul, he had been a one-man CIA, the president’s trusted personal agent. A singularly unorthodox arrangement, the relationship would have been history-altering, were it not for one insurmountable problem: FDR paid no heed to him. Worse, he resented information that contradicted his instincts, ideology, and information received from White House aides, some of whom, wittingly or unwittingly, and surely unbeknownst to him, were parroting the Kremlin line.
Exiled Emissary
Academica Press
At last, Earle’s extraordinary exploits are seeing the light of day in a new book titled “Exiled Emissary: George H. Earle III – Soldier, Sailor, Diplomat, Governor, Spy”, by former counterespionage officer Chris Farrell, whose excellent training in counterintelligence operations, insightful and extensive study of modern totalitarianism, and a natural aptitude for information warfare, a personal commitment, renders him ideally suited for the task. But no less important, Farrell first learned the story from his grandmother, who revealed her husband’s partnership with then-governor George Earle, in 1936, to help Jewish businessmen and their families escape from Nazi Germany.
True to his Mayflower ancestry, Earle had always been a staunch champion of equal rights. A year earlier, in 1935, Earle had worked with African-American state legislator Hobson Reynolds, who introduced an “equal rights” bill which Earle promptly signed. The bill “enable[d] any Negro in Pennsylvania to bring suit for damages if he is discriminated against by a hotel, restaurant, shop, or theatre.” The two had pulled it off without a hitch. “In this regard,” writes Farrell, “George Earle was 30-years ahead of the rest of the country. This was yet another moment wherein Earle demonstrated the courage of his personal conviction.”
Looking deeper into the life of his grandfather’s erstwhile partner, Farrell learned that Earle had proved faithful to his commander in chief long after the latter turned his back on him, ignoring both their personal friendship and Earle’s impeccable service to the country. Farrell was outraged that so important a matter was all but unknown to the public. As if any additional proof were needed that historical record-keeping, too often censored by entrenched interests, obscures uncomfortable truths about the real character and actions of individuals at the highest level, this case is surely among the most scandalous.
It had started as a close personal and professional relationship. President Roosevelt did not hesitate to call on Earle to uncover what was really going on in Europe at that critical and dangerous time before and during World War II, to report his findings unvarnished, bypassing bureaucrats. FDR had every reason to trust this brilliant businessman, who had made large contributions to the president’s campaigns. Indeed, in 1940 he unflinchingly stepped aside from the nomination for the presidency in order for FDR to make an unprecedented run for a third term. A Navy Cross recipient, having doubtless inherited some of his great-great-uncle Benjamin Franklin’s patriotic genes, Earle was fearless, yet also savvy and insightful.
Cultivating invaluable intelligence sources in the murky complexity of the Balkans could have changed history, had it not proved too effective to avoid raising the enmity of rivals within the national security bureaucracy – both in the intelligence agencies and the State Department – and of close advisors within the White House. As Earle soon learned, FDR was surrounded by Soviet sympathizers and agents of influence, witting and unwitting fellow travelers. Only later would de-classified archives confirm the full extent of that infiltration, exposed in superb analyses by Herb Romerstein, M. Stanton Evans, Eric Breindel, Diana West, Harvey Klehr, John Earle Haynes, and others.
But advisors are not solely to blame. FDR thought of “Joe Stalin” as his friend, and trusted him. In his foreword to the book, senior intelligence officer Jack Dziak writes that the president himself shared their perspective: “FDR was not at all sympathetic to data, assessments, and intelligence that pointed to Stalin’s massacres, his other crimes, and his intelligence operations against the U.S. both before and during World War II.” Thus that first unwelcome fact that Earle revealed to FDR, which led to the “tragic mistake!,” fell on all but deaf ears.
To be fair, it does sound like the script of a B-rated movie. Earle writes: “In 1943, while I was serving as U.S. Naval attaché at Istanbul, two high-placed Germans risked their lives to approach me with peace feelers. One was Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, chief of Hitler’s Secret Service. The other was an agent of Franz von Papen, the Nazi ambassador to Turkey. This agent laid before me a fantastic proposition. Papen and other high-ranking German Army officers, some of them members of the Prussian aristocracy, were prepared to revolt against the Nazi regime, kidnap Hitler, seize control [sic] of the Nazi war machine and surrender to the Allies. They asked one thing in return: the containment of Russia. The still formidable German Army would line up with American and British troops at the Russian border and say to the Reds: ‘Stop. Stay back – where you belong.’”
By 1943, Earle had absolutely no illusions about the USSR. As minister to Austria in 1933-34 and in Bulgaria during 1942-42, he “had talked with fear-crazed refugees from Russia – Jews, Mohammedans, Christians. Their stories were shocking testaments to inhuman Bolshevik brutality. All of Russia was a monstrous concentration camp.” He knew as well that “Russian leaders were creatures of lies and treachery,” they could not be trusted. So he jumped at the improbably fantastic German initiative, ironically realistic for its very audacity: “here was a chance to stop them in their tracks.” Earle contacted the president immediately, with no effect. None. The implication was clear: approval was always met with glowing acknowledgment by return courier. “But when a dispatched jarred or displeased him, I never got an answer.”
Farrell describes Earle’s revelation as “one of the most audacious and astounding clandestine acts of the Second World War.” If he stops short of adding “indeed of all time,” the reader would be justified to so. Equally astonishing, however, is his next observation: “It is also probably the least known German resistance overtures and one of the best kept secrets of the entire era.” It is impossible to resist wondering why that is so – especially since the solo flight to Scotland by Deputy Fuhrer Rudolph Hess for an attempted, albeit failed, peace bid in May 1941 is well known.
Therein, almost certainly, lies the clue. By contrast, Canaris and Earle meeting, as Farrell points out “actually had some possibility for real success.” Which is precisely why FDR ignored it. The president would have had to have had an interest in ending the war. Indeed neither did the British, who were even more alarmed by Earle’s escapades – which undoubtedly deserves another book, all its own. In retrospect therefore, it makes perfect sense to suppress that uncomfortable episode. Explains Farrell: “The ‘court history’ and victory’s propaganda simply does not allow for inconvenient, factual narratives to take hold or gain purchase in the contemporary conscience of establishment history,” speculates Farrell. “Legacy preservation trumps reality.” At this time of self-critical historical revisionism, it may be worth revisiting the nation’s sins in ways less ideologically skewed.
The second most important message among the many that Earle sent to a president unwilling to hear was delivered in May 1944. Having traveled to Washington, he was waiting for FDR to arrive when he chanced to meet Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, who lamented: “My God, George, you and I and [U.S. Ambassador to the USSR] Bill Bullitt are the only ones around the President who know the Russian leaders for what they really are.”
Still Earle had to make sure his commander-in-chief saw all the evidence demonstrating beyond doubt that the USSR was responsible for the slaughter of approximately 22,000 Polish officers, intellectuals, and religious figures in 1940 in the Katyn Forest. Unfurling countless photos, affidavits, Red Cross reports, autopsy documents, and interviews conducted with his extensive network of Central and Eastern European contacts, should have convinced the stubbornest skeptic. But FDR “did not want to hear Earle’s analysis and conclusion.” In fact, as Earle would later testify to Congress in 1947 and 1952, FDR rejected it all out of hand: “George, this is entirely German propaganda and a German plot. I am absolutely convinced the Russians did not do this.” Dismissing all of Earle’s warnings about Russia, the president predicted with casual confidence that “when the war is over she will fly to pieces like a cracked centrifugal machine at high speed.”
It would take another forty-seven years for the truth to emerge: in 1990, premier Mikhail Gorbachev confirmed Soviet culpability. Two decades later, in November 2010, the Russian State Duma issued an official acceptance of responsibility.
Earle’s Congressional testimony had come long after FDR had severed both their personal and official relationship, indeed with unpardonable cruelty. On March 24, 1945, a full year after Earle had handed him the incriminating Katyn documents, FDR dispatched the following missive to his long-time friend: “I specifically forbid you to publish any information or opinion about an ally that you have acquired while in office or in the service of the United States Navy. In view of your wish for continued active service, I shall withdraw any previous understanding that you are serving as an emissary of mine and I shall direct the Navy Department to continue your employment wherever they can make use of your services.” Two weeks later, FDR was dead. But Earle was exiled to Samoa. There he would become assistant governor to 16,000 island natives. He remained in Samoa until recalled by President Truman, four months later.
Earle met his fate with typical equanimity. As he wrote to his friend General Albert C. Wedemeyer on December 11, 1958, “I felt I was perfectly safe in Samoa and that the longer I stayed there the more damning it would be for the pro Russians in our government,” who couldn’t but be irked by their failure to break him psychologically or to damage his reputation. Yet he would soon suffer a debilitating stroke, which eventually killed this fearless American, who surely deserves to be better known.
Earle never wavered in his belief that FDR missed the biggest chance of his presidency. “If President Roosevelt had accepted Papen’s peace offer and agreed to its one condition, it is my firm conviction that the war would have ended by January, 1944, at the latest!” He went on: “Most important of all, without the help of the German scientists they ultimately captured, the Russians would never have been able to develop long-range missiles or nuclear weapons. The military supremacy of the United States would be clear and unchallenged.” But in truth, so much else would have had to be different; FDR’s was no mere mistake.
The enemy had turned out to be not only external but had been festering within. We had met him and learned, as had the famous diminutive strategist Pogo exactly half a century ago, that “he is us.”
Juliana Geran Pilon is a Senior Fellow at the Alexander Hamilton Institute for the Study of Western Civilization. She is the author of several books, including "The Art of Peace: Engaging a Complex World" (2016) and her latest, "The Utopian Conceit and the War on Freedom" (2019).
19. Strength in Numbers: The Future of Coalition Building and Irregular Warfare
Strength in Numbers: The Future of Coalition Building and Irregular Warfare - Modern War Institute
The US withdrawal from Afghanistan ended a coalition of some forty nations, all with their own national goals and internal political dynamics but brought together by a shared interest in that war. In the aftermath of its chaotic collapse, it is easy to forget the prominent role that the United States played in building, leading, and sustaining this coalition—a task that required some determined diplomacy and a sophisticated understanding of what each country brought to the table. As the United States pivots to the Indo-Pacific region and the competition with China for legitimacy and influence below the level of armed conflict, the question becomes whether coalition building is the right approach.
Our guests today have served at the highest levels of government in the United States and Australia, both as soldiers and diplomats. They have considerable experience working with coalitions and understand the rare alchemy that enables them to work at every level, from the tactical to the strategic.
Lieutenant General Douglas Lute retired from the US Army in 2010 after thirty-five years of distinguished service. His military career concluded with six years in the White House, where he served under President George W. Bush as deputy national security advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan, and then as coordinator for South Asia during the first term of the Barack Obama administration. During Obama’s second term, Lute was US Ambassador to NATO, where he focused on the thirty-nation alliance’s responses to new security challenges in Europe and the Middle East.
Ambassador Duncan Lewis is a retired Australian military officer, diplomat, and intelligence chief. From 2014 to 2019, he was the director-general of security, leading the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. Prior to that appointment, he held the post of Australian ambassador to the Kingdom of Belgium, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the European Union, and NATO. He is a former national security advisor, secretary of the Department of Defence, and head of Australian Special Operations Command.
Ambassadors Lute and Lewis argue that coalitions have played an important role in the major irregular warfare fights of recent history. They discuss why nations join coalitions in the first place—an often complex combination of motivations that can perhaps be best summed up as “enlightened self-interest,” and they share some of their own lessons on how to lead a coalition to achieve its collective objectives while providing value to each member. They argue that to compete effectively in irregular warfare contexts, to include in the era of strategic competition, the United States and Australia cannot go it alone but will be dependent on building partnerships with like-minded nations as a bulwark against adversaries who have adopted political warfare as the means to further their global ambitions.
The Irregular Warfare Podcast is part of the broader Irregular Warfare Initiative. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as fellows. You can follow and engage with the Irregular Warfare Initiative on Twitter, Facebook, or LinkedIn to make sure you don’t miss any new content.
Image credit: Breanna L. Weisenberger, US Marine Corps
20.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
