Quotes of the Day:
“Each of us was put here in this time and this place to decide the future of humankind. Did you think you were put here for something less.”
- Chief Arvol Looking Horse
“Never fight unless you have to. Never fight alone. Never fight for long.”
- Fox Conner
"The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge."
- Bertrand Russell
1. N.Korea Sends No New Year's Greeting to S.Korea, U.S.
2. North Korea Still Won't Sign the Korean War Peace Declaration
3. Food, not nukes, key to North Korea: The Statesman
4. North Korea’s Priority May be Food Over Nukes
5. Returned N.Korea defector struggled to resettle in South, lived meagre life
6. Seoul says N.K. defector presumed as border crosser received due settlement support
7. Boomerang case raises new concerns about defectors
8. How a Renegade Gymnast Strolled Into North Korea Like It Was No Big Deal
9. [EXCLUSIVE] In Year of Tiger, Samsung lays out 'Tiger' strategy to beat Apple
10. North Koreans, already hungry, now short of cooking oil
11. Three issues for US-Korea relations in 2022
12. North Korean prices of South Korean cosmetics skyrocket 10-fold since start of 2022
13. F-35A fighter makes emergency landing due to 'avionic system issues': Air Force
14. Leading presidential candidates face mounting distrust
1. N.Korea Sends No New Year's Greeting to S.Korea, U.S.
I would add that this sentence may be simply linking back to the 8th Party Congress from January 2021 and reinforcing everything that has been put in place without having to say so publicly: :
A single sentence referring to South Korea or the U.S. took up a mere 0.4 percent of the 18,400-odd-word report. "The increasingly unstable military environment on the Korean Peninsula and international politics have instigated calls to vigorously push forward with our national defense build-up plans without any delay," it reads.
Here is my summary of the 8th Party Congress from last January. There is no evidence that Kim has strayed from this.
North Korea StrategyReaffirmed by 8th Party Congress
•Political Warfare
•Subversion, coercion, extortion
•“Blackmail diplomacy” – the use of tension, threats, and provocations to gain political and economic concessions
•Example: Kim Yo-jong threats in June – ROK anti-leaflet law in December
•Negotiate to set conditions - not to denuclearize
•Set Conditions for unification (domination to complete the revolution)
•Split ROK/US alliance
•Reduce/weaken defense of the South
•Exploit regional powers (e.g, China and Russia)
•Economics by Juche ideology – the paradox of “reform” (reform necessary for nK to survive - reform is a threat to regime survival)
•Illicit activities to generate funds for regime
•Deny human rights to ensure regime survival
•Continue to exploit COVID threat to suppress dissent and crack down on 400+ markets and foreign currency use
•Priority to military and nuclear programs
•For deterrence or domination?
N.Korea Sends No New Year's Greeting to S.Korea, U.S.
January 03, 2022 14:27
North Korea sent no New Year's greetings to either South Korea or the U.S. on Jan. 1. It is unusual for leader Kim Jong-un to skip such a message, however perfunctory.
This suggests that the regime has put external affairs on the back burner due to the growing need to concentrate its capabilities and resources on overcoming economic difficulties caused by prolonged international sanctions and a total border lockdown.
Kim started sulking when U.S. President Donald Trump walked out of a summit in Hanoi in February 2019, and his New Year's message the following year was replaced by a report on a Central Committee plenary meeting in 2020 and last year. This year too the official Rodong Sinmun just carried a report on the year-end gathering.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un speaks at a year-end plenary session from Dec. 27 to 31, Pyongyang, in this grab from [North] Korean Central Television on Jan. 1.
A single sentence referring to South Korea or the U.S. took up a mere 0.4 percent of the 18,400-odd-word report. "The increasingly unstable military environment on the Korean Peninsula and international politics have instigated calls to vigorously push forward with our national defense build-up plans without any delay," it reads.
"They apparently wanted to have enough leeway in foreign policy in the future by avoiding any specific policies now amid a high possibility of political changes ahead of the Beijing Winter Olympics in February and the presidential election in South Korea in March," the Institute for National Security Strategy here speculated.
The Central Committee session lasted five days from Dec. 27 to 31, with a record 1,000 participants. Kim only went to the first two sessions.
Agriculture was heavily highlighted and mentioned a 143 times.
- Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com
2. North Korea Still Won't Sign the Korean War Peace Declaration
Excerpts:
When asked about Chung’s remarks, a State Department spokesman emphasized the role of ongoing diplomacy in reaching a peace agreement in Korea.
“The United States remains committed to achieving lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and diplomacy with the DPRK,” the spokesman said, using the acronym of North Korea’s official name.
North Korea Still Won't Sign the Korean War Peace Declaration
Seoul has reached an agreement with the United States on a draft declaration that, if put into effect, would officially end the Korean War. The only problem? Pyongyang.
South Korean foreign minister Chung Eui-yong announced on Wednesday that Seoul had reached an agreement with the United States on a draft declaration that, if put into effect, would officially end the Korean War.
Chung informed reporters on Wednesday that South Korea and the United States had “already shared the understanding” with each other, according to reporting by the South Korean Yonhap News Agency.
However, the foreign minister underlined that the ultimate decision to formally end the war would rest with North Korea, which has largely remained unresponsive to peace overtures from Washington and Seoul in recent years. Kim Yo-jong, the sister of North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un, described an end to the war as an “admirable” goal in September but criticized South Korean leaders for “hostile” policymaking. Vice Foreign Minister Ri Thae Song said the same month that the north would not agree to an official peace declaration until U.S. policies toward Pyongyang were improved.
Chung was optimistic in his remarks, claiming that “North Korea showed a set of prompt, positive responses to the end-of-war declaration.”
“We hope [it] will show a more concrete reaction,” he added, noting that many South Korean observers would be watching the ongoing party conference in Pyongyang for signs of Kim’s attitude toward reconciliation with the south in 2022.
The Korean War, fought from 1950 to 1953, resulted in a military stalemate near the 38th parallel. The front line of the war is now the “Demilitarized Zone,” a heavily armed border area dividing the two Koreas.
The agreement reached between U.S., North Korean, and Chinese diplomats in 1953 was an armistice rather than a peace treaty. It was intended to “ensure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved”—leaving unresolved the question of what the final settlement would look like. Consequently, North and South Korea have technically remained at war for more than seventy years.
When asked about Chung’s remarks, a State Department spokesman emphasized the role of ongoing diplomacy in reaching a peace agreement in Korea.
“The United States remains committed to achieving lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and diplomacy with the DPRK,” the spokesman said, using the acronym of North Korea’s official name.
Trevor Filseth is a current and foreign affairs writer for the National Interest.
Image: Reuters
3. Food, not nukes, key to North Korea: The Statesman
We are seeing the expected pattern here. Kim ignores his hostile policy and focuses on the economy and food. Therefore he must be willing to give up his nuclear weapons.
Food, not nukes, key to North Korea: The Statesman
By Hermes Auto The Straits Times3 min
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un speaks at the 4th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea in Pyongyang on Jan 1, 2022. PHOTO: AFP
NEW DELHI (THE STATESMAN/ASIA NEWS NETWORK) - The fourth plenary meeting of the 8th central committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) coincided with the 10th anniversary of the leadership of President Kim Jong-Un, who assumed power after the death of his father in 2011.
Notably, President Kim's presentation underscored the need for more tractor factories and school uniforms rather than nuclear weapons. Tangibly, he has underlined the imperative of close-to-the-bone issues such as industrial development, employment and education.
Kim has utilised the opportunity of using earlier occasions such as when the New Year unfolds to buttress major policy announcements, such as dealings with South Korea and the United States. And yet, the summaries of his address this year, as published in the North Korean state media, made no specific mention of the United States. There was only a passing reference to unspecified discussions of the equation between the two Koreas and what they call "external affairs".
By and large, Kim's address was riveted to the problems of Pyongyang's economic development which had been hampered in 2020 by the "self-imposed" anti-pandemic border lock-downs. Both have left North Korea more isolated than ever before. Confusion gets worse confounded as international aid organisations have warned the government helmed by Kim of looming shortages of food and a humanitarian crisis.
The North Korean leader reportedly told the gathering that "the main task facing the party and people next year is to provide a sure guarantee for the implementation of the five-year plan and bring about a remarkable change in state development and the people's standard of living". Ergo, the focus of his speech was on domestic issues, specifically a rural development plan, the "diet of the people", school uniforms and the need to crack down on what he called "non-socialist practices".
In point of fact, the emphasis on rural development has been called a "populist strategy" by Chad O'Carrol, the founder of NK News, a Seoul-based website that tracks North Korea. It was clear from Kim's address that the North is facing severe economic challenges. Two factors have compounded the nation's problems - its unsplendid isolation and the cache of crippling sanctions imposed by the Western powers.
Restrictions imposed to contain the pandemic have been exacerbated by the worsening floods. Kim has made it pretty obvious that there is a red herring too many on the trail towards the fulfilment of his nuclear ambition, in his reckoning a consummation to be devoutly wished for. And his subtext must be that nuclear proliferation and the equation with the United States ought not to take precedence over the quality of the citizen's life.
The occasional bang in the sea is of little or no moment in day-to-day life. This precisely is the message that has been conveyed to the West, pre-eminently the United States. President Kim has harped on food and not nukes.
- The Statesman is a member of The Straits Times media partner Asia News Network, an alliance of 24 news media entities.
4. North Korea’s Priority May be Food Over Nukes
For the north Korean Propaganda and Agitation Department here is a data point for your post test evaluation: you have reached and influenced your target audience in accordance with your intent.
North Korea’s Priority May be Food Over Nukes
For the time being, at least, Kim Jong-Un's attention appears to be focused on North Korea's food crisis.
Times are tough in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) threaten militarily. Foreign cultures undermine ideologically. And inadequate rural development fails agriculturally.
Kim, impeccably attired in a Western-style business suit, spoke at the five-day Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) plenum ending 2021. The conference was directed largely inward, lacking “messages for the U.S. or South Korea like those that Kim has delivered in previous New Year’s policy speeches,” according to Colin Zwirko and Jeongmin Kim of NKNews. In fact, explained the Sejong Institute’s Cheong Seong-chang: “If we consider this report on the plenum as a replacement of Kim Jong-un’s annual New Year’s speech, it can be said that it’s by far the shortest mention of inter-Korean relations and foreign policy ever.”
The event’s focus was economics, and especially food. The party report cited progress, including “great improvement and results” as part of the implementation of the new five-year plan. The WPK noted that select projects were being completed. Yet significant difficulties were manifest. The party admitted that it sought to “find out the method of stabilizing the economy in the most difficult circumstances,” which evidently was not achieved. Moreover, the report cited success in “consolidating” economic rules involving state plans and “strengthening” cabinet controls. This appeared to continue the reversal of economic reforms and reassertion of state economic primacy.
Rural development appeared to be least successful. At least, Kim and the party were more critical of current policy. The WPK set forth a typically positive objective, to “open a great new era of achieving a radical development of the socialist countryside of Korean style.” Given the DPRK’s longstanding inability to feed itself, it’s hard to imagine what the party meant.
In any case, the “radical development of the socialist countryside of Korean style” apparently has not been attained. The Supreme Leader did not sound happy, though he avoided his severe rhetoric earlier in the year when he stated that the “people’s food situation is now getting tense as the agricultural sector failed to fulfill its grain production plan.” One of the agenda items at the June party plenum was “On establishing an emergency policy on overcoming the current food crisis.”
Nevertheless, outside observers told NKNews that the continuing focus on the subject is significant. Observed Joshua Pollack of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies: “This striking emphasis on agriculture combined with the many references to severe difficulties suggests that hunger is already a serious problem.” Similar was the assessment of Thomas Schäfer, formerly German ambassador to the DPRK: “Dispensing so many words on agriculture seems to be a clear sign that the situation there is dire indeed.”
At the latest gathering, Kim emphasized “solving current rural issues to boost the agricultural production of the country.” He also ordered those assembled to “solve the issue of food, clothing, and housing for the people.” That presumably is necessary for him to fulfill his pledge to the party and North Korean people: “The main task facing our Party and people next year is to provide a sure guarantee for the implementation of the five-year plan and bring about a remarkable change in the state development and the people's standard of living.”
The obvious question is how? Especially given the regime’s turn away from earlier economic reforms. Which may be related to other themes at the plenum.
One is the emphasis on security, with no hope expressed for improved relations with Washington. Kim may have decided on a long-term commitment to autarky and practical abandonment, irrespective of his rhetoric, of any serious effort to improve the welfare of the North Korean people. NKNews’ Peter Ward argued that Kim’s emphasis on heavy industry may be a security measure, since “The regime needs to produce certain key industrial products for national defense and to ensure self-reliance in major areas of the industrial economy.” Indeed, this approach looks a lot like the strategy of Kim’s father and grandfather. The regime likely expects Beijing to see the North through hard times.
The other issue is combating ideological subversion. Kim once appeared to welcome Western and South Korean culture, having hosted not only a K-Pop concert but an earlier event with Disney figures. However, the regime recently began a dramatic crackdown on access to such forbidden fruit. The latest plenum continued this theme, lauding North Korean youth who abandoned “anti-socialist” attitudes and turned back toward subservience to the party. And the WPK pledged to “wage more active struggle against the anti-socialist and non-socialist practices throughout the Party, the state and the society.” Notably, economic isolation makes it easier to enforce ideological purity by reducing smuggling opportunities.
Pollack suggested further evidence of political concern. Kim Jong-un’s significant weight loss was noted earlier this year and tied to potential health issues: either the Supreme Leader was suffering from a serious condition or was seeking to avoid suffering from a serious condition. However, argued Pollack, “It seems clearer than ever that his former corpulence had become a political liability: We might infer that hunger is already reaching into the regime’s base of support, and is not confined to the countryside.” Kim’s presumed desire to avoid his father’s early death still seems a more plausible motive, but if widespread malnutrition and starvation persist, the old meme of “Kim Fatty the Third,” as waggish Chinese netizens called him until censored by Beijing, might become more politically damaging.
Finally, Kim’s failure to pay much attention to the United States or South Korea suggests a lack of interest in sanctions relief—or, more accurately, a lack of belief that it is likely. As NKNews’ Chad O’Carroll and Chaewon Chung observed, “The absence of foreign policy was stark: The report reserved more space for Kim Jong-un’s thoughts on school uniform policy than goals in dealing with South Korea and the U.S.”
That in turn indicates that Kim is likely to proceed with his ambitious armament program. The party report concluded: “The military environment of the Korean peninsula and the trend of the international situation getting instable day after day demand that bolstering the state defense capability be further powerfully propelled without a moment's delay.” Although it is difficult to separate his military wish list from reality, Kim’s rhetoric suggests that he will do his best to turn the former into the latter.
There isn’t much good from the latest WPK plenum for the DPRK, South Korea, or America. However, the lack of incendiary rhetoric and threats may foreshadow relative international quiet for at least a time as Kim focuses on meeting domestic challenges. Moreover, Beijing’s presumed backing may depend on the North’s relative forbearance, at least when it comes to nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests.
The ROK and US should continue to press for engagement but do so without any illusions. With Pyongyang and Washington preoccupied with domestic problems, both sides might end up playing an updated version of “strategic patience.” Although hardly a satisfactory outcome, it would be better than another round of “fire and fury.”
Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is author of several books, including Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World and co-author of The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations with North and South Korea.
Image: Reuters
5. Returned N.Korea defector struggled to resettle in South, lived meagre life
Any evidence that he was deliberately sent to the South for espionage or propaganda purposes? It does not appear so to me based on the reporting.
Returned N.Korea defector struggled to resettle in South, lived meagre life
1/3
A general view of the North Korean guard posts, in this picture taken from the top of the Aegibong Peak Observatory, south of the demilitarised zone (DMZ), separating the two Koreas in Gimpo, South Korea, October 5, 2021. REUTERS/Kim Hong-Ji
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- Summary
- Man in his 30s had only been in S.Korea for about a year
- Many N.Korean defectors struggle to settle, earn well
- Unification Ministry to examine policies, support for defectors
SEOUL, Jan 4 (Reuters) - A former North Korean defector who made a risky and rare cross-border return home last week had struggled in South Korea, officials and media reports said on Tuesday, sparking fresh debate over how such defectors are treated in their new lives.
The man's plight shed new light on the lives of re-defectors and raised questions about whether they had received adequate support after making the dangerous journey from the impoverished, tightly controlled North to the wealthy, democratic South.
The re-defector was in his 30s and making a poor living while working as a janitor, a military official said.
"I would say he was classified as lower class, barely scraping a living," the official said, declining to elaborate citing privacy concerns.
Officials, who said they saw little risk of the man being a North Korean spy, have launched an inquiry into how he evaded guards despite being caught on surveillance cameras hours before crossing the border.
North Korean officials have not commented on the incident and state media have not reported it.
LITTLE INTERACTION
South Korea's Yonhap news agency reported police in the northern Seoul district of Nowon who provided safety protection and other care to him raised concerns in June over his possible re-defection, but no action was taken due to a lack of concrete evidence.
Police declined to comment. An official at Seoul's Unification Ministry handling cross-border affairs said on Tuesday the re-defector had received government support for personal safety, housing, medical treatment and employment.
The man had little interaction with neighbours, and was seen throwing away his belongings a day before he crossed the border, Yonhap reported.
"He was taking out a mattress and bedding to garbage dumps on that morning, and it was strange because they were all too new," a neighbour was quoted by Yonhap as saying. "I thought about asking him to give it to us, but ended up not doing that, because we've never said hi to each other."
As of September, around 33,800 North Koreans had resettled in South Korea, daring a long, risky journey - usually via China - in pursuit of a new life while fleeing poverty and oppression at home.
Since 2012, only 30 defectors are confirmed to have returned to the North, according to the Unification Ministry. But defectors and activists say there could be many more unknown cases among those who struggled to adapt to life in the South.
About 56% of defectors are categorised as low income, according to ministry data submitted to defector-turned-lawmaker Ji Seong-ho. Nearly 25% are in the lowest bracket subject to national basic livelihood subsidies, six times the ratio of the general population.
In a survey released last month by the Database Center For North Korean Human Rights and NK Social Research in Seoul, around 18% of 407 defectors polled said they were willing to return to the North, most of them citing nostalgia.
"There's a complex range of factors including longing for families left in the North, and emotional and economic difficulties that emerge while resettling," the Unification Ministry official said, vowing to examine policy and improve support for defectors.
Reporting by Hyonhee Shin; Editing by Lincoln Feast.
6. Seoul says N.K. defector presumed as border crosser received due settlement support
Seoul says N.K. defector presumed as border crosser received due settlement support | Yonhap News Agency
By Choi Soo-hyang
SEOUL, Jan. 4 (Yonhap) -- The North Korean defector who is presumed to have crossed the tense inter-Korean border to return home last week had received due resettlement support from the South Korean government, Seoul's unification ministry said Tuesday, amid reports he suffered economic difficulties after his defection.
The man crossed the heavily fortified eastern border into the North over the weekend, about a year after he reached the South, also using an eastern front-line route in November 2020, according to the military.
Following media reports he could have opted to return home due to economic difficulties, a unification ministry official said the government provided due support granted for North Korean defectors settling in the South. The presumed border crosser, in his 30s, is known to have worked as a cleaner here.
"The defector had received overall support for safety, housing, medical care, employment and living in accordance with the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act," the official told reporters on background.
According to government data, at least 30 North Koreans went back to their communist homeland from South Korea in the past decade.
"Such returns stem from various and complex reasons, including yearning for family, and psychological and economic difficulties," the official said. "The government has been continuing efforts to improve our support programs to help them better resettle in the South."
As of 2020, 33,752 North Korean defectors were living in South Korea.
scaaet@yna.co.kr
(END)
7. Boomerang case raises new concerns about defectors
Excerpts;
Cho urged more psychological and career support for defectors trying to settle in South Korea, where they often struggle with discrimination, a lack of familial ties, and difficulty making a living in a fiercely competitive society.
Cho singled out the adjustment program at Hanawon as under-preparing defectors for their lives in the South.
“The institute needs to offer practical, hands-on training in fields where defectors can feasibly find employment, like hairdressing,” the author said. “Most defectors leave Hanawon and end up working in karaoke parlors if they’re women, and manual labor if they’re men.
“They just continue struggling to survive [after they leave Hanawon] because they’re left to their own devices.”
Cho also said that many defectors remain emotionally unmoored, even after living in the South for a long time. “Not only do they face discrimination, but they miss the families they left behind. Hanawon needs to maintain a counselling department to manage defectors over a longer period of time.”
The Unification Ministry’s estimate that a total 30 North Korean defectors in the past decade have boomeranged back to the North suggest that the struggle to adapt to South Korean society is so hard that they take the dangerous trek back, where they can face brutal recriminations.
Tuesday
January 4, 2022
Boomerang case raises new concerns about defectors
The suspected boomerang defection of a man to North Korea on Saturday has raised new concerns that defectors in the South are not being properly cared for.
North Korean defectors often experience discrimination and alienation in the process of settling in South Korean society and have difficulty making a living, according to writer Cho Gyeong-il, whose autobiographical story, “To Aoji,” was published on Dec. 15
Cho, who defected to the South at the age of 16, told the JoongAng Ilbo in an interview that the man who re-defected on Saturday “must have been very lonely psychologically, especially considering that he only spent a few months living in the South [on his own] after being released from Hanawon and questioning by the National Intelligence Service (NIS).”
Defense Ministry officials believe the man who crossed over to the North on Saturday was a man in his 30s who defected to the South in November 2020 based on CCTV footage and their knowledge of defectors who crossed the same area in Goseong County, Gangwon, to make their way South.
Defectors from the North are mandated to undergo a 12-week course at Hanawon — officially known as the Settlement Support Center for North Korean Refugee — where they are prepared for life in the capitalist South. They also undergo screening by NIS investigators to ensure they are not spies sent by Pyongyang or ethnic Koreans from China posing as defectors.
Cho urged more psychological and career support for defectors trying to settle in South Korea, where they often struggle with discrimination, a lack of familial ties, and difficulty making a living in a fiercely competitive society.
Cho singled out the adjustment program at Hanawon as under-preparing defectors for their lives in the South.
“The institute needs to offer practical, hands-on training in fields where defectors can feasibly find employment, like hairdressing,” the author said. “Most defectors leave Hanawon and end up working in karaoke parlors if they’re women, and manual labor if they’re men.
“They just continue struggling to survive [after they leave Hanawon] because they’re left to their own devices.”
Cho also said that many defectors remain emotionally unmoored, even after living in the South for a long time. “Not only do they face discrimination, but they miss the families they left behind. Hanawon needs to maintain a counselling department to manage defectors over a longer period of time.”
The Unification Ministry’s estimate that a total 30 North Korean defectors in the past decade have boomeranged back to the North suggest that the struggle to adapt to South Korean society is so hard that they take the dangerous trek back, where they can face brutal recriminations.
The North has taken an even tougher stance on unauthorized entries during the Covid-19 pandemic.
When a North Korean defector surnamed Kim re-defected to his hometown of Kaesong in July 2020, the regime shut down the city for three weeks over Covid-19 fears.
In September 2020, a South Korean official with the fisheries department disappeared near the border while on a patrol boat and was later shot dead and his body burned in North Korean waters by North Korean soldiers, according to South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
8. How a Renegade Gymnast Strolled Into North Korea Like It Was No Big Deal
My comments, among others, are below.
How a Renegade Gymnast Strolled Into North Korea Like It Was No Big Deal
The young defector has sent South Korean officials into a frenzy as they try to figure out how in the world he managed to pull off the dangerous journey to the North.
Published Jan. 03, 2022 12:24PM ET
ED JONES/AFP via Getty Images
Talk about double jeopardy.
It was one thing for a young North Korean man to jump over the tall barbed-wire fences of the heavily guarded demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the two Koreas and defect to the South. And it was quite another to do it the other way around.
This Saturday, according to embarrassed South Korean officials, the unidentified man, who is reportedly in his 30s, re-defected. That is, he made it over the fences of the four-kilometer-wide DMZ and back into North Korea. Having defected to the South back in November 2020, he evidently decided he didn’t like his lowly job for a cleaning service in the South and wanted to go back home the way he came.
Considering the height of the fencing, the man either had to climb up and over the wire curled at the top or take a running leap or even pole-vault. While under interrogation after his first defection to the South, he reportedly described himself as a gymnast in North Korea—light, slim and in good physical shape. His success in getting up and over the barriers, not once, but twice would suggest he’s fit enough to have dared crossing from North to South and back again.
The case has the South Korean defense ministry wondering how it could have been so easy for the man to escape detection by surveillance gear on the southern side of the line. And how then could he have slipped through and around mine fields and escaped South Korean troops scrutinizing any signs of movement in the crags and valleys on the eastern end of the DMZ, the scene of some of the Korean War’s bloodiest battles?
While interrogating the South Korean army officers responsible for that particular patch of desolate turf, an anonymous South Korean official dismissed speculation that he was either an embittered South Korean army turncoat or a North Korean spy. The official told Korean journalists that the man “was recognized to be the same as the defector” after reviewing surveillance footage that captured a glimpse of his movements.
“I think it was likely a fatal mistake for the defector.”
The success of the man in evading detection as he infiltrated the DMZ and then crossed the line into the North places him in a unique category. “Never heard of someone going both ways through the DMZ since the war except for spies/agents,” Steve Tharp, who’s made a career watching North Korea as an army officer and civilian official with the U.S. command, told The Daily Beast. “If he isn't an agent, it must be a first.”
It’s not all that unusual for defectors from North Korea, many of them facing discrimination, loneliness and near-poverty in the South, to regret leaving the North, but so far only about 30 of the 33,000 or so who’ve made it to the South have then made it back.
The vast majority of defectors have escaped North Korea by crossing either the Yalu or Tumen River into China, evading capture by the Chinese, who would return them to cruel fates in North Korea, and making their way either to Mongolia or into Thailand, Laos or Vietnam. Re-defectors, as they are sometimes called, generally go back via China.
Some of those who’ve opted to return have appeared on North Korean TV saying how awful life was in the South, how much they had wanted to return to their families and, of course, how grateful they were to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un for the benefits and privileges of life in the North. For this man, though, the immediate challenge after he stepped across the line would have been to avoid getting shot on sight by North Korean soldiers dug in close to their side of the DMZ.
North Korea acknowledged receiving messages from the South asking about the man but did not say if he’d been picked up dead or alive. Chances for survival, however, were not good.
“I think it was likely a fatal mistake for the defector as the KPA (Korean People’s Army) are not receptive of defectors due to COVID19 concerns,” Tharp told the Daily Beast. “I assume that the defector is dead and has been burned or otherwise disposed of by now.”
Tharp doubted the North Koreans would acknowledge having killed him, as they did in the case of a South Korean fisheries official who was shot and killed while floating in the Yellow Sea in September 2020.
Miraculously, however, this alleged gymnast was able to weave around mines in place on the southern side of the DMZ since the Korean War ended with a truce in July 1953.
“There are so many mines unaccounted for over the decades,” said David Maxwell, a retired U.S. army colonel. “It is very dangerous to walk in the DMZ. It is not like in the movies and someone provides a hand sketch to follow at night.”
Maxwell, who did five tours in South Korea in the special forces, told The Daily Beast, “Known and marked minefields can be avoided if you have the knowledge and experience” but emphasized, “Many unmarked mines make it very dangerous.”
But how could the man have gotten past the South Koreans just below their side of the DMZ?
“The main issue is lax discipline, especially under this regime.”
“The breakdown was not in the DMZ,” said Maxwell, now with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “It was at the South Barrier fence (SBF) on the southern edge of the DMZ. There must have been a breakdown in observation, patrolling, and the high SBF to allow this person to enter the DMZ.”
The problem could well be related to both politics and technology. The government of South Korea’s liberal President Moon Jae-in, looking for dialog with the North, “may be reluctant to appear too aggressive,” said Maxwell. “They rely on technology which has been proven time and again to be insufficient whether it is the DMZ or any nation’s border.”
And, he said, “Once in the DMZ there is no fence from two kilometers south of the military demarcation line until you reach the north’s territory.” The man, having made it past the barrier fence, “could make it across the DMZ and be lucky he did not step on a mine anywhere as there are so many within the DMZ.”
Politics was clearly an all-important factor, in the view of Shim Jae-hoon, who’s been analyzing North Korea as a journalist for years.
“The main issue is lax discipline, especially under this regime,” said Shim. “Remember: this incident happened during New Year holidays. The company commander in charge apparently relaxed security. Such lapses occurred rarely under the conservative government leadership.”
9. [EXCLUSIVE] In Year of Tiger, Samsung lays out 'Tiger' strategy to beat Apple
A bold prediction now that Apple has surpassed the $3 Trillion threshold. I am sure Apple is uttering the immortal words of former President George W. Bush: "Bring it on."
[EXCLUSIVE] In Year of Tiger, Samsung lays out 'Tiger' strategy to beat Apple
Published : Jan 4, 2022 - 12:30 Updated : Jan 4, 2022 - 17:52
Samsung Electronics Vice Chairman and CEO Han Jong-hee (Samsung)
LAS VEGAS -- In the Year of the Water Tiger, Samsung Electronics has set out its own “Tiger” strategy to seek a more aggressive push in the North American market and narrow its gap with Apple in the cutthroat smartphone market.
Two days ahead of the opening of the CES electronics show in Las Vegas, some 40 Samsung executives gathered at a meeting in the US city to discuss this year‘s smartphone strategy with the acronym “Tiger.”
The letters individually stand for: “True No. 1 in all product categories,” “Improve flagship market share,” narrow the “Gap between Apple,” “Expanding” the presence of products such as wireless earphones, and the firm’s determination to achieve a “Record year” by reaching its targets.
The closed-door meeting was attended by Han Jong-hee, vice chairman at Samsung Electronics, Roh Tae-moon, head of the tech giant’s mobile experience, or MX, division, and Park Hark-kyu, chief of operations of the firm’s end products division, known as SET.
Opening with a short New Year’s address from Han, Roh‘s presentation followed in English, laying out details for his mobile experience vision.
“Our MX vision is to shift from a smartphone vendor to an intelligent device company. We will not be a tech brand, but a brand beloved by young generations, providing innovative experience,” Roh said.
Playing a video clip, which contained constant roaring sounds of a tiger throughout, executives urged a concerted effort to achieve No. 1 in all product categories, increase the market share of premium products over $600, induce users to convert to Galaxy smartphones, bolster the presence of electronics accessories such as wireless earphones and make 2022 a record year.
Samsung’s Tiger strategy appears to be reflecting the tech giant‘s sense of urgency for losing ground to cheap low-end smartphones.
In China, the world’s largest smartphone market, Samsung has near zero presence. The tech company’s market share in the Chinese smartphone market stood at 0.5 percent in the first half of last year, which was a 0.7 percentage-point drop on-year, Counterpoint Research data showed.
In India, the world’s second-largest smartphone market after China, Samsung’s market share has been on decline. Samsung‘s margin line of 20 percent market share was compromised in the second half of last year, Sino Research suggests. The company eventually yielded its second place to a Chinese smartphone manufacturer Realme in October.
But in the premium smartphone markets of North America and Europe, Samsung is doing better than ever, partially benefiting from the absence of LG, which decided to call its smartphone business quits.
According to Strategy Analytics, Samsung reclaimed its top spot in both the North American and European markets from Apple and Xiaomi in the third quarter last year.
Samsung’s focus on expanding the market share of its flagship models is based on the success of Galaxy Z Fold3 and Flip3. Despite their hefty prices, they sold well last year. Galaxy Z Flip 3 was among the bestsellers in the North American market, falling slightly short to enter the top 5 list by sales. With its Galaxy Z lineup, Samsung is expected to narrow the gap with Apple in the global market.
10. North Koreans, already hungry, now short of cooking oil
Another indication of the suffering and hardships in the north.
North Koreans, already hungry, now short of cooking oil
High costs put the ‘essential’ ingredient out of reach for many.
North Koreans hit by food shortages and soaring prices caused by the closing of cross-border trade with China are now finding it hard to buy cooking oil, an essential commodity, sources say.
Cooking oil previously cost less than 10,000 North Korean won, or about U.S. $2 per kilogram, but has now become more expensive, a resident of Puryong county in North Hamgyong province told RFA.
“Now, it costs around 45,000 North Korean won [U.S. $9], and there are cases now where the cooking oil stand is empty due to insufficient quantity in the marketplaces, so people sometimes aren’t able to buy it,” the source said, speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons.
“If you don’t have sugar or seasoning, you just don’t eat it, but oil is essential to our diet,” the source said. “However, it has been a long time since many residents have cooked with cooking oil.”
The source said that he had recently bought a small bottle of cooking oil to help celebrate the New Year and had encountered a group of other women from her village on her way home.
“I was astonished to hear them say that they hadn’t had any cooking oil for a long time and couldn’t even remember when they had it last,” he said. “A woman living next door to me said she had not been able to use cooking oil at all since the fall of last year. She was jealous of the oil that I had.”
Also speaking to RFA, a resident of Manpo city in Chagang province said that cooking oil is now commonly sold in small bottles or plastic bags of 50 or 100 grams.
“And if someone is seen carrying cooking oil packed in 2-kilogram cans, everyone looks at that person with envy,” the source said. “I bought half a bottle, about 500 grams, of oil a couple of months ago, and I’m using it little by little. And when you see other families, you can hardly find side dishes cooked with oil.
“The authorities have said they will solve the cooking-oil problem by cultivating crops of oil plants such as sunflower and castor bean, but in reality we’re not seeing any farms growing oil plants. Total national production would probably be negligible anyway,” he said.
Also missing from many North Korean tables this year is a red bean porridge called patjuk, a popular traditional winter food believed to ward off bad luck in the new year, but now largely out of residents’ reach due to rising prices, sources said.
“Just like last year, many residents cannot afford to make patjuk and are instead making porridge from corn," said a resident of North Hwanghae province, which borders South Korea.
“Only some people have enough money to afford beans, but for regular citizens this has become a luxury,” the source said, also speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons.
North Korea now needs external food aid to meet its basic needs, according to a Dec. 2 report by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization.
The FAO said North Korea should have imported 1.06 million tons of grain between November 2020 and November 2021 to cover the gap between supply and demand, but trade with China has been on hold since January 2020 due to the coronavirus pandemic.
Reported by Chang Gyu Ahn and Jieun Kim for RFA’s Korean Service. Translated by Leejin Jun and Claire Lee. Written in English by Richard Finney.
11. Three issues for US-Korea relations in 2022
Conclusion:
While the transition to Biden allowed the United States and South Korea to reset relations, how the allies manage the pandemic, economic coercion and North Korea will have implications beyond 2022.
Three issues for US-Korea relations in 2022
By Troy Stangarone
After four years of tensions over national security and trade, the United States and South Korea sought to reset relations in 2021. The election of Joe Biden as president of the United States allowed Washington and Seoul to reach a new agreement quickly on defense cost sharing and then agree to increase cooperation on issues ranging from supply chains to vaccine cooperation to climate change at the U.S.-Korea summit in May.
As 2022 begins, the United States and South Korea face three key issues: how to best cooperate in managing the pandemic and its impact on economic and security cooperation, how to address the political and economic coercion that continue to increase globally and how to deal with North Korea.
How the allies manage these three issues as South Korea begins its own presidential transition will be key to achieving progress in the year ahead. The pandemic, which has taken millions of lives globally, disrupted trade and heightened geopolitical tensions, is entering its third year. International coordination has been lacking during much of the pandemic. But with the rise of the Omicron variant and the potential for new variants in the year ahead, any effort to return life to normal in the United States and South Korea must include deeper cooperation on vaccinating the rest of the world's population.
Last May's summit meeting put forward a framework for increased U.S.-Korea cooperation to achieve that goal. It called for both countries to increase vaccine cooperation and work to scale up COVAX, the international effort to vaccinate middle- and low-income countries. It also called for expanding the production capacity for COVID-19 vaccines, specifically in South Korea, and working to secure the supply chains needed to produce vaccines. Both of these goals are also designed to help in dealing with potential future pandemics as well.
Fully implementing this agreement would help in returning life to normal domestically and in relieving some of pressure on supply chains that have begun to push up inflation in both countries. While disruptions from closures due to the pandemic have been a factor, global supply chains have largely worked well during the pandemic but have been under additional stress from significantly increased demand for durable consumer goods. The quicker that countries are able to move to "Living with COVID-19" policies and individuals can safely return to restaurants, movies and other forms of entertainment, the sooner strains on supply chains will ease.
Much of the focus on secure supply chains has been due to the pandemic, but it is also related to the political and economic coercion that has grown in recent years. China's efforts to coerce South Korea into withdrawing the THAAD missile defense system has become more common. While not alone in using this tactic, China has also recently attempted to coerce Australia into rescinding a call for an investigation into the origins of COVID-19 and Lithuania to refrain from opening a representative's office in Taiwan. It has even used similar tactics to silence voices in the NBA over its human rights record.
Addressing this issue will be critical for the alliance, as the United States is looking to South Korean firms to help in its transition to electric vehicles, specifically in regards to lithium-ion batteries. China is a key source for the materials needed to produce lithium-ion batteries.
In addition to electric vehicle batteries, key technologies such as semiconductors and 5G equipment are potentially vulnerable to supply chain disruptions. Increased cooperation to identify potential vulnerabilities and lower dependence on a single source will help to reduce the temptation of other countries to utilize trade as a tool to coerce the alliance.
The pandemic is also constraining the alliance's efforts to deal with North Korea. Despite the efforts of the Moon administration to restart negotiations with North Korea, talks remain stalled, including over an end-of-war declaration. Pyongyang's policies, while preventing the domestic spread of COVID-19, have created an economic crisis, one that it can only overcome with international assistance to deal with the pandemic. While there has been a concerted effort by the United States and South Korea to engage North Korea, the deeper reality is that as long as the pandemic continues North Korea is unlikely to negotiate from a position of weakness.
This presents a dilemma for the United States and South Korea. Failing to help North Korea through the pandemic could push nuclear talks further into the future. However, diverting significant resources to North Korea as long as Pyongyang remains opaque about COVID-19 domestically would mean taking scarce resources from countries known to be in need.
While the transition to Biden allowed the United States and South Korea to reset relations, how the allies manage the pandemic, economic coercion and North Korea will have implications beyond 2022.
Troy Stangarone (ts@keia.org) is the senior director of congressional affairs and trade at the Korea Economic Institute.
12. North Korean prices of South Korean cosmetics skyrocket 10-fold since start of 2022
I guess there is a real "income gap" in north Korea between the elite and all the rest of the Korean people. Compare this report with the RFA report on the high cost of cooking oil for the hungry. Who can afford to spend $500 to $1000 on skin care products?
And another issue to note is how much demand there is among the elite for South Korean products.
But this is an interesting concept. So there must be subversive elements within the elite buying these products and they are acting in a most disloyal way to the regime. Think of how we could exploit this as part of an information and influence activities campaign.
Excerpt:
Moreover, the prices also reflect a sort of “risk premium” as North Korean authorities conduct a dragnet against “anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior” after enacting a law to eradicate “reactionary culture and thought” in late 2020.
North Korean prices of South Korean cosmetics skyrocket 10-fold since start of 2022
Sulwhasoo gift sets with skin cream and lotion have recently been selling for USD 500 to 1,000
The price of South Korean cosmetics in North Korea has skyrocketed 10-fold since the start of the new year. Purchasing South Korean cosmetics, a popular New Year’s present in North Korea in years past, is apparently growing more difficult due to the border closure to combat COVID-19.
A Daily NK source in North Korea said Monday that the price of the South Korean cosmetic products has recently shot up more than 10-fold in Pyongyang’s markets, despite economic troubles in the wake of COVID-19.
The source added that with imports shut off for nearly two years due to the border closure, supplies have hit nearly bottom and prices are climbing.
Sulwhasoo gift sets with skin cream and lotion used to cost USD 50 to 100 prior to COVID-19, but they have recently been selling for USD 500 to 1,000. That represents a 10-fold climb over two years.
Sulwhasoo is a cosmetic brand made by South Korean company Amorepacific. This means that a South Korean cosmetic brand popular with North Korean women has significantly climbed in price.
When North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visited a cosmetic shop in the Haedanghwa Service Complex near the Taedong River prior to its opening, you could see a place selling famous brands Laneige, L’Oréal and Lancôme. Laneige is also an Amorepacific brand.
Demand for South Korean products in North Korea has been climbing as South Korean pop culture has grown in popularity. You cannot buy South Korean products in markets because North Korean authorities ban their sale, but customers have been able to get them through private black market deals with traders.
Popular South Korean cosmetics on offer in North Korean markets. / Image: Daily NK
In particular, North Koreans find it trendy to use South Korean products in their weddings, so having family in South Korea has been advantageous in the marriage market. Couples who wear South Korean-made wedding attire and exchange many South Korean-made wedding gifts are viewed with envy.
However, the source said with both trade and smuggling stopped, the supply has dried up and prices gradually climbed.
Moreover, the prices also reflect a sort of “risk premium” as North Korean authorities conduct a dragnet against “anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior” after enacting a law to eradicate “reactionary culture and thought” in late 2020.
The law is an attempt to prevent South Korean “cultural content” from entering the country.
Given that South Korean cosmetics are not only imported from outside the country, but also carry a political risk considering their country of origin, sellers can name their price.
The source said with foreign-made home appliances and even South Korean cosmetics growing hard to come by, North Korean users of such products are complaining. He added that the wives of rich donju and cadres were asking around for such merchandise, prepared to pay any price.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
13. F-35A fighter makes emergency landing due to 'avionic system issues': Air Force
(2nd LD) F-35A fighter makes emergency landing due to 'avionic system issues': Air Force | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with details in paras 4-5, 9)
By Kang Yoon-seung and Song Sang-ho
SEOUL, Jan. 4 (Yonhap) -- An F-35A fighter operated by South Korea's Air Force made an emergency landing during a training session Tuesday due to avionic system issues, with its pilot having emerged unscathed, officials said.
The radar-evading jet made the belly landing on a runway at an air base in Seosan, 151 kilometers south of Seoul, at 12:51 p.m. after the issues caused the landing gear to momentarily malfunction, the officials said.
The pilot walked away unscathed, they added.
Before the landing, the Air Force mobilized a fire engine to apply special foam on the runway, which prevented the jet's fuselage from sustaining any serious damage.
It apparently marks the first known belly landing ever reported since the U.S. began exporting F-35A fighters to foreign countries, an informed military source said.
South Korea's Air Force and the U.S. military plan to initiate a joint investigation into what went wrong with the fighter manufactured by the U.S. defense firm Lockheed Martin.
The Air Force will suspend all of its F-35A fighters pending the probe, the officials said.
It has so far received more than 30 F-35A jets from the United States under a plan to deploy a total of 40 units.
The F-35A is the fighter's air force variant, while the F-35B and F-35C are for marine and aircraft carrier-based operations, respectively.
colin@yna.co.kr
(END)
14. Leading presidential candidates face mounting distrust
More on the complexity of South Korean politics.
Leading presidential candidates face mounting distrust
People Power Party presidential candidate Yoon Suk-yeol leaves the party's headquarters on Yeouido, Seoul, Monday. Joint Press Corps
By Nam Hyun-woo
The presidential hopefuls of the ruling Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) and the main opposition People Power Party (PPP) are suffering from a high level of distrust from both the public and members of their own political camps, and even facing calls from their own party members to be replaced with less than 70 days left until the March 9 presidential election.
The election committee of PPP presidential candidate Yoon Suk-yeol has been almost disbanded after all of the chiefs of the committee offered to resign on Monday, in an effort to overhaul the organization amid a rapid decline in Yoon's support rate following the party's internal disputes and the candidate's continued slips of the tongue.
As Yoon's gaffes continue, along with conflicts within the party, the candidate has faced mounting criticism from within the PPP over his leadership, along with calls to replace him.
Such demands peaked when PPP election committee chief Kim Chong-in on Monday told Yoon to "act" according to the campaign team's direction.
Along with the comment, Kim announced the decision to reform the election committee without informing Yoon beforehand, indicating that many of the decisions at the committee have been made without seeking the candidate's opinion.
The moves triggered strong responses from both inside and outside the party.
Yoon's primary rival within the PPP, Rep. Hong Joon-pyo, said that the comment shows that the party looks down on the candidate, while DPK Chairman Song Young-gil said that the opposition party has admitted that Yoon is nothing more than a "figurehead."
Although the PPP is unlikely to replace the candidate when the election is about two months ahead, there is still anticipation that Yoon may have to form a coalition with the moderately-conservative People's Party and contend with its presidential candidate, Ahn Cheol-soo, for a single candidacy.
People's Party presidential candidate Ahn Cheol-soo speaks to Kim Ho-il, the chairman of the Korea Senior Citizens Association, at its office in Yongsan District, Seoul, Tuesday. Joint Press CorpsWhile Yoon's support rate falters, Ahn has seen a noticeable growth in the number of backers, dropping hints that a coalition with the former doctor and software tycoon could be a viable choice for the PPP.
According to a survey by Global Research, requested by broadcaster JTBC, Ahn's support rate stood at 9.1 percent, following behind Yoon with 28.1 percent and DPK candidate Lee Jae-myung with 37 percent. The poll questioned 1,012 adults from Jan. 1 to 2, and further details are available at the National Election Survey Deliberation Commission website.
In response to a question about who should be the single candidate in case Yoon and Ahn form a coalition, 41.1 percent of respondents said they prefer Ahn, while 30.6 percent said they prefer Yoon. Among the respondents who said they support a Yoon-Ahn coalition, however, Yoon outpaced Ahn by 55.9 percent to 35.9 percent.
So far, Ahn has been ruling out any possibility of a coalition with Yoon and the PPP.
"There will be no coalition and I am the only person who can beat DPK's Lee," Ahn said during an interview with Sisa Journal. However, pundits say chances are high that the PPP will seek a coalition with Ahn, although either Yoon or Ahn will not be able to fully absorb each other's support rate.
Against this backdrop, there are multiple scenarios for such a coalition, such as a primary between Ahn and Yoon after Ahn joins the PPP, or a merger of the People's Party with the PPP. Also, there is a chance that the two will hold a primary regardless of their party.
Democratic Party of Korea presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung, second from right, listens to an official at Kia's plant in Gwangmyeong, Gyeonggi Province, Tuesday. Joint Press CorpsMeanwhile, DPK presidential candidate Lee is also suffering from lingering doubts about his candidacy.
The DPK reopened an online forum for party members on Monday and more than 1,300 posts about replacing the presidential candidate were posted that day.
Most of the posts demanded that the party replace its candidate, Lee, suggesting his primary rival, former Prime Minister Lee Nak-yon, as an alternative.
"Apart from personal favors of Lee, the candidate, whose ethical flaw is at a critical level, is unqualified to criticize the PPP candidate and justify his presidency," a post read.
Lee has been grappling with suspicions that he was involved in a massive land development scandal in Seongnam, Gyeonggi Province. Also, the police are investigating allegations that Lee's son dabbled in illegal gambling.
15.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
