Quotes of the Day:
“As we express our gratitude, we must never forget that the highest appreciation is not to utter words, but to live by them.”
-John F. Kennedy
“There is nothing nobler than risking your life for your country.”
- Nick Lampson
“Who kept the faith and fought the fight; The glory theirs, the duty ours.”
- Wallace Bruce
1. North Korea Intensifies War Against Foreign Influence
2. North Koreans struggling with high prices, banknote shortages, and tougher ideological rules
3. U.S. diplomat for East Asia policy discusses North Korea, alliance, supply chains in Seoul
4. Foreign minister says S. Korea-U.S. talks over end-of-war declaration in final stages
5. Despot Kim not seen in public for over a month sparking fresh health rumours
6. North Korean prisoners are lined up for gruelling work in rare photos
7. Could the U.S. Navy Strangle North Korea with a Naval Blockade?
8. Is Korea Overdependent on China?
9. North Korean hackers target the South's think tanks through blog posts
10. North Korea teeters on the brink of famine as winter approaches
11. Joe Biden Must Change His North Korea Policy
12. A North Korean defector is on the run in China after escaping from prison 23 days ago, with police offering a $31,000 reward
13. Seoul rejects refugee claims by Chinese N. Korean defectors
14. What's behind the global K-pop and Korean film takeover?
1. North Korea Intensifies War Against Foreign Influence
Excellent analysis from Martyn Williams.
Conclusion:
North Korea’s complete legal framework for dealing with foreign content and culture has never been published, but based on what has been smuggled out in the past, this new law represents a significant step up in punishments. When taken with increased border restrictions, it appears the state has taken advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic to tighten its grip on the North Korean people. This is a troubling development and could pose a real threat to future efforts to get uncensored information into the country.
North Korea Intensifies War Against Foreign Influence
In early December 2020, a plenary meeting of North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), its highest legislative body, approved several new laws, including one called the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law.[1] While the text of the law was not made public outside of the North, anecdotal reports since indicate that this has prompted a widespread crackdown on foreign content and influence in the country.
The current campaign does appear more intense and far-reaching than citizens have faced in recent years, although it is difficult to judge the full extent of these measures or effect of the law, in part, due to a lack of foreign observers inside the country, and in part due to communications restrictions imposed by the law itself.
However, North Korean documents about the law detail the full extent of its reach, outlining harsh new punishments—up to and including execution for the most severe violations—and bans on such behavior as even speaking in a “South Korean” style.
(Source: DPRK Today via Martyn Williams)
Considered alone, the new law takes the state’s battle against foreign information to a worrying level not seen for many years, but the law has not appeared in a vacuum. The country has almost totally sealed its borders shut since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, shutting down nearly all smuggling routes. Last year it began strengthening its border with the addition of a second fence and new electronic monitoring systems designed to keep people in and foreign culture out.
North Korea shows no signs of reducing its pandemic protections anytime soon, so smuggling likely remains all but impossible until that happens. And even when it does, it is difficult to know if the border will go back to its old ways or if the current protocols will remain in place. If the latter happens, there is a real worry North Korea could be stepping much further back into the information dark ages.
Origins
North Korea’s battle against foreign culture began in the 1980s with VHS tapes from Japan. Foreign media has always posed a threat to the state, which uses the Propaganda and Agitation Department (PAD) to ensure all North Korean media sends the same message to citizens.
The VHS tapes were eventually replaced by physically smaller digital formats that were easier to smuggle. First, it was Video CDs and DVDs, then USB memory sticks and now fingernail-sized MicroSD cards.
Demand inside the country also grew as word of foreign movies and TV shows spread. Many defectors say illicit consumption of foreign media was the norm among peers and even those charged with enforcing the law. When crackdowns did occur, it was often possible to escape punishment with a bribe.
Restrictions regarding the foreign media environment seemed to be easing at one point, when the harshest penalties surrounding foreign media in North Korea’s Criminal Code shifted from consumption to distribution in the years from 2009 to 2015. It appeared that the state recognized it had lost the battle against consumption and turned its attention to the providers instead.
However, in late January 2020, when North Korea sealed its borders in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the state achieved something—at least temporarily—it had been unable to do for years: stopping the physical flow of foreign content into the country.
New Law
When delegates converged on Pyongyang in early December 2020, the new law on reactionary culture was one of the top agenda items.
At the time, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said the law set out the principles to which citizens, institutions and organizations should follow to cement “ideological, revolutionary and class positions by thoroughly preventing the inroads and spread of the anti-socialist ideology and culture and firmly maintaining our idea, spirit and culture.”[2]
The full text of the law was not published, but four pages describing a portion of it were obtained by the Seoul-based Daily NK and shared with 38 North.
The document covers articles 27 to 33 of the law, which spell out criminal punishments for a series of violations, from mass distribution of South Korean movies to the use of South Korean slang and fonts. The penalties range from dismissal from jobs for minor offenses to death for the most severe crimes; financial penalties for some crimes are specified as well. Together, this helps indicate what content and actions are feared most by the North Korean state.
South Korean Content
When it comes to smuggled content from overseas, the largest and highest demand inside North Korea is for South Korean movies and TV shows. For the regime, however, this material represents one of the greatest perceived threats to the nation’s ideological purity. Because the two countries used to be one, concerns linger that unfavorable conclusions will be drawn about the competency of the North’s leadership based on the vast difference in development of the two nations. As such, South Korean content attracts the harshest punishment.
Article 27 of the law says the import or distribution of South Korean movies, TV shows, songs and books is punishable by an indefinite period of reform through labor or death. For people convicted of organizing or encouraging group viewing of the content—considered the highest level of crime—the punishment specified is death.
The punishment for those caught watching or possessing the same content is five to 15 years of reform through labor.
While accounts vary, reform through labor is generally understood to involve hard manual labor inside a political prisoners’ camp. When prisoners are not working, they are undergoing ideological indoctrination sessions. The overall aim of the camp is to ensure that those released are never tempted to break the law again. Some accounts say the conditions are so harsh, many prisoners do not survive their sentences.
This is not the first time the death penalty has been handed out in relation to foreign content, but its use had been thought to be waning. It was often used in the late 1990s and early 2000s by Kim Jong Il, but recorded cases dropped in recent years. The last execution related to South Korean media documented by the Transitional Justice Working Group, for instance, was in 2013/2014, according to its 2019 report.
But since the new law has been announced, executions related to South Korean media are reportedly occurring once again. Daily NK reported a Wonsan man was executed in April for selling CDs and USBs with South Korean content, and four in Pyongyang were executed in March for selling and distributing South Korean material. It also reported that six students in Nampho were sentenced to five years in a reeducation camp for watching South Korean movies.
Other Content
A step below South Korean content in severity is movies, TV shows and other material from countries judged hostile to North Korea, which, according to the document, includes the US and Japan.
Article 28 of the law deals with importing and distributing movies, TV shows and books from such nations and punishes those convicted with up to 15 years of reform through labor; however, that jumps to an indefinite period or death in the case of a “large amount.” (The document does not specify what constitutes a “large amount,” and this ambiguity is likely by design.) For simply watching or possessing such content, the penalty is up to ten years of reform through labor.
Another target of the law is pornography, which has always been harshly punished. Article 29 says anyone who watches or possesses pornography or “books, photos and pictures that preach sex or superstition” will be sentenced with five to 15 years of reform through labor.
An indefinite period of reform through labor is possible for those who import or distribute the content, rising to death depending on volume or if collective viewing is organized or encouraged.
The law also punishes the making of pornographic content with an indefinite period of reform through labor.
Article 30 targets content from countries that is “inconsistent with the socialist ideology and culture and our ways of life.” This is a wider catch-all category that can include content from even friendly nations that is judged to offend. Watching or keeping such material carries a punishment of reform through labor for up to five years, while importing and distributing such materials can carry a sentence of five to 15 years.
Cultural Influence
Article 32 of the new law moves beyond simply the consumption of South Korean media, but targets the larger impact that has had on society. It states:
“A person who speaks or writes in the South Korean style, sings a song in the South Korean style, or produces printed materials in a South Korean font shall be punished by training through labor or by reform through labor for up to two years depending on the circumstances.” The difference between “training through labor” and “reform through labor” is unclear.
According to defectors, the use of South Korean slang, especially among youths, is one of the things security services check for in on-the-spot street inspections of smartphones. Getting caught using South Korean slang in text messages now, for instance, can carry a sentence of up to two years of reform through labor.
Article 33 targets those who turn a blind eye to any of these illegal activities. Anyone who is aware of foreign media content or pornography being imported, distributed or consumed and does not report it can be subject to training through labor. The length of the training is not defined in the document.
North Korean Content and Chinese Phones
Under the new law, it is not just foreign content that can get North Koreans in trouble. The regime’s tight control of media and centrally controlled messaging means that there are times when even domestically produced material can become prohibited. One of the most well-known examples of this was the scrubbing of Jang Song Taek from all state media (ever) following his arrest and execution in 2013.
The new law includes an article targeting the distribution and viewing of domestic content that “has been nationally suspended,” with a sentence of at least three months of reform through labor. This hints that a (domestic) market does exist for content previously published by state media that is later withdrawn.
The same punishment is also levied on three other acts: unlawfully making recordings or printed matters, possessing a foreign mobile phone and installing a “mobile phone manipulation program” (ways to work around domestic mobile network restrictions).
Financial Fines
And finally, there is a range of fines spelled out in the law targeted at both individuals and institutions.
For context, all televisions, radios and personal computers in North Korea must be registered with authorities. TVs and radios brought in from overseas are modified so they cannot tune in to foreign broadcasting stations. Computers are also required to run North Korean surveillance software, but some defectors say it is common for citizens to either ignore the registration requirements and keep the device in secret or to bribe officials to forego the software installation.
Under the new law, fines from 10,000 to 50,000 North Korean won can be imposed for watching or keeping North Korean material that has been taken out of circulation; from 50,000 to 100,000 won for using a TV, radio or computer that hasn’t been inspected and registered with authorities, or for using a mobile phone with a propaganda-blocking app or other “impure” content; and from 100,000 to 200,000 won for creating photos, drawings or writings that “do not fit our ways of life and national customs” or for educating your own children “in an irresponsible manner.”
There are bigger fines levied on institutions, organizations and workplaces where offenses occur.
The largest of these, at between 1 million and 1.5 million won, is for “creating space for bringing in and distributing reactionary ideology and culture by violating the established order.” This includes ignoring import inspections on foreign electronic, radio, TV or printing equipment or for “not correctly controlling Internet or computer network management.”
The latter appears to be targeted at lax monitoring of Internet use by employees and students at institutions that are allowed access, such as foreign trading firms and universities.
A smaller fine of between 500,000 to one million won is threatened on organizations that ignore rules on registration and inspection of electronics, radios, TVs and printing equipment.
Companies and organizations can also be ordered to suspend business or close completely if the infractions are judged to be severe enough.
Article 39 allows the state to confiscate any money made through any acts that violate the law.
In addition to the fines, the new law also targets workers. Customs officials who let foreign content into the country and teachers or managers at organizations or schools where workers and students are caught with offending material are threatened with unpaid labor, demotion or dismissal for allowing the misdeeds to happen.
Conclusion
North Korea’s complete legal framework for dealing with foreign content and culture has never been published, but based on what has been smuggled out in the past, this new law represents a significant step up in punishments. When taken with increased border restrictions, it appears the state has taken advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic to tighten its grip on the North Korean people. This is a troubling development and could pose a real threat to future efforts to get uncensored information into the country.
- [1]
“12th Plenary Meeting of 14th Presidium of DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly Held,” KCNA, December 5, 2020.
- [2]
Ibid.
2. North Koreans struggling with high prices, banknote shortages, and tougher ideological rules
But the common point throughout the history of the regime is that it is all about ideology. The regime believes it must be able to exert absolute ideological control over the people and every aspect of north Korea.
North Koreans struggling with high prices, banknote shortages, and tougher ideological rules - Daily NK
The North Korean government is doubling down on its efforts to "strengthen socialism" within the country
Economic woes caused by the pandemic continue to affect the lives of North Koreans throughout the country. With the country is running low on finances, a wide range of products remain unavailable while people struggle to purchase daily necessities at higher prices. Although the fall harvest was expected to reduce prices to some extent, the difference in prices has remained minor, with ordinary people feeling the pinch.
Locals in Yangang Province are reportedly disappointed that prices have not fallen as anticipated this autumn while expressing concern about next year’s food supply. The price of items that were in high demand such as cooking oil, seasonings and sugar are falling, but from the perspective of locals, prices are still very high compared to what they were before the pandemic.
Even if locals can manage to find Chinese goods in markets, prices are reportedly so high due to the lack of imports that ordinary people can’t afford them. For example, although Chinese shampoo was selling for around RMB 30 (about USD 4.65) before the pandemic, prices recently skyrocketed to as high as RMB 800 (about USD 123). Even staple items such as cabbage necessary to make kimchi have become unaffordable for many North Koreans, resulting in them having to give up making winter kimchi for the second straight year.
Last month, the central government reportedly issued an order to provincial authorities to find ways to better supply daily necessities to the people and “build a new commercial network.” The order called on authorities to draw up a basic design plan by the end of November and begin operations of the new network by the end of the year. As a result of the order, North Hamgyong Province is conceptualizing a plan that would operate provincial markets in accordance with current conditions, while inviting private investment to build new general stores of various sizes in densely populated areas, or to expand existing stores.
Market official on patrol in Sunchon, South Pyongan Province. / Image: Daily NK
What’s more, faced with foreign exchange shortages, North Korean authorities reportedly plan to send a new batch of workers overseas. Pyongyang plans to send over 1,000 workers within the year, mainly to Russia to work in logging camps. North Korean authorities plan to send them in two or three batches, the first of which is scheduled to depart in early-to-mid November.
Despite international sanctions, the situation is dire enough for the government to make such moves. In fact, the government has been unable to print banknotes lately, resulting in the issuing of money coupons called “donpyo.” These coupons are now being used in major cities at certain stores instead of banknotes due to a shortage of ink and paper. Local sources, however, say the government has not adequately completed preparations to roll out a large-scale implementation of these money coupons yet. Even the capital city of Pyongyang has not received enough money coupons to distribute to all who need them.
Although the government is making attempts to improve the economic situation on some fronts, it has also been engaging in more crackdowns. State media reported on Sunday of last week that the government had established new laws to strengthen organizational control over markets and financial systems. One law particularly stands out: the Law on Electronic Transactions. The law is likely aimed at expanding the use of electronic payment methods while also strengthening the government’s control of this sector. Although debit cards and QR payments have been introduced in North Korea in recent years, their use remains limited mainly to elites living in Pyongyang.
Besides enacting new laws, the North Korean government is also doubling down on its efforts to “strengthen socialism” within the country. According to a report by KCNA last weekend, “ensuring the balanced and simultaneous development of all the fields of the country” is key to defend socialism and “in building a powerful country.” North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun has also been posting an increasing amount of articles promoting an “ideological offensive”: “Under the present situation where everything is in short supply, the biggest reserve and a main key to the creation and innovation lies in displaying the mental power of the popular masses,” an Oct. 29 article read.
Although the government is paying increased attention to its economic policies, this does not mean military plans have taken a back seat. Last month, Kim Jong Un reportedly ordered that the Ministry of Defense’s Weapons Bureau be “enlarged and reorganized” as a result of their “excellent contributions.”
This indicates Kim’s desire to quickly modernize and diversify weapons and launch systems to build North Korea’s self-defense capacity as well as a perceived need to push the modernization of the country’s arsenal to strengthen its “nuclear deterrent” as called for during the Eighth Party Congress at the start of the year. The order may also reflect Pyongyang’s intention to break through the country’s difficulties by strengthening national defense.
Views expressed in Guest Columns do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
3. U.S. diplomat for East Asia policy discusses North Korea, alliance, supply chains in Seoul
Sustained high level diplomatic alliance engagement continues.
(2nd LD) U.S. diplomat for East Asia policy discusses North Korea, alliance, supply chains in Seoul | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with latest details, comments; CHANGES headline, lead, photos)
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Nov. 11 (Yonhap) -- The top U.S. diplomat for East Asia met with South Korean officials Thursday to discuss North Korea, the bilateral alliance and joint efforts to build resilient global supply chains.
Daniel Kritenbrink, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, arrived in Seoul on Wednesday for his first trip to the nation since taking office in September.
His trip drew keen attention as the two countries have been in talks on ways to resume dialogue with Pyongyang and a proposed declaration of a formal end to the 1950-53 Korean War.
Also, Washington has been rallying its allies and partners to build global supply chains that are less dependent on China in chips, batteries and other key industries.
On the second day of his three-day trip, Kritenbrink met with his South Korean counterpart Yeo Seung-bae, deputy minister for political affairs at the foreign ministry.
"The two sides reaffirmed the robust S. Korea-U.S. alliance is the linchpin of the peace, stability and peace in the Northeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific region," the foreign ministry said in a statement.
"They also agreed to expand the bilateral cooperation to resolve pending global issues, including climate change, COVID-19 response and supply chains," it said.
The diplomats agreed on the need to "stably manage the situation on the Korean Peninsula" and discussed various ways to resume dialogue with Pyongyang at an early date.
The two sides also positively evaluated a recent flurry of high-level meetings between Seoul and Washington officials and vowed to maintain close communications.
In a separate meeting with Deputy Trade Minister Jeong Dae-jin, Kritenbrink talked about how to expand economic cooperation between the two nations to build resilient supply chains in major industrial areas.
"The two sides talked about how to expand cooperation in supply chains in key sectors, including semiconductor and electric vehicle batteries," the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy said in a release.
He also sat down with Lee Sung-ho, deputy minister of economic diplomacy at the foreign ministry, to explore ways to forge closer ties in a wide range of areas, including COVID-19 response, climate change and technology, the foreign ministry said.
Last month, South Korean President Moon Jae-in attended a global supply chain summit convened by U.S. President Joe Biden on the sidelines of the Group of 20 summit and said Seoul will play a greater role in tackling challenges affecting global trade.
Kritenbrink also met with Lee Jae-myung, the presidential nominee of the ruling Democratic Party, to exchange views on bilateral relations and economic issues.
During their meeting at the party's headquarters, the U.S. diplomat emphasized Washington's commitment to the bilateral alliance and vowed to support Seoul's growth into a global partner, Lee's aides said.
He also plans to meet with Yoon Seok-youl, who is to represent the main opposition People Power Party in the March 9 presidential election, before his departure Friday.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
4. Foreign minister says S. Korea-U.S. talks over end-of-war declaration in final stages
It the alliance makes a unilateral decision for an end of war declaration without force reductions from the north I hope that it has plan to counter the political warfare effort the regime will unleash with the support of all those in Seoul and Washington who will be calling for an end to the alliance, withdrawal of the UN Command and all US forces and dismantlement of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command, and an end to extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella over Korea and Japan. We will see some very apreggesive political warfare and influence operations moves (as well as subversive activities by the United Front Department and the 225th Bureau) as well as by China and Russia to undermine the legitimacy of the alliance and the US presence in Northeast Asia.
This should make for some very interesting discussions at the upcoming Security Consultative Meeting and the Military Committee Meeting (SCM/MCM).
Unfortunately the US has been backed into an information and influence corner. To not give into the regime's demands to lift sanctions for its agreement to an end of war declaration or to oppose an end of war declaration means the US will be accused of opposing peace or being a roadblock to peace. My ROK friends and colleagues have walked the US right into an L shaped information and influence ambush by north Korea, China, and Russia. The only recourse will be to assault through the ambush.
I am very concerned about these statements by Minister Chung:
"(South Korea and the U.S.) have agreed on the big framework and are discussing how to proceed with the (declaration's) format and contents," Chung said.
"The United States is almost in agreement with our government on the need for an end-of-war declaration and what form it should take, as well as its substance," he said, adding Seoul plans to continue discussing the details with Washington.
"It is our united view with the United States that an end-of-war declaration is necessary as the first step to draw North Korea to talks and thus achieve denuclearization and the establishment of peace," he said.
(LEAD) Foreign minister says S. Korea-U.S. talks over end-of-war declaration in final stages | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with minister's remarks on papal visit to North Korea in last 5 paras)
SEOUL, Nov. 11 (Yonhap) -- Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong said Thursday coordination between Seoul and Washington over a declaration to formally end the 1950-53 Korean War is in its final stages.
Chung made the remarks during a parliamentary session, confirming there has been progress in the allies' talks over the declaration as stated this week by South Korean Ambassador to the U.S. Lee Soo-hyuck.
"We have recently had very close consultations with the U.S. about the format and contents of an end-of-war declaration," Chung said. "Coordination between South Korea and the U.S. has almost been completed."
The minister acknowledged, however, that adopting the declaration will take time.
"It's not something that can be achieved solely through an agreement between the United States and South Korea, so it doesn't appear as if an end-of-war declaration will be easy," he said, adding that he is not in a position to predict when it will happen.
The Moon Jae-in administration hopes to use an end-of-war declaration as a starting point to resume talks with North Korea and bring lasting peace to the peninsula, including through a dismantlement of the North's nuclear weapons program.
The Korean War ended in an armistice, not a peace treaty, leaving the sides technically at war.
"(South Korea and the U.S.) have agreed on the big framework and are discussing how to proceed with the (declaration's) format and contents," Chung said.
"The United States is almost in agreement with our government on the need for an end-of-war declaration and what form it should take, as well as its substance," he said, adding Seoul plans to continue discussing the details with Washington.
"It is our united view with the United States that an end-of-war declaration is necessary as the first step to draw North Korea to talks and thus achieve denuclearization and the establishment of peace," he said.
North Korea has yet to publicly express its interest in the declaration.
When asked if he has ever asked the North to consider inviting Pope Francis during inter-Korean talks, Chung said he has, but declined to elaborate.
"In the course of inter-Korean talks, I did propose the North consider arranging a visit by the pope," he said.
At their meeting at the Vatican last month, President Moon asked the pope a second time to visit the North and the pontiff responded he would do so if he received an invitation from Pyongyang.
Chung said there has been no "negative response" from the North.
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
5. Despot Kim not seen in public for over a month sparking fresh health rumours
Come one (yes this is from the UK Sun). But don't these guys pay attention to history? How many times has KJU gone "missing" and everyone jumps to conclusions or at least wild speculation? Of course maybe one of these days they will be right.
But Kim has the toughest work schedule. He works for a day or two and then he needs a month's rest.
Despot Kim not seen in public for over a month sparking fresh health rumours
KIM JONG GONE? Kim Jong-un’s longest absence in seven years sparks fresh health rumours after despot goes missing for over a month
KIM Jong-un has not been seen for more than a month amid fresh speculation about his health.
The North Korean despot has not been seen since a huge missile exhibition 30 days ago — his longest absence for seven years.
3
Kim Jong-un's last public appearance at the Defence Development Exhibition, in PyongyangCredit: Reuters
North Korean observers said his absence is the longest period of absence since 2011.
It follows reports about his health which were made earlier this year.
His last appearance on state media is believed to have taken place on October 12
This was during coverage of a huge missile exhibition in Pyongyang the day before.
But since then NK News reports he has not been seen on state channels — yet satellite imagery has shown increased activity at his east coast beach house and a lakeside mansion near the capital.
Observers claim this is his longest absence for seven years amid speculation in recent months.
Kim has taken at least seven breaks lasting at least two weeks in 2021, according to NK News.
He vanished from public view for long stretches in 2020.
In June, Kim reappeared in public looking substantially thinner than before, following a nearly month-long absence.
The North Korean leader has sparked health fears in recent months after shedding more than 40 pounds as commentators questioned whether his weight loss is intentional or due to a grave illness.
images of a trimmer Kim sporting a beige suit with a serious look on his face have now led to conspiracy theorists claiming he has been replaced by a lookalike.
"Kim Jong-Un has been replaced by a lookalike," one online sleuth wrote on Reddit.
But many were quick to shoot down the whacky claim, saying Kim looks the same - just slimmer.
One replied: "He lost that baby fat and is showing his grown man face?"
Another added: "I was thinking the ears were identical.
"So identical, in fact, that I’m convinced this is just a slimmer, healthier Kim."
Last year, photos of Kim released 20 days after he mysteriously disappeared caused rumours the despot used a lookalike as some speculated the double could have been standing in due to the leader's poor health, or even death.
Sleuths pointed to slight differences in Kim's nose, wrinkles, teeth, cupid's bow, hairline and ears.
The latest body double claims come after it was reported North Korea is hunting for a Kim successor amid fears the tyrant's health is failing after his sudden weight loss.
Starving North Koreans are increasingly worried about the health of "emaciated" Kim in the wake of his dramatic weight loss after he used to top 22 stone, according to state media.
And a prominent member of Kim's entourage has now been tasked to find a successor for the dictator as rumours mount over his failing health.
3
The previous month Kim appeared to be cutting a dashCredit: AP
3
Kim Jong Un speaks to officials next to military weapons and vehicles on display, including the country's intercontinental ballistic missilesCredit: Reuters
Kim Jong-un hugged by adoring kids as his troops step out in bizarre red hazmat suits for North Korea's midnight parade
6. North Korean prisoners are lined up for gruelling work in rare photos
The evil nature of the Kim family regime.
North Korean prisoners are lined up for gruelling work in rare photos
Starving North Korean prisoners are seen lined up for another day of gruelling work in rare photos of labour camp from space
- Images taken at T'osŏng-ni, a camp only a few miles from the Chinese border
- Photo shows group of prisoners standing in formation alongside stacks of grain
- Another sees the inmates in a yard flanked by industrial workshops
- Escapees tell how families are locked up together and suffer gruelling labour
PUBLISHED: 03:43 EST, 11 November 2021 | UPDATED: 04:19 EST, 11 November 2021
Daily Mail · by Michael Havis For Mailonline · November 11, 2021
Starving prisoners line up to face another day of gruelling forced labour in rare photos of inmates at a North Korean prison camp.
Satellite images of T'osŏng-ni, a labour camp only a few miles from the Chinese border, reveal the shambling figures of prisoners, standing in formation alongside stacks of grain.
Another photo appears to show inmates in a yard flanked by industrial workshops.
Kim Doohyun, who escaped North Korea and has knowledge of the camp, said the prisoners photographed faced punishing forced labour.
Satellite images of T'osŏng-ni, a labour camp only a few miles from the Chinese border, reveal the shambling figures of prisoners, standing in formation
The prisoners are flanked by industrial workshops and warehouses
Another photo shows the prisoners standing beside stacks of grain in trailers as a flatbed truck stands by
He said: 'Sometimes prisoners are mobilised to help nearby farms.
'They have to line up and walk like the images show when they go to work or back from work.
'Also, their uniforms are grey and they wear the same colour hats – and you can see that the top of their heads looks a little bit white in the image.
'The image of the prisoners shows clearly that T'osŏng-ni is still operating.'
Prisoners who aren't sent food by their families face a battle for survival, Mr Kim added.
He said: 'Families can support prisoners with food, but of course not all the food you send will go to your family in prison, some is taken by officers.
'If prisoners don't have family or are not supported by families, life in prison is much more difficult to survive.'
An estimated 2,500 people are imprisoned within T'osŏng-ni.
According to Anti-Slavery International, prisoners in North Korea begin work as early as 4am and continue as late as midnight, with 12-hour shifts and no rest days being typical.
The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), which released the pictures, detailed T'osŏng-ni in a new report.
It describes how the prisoners not only toil in nearby farms, but also manufacture uniforms, winter coats, hats, boots and bicycles for North Korea's security services.
The T'osŏng-ni labour camp is just a few miles from the Chinese border
A diagram showing the layout of the labour camp, with guard posts, fences and trucks to ship out the stacks of grain
Executive director Greg Scarlatoiu said: 'Prisoners at this and other North Korean detention facilities are subjected to a relentless vicious cycle of forced labour and induced malnutrition.
'Conditions are terrible and we have documented the use of forced labour at the camp.'
As brutal as it is, T'osŏng-ni is one of the less severe camps.
The facility is a kyo-hwa-so or reeducation camp, used to punish lesser offences.
The most serious crimes – political crimes – are punished at 'kwan-li-so' camps, which the regime denies exist.
Mr Kim's father was sentenced to eight years in prison and the family had requested he be transferred to T'osŏng-ni, which was local to them.
However he was already too weak to work and was refused by the guards, even when a bribe was offered.
Mr Kim recalled: 'They didn't accept my father because they believed he would die very soon.
The facility is one of the most notorious gulags in North Korea
Red triangles mark out the guard towers along the perimeter, while green dots represent gates to the jail
'It was true that my father was almost dying because of the torture he got in the detention centre.
'He was down to 66lbs and the kyo-hwa-so didn't want to dispose of the body.'
Mr Kim's father died two years into his sentence.
Mr Scarlatoiu credited improvements in satellite imagery for the fact we could now see the prisoners themselves.
He said: 'It is not the technology itself that has improved.
'Rather, for national security reasons, the resolution of open source imagery is not as good as that of classified imagery.
'That said, the resolution available in the public domain has continued to improve, and this trend is certain to continue.'
The report's lead author, North Korea expert Joseph Bermudez, said there were implications for justice now that satellite images were available with enough detail to reveal human beings.
A wider angle shows where the grain loading area of the prison is located
He said: 'This is evidence that can be brought into a court of law and used.
'When we combine it with the interviews with former detainees, it provides powerful evidence that can be used to bring those who have perpetrated these issues to justice.
'That is what we intend to do.'
Mr Kim warned that the prisoners in the photo were only the tip of the iceberg.
'My story is not unique and it didn't happen 100 or 200 years ago,' he said.
'At this very moment there are thousands of people in North Korea like my father and our family suffering from this kind of oppression and human rights violations.'
Daily Mail · by Michael Havis For Mailonline · November 11, 2021
7. Could the U.S. Navy Strangle North Korea with a Naval Blockade?
Conclusion:
In short, there’s more to blockading North Korea than ordering the fleet into action. A fair amount of politicking vis-à-vis allies, friends, and prospective antagonists would be a must.
And lastly, success is far from preordained. Sea-power historian and theorist Julian Corbett teaches that, far from settling wars in an afternoon, naval warfare can garner victory only through a process of “gradual exhaustion.” A navy chips away at a seaborne foe’s mercantile fleet, throttling the flow of goods and raw materials merchantman by merchantman rather than halting it in one decisive blow. A strategy that works bit by bit tries the patience of the government and society that set it in motion.
It also tries the patience of one’s own business interests, as well as friendly countries that might see their own seagoing commerce impeded. A blockade of North Korea, then, will demand not just naval resources but time, painstaking diplomacy, and goodwill. The latter two are in short supply in Northeast Asia just now, with the United States and China locked in a trade war and allies Japan and South Korea perennially at odds with each other.
Will blockading fleets take to Asian seas? Maybe. But if so, they will prevail through a slow grind rather than a masterstroke.
Could the U.S. Navy Strangle North Korea with a Naval Blockade?
Suppose Washington decided to go big in response to a North Korean ballistic-missile test, rather than content itself with humdrum peacetime deterrence. And suppose Washington blanched at ground combat. How to satisfy both the impulses goading it into action and those urging restraint?
Well, it could impose a naval blockade to halt shipping bound to or from North Korean seaports—squeezing the hermit kingdom’s seaborne imports and exports while confining its navy to its moorings. Is the U.S. Navy up to enforcing a blockade? Yes—but Washington must not regard a maritime quarantine as a cheap, quick, or painless alternative to land warfare. Just the opposite. It would be expensive, time-consuming, and resource-intensive.
Nor would success be a sure thing.
First, the navy would incur both direct and opportunity costs—especially if allies such as the South Korean Navy and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force declined to supply ships to help squelch shipping. A squadron sufficiently numerous and powerful to apprehend blockade runners would have to linger off each North Korean seaport for the duration of the quarantine. Each squadron would need regular refueling and resupply, as well as relief by replacement ships to allow for upkeep and crew rest.
Multiply the bare number of ships required for sentry duty by two and you have some idea of the direct costs of an offshore strategy. Some 50-70 ships comprise the Japan-based U.S. Seventh Fleet, which would presumably spearhead cordon operations. Subtract submarines from that total and divide the remainder by two and the magnitude of the challenge before the Seventh Fleet becomes plain. The direct costs appear bearable but burdensome.
That leaves aside the opportunity costs. A vessel monitoring North Korean traffic is a vessel not taking a direct hand in great-power competition, the administration’s and the Pentagon’s stated strategic priority. It is not training for peer fleet-on-fleet combat or honing interoperability with allied forces. It is not transiting the Taiwan Strait to tweak China. It is not working with partners in the South China Sea or the Indian Ocean. It is a sentinel, mostly static and tethered to a minuscule patrol ground.
Second, a blockade would not be a one-on-one brawl between the United States against North Korea. A blockade is an act of war under international law, and Washington would be prosecuting that act of war in part along the Korean west coast—at Beijing’s maritime door. Chinese Communist Party leaders are acutely conscious that the Korean Peninsula overshadows the sea route into the Bohai Sea, home to one of China’s coastal economic hubs as well as the gateway from the Yellow Sea to China’s capital city.
U.S. naval operations in China’s near seas and skies always rankle with Chinese Communist prelates. In 2010, for instance, Beijing pitched a fit over planned U.S.-South Korean maneuvers in the Yellow Sea—prompting the Obama administration to relocate the exercises to less contentious waters. And those were mere peacetime maneuvers, not open war. Entanglement between a U.S.-North Korea blockade and already fraught U.S.-China relations is a sure bet.
Third, alliance diplomacy would come into play in all likelihood. Think about it. The closest American territory to the Korean Peninsula is Guam, some 2,000 miles from Korean coasts. It would verge on impossible to sustain a blockade from a base that remote from the quarantine zone. Accordingly, the U.S. Navy would be forced to stage the effort from Japanese or South Korean seaports. Hence Tokyo and Seoul would get in a say in whether or how the venture unfolded.
The allies might contribute ships. Overt participation would be more likely in the case of South Korea’s navy than Japan’s, considering imperial Japan’s vexed past with Korea. Images of Japanese warships lurking offshore to intercept Korean vessels might conjure up ill will in the region. Pacifist-minded Japanese might object as well. Both capitals could impose conditions on what U.S. flotillas based in their harbors could do, so as to avoid entrapment in potential American misadventures.
In short, there’s more to blockading North Korea than ordering the fleet into action. A fair amount of politicking vis-à-vis allies, friends, and prospective antagonists would be a must.
And lastly, success is far from preordained. Sea-power historian and theorist Julian Corbett teaches that, far from settling wars in an afternoon, naval warfare can garner victory only through a process of “gradual exhaustion.” A navy chips away at a seaborne foe’s mercantile fleet, throttling the flow of goods and raw materials merchantman by merchantman rather than halting it in one decisive blow. A strategy that works bit by bit tries the patience of the government and society that set it in motion.
It also tries the patience of one’s own business interests, as well as friendly countries that might see their own seagoing commerce impeded. A blockade of North Korea, then, will demand not just naval resources but time, painstaking diplomacy, and goodwill. The latter two are in short supply in Northeast Asia just now, with the United States and China locked in a trade war and allies Japan and South Korea perennially at odds with each other.
Will blockading fleets take to Asian seas? Maybe. But if so, they will prevail through a slow grind rather than a masterstroke.
James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and the author of A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy,
8. Is Korea Overdependent on China?
In a word: YES. (but so are so many countries as well)
Is Korea Overdependent on China?
Korea has found itself dramatically short of diesel exhaust fluid as China canceled shipments of 18,700 tons that had already been paid for because of new restrictions on exports of urea, which is also essential as fertilizer. After government intervention the contracted amounts that China was holding back will be finally shipped, but it was a close call and the incident exposed the country's weakness in depending so heavily on China for core supplies. Korea has benefited significantly from China's rapid economic growth, and it now accounts for 25.8 percent of its exports and 23.3 percent of imports. But now the U.S. is aggressively pursuing anti-Chinese policies and trying to wrest its allies away from the Chinese supply chain, this could soon prove a burden. Also, Beijing has never hesitated to resort to economic arm-twisting to achieve any number of political goals and is proving a tremendous bully of countries that have been lured into economic dependence on it.
There are other areas of concern. Out of 12,586 imported products, Korea is 80-percent dependent on China for 1,850. It depends entirely on China for magnesium ingots, which are essential for the manufacture of lightweight materials for cars, and they too are in short supply after China curbed output to deal with power shortages. It also largely depends on China for oxidized tungsten, which is used to make microchips, neodymium magnet used to make electronics products lightweight, and lithium hydroxide which is essential for rechargeable batteries.
Unless Korea can reduce its dependence on China by diversifying suppliers, the entire economy could be held hostage by the shortage of even a single product. It might be inconvenient at first, but such efforts will protect the country's industries over the long term. The government must review the country's total industrial supply structure and provide policy and financial support to manufacturers.
Japan has steadily reduced its dependence on China after suffering economic retaliation in 2012 over the disputed Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands. But the Korean government has done nothing despite a crippling Chinese boycott in 2017 over the stationing of a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense battery from the U.S. here. It took a hardline stance on Japan's attempts at economic retaliation in historical disputes, but with China it invariably folds. President Moon Jae-in commented on the diesel exhaust fluid crisis a few days ago and asked Korean manufacturers to "carefully manage the supply of products that are highly dependent on imports from a particular country." Why is he saying that now when he did nothing for years?
9. North Korean hackers target the South's think tanks through blog posts
The all purpose sword is hard at work. And as I have mentioned the Korea watcher community has been under attack with many phishing and spoofing attempts. The north is spoofing email addresses of other Korean watchers and journalists. Beware.
North Korean hackers target the South's think tanks through blog posts | ZDNet
ZDNet · by Charlie Osborne
A North Korean hacking group has been attacking think tanks in the South through malware-laden blog posts.
In a new campaign, tracked since June 2021, the state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) group has been attempting to plant surveillance and theft-based malware on victim machines.
On Wednesday, researchers from Cisco Talos said the Kimsuky APT, also known as Thallium or Black Banshee, is responsible for the wave of attacks, in which malicious Blogspot content is being used to lure "South Korea-based think tanks whose research focuses on political, diplomatic, and military topics pertaining to North Korea, China, Russia, and the US."
Specifically, geopolitical and aerospace organizations appear to be on the APT's radar.
Kimsuky has been active since at least 2012. The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued an advisory (.PDF) on the APT in 2020, noting that the state-sponsored group is tasked by the North Korean government with "global intelligence gathering." Past victims have been located in South Korea, Japan, and the United States.
AhnLab says that compensation forms, questionnaires, and research documents attached to emails have been used in the past as phishing lures, and in the campaign detected by Talos, malicious Microsoft Office documents are still a primary attack vector.
Typically, malicious VBA macros are included in the documents, and when triggered, will download the payloads from Blogspot.
According to the team, the blogposts deliver three types of malicious content based on the Gold Dragon/Brave Prince malware family: initial beacons, file stealers, and implant deployment scripts -- the latter of which is designed to infect endpoints and launch further malware components, including a keylogger, information stealer, and a file injector module for website login credential theft.
While some APTs will try to steal whatever content they can from an infected machine, Kimsuky has adopted a different approach. The threat actors will, instead, scan for files of particular interest to them.
This includes content related to North Korea, denuclearization, the relationships between the US, China, and Russia, as well as rocket designs, aviation fuel research, fluid mechanics, and material science.
"The attackers knew exactly which files they were looking for," Talos commented. "This indicates that the attackers have a deep understanding of their targets' endpoints, likely obtained from previous compromises."
The researchers informed Google of their findings and the malicious blog content has since been removed. However, this is unlikely to stop Kimsuky's activities.
"Kimsuky is a highly motivated threat actor targeting a number of entities in South Korea," the researchers say. "This group has been relentlessly creating new infection chains to deliver different types of malware to their victims. Such targeted attacks can result in the leak of restricted research, unauthorized access for espionage, and even destructive attacks against target organizations."
Previous and related coverage
Have a tip? Get in touch securely via WhatsApp | Signal at +447713 025 499, or over at Keybase: charlie0
ZDNet · by Charlie Osborne
10. North Korea teeters on the brink of famine as winter approaches
Observe for the indicators and prepare for contingencies. Things could get dicey on the Korean Peninsula. This is potentially far worse than the Arduous March of the famine of 1994-1996. And there is no safety valve in sight.
While we bicker over an end of war declaration that is only symbolic and not legally binding, the Korean people in the north suffer terribly.
I recommend dusting off Robert Collins' Seven Phases of Collapse.
“When North Korea Falls
The furor over Kim Jong Il’s missile tests and nuclear brinksmanship obscures the real threat: the prospect of North Korea’s catastrophic collapse. How the regime ends could determine the balance of power in Asia for decades. The likely winner? China”
ROBERT D. KAPLAN
OCTOBER 2006 ISSUE
North Korea teeters on the brink of famine as winter approaches | DW | 10.11.2021
DW · by Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com)
Although the last of the harvest was gathered shortly before the first snow fell in North Korea this year, the yield was significantly less than the amount needed to feed the isolated nation's 26 million people.
This June, a report issued by the South Korea-based Korea Development Institute estimated that the North gathered just over 4.4 million tons of crops last year, down more than 240,000 tons compared to the previous year's harvest.
The think tank reported that North Korea requires a harvest of 5.7 million tons per year to feed its people.
Aid agencies and experts are warning that there is already widespread hunger across the North, and some are cautioning that the nation is on the brink of a repeat of the widespread starvation experienced there in the mid-1990s.
That four-year famine is known euphemistically as the "Arduous March."
As many as 3 million North Koreans are believed to have died as a result of chronic economic mismanagement, the collapse of the food distribution system, and other countries halting aid supplies.
A quarter of a century later, the situation is once again bleak — albeit for different reasons.
COVID border closure combines with weak harvest
Pyongyang continues to insist that there have been no cases of the virus within its borders, which remain sealed.
For nearly two years, there have been no imports of desperately needed food, medicine or other daily necessities, including fertilizers required for farmers' fields.
Before its staff were ordered to leave the North in the summer of 2020, the World Food Program (WFP) estimated that 10.3 million residents, or more than 40% of the population, were already experiencing malnutrition.
Other experts have reached similarly worrying conclusions.
Choi Ji-young, a research fellow and economist with the Korea Institute for National Reunification in Seoul, said that closing the border with China has been the largest factor in the North's present supply problem.
Pyongyang has traditionally relied on China for imports of key items, such as food, medicine and fuel.
"We estimate that cereal production decreased by 5% last year, and that has affected food supply conditions this year," she told DW.
"We have also observed increases in cereal prices in the North this year, while there has also been volatility in rice prices," she added.
"That has been particularly notable in the border regions, while the increasing price of corn to rice is another sign of food shortages."
In late October, Tomas Ojea Quintana, the United Nations' Special Rapporteur on human rights in North Korea, told reporters in New York that the hunger crisis in the North is worsening and that children, the elderly and those in prisons or labor camps are at particular risk of starvation.
Imesh Pokharel, head of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Seoul, said obtaining an accurate picture of the food situation in the North is notoriously difficult.
However, defectors who have fled to the South are able to offer some insights, especially those who are able to remain in contact with their families there via mobile phone. The UN human rights office has been able to glean some information that way.
Watch video 06:10
Are we seeing a new arms race on the Korean Peninsula?
North Koreans resorting to desperate measures
"The borders have been closed for nearly two years and we are hearing that the resilience of the people is declining," Pokharel told DW.
"Many no longer have goods or property to sell in order to obtain food and we are hearing reports of people struggling and food distress in parts of the country."
"The bottom line is that a large proportion of the country does not have enough food, and there are deep concerns within this organization about the situation there," he said.
As well as speaking with defectors, Pokharel's office follows the reports of media that specialize in North Korean issues and employ networks of undercover "citizen reporters" who also communicate with the outside world via smuggled mobile phones.
Many of their reports make for harrowing reading — such as farmers being sent to disciplinary labor camps for failing to hand over 60% of their crops to the state simply because yields have fallen this year and there is insufficient leftover to feed their own families.
City residents mobilized to help bring in the harvest are reportedly being strip-searched at the end of the workday to make sure they are not trying to steal any of the crop.
People who have resorted to picking wild plants in the mountains have become ill after consuming plants that are not suitable, while many people are too weak due to a lack of food to report to their assigned jobs.
There were reports last winter of entire families being forced to sell their homes to buy food, and then dying of exposure in towns across the country.
Aid groups fear tough winter
Some experts fear that there will be more deaths this winter, which has started earlier than usual and may be colder than average.
However, researcher Choi believes Kim will be able to avoid another "Arduous March" and once again stave off complete collapse of society, which would inevitably threaten the survival of his own regime.
"There are obviously some serious food shortages; but the food supply situation today is more favorable than it was compared to the mid-1990s," she said.
"There are also reports that the North may be close to reopening its border with China and resuming trade. And if North Korea were to face another Arduous March situation, then I expect that China would come to its assistance."
For now, the people of North Korea are hoping the borders do reopen, that trains carrying the food they so desperately need start rolling again, and that the winter is not as harsh as feared. And then, they must also hope that next year's harvest is better.
DW · by Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com)
11. Joe Biden Must Change His North Korea Policy
Sanctions are not a strategy. But lifting sanctions will result in Kim doubling down on his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies. It is imperative we understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.
The assumption that lifting sanctions will moderate KJU's behavior is an erroneous one.
Joe Biden Must Change His North Korea Policy
The value of sanctions is not in their imposition but in their success at moderating behavior in the target country—and only with the potential of having sanctions lifted will the adversary change conduct.
South Korean president Moon Jae-In has renewed his call to formally end the Korean War—and as North Korea demands a high price for doing so. These are the two fundamental truths about North Korea the Biden administration must keep in mind. First, Kim Jong-un has no intention of giving up his nuclear weapons, no matter how many incentives America offers him. Second, the United States will deter Pyongyang indefinitely regardless of what Kim does or doesn’t do.
The overriding objectives of Washington’s foreign and military policy regarding North Korea must be to prevent unnecessary war and to maximize America’s ability to prosper in the Indo-Pacific region. The United States can work toward the distant goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula is a good and worthy target, but it is not a prerequisite for the United States to fully realize those two paramount objectives. Closely cooperating with our South Korean ally and engaging diplomatically with North Korea can help facilitate both.
Possibly the single greatest roadblock to minimizing the threat of war that has afflicted virtually every U.S. administration since 2006, which is when Pyongyang successfully conducted its first test of a nuclear warhead is the dogmatic insistence that North Korea must completely denuclearize before the United States takes any action.
Refusing to engage with Pyongyang until it denuclearizes guarantees that Kim will not only continue to keep his nuclear weapons. Also, this feeds his fears and is the reason why North Korea developed nukes in the first place. Kim believes having a credible nuclear deterrent is necessary to prevent the United States from attacking or invading his country. Regime survival is Kim’s top objective; therefore, it is highly unlikely he would ever attack the United States with a nuclear strike because he knows doing so would result in a withering nuclear retaliation that would annihilate his regime.
It is therefore the Biden administration’s responsibility to pursue policies and actions which strengthen the principal objectives of avoiding unnecessary war and maximizing economic opportunity. The first goal can be secure by the maintenance of a strong, well-trained, and modern U.S. military, including both conventional and nuclear forces. That is something that already exists.
America’s ability to enhance economic opportunity in the region can best be safeguarded by its leaders acknowledging its significant military advantages over Pyongyang and engaging in tough but realistic diplomacy. There are various ways Biden could advance U.S. interests in the diplomatic sphere.
First, Biden should leverage the expertise and incentive of Moon and support some of his key initiatives. There is no one who has more at risk in the event of war with the North than Moon. In his UN speech in September, Moon reiterated his call to craft an end-of-war declaration with North Korea to “make irreversible progress in denuclearization and usher in an era of complete peace.”
Moon pragmatically said the objective was to make “progress” towards denuclearization, not to “achieve” it. An end-of-war declaration is not the same as a peace treaty and would provide little beyond symbolism, but Moon believes that even symbolically ending the war will open additional opportunities to further lower tensions and connect the two Koreas culturally and economically. Lowering tensions on the peninsula and advancing peace are in America’s interests.
Second, Biden could take the initiative to engage in direct talks between Washington and Pyongyang. Former President Donald Trump engaged in such talks beginning in 2018 and made initial progress in greatly lowering the tensions between the two countries. Unfortunately, he listened to the hawkish advice of his then-National Security Advisor John Bolton at a summit in Hanoi in 2019 and all progress was irrevocably lost for the remainder of Trump’s term in office. Biden has a chance to correct those errors.
In September, North Korean officials publicly acknowledged that they were open to discussions with the Biden administration. Pyongyang is no doubt motivated to have talks with the intent of winning sanctions relief. Many in Washington reflexively dismiss such a possibility but that is a mistake.
The value of sanctions is not in their imposition but in their success at moderating behavior in the target country—and only with the potential of having sanctions lifted will the adversary change conduct. Biden would be wise to explore the potential for targeted, limited sanctions relief in exchange for getting Pyongyang to take actions that benefit the security of the United States and South Korean (like nuclear freezes and verifiably rolling back on critical nuclear infrastructure, as examples).
The Biden administration would remain in a position of strength over North Korea in any negotiations because it could walk away any time Pyongyang makes unreasonable demands. It doesn’t need a deal to keep the country safe and U.S. economic opportunities preserved. It only has to avoid an unnecessary war.
Kim knows better than anyone that his conventional and nuclear forces can at best deter invasion but are woefully inadequate to even contemplate an unprovoked, offensive attack against either the United States or South Korea. Kim isn’t going to give up his only deterrent against U.S. attack any time soon, but he will remain deterred indefinitely. It makes sense for Biden and Moon to exploit this advantageous position to seek diplomatic engagement.
Daniel L. Davis is a senior fellow for Defense Priorities and a former lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army who deployed into combat zones four times. He is the author of The Eleventh Hour in 2020 America. Follow him at @DanielLDavis1.
Image: Reuters
12. A North Korean defector is on the run in China after escaping from prison 23 days ago, with police offering a $31,000 reward
A North Korean defector is on the run in China after escaping from prison 23 days ago, with police offering a $31,000 reward
A mugshot showing Zhu Xianjian.
Jilin City Public Security Bureau
- Zhu Xianjian, 37, escaped from prison in China's Jilin province on October 18, state media said.
- He was caught defecting from North Korea to China in 2013, and imprisoned the next year.
- Police are now offering a $31,000 reward for any information leading to his capture.
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A North Korean defector who escaped from a Chinese prison 23 days ago is still at large, Chinese media reported.
The 37-year-old man, identified in Chinese media as Zhu Xianjian, scaled the walls at Jilin prison at around 6 p.m. on October 18, the Jilin City public security bureau wrote in an October 19 WeChat post.
Zhu's escape came at the end of a prisoner work shift, and involved him scaling the roofs of the prison complex, the state-run CCTV news network reported.
Zhu was sent to Jilin prison in 2014 after being sentenced to 11 years in prison for crimes including robbery and illegally crossing the Chinese border, CCTV reported.
He was to due for release in 2023, but was to be deported back to North Korea afterwards, CCTV said.
Police in Changchun, a city in Jilin province, initially offered up a reward of 150,000 Chinese yuan ($23,300) for tips leading to his capture, China's state-run Global Times newspaper reported.
Police have now increased that number to 200,000 yuan ($31,293), the Global Times tweeted Wednesday.
Zhu, who worked as a coal miner in North Korea, fled the country on July 21, 2013, by swimming across the Tumen River that connects North Korea with the Chinese city of Tumen, according to court documents.
Once across, Zhu stole around $230 in cash, several cellphones, and some clothes from homes in a nearby village, the documents said. He also stabbed an elderly woman who tried to stop him, the documents said.
"I took out a knife tied to my waist and stabbed the granny in the back. Then I noticed she was carrying a satchel. I tried to yank it off her but she wouldn't let go, so I stabbed her a few times more," Zhu told investigators, according to the documents.
The police caught up with Zhu within two days, and arrested him as he tried to flee in a taxi, the documents said.
13. Seoul rejects refugee claims by Chinese N. Korean defectors
Very troubling on two levels - the fact that the South will not recognize them as refugees and that China is complicit in north Korean human rights abuses. . I was speaking with a friend who is helping to get one of these people out of China.
Seoul rejects refugee claims by Chinese N. Korean defectors
AP · by HYUNG-JIN KIM · November 10, 2021
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — South Korea has rejected refugee status for ethnic Chinese people who have been “stateless” since they fled North Korea years ago, two of the applicants and an activists’ group said Wednesday.
Unlike North Korean defectors, who receive citizenship, almost-free apartments and other economic assistance in South Korea, ethnic Chinese from North Korea are denied access to such benefits if they maintained Chinese nationality in North Korea. About 30 of them have been designated as “stateless” in South Korea after authorities found they were attempting to pose as North Korean nationals and detained them, observers say.
The “stateless” designation makes it extremely difficult for them to get jobs and receive basic government-provided services. Four of them subsequently applied for refugee status in 2019, saying they wanted better treatment because their families have lived in North Korea for generations and suffered political suppression and economic difficulties similar to what most North Korean citizens face.
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Last week, however, South Korea’s Justice Ministry notified them that their refugee claims had been turned down, said Kim Yong-hwa, a North Korean defector-turned-activist who helped the four with their refugee applications.
Kim’s organization provided The Associated Press with a photo of the ministry notification to an applicant surnamed Yoon. According to it, the ministry said he didn’t appear “to have experienced threats that amounted to persecution in China and North Korea.” It also said the ministry could not help but determine he is a Chinese national based on its review of his testimony and comments by South Korea’s spy agency.
Kim said the three other applicants received near-identical notifications.
The Justice Ministry said later Wednesday it won’t disclose the results of its review of individual refugee applications because of privacy issues.
The rejections were widely expected because South Korea’s acceptance rate for refugee status applications has been less than 2% in recent years.
“It totally doesn’t make sense to rule that there was (no evidence) that they suffered oppressions in North Korea. They can get killed if they return to North Korea and get caught there,” Kim said.
He previously said at least one ethnic Chinese was executed in North Korea after failing to resettle in South Korea and returning home.
Reached by phone, Yoon and another applicant, Cho Guk-gyeong, confirmed the rejections.
“I have no hopes at all now as my refugee application was turned down,” Cho said in a statement provided by Kim. “I have nowhere to return. I want to live with a minimum level of human dignity.”
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Kim said the ministry has told the four applicants it could improve their alien residential status if they file a petition asking for government help for their settlement in South Korea. Kim said he doesn’t understand why they have to file a petition asking for leniency but they planned to check what improvements in their status they could get.
In previous interviews with the AP, Cho and other ethnic Chinese said they considered themselves as North Koreans because they were born and grew up in the North. They said they were allowed to maintain Chinese nationality in North Korea and visit China once or twice a year for cross-border business. They said authorities monitored them more intensely than North Korean nationals.
They said they would face harsh punishment if they returned to North Korea. They also said it would be very difficult to resettle in China because they don’t speak Chinese, have lost touch with relatives there and it could take years to get local residence cards in China.
Cho spent one year in prison and Yoon 20 months in a government-run detention center for lying about their nationality in North Korea.
Some experts say 3,000-5,000 ethnic Chinese live in North Korea and are the only foreigners with permanent residency rights among North Korea’s 26 million people. About 34,000 North Koreans have fled to South Korea for economic and political reasons since the late 1990s.
AP · by HYUNG-JIN KIM · November 10, 2021
14. What's behind the global K-pop and Korean film takeover?
What's behind the global K-pop and Korean film takeover? - Futurity
futurity.org · by Melissa De Witte-Stanford · November 10, 2021
Korean media has reached the pinnacle of global success by providing easy access to content, approachable and likable characters, and high-quality production, says scholar Dafna Zur.
South Korea is a country slightly larger than the US state of Indiana. It has a population of 50 million. And yet its popular culture has gone global.
In just the past few months, the television series Squid Game smashed online streaming records, the Oxford English Dictionary added 26 Korean words, and the boyband BTS’ appearance at the United Nations 76th General Assembly went viral—these are just some examples of the world’s obsession with Korean cultural content.
Korean cultural content is popular because it’s really good, says Zur, an associate professor in the East Asian languages and cultures department and scholar of Korean literature. Zur teaches courses on Korean literature, cinema, and popular culture, and is the director of the Center for East Asian Studies at Stanford University.
Here, Zur talks about what makes Korean popular culture successful and explains why it appeals to audiences around the world:
Q
What are some distinguishing features of Korean media, particularly its dramas?
A
Thanks to streaming platforms like YouTube and Netflix, and to vigorous subtitling efforts—with collaboration by fans, too—Korean pop music and dramas are widely available and easily accessible. Even when the content is in Korean, there are few barriers to entry.
Korean dramas strike a balance of predictability and originality. Their story arcs are often predictable: rags to riches, rich boy meets poor girl, children defy their parents’ wishes and strike out on their own. But they have a Korean twist: Characters are deferential to their elders, sons and daughters are filial. The backdrop is hyper-modern and glitzy. The actors are polished and attractive. They play characters that are charming, vulnerable, and have a healthy dose of self-deprecation. The scripts are full of good humor. Of course, there is often a dark twist: suffocating expectation, crushing poverty, a profound secret that must not get revealed. Korean dramas humanize even the most aloof billionaires and get audiences to care—and usually, all they ask of us is 16 hours of our time.
Korean media pour tremendous resources into their dramas. Dramas are collaborative productions that attend to every last detail to ensure a positive viewing experience that is also wholesome and family friendly. Viewers are assured to get good shots of Korean food, fashion, street life, and gorgeous countryside landscapes.
Q
What about K-pop? Is there a similar formula or secret to its success?
A
Much of the success of K-pop has to do with the idols at the center. K-pop idols are as close to elite athletes as you will ever get in music talent. They are incredible dancers. They have tremendous charisma. They are disciplined and hard-working. They know how to speak to the camera and they know how to interact with one another in a way that draws in the fans. They maintain squeaky clean images. Their behavior is held up to extremely high standards.
At the same time, they project extreme approachability. They ooze fun and kindness, and they address their fans in ways that come across as authentic. In return, fans are loyal, as loyal to K-pop idols as any sports fans are to their favorite teams. This forms a really interesting dynamic between the idols and their fans.
Q
How so?
A
Idols take their fans very seriously. Elaborate communication platforms allow K-pop idols to speak to their fans and to acknowledge fans’ role in their idols’ success. Fans are fiercely protective of their idols’ well-being. They reject fans who are too obsessive, like those who deliberately book flights on the same planes as their idols. The bond that is built between idol and their fans is powerful.
BTS, for example, started as underdogs in Korea’s entertainment industry. They lacked the brand recognition of Korea’s larger entertainment companies. Their success had as much to do with the loyalty they cultivated among their fans as with their talent. Their fan base is called Army—all K-pop groups have a named fan group. Army’s enthusiasm—and membership—has only been growing in recent years.
Q
How do your students today who are familiar with Korean culture as a consumer respond to studying the country from an academic perspective? How has the field evolved given the spread of Korean culture abroad?
A
I first went to South Korea in the early 1990s to get my black belt in taekwondo. I knew very little about the place I was going—I wasn’t aware that Korea had only recently emerged as a democracy, for example. There was still a lot of roughness about Seoul—it was not as polished as it is today. Traffic was a mess. Bus drivers smoked while they worked. Back then I knew little about South Korea other than taekwondo.
By comparison, today’s students have grown up with Korean popular culture. “Gangnam Style” went viral in July of 2012—that was almost 10 years ago. Some of my students have never even seen the video because they were 8 or 9 when it came out. But they know SuperM, EXO, Blackpink, Girls’ Generation, Seventeen and so many other K-pop groups—too many to mention in one breath.
I find that students are increasingly interested in engaging with Korean culture on multiple levels. They want to learn the language, along with Korean literature, film, history, politics, and popular culture. They want to understand how a small country with limited natural resources managed to become a giant economy and influencer in the cultural field. Students also want to understand North Korea and how South Korea can thrive while a nuclear North Korea, just across the border, presents a complex security threat. It is not just South Korea’s issue: North Korea shares a border with China and Russia, and Japan is just across the East Sea. Our students today know what took me years to figure out: Korea holds the key to economic, political, and cultural puzzles today. And it is way cool.
futurity.org · by Melissa De Witte-Stanford · November 10, 2021
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
