Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners



Quotes of the Day:

“What are the facts? Again and again and again–what are the facts? Shun wishful thinking, ignore divine revelation, forget what “the stars foretell,” avoid opinion, care not what the neighbors think, never mind the unguessable “verdict of victory” – what are the facts, and to how many decimal places? You pilot always into an unknown future; facts are your single clue. Get the facts!” 
- Robert A. Heinlein -Time Enough For Love

"Popularity may be united with hostility to the rights of the people, and the secret slave of tyranny may be the professed lover of freedom."
- Alexis de Tocqueville

"I was wise enough to never grow up while fooling most people into believing I had."
- Margaret Mead


1. Kazakh leader ordered use of lethal force on 'terrorists'
2. White House Nominates Airborne Officer to Lead Central Command
3. Opinion | Biden’s efforts to build alliances against China are bearing fruit
4. Japan, Australia ink deal to make military drills run more smoothly
5. Iran wrestling chief, US green card holder, calls for a violent ‘Death to America’
6. New Albanian HQ to serve as hub for US special operations in Balkans
7. In a tense corner of Europe, SEALs and Green Berets are helping a close ally up its skills with old US gear
8. A World of Mounting Disarray | by Richard Haass
9. Reestablish the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group-Taiwan
10. What Is Russia’s Logic for the Current Crisis?
11. Civil Affairs in the High North: How SOCOM's Governance Specialists Can Become Arctic-Capable
12. (Philippine) Army Special Forces launch ‘fighters to farmers’ program in Sulu
13. Philippine Military Kills Communist Guerrilla Leader in Mindanao
14. Veteran U.S., Russia diplomats to tackle Ukraine tensions in Geneva
15. Cyber Command Task Force Conducted Its First Offensive Operation As The Secretary Of Defense Watched
16. Introducing the Competition in Cyberspace Project
17. A year after Jan. 6, DoD’s vague extremism definition could set up new problems
18. Biden’s Moment of Truth in Iran
19. Fact check: How we know the 2020 election results were legitimate, not 'rigged' as Donald Trump claims





1. Kazakh leader ordered use of lethal force on 'terrorists'

Kazakh leader ordered use of lethal force on 'terrorists' | AP News
AP · by DASHA LITVINOVA · January 7, 2022
MOSCOW (AP) — The President of Kazakhstan said Friday he authorized law enforcement to open fire on “terrorists” and shoot to kill, a move that comes after days of extremely violent protests in the former Soviet nation.
In a televised address to the nation, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev blamed the unrest on “terrorists” and “militants” and said that he had authorized the use of lethal force against them.
“Those who don’t surrender will be eliminated,” Tokayev said.
He also blasted calls for talks with the protesters made by some other countries as “nonsense.” “What negotiations can be held with criminals, murderers?” Tokayev said.
Kazakhstan’s Interior Ministry reported Friday that 26 protesters had been killed during the unrest, 18 were wounded and more than 3,000 people have been detained. A total of 18 law enforcement officers were reported killed as well, and over 700 sustained injuries.
Kazakhstan is experiencing the worst street protests since the country gained independence three decades ago. The demonstrations began over a near-doubling of prices for a type of vehicle fuel and quickly spread across the country, reflecting wider discontent over the rule of the same party since independence.
Protests have turned extremely violent, with government buildings set ablaze and scores of protesters and more than a dozen law enforcement officers killed. Internet across the country has been shut down, and two airports closed, including one in Almaty, the country’s largest city.
In a concession, the government on Thursday announced a 180-day price cap on vehicle fuel and a moratorium on utility rate increases. Tokayev has vacillated between trying to mollify the protesters, including accepting the resignation of his government, and promising harsh measures to quell the unrest, which he blamed on “terrorist bands.”
In what was seen as one such measure, the president has called on a Russia-led military alliance for help.
The alliance, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, includes the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and has started deploying troops to Kazakhstan for a peacekeeping mission.
Kazakh officials have insisted that the troops will not be fighting the demonstrators, and instead will take on guarding government institutions.
On Friday, Tokayev declared that constitutional order was “mainly restored in all regions of the country” and that “local authorities are in control of the situation.”
The president added, however, that “terrorists are still using weapons and are damaging people’s property” and that “counterterrorist actions” should be continued.
Skirmishes in Almaty were still reported on Friday morning. Russia’s state news agency Tass reported that the building occupied by the Kazakh branch of the Mir broadcaster, funded by several former Soviet states, was on fire.
However, the Almaty airport — stormed and seized earlier by the protesters — was back under the control of Kazakh law enforcement and CSTO peacekeepers, Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov said Friday. The airport will remain shut until Friday evening, local TV station Khabar 24 reported, citing the airport’s spokespeople.
In other parts of the country some things started to go back to normal. In the capital, Nur-Sultan, access to the internet has been partially restored, and train traffic has been resumed across Kazakhstan.
The airport in the capital is operating as usual, Khabar 24 reported. According to the TV channel, airlines will resume domestic flights to the cities of Shymkent, Turkestan and Atyrau, as well as flights to Moscow and Dubai, starting from 3 p.m. (0900 GMT).
___
Jim Heintz in Moscow contributed.
AP · by DASHA LITVINOVA · January 7, 2022





2. White House Nominates Airborne Officer to Lead Central Command


White House Nominates Airborne Officer to Lead Central Command
Army Lt. Gen. Michael Erik Kurilla would succeed Gen. Frank McKenzie and oversee operations in the Middle East
WSJ · by Gordon Lubold and Nancy A. Youssef
Gen. Kurilla, a former chief of staff for Central Command who is now the commander of the 18th Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, N.C., would assume the role as concerns grow that al Qaeda and the Afghanistan branch of Islamic State could re-emerge as a threat to American interests. Other issues in Central Command’s purview include Tehran’s nuclear program and influence in the region and ongoing civil wars in Syria and Yemen.
Gen. McKenzie has been seen as an effective advocate for maintaining military forces and capabilities in the Central Command region, but the administration has directed him to relocate missile defense hardware, fighter jet squadrons and other materiel and forces as the administration realigns its focus on the Indo-Pacific region.
“While Lieutenant General Kurilla is honored by the nomination to serve as commander of US Central Command, he is not presuming confirmation and remains solely focused on his present responsibilities in command of the XVIII Airborne Corps,” Col. Joe Buccino, a spokesman for Gen. Kurilla, said in a statement.
Born in California and raised in Elk River, Minn., Gen. Kurilla is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and served in the Gulf War. From 2004 to 2014, Gen. Kurilla served in Central Command, according to his biography. As a battalion commander in Mosul, Iraq, he was shot multiple times by insurgents between 2004 and 2005.
The U.S. military has said it plans to pivot toward threats from China and Russia, and Gen. Kurilla will be the first general to command the region since the Biden administration withdrew the last U.S. troops from Afghanistan in August, ending the 20-year war there.
Last month, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin ordered the aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman and its supporting ships to stay near the Ionian Sea rather than sail on a planned mission in the Middle East. The U.S. military often has had a carrier in the Middle East to project its naval influence.
The U.S. also has withdrawn ground forces across the region outside of Afghanistan to fewer than 40,000, defense officials said, a drop by half from its peak two years ago, and has redeployed several Patriot missile defense systems from Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, the U.S. has drawn down military resources and personnel from Iraq, leaving a rump of advisers.
Within the Middle East, Gen. Kurilla will have to contend with growing Chinese and Russian influence among the U.S.’s partners. China is looking to build a military facility at a port in the United Arab Emirates, while countries such as Egypt are looking to Russia for military and economic support. Gulf allies including Qatar and Saudi Arabia will also look to Gen. Kurilla to maintain their alliances with the U.S.
The effects of the chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan over the summer also continue to reverberate. The Islamic State’s Afghanistan branch has successfully launched terrorist attacks in that country as recently as Dec. 25. And the Taliban takeover of the country has been followed by an economic collapse that has led to food shortages and threatens regional security.
The biggest focus in the region is Iran, officials said. Talks between the U.S. and its allies with Tehran over its nuclear program have stalled, and Iranian-aligned paramilitary groups continue to launch attacks in Iraq and Syria. Iran-backed groups have stepped up their attacks against Saudi Arabia in recent months.
Retired Army Gen. Joseph Votel, who worked with Gen. Kurilla when he led Central Command, said Gen. Kurilla was among the best leaders in the Army because he was unafraid to try new things. In his current post, Gen. Kurilla has studied the applicability of artificial intelligence and machine learning to warfighting, Gen. Votel said.
Adapting to a changing region with fewer military resources will make Gen. Kurilla’s job more nuanced than that of his predecessors, he said.
“I think the job will be about using the technology we have available to protect our interests. It will be about supporting our diplomats. It will be about working in the gray zone of influence and promoting the United States as the preferred partner,” Gen. Votel said.
Write to Gordon Lubold at Gordon.Lubold@wsj.com and Nancy A. Youssef at nancy.youssef@wsj.com
WSJ · by Gordon Lubold and Nancy A. Youssef



3. Opinion | Biden’s efforts to build alliances against China are bearing fruit

Alliances are a critical component of our national security. What is key is that there is a sufficient alignment of interests and understanding of the mutual threats facing alliance partners.

Opinion | Biden’s efforts to build alliances against China are bearing fruit
The Washington Post · by Henry OlsenColumnist |AddFollowToday at 2:45 p.m. EST · January 6, 2022
President Biden has focused his foreign policy on strengthening an alliance of democracies in the Pacific to counter China’s rise. That effort is now bearing fruit.
Two U.S. allies, Australia and Japan, recently signed a defense agreement that tightly binds the nations together. The pact allows detachments of each nation’s military to freely enter the other country for joint training exercises, a measure that allows for further integration of their fighting capabilities. This is the first such treaty that Japan has signed with a nation besides the United States and shows that the mighty Asian nation is beginning to flex its considerable muscles to protect itself from Chinese aggression.
Japan is strengthening itself in other historic ways, too. The nation’s defeat in World War II shackled it with a constitution that enshrined pacifism, resulting in a self-imposed limit on the size of its military. Japan has traditionally spent no more than 1 percent of gross domestic product on its self-defense forces, preventing one of the world’s largest economies to project its power. But that is beginning to change.
The new conservative Japanese government recently introduced a defense budget that would hike spending to 1.09 percent of GDP, the first time in decades that the nation has breached its informal limit. New Prime Minister Fumio Kishida stated during this past year’s election campaign that he intended to raise military spending to 2 percent of GDP.
This increase allows Japan to significantly modernize and expand its military, especially its navy. Japan is beefing up its maritime capabilities across the board, but especially important is its decision to retrofit two helicopter carriers into small aircraft carriers that will carry the state-of-the-art F-35. When those ships are complete, Japan will be able to project power well south of its island bases, including contesting Chinese influence in the waters around Taiwan. They could also be used to protect Japan’s claims to the Senkaku Islands, a chain in the East China Sea that sits astride the sea lanes that Japan uses to import oil and natural gas from the Middle East.
Follow Henry Olsen‘s opinionsFollow
These uninhabited islands are about 100 or so kilometers from Taiwan, and fortifying them would allow Japan to protect Taiwan, too, should China choose to retake what it regards as a rebellious province by force. The Japanese Ministry of Defense made news this past year when it made clear in a white paper that Japan considered Taiwan a strategically important country, implying that Japan could come to its defense if attacked. This declaration comes along with other statements that constitute a dramatic shift for Japanese foreign policy, moving from a position of indifference about Chinese claims to one that forcefully puts Japan on Taiwan’s side.
None of this is happening by accident. While Japan’s rearmament began years ago, its quickening pace comes alongside increased U.S. focus on containing China. The Trump administration was working along these lines, too, but its efforts were frequently complicated by the former president’s myopic focus on other issues. Too often, he threw obstacles in front of efforts to build a strong alliance to contain China, such as his demand that South Korea quintuple its annual payment for U.S. bases. Biden quickly put an end to that dispute, agreeing to a five-year deal in early March that fixed South Korean payments at dramatically lower levels than Donald Trump sought.
The Biden administration also sought increased ties with other nations in the region. Vice President Harris visited Vietnam this past summer in an effort to push the former U.S. enemy toward open cooperation. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin visited the Philippines this past year, too, and that country’s mercurial leader, Rodrigo Duterte, subsequently authorized more extensive ties with the U.S. military. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s December trip to Southeast Asia continued the U.S. diplomatic offensive in this region. His speech in Indonesia took direct aim at China, calling on the communist nation to stop its “aggressive actions.” Indonesia, the world’s fourth-most populous country, is yet another place where China and the United States are engaged in a behind-the-scenes battle for influence.
The year 2021 was not kind to Biden, as he too often proved to be either wrong or incompetent, from the disastrous Afghanistan withdrawal to his failure in passing his domestic agenda. His policy toward China, however, appears refreshingly coherent and competent. Confronting China’s rise is the biggest policy challenge for the United States. If Biden proves up to the task, both parties should be thankful.
The Washington Post · by Henry OlsenColumnist |AddFollowToday at 2:45 p.m. EST · January 6, 2022



4. Japan, Australia ink deal to make military drills run more smoothly

SOFA negotiations are always difficult and complex.

Excerpts:
Both countries had begun negotiating the reciprocal access agreement in 2014, according to Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, talks stalled over jurisdictional concerns that could see Australian troops subject to the death penalty in Japan.
Japanese news outlet Nikkei recently reported the two sides agreed that Japan will not have jurisdiction in cases involving Australian troops carrying out their official duties, but crimes outside that context will be subject to Japanese law.
The agreement will streamline both countries’ complex entry procedures for foreign defense forces and equipment, which have become increasingly onerous as interactions increase, partly driven by growing concerns about China’s military modernization efforts and regional activities.
Japan, Australia ink deal to make military drills run more smoothly
Defense News · by Mike Yeo · January 6, 2022
MELBOURNE, Australia — Australia and Japan have signed a reciprocal access agreement to make it easier for their respective militaries to visit each other’s countries for exercises.
The agreement was signed Thursday during a virtual conference between Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison and his Japanese counterpart Fumio Kishida, which took place in lieu of an official visit to Australia by the latter. That scheduled visit was was canceled due to a surge in COVID-19 cases in Australia.
This is the first such agreement Japan has signed with a country other than the United States. The U.S. has a so-called status of forces agreement with Japan, which allows American forces to be stationed throughout the Asian nation’s territory.
The new bilateral agreement will “underpin greater and more complex practical engagement between the Australian Defence Force and the Japanese Self-Defence Forces,” according to a statement released by Morrison on Wednesday.
“This treaty will be a statement of our two nations’ commitment to work together in meeting the shared strategic security challenges we face and to contribute to a secure and stable Indo-Pacific,” the statement read.
Both countries had begun negotiating the reciprocal access agreement in 2014, according to Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, talks stalled over jurisdictional concerns that could see Australian troops subject to the death penalty in Japan.
Japanese news outlet Nikkei recently reported the two sides agreed that Japan will not have jurisdiction in cases involving Australian troops carrying out their official duties, but crimes outside that context will be subject to Japanese law.
The agreement will streamline both countries’ complex entry procedures for foreign defense forces and equipment, which have become increasingly onerous as interactions increase, partly driven by growing concerns about China’s military modernization efforts and regional activities.
Australian and Japanese forces in recent years have joined for joint and multilateral military exercises, such as the biennial Talisman Sabre drill in Australia, which began in 2015. Australian forces have also taken part in a military exercise in Japan, with Australian fighter jets deploying to the country for Bushido Guardian in 2019. The 2021 iteration was canceled due to the pandemic.
Japanese Mitsubishi F-2 fighter jets have been scheduled to conduct refueling trials with Australia’s Airbus KC-30 tankers since 2019, although scheduling issues and the spread of COVID-19 saw that plan repeatedly pushed back.
Australia and Japan already have deals in place governing defense equipment transfers and intelligence sharing, along with an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement to enable sharing of fuel and other supplies.

Defense News · by Mike Yeo · January 6, 2022


5. Iran wrestling chief, US green card holder, calls for a violent ‘Death to America’

Iran wrestling chief, US green card holder, calls for a violent ‘Death to America’
Dabir's statement comes a year after a former Iranian wrestling champion was executed for protesting corruption in the country
foxnews.com · by By Benjamin Weinthal | Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Former education secretary Dr. Bill Bennett called the comparisons ‘ridiculous’ and ‘ignorant.’
The president of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s wrestling federation, Alireza Dabir, urged "Death to America" in a television interview on Wednesday, a little over a month before a wrestling dual meet slated to be held between the national teams of the U.S. and Iran in Arlington, Texas on February 12.
In addition to Dabir's shocking anti-American statement, Fox News Digital can reveal that Dabir is a U.S. green card holder, according to Iran's former Greco-Roman national team wrestling coach.
"We always chant ‘Death to America’ but importantly is showing it in action," said Dabir, who won a gold medal in freestyle wrestling at the Olympics in Sydney in 2000. He added that "A doctor, he might even be wearing a tie, but he is doing his job well. He is saying ‘Death to America.’ Some talk a lot but don’t do much. We need to prove it [Death to America] with an action."

Alireza Dabir of Iran celebrates gold medal win for 58-kilogram Freestyle Wrestling at Sydney 2000 Summer Olympic Games, photo on black (Associated Press)
Dabir’s call for the violent destruction of the United States comes a year after the theocratic state he serves executed champion Greco-Roman wrestler Navid Afkari for daring to protest against political and economic corruption in Iran.
In September 2020, then-President Donald Trump tweeted a Fox News Digital article about Afkari’s dire plight shortly prior to his execution.
Sardar Pashaei, the Iranian-American former head coach of Iran’s national Greco-Roman wrestling team, told Fox News Digital: "It’s painful for me as a wrestler and national team coach to listen to these words, when I and many other athletes who have been forced to leave their homeland due to pressure from the Iranian government see Alireza Dabir, the president of the Iranian Wrestling Federation, say ‘Death to America’ while he has a U.S. green card in his pocket."
Pashaei, a former world champion Greco-Roman wrestler, oversees the United for Navid campaign. The organization seeks to commemorate the memory of and secure justice for Afkari.
"Why should someone [Dabir] who has been one of the athletes very close to the Iranian government in all the past years and part of the government’s propaganda be able to travel freely to the United States?" Pashaei asks.
The United States government—under both Democratic and Republican administrations—has designated Iran’s clerical regime the world’s worst state-sponsor of terrorism.
Pashaei continued, "The US government and security agencies should take the entry of such people seriously because they are part of a force very close to the Iranian government. In the past, we saw the presence of terrorists in the guise of ambassadors and diplomats, and now we see the regime sending its people in the form of athletes, including Javad Foroughi, a [sport] shooter and a member of the Revolutionary Guards, at the Tokyo Olympics [last year]."
Foroughi was sent to Syria to aid the regime of Bashar al-Assad, which has killed over 500,000 people in the war-ravaged nation. The US classifies the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization. The IRGC has been responsible for the murder of more than 600 American military personnel, according to the US government.
Lawdan Bazargan, a prominent Iranian-American human rights activist from California who was imprisoned in Tehran’s infamous Evin Prison for political dissent, told Fox News Digital: "It’s a shame that the US gives residency to people like the president of Iran’s Wrestling Federation. Dabir, who wants to act on the slogan of "Death to the U.S.," received a green card while hundreds of thousands of Iranians who were forced to leave Iran by the Islamic Regime are in refugee camps around the world, waiting for a country to accept them."
Fox News Digital sent press queries to Rich Bender, the executive director of USA Wrestling, which is the organizer of the dual meet between the American and Iranian teams.
Pashaei noted that Iran’s regime "arrests, tortures and executes innocent athletes, including Navid Afkari, solely for engaging in peaceful protest, and took Afkari’s two brothers hostage, imprisoning them. The Iranian government has also barred millions of women from competing in wrestling and has blocked their aspiration to participate in international competitions.
"We ask: How can USA Wrestling turn a blind eye to these issues and unilaterally invite those who say ‘Death to America’ in front of the cameras and viewers?"

Alireza Dabir of Iran, receives gold medal for 58 kg Freestyle Wrestling at Sydney 2000 Summer Olympic Games, photo on black (Associated Press)
Navid Afkari’s brothers, Vahid and Habib, were arrested, like Navid, in 2018 for their peaceful protest against the Iranian regime in Shiraz. An Iranian court sentenced Vahid to 54 years and six months imprisonment and Habib to 27 years and three months in jail, as well as 74 lashes each.
The clerical regime claims that Navid killed a security guard who monitored the protest in 2018, but the star chamber-like proceeding provided no proof of the killing.
Pashaei said, "On behalf of thousands of Iranian athletes, we urge you to refrain from hosting Iranian-government sponsored athletes as long as that government tortures and executes athletes, deprives women of participation in competition, and chants 'Death to America' in their media."
"Refrain from inviting officials and athletes who are tools of government propaganda that is anti-woman and anti-American. Your participation in events with Iran will certainly seriously damage the reputation of American wrestling and wrestlers," Pashaei urged.
The powerhouse wrestling teams from the University of Iowa and Oklahoma State University are slated to compete against each other on February 12 in Texas along with Iran and the U.S. squad.
The deep dissatisfaction among elite Iranian athletes prompted many defections in 2021. The London-based Iran International news outlet reported in December that Greco-Roman national team wrestler Ali Arsalan defected and will represent Serbia in competition. According to Iran International, roughly 30 elite Iranian athletes have recently defected for reasons ranging from women being forced wear a hijab and Iran’s discriminatory directive that their athletes cannot compete against Israelis.
Benjamin Weinthal is a Jerusalem-based Journalist and a fellow for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Follow Benjamin on Twitter @BenWeinthal.
foxnews.com · by Foundation for Defense of Democracies



6. New Albanian HQ to serve as hub for US special operations in Balkans

Excerpts:
The headquarters will give U.S. special operators more logistical flexibility and better access to regional transportation hubs, U.S. Special Operations Command Europe said Thursday.
“The ability to rapidly move and train within the Balkans in close coordination with other allied and partner forces made Albania the best location for this effort,” said Maj. Gen. David Tabor, commander of Special Operations Command Europe.
...
For SOCEUR, the headquarters in Albania resembles similar sites in other parts of Europe.
The command, based in Stuttgart, Germany, also has small forward operation sites in Estonia and Ukraine, where troops coordinate training efforts with local forces.

New Albanian HQ to serve as hub for US special operations in Balkans
Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · January 6, 2022
A U.S. Army Green Beret prepares Albanian special forces soldiers for drills July 23, 2021. The Stuttgart, Germany-based U.S. Special Operations Command Europe said Thursday that it has positioned a new forward operating headquarters in Albania. (Devin Andrews/U.S. Marine Corps)

STUTTGART, Germany — The U.S. has established a forward operating headquarters in Albania and will use the facility in the Adriatic Sea-facing country as a home base for missions in the broader Balkans.
The headquarters will give U.S. special operators more logistical flexibility and better access to regional transportation hubs, U.S. Special Operations Command Europe said Thursday.
“The ability to rapidly move and train within the Balkans in close coordination with other allied and partner forces made Albania the best location for this effort,” said Maj. Gen. David Tabor, commander of Special Operations Command Europe.
A U.S. Army Green Beret observes close-quarter battle drills conducted by the Albanian special forces July 21, 2021. (Devin Andrews/U.S. Marine Corps)
Albania is a fellow NATO member. The move puts American special operators near such countries as Greece, Kosovo, Montenegro, Bosnia, North Macedonia and Serbia, where Russian political, economic and military influence has been growing steadily stronger.
SOCEUR didn’t say how many troops will be based in Albania, but service members will be stationed there on rotational basis.
U.S. Army Green Berets assigned to 10th Special Forces Group reviews close-quarter battle drills conducted by the Albanian Special Forces, Albania, July 21, 2021. U.S. Special Operations Command Europe said Thursday that it has positioned a new forward operating headquarters in the small southern European country that will serve as a homebase for missions in the broader Balkans region. (Devin Andrews/U.S. Marine Corps)
For U.S. European Command, the Balkans has been an area of concern for several years, even if the security situation there has been overshadowed by tensions with Russia in the Baltics and the greater Black Sea region.
For example, NATO countries have blamed Russian agents for destabilization campaigns in Montenegro, an alliance member that borders Albania. EUCOM’s Gen. Tod Wolters also has called the Balkans “primary targets of persistent Russian malign influence.”
A U.S. Army Green Beret assigned to 10th Special Forces Group observes close-quarter battle drills conducted by the Albanian Special Forces, Albania, July 21, 2021. U.S. Special Operations Command Europe announced plans to locate a forward-based SOF headquarters, on a rotational basis, in Albania. (Devin Andrews/U.S. Marine Corps)
For SOCEUR, the headquarters in Albania resembles similar sites in other parts of Europe.
The command, based in Stuttgart, Germany, also has small forward operation sites in Estonia and Ukraine, where troops coordinate training efforts with local forces.
John Vandiver
John covers U.S. military activities across Europe and Africa. Based in Stuttgart, Germany, he previously worked for newspapers in New Jersey, North Carolina and Maryland. He is a graduate of the University of Delaware.

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · January 6, 2022


7. In a tense corner of Europe, SEALs and Green Berets are helping a close ally up its skills with old US gear

Excerpts:
Greece has consistently been one of the few NATO allies to spend more than 2% of its GDP on defense — it has even exceeded US defense spending as a percentage of GDP in some years — due in large part to its longstanding rivalry with Turkey.
During the height of the Greek debt crisis, defense procurements stopped. However, since 2019 the country has pursued a major rearmament program, buying new equipment and upgrading older gear.
In 2021, in an effort to increase its power-projection capabilities in the critical Eastern Mediterranean region, Greece agreed to buy three Belharra frigates from France with an option for one more and 18 Rafale combat jets with an option for six more. Athens is also planning to buy four corvettes. The ships and jets cost roughly $7.35 billion.
...
Greek forces are also active overseas. A regiment is permanently stationed in Cyprus, and Greek troops may soon head to the Sahel to support the French-led Operation Barkhane. A Greek Patriot anti-aircraft missile battery is deployed to Saudi Arabia.
As Pyatt said this month, "a Greece which is stronger and more secure makes our alliance stronger and more secure, and therefore makes the United States stronger and more secure."
In a tense corner of Europe, SEALs and Green Berets are helping a close ally up its skills with old US gear
Business Insider · by Constantine Atlamazoglou

A US Navy Special Warfare Combatant-Craft crewman steers a Mark V Special Operations Craft near Key West, April 28, 2009.
US Navy/PO1 Kathryn Whittenberger
  • The US and Greek militaries have continued to strengthen their relationship.
  • At the end of 2021, the US transferred dozens of armored vehicles and specialized watercraft to Greece.
  • Greece has sought to bolster its military amid increasing tension in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Get a daily selection of our top stories based on your reading preferences.
The US continues to strengthen its military partnership with Greece following the signing of the Mutual Defense and Cooperation Agreement in October.
The US is helping its Mediterranean ally now by transferring 1,200 surplus M1117 Guardian armored vehicles and four Mark V Special Operations Craft to the Greek military.
The combined value of the equipment is close to $1 billion, but it is being provided to Greece at a very significant discount under the US's Excess Defense Articles program.
Congressional approval is required for a country to receive EDA equipment. Therefore, the transfers reflect a "commitment to continuing to build on the strength of a relationship that has reached a high point but is not yet at its summit," according to US Ambassador to Greece Geoffrey Pyatt.
Hellenic Guardians

US and Greek officials with the first of 1,200 M1117 Guardian armored vehicles transferred to Greece by the US in December 2021.
The Greek military will purchase the M117 Guardians for about $80,000 apiece — a discount of nearly 90% over their $800,000 production price.
However, the Guardians will be provided without armament; the Greeks will have to procure and install machine guns and grenade launchers themselves.
Forty-four vehicles have already been delivered to Greece. The remainder are to be delivered by April 2022. The M117 has a number of variants, but it is not yet known which Greece will receive.
The M117 Guardian was used in Afghanistan and Iraq, where its mine-resistant hull and ability to withstand small-arms fire made it popular among troops, but the Guardians' operational roles with Greece are likely to be limited, according to Savvas Vlassis, a Greek defense journalist and publisher.
The vehicles are expected to be used mainly on patrol missions, deploying primarily with Greek units in the Evros border region and on the Greek islands.
A special partnership

A Scan Eagle drone is launched from a Mark V boat off of San Clemente Island, California, February 7, 2008.
US Navy/MCS3 Michelle L. Kapica
The Mark V Special Operations Craft are primarily used for insertion and patrol and were in service with the US Navy SEALs from 1995 to 2013.
Greece has the largest coastline in the Mediterranean and over 2,000 islands and islets, meaning the boats — Greece's first Mark Vs — will be particularly useful.
To showcase the Mark V's capabilities, US Navy SEALs and Green Berets from US Special Operations Command Europe conducted joint drills with Hellenic Underwater Demolition Command (DYK) operators in Attica, off the southeastern end of the Greek mainland.

US and Greek special operators with Amb. Geoffrey Pyatt after an exercise in Athens, November 24, 2021.
DYK operators are roughly equivalent to US Navy SEALs. The Greek selection process is based on the US Navy's BUD/S course, and the two units have similar attrition rates.
"I have been so impressed to see not only the growth in the US-Greece Special Forces partnership but also the way the Hellenic Special Forces are working across a wide region," Pyatt said during the drills.
Cooperation between Greek and US special-operation units is frequent and has increased in recent years, with the occasional inclusion of other regional partners. The Aegean topography allows for unique exercise scenarios centered around the Greek islands.
Although useful, the Mark Vs and M1117s are not Greece's biggest recent acquisitions.
Greek spending spree

The first of 1,200 M1117 Guardian armored vehicles transferred to Greece by the US in December 2021.
Greece has consistently been one of the few NATO allies to spend more than 2% of its GDP on defense — it has even exceeded US defense spending as a percentage of GDP in some years — due in large part to its longstanding rivalry with Turkey.
During the height of the Greek debt crisis, defense procurements stopped. However, since 2019 the country has pursued a major rearmament program, buying new equipment and upgrading older gear.
In 2021, in an effort to increase its power-projection capabilities in the critical Eastern Mediterranean region, Greece agreed to buy three Belharra frigates from France with an option for one more and 18 Rafale combat jets with an option for six more. Athens is also planning to buy four corvettes. The ships and jets cost roughly $7.35 billion.
Greece is in the process of upgrading 83 of its F-16 fighter jets to Block 72 Viper, the latest configuration, but has also expressed strong interest in purchasing F-35s.
Athens has also agreed to buy seven MH-60R multirole helicopters from Lockheed Martin. The cutting-edge helicopters will be outfitted for anti-submarine warfare and cost about $600 million.
Together, these purchases will significantly increase the Greek military's operational capabilities in what has become a tense intersection of Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.
A valuable NATO ally

Greek navy frigate Aigaion during an exercise in the Mediterranean Sea, August 7, 2019.
JACK GUEZ/AFP via Getty Images
Due to the region's maritime character, the mainstay of the Hellenic Navy are its 13 frigates and 11 submarines, four of them highly advanced Type 214s, and it frequently operates in the central and eastern Mediterranean with regional partners and allies.
The Hellenic Army is an integral part of NATO's southern flank. It is structured to focus on the defense of eastern Aegean islands, north, and northeastern Greece.
The Greeks have one of the largest tank forces in Europe, with close to 1,300 main battle tanks. Most of them are German Leopards, though Greece also operates 390 upgraded but old US-made M48 Patton tanks.

A Greek F-16 at the Athens Flying Week 2021 air show, September 5, 2021.
Nicolas Economou/NurPhoto via Getty Images
Currently, the Hellenic Air Force has 231 fighters with a healthy mix of F-16s and French-made Mirage 2000s. Greek pilots are well regarded in NATO.
Greek forces are also active overseas. A regiment is permanently stationed in Cyprus, and Greek troops may soon head to the Sahel to support the French-led Operation Barkhane. A Greek Patriot anti-aircraft missile battery is deployed to Saudi Arabia.
As Pyatt said this month, "a Greece which is stronger and more secure makes our alliance stronger and more secure, and therefore makes the United States stronger and more secure."

Business Insider · by Constantine Atlamazoglou



8. A World of Mounting Disarray | by Richard Haass


Excerpts:
What would it take to avoid a future defined by disarray? A short list would include widespread vaccination against COVID-19 and new vaccines effective against future variants; a technological or diplomatic breakthrough that would dramatically reduce the use of fossil fuels and slow climate change; a political settlement in Ukraine that promotes European security and an outcome with Iran that prevents its becoming a nuclear or even near-nuclear power; a US-China relationship able to put in place guardrails to manage competition and avoid conflict; and a US that managed to repair its democracy sufficiently so that it had the capacity to focus on world events.
As always, little is inevitable, for better or for worse. What is clear, though, is that trends will not improve by themselves. Innovation, diplomacy, and collective will are needed to turn things around. Unfortunately, the last two are in short supply.

A World of Mounting Disarray | by Richard Haass - Project Syndicate

project-syndicate.org · by Richard Haass · January 6, 2022
From climate change to public health to geopolitical rivalry and the security of cyberspace, the gap between global challenges and responses is large and growing. And the resources needed to turn things around – especially collective will and skillful diplomacy – are in short supply.
NEW YORK – My book, A World in Disarray, was published five years ago this month. The book’s thesis was that the Cold War’s end did not usher in an era of greater stability, security, and peace, as many expected. Instead, what emerged was a world in which conflict was much more prevalent than cooperation.
Some criticized the book at the time as being unduly negative and pessimistic. In retrospect, the book could have been criticized for its relative optimism. The world is a messier place than it was five years ago – and most trends are heading in the wrong direction.
At the global level, the gap between challenges and responses is large and growing. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the inadequacies of international health machinery. We are entering the third year of the pandemic, but still do not know its origins, thanks to Chinese stonewalling.
What we do know is that more than five million people, and more likely 15 million, have died. We also know that some three billion people (many in Africa) have yet to receive a single dose of a COVID-19 vaccine. And we know that the ongoing pandemic has reduced global economic output by trillions of dollars.
Climate change has advanced. The world is already more than 1° Celsius warmer than it was at the start of the industrial revolution and is on course to get warmer. Extreme weather events are more frequent. Fossil fuel use is up.
Governments have pledged to do better. Their performance remains to be seen; in some cases, including China and India, the world’s two most populous countries, the pledges are noteworthy for their lack of ambition and urgency.
Cyberspace remains akin to the Wild West, with no sheriff willing or able to set boundaries on acceptable behavior. There is not even the pretense of global cooperation. Rather, we see technology outpacing diplomacy, with authoritarian governments going to considerable lengths to wall off their societies while violating the cyberspace of others to sow political discord or steal technology.
Nuclear proliferation continues. North Korea has increased the quantity and quality of its nuclear arsenal and the range and accuracy of its missiles. And, in the aftermath of the unilateral US decision in 2018 to exit the accord that placed temporary ceilings on Iran’s nuclear capabilities, the Islamic Republic has gone from being a year away from possessing a nuclear weapon to just a few months or even weeks.
Great power rivalry is more pronounced than at any time since the Cold War. US-China relations have deteriorated rapidly, mostly owing to increased Chinese repression at home, trade and economic frictions, and China’s growing military strength and increasingly assertive foreign policy. Against a backdrop of growing economic competition and possible conflict over Taiwan, it is unclear whether the two countries will be able to cooperate on global challenges like public health and climate change.
Russia is arguably even more disaffected with the world order. Three decades after the end of the Cold War, President Vladimir Putin, seemingly ensconced in power for the foreseeable future, is set on stopping or, if possible, reversing NATO’s reach. Putin has shown himself to be comfortable using military force, energy supplies, and cyberattacks to destabilize countries and governments he views as adversarial. The immediate target is Ukraine, but the strategic challenge posed by Putin’s Russia is much broader.
Other developments also offer reason for concern. More than 80 million – one in every hundred people – are displaced. Many times that number are enduring what can only be described as a humanitarian crisis. The Middle East is home to several ongoing wars that are simultaneously civil and regional.
Democracy is in retreat in much of the world, not just in dramatic cases such as Myanmar and Sudan, but also in parts of Latin America and even Europe. Haiti and Venezuela are essentially failed states, as are Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Afghanistan appears on its way to again becoming a world leader in terrorism, opium production, and misery.
There is one other critical factor: The United States is in greater disarray internally than it was five years ago. Political polarization is at an all-time high, and political violence has emerged as a serious threat. The peaceful transfer of political power following elections can no longer be taken for granted. This internal reality has in turn accelerated America’s pullback from global leadership after three-quarters of a century. No other country is able and willing to assume this role.
To be sure, some positive developments deserve mention: the rapid creation of vaccines that dramatically reduce vulnerability to COVID-19; new green technologies that reduce reliance on fossil fuels; growing cooperation between the US and several of its partners to push back against a more forceful China; and the simple fact that, so far, great power rivalry has not descended into war.
What would it take to avoid a future defined by disarray? A short list would include widespread vaccination against COVID-19 and new vaccines effective against future variants; a technological or diplomatic breakthrough that would dramatically reduce the use of fossil fuels and slow climate change; a political settlement in Ukraine that promotes European security and an outcome with Iran that prevents its becoming a nuclear or even near-nuclear power; a US-China relationship able to put in place guardrails to manage competition and avoid conflict; and a US that managed to repair its democracy sufficiently so that it had the capacity to focus on world events.
As always, little is inevitable, for better or for worse. What is clear, though, is that trends will not improve by themselves. Innovation, diplomacy, and collective will are needed to turn things around. Unfortunately, the last two are in short supply.

project-syndicate.org · by Richard Haass · January 6, 2022


9. Reestablish the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group-Taiwan

They overlooked the former Taiwan Resident Detachment that was manned by a handful of Special Forces personnel from about 1958 through 1974 with members of the 1st Special Forces Group from Okinawa. It is analogous to the Special Forces detachment Korea (SFD-K and not the 39th SF Detachment) that has provided sustained advisory and assistance capabilities to the ROK Special Warfare Command since 1958. It is the longest continuously serving SOF unit in Asia. It is time to reprise the Taiwan Resident Detachment. 

Reestablish the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group-Taiwan - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Jake Yeager · January 7, 2022
The United States has a nasty habit of firing resources at a military problem first and asking questions about effective implementation later — as recently demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan — but that does not have to be the case with Taiwan. U.S. officials are starting to get more serious about supporting Taiwan’s ability to defend itself. They debate competing policy stances on defending Taiwan (ambiguity versus clarity) but largely agree that “bolstering Taiwan’s self-defenses is an urgent task and an essential feature of deterrence,” as recently stated by the Pentagon’s top official for Asia. Experienced U.S. officials are raising the alarm that China may attempt forceful unification with Taiwan later this decade if deterrence continues to erode.
In the 1970s, the United States used triangular diplomacy to gain leverage over the Soviet Union by opening relations with China and eventually switching diplomatic recognition from Taipei, which Washington had previously recognized as the seat of the legitimate Chinese state and government, to Beijing. Prior to this switch in 1979, the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group-Taiwan was the central hub for planning, coordinating, and executing defense cooperation initiatives. It served as the eyes, ears, and voice of the U.S. military to the Taiwanese armed forces. It possessed the requisite staff and planning horsepower to facilitate the large-scale military arms transfers, training, and advising that contributed to decades of Taiwanese military superiority over China, which has since evaporated.
U.S.-Taiwanese defense initiatives are ramping up — to levels unseen since 1979 — due to legitimate concerns about Chinese designs on the island. However, the thick military organizational connective tissue that existed prior to 1979 is no longer in place to facilitate this cooperation. Without a military organization focused on the island, the U.S. personnel, funding, and materiel poured into supporting Taiwan may be inefficiently applied and generate limited return on investment — defined in terms of deterrence and lethality in conflict. To help to deter Chinese aggression, the United States should establish a 21st century version of this often forgotten advisory group to provide the staff capacity, synchronization, and interagency integration required to facilitate increasingly robust U.S.-Taiwanese military collaboration, bolster Taiwan’s defenses, and strengthen its will to fight. Despite inevitable Chinese government counterpressure, reestablishing this organization would probably not trigger military conflict and would be consistent with the U.S. commitment to the One China policy, guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances.
The Original Organization
The original U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group-Formosa (this last word was later changed to “Taiwan”) operated from 1951 to 1979 and was instrumental in professionalizing and modernizing Taiwan’s military. During the Cold War, the United States established military assistance advisory groups in South Korea, Japan, South Vietnam, Europe, and the Middle East to strengthen allies threatened by communism. The group in Taiwan was a reincarnation of the similarly named organization that operated in China from 1947 to 1949, until the Republic of China was defeated by the Communists and withdrew to Taiwan. From 1951 to 1955, this group was responsible for all U.S.-Taiwanese defense matters. In 1955, upon ratification of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command was established and absorbed many personnel, resources, and responsibilities that had previously been aligned to the advisory group.
The original advisory group was established in 1951 to facilitate large-scale arms transfers and provide military training and assistance to deter Chinese aggression. The impetus for establishing the organization was a U.S. military aid package worth $300 million — equivalent to over $3 billion today — that would have overwhelmed the small U.S. military staff in Taiwan at the time. In 1950, after North Korea invaded South Korea, the United States shifted its policy to support Taiwan and sent a small team to the island to prepare a comprehensive report on Taiwan’s military that was the basis for the aid package. Once established, the advisory group was led by a major general and initially manned with 116 U.S. servicemembers, but later grew to over 2,000 personnel. The group established a comprehensive American-type military school system for Taiwan’s officer corps, helped the country to implement conscription, trained and advised the military, and oversaw military aid.
The U.S. advisory group deeply understood the Taiwan military, shaped its defense concepts, and built complementary U.S. war plans. Lessons from previous U.S. security cooperation efforts — including recent failures in Iraq and Afghanistan — suggest that Washington’s willingness to influence higher-order issues of mission, organizational structure, and leadership is critical. The original advisory group had offices in the same building as the Taiwan Ministry of National Defense and U.S. staff sections were directly attached to their Taiwanese counterparts. It embedded advisers in all major Taiwanese training units and at the regimental level and above. All of the group’s initiatives were informed by the in-depth understanding of Taiwan’s military that was gained through this integration.
The group also influenced Taiwan’s defense concepts. It translated hundreds of U.S. military training manuals into Chinese, which shaped Taiwan’s warfighting approach. In the early 1950s, U.S. advisors helped Taiwan to adjust its defense concept from static to mobile defense. The United States later helped Taiwan to shift from a defensive approach to an offensive posture, to hasten an end to the Korean War by implicitly threatening a second front in China’s southeastern underbelly.
Prior to the establishment of the Taiwan Defense Command, the advisory group developed U.S. war plans that complemented Taiwan’s own. It also planned U.S. support to the island’s wartime logistical requirements. As part of the U.S. strategy to leverage Taiwan to help to end the Korean War, the organization planned to help to deploy 25,000 Taiwanese military personnel to the Korean front by the end of 1954. A reestablished advisory group could similarly improve Taiwan’s defenses today while creating regional security benefits for the United States and its interests.
The Requirement: Control the Increasing Flow of U.S. Military Resources to Taiwan
A new advisory group would ensure that increased U.S. defense support provided to Taiwan is synchronized and woven into a holistic plan that enables a credible defense of the island and helps to reverse the erosion of cross-strait deterrence. China has rapidly modernized its fleet and increased its inventory of major naval combatants since 2005, while the U.S. fleet has aged and shed major combat vessels. The U.S. Navy still leads — 213 major combatants to China’s 145 — but China is expected to reach rough parity in major combatants and surpass the U.S. Navy in total submarines by 2030. Further, China’s navy is deployed almost entirely in the Indo-Pacific while America’s is dispersed around the globe. There is ample opportunity to bolster Taiwan’s deterrence to help offset declines on the U.S. side of the equation.
This organization would help to fulfill the legal mandate in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. The law requires the United States to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capacity.” The group would ensure that the growing volume and complexity of “defense articles” and “services” being provided to Taiwan arrive in a timely manner and are “sufficient” to deter Chinese aggression.
Bilateral military initiatives are reportedly expanding, in accordance with the growing threat posed by China. Washington is reportedly considering using special operators to help Taipei to conduct irregular warfare, including establishing resistance networks and countering an amphibious landing. This could support Taiwan’s grassroots efforts to mount a whole-of-society defense of the island, integrating civilian militias with active-duty and reserve military personnel. Earlier this year, the United States and Taiwan signed a coast guard cooperation agreement. Taiwan is fielding coast guard vessels capable of carrying anti-ship missiles and envisions its coast guard as a second navy during wartime. Taiwan is also revamping its military reserve system. These are complex undertakings that would benefit from substantial U.S. advice and assistance — especially if they are to be realized this decade.
Congress is also pushing for more tangible U.S. support to Taiwan’s defensive preparedness, beyond routine U.S. arms sales. The recently introduced Taiwan Deterrence Act and Arm Taiwan Act would authorize $2 billion and $3 billion a year respectively in foreign military financing for Taiwan. This could help Taipei to purchase relevant defense articles like survivable communications systems, coastal defense cruise missiles (including in shipping containers), small missile boats, sea mines, loitering munition swarms, and mobile air defenses. The Taiwan Partnership Act would establish a partnership between the U.S. National Guard and Taiwan’s military. Taiwan’s plan to spend an extra $9 billion on domestically manufactured missiles and other capabilities may also generate demand for increased U.S. military assistance.
Unless it reestablishes a dedicated Taiwan-focused organization, U.S. military staff planning capacity — rather than U.S. policy — may soon become the limiting factor that slows the momentum of expanding U.S.-Taiwanese defense initiatives. U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Forces Japan headquarters are staffed with hundreds of personnel dedicated to bilateral military cooperation and supporting the defense of their host-nation allies. The U.S. military lacks an equivalent organizational headquarters focused on military cooperation with Taiwan.
The United States needs an integrated organization that is dedicated to military deterrence and tightly networked with other elements of national power. It should be flush with U.S. interagency personnel and allies — especially from Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan. To have credibility with Taiwan’s senior officers, it should be led by a U.S. general or flag officer who is empowered to speak authoritatively on military matters on behalf of the U.S. government. It should start with 100 to 200 personnel and grow as additional initiatives come online or scale-up. It should also maintain well-staffed satellite offices in U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and Washington. The advisory group would facilitate training for Taiwanese personnel beyond the borders of Taiwan, in the United States and throughout the Indo-Pacific region.
This new security cooperation and assistance organization should be headquartered in Taiwan to enable integration with Taiwanese counterparts. Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, it should be affiliated with the American Institute in Taiwan — the non-profit organization responsible for U.S. relations with Taiwan. This new organization would not be a military “command” — like the old U.S. Taiwan Defense Command — and placing it in Taiwan would not constitute “basing” troops on the island. Most of its personnel should be contractors and retired military personnel, with a smaller contingent of active-duty liaisons and interagency personnel to fill key leadership and staff positions. These personnel would serve in an unofficial capacity, consistent with how the institute is currently staffed in order to maintain Washington’s adherence to the One China policy. If placing this new organization on the island is deemed politically infeasible, it could be headquartered elsewhere — perhaps Palau, Guam, Japan, or Australia — with forward elements in Taiwan.
Establishing this organization would trigger retaliation from Beijing, which would decry this move as a change to the status quo, but the United States could carefully calibrate its rollout to avoid provoking military conflict. This new organization would be provocative and further enflame already heightened domestic nationalist sentiment calling for Chinese leaders to take forceful action against Taiwan. Rather than hyping it, U.S. officials should only indirectly reveal the new organization’s existence and respond to queries for information with stock responses about how the U.S.-Taiwanese defense relationship “remains aligned against the current threat posed by the People’s Republic of China and is in line with our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act and our One China policy.” This would give Chinese officials the space needed to temper the domestic narrative and calm full-tilt nationalists — defusing pressure for military conflict.
Nevertheless, Beijing would retaliate. China’s responses could range from military aircraft incursions in close proximity to — or overflying — Taiwan, to missile launches that impact near Taiwan, similar to those that bracketed the north and south of the island during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. In a more extreme scenario, China could seize Taiwanese-held Pratas or Itu Aba island in the South China Sea, but this is far less likely and may be counterproductive for Beijing, since it could prematurely trigger large-scale war before China is ready, drive the United States and Taiwan closer together, and rally international support for Taiwan. Beijing’s near-term ire is the price of mid- to long-term deterrence — and it is well worth the cost.
The Benefits: Understand, Shape, and Complement Taiwan Defenses
Besides facilitating U.S. military support, this advisory group would help to deepen and maintain America’s understanding of Taiwan’s military, shape its concepts, and inform complementary U.S. war plans to defend Taiwan. U.S. support to Taiwan should be informed by an in-depth understanding of Taiwan’s military, including its strengths and weaknesses, bureaucracy, culture, interservice rivalries, and key personalities. Taiwan’s capability and concept development is influenced by parochial service interests and complex internal rivalries that are difficult to discern and disentangle. Additionally, Taiwanese officials often pursue high-end, prestige U.S. capabilities because they reassure the Taiwanese people about U.S. support for the island — not because they provide credible wartime capability. Some Taiwanese military officers prioritize maintaining “face” over adapting for survival, while others have a genuine sense of urgency. The new organization’s unparalleled understanding of the inner workings of Taiwan’s military would enable more effective and targeted engagements and prioritized support to reform-minded military counterparts.
This increased understanding of Taiwan’s military could translate to influence over Taiwan’s defense approach. Based on clear guidance from the political leadership, the Taiwanese military is in the throes of transitioning to a more credible defense concept, but reformers are struggling to overcome bureaucratic inertia and entrenched countervailing interests. The advisory group we call for here could help to tip the balance in favor of the reformers by giving them “face” via regular high-level military engagements and by publicly championing promising initiatives. It could also funnel the resources, advice, and training that would build momentum for these initiatives.
Leveraging its understanding and influence, this organization could inform complementary U.S.-Taiwanese war-planning. Although not its intended purpose, it could also form the nucleus of a U.S. wartime command that activates to help to execute the plan, if required. The Taiwan Relations Act does not obligate the United States to defend Taiwan, but it says that any non-peaceful Chinese attempt to achieve unification will be “considered a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” It also requires the United States to maintain the military capacity to defend the island. Whether the plans are executed or not, U.S. and Taiwanese war-planning should be complementary.
The United States can keep its policy of strategic ambiguity while establishing this organization. The U.S. president and top officials have repeatedly signaled American intent to defend Taiwan — achieving the deterrence benefits of strategic clarity, while shrewdly retaining the strategic autonomy inherent in the policy of ambiguity. Japanese and Australian leaders have followed suit. This organization’s existence would signal U.S. intent to help defend Taiwan, but it would not commit the United States to doing so.
Bolstering Taiwan’s Resolve and Cross-Strait Deterrence
Reestablishing this organization would symbolize tangible U.S. commitment to the defense of Taiwan. The original military assistance advisory groups were primarily intended to provide critical political and psychological reassurance to friendly nations resisting communist expansion. For Taiwanese officials, the symbolic value of U.S. military support is as important as its practical utility.
This organization would bolster the Taiwanese perception of U.S. commitment to the island, which is correlated to the population’s will to fight. A study discussed in these pages showed that Taiwanese citizens become more willing to defend Taiwan as U.S. military support becomes more certain. This organization would help to solidify the population’s will to fight without requiring the more extreme step of establishing formal alliance institutions or even necessarily abandoning the policy of strategic ambiguity. Its existence would also relieve the pressure felt by Taiwanese officials to pursue expensive, symbolic U.S. capabilities that are of questionable value in conflict. This organization would enable Taiwan to translate popular resolve into concrete defensive preparations. Steel resolve, resistance, and resiliency against Chinese aggression are the key to saving Taiwan, but are not sufficient on their own. Unless Taiwan translates resolve into credible defenses, deterrence will fail.
Taiwan Is Not Alone
The new U.S. organization would also show Taiwan that it is not alone. China understands the importance of Taiwanese resolve and is engaged in a comprehensive pressure campaign that aims to steadily increase Taiwan’s sense of psychological isolation, demoralize the citizenry, and erode the island’s will to resist unification. If unable to win without fighting, China will attempt to shatter Taiwan’s psychological resolve and cohesion at the outset of conflict, via devastating missile barrages and non-kinetic attacks.
This organization would help Taiwan to psychologically and militarily prepare to absorb these blows and continue fighting. When the organization is revealed, the United States and Taiwan could announce the sale of large quantities of explosives, small arms, and shoulder-launched weapons to signal that Taiwan is preparing — with a new organization’s help — to mount a protracted whole-of-society resistance. Taiwan’s political leadership and much of the military and civilian population is earnestly preparing for war with China. The United States needs a dedicated organization to stand side-by-side with Taiwan, bolster the island’s resolve, and rebuild credible deterrence, so that rather than “winning without fighting,” China will face a long, costly fight without winning.

Maj. Jake Yeager is an intelligence officer in the U.S. Marine Corps, assigned to 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit. He was previously detailed to the intelligence community where he focused on China and Taiwan. He has experience in Taiwan.
William Gerichten works for the U.S. Defense Attaché Service as a civilian attaché and serves in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserves as an intelligence officer, a foreign area officer specialized in China and Taiwan, and a Marine attaché. He served in the Defense Attaché Office in U.S. Embassy Beijing and has experience in Taiwan.
The views expressed here are those of the authors and not those of the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. Defense Attaché Service, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense Department, or any part of the U.S. government. The adjective “Taiwanese” is used by the editors for grammatical correctness, but this does not imply the authors are ascribing nationhood to Taiwan.
warontherocks.com · by Jake Yeager · January 7, 2022


10. What Is Russia’s Logic for the Current Crisis?

I wonder if this essay was cleared by the Kremlin. Note the author is director of the Institute for International Studies at Moscow State Institute of International Relations.

Conclusion:

Biden’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, never mind how it was carried out and how much Russia profited from it in terms of media propaganda, was seen in Moscow as Biden’s ultimate ability to act, unlike his predecessors who had to care about reelection, in a more audacious and decisive manner on matters of strategic importance to the United States. Putin’s remark in his latest phone call with Biden that “too many mistakes were made in the last 30 years [in U.S.-Russian relations]” is a ball pass to Biden. The Russian president believes that his American counterpart now has the opportunity to benefit from these proposals and do away with yet another “damned question” of U.S. foreign policy in the post-9/11 era — “Russia problem.” As both Russia and the United States enter a qualitatively new stage in the making of the new world order, this may be an attempt to orient the forthcoming conversation in Geneva to some vision for the future rather than continuing to argue over the past.

What Is Russia’s Logic for the Current Crisis? - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Maxim A. Suchkov · January 7, 2022
U.S.-Russian relations may no longer be central to world politics, the way they used to be during the Cold War, but when it comes to strategic stability and security in Europe and Eurasia, there is still no more important bilateral relationship in the world. President Vladimir Putin’s demands for “security guarantees” from the United States and NATO have caught many, including in Moscow, by surprise. The urgency with which Moscow seeks to have its proposals addressed — presented not as a “menu of options” to choose from but a “package” — has been even more stunning. This swift and somewhat bewildering presentation by Moscow should not be read as a bluff or as yet another attempt to simply get the attention of the United States. Putin may not exactly know what he wants, but he surely knows what he doesn’t want: over the course of his almost 20-year rule, this is his third major call to negotiate more favorable security conditions for Russia. Two previous attempts ended in wars. This time Moscow feels may be different, primarily because of the changing focus of the United States from Europe to Asia, and a U.S. interest in “a stable, predictable relationship” with Russia. In other words, there’s a sense in Moscow that Washington is looking for changes to the European security architecture so that it can focus on the Indo-Pacific. And if that is the case, Russia can be part of the solution if the United States agrees to the Kremlin proposals, or become an even bigger problem if the United States rejects them. The military build-up around Ukraine that unfolded before the proposals were formally rolled out appears to have signaled Russia’s determination to have frank, direct, and prompt discussions with the United States. Putin’s virtual “ultimatum” thus breaks into two closely intertwined subject matters: the Kremlin’s hopes to change Washington’s approach to the European security order and Russia’s intentions for Ukraine. Moscow is likely to make decisions regarding the second track depending on the progress on the first one — or lack thereof. Invading Ukraine was — and still is — not Putin’s preferred option to bring Washington to the table, but it took such a threat to get the White House to take his agenda seriously. This, however, seems to be only the first part of the plan. Should the talks with the United States fail to deliver satisfactory results for Moscow, the “military and military-technical response” that the Russian leadership mentioned may indeed directly concern Ukraine. This doesn’t necessarily imply a direct military invasion but may include a range of other options such as, for instance, missile deployments in Donbass, Crimea, or elsewhere. In addition, Russian officials also promised to embark on the course of “creating vulnerabilities” for Western countries.
At the first sight, the proposals may look bizarre: In this respect, it’s only logical that the knee-jerk reaction to Russia’s dozens of demands in Western policymaking circles was to scoff at them, especially since Moscow did not propose even one concession of its own. Some of the proposals concern fundamental issues rooted in late 1980s and early 1990s, while others focus on modern-day issues where the interests of the parties have long seemed irreconcilable.
The proposals could also be grouped according to time horizon: those that can be addressed immediately, those that may be dealt with in the middle term, and those that require a much longer distance and a more comprehensive discussion about European security. But as Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs magazine and chairman of the Presidium of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, put it:
Everyone wants to return to the situation at the moment of their highest influence: Russia – to 1945, the West – to 1991. To do this, Russia needs to annul the outcome of the Cold War, and the West needs to correct the outcome of World War II. But both sides are aware that neither is possible.
Some of the proposals demand concrete substantive solutions in the short term. Other proposals are meant to start a process. But at the root, Russia wants security guarantees alongside its borders. It intends to get those at the negotiating table or through creating new realities on the ground. If this is the case, understanding the drivers of Putin’s “compellence tactics” with the United States is critical, as is understanding why Putin thinks that now is his moment.
***
Since its beginning, NATO’s enlargement policy has become a significant irritant in Russia’s relations with the United States. Moscow didn’t see the expansion of the alliance that was historically meant to contain Moscow as an effort to enlarge the “security community” in Europe. Instead, most of the Russian political elite and much of the public came to think of NATO as a euphemism for U.S. military presence in Europe, a tool for advancing American interests, and a source of legitimacy for the Americans to adopt key political decisions in the “belt of Russia’s vital interests.” The phrase “aggressive advancement of military infrastructure to the Russian borders” came to accompany most Russian official statements on NATO.
Since the end of the 1990s, NATO has seen five waves of enlargement eastward. Each wave triggered noise from Moscow, but it was the possibility of Ukraine and Georgia’s accession to NATO that Russia feared most and set as the red line. Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 symbolically ended the 1990s era of Russian-Western relations. It was Putin’s first notable call to set the framework for “security guarantees” for Russia. Agitated by what Russia called “color revolutions” in Ukraine and Georgia as well as the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Putin’s complaints about “unilateral dominance of the United States in international relations” were a howl of frustration after failed attempts to establish a more favorable relationship with the United States during the presidency of George W. Bush. In the West, his remarks were seen as a signal of Russia’s own revisionist ambitions. The five-day war with Georgia in August of 2008, although triggered by then-President Mikheil Saakashvili’s adventurous offensive in South Ossetia, was, in Moscow’s view, part and parcel of the greater American and European failure to take the red lines seriously.
Putin’s second call for “joint undivided security” came during another period of turbulence: the Arab uprisings, NATO’s intervention in Libya, and what Moscow perceived as the Obama administration’s support for the Bolotnaya protests in Russia. These spurred Putin to raise the issue of Russia’s “security guarantees” in one of the articles he penned as an aspiring presidential candidate in the spring of 2012. Titled “Got to Be Strong: Security Guarantees for Russia,” the article in Rossiyskaya Gazeta argued that Russia’s own security can be guaranteed only by means of “developing military potential in the framework of containment strategy and at the level of defense sufficiency.”
Putin’s key thesis there warned: “We must not lead anyone into temptation with our weakness.” In early 2014, the Maidan revolution in Ukraine, hailed by major Western powers, made Moscow “take active measures to avoid the temptation.” The takeover of Crimea became another milestone in Russian-Western relations and officially ended the era of President Barack Obama’s reset policy with Russia.
Putin’s current “ultimatum” is thus a third attempt to coerce the United States and its European allies to review the entire European security architecture as well as alter the Western approach towards the post-Soviet space. This is a matter of strategic importance for Moscow. Regardless of the rhetoric, Russia’s major challenges cannot be adequately addressed without at least a “cold peace” with the United States and Europe. Putin’s threat to sever diplomatic ties with the West if Washington opts to impose new sanctions on Russia over Ukraine suggests the Kremlin feels it may reach a certain point after which talking to the West makes no sense. After that, Russia would have to activate an option of “providing its own security” that would probably imply greater costs for its own economy but also an uncomfortable security reality for others.
The urgency of the Russian proposals most probably has to do with Ukraine. On a number of occasions, Russian leaders have talked about the “active military development” of Ukraine — meaning the American buildup of Ukraine’s military potential, the penetration of American intelligence structures into key branches of the Ukrainian government, and the deployment of America’s own military infrastructure on its territory. Topped off with what Russia sees as Kyiv’s assertive policies towards Donbass, the persecution of pro-Russian groups and individuals in the rest of Ukraine, as well as escalating pressure on Lukashenko’s Belarus, the picture the Kremlin is getting is grim: Political and military trends near Russian borders are shaping up in an unfavorable manner for Russia’s security and status. When Putin says “Russia is pushed against the wall” it is not an exaggeration, but a real reflection of how Russian leaders view the current situation. If the pattern is recurring and unaddressed, Russian pledges for security guarantees end in major crises and war, such as the Russo-Georgian War and Russia’s seizure of Crimea. Diplomacy is not yet exhausted, but it might be soon.
Russia’s gambit with the United States is based upon two considerations: its perception of how the United States sees Russia and Russia’s assessment of the top foreign policy priorities of the Biden administration.
On the first, while the United States doesn’t see Russia as a peer competitor on a global scale — much to the despondency of the Kremlin, perhaps — the American military and intelligence community takes Russia as a serious adversary, especially in terms of nuclear and precision weapons, in cyberspace, and space capabilities. Following the extension of the New START treaty and the first Biden-Putin summit in Geneva on June 16, 2021, it became clear to the Russian party that strategic stability is the only area that truly concerns the United States in relation to Russia since these are the domains where Russia maintains near-peer capabilities and poses a serious threat to the United States. Based on these assumptions, Putin’s proposals hinged any further progress with the United States on matters of strategic stability on Russia’s own security guarantees in Europe. Without addressing the latter, it would be hard to move forward in the framework of the two working groups on strategic stability that the United States and Russia now have. “Walking and chewing gum,” as Biden once framed his Russia policy, is made more difficult this way.
On the second account, Moscow appears to believe that the Biden administration is better placed for serious deal-making at the moment. First, because there is an increasing domestic demand in the United States for a more restrained foreign policy that has supporters on both sides of the political aisle. Greater reliance on diplomacy was also stressed by Biden’s team during the campaign as one of his signature policies. Second, and most importantly, Moscow is skeptical that Biden is going to run for a second term and therefore may be thinking about his political legacy now. “Building back better” and getting America in shape for the century’s most important showdown with China are the two prime goals. A messy, protracted conflict with Russia that may also tie America’s hands in other regions would distract resources and impede the achievement of both goals.
Moreover, if Russia decides to augment its “force multiplier” role for China, things may also get more difficult for the United States in the Indo-Pacific theater. Putin has already made a small step in that direction by virtually inviting Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping to tacitly support a Russian “ultimatum” vis-à-vis the United States and NATO. China wouldn’t jump to Russia’s support, but is displeased with how Washington “drags” Europe into its China containment agenda in the Indo-Pacific.
Biden’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, never mind how it was carried out and how much Russia profited from it in terms of media propaganda, was seen in Moscow as Biden’s ultimate ability to act, unlike his predecessors who had to care about reelection, in a more audacious and decisive manner on matters of strategic importance to the United States. Putin’s remark in his latest phone call with Biden that “too many mistakes were made in the last 30 years [in U.S.-Russian relations]” is a ball pass to Biden. The Russian president believes that his American counterpart now has the opportunity to benefit from these proposals and do away with yet another “damned question” of U.S. foreign policy in the post-9/11 era — “Russia problem.” As both Russia and the United States enter a qualitatively new stage in the making of the new world order, this may be an attempt to orient the forthcoming conversation in Geneva to some vision for the future rather than continuing to argue over the past.
Maxim A. Suchkov is director of the Institute for International Studies at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University). On twitter: @m_suchkov
warontherocks.com · by Maxim A. Suchkov · January 7, 2022


11. Civil Affairs in the High North: How SOCOM's Governance Specialists Can Become Arctic-Capable

Rather than either SF or CA how about cross functional teams in accordance with the 1st Special Forces Command's vision? (Quotes from 1st SFC Vision: "Soldiers from our three interdependent Army Special Operations regiments operate in small cross-functional teams that strengthen partner and Allied relationships and complement our partners’ efforts." "By combining our unique capabilities into mission-specific cross-functional teams, 1st SFC (A) achieves out-sized effects for the Nation in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts." https://www.soc.mil/USASFC/Documents/1sfc-vision-2021-beyond.pdf)

Rather than thinking about specific units we should be considered how to achieve synergistic effects using the right capabilities executing the right missions. And in my opinion we should be resolutely focused on the two SOF "trinities:"

1.Irregular Warfare
2.Unconventional Warfare
3.Support to Political Warfare
ØThe Comparative advantage of SOF:
1.Influence
2.Governance
3.Support to indigenous forces and populations
With exquisite capabilities for the no fail CT and CP national missions


Civil Affairs in the High North: How SOCOM's Governance Specialists Can Become Arctic-Capable - Modern War Institute
mwi.usma.edu · by Clayton Hudak · January 7, 2022
Recently, Project 6633 asked authors to answer the question, “How can American special operations forces compete with near-peer adversaries in the polar regions?” The winning essay, “Competing in the Arctic through Indigenous Group Engagement and Special Reconnaissance Activities,” penned by Colonel Kevin D. Stringer, proposes US Army Special Forces should be the primary special operations effort in the high north due to their heritage and experience conducting engagement with the indigenous population. He charges them with maintaining “regular and persistent engagements with the indigenous peoples of the Arctic.” While this mandate falls under the purview of Special Forces, in many cases, it would be more resource-efficient and politically palatable to have special operations force civil affairs teams (CATs) expand the competitive space in the northern latitudes. Stringer states that “US Special Forces have a civil affairs opportunity with the large number of indigenous governance organizations and bodies.” This begs the question: Why not offer this mission to United States Special Operations Command’s dedicated civil affairs (CA) unit?
Despite the region’s location on the geographic periphery, access to natural resources and expanding trade routes underscore the region’s importance. Both Russia and China are eager to galvanize their positions as key influencers. China recently announced plans build a third icebreaker, furthering its efforts to incorporate the northern sea route into the Belt and Road Initiative. Meanwhile, following a 2007 stunt planting of its flag on the North Pole, Russia has expanded its military presence in the Arctic and seeks to establish itself as the preeminent power in the region.
The 92nd Civil Affairs Battalion (US Special Operations Command’s Europe-aligned CA unit) is uniquely suited to fulfill the mission set illuminated by Stringer’s essay. However, as the Army’s Arctic strategy, Regaining Arctic Dominance, states, Arctic-capable forces cannot be rapidly developed. Indeed, formations cannot “simply be re-purposed or provide (sic) add-on capability to be proficient and survive arctic conditions.” Instead, they require specialized training and equipment. The lack of Arctic-oriented CA capacity can be filled through specially trained and equipped high north CATs, the establishment of a winter warfare section within the 92nd, and increased engagement in the US Special Operations Command–North (SOCNORTH) and Special Operations Command–Europe (SOCEUR) areas of responsibility.
Renewed strategic competition necessitates the United States maintain access, presence, and influence across the high north. Essentially, failure to address this capability gap cedes access, presence, and influence in the region to Washington’s competitors. National leaders require the full range of special operations force (SOF) options in the polar north. Our adversaries are not waiting. Neither should we.
Why Civil Affairs?
The SOF CA mission set is uniquely suited to expand the competitive space in the high north. While the polar and near-polar regions are divided by nation-states, the population there is not. A full nine percent of the population is indigenous, coming from over forty ethnic groups. The Arctic Council, an international organization for intergovernmental cooperation and coordination in the Arctic region, is one of the few international organizations where indigenous groups participate at the same level as nation-states. In the council, eight Arctic states share membership status with six “Indigenous Permanent Participant” organizations, who in many cases enjoy de jure administration of their ancestral lands. In this region, the lines between traditional government and indigenous governance are blurred, and on-the-ground conditions cannot be divined from capitals thousands of kilometers away. Under these circumstances, CA’s indigenous governance expertise, civil network development, and engagement skills are crucial competencies for any special operations unit operating in the polar region.
Furthermore, what military presence does exist is often minimal and sometimes explicitly absent. Iceland’s coast guard is administratively a law enforcement agency and the nation lacks any other military branch. Canada’s Arctic defense forces are primarily the Canadian Rangers, an overwhelmingly local and indigenous reserve organization. In space where conventional state infrastructure is ceded to bottom-up, locally derived systems, CA provides an opportunity to strengthen our allies and partners.
A core CA mission is civil reconnaissance, which is the targeted, planned observation of civil factors of the operational environment, providing commanders with crucial information pertaining to the human, physical, and informational domains. As noted in Regaining Arctic Dominance, climatic shifts will cause permafrost to thaw, resulting in formerly secure infrastructure such as roadways, airfields, and bridges becoming inoperable. Therefore, maintaining an accurate common operational picture of these environments requires persistent access and presence. These remote environments where indigenous populations and critical infrastructure intersect are prime candidates for civil reconnaissance.
However, at this crucial juncture, the civil affairs regiment is not prepared to operate in the high north, whether organically or in a cross-functional team. The 92nd must address this gap. Like the specialization seen in Special Forces companies, the 92nd should develop one high north CAT per company capable of operating in a polar environment, either independently or integrated with a mountain Special Forces team, or ODA (operational detachment alpha). These CATs will enhance persistent presence missions in mountainous or Arctic countries. Additionally, they would serve as a force capable of attaching to other SOF elements in the event of contingency operations in the polar regions. Furthermore, they will serve as subject matter experts capable of facilitating winter environment training for their companies. High north CAT certification will focus on two closely entwined competencies currently absent from the training progression: military mountaineering and winter warfare.
Military Mountaineering
A basic aspect of winter warfare is the ability to conduct operations in alpine terrain. 1st Special Forces Command’s A Vision for 2021 and Beyond expressly highlights the need for integrated, cross-functional SOF at the micro level. Simply assigning two units to work together does not automatically bestow compatibility or comparable capability between them. Expecting interoperability because of a task organization chart, at best, breeds animosity between units and, at worst, turns an ad hoc addition to the team into a liability.
Currently, CATs do not train on specialized infiltration techniques such as mountaineering. Infiltration or movement techniques cannot serve as a barrier to SOF integration. Simply put, attaching a CAT to a mountain ODA and expecting the resulting cross-functional team to retain its full capability is impossible. This can be overcome through deliberate training to a set standard across US Special Operations Command.
Fortunately, this problem set is not unique to the civil affairs regiment, and low-cost solutions exist within the Department of Defense. In addition to in-house mountaineering training conducted within 10th Special Forces Group, both the Black Rapids Training Site in Alaska and the Army Mountain Warfare School in Vermont offer the basic military mountaineering course. This two-week school grants the “E” skill identifier, level I mountaineer, and provides soldiers with the knowledge base to integrate into a larger mountaineering element. Level I certification is the same level of certification most members of a mountain ODA earn. A common skill vernacular can reduce weeks of cross-training otherwise required to bring the cross-functional team to a functional level to days of developing standard operating procedures as the component members establish a baseline with each other.
Initially, the entire unit will have to attend this training to build unit capability. As high north CATs experience turnover, new members will attend as individuals to replace those who have moved on. As the program develops, other training opportunities such as the Special Operations Advanced Mountaineering School should be pursued.
Mountain warfare specialization remains relevant outside polar regions. Mountaineering experience significantly enhances existing CA missions, such as those in the Caucasus and Balkans. Mountainous terrain is prevalent across the SOCEUR area of responsibility, comprising over 35 percent of the continent’s landmass. Outside of the northern European plain, these numbers increase drastically; for example, mountainous terrain comprises over two-thirds of both Georgia and Norway. A mountain certification increases opportunities for training within a cross-functional team or with partner forces, participation in host nation exercises, and partnership with existing search-and-rescue or mountaineering networks, furthering access to the region and broadening opportunities to enhance civil resiliency in the region.
Failure to invest in specialized skills severely inhibits full cross-functional team integration. Creating mountain warfare CATs and demonstrating a shared skill set builds rapport across SOF by removing infiltration as a barrier to entry for operations.
Winter Warfare
Mountaineering by itself does not bestow Arctic capability. It must be paired with dedicated winter warfare training. Skis and snowshoes replace foot movement. Traditional lubricants freeze and batteries must be kept warm and used sparingly. Uniform and packing lists transform from questions of comfort to questions of survival. Fortunately, this is not an unsolved problem set.
The extreme winter conditions that a globally deployable force must prepare for are uncommon at most US military bases. Arctic-capable units must train deliberately for such environments. They are “enabled by doctrine, trained at echelon, with the right equipment, and manned by Soldiers with the appropriate knowledge, skills, and abilities to successfully operate in the Arctic.” Therefore, the development of Arctic-capable CATs requires specialized training to shoot, move, communicate, and survive. The cruel realities of life below zero require relearning fundamentals.
Winter warfare specialists have overcome this problem set in a myriad of ways. The Northern Warfare Training Center offers the Cold Weather Leaders Course. This ten-day course familiarizes small-unit leaders in brigade combat teams with the principles of operating in Arctic and sub-Arctic conditions. Our Swedish partners offer the Basic Winter Warfare Course, which is frequently attended by ODAs. Other NATO allies offer similar courses, and recently 10th Special Forces Group introduced a four-week Winter Warfare Course. 10th Special Forces Group also conducts the Cold Weather Instructor Course (CWIC), whose graduates serve as subject matter experts for their companies, planning and executing their cold weather training. Each course should be considered toward the eventual codification of requirements for high north CAT certification. However, in the nascent stages of the program, the focus should be on CWIC and the Winter Warfare Course. Both are tailored toward SOF-particular techniques, and therefore bolster SOF interoperability. As an instructor course, CWIC is designed to export knowledge to parent units, which would allow a CA company to focus a training cycle on a winter environment with a reduced need to outsource training and instructors.
Winter Warfare Section
For sustained readiness to conduct operations in the high north, the 92nd must maintain a winter warfare section, like that held by 10th Special Forces Group. Once mature, this team of three to six experienced noncommissioned officers will be responsible for certifying high north CATs. The section will assist the CATs with scheduling and coordinating training opportunities across echelons. Additionally, they will track each team’s training pathway, and at the end of the progression, validate that the CAT met the individual and collective requirements to deploy as a high north CAT. Additionally, they will serve as an institutional link to other military and civilian organizations to ensure that units receive the most modern, safe, and tested techniques and methodologies available.
In addition to nurturing the winter warfare skills of the high north CATs, the section will be responsible for equipping them as well. The section will maintain specialized equipment that would be cost-prohibitive and unnecessary to purchase for six individual CATs. Equipment such as avalanche beacons, probes, and snow machines may be necessary for operational or training requirements but not used at a frequency that necessitates purchasing sets for each CAT. The critical factor for consideration is that training and deployment requirements are met simultaneously. Training on equipment you do not deploy with and deploying without equipment you trained with greatly hinders the efficacy of this proposal. Collocating equipment procurement with subject matter experts ensures that teams are operating with proven gear common across winter warfare professionals and that high north CATs are equipped to achieve interoperability across the SOF enterprise.
Engagements on the Periphery
Properly trained and equipped high north CA teams open the door for a variety of engagements within the SOCNORTH and SOCEUR areas of responsibility. Either integrated into a cross-functional team or as an independent element, training for the Arctic generates opportunities that offer a robust return on investment, both in strategic competition and during contingency operations. As home to many autonomous indigenous groups who participate as peers to nation-states in intergovernmental organizations, the Arctic presents both an opportunity to apply the governance expertise of a CA team and an opportunity for a team to hone its craft.
One such engagement would be realistic military training conducted with organizations such as the Alaska State Troopers and others within the Alaska state government. Such training offers high north CATs a US-based opportunity to increase understanding of tribal governance within an advanced governmental structure. Studying how local groups interact with highly developed state and national institutions is critical as we strive to map networks, identify vulnerabilities, and strengthen the national resiliency of our allies and partners. Such indigenous groups are perfect for cross-functional team engagement, as the local defense and governance aspects in these tight-knit and isolated communities are often intertwined.
At the opposite end of the spectrum (and globe) lays an additional opportunity to study governance in polar extremes. McMurdo Station, run by the National Science Foundation, serves as the primary hub for the three thousand Americans conducting research operations across Antarctica every summer. A subject matter expert exchange with the administration of McMurdo Station would grant the team increased awareness of the challenges and best practices associated with governing and maintaining critical infrastructure. Lessons learned here can be applied to any isolated organization operating in extreme conditions. Such austere settlements range from mining outposts, not unlike those found in Svalbard, to potential logistical hubs supporting nascent northern sea lanes.
In addition to these opportunities, the high north is rife with exercises primed for CA participation. The annual Adamant Serpent exercise involves a nonstandard infiltration of ODAs to Gotland Island, Sweden. Upon arrival, the training unit conducts linkup with the Swedish Home Guard, and advises, assists, and accompanies them on missions. This scenario could easily be adapted for a cross-functional team. Using the same nonstandard infiltration lanes, a CAT could advise the local government on managing the incursion-induced crisis, with minimal modifications to the exercise. Similarly, other exercises within the SOCNORTH area of responsibility can be modified to add network development lanes in realistic environments to enable nonstandard logistics, medical, and communication capabilities that support or enable other participating units. The low profile and small size of CATs make them ideal for the implementation of such concepts.
The skills and knowledge described build a depth of experiences that directly enhance the 92nd’s ability to provide SOCEUR with governance specialists capable of operating in extreme polar environments. To specialize in winter warfare will not come with a diminished ability to map networks or identify and employ civil networks. On the contrary, the operating environment of the high north, with its robust and empowered indigenous autonomous communities, is an ideal environment for properly trained CATs. High north CATs provide the means to maintain access, presence, and influence in a region seeing increased Chinese interest and Russian posturing. We cannot wait for a crisis to develop this capability.
Capt. Clayton Hudak is a special operations forces governance officer assigned to the 92nd Civil Affairs Battalion. He is currently deployed with 10th Special Forces Group as the executive officer for Task Group Black Sea. This summer, he spent three weeks in the high north assisting the Swedish Home Guard with exercise planning. He holds a BA in international relations from Boston University’s Pardee School of Global Studies, where the late professor Michael Corgan ignited his interest in all things Arctic.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Staff Sgt. Christopher B. Dennis
mwi.usma.edu · by Clayton Hudak · January 7, 2022



12. (Philippine) Army Special Forces launch ‘fighters to farmers’ program in Sulu

Long term effects of advisory assistance. It is difficult to know when things will bear fruit.

Excerpt:

“This kind of initiative showcase how committed and professional our modern Army is. We strive to become experts in project development and community organizing through the aid of our partner agencies,” said Gonzales, who is also the Joint Task Force (JTF)-Sulu commander.

Army Special Forces launch ‘fighters to farmers’ program in Sulu
FIGHTERS TO FARMERS. The Army's 2nd Special Forces Battalion launches on Wednesday (Jan. 5, 2021) the "fighters to farmers" program to provide sustainable livelihood to former members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Talipao, Sulu. A total of 14 ASG members have surrendered to government authorities in Talipao, Sulu since September last year. (Photo courtesy of the 11ID)
ZAMBOANGA CITY – The Army’s 2nd Special Forces Battalion (2SFBn) has launched the “fighters to farmers” program to provide sustainable livelihood to formers members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Talipao, Sulu.
Lt. Col. Benito Ramos Jr., 2SFBn commander, said Wednesday that the program aims to put food on the table of ASG surrenderers and their families.
“This food on the table concept was a success in empowering communities in Basilan. We believe that this will also boost our PCVE (Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism) efforts here in Sulu,” Ramos said in a statement.
Ramos said the military and the Provincial Task Force in Ending Local Armed Conflict (PTF-ELAC) have constructed several enabling facilities to include a two-kilometer water system from Sitio Tubig Dakula, Barangay Upper Sinumaan to Barangay Bud Bunga in the municipality of Talipao.
The PTF-ELAC is Sulu’s version of the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC).
He said that the ASG surrenderers from Talipao town are programmed to undergo workshops in agriculture workshops to be facilitated by soldiers who know practical and traditional farming techniques.
“They (ASG surrenderers) will also be acquainted with the use of technologies including motorized tillers to increase efficiency and yield,” he added.
Capt. Ron Villarosa Jr, 6th Special Forces Company commander and project convener of the “Fighters to Farmers’ program, said the project will help change the security landscape of the province.
“Food is peace served on the table. By empowering the ASG surrenderers and the community with the means to provide for their basic needs, we are reducing the vulnerability of the ASG surrenderers and the community to be dragged into the conflict in exchange for food, money, or other subsistence,” Villarosa said in a separate statement.
Since September last year, 14 ASG bandits have surrendered to government authorities in Talipao, Sulu.
Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. William Gonzales, 11th Infantry Division commander, commended the troops for their ingenuity in confronting security threats in the province.
“This kind of initiative showcase how committed and professional our modern Army is. We strive to become experts in project development and community organizing through the aid of our partner agencies,” said Gonzales, who is also the Joint Task Force (JTF)-Sulu commander. (PNA)



13. Philippine Military Kills Communist Guerrilla Leader in Mindanao

The communists remain an existential threat to the Philippines.

Philippine Military Kills Communist Guerrilla Leader in Mindanao
Government troops killed a senior commander of the communist New People’s Army during a gunfight in the southern Philippines, a military chief in the Mindanao region said Thursday.
The suspect slain on Wednesday night was identified as Menandro Villanueva (also known as Bok), a member of the NPA’s high command and longtime veteran of the Philippine communist insurgency, one of Asia’s longest-running armed conflicts.
Officials said he headed the guerrillas’ national operations command and controlled rebel units operating in the northeastern parts of Mindanao, the main island in the south.
“It will take the communist terrorist group some time to replace a seasoned leader as Villanueva. As a result of this, we expect more communist terrorists to either yield to the troops or continue to suffer defeats under an inexperienced leader in the coming days,” said Lt. Gen. Greg Almerol, head of the Eastern Mindanao Command.
Villanueva was the second member of the NPA’s high command to be killed in recent months. In October, government troops killed Jorge Madlos, 72, the guerrilla force’s spokesman and its most wanted commander.
Villanueva, 69, also was a member of the politburo of the outlawed Communist Party of the Philippines. The New People’s Army is the CPP’s military wing.
“Mindanao’s most wanted terrorist is now finally neutralized by your Agila troopers,” said Ernesto Torres, commander of the 10th Division, referring to troops from his division.
“They [NPA rebels] have nowhere to hide because the masses are already fed up with the abuses and extortion they perpetrated for more than five decades. The death of Menandro Villanueva signals that the end of the communist insurgency in Mindanao is already at hand.”
The gunfight that ended Villanueva’s life began as soldiers were patrolling a remote village in Mabini, a town in Davao de Oro province, after receiving information that Villanueva’s group was in the area, according to Capt. Mark Anthony Tito, spokesman for the Army’s 10th Infantry Division.
“Bok was hit in several parts of his body resulting in his demise. Troops are still conducting pursuit operations on the fleeing CNTs [CPP-NPA-Terrorists],” Tito told reporters.
Military officials did not say if any other NPA members or troops involved in the gunfight were injured.
Founding member
Villanueva was a founding member of the NPA in Mindanao in the 1970s with Edgar Jopson, who died after a military raid in Davao City in 1982, officials said.
As a young man, Villanueva was an activist with the reformist youth organization Kabataang Makabaya who opposed the brutal rule of then-dictator Ferdinand Marcos. In 1972, while a student at the Jesuit-run Ateneo de Manila University, Villanueva went underground after the Philippine president declared martial law, according to the military.
The communist insurgency in the Philippines dates back to 1969. From a peak of at least 20,000 guerrillas in the 1980s, the number of NPA fighters has fallen to about 5,000 in mostly remote areas of the Philippines.
CPP and NPA leaders could not immediately be reached for comment on Thursday.



14. Veteran U.S., Russia diplomats to tackle Ukraine tensions in Geneva


Are we expecting too much from these talks? Will we be disappointed or can these diplomats move the ball forward in a positive direction?

What is the acceptable durable political arrangement that will protect, sustain, aned advance our interests?



Veteran U.S., Russia diplomats to tackle Ukraine tensions in Geneva
Reuters · by Simon Lewis
1/2
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov speaks during a news conference in Moscow, Russia February 7, 2019. REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov

WASHINGTON, Jan 7 (Reuters) - Talks between U.S. and Russian diplomats begin in Geneva on Monday after a weekslong stand-off over Russian troop deployments near its border with Ukraine, with veteran envoys on each side trying to avert a crisis.
Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, the No. 2 official at the U.S. State Department, will face Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov. The two combined have more than half a century of diplomatic experience.
Russia, which moved nearly 100,000 troops close to its border with Ukraine, says it is not preparing for an invasion but wants to see the West back off from its support for Ukraine’s government and halt the eastward expansion of the NATO military alliance.

Washington has already dismissed some of Moscow's demands as unviable, making rapid progress desired by Russia in the meetings unlikely.
An added wrinkle is Russia sending troops to quell anti-government protests in neighboring Kazakhstan this week, raising concern in Washington.
The U.S. approach would be “pragmatic, results-oriented,” White House spokesperson Jen Psaki said in a press briefing on Wednesday. “We’re not responding to them point by point."
In a phone call last week between Presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin, Biden reiterated that the U.S. and European allies would impose unprecedented sanctions if Russia chose to invade Ukraine. Putin responded that sanctions could lead to a "complete breakdown in ties."
Ryabkov told the Izvestia newspaper this week that Russia's approach was necessarily tough, because its previous attempts at persuasion had been fruitless.
Ryabkov repeated Moscow's demands for a halt to NATO enlargement, no deployment of its weapons systems in Ukraine and an end to "provocative" military exercises.
"All these are absolutely necessary integral elements, without which we will be forced to state that the other side is showing a lack of cooperation," he said.
Other officials will also play lead roles when the talks move to Brussels for a NATO-Russia meeting on Wednesday and a meeting hosted by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe on Thursday.
Sherman and Ryabkov will lead the two delegations in Geneva, where talks over Ukraine are taking place at a meeting initially scheduled as the latest Strategic Stability Dialogue between the two adversaries. The regular talks designed to head off the possibility of nuclear confrontation resumed in July following a meeting between Biden and Putin the previous month.
Thomas Graham, a former senior director for Russia on the White House's National Security Council, said Sherman and Ryabkov were vastly experienced and would conduct the talks professionally, understanding that the task is to defuse the current crisis.
"There aren't going to be raised voices or pounding on the table," said Graham, now a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He said a positive outcome for the United States would be for Russia to agree to a program of further talks.
Andrey Kortunov, an analyst who heads the Russian International Affairs Council, said the Kremlin might see confidence-building measures and some constraint from the West in supplying modern weaponry to Ukraine as sufficient to reduce tensions.
VETERAN DIPLOMATS
Sherman, 72, a former social worker, has served in Democratic administrations since the 1990s. She is best known for leading negotiations on the 2015 nuclear accord between Iran and world powers, which also involved dealing with Russian diplomats.
Sherman, like the deal itself, was criticized by hawks in Washington as being too soft on Iran. In Iran, anti-American protesters reportedly chanted “Death to Sherman” during the negotiations.
In her previous role as under secretary of state, Sherman traveled to Kyiv in March 2014, where she spoke about holding back tears as she walked through the Maidan, the central Kyiv square where Ukrainians gathered in protests that toppled a Russian-backed government.
Sherman said she was approached by “schoolchildren with flowers” rather than the “dangerous elements” Moscow said were behind the protests, and issued a warning to Putin over his annexation of Crimea and the conflict involving Russia-backed separatists in the Donbass region.
Ryabkov, 61, is a 40-year veteran of the Soviet and Russian foreign ministries who in recent weeks has delivered some of Moscow's harshest rhetoric and direst warnings on the Ukraine crisis.
He has more than once compared the situation to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, when the world came close to nuclear war, and has warned that Russia might be compelled to deploy intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe.
Kortunov, who has known Ryabkov for years, said the diplomat was less hawkish than some members of Russia's security establishment but would be as flexible or rigid as the Kremlin required.
"At the end of the day it's up to Mr Putin to define the red lines, not Ryabkov, and Ryabkov will do his best to articulate the red lines," said Kortunov.

Reporting by Simon Lewis in Washington and Mark Trevelyan in London; additional reporting by David Brunnstrom and Trevor Hunnicutt in Washington; Editing by Mary Milliken and Grant McCool
Reuters · by Simon Lewis




15. Cyber Command Task Force Conducted Its First Offensive Operation As The Secretary Of Defense Watched

Excerpt:

As many recent cyber and ransomware attacks worldwide have shown, much of America's utility networks and other critical infrastructure remain vulnerable to cyberattacks from both state and non-state actors. It’s likely the Pentagon’s emphasis on cyber capabilities, both defensive and offensive, will continue to grow as the U.S. government attempts to strengthen its ability to respond to these rapidly emerging threats.

Cyber Command Task Force Conducted Its First Offensive Operation As The Secretary Of Defense Watched
The operation is another sign of the rapidly evolving nature of warfare in the digital domain and the future importance of offensive cyber operations.
thedrive.com · by Brett Tingley · January 6, 2022
A U.S. Cyber Command task force executed what is being described as its “first offensive cyber effect operation” against real-world cyber threats. While the exact nature of the operation and its target remains unknown, the event was significant enough for the U.S. Secretary of Defense to personally attend to watch the operation in action.
The operation was conducted between February and August 2021 by a task force consisting of personnel from the Maryland Air National Guard’s 175th Cyber Operations Group, the Delaware Air National Guard’s 166th Cyber Operations Squadron, U.S. Navy’s Cyber Strike Activity Sixty-Three, the U.S. Air Force’s 341st Cyber Operations Squadron, and the Air Force Reserve. The task force executed the operation from February to August last year, although the Air National Guard (ANG) just announced it this week. While there have been other offensive cyber operations conducted by U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), this is the first conducted and acknowledged by this particular task force.
USCYBERCOM/Josef Cole
Cyber National Mission Force members participate in a training and readiness exercise at Fort Meade, Maryland in 2021.
Details about the specific threat countered by the task force’s cyber offensive are scarce, but USAF Maj. Corley Bradford, director of operations for 175th Cyberspace Operations Squadron, said the offensive cyber operation involved the security of Department of Defense information networks.
“[Our] NMT was a direct contributor to [our task force] conducting a successful offensive cyber effects operation,” Bradford stated in an ANG press release. “It was a lot of excitement to finally see the fruits of our labor when [our task force] delivered its first offensive cyber effects operations during this mobilization,” said Bradford.
Interestingly, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III was on hand to personally witness the operation. “It was a massive milestone,” Maj. Bradford said, “so he wanted front row seats to see the action firsthand.”
U.S. Cyber Command has not released information about the target(s) of the operation. One of the largest publicly-known threats Cyber Command responded to last year was the Russian-led SolarWinds breach, but it isn’t clear if this offensive operation was related to that incident in any way. Whatever the case may be, U.S. Cyber Command held an international exercise in late 2021 in direct response to the SolarWinds incidents, and in December 2021 conducted offensive operations against international ransomware groups like those responsible for the Colonial Pipeline attack. At the same time, Russian cyberattacks have been increasing steadily alongside its recent aggressive military posturing along its border with Ukraine.
The U.S. National Guard has been activating additional cyber operations units since 2015 as part of a growing emphasis on cyber operations throughout the Department of Defense. A large part of these units’ mission is to provide assistance and intelligence to state and local governments in the event of emergencies, and they actively carry out exercises to plan for such contingencies. "The Guard is in all 50 states, three territories and the District of Columbia,” said Air Force Col. Timothy T. Lunderman. “If state and local officials need help they're more likely to turn to the folks they know. The people they know are the Guard."
ANG/SrA Sarah M. McClanahan
U.S. Air Force 2nd Lt. Robert Kocsis, an operator with the Maryland National Guard Joint Task Force Cyber, at the 175th Wing at Warfield Air National Guard Base.
The Maryland Air National Guard’s 175th Cyber Operations Group was stood up in 2016. "We have all the ingredients to operationalize the cyber mission," 275th Operations Support Squadron commander Col. Kevin George said at the time. "Because of our unique situation and support mechanisms we will be able to execute defense, offense and kinetic operations." The group features members who work in civilian positions for defense contractors and cybersecurity firms, which allows the National Guard to leverage the expertise these members have gained in the private sector.
While this may have been the first offensive cyber operation carried out by this particular task force, it underscores the Pentagon’s growing emphasis on cybersecurity. The White House signed an executive order last year aimed at bolstering cyber defenses throughout the intelligence community and Department of Defense, and later announced it would elevate certain cyberattacks to the same priority as terrorist attacks. While those initiatives are largely defensive in nature, Cyber Command has previously issued statements that outline how offensive cyber capabilities are also necessary to "target enemy and hostile adversary activities." The exact nature of those capabilities remains unknown.
USAF/Joseph Eddins
Personnel with the 175th Cyberspace Operations Group monitor cyberattacks on the operations floor, known as the Hunter's Den.
As many recent cyber and ransomware attacks worldwide have shown, much of America's utility networks and other critical infrastructure remain vulnerable to cyberattacks from both state and non-state actors. It’s likely the Pentagon’s emphasis on cyber capabilities, both defensive and offensive, will continue to grow as the U.S. government attempts to strengthen its ability to respond to these rapidly emerging threats.
Contact the author: Brett@TheDrive.com​
Don't forget to sign up Your Email Address
thedrive.com · by Brett Tingley · January 6, 2022


16. Introducing the Competition in Cyberspace Project

Introducing the Competition in Cyberspace Project - Modern War Institute
mwi.usma.edu · by Maggie Smith · January 5, 2022
The Modern War Institute and Army Cyber Institute are proud to announce the Competition in Cyber Project (C2P). C2P’s purpose is to provide a forum to support increased conversation between military and cyber professionals, cultivating the incorporation of cyber and information competencies into the context of modern military strategy, national security strategy, and competitive strategy. C2P also provides academic, private sector, and military leaders an opportunity to characterize the threats facing the United States and its allies in cyberspace, in the information environment, and in conventional and irregular spaces. C2P’s scholarly content production is designed and curated to merge practitioner perspectives with academic research to contribute substantive dialogue on topics relevant to cyberspace, the information environment, and competition.
The need for this conversation has never been greater. Our adversaries have embraced cyber as a key component of their competitive strategies. Cyber operations ranging from malign influence campaigns to cyber-physical attacks on critical infrastructure have enabled the Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean governments to impose largely asymmetric costs on their targets. Our competitors and adversaries work tirelessly to outpace the United States: China is stealing large data sets and intellectual property as well as prioritizing artificial intelligence (AI) development, and Russia is conducting relentless and sophisticated cyberattacks against US critical and information systems. The middle powers of Iran and North Korea are also launching attacks on US systems and democracy. The United States must develop and execute a strategy to meet and ultimately surpass our adversaries’ capabilities in cyberspace and the information domain to retain a dominant position, both in the current era of competition and in future battlefields.
But the US government—and specifically the US military—cannot modernize alone. Our interconnectedness requires partnerships across the government and private sectors to pool resources and foster collaboration. Our competitive edge continues to be our human capital, a direct benefit of our American ideals. We must continue to invest in our human capital and develop technological expertise at pace with, or ahead of, our adversaries. Technological advances in the cyber and AI fields will be critical in future military modernization and will revolutionize how the military recruits, trains, equips, deploys, defends, and sustains its forces around the globe. Continued cooperation across the US government and private sector are critical to this effort. C2P hopes to facilitate improved communication between the public and private sector in order to assist in this public-private partnership effort.
Finally, C2P is intended to serve as a platform for informed contributions to the ongoing efforts to synthesize and integrate the modern cyberspace and information warfare competencies within the anticipated needs of competition and conflict over the next few decades. We look forward to engaging on these important discussions and doing our part to articulate, advocate, and advance cyber and information security awareness in the context of modern great power competition.
Come join us in this evolving and important conversation. We look forward to hearing from you!
Capt. Maggie Smith, PhD, is a US Army cyber officer currently assigned to the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy, where she is a scientific researcher and an assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences. She is the director of the Competition in Cyberspace Project.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: J.M. Eddins Jr., US Air Force
mwi.usma.edu · by Maggie Smith · January 5, 2022
17. A year after Jan. 6, DoD’s vague extremism definition could set up new problems

A year after Jan. 6, DoD’s vague extremism definition could set up new problems - Breaking Defense
"DoD is taking the attitude towards violent extremism that the Supreme Court took towards pornography; they will know it when they see it," writes Mark Cancian. "That was not a useful legal test for pornography, and DoD will run into the same problem."
breakingdefense.com · by Mark Cancian · January 6, 2022
Supporters of then-President Donald Trump attack police officers during the Jan. 6 riot. (Brent Stirton/Getty Images)
On Jan. 6 2021, the nation watched as a nightmare unfolded in Washington: pro-Trump supporters rioting through the halls of Congress as lawmakers huddled for safety. Shortly after, it emerged that some servicemembers and veterans were among those attempting to disrupt the confirmation of President Joe Biden’s electoral win. Now, dealing with extremism in the military is now a top priority for Defense Department leaders, but Mark Cancian of CSIS argues below that they must confront hard decisions about defining who is and isn’t dangerous.
A year ago today, rioters stormed the US Congress in an attempt to disrupt – if not somehow overturn entirely — the outcome of the 2020 presidential election. That event raised questions about extremism among military personnel.
During his confirmation hearing, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin identified the issue as a serious challenge for the force, saying “The job of the Department of Defense is to keep America safe from our enemies. But we can’t do that if some of those enemies lie within our own ranks.” Senior officials have made repeated statements to that effect.
One year in, DoD is getting a grip on the numbers (small) and has revised the guidance on what constitutes violent extremism. However, some critics want drastic action and the guidance, by not specifying what organizations might be prohibited, leaves individual commanders to judge is or is not acceptable. As it stands, the department’s attempts as staying vague with its guidance is sending defense leaders down a path for greater attention and controversy.
The Numbers
The Pentagon recently published its initial findings [PDF] on violent extremists in the military, and given how much attention the issue has engendered, the numbers are surprisingly low. The DoD Inspector General stated that there were 92 active-duty and reserve personnel “who are subject to official action due to engagement in prohibited extremist activity.” Those “official actions” were mostly administrative, with only one criminal prosecution. About one-third of the cases are still being resolved.
This number represents .005 percent of the 2.1 million active and reserve troops, or one servicemember out of every 21,000. In transmitting the report, Austin noted “The overwhelming majority of the men and women of the Department of Defense serve this country with honor and integrity. They respect the oath they took to support and defend the Constitution of the United States.”
These low numbers are not surprising given that DoD screens military personnel when recruited and has day-to-day oversight on them. Impressions about large numbers of violent extremists in the military ― and hence how serious an issue it is ― arise from how the numbers are presented. DoD focuses on active-duty and reserve personnel because they are under its control. Most analyses look at broader categories, particularly including veterans. Veterans (except retirees) are fully civilians, not being under the DoD’s control, and may be many years removed from their military service.
The January 6 riots are an illustration. Of the 727 rioters identified so far, 81 are veterans, four are reservists, and one (a Marine major) was active duty. (These numbers change frequently as the legal process unfolds.) The number of veterans is high — just over 11 percent of those identified — but that is out of 18 million veterans in the United States.
The four reservists are out of 810,000 currently serving Guard and reserve personnel. That’s one out of about 200,000. The single active-duty service member is out of 1,350,000 active-duty personnel.
Some analyses also gather data over many years, so the numbers look high. One study found that 458 personnel “associated with the military” had been arrested for extremist activities. But this was over 30 years and included active-duty personnel (rare), reservists (also rare), and veterans (by far the most numerous category).
A New Definition
With numbers out of the way, let us take a look at what the department has done since Jan. 6, which includes several responses to control violent extremism. It stood up a “Countering Extremism Working Group.” It conducted a one-day stand down to train troops on what was permitted and how to recognize extremism. It will update training for troops leaving active duty to help them resist extremist messages.
But perhaps most notable — for both its intended and potential unintended consequences — is the decision to update guidance on prohibited activities, vis DoD instruction 1325.06, “Handling Protest, Extremist, and Criminal Gang Activities among Members of the Armed Forces.”
Compared with the 2009 version, the new guidance expands the types of prohibited activities and focuses on violent and illegal actions. Most are not surprising, for example: “advocating, engaging in, or supporting terrorism within the United States or abroad…Advocating, engaging in, or supporting the overthrow of the government of the United States or any political subdivision thereof….”.
Others, however, edge toward the political and cultural realm: “Advocating widespread unlawful discrimination based on race, color, national origin, religion, sex (including pregnancy), gender identity, or sexual orientation.” And while that key term, “widespread unlawful,” would seem to require the high bar of rhetoric that incites extensive violence, the phrasing opens up a lot of gray area.
Would a statement questioning the role of transgender individuals in the military be considered “violent extremism?” The Biden administration regards discrimination against transgender people as illegal. What about a statement arguing that pregnancy hurts readiness? Discrimination against pregnant women is illegal. Such sentiments have been legitimate topics for discussion in the past, even if today official policy and most senior officials disagree.
The “boogaloo boys” group is a rare clear-cut case of “extremism” under the Pentagon’s definition. (Spencer Platt/Getty Images)
Military journals are full of articles questioning and even opposing current policies. That’s how militaries adapt to changing circumstances. Thus, how this provision is applied will be important to the intellectual life of the military services. One overzealous censor could stifle a lot of intellectual activity.
Another key term, “active participation,” has been expanded to include advocating, providing material support or resources, recruiting, training, fundraising, or knowingly communicating sensitive government information. Most of these activities fall within a commonsense definition of active participation. However, commentators have speculated that “liking” extremist materials on social media could be considered advocacy and therefore cause for disciplinary action. No one should be “liking” extremist material, but that’s only a click on social media, as opposed to other activities that involve much more time and commitment.
A major uncertainty is that the guidance does not specify which organizations the new guidance would prohibit ties with. DoD is taking the attitude towards violent extremism that the Supreme Court took towards pornography; they will know it when they see it. That was not a useful legal test for pornography, and DoD will run into the same problem. Deciding on a case-by-case basis which organizations are violent extremists and which are protected by constitutional rights to assembly and free speech is likely to be an onerous and contentious process. It just postpones difficult decisions.
Are the various “Boogaloo” organizations violent extremists? They advocate race war, hence violence. They would seem to fall under the definition. Are “Oath Keepers” a prohibited organization? They do not advocate the overthrow of the US government and say they are protecting constitutional rights. On the other hand, members have been involved in violent incidents, and their interpretation of “constitutional rights” is inconsistent with that of the Supreme Court.
Are the various “stop the steal” organizations violent extremists? Certainly, they are trying to overturn a settled election, but most don’t advocate violence. Are President Donald Trump and his political support organizations violent extremists? He continues to challenge the election results and is unrepentant about his involvement with the Jan. 6 riots, but he is a former president and supported by a large part of the US electorate.
Ongoing Challenges
DoD is in a difficult place. The numbers of violent extremists are small, indicating that current policies are generally working. That’s good. However, some legislators and commentators like Rep. Anthony Brown, D-Md., argue that “one extremist in the ranks is just one too many.” He believes that the department is denying the problem and should take more aggressive action. A recent op-ed in the Washington Post suggested establishing spying mechanisms on military bases to identify “potential mutineers.” However, this kind of aggressive surveillance risks damaging military morale and cohesion, even if legally allowable.
Senior military officials prefer a leadership and education approach, rather than a judicial approach. As Carter Ham, a retired US Army General, stated, “DoD’s plan should not be a witch hunt or a ’just throw them out’ approach. The Army has a lot invested in soldier and leader training and development.” A RAND study on extremism in the military came to similar conclusions, recommending “community-based approach that leverages existing military programs.” However, this may not be acceptable to critics like Brown, who want immediate and dramatic action.
For defense leaders, it may seem easier in the short term to keep things open-ended. But that is just kicking the can down the road. Ultimately, the department will need to get specific about which organizations and ideologies constitute “violent extremism” and which might be unsavory but covered by constitutional protections.
A narrow definition will minimize legal and political challenges by focusing on organizations that are clearly violent. However, that may not satisfy some critics who will point to the extremist language of some excluded organizations. Here DoD will run into a problem that appears on many university campuses: the belief that speech is action and therefore violent speech is the same as violent action.
A broad definition will pull in organizations that use extremist rhetoric even if not physically violent, but such broad definitions may pick up partisan overtones. They might, in theory, exclude some conservative members of Congress from military service. Without a clear list of prohibited organizations, the choice devolves on individual commanders who will come up with conflicting definitions that engender partisan controversy and legal chaos.
The issue is thus far from resolved. Department leaders should act sooner rather than later to create specific guiderails, as difficult as those discussions may be.
Mark Cancian, a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, is a retired Marine colonel now with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.


18. Biden’s Moment of Truth in Iran
Excerpts:
Military options are most effective when they don’t have to be used. If Tehran understands that diplomatic intransigence will have serious consequences, it will be more likely to negotiate. For those who hold out hope that coercive diplomacy still can solve the Iranian nuclear challenge, putting the military option back on the table, along with a renewed sanctions offensive, is the best bet.
If all else fails, Mr. Biden should be prepared to destroy Iran’s nuclear program. The risks of this approach pale in comparison to the threat of living with a nuclear-armed Iran for decades to come.
Biden’s Moment of Truth in Iran
With negotiations likely to fail, he’d better be prepared for a military strike.
WSJ · by Mark Dubowitz and Matthew Kroenig
The best possible resolution of this crisis would be a negotiated settlement that verifiably and permanently closes off all Iranian pathways to the bomb. But the 2015 nuclear deal failed to do that, and Tehran isn’t interested in any agreement that does.
Meanwhile, time is running out. Iran already could produce one bomb’s worth of weapons-grade uranium in as little as three weeks and test a crude nuclear device in six months. It might take a year or two to fashion a functioning nuclear warhead that is deliverable on a missile, but once the clerical regime has enough weapons-grade material, the game is over. The world could no longer physically prevent Iranian weaponization. Like North Korea, Tehran could move its bomb-grade material to secret facilities and fashion warheads undisturbed. To stop Iranian nuclearization, Washington must stop Tehran from acquiring sufficient quantities of fissile material.
A nuclear-armed Iran would cause further proliferation as regional powers like Saudi Arabia build their own bombs. Backed by the threat of nuclear weapons, Iran would step up its regional aggression and support to terror and proxy groups. With Washington deterred by fear of escalation—including the risk of a nuclear strike against Israel—the clerical regime would have a freer hand. Eventually, as Tehran’s intercontinental ballistic missile program advances, the U.S. itself would be vulnerable to Iranian nuclear attacks and coercion.
Fortunately, Washington has effective military options. There is little doubt the Pentagon can destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities (even those that are deeply buried and hardened), as several defense secretaries have stated.
American strikes would delay Iran’s efforts by years at minimum and forever at best. Tehran can’t enrich uranium without the necessary facilities. It would take time to rebuild, install and operate centrifuges, and reconstitute stockpiles of fissile material. The U.S. government has estimated that an Israeli strike would buy only one or two years, but an American strike would be more effective. And Iran might think twice before spending billions to rebuild facilities the U.S. could destroy again.
Iran would likely retaliate, but the lesson from President Trump’s strike on Gen. Qasem Soleimani two years ago is that Tehran’s response would likely be muted. The attack would stun the Iranian political system since it will be unexpected; Islamic Revolutionary Guard publications now regularly mock American determination. The ruling clerics still fear a major war, which could lead to the destruction of their military and the end of their regime. Washington can further deter retaliation by issuing an explicit threat that if Tehran escalates, the Pentagon will destroy more than the nuclear facilities.
Mr. Biden should publicly ask the Pentagon to update military plans and, alongside allies and partners, conduct exercises targeting mockup Iranian nuclear facilities. He should also ensure that U.S. allies and bases in the region are protected against Iranian counterstrikes. Israel would benefit from help addressing the threat of Iranian precision-guided missiles. Mr. Biden could also broker a deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia on missile and drone technology, which Riyadh needs to defend against Iranian attacks. It could have the added benefit of encouraging the kingdom’s entry into the Abraham Accords.
Military options are most effective when they don’t have to be used. If Tehran understands that diplomatic intransigence will have serious consequences, it will be more likely to negotiate. For those who hold out hope that coercive diplomacy still can solve the Iranian nuclear challenge, putting the military option back on the table, along with a renewed sanctions offensive, is the best bet.
If all else fails, Mr. Biden should be prepared to destroy Iran’s nuclear program. The risks of this approach pale in comparison to the threat of living with a nuclear-armed Iran for decades to come.
Mr. Dubowitz is chief executive of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. Mr. Kroenig is a professor of government at Georgetown, director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Strategy Initiative and a former senior policy adviser at the Pentagon (2017-21).
WSJ · by Mark Dubowitz and Matthew Kroenig

19. Fact check: How we know the 2020 election results were legitimate, not 'rigged' as Donald Trump claims
For those researching this there is a long list of references. But will reports like this influence anyone to alter their views?  

Fact check: How we know the 2020 election results were legitimate, not 'rigged' as Donald Trump claims
USA Today · by Daniel Funke
| USA TODAY

Show Caption
Hide Caption
Jan. 6: One year after the deadly attack, are we safer?
One year after the deadly January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol, lawmakers weigh in on the safety of the Capitol and the nation.
Jasper Colt and Hannah Gaber, USA TODAY
The claim: The 2020 presidential election was 'rigged'
As the nation marks a deadly insurrection at the U.S. Capitol, Donald Trump continued to promote a falsehood that he and his supporters have peddled for more than a year: that the 2020 election was rigged against him.
"Why is it that the Unselect Committee of totally partisan political hacks, whose judgment has long ago been made, (sic) not discussing the rigged Presidential Election of 2020?" the former president said in a Jan. 6 statement, which spokesperson Liz Harrington tweeted. "It's because they don't have the answers or justifications for what happened.
"They got away with something, and it is leading to our Country's destruction."
The statement, which has also been widely shared on Facebook, came after President Joe Biden delivered a speech in the Capitol's Statuary Hall in which he criticized Trump and his distortion of the 2020 election results. Biden said Trump and his supporters "held a dagger at the throat of America."
"You can’t love your country only when you win,” Biden said. “You can’t obey the law only when it’s convenient. You can’t be patriotic when you embrace and enable lies."
On Jan. 6, 2021, Trump supporters stormed the Capitol, pushing through police barricades and smashing windows in an attempt to disrupt Congress' certification of the presidential election results. The events of that day led to five deathshundreds of arrests and Trump's second impeachment, as well as the creation of a bipartisan House select committee to investigate the attack. That committee's work is ongoing.
The violent insurrection was predicated on the misguided belief that widespread voter fraud swayed the election in Biden's favor. This was a baseless claim when Trump first made it in late 2020, and the year that passed since has only added to the evidence of the election's legitimacy.
USA TODAY reached out to Harrington for comment.
Ample evidence fraud did not affect election outcome
In the immediate aftermath of Biden's win, election officials insisted the results were legitimate.
"The November 3rd election was the most secure in American history," the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and its partners said in a November 2020 statement. "There is no evidence that any voting system deleted or lost votes, changed votes or was in any way compromised."
Trump's own attorney general, William Barr, said in early December 2020 that the Justice Department had "not seen fraud on a scale that could have affected a different outcome in the election." Biden won the presidency with 306 electoral voteswhich Congress certified in January 2021 after the Capitol riot.
At the time, some Republican lawmakers also pushed back on claims of widespread fraud.
"Nothing before us proves illegality anywhere near the massive scale, the massive scale that would have tipped the entire election – nor can public doubt alone justify a radical break when the doubt itself was incited without any evidence," Sen. Mitch McConnell, the Senate's top Republican said in his address to the chamber before it was evacuated during the Jan. 6 insurrection.
Since then, a mountain of evidence – including lawsuits, recounts, forensic audits and even partisan reviews – has affirmed those results.
Dozens of lawsuits by Trump and his allies aimed at overturning the election, some of which inspired misinformation about results in contested states like Nevada, failed. The Supreme Court refused to take up several cases challenging results in battleground states that played a key role in the outcome of the election.
In those battleground states, numerous audits and recounts have affirmed Biden's win:
Many claims of fraud stemmed from a misunderstanding of how vote counting and reporting processes work in different states.

AP: Voter fraud rare in states Trump disputed
A review by The Associated Press in the six battleground states disputed by former President Donald Trump has found fewer than 475 cases of potential voter fraud, a number that would have made no difference in the 2020 presidential election. (Dec. 14)
AP
In Wisconsin, for example, some claimed late-night vote dumps for Biden were proof of fraud. That's wrong – the state can't count absentee ballots until Election Day, so tallies for the largest counties can take all day to complete, or even into the night. On election night, that resulted in a late addition of absentee votes, which trended heavily Democratic in 2020.
Similar narratives targeted other contested states.
In Michigan, an election-night typo resulted in the addition of more than 100,000 votes to Biden's tally. Although the clerical error was quickly corrected, some falsely claimed it was evidence of voter fraud. In Georgia, footage of poll workers placing ballots in their proper storage containers was also misconstrued as evidence of fraud.
Special access for subscribers! Click here to sign up for our fact-check text chat
Other pervasive election conspiracy theories haven't panned out, either.
Claims from conservative pundits that voting machines deleted Trump votes and changed them to Biden are false.
Companies like Dominion Voting Systems and Smartmatic have filed defamation lawsuits against Trump allies and conservative news outlets for promoting baseless claims about their voting technology.
Our rating: False
Based on our research, we rate FALSE the claim that the 2020 presidential election was "rigged." Lawsuits, recounts, forensic audits and partisan reviews have all affirmed the election results. Officials from both parties have repeatedly debunked claims of widespread voter fraud. With 306 electoral votes, Biden beat Trump in the election.
Our fact-check sources:
USA Today · by Daniel Funke










V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
Company Name | Website
basicImage