On Oct. 17, I attended
the Al Smith Dinner, an annual charity gala in New York City. Political big-shots mingle with media celebrities and corporate executives. It is always an entertaining experience. This year's keynote address was by retired Marine Corps Gen. James Mattis, President Donald Trump's erstwhile secretary of defense.
Trump once praised Mattis profusely, but more recently has made him the object of his scorn, calling him
"the world's most overrated general." (Full disclosure: I know Jim Mattis and can report that he is among the finest officers I have met since I first donned a uniform 53 years ago.)
Although Mattis has a well-developed and wry sense of humor, he is judicious about using it.
Although Mattis has a well-developed and wry sense of humor, he is judicious about using it.
His public persona leaves one with the correct impression that he is the consummate professional warrior. But at the Al Smith Dinner, he chose to deploy his weapons of erudition, surprising and amusing the hundreds of attendees with a rare counterattack. "I'm honored to be considered that by Donald Trump because he also called Meryl Streep an overrated actress," Mattis said in his keynote speech. "So, I guess I'm the Meryl Streep of generals."
The barb was doubly surprising given Mattis' previous reluctance to criticize his former commander in chief, a decision that
has garnered its fair share of criticism. But there's a reason for Mattis' reluctance. Generals in Mattis' position, even those who are retired, do not criticize the sitting president. Until this administration, Mattis' joke would have been unthinkable. And yet, Mattis is merely the
latest in a line of commanding officers who have recently rebuked the president's decisions. This collective decision to go against such entrenched military traditions should give their warnings even more weight. When the generals are speaking out, something is really wrong.
Earlier in October, retired Adm. William McRaven, also a very highly respected warrior, was even
more direct in an opinion piece in The New York Times, in which he asserted that our nation is under attack from within.
"Last week I attended two memorable events that reminded me why we care so very much about this nation and also why our future may be in peril,"
McRaven, who oversaw the Navy SEAL team that killed Osama bin Laden, wrote. "But, beneath the outward sense of hope and duty that I witnessed at these two events, there was an underlying current of frustration, humiliation, anger and fear that echoed across the sidelines. The America that they believed in was under attack, not from without, but from within."
Very early on, service members are taught that the success of our national defense rests on the strength of the chain of command.
Very early on, service members are taught that the success of our national defense rests on the strength of the chain of command. Yes, one can argue and even disagree with the boss. Indeed, commanders routinely insist on critical input from their subordinates. But once the decision is made, unless the order is immoral or illegal, it must be obeyed.
In America's long history, we have made many strategic errors in the use of the military instrument of power. We strenuously avoided getting involved in World War II, and as a result, millions of people were slaughtered before we finally answered the call. Fighting in Vietnam, while supporting its corrupt and inept government, was a deadly folly. Invading Iraq was a huge mistake, and the error of doing so has not yet been fully realized.
From left, Col. Jake Jacobs, former Secretary of Defense Gen. James Mattis, and Cardinal Timothy M. Dolan during the 74th Annual Alfred E. Smith Memorial Foundation Dinner in New York on Oct. 17, 2019.Courtesy Bill Frank
But even in these cases, criticism of the national command authority by members of the military was, at most, muted. Four-star generals were certainly not directing criticism specifically at the commander in chief. Not so today. Trump's decision to pull U.S. troops out of Syria seems to have been the final straw for several leaders. Also in October, retired
Gen. John Allen, the former commander of American forces in Afghanistan, told CNN the events in Syria were "completely foreseeable" and that the U.S. had "greenlighted" the crisis. "This is what happens when Trump follows his instincts and because of his alignment with autocrats," Allen noted.
Over at the Atlantic, retired Gen. Joseph Votel, former commander of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) who helped lead the fight against the Islamic State militant group, wrote that Trump's Syria "abandonment threatens to undo five years' worth of fighting against ISIS and will severely damage American credibility and reliability in any future fights in which we need strong allies." Even more three- and four-star generals
voiced their frustration with Trump to Mark Bowden in a separate piece, some on the record and others off.
When warriors of the caliber of Mattis and McRaven or Votel and Allen publicly reprove the president, citizens may properly conclude that our national security decision-making is truly dysfunctional and that the nation is dangerously at risk.
To be sure, from the very beginning of his tenure, the president has given critics plenty of reasons - both stylistic and substantive - to be excoriated. But, as in the past, we have not heard dissent from warriors. Until now.
Related
Perhaps the proximate impetus for the military's disaffection was the president's latest decision, to withdraw precipitously
almost all American forces from Syria. For the United States, there has been nothing positive that has resulted from this misguided choice, and all the strategic gains have accrued to Turkey, Syria, Russia, Iran and ISIS.
On the other hand, maybe this decision's effect on these officers' thinking is more wide-ranging. We are now in the unenviable and dangerous position of having convinced both friends and adversaries that we are withdrawing from the world stage. Mattis, for one, would gladly suffer a lifetime of adolescent, ad hominem criticism if the result were the safety, security and prosperity of his country.
2. US military struggles to find a strategy amid sudden policy changes in CENTCOM region
Excerpts:
The spate of sudden decisions from the White House has called into question the future of the five-year fight against Islamic State militants as well as the entire strategy that underpins the U.S. presence in the U.S. Central Command region.
It also highlights the second- and third-order effects of abrupt decisions that so far have included a high death toll of Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in the Turkish invasion and Iraq's unexpected decision to prohibit U.S. forces leaving Syria to stay in neighboring Iraq. The combination of events threatens to greatly diminish, if not end altogether, the still ongoing fight against Islamic State militants in both Syria and Iraq as the coalition's most effective indigenous partner in Syria is under fire from the coalition's NATO ally.
And with all that taking place, NBC News reported that military
planners are developing plans for a rapid drawdown in Afghanistan should Trump make a similar quick decision about the remaining 12,000 troops there.
The tumultuous events of the last 10 days threaten to wash away whatever gains have been made in the past 18 years of war in the U.S. Central Command region and that concerns some of those who once oversaw military planning there.
"There doesn't appear to be much strategy going on at all, aside from piecemeal political decisions," said Mike Jones, a retired Army major general who served as CENTCOM's chief of staff.
US military struggles to find a strategy amid sudden policy changes in CENTCOM region
militarytimes.com · by Howard Altman, Meghann Myers, Shawn Snow · October 22, 2019
Kurds hurl insults and garbage at departing US troops
Residents of a Kurdish-dominated town in Syria pelt U.S. troops with potatoes and other items as they move through local streets. (AP)
The rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from northeast Syria, which included
U.S. forces bombing their own equipment at the bases they hastily left behind, is a vivid example of how the U.S. military is being forced to cope with national security and foreign policy decisions announced at the speed of a tweet.
Although President Donald Trump long ago telegraphed his interest in pulling out of Syria and reducing the U.S. military role in other parts of the world, the cascade of events that unfolded after his Oct. 6 conversation with Turkish President Recip Tayyip Erdogan highlights the mounting challenges heaped on military planners and the troops they command.
The spate of sudden decisions from the White House has called into question the future of the five-year fight against Islamic State militants as well as the entire strategy that underpins the U.S. presence in the U.S. Central Command region.
It also highlights the second- and third-order effects of abrupt decisions that so far have included a high death toll of Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in the Turkish invasion and Iraq's unexpected decision to prohibit U.S. forces leaving Syria to stay in neighboring Iraq. The combination of events threatens to greatly diminish, if not end altogether, the still ongoing fight against Islamic State militants in both Syria and Iraq as the coalition's most effective indigenous partner in Syria is under fire from the coalition's NATO ally.
And with all that taking place, NBC News reported that military
planners are developing plans for a rapid drawdown in Afghanistan should Trump make a similar quick decision about the remaining 12,000 troops there.
The tumultuous events of the last 10 days threaten to wash away whatever gains have been made in the past 18 years of war in the U.S. Central Command region and that concerns some of those who once oversaw military planning there.
"There doesn't appear to be much strategy going on at all, aside from piecemeal political decisions," said Mike Jones, a retired Army major general who served as CENTCOM's chief of staff.
"If there was some kind of apparent strategy, then maybe I could make some sense of it. And of course, that's very frustrating, because what the military would love to have is some coherent policy and strategy that it could work from, rather than just discrete planning endeavors to account for whatever the latest idea is."
Syrian exodus
After the U.S. agreed to withdraw troops from northeast Syria to get out of the way of the Turkish offensive, Pentagon officials talked about continuing the fight against ISIS by
moving a good chunk of its 1,000 troops there into Iraq.
"I'll have that discussion tomorrow with the Iraqi defense minister about the details" of their decision, Defense Secretary Mark Esper told reporters in Saudi Arabia Tuesday. "But the aim isn't to stay in Iraq interminably. The aim is to pull our soldiers out and eventually get them back home."
A few days earlier, the plan was to stage troops in western Iraq to fight ISIS militants in Syria from Iraq. Esper hinted that those operations could include cross-border raids by American commandos backed by U.S. airpower.
Iraq's demand is bad news for those plans, said one former U.S. defense official.
"Since Iraq has all the authority it wants to ask us to leave, we're more or less giving up on exerting [counterterrorism] pressure against the Islamic State in east Syria," a former U.S. defense official told Military Times.
Asked Monday by reporters about the possibility of
U.S. troops protecting oil wells in Syria, Esper said that there were already American troops by oil wells in Syria and that those forces were not in the "present phase of withdrawal."
"The purpose of those forces - a purpose of those forces, working with the SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces], is to deny access to those oil fields by ISIS and others who may benefit from revenues that could be earned," Esper said.
Esper explained Monday that a potential option for the president could be how to deny ISIS oil revenue. Esper also said that he has made no decision on any options.
A convoy of U.S. military vehicles arrives near the Iraqi Kurdish town of Bardarash in the Dohuk governorate after withdrawing from northern Syria on Oct. 21, 2019. (Safin Hamed/AFP via Getty Images)
Of importance to U.S. policymakers is a plan to continue to combat ISIS militants in Syria from Iraq.
But if the Iraqi government has its way, U.S. troops withdrawing from Syria may have to exit Iraq almost immediately, complicating any U.S. plan to combat ISIS in Syria.
"Doing effective CT targeting requires proximity, both in terms of intelligence collection and striking the target. If we're moving aircraft/ground forces away from the target area, we not only lose response time, we lose our situational understanding," the former U.S. defense official told Military Times.
Retired Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling, a former U.S. Army Europe commander, tweeted Tuesday that the "Iraqi military says "no permission" US says "plans are 'fluid'." In this situation, "fluid" isn't a good thing."
Esper said that the U.S. was still conducting combat air patrols to protect U.S. forces on the ground in Syria.
Another potential problem is the new rules for U.S. air power imposed by Iraq. U.S. and coalition troops fighting the
anti-ISIS campaign in Iraq must now get flights approved daily, following an Aug. 15 order from Iraq's prime minister that all use of
Iraqi airspace would have to be pre-approved or else be considered hostile.
A spokesman for
Operation Inherent Resolve told Military Times at the time that emergency flights receive blanket approval.
But Iraqi leadership now reviews a daily air tasking order with more detailed information about the types of missions, aircraft and operating areas for each flight, said the spokesman for Operation Inherent Resolve.
Those include pre-planned strike, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, resupply and transit flights inside restricted zones.
"The process we have in place does not increase the risk of compromise for our operations," OIR spokesman Army Col. Myles Caggins III told Military Times at the time. However, officials from the Pentagon, Operation Inherent Resolve and CENTCOM did not immediately respond Tuesday to questions about how those rules would effect any future action against ISIS in Syria launched from Iraq.
National security experts and U.S. officials have criticized Trump's decision to withdraw from Syria, warning that the American power vacuum would breathe new life into ISIS that has recently been relegated to remote rural areas of the desert.
Trump ordered the departure of U.S. forces from Syria following Turkey's launch of military operations to combat the U.S.-backed Kurdish allies who aided the American-led coalition in its fighter to clear northern Syria of the Islamic State. Turkey believes the YPG - a Kurdish militia that falls under the SDF - is a terrorist group.
American officials have urged Turkey to secure the thousands of ISIS prisoners holed up in makeshift SDF prisons in Syria.
Analysts have argued that Turkey does not have the will nor interest to follow through on those concerns expressed by the Pentagon and White House.
"The Turks, Syrians, Iraqis, and Russians won't do it as capably, even if they wanted to do so, so we're assuming extraordinary strategic risk here," the former U.S. defense official said regarding the Syria anti-ISIS fight. "Beyond abandoning the Kurds, we're giving IS [the Islamic State] the space to reconstitute and eventually conduct external operations again."
Moreover, a potential decision by Trump to keep U.S. forces in Syria to guard oil wells could draw American forces into the broader conflict his administration had hoped to avoid.
Those
oil fields were the scene of a deadly exchange between U.S. forces and Russian mercenaries in February 2018. American troops embedded with their SDF partners had to call in air support to counter an attack by Russian mercenaries and pro-Syrian regime forces in Deir ez-Zor province, Syria. Nearly 200 enemy fighters were killed in the fight.
Jennifer Cafarella, the research director for the Institute for the Study of War, told Military Times that she does not believe the U.S. will keep troops guarding oil wells in Syria. But, "retaining a presence in Deir ez-Zour may help keep the SDF together and thereby mitigate the ISIS resurgence," she said.
Afghanistan, stay or go
A report from
NBC News on Monday said the Pentagon recently began drawing up plans for an abrupt withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Afghanistan in case Trump surprises military leaders by ordering an immediate drawdown there
as he did in Syria, according to three current and former defense officials. Military Times could not independently verify that, but the Pentagon on Tuesday told Military Times that the White House hasn't given any orders to kick off a drawdown out of Afghanistan.
Such plans, however, are routinely considered by CENTCOM planners, said Jones, the former chief of staff.
"It may have nothing to do with the wisdom of whether one should withdraw, but certainly, folks are doing plans like that all the time," said Jones, who retired from the Army in 2011 and is now a consultant in Alexandria, Virginia.
A withdrawal plan from Afghanistan would involve removing U.S. equipment, bringing some home, while transferring some to local partners, or - in some cases - destroying it.
"How to dispose of things, as well as the mechanics of scheduling aircraft, shipments of stuff, road convoys to move things and all that," he said. "Obviously, you don't prefer to have to destroy all your equipment because you can't physically get it out based on the timeline that's necessary."
Reports out of northern Syria last week had the U.S. setting ablaze some vehicles while dropping bombs on other equipment, a necessity with the short few days special operations troops were given to evacuate after it became clear Turkey would invade. They destroyed the equipment rather than let it fall into the hands of unfriendly forces.
"There are times when destruction of something is a better option than trying to ship it out," Jones said. "The key is making sure you make those choices deliberately and on a sound basis, rather than being forced into it."
On Monday, the New York Times reported that the U.S. has already quietly withdrawn about 2,000 troops from Afghanistan. That news came days after Esper
told reporters traveling with him to Afghanistan that a
withdrawal of U.S. troops in Afghanistan would be "conditions based." However, he said the U.S. believes only 8,600 troops are necessary to keep up current counter-terrorism operations.
Army Lt. Col. Thomas Campbell, a defense department spokesperson, told Military Times that there are currently about 13,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan.
"While the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan fluctuates regularly due to troop rotations and conditions on the ground, there have been no changes to DoD's mission or to our commitment to our security partnership with the Government of Afghanistan," Campbell said.
The other key component of an Afghanistan exit is, of course, the massive investment U.S. troops have made in training Afghanistan's security forces.
Of the five regional train-advise-assist commands, the U.S. is responsible for two. Turkey, Germany and Italy are taking the lead in the others.
"Right now, it's our judgment that the Afghans need support to deal with the level of violence today," Marine Gen. Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, told reporters Aug. 28 in a Pentagon briefing. "If an agreement happens, that could change."
President Trump in September axed the conditions-based withdrawal agreement with the Taliban that U.S. diplomats had been working on all year.
Army Special Forces soldiers from ODA 3336, 3rd Special Forces Group, recon the remote Shok Valley, Afghanistan. (Sgt. David N. Gunn/DoD)
Afghan officials, who were not included in the multiple meetings held between the U.S. and the Taliban in Qatar throughout most of 2019, had expressed concern about the U.S. pulling out and leaving them to fight the Taliban alone.
"Frankly, I don't know how you do that. You can spin it any way you want, but at the end of the day ... any time you just say, 'Our goal is no longer your success, our goal is to leave' - I don't think there's any way to tell somebody that that doesn't cause them to be unhappy and bitter," Jones said.
According to a June report from the Pentagon, Afghan national force are making progress in their ability to fight insurgents on their own, but are still far from being totally independent.
They are at the mercy of political decisions, Jones said. It's possible to speed up their progress, but it's a huge commitment.
"You can accelerate the rate at which you increase someone's capability," he said. "But in order to do that, it requires a much higher level of commitment than the United States has been willing to make. We have done it at the pace of the resources that were available, and not at the pace of what could be done."
One former military official with knowledge of the region said that a hasty withdrawal would be disastrous for the current Afghan government and greatly reduce the U.S. ability to influence events in the region.
The former official added that maintaining a presence at Bagram Air Base is essential for any future fight against Iran.
"Bagram is an enormous military hammer on the other side of Iran," said the former official. "They can't react to both sides. The strike time from Bagram is very short if we have to do something."
Campbell said the Pentagon has not received any orders to draw down U.S. troops in Afghanistan and future reductions would be "conditions-based."
militarytimes.com · by Howard Altman, Meghann Myers, Shawn Snow · October 22, 2019
3. #Reviewing Why America Loses Wars (Book Review)
Excerpts:
Donald Stoker's book challenges how we categorize war and argues convincingly that misunderstanding these categories comes with substantial consequences. There are interesting civil-military relations dynamics at play in his arguments. Stoker does not place more blame on either civilians or military leaders for America's poor formulation of strategy over the past 70 years. Military officials can pressure civilians for political objectives, like in the quoted interaction above, and civilians can provide none. Civilians can make their political objectives clear and military officials can ignore them or be resistant. The formulation and execution of good strategy requires that both civilians and military leaders understand and recognize the importance of both military and political dynamics.
Students of strategic theory will not be wholly unfamiliar with his framing, although some may find it unique and useful for engaging a lay audience. Stoker seems to be pushing readers to better understand and appreciate the "ends" side of the ends, ways, means formulation. Essentially, Stoker is arguing that a better understanding of the political objectives of a war will result in a better American way of war than has been occurring for the past 70 years. Events in Syria, and ongoing U.S. military engagements throughout the world, demand that we at least hear what he has to say.
The national defense and foreign policy establishments in the United States are collectively looking away from Afghanistan and Iraq and towards China and Russia. As such, debates now center around how the military should be organized to deal with near-peer conventional conflict rather than the counterinsurgency conflicts it has been fighting for the better part of two decades. The debate is long overdue. Doctrinal documents and international developments are now beginning to refocus the military's attention on high-intensity conventional conflict. However, reorganizing the military for new missions is far from sufficient. Reorganizing the military for great power competition and then selecting yet another conflict that requires counterinsurgency and stability operations will leave warfighters unprepared and dangerously exposed, as has happened repeatedly in the 70 years since World War II. Poor political decisions have the potential to undermine any advantageous reorganizing of the military, and a new book by Donald Stoker suggests this is likely to occur yet again.
In
Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and U.S. Strategy from the Korean War to the Present, Stoker applies strategic theory to the modern American way of war and why it consistently fails to deliver on their political objectives.[1] To be fair, Stoker's contributions are less a reworking of strategic theory, and more of a reminder of how existing strategic thought
should be applied. Two of Stoker's contributions are most important for the current debate on how to organize the military to compete with Russia and China. He argues for a restructuring of the limited war concept itself, and then provides a historical analysis of how U.S. leaders have misunderstood their role in forming strategy. Both contributions should be taken as warnings for current and future great power competition. The U.S. military can be given the necessary resources and take all prudent steps to compete with near-peer competitors, but if political leaders fail to wield military power in a way for which it is designed or fail to provide clear and attainable political objectives for the military, then all of this effort is for naught. Stoker's book should be required reading for both military practitioners and those civilian leaders who are responsible for directing those practitioners.
What Are Limited Wars?
Stoker begins with a comprehensive dismantling and reconstruction of the concept of limited war itself. The term has come to be used for so many circumstances and under so many conditions that it now means little more than any war that isn't branded a World War. Stoker says, "Simply put, we don't know what we mean when we use the term 'limited war."[2] Many have attempted to define it in relation, and opposition, to total war. Limited war, therefore, is any war in which a state limits the resources dedicated to the war effort. This means-based definition is problematic, for many reasons that Stoker points out. The biggest problem in that no state has, or even can, divert the totality of their resources towards any war effort. Even in the example case of World War II, the United States held back enough resources to feed its own population, and not every citizen was involved in the war effort. Michael Beckley argued in
Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World's Sole Superpower that the United States will continue to be a dominant power because, among other reasons, it is more difficult for China to divert resources away from a large and aging population to wage a long war of attrition. China, in other words, cannot divert the whole of its economic output to war-nor can any other country.
Stoker instead argues an ends-based definition focusing on the political objectives of the war has far more utility than a means-based definition. This is based on a reading of Clausewitz, who believed a war should be defined by the political objectives being sought and not the level of resources being used to achieve it. For Clausewitz, war was either an attempt at an unlimited political objective of overthrowing the opposing enemy's regime, or something less than this-usually dealing with the capture of some piece of territory.
War can be of two kinds, in the sense that either the objective is to overthrow the enemy-to render him politically helpless or militarily impotent, thus forcing him to sign whatever peace we please; or merely to occupy some of his frontier-districts so that we can annex them or use them for bargaining at the peace negotiations.[3]
Therefore, a limited war is any war in which regime change is not being sought. This immediately draws into question the classification, and therefore the conduct, of many U.S. wars since World War II. Korea, at times, sought the overthrow of the North Korean regime, and both Afghanistan and Iraq post-2001 were unlimited wars seeking the overthrow of regimes. Furthermore, this classification should be evaluated for each dyad belligerent in the war. Take Vietnam for example. The U.S. sought a limited objective against the North in preserving the South Vietnamese regime. The North Vietnamese sought an unlimited political objective against the South in overthrowing the regime, but sought a limited objective against the U.S. in simply expelling them from South Vietnamese territory. Furthermore, these objectives can change over time.
While many outside the halls of academia see little value in such a comprehensive analysis of what a concept is and is not, these analyses are vital for practitioners and policy makers. The misconceptions surrounding the term limited war create conditions leading policy makers to believe complicated political objectives can be achieved on the cheap through military means insufficient to achieve the ends desired. Stoker says, "...bad limited war theory has helped rob the US and other Western nations of the awareness that wars should be waged decisively."[4]
Take, as one example, the possibility of limited military strikes against Iran.[5] It is unclear what objective this kind of operation would achieve, although some hope it would deter Iran from future aggression. This strategy would be indecisive, would likely only escalate hostilities, and would not achieve the objective sought. If we think of limited war as anything not approaching the level of effort undertaken during World War II, then almost every plausible military engagement appears to be achievable for a relatively low cost. It takes little time to research the history of American wars defined in such a way to see that limited war is by no means small or cheap. The problem reveals itself as far more pernicious than it first appears after reading Stoker's historical examples.
The book, on several occasions, recounts interactions between civilian leaders and military officers in which civilians ask for military options against a country, military officers ask for the political objective to be achieved, and the civilians refuse to provide them. Stoker places the majority of the blame at the feet of political leaders who do not understand that wars should be defined by the political objectives sought, and how it is their responsibility to clearly communicate those objectives to the military. However, the problem goes beyond an initial understanding of what the political objective should be, to a situation where leaders allow political objectives to be expanded into nebulous, far-flung ambitions long after the initial objectives have been achieved. For example, after 2003, Iraq morphed from an unlimited political objective of regime change to an unclearly defined limited objective of preserving the western-backed regime. Proper strategy, as argued for in Stoker's book, would have the end state of an Iraq invasion in mind before it began, and civilian and military leaders would have planned for that outcome before the first tanks rolled across the border.
Rhythmic History?
My own research looks into the military's effectiveness in armed state-building operations, what many call nation-building. Much of my focus revolves around a painfully predictable cycle of the military finding itself unprepared in a state-building operation, diverting resources and effort to getting better at state-building and counterinsurgency, then dismantling those capabilities to refocus on great-power competition, just to find itself once again sent unprepared into another state-building operation.
Unclear political objectives contribute to this cycle. The initial stages of recent conflicts saw clear objectives early on-the removal of a regime. These then morphed into operations with unclear objectives requiring tasks the military was not designed for, like statebuilding and counterinsurgency. Restructuring the military is of little value if it is designed for one type of conflict and sent by political leaders into wars with unclear political objectives. For those who think the United States couldn't possibly repeat the mistakes of Afghanistan and Iraq, Trump administration officials have pushed for military interventions in both Venezuela and Iran. Both would likely require a substantial commitment of ground forces dedicated to counterinsurgency operations if the United States sought to take and hold territory.
Breaking this cycle requires an awareness among
both civilian and military leaders that political objectives must come first, that war must then be waged decisively to achieve those objectives, and finally that these wars must not be allowed to morph into indecisive forever wars. The United States cannot allow interactions like the one below with the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, to occur at the highest levels of government.
Powell, fearing the U.S. public would not support it, was reluctant to use military force over the fate of Kuwait. As the conversation extended, Cheney pressed Powell for options regarding how the US could use its military power against Iraq. Powell, for his part, insisted that his civilian leaders first provide the political objectives they wanted to achieve. Growing irritated, Cheney exploded at Powell, growling 'I want some options, General.' 'Yes, Mr. Secretary,' Powell replied, and the meeting ended.[6]
U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell talk to reporters during a briefing at the Pentagon in Washington. on Aug. 9, 1990. (AP)
Donald Stoker's book challenges how we categorize war and argues convincingly that misunderstanding these categories comes with substantial consequences. There are interesting civil-military relations dynamics at play in his arguments. Stoker does not place more blame on either civilians or military leaders for America's poor formulation of strategy over the past 70 years. Military officials can pressure civilians for political objectives, like in the quoted interaction above, and civilians can provide none. Civilians can make their political objectives clear and military officials can ignore them or be resistant. The formulation and execution of good strategy requires that both civilians and military leaders understand and recognize the importance of both military and political dynamics.
Students of strategic theory will not be wholly unfamiliar with his framing, although some may find it unique and useful for engaging a lay audience. Stoker seems to be pushing readers to better understand and appreciate the "ends" side of the ends, ways, means formulation. Essentially, Stoker is arguing that a better understanding of the political objectives of a war will result in a better American way of war than has been occurring for the past 70 years. Events in Syria, and ongoing U.S. military engagements throughout the world, demand that we at least hear what he has to say.
Adam Wunische is a researcher with the Quincy Institute, an instructor at the George Washington University, and a PhD candidate at Boston College. He served in the U.S. Army and completed two deployments to Afghanistan.
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Header Image: U.S. Air Force pararescueman participates in a training exercise in the Grand Bara Desert, Djibouti. (A1C Nicholas Byers/USAF Photo)
Notes:
[1] Stoker, Donald.
Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy from the Korean War to the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
[2] Ibid.: 4.
[3] Howard, Michael, and Peter Paret.
On war. Vol. 117. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976: 69.
[4] Stoker, Donald.
Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy from the Korean War to the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019: 7.
[6] Stoker, Donald.
Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy from the Korean War to the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019: 44.
4. Elephants and Mosquitos: Why Leaders' Character Really Matters
Excerpt:
Leadership basics-principles that are easy to list but far more difficult to practice-ruin more leaders and organizations than the larger, complex issues. But leaders must avoid taking basic principles for granted as they grow within organizations and develop a sense of mastery. While basic, the application of leadership principles at higher levels demands that leaders self-police their behavior because everyone is watching, and very few will stop the boss from crossing the line. Do routine things routinely well and don't lose sight of the basics-that is what will help you avoid mosquito bites.
Elephants and Mosquitos: Why Leaders' Character Really Matters - Modern War Institute
mwi.usma.edu · by Robert Massey · October 23, 2019
Make your bed, clean your room, iron your shirt, elbows off the table, listen, and be polite.
It was my first week at West Point, and at a school lauded for its reputation in developing leaders, I was relearning the very lessons that my parents had been trying to teach me for the past eighteen years. To be sure, during the next four years I went on to learn the practical skills to succeed as an Army officer, but already in my first week I was getting lessons on something else-character-that is the hallmark of any good leader. Competence is important, but only if it is established on a bedrock foundation of character. The headlines we read on a regular basis regarding leaders resigning or being fired rarely have to do primarily with competence and often have almost everything to do with character. From military organizations to academic institutions, athletic programs to major corporations, a failure to adhere to the most basic principles of leadership is what topples leaders and organizations.
Unfortunately, there is no shortage of examples that highlight the great need for leaders to constantly revisit and reflect on the very basic responsibilities they owe to their organizations. Last fall, Ohio State University's head football coach, Urban Meyer,
was suspended for three games after an investigation revealed that he misrepresented what he knew regarding a domestic abuse allegation against one of his assistant coaches. In 2016, Army Maj. Gen. Ronald Lewis came under scrutiny for using a government credit card to pay bar tabs at strip clubs in Rome and Seoul. Lewis was
demoted for the infraction and forced to retire as a brigadier general. In 2018, Joel Seligman
voluntarily resigned as the president of the University of Rochester after a growing number of complaints called into question his administration's handling of sexual harassment allegations made against a university professor. An independent investigation would vindicate Seligman of wrongdoing, but it
recommended that the university change its intimate relationships policy so that it "flatly prohibits all intimate relationships between faculty and students in the same department."
It is worth noting that in each of these examples, a head football coach, an Army general, and a university president, there is very little in the way of conduct that was actually illegal. Meyer should have been honest with the media, Lewis should not have used his government credit card in a strip club (he
was found to be in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice for false statements he made about the expenses), and Seligman should have considered modernizing the conduct expected of university professors. These examples highlight the very real difference between the legal obligation of leaders and the ethical ones. On one hand, we expect more of our leaders, but on the other, we also expect the basics.
The expectation is-and must be in any healthy, well-functioning organization-that leaders will get the routine things, the most basic aspects of their job, right. As a former leader of mine likes to say, "Do routine things routinely well." Every one of us can appreciate the spirit of that phrase as we get in a car and hit the road for a long weekend. Driving should be routine-put your seatbelt on, don't answer that text message, stop at the stop sign, don't drink and drive. For something so routine, it's amazing how frequently we get it wrong. Much like driving, there is a sense of mastery that sets in as we gain experience within an organization, and the byproduct, too often, is that we begin taking the basics for granted. But it is a series of these routine things that, when done wrong or not done at all, result in a crisis. Stealing once again from a former boss, there's a useful analogy that applies here: none of us have ever been crushed by an elephant, but we've all been bitten by a mosquito-it's the little things that will get you.
Most of us probably don't shine our shoes, put hospital corners on our beds, or clean the sink each morning like I was learning to do in that first week at West Point. However, setting the example and a steadfast adherence to the little things becomes even more important as we lead larger teams and organizations. As leaders climb the ladder within their organizations, the stakes become higher, responsibilities increase, and the number of people to influence grows. At the same time, there become fewer advisers left to let leaders know when they are failing to set the example. The responsibility of understanding what our role as leaders is and the impact we have on our organizations falls more and more on us. While there may not be anyone telling senior leaders how to set the right example as they advance within an organization, there are several ways leaders can continue to self-police their own behavior.
Ego or commitment? Organizations reward talented leaders by giving them opportunities to lead at higher levels. That's not a bad thing, as demonstrated successful past performance is an indicator of potential future success. However, just because a more senior position is being offered, it does not mean a junior leader should accept it. Ask yourself this: Am I taking this job because I can add value to the organization or because I like the title, the pay, or the perks? If your heart is not in it to lead that organization, to be the example your workforce will look up to, to do those basic things that are crucial to organizational success, then you run the risk of hurting your reputation and the people you were put there to lead.
Who's going to call you out? If you can't answer that question, you will have a hard time leading at higher levels. Leadership at the organizational level and beyond can be lonely. There are no more colleagues leading at the same level to turn to for advice or an azimuth check. Additionally, there is a sense at the higher levels that organizational leaders should just "get it" by now. Consequently, the burden of policing behavior and setting a good example becomes an individual responsibility. Having an adviser, whether formal or informal, whose opinion matters to us and who will always tell it like it is, can be one of a leader's most valuable assets.
Self-reflection and self-critique? When was the last time you shut your office door and took the time to truly assess yourself? The Army's
leadership requirements model outlines what is expected of Army leaders. Most organizations have something similar. Those models are just words until we measure our own behaviors and actions against them. In these moments of self-reflection, it is important to be critical. The more senior the leaders, the less likely they are to receive direct criticism, making it all the more important to be their own critics. Leaders must routinely ask themselves hard questions, and answer honestly: When was the last time my example came up short? What areas of my organization am I neglecting? Are people still willing to come to me with their problems? Am I doing the right thing? This is no time to hold back, and it's a powerful way to put ourselves back on track to aggressively attack organizational challenges.
Leadership basics-principles that are easy to list but far more difficult to practice-ruin more leaders and organizations than the larger, complex issues. But leaders must avoid taking basic principles for granted as they grow within organizations and develop a sense of mastery. While basic, the application of leadership principles at higher levels demands that leaders self-police their behavior because everyone is watching, and very few will stop the boss from crossing the line. Do routine things routinely well and don't lose sight of the basics-that is what will help you avoid mosquito bites.
Author's note: I'd like to dedicate this to my father-in-law, a great teacher, coach, father, and man of character.
Maj. Rob Massey is the Acquisitions Officer at the Army Cyber Institute at West Point. He holds a MBA from the University of Rochester's Simon School of Business, and a B.S. from the United States Military Academy. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Staff Sgt. Brian K. Ragin Jr, US Army
mwi.usma.edu · by Robert Massey · October 23, 2019
5. National Security Perils of China's Belt and Road Policy
Excerpts:
The West is dealing with an unprecedented challenge from a rising China. The world is learning more year-by-year about China's strategic thinking. More is known now than was known when the Haifa port contract was concluded. U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Pompeo and recently departed National Security Adviser Bolton, have now asked that Israel reexamine the planned Chinese role in Haifa port. This should be done in light of current information on China's Belt and Road strategy - in particular, China's focus on controlling ports from southeast Asia across the Indian Ocean, through the Red and Mediterranean Seas and around the world. Consideration should be given to China's military-civilian fusion policy and to China's security relations with Russia and Iran.
Consideration should be given to a range of options, from cancelling the contract to modifying its terms. Israel could ask to shorten the term for operation of the facility from twenty-five years to, perhaps, five or ten years and adopt various risk mitigation measures. If the Chinese project in Haifa port proceeds, Israeli officials should have ongoing and pervasive access to the Chinese-run facilities. The presence of Israeli monitors would make Chinese intelligence operations at the facility more difficult.
The Haifa port issue is only one part of the broad question of how Israel (and the United States and other U.S. allies) should manage its economic and strategic relations with China. It is not necessarily even the most important part, given the gravity of such issues as 5G infiltration and technology transfer. But the port issue has potential to harm U.S.-Israeli defense relations and it revealed gaps in Israel's strategic and technology review processes
. A successful U.S.-Israeli effort to resolve the issue would be a model for how Western allies can constructively manage new China-related challenges
Feith, Douglas J., and Shaul Chorev, National Security Perils of China's Belt and Road Policy | National Institute for Public Policy
National Security Perils of China's Belt and Road Policy
Douglas J. Feith and Shaul Chorev
Douglas J. Feith is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute and served as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from July 2001until August 2005. Admiral Chorev, who heads the Research Center for Maritime Strategy at the University of Haifa, served as Deputy Chief of the Israeli Navy and as head of Israel's Atomic Energy Commission. This article is excerpted and adapted from a recent report entitled "The Eastern Mediterranean in the New Era of Major-Power Competition" by the University of Haifa-Hudson Institute Consortium on the Eastern Mediterranean.[i]
China's emergence as a world power has been underway for decades, but it accelerated stunningly in the last few years since President Xi Jinping came to power, consolidated his authority and adopted military, diplomatic and economic policies that are boldly ambitious, nationalistic and far-sighted.
Perhaps the greatest strategic challenge facing the United States now is how to regulate its business and other relations with China in light of President Xi's aggressive aims and his determination to "fuse" China's commercial and military interests. Given China's economic importance in the world, it is an unprecedented problem. The answer is not to stop all trade with China; that is not necessary, realistic or advisable from a business point of view. But obliviousness is not the answer either. It would be reckless to ignore the role of economic activity, including private commercial transactions, in China's defense policy and national security strategy.
The challenge has become reasonably clear only in the last half dozen years or so. The United States has by no means mastered it. U.S. officials are just beginning to develop the necessary new laws, policies and initiatives. They are just beginning to discuss, debate and sometimes quarrel with allies about how to counter Chinese ambitions regarding 5G internet infrastructure, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, advanced manufacturing technology, cyber operations, influence over critical facilities (e.g., seaports) and other militarily sensitive matters. Such discussions are already generating friction. The stakes are high and will weigh heavily in U.S. foreign policy. Attitudes toward China will be an important factor in shaping future U.S. relations with Britain, Germany, France, Italy and other important allies of longstanding, as well as with Israel.
Chinese national security strategy is based on historical themes that the ruling Chinese Communist Party promotes in its schools and museums and in the speeches of government officials. First is China's "century of humiliation," beginning in the 1830s, inflicted by the Western powers and Japan. Second is China's rescue from this plight in 1949, when the Communist Party led by Mao Zedong took over through revolution. Third, China has been transcending its long humiliation by building its strength over the last seventy years.
Fearing that others might stifle its emergence as a great power, China long adhered to a policy articulated by Mao's successor, Deng Xiaoping, which called for maintaining a non-aggressive low profile as China grew its power. The policy became famous through Deng's dictum: "hide your strength, bide your time."
President Xi, however, has moved China into a new era. Leaving behind the "hide and bide" policy, he has declared that China stands "tall and firm in the East" and should now "take centre stage in the world."[2] China is asserting itself. It is, for example, claiming sovereignty over vast areas in the South China Sea that, according to the Law of the Sea Treaty, are international.[3] The Philippines took the matter to the tribunal of the Law of the Sea Treaty, which ruled that China's claims were prohibited. Though a treaty party, China is ignoring the ruling.[4] Its claims have created conflict not only with the Philippines, but also with Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam and other neighbors. China has threatened these countries, punishing some by severing their underwater cables and sinking their fishing boats.[5] To bolster its claims, China is creating islands in the South China Sea through land reclamation and building military facilities there, despite President Xi's personal promises to refrain from militarizing the islands.[6]
Beyond its own littoral, China cannot currently contest U.S. control of the seas. It does however aim to become a maritime great power consistent with its maritime strategic interests.[7] China has large global merchant and fishing fleets. Sea lanes of communication are important to its economic growth and well-being. Chinese President Xi is committed to developing the capability to provide what Chinese doctrine calls "open seas protection." As long as its economy can support growth in the Navy's size and capability, China can be expected to increase such protection - that is, its blue water capability and competence, including its ability to project power.
Through prolific naval shipbuilding, deployment of a fleet of aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, surface vessels and submarines, development of missiles, conduct of long-range missions and establishment of numerous facilities abroad that can facilitate blue-water naval operations, China shows its determination to be a global maritime power.[8] If the U.S. naval presence in strategic locations wanes further and China maintains its trajectory, China will in time enjoy a sea control advantage.
The Eastern Mediterranean is far from the Chinese navy's traditional area of patrol, but over the last decade Chinese warships have operated in and around the region. In February 2011, China deployed a frigate and four military transport aircraft to Libya to help in a major non-combatant evacuation (transporting over 35,000 Chinese nationals).[9] It sent warships to war-stricken Yemen in March 2015 to remove citizens of China and nine other countries.[10] Of singular importance was China's inauguration in August 2017 of its first overseas military base in Djibouti. It is strategically located on the tip of the Horn of Africa at the choke point between, on the one side, the Indian Ocean, and on the other, the Red Sea, Suez Canal and Mediterranean.[11]
One of China's grandest strategic enterprises is President Xi's Belt and Road Initiative, which involves massive loans and huge infrastructure construction projects around the world. A hallmark of this initiative is Chinese-furnished financing that often exceeds what the foreign government debtors can service. The loans give Chinese officials extraordinary leverage. Some critics call this "predatory economics"; others call it "debt diplomacy."[12] Unfortunately, the United States, its allies and like-minded partners have not generally been able to offer alternative arrangements to meet other countries' infrastructure needs along Eurasia's important trade routes.
Belt and Road's strategic significance extends beyond the physical facilities involved. China uses the initiative to promote its own information technology standards and e-commerce platforms in such a way that competition from non-Chinese companies will be increasingly difficult in the future.[13] In working to set standards that favor Chinese hardware and software, Chinese technology companies aim not just to obtain commercial clout, but to give Chinese officials access - clandestine as well as overt - to vast quantities of technological, commercial, personal and other information - all of which is exploitable for economic and strategic purposes.
The Chinese government integrates commercial and strategic activities to a much greater extent than do Western governments. One of China's most important national security initiatives is the Military-Civilian Fusion Policy. It was announced personally by President Xi and is supervised by a commission that he chairs. President Xi makes no effort to hide the commitment to take advantage of civilian business activities to strengthen China's military power. He says, "implementing the strategy of military-civilian integration is a prerequisite for building integrated national strategies and strategic capabilities and for realizing the Party's goal of building a strong military in a new era."[14]
As reported on Chinese state television (June 21, 2017), President Xi said, "The ideas, decisions and plans of military and civilian integration must be fully implemented in all fields of national economic development and defense building."[15]
China's position in the world is arguably unprecedented. It is a peer strategic competitor of the United States and simultaneously America's major trade and investment partner. It is competing economically, politically, technically and militarily. Much of China's trade and investment relates to technology and is helping China improve its ability to confront America militarily. In contrast, the Soviet Union during the Cold War was never a major world economic power or a major trade and investment partner of the United States.
The United States cannot now think of China simply as an enemy in traditional terms. Nor can it "contain" China as the Soviet Union was economically isolated and restricted in its access to hard currency and high technology. Export controls worked well against the Soviet Union in large part because, at the time, the distinction between military and civilian technology was reasonably well defined. That distinction is far less clear now. Also, China is an integral part of the world's advanced economy, which the Soviet Union never was.
China, however, is subject to deterrence. A key deterrent is to hold at risk one of its vital assets, its seaborne trade. The key Chinese Communist Party claim to legitimacy is increasing prosperity, which depends on such trade. This gives impetus to the maritime element of the Belt and Road Initiative.
Neither Americans nor their allies and partners are going to stop doing business with China. But they should keep clearly in mind the Chinese government's increasingly militaristic national security policy and its Military-Civilian Fusion Policy. China has and will continue to strengthen its military capabilities with whatever assets or technologies it acquires abroad through commercial intercourse.
A major element of Belt and Road is China's construction of a globe-girdling network of strategically located maritime ports, many of which China then either owns or has secured lengthy operating agreements. China owns, operates or has plans to own or operate ports in scores of places, including Burma, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Djibouti, Egypt, Israel, Turkey, Greece, Italy, Spain, Morocco, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. In its 2018 report on Chinese military power, the U.S. Defense Department focused attention on the port project within the Belt and Road Initiative. The report highlighted the financing and long-term lease arrangements China made at Hambantota, Sri Lanka and in Piraeus, Greece and Darwin, Australia, noting that the logistics and basing infrastructure there will serve China's "overseas military logistics needs," allowing it "to project and sustain military power at greater distances."[16]
Reporting on China's takeover of the Gwadar port in Pakistan, the
Financial Times explained how China turned a commercial project into a military base: "The Gwadar [Pakistan] template, where Beijing used its commercial know-how and financial muscle to secure ownership over a strategic trading base, only to enlist it later into military service, has been replicated in other key locations." An Indian research analyst said, "There is an inherent duality in the facilities that China is establishing in foreign ports, which are ostensibly commercial but quickly upgradeable to carry out essential military missions."[17]
Control over Gwadar can help China alter the military alignment not only of Pakistan but also of Saudi Arabia. In both cases, realignment would be unfavorable to the United States. China can use its close ties with Pakistan as a means of drawing Saudi Arabia more into China's orbit. China is of course interested in Saudi Arabia as a source of oil, and the China-Pakistan-Saudi triangle also raises questions about possible nuclear proliferation. These are matters of concern for India, Israel, the United States and other western countries.
A Chinese-government-owned company - Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) - has a contract to operate a large new container facility in Haifa port for 25 years, beginning in 2021. This affects American as well as Israeli security interests.
The site is within a few kilometers of Israel's main naval base. To operate the facility, SIPG will have to connect to all the internet systems of both the harbor and the Ministry of Transportation, exposing them to manipulation, data mining and cyber warfare in the service of Chinese government interests. Given the military and intelligence ties among China, Russia and Iran, the Haifa port arrangements create the risk that China might, under some circumstances, obtain sensitive Israeli naval, merchant shipping and maritime infrastructure information and provide it to Iran. Beyond sensitive information, the aggregation and mining of logistic and commercial information and data is exploitable and commercially, politically and militarily valuable. The long-term presence of a substantial number of Chinese nationals at Haifa will affect the willingness of U.S. Navy officials to make use of Haifa for port calls and other activities.
The West is dealing with an unprecedented challenge from a rising China. The world is learning more year-by-year about China's strategic thinking. More is known now than was known when the Haifa port contract was concluded. U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Pompeo and recently departed National Security Adviser Bolton, have now asked that Israel reexamine the planned Chinese role in Haifa port. This should be done in light of current information on China's Belt and Road strategy - in particular, China's focus on controlling ports from southeast Asia across the Indian Ocean, through the Red and Mediterranean Seas and around the world. Consideration should be given to China's military-civilian fusion policy and to China's security relations with Russia and Iran.
Consideration should be given to a range of options, from cancelling the contract to modifying its terms. Israel could ask to shorten the term for operation of the facility from twenty-five years to, perhaps, five or ten years and adopt various risk mitigation measures. If the Chinese project in Haifa port proceeds, Israeli officials should have ongoing and pervasive access to the Chinese-run facilities. The presence of Israeli monitors would make Chinese intelligence operations at the facility more difficult.
The Haifa port issue is only one part of the broad question of how Israel (and the United States and other U.S. allies) should manage its economic and strategic relations with China. It is not necessarily even the most important part, given the gravity of such issues as 5G infiltration and technology transfer. But the port issue has potential to harm U.S.-Israeli defense relations and it revealed gaps in Israel's strategic and technology review processes
. A successful U.S.-Israeli effort to resolve the issue would be a model for how Western allies can constructively manage new China-related challenges
[1]. Mr. Feith and Admiral Chorev co-chaired the team that produced the report on "The Eastern Mediterranean in the New Era of Major-Power Competition" (
http://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/Feith_The%20Eastern%20Mediterranean%20in%20the%20New%20Era%20of%20Major-Power%20Competition.pdf). The other principal members were Dr. Seth Cropsey, Hudson Institute senior fellow and former Deputy Under Secretary of the U.S. Navy; Vice Admiral Jack Dorsett (USN, ret.), vice president for cyber and C4 at Northrop Grumman, former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance and Director of Naval Intelligence; and Admiral Gary Roughead (USN, ret.), Robert and Marion Oster Distinguished Military Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and former Chief of Naval Operations.
[2]. Charles Clover, "Xi Jinping signals departure from low-profile policy,"
Financial Times, October 20, 2017. See also Stan Grant, "China's era of 'hide and bide' is over,"
ABC News [Australian Broadcasting Corporation], January 30, 2018; Tobin Harshaw, "Emperor Xi's China is Done Biding its Time,"
Bloomberg, March 3, 2018 (quoting former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd: "to sum up the question on China's view of itself in the world, we've been told for a long, long time that Deng Xiaoping's action was this: 'Hide your strength, bide your time, never take the lead.' Xi Jinping in his last five years turned that on its head, and now we see consciously and deliberately a more overtly activist Chinese foreign policy and security policy and international economic policy in the world at large.").
[3]. See Sarah Lohschelder, "Chinese Domestic Law in the South China Sea,"
New Perspectives on Foreign Policy, Issue 13, Summer 2017, Center for Strategic and International Studies, p. 33 ("China tried to claim maritime areas based on historical rights rather than distance to its land territory and had its argument rejected for violating the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.").
[4]. See Tim Daiss, "China Has Defied International Law, Now What? Experts Speak Out,"
Forbes, July 16, 2016 ("State-run
Xinhua news agency said that the 'law abusing tribunal' issued an ill-founded award on the South China Sea arbitration. China's Foreign Ministry said that 'China solemnly declares that the award is null and void and has no binding force. China neither accepts nor recognizes it.'").
[5]. Regarding Japan, see Chieko Tsuneoka, "Japan Protests to China After Ships Approach Disputed Islands,"
Wall Street Journal, January 11, 2018. Regarding Taiwan, see BBC News, "Xi Jinping says Taiwan 'must and will be' reunited with China," January 2, 2019; and Chris Buckley and Chris Horton, "Xi Jinping Warns Taiwan That Unification Is the Goal and Force Is an Option,"
The New York Times, January 1, 2019. Regarding Vietnam, see Carl Thayer, "Alarming Escalation in the South China Sea: China Threatens Force if Vietnam Continues Oil Exploration in Spratlys,"
The Diplomat, July 24, 2017; and Joshua Kurlantzick, "A China-Vietnam Military Clash," Council on Foreign Relations Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 26, September 23, 2015. Regarding the Philippines, see Manuel Mogato, "Duterte says China's Xi threatened war if Philippines drills for oil," Reuters, May 19, 2017.
[6]. Banyan, "China has militarised the South China Sea and got away with it,"
The Economist, June 21, 2018 ("Less than three years ago, Xi Jinping stood with Barack Obama in the Rose Garden at the White House and lied through his teeth. ... China absolutely did not, Mr Xi purred, 'intend to pursue militarisation' on its [artificial] islands.").
[7]. See Andrew Chubb, "Xi Jinping and China's maritime policy,"
Brookings, January 22, 2019; and Michael McDevitt, "Becoming a great maritime power 'is China's dream,'"
The Australian Naval Institute, July 24, 2016.
[8]. Regarding submarines, see David Axe, "China's Submarine Force Is Testing Missiles That Can Nuke America from Long-Range,"
The National Interest, December 21, 2018; Rick Joe, "The Chinese Navy's Growing Anti-Submarine Warfare Capabilities,"
The Diplomat, September 12, 2018; Christopher Woody, "US submarines are better than China's 'by far,' but in a war that may not matter,"
Business Insider, September 11, 2018; David Majumdar, "China's Advanced Submarines Are 'Breaking Records,'"
The National Interest, July 26, 2018; Ellen Nakashima and Paul Sonne, "China hacked a Navy contractor and secured a trove of highly sensitive data on submarine warfare,"
The Washington Post, June 8, 2018. Regarding aircraft carriers, see Ben Westcott, "China reveals new domestically-built aircraft carrier under construction,"
CNN, November 27, 2018; Kyle Mizokami, "China Could Have 4 Aircraft Carriers by 2022: Should the Navy Be Worried?"
The National Interest, September 12, 2018.
[9]. See Shi Jiangtao, "Lessons to Learn from Libyan Evacuation,"
South China Morning Post, March 5, 2011 (quoting a Chinese university professor: "'the operation is a vivid display of China's national strength and its success has made many Chinese proud'").
[10]. See Kevin Wang, "Yemen Evacuation a Strategic Step Forward for China,"
The Diplomat, April 10, 2015.
[11]. See Arwa Damon and Brent Swails, "China and the United States face off in Djibouti as the world powers fight for influence in Africa,"
CNN, May 27, 2019.
[12]. In Sri Lanka, for example, China extended large amounts of credit to the government to pay for construction of a huge maritime port. When Sri Lanka (unsurprisingly) defaulted, China seized ownership. "Under heavy pressure and after months of negotiations with the Chinese, the government handed over the port and 15,000 acres of land around it for 99 years in December [2017]," the
New York Times reported, noting "The transfer gave China control of territory just a few hundred miles off the shores of a rival, India, and a strategic foothold along a critical commercial and military waterway." The incident, in the words of the
Times reporter, demonstrated "China's ambitious use of loans and aid to gain influence around the world" and its "willingness to play hardball to collect." It revealed Belt and Road as "a debt trap . . . fueling corruption and autocratic behavior" in borrowing countries. Maria Abi-Habib, "How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port,"
New York Times, June 25, 2018. See also Mark Green, "China's Debt Diplomacy,"
Foreign Policy, April 25, 2019.
[13]. It is hard to overstate the importance of setting standards. People who lived through the videotape format "war" of the 1970s and 80s or the more recent Microsoft versus Apple computer operating system contest can readily appreciate the point. When television cassette recorders first became popular, those made by Sony used "Betamax" technology while most other companies used "VHS." Promoting Betamax meant favoring Sony over its competitors. Similarly, in the early days of personal computers, software generally worked either on the Microsoft operating system (known as DOS) or the Apple operating system. Promoting DOS-compatible products favored Microsoft over Apple. By setting the standard for an industry, one can dominate that industry.
[14]. See Xinhua, "Xi calls for deepened military-civilian integration," March 12, 2018.
[15]. See Wang Lei, "China names key areas of military-civilian integration,"
China Global Television Network, June 21, 2017.
[16]. Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2018," May 16, 2018, pp. i, ii, 111-112.
[17]. James Kynge, Chris Campbell, Amy Kazmin and Farhan Bokhari, "How China Rules the Waves,"
Financial Times, January 12, 2017.
The views in this
Information Series are those of the author and should not be construed as official U.S. Government policy, the official policy of the National Institute for Public Policy or any of its sponsors. The opinions expressed in this article are the authors and do not represent the Department of Defense or any U.S. government agency. For additional information about this publication or other publications by the National Institute Press, contact: Editor, National Institute Press, 9302 Lee Highway, Suite 750 | Fairfax, VA 22031 | (703) 293-9181 |www.nipp.org. For access to previous issues of the National Institute Press Information Series, please visit http://www.nipp.org/information-series-2/.
Beijing's stale playbook to respond with appeals to nationalism, along with economic carrots and sticks, has run into obstacles abroad as well. As the Trump administration began levying tariffs on Chinese goods in mid-2018, China responded by placing retaliatory tariffs on agricultural products from regions that had strongly supported the US president in his 2016 presidential campaign, hoping to undermine some of Trump's political base. Yet despite the economic harm, support for the president among the nation's farmers
remained high.
For those familiar with the American electorate, this may not come as much of a surprise. Perhaps Beijing would have been well-served to read reporter Thomas Frank's 2004 book
What's the Matter with Kansas?, in which he dissects a trend in his home state of Kansas that now seems to be even more pronounced: for many, the values of nationalism, anti-elitism, and conservative religion often have far greater political impact than simple economic interests.
More recently, similar such misreadings by Beijing have caused additional backlash. After finding that by threatening to cut off access to Chinese consumers the party could successfully pressure foreign businesses from Apple to Zara into adhering to the CCP's rhetorical standards, a recent failure to achieve the same outcome with the NBA may be demonstrating the limits of such an approach, when their attempt at economic coercion created a political and media firestorm in the US like only the hot-button topics of sports, nationalism, and free speech can.
While the NBA's relationship with China may remain intact at least into the foreseeable future, increased profile of Beijing's "sharp power" attempts will be at the front of any organisation's mind before attempting to partner with Chinese entities or pursue Chinese consumers. The irony in much of this is that as China's economy slows and foreign investment into the country tapers off, Beijing may find that its ability to project power through its economic heft weakens as well.
China owes much of its rise to its practical approach to problem-solving and clear-eyed analysis of others' interests as well as their own. In addition to economic interests, humans throughout the world also have values, many of which are incompatible with those of Beijing. Cynically ignoring that those values exist, or dismissing them as illegitimate, is a surefire recipe for disaster.
The CCP, when at its best, has been masterfully realistic. Yet at this moment, reality is staring them in the face, and they seem to be unable - or unwilling - to open their eyes.
China's own "Great Delusion"
ELLIOTT ZAAGMAN
China has turned American hubris on its head - overselling
realism and nationalism while ignoring liberalism.
In his
2018 bookThe Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, international relations scholar John Mearsheimer argues that many of America's post-cold war foreign policy failures have ultimately been the result of a misguided strategy of a pursuit of "liberal hegemony", an overly ambitious attempt to spread liberal democracy throughout the world. As Mearsheimer sees it, American foreign policy over much of the past three decades placed too much weight on the power of liberal ideals, while greatly underestimating the enduring influence of realism and nationalism.
Although Mearsheimer is not without his critics, it is hard to disagree with his broader point: while many in the world may love liberal democracy, realism and nationalism are powerful and resilient forces. If anything, the rise of China is a testament to this point.
Economic issues may provide dry tinder, but it is issues of rights, democracy, and national identity which consistently light the match.
While continuing to reject liberal democracy, the Chinese Communist Party masterfully harnessed both realism and nationalism in establishing its case for legitimacy. Strong economic growth for the vast majority of the country allowed for the party to make a very compelling case that they could serve the interests of the people, even if the people did not all hold their values. After all, their material lives were improving. The party coupled this realistic "performance legitimacy" with a tightly controlled nationalist narrative, emphasising China's past greatness, hundred years of "humiliation" at the hands of foreign powers, and the CCP's indispensable role in returning the nation to greatness.
Yet as the Party now faces perhaps its most challenging period in decades, it appears as though Beijing is suffering from its own form of "delusion". If, as Mearsheimer would put it, the US has overestimated the power of liberalism and underestimated that of realism and nationalism, China's mistake has been to overestimate realism and their own narrative of nationalism while underestimating both liberalism and alternative forms of nationalism. This, somewhat ironically, is undermining their realistic interests as well.
To observe this dynamic at play, look no further than Beijing's failure to resolve the crisis in Hong Kong.
All indications seem to show that in the CCP's eyes, the problems facing the people of Hong Kong are purely economic, and therefore the solutions must be as well. Protestors' demands for human rights and democracy, Chinese media would have you believe, are the influence purely of "hostile foreign forces" and "separatists".
And yet, while economic problems certainly play a role, it is abundantly clear that no sustainable solution can be found without addressing the conflict between the mainland's narrative of nationalism and Hongkongers' sense of identity, as well as the role that liberal democracy plays in that identity.
Many of the protestors of this year became initiated into political activism through protesting a
2012 plan to implement mainland-style "patriotic education" curricula into Hong Kong schools. The 2014
Umbrella Movement began as a response to a Beijing-led attempt to limit Hongkongers' rights to universal suffrage. The 2019 protest movement began with opposition to a proposed extradition bill that would have allowed mainland authorities to circumvent Hong Kong's judicial system and try Hong Kong criminal suspects in a system with a conviction rate over 99%.
Economic issues may provide dry tinder, but it is issues of rights, democracy, and national identity which consistently light the match.
A pro-democracy march in Hong Kong, 20 October 2019 (Photo: Dale de la Rey/AFP via Getty)
In an attempt to quell the unrest in the territory, Hong Kong's embattled chief executive Carrie Lam announced
policy proposals intended to control the city's soaring housing costs, but ignoring the protestors' five demands. As one can imagine, this was not greeted with the warmest possible reception from the region's pro-democracy lawmakers.
Beijing's stale playbook to respond with appeals to nationalism, along with economic carrots and sticks, has run into obstacles abroad as well. As the Trump administration began levying tariffs on Chinese goods in mid-2018, China responded by placing retaliatory tariffs on agricultural products from regions that had strongly supported the US president in his 2016 presidential campaign, hoping to undermine some of Trump's political base. Yet despite the economic harm, support for the president among the nation's farmers
remained high.
For those familiar with the American electorate, this may not come as much of a surprise. Perhaps Beijing would have been well-served to read reporter Thomas Frank's 2004 book
What's the Matter with Kansas?, in which he dissects a trend in his home state of Kansas that now seems to be even more pronounced: for many, the values of nationalism, anti-elitism, and conservative religion often have far greater political impact than simple economic interests.
More recently, similar such misreadings by Beijing have caused additional backlash. After finding that by threatening to cut off access to Chinese consumers the party could successfully pressure foreign businesses from Apple to Zara into adhering to the CCP's rhetorical standards, a recent failure to achieve the same outcome with the NBA may be demonstrating the limits of such an approach, when their attempt at economic coercion created a political and media firestorm in the US like only the hot-button topics of sports, nationalism, and free speech can.
While the NBA's relationship with China may remain intact at least into the foreseeable future, increased profile of Beijing's "sharp power" attempts will be at the front of any organisation's mind before attempting to partner with Chinese entities or pursue Chinese consumers. The irony in much of this is that as China's economy slows and foreign investment into the country tapers off, Beijing may find that its ability to project power through its economic heft weakens as well.
China owes much of its rise to its practical approach to problem-solving and clear-eyed analysis of others' interests as well as their own. In addition to economic interests, humans throughout the world also have values, many of which are incompatible with those of Beijing. Cynically ignoring that those values exist, or dismissing them as illegitimate, is a surefire recipe for disaster.
The CCP, when at its best, has been masterfully realistic. Yet at this moment, reality is staring them in the face, and they seem to be unable - or unwilling - to open their eyes.
7. Lost in the Furor Over Syria: Alliances are a Means, not an End
Perhaps for the most part the title is correct. But alliances that are based on shared interests, shared values, and shared strategy (with a common threat) are likely to be enduring. I would argue that without alliances the US will cede influence, the ability to project power, and the ability to defend US interests around the world. And ends do change but before alliances are abandoned perhaps they should evolve based on new assumptions and conditions.
Lost in the Furor Over Syria: Alliances are a Means, not an End - War on the Rocks
Despite the cacophony in Washington, President Donald Trump's decision to move U.S. forces out of northern Syria was fundamentally correct. His choice was unfortunately influenced by a mix of dubious formal alliances and informal partnerships. Unwinding them has proved chaotic - and deadly. Avoiding such a tragic outcome in the future requires more than critiquing the current president's bluster; it means learning to rein in U.S. policymakers' impulses to add new allies and partners, even when the latter's interests conflict, and curing Washington officials of their desire to retain those relationships when circumstances change.
To be sure, the president went about it the wrong way, and in the process demonstrated a shortsighted indifference to the suffering of millions of people. He would have done better to forewarn the Syrian Kurds, which would have allowed them to consider alternate arrangements that could have deterred a Turkish invasion, or begun the process of creating a safe haven under Syrian auspices. This is the deal that the Kurds and Bashar al-Assad's government are
trying to work out now. But this would still have been making the best of an unwinnable situation.
Rather than reflexively treating even passing cooperation as a long-term alliance, and every long-term alliance as permanent, the United States should take a more skeptical view of its security commitments. Washington should only rarely turn political relationships into military obligations, and American officials should periodically review previous alliances and partnerships, terminating them when they no longer serve the parties' interests. Taking these steps is particularly important when the relationship is transitory, as in the case of Syria's Kurds.
A History of Temporary Alliances - But an Aversion to Permanent Ones
Historically, the United States eschewed military alliances, as in this colonial grievance advanced by
Thomas Paine in Common Sense: "any submission to, or dependence on, Great Britain, tends directly to involve this Continent in European wars and quarrels, and set us at variance with nations who would otherwise seek our friendship, and against whom we have neither anger nor complaint."
After achieving independence, President George Washington issued a similar warning in his famous
Farewell Address, saying, "permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations, and passionate attachments for others, should be excluded." He explained that "habitual hatred or a habitual fondness" turns a nation into "a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest."
Of course, Washington was not against alliances in the right circumstances: French support was critical for the colonies' success in throwing off the mantle of British imperialism. But the preeminent founding father declared the young United States' neutrality in the wars of the French Revolution, despite cries by many French and American Francophiles that he had betrayed America's essential benefactor. Undeterred, Washington put America's interests first.
To be sure, a nation's core interests - maintaining territorial integrity, national independence, economic prosperity, and constitutional liberty - do not change. But they sometimes manifest themselves in different ways. And lesser interests, such as in the affairs of individual Middle Eastern countries, will vary substantially over time.
Nevertheless, the U.S. government has recently forged alliances with far less relevance to American security. And the alliances that America has entered into have been permanent in practice. Most notably, three major relationships forged after World War II - the NATO alliance plus bilateral treaties with South Korea and Japan - remain in place despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the death of Mao Zedong. Friendly nations once ravaged by war have now recovered or even surpassed the United States in terms of per-capita wealth.
Not all Allies are the Same (and Some aren't Even Allies)
The disadvantages of having too many allies - and the wrong allies - are not just historical. The bitter controversy over America's military presence in northern Syria highlights a similar challenge today. Most commentary has reflected horror at relocating U.S. military personnel who were once stationed with Kurdish militias and which had once battled ISIL militants.
That relationship, however, was an alliance in mind but not in fact. The Syrian Kurds used Americans much as the Americans used them, to battle a common foe. Washington provided military assistance to a group which faced extinction should the Islamic State triumph. Importantly, the U.S. commitment was against ISIL, not Syria, Iran, Russia, or Turkey. And there was no formal alliance, no treaty ratified by the Senate, and no public debate. There wasn't even legal authority for the deployment, let alone a commitment to go to war on behalf of the Kurds. The U.S. mission in Syria cannot reasonably be counted as legitimate under either the 2001 or 2002 versions of the Authorization for Use of Military Force -
though the Obama and now Trump administrations have tried.
On the other hand, the United States and Turkey have been formal treaty allies for almost seven decades. Ankara has not been a very good ally of late, but it remains a member in good standing in the NATO alliance. Long ago, the U.S. Senate ratified Turkey's inclusion in that treaty, which includes a promise to act collectively in defense of individual members. Washington has sold weapons to, manned bases in, provided aid to, stored nuclear weapons in, and otherwise cooperated with Turkey
for decades.
And U.S. officials knew that Ankara viewed Washington's relationship with the Syrian Kurds as a serious, even existential, threat. The issue is not whether U.S. officials believed Turkey's claims. In fact, the connections between the Kurdish-dominated People's Protection Units, or YPG, in Syria, with the Kurdistan Worker's Party, or PKK, in Turkey are real, but seem unlikely to threaten the integrity of the Turkish state. Nevertheless, Ankara, not America, makes decisions on Turkey's security. Turkish officials repeatedly and loudly informed Washington of their concerns.
Turkey sees America's seeming insouciance as abandonment, especially coming after the tepid response of the United States and NATO's European members to
Turkey's shootdown of a Russian warplane in November 2015. At the time, Ankara's allies showed little interest in triggering NATO's Article 5, under which all NATO members are expected to treat an attack on any other state as the functional equivalent of an attack on themselves.
In the case of its invasion of Syria, Turkey initiated the attack, so Ankara should not have expected help from the alliance. But the earlier point stands: Turkey's behavior was motivated, in part, by a desire to resolve a security problem that it sees the United States as having made worse.
More Partners Mean More Potential Conflicts or Contradictions
Most were quick to blame the ensuing chaos on the Trump administration's flagrant incompetence. But even a well-organized White House would struggle to reconcile the many contradictory impulses embedded within U.S. policy toward Syria's civil war in particular, not to mention the greater Middle East in general. An ever-increasing number of allies and security dependents makes conflicting interests almost inevitable.
For instance, NATO incorporated two countries - Greece and Turkey - with a long history of enmity toward one another. It appears poised to admit Macedonia (since renamed the Republic of North Macedonia), which also has disputes with Greece. These may never spill over into actual conflict, but the possibility cannot be discounted completely.
And U.S. treaty allies
have gone to war with one another. In 1983, the United States
nominally backed the United Kingdom over Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas conflict. That seems an obvious choice given the United Kingdom's status as a NATO ally, but ignores Argentina's coverage by
the Rio Pact, which, like the NATO treaty, formally declares an attack on one as an attack on all. Washington might have justified sorting through such challenges during the Cold War, when there was an overriding shared interest in containing the Soviet Union. No similar argument can be made, however, for attempting to adjudicate among the numerous factions battling it out in Syria today.
Washington should take greater care in creating and maintaining alliances. U.S. officials add allies to NATO, such as Montenegro and North Macedonia, rather like most people collect Facebook friends. Proposals to add Kosovo and Serbia, which remain at odds over the former's secession from the latter, would bring new conflicts into the organization, as would including Georgia and Ukraine.
Revisiting Alliance Commitments
The broader lesson here is that Washington should also reconsider past commitments which have outlived their usefulness. That includes cases in which the initial circumstances giving rise to the alliance - say with respect to South Korea or NATO - have changed dramatically, as well as cases in which the supposed ally, like Turkey, has changed dramatically. Alliances, like underlying foreign and military policy, should be based on circumstances, which can change significantly over time.
In fact, Tim Sayle, author of
Enduring Alliance, notes that U.S. and Canadian officials considered adding to the NATO Treaty an explicit provision to remove countries no longer deemed fit for membership. The drafters were most concerned about negative changes in allied governments, for example if democracies turned illiberal, or autocratic states moved toward authoritarianism. Sen. Arthur Vandenberg, a leading NATO advocate, concluded that "if one of the existing signatories itself fundamentally changes character," then it would not be formally expelled, but rather "the pact simply ceases to be operative in respect to them."
The idea of revisiting whether alliances serve vital national security objectives, however, deserves to be resurrected. Diplomats have long recognized that changed circumstances warrant adapting or even dissolving alliances. For centuries, the United Kingdom famously shifted military partners to maintain a continental balance of power. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance originally was envisioned as a counter to Imperial Russia. Inked in 1902, the pact fell victim to London's desire to strengthen ties with the United States and was officially terminated in 1923.
More recently, regime changes ended treaties. For example, in 1955, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and Iran joined the United Kingdom in the Baghdad Pact. Directed against the perceived communist menace, the organization lost Iraq in 1959 after a Baathist coup overthrew the ruling Hashemite monarchy. Renamed as the Central Treaty Organization, it limped along for another two decades. The revolution that overthrew the shah of Iran in 1979 effectively ended Iran's membership in the organization, and Pakistan withdrew in that same year. The Central Treaty Organization was no more.
Washington's turn away from a collective defense agreement with South Vietnam is a more familiar case for most Americans. Washington had plunged into a massive ground war to, it believed, confront a monolithic communist bloc, led by the Soviet Union and China. Within a few years, however, those notions were mostly shattered. The Soviets and Chinese engaged in a brief but violent border war in 1969, and U.S. policymakers moved swiftly to widen the Sino-Soviet split through arms negotiations with Moscow and by increasing diplomatic contact between East and West. The most dramatic move was Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger's secret diplomacy with Beijing.
This context is critical to understanding why, by 1973, American policymakers had decided that the costs of the Vietnam War were too high, the likelihood of success too low, and the consequences of failure no longer so fearsome. The Saigon government was toppled just two years later. But Beijing ended up at war with
both Moscow and Hanoi. Washington exploited the communist breach with the opening to - and later formal recognition of - the People's Republic of China.
These decisions engendered harsh criticism, perhaps especially from within Nixon's own party. And America's decision to terminate support for South Vietnam wasn't pretty. But very few scholars today believe that normalization of relations with China was a mistake. Such policy changes almost certainly improved American security by transforming the international threat environment. A similar adaptation to global power shifts is needed today.
Unfortunately, few U.S. policymakers seem to agree. They still believe that the United States can obtain all that it desires, with minimal effort, and without having to choose among many desirable outcomes.
However, that illusion should long ago have been shattered. The policy of successive administrations in the Middle East has been disastrous. Trump's use of "maximum pressure" has failed in every case. Indeed, Washington has managed to unite Europe with China and Russia in search of alternatives to dollar dominance of the international financial system. Maintaining a thousand or so American personnel amidst multiple warring factions in Syria is unlikely to end any better.
It makes no more sense for Washington to anoint new allies, and maintain every alliance forever, irrespective of circumstance. In that vein, the United States and all other NATO members should reconsider Turkey's status.
Meanwhile, there is neither moral cause nor legal warrant to turn the Syrian Kurds into permanent defense dependents. President Trump can be ever counted on to do even the right thing badly. But he is acting far more responsibly than members of Congress who are using the present fiasco as an excuse to prolong an endless war which they failed to authorize. It is time to end U.S. military involvement in Syria and encourage development of a durable, if imperfect, peace.
Meanwhile, the combined use of AI and sensors to enhance situational awareness could make new kinds of military deception possible. AI systems will be fed data by a huge number of sensors - everything from space-based synthetic-aperture radar to cameras on drones to selfies posted on social media. Most of that data will be irrelevant, noisy, or disinformation. Detecting many kinds of adversary targets is hard, and indications of such detection will often be rare and ambiguous. AI and machine learning will be essential to ferret them out fast enough and use the subtle clues received by multiple sensors to estimate the locations of potential targets.
To use AI to "see everything" requires solving a multisource-multitarget information fusion problem - that is, to combine information collected from multiple sources to estimate the tracks of multiple targets - on an unprecedented scale. Unfortunately, designing algorithms to do this is far from a solved problem, and there are theoretical reasons to believe it will be hard to go far beyond the
much-discussed limitations of "deep learning." The systems used today,
which are only just starting to incorporate machine learning, work fairly well in permissive environments with low noise and limited clutter, but their performance degrades rapidly in more challenging environments. While AI should improve the robustness of multisource-multitarget information fusion, any means of information fusion is limited by the assumptions built into it - and wrong assumptions will lead to wrong conclusions even in the hands of human-machine teams or superintelligent AI.
Moreover, some analysts - backed by some
empiricalevidence - contend that the approaches typically used today for multisource-multitarget information fusion are unsound. That means that these algorithms may not estimate the correct target state even if they are implemented perfectly and have high-quality data. The intrinsic difficulty of information fusion demands the use of approximation techniques that will sometimes find wrong answers. This could create a potentially rich attack surface for adversaries. "Fog of war machines" might be able to exploit the flaws in these approximation algorithms to deceive would-be "finders."
...
If technological progress boosts deception, it will have unpredictable effects. In some circumstances, improved deception benefits attackers; in others, it bolsters defenders. And while effective deception can impel an attacker to misdirect his blows, it does nothing to shield the defender from those that do land. Rather than shifting the offense-defense balance, AI might inaugurate something qualitatively different: a deception-dominant world in which countries can no longer gauge that balance.
That's a formula for a more jittery world. Even if AI-enhanced military intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance prove effective, states that are aware that they don't know what the enemy is hiding are likely to feel insecure. For example, even earnest, mutual efforts to increase transparency and build trust would be difficult because both sides could not discount the possibility their adversaries were deceiving them with the high-tech equivalent of a Potemkin village. That implies more vigilance, more uncertainty, more resource consumption, and more readiness-fatigue will follow. As Paul Bracken observed, "
the thing about deception is that it is hard to prove it will really work," but technology ensures that we will increasingly need to assume that it will.
Military Deception: AI's Killer App? - War on the Rocks
This article was submitted in response to the call for ideas issued by the co-chairs of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, Eric Schmidt and Robert Work. It addresses the first question (parts a. and b.), which asks how artificial intelligence will affect the character and/or the nature of war, and what might happen if the United States fails to develop robust AI capabilities that address national security issues.
In the 1983 film
WarGames, Professor Falken
bursts into the war room at NORAD to warn, "What you see on these screens up here is a fantasy - a computer-enhanced hallucination. Those blips are not real missiles, they're phantoms!" The Soviet nuclear attack onscreen, he explained, was instead a simulation created by "WOPR," an artificial intelligence of Falken's own invention.
WOPR's simulation now seems more prescient than most other 20th century predictions about how artificial intelligence, or AI, would change the nature of warfare. Contrary to the promise that AI would deliver an omniscient view of everything happening in the battlespace - the goal of U.S. military planners for decades - it now appears that technologies of misdirection are winning.
Military deception, in short, could prove to be AI's killer app.
At the turn of this century,
Admiral Bill Owens predicted that U.S. commanders would soon be able to see "everything of military significance in the combat zone." In the 1990s, one military leader
echoed that view, promising that "in the first quarter of the 21st century, it will become possible to find, fix or track, and target anything that moves on the surface of the earth." Two decades and considerable progress in most areas of information technology have failed to realize these visions, but predictions that "perfect battlespace knowledge" is a
near-term inevitability persist. A
recent Foreign Affairs essay contends that "in a world that is becoming one giant sensor, hiding and penetrating - never easy in warfare - will be far more difficult, if not impossible." It claims that once additional technologies such as "quantum sensors are fielded, there will be nowhere to hide."
Conventional wisdom has long held that advances in information technology would inevitably advantage "finders" at the expense of "hiders." But that view seems to have been based more on wishful thinking than technical assessment. The immense potential of AI for those who want to thwart would-be "finders" could offset if not exceed its utility for enabling them. Finders, in turn, will have to contend with both understanding reality and recognizing what is fake, in a world where faking is much easier.
The value of military deception is the subject of one of the oldest and most contentious debates among strategists.
Sun Tzu famously decreed that "all warfare is based on deception," but Carl von Clausewitz
dismissed military deception as a desperate measure, a last resort for those who had run out of better options. In theory, military deception is extremely attractive. One
influential study noted that "all things being equal, the advantage in a deception lies with the deceiver because he knows the truth and he can assume that the adversary is eagerly searching for its indicators."
If deception is so advantageous, why doesn't it dominate the practice of warfare already? A major reason is that historically, military deception was planned and carried out in a haphazard, unsystematic way. During World War II, for example,
British deception planners "engaged in their work much in the manner of college students perpetrating a hoax" - but they still accomplished feats such as convincing the Germans to expect the Allied invasion of France in Pas-de-Calais rather than Normandy. Despite such triumphs, military commanders have often
hesitated to gamble on the uncertain risk-benefit tradeoff of deception plans, as these "require investments in effort and resources that would otherwise be applied against the enemy in a more direct fashion." If the enemy sees through the deception, it ends up being worse than useless.
Deception via Algorithm
What's new is that researchers have invented machine learning systems that can
optimize deception. The disturbing new phenomenon called "
deepfakes" is the most prominent example. These are synthetic artifacts (such as images) created by computer systems that compete with themselves and self-improve. In these "
generative adversarial networks," a "generator" produces fake examples and a "discriminator" attempts to identify them. Each refines itself based on the other's outputs. This technique produces photorealistic "deepfakes" of imaginary people, but it can be adapted to generate seemingly real sensor signatures of critical military targets.
Generative adversarial networks can also produce novel forms of
disinformation. Take, for instance, the "
image of unrecognizable objects" that went viral earlier this year (fig. 1). The image resembles an indoor scene, but upon closer inspection it contains no recognizable items. It is neither an "adversarial example," - an image of something that
machine learning systems misidentify -nor a "deepfake," though it was created using a similar technique. The picture does not make any sense to either humans or machines.
This kind of "ambiguity-increasing" deception could be a boon for militaries with something to hide. Could they design such nonsensical images with AI and paint them on the battlespace using decoys, fake signal traffic, and careful arrangements of genuine hardware? This approach could render multi-billion-dollar sensor systems useless because the data they collect would be incomprehensible to both AI and human analysts. Proposed schemes for "deepfake" detection would probably be of little help, since these require knowledge of "real" examples in order to pinpoint subtle statistical differences in the fakes. Adversaries will minimize their opponents' opportunities to collect real examples - for instance, by introducing spurious "deepfake" artifacts into their genuine signals traffic.
Rather than lifting the "fog of war," AI and machine learning may enable the creation of "fog of war machines" - automated deception planners designed to exacerbate knowledge quality problems.
Figure 1: This bizarre image generated by a generative adversarial network resembles a real scene at first glance but contains no recognizable objects.
Deception via Sensors - and Inadequate Algorithms
Meanwhile, the combined use of AI and sensors to enhance situational awareness could make new kinds of military deception possible. AI systems will be fed data by a huge number of sensors - everything from space-based synthetic-aperture radar to cameras on drones to selfies posted on social media. Most of that data will be irrelevant, noisy, or disinformation. Detecting many kinds of adversary targets is hard, and indications of such detection will often be rare and ambiguous. AI and machine learning will be essential to ferret them out fast enough and use the subtle clues received by multiple sensors to estimate the locations of potential targets.
To use AI to "see everything" requires solving a multisource-multitarget information fusion problem - that is, to combine information collected from multiple sources to estimate the tracks of multiple targets - on an unprecedented scale. Unfortunately, designing algorithms to do this is far from a solved problem, and there are theoretical reasons to believe it will be hard to go far beyond the
much-discussed limitations of "deep learning." The systems used today,
which are only just starting to incorporate machine learning, work fairly well in permissive environments with low noise and limited clutter, but their performance degrades rapidly in more challenging environments. While AI should improve the robustness of multisource-multitarget information fusion, any means of information fusion is limited by the assumptions built into it - and wrong assumptions will lead to wrong conclusions even in the hands of human-machine teams or superintelligent AI.
Moreover, some analysts - backed by some
empiricalevidence - contend that the approaches typically used today for multisource-multitarget information fusion are unsound. That means that these algorithms may not estimate the correct target state even if they are implemented perfectly and have high-quality data. The intrinsic difficulty of information fusion demands the use of approximation techniques that will sometimes find wrong answers. This could create a potentially rich attack surface for adversaries. "Fog of war machines" might be able to exploit the flaws in these approximation algorithms to deceive would-be "finders."
Neither Offense- nor Defense-Dominant
Thus, AI seems poised to increase the advantages "hiders" have always enjoyed in military deception. Using data from their own operations, they can model their own forces comprehensively and then use this knowledge to build a "fog of war machine." Finders, meanwhile, are forced to rely upon noisy, incomplete, and possibly mendacious data to construct their own tracking algorithms.
If technological progress boosts deception, it will have unpredictable effects. In some circumstances, improved deception benefits attackers; in others, it bolsters defenders. And while effective deception can impel an attacker to misdirect his blows, it does nothing to shield the defender from those that do land. Rather than shifting the offense-defense balance, AI might inaugurate something qualitatively different: a
deception-dominant world in which countries can no longer gauge that balance.
That's a formula for a more jittery world. Even if AI-enhanced military intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance prove effective, states that are aware that they don't know what the enemy is hiding are likely to feel insecure. For example, even earnest, mutual efforts to increase transparency and build trust would be difficult because both sides could not discount the possibility their adversaries were deceiving them with the high-tech equivalent of a Potemkin village. That implies more vigilance, more uncertainty, more resource consumption, and more readiness-fatigue will follow. As Paul Bracken observed, "
the thing about deception is that it is hard to prove it will really work," but technology ensures that we will increasingly need to assume that it will.
Social credit score. Coming to s street corner, iphone, browser, or social media platform near you. (or maybe it is already there).
Interesting excerpt here:
In the US, the state does not determine its citizens' "social credit" score. We Americans are told that the traditions of free speech and freedom of the press ensure a baseline of liberty that, when compared with China at least, look more benign and less dystopian. We are told that people ultimately determine the market and that the big digital players will respond to the wishes of the consumer. We are told ...
And yet, Americans do have a social credit score.
Except that one's "score" that determines access to climbing the social hierarchy is primarily the outcome of the market and not the state. It is the outcome of a world where recruitment, employment, law enforcement and education are processes of sorting, categorizing and, ultimately, acting upon data. The market is just as vicious as the state in determining who's in and who's out.
People are shocked when they learn about the extent to which data analytics sorts résumés, processes e-mails, and determines what is "acceptable" in the social-media world. As the sociologist Manuel Castells puts it, exclusion becomes the main fulcrum of power in the digital age. And both in the US and China, exclusion is the main game in digital space.
For example, take the multiple instances of Google's ad platform discriminating against certain groups through using protected characteristics (race, gender, etc) as lead data indicators. Or the stories of how application algorithms have misinterpreted e-mails, misconstrued interview signals, or even misrepresented an applicant as a different, less qualified person.
These are just the mistakes. When the system really works, one's place is the "natural reflection" of one's aptitude and relative qualification. And what really "qualifies" someone is hard to "quantify" - at least without the risk of our social indicators falling victim to personal bias or in worse circumstances, the whim of something people cannot control.
...
Many have rightly raised criticism and concern at the emerging reality of China's futuristic surveillance state. Yet looking at the US, we see a daily barrage of disinformation, people or bots making implausible statements through digital forms, and constant, non-stop addiction to screens. All of this has produced a situation of constant surveillance - surveillance of our psychologies, our moods, our creative potentials. And this has resulted in a practice not dissimilar to that of the Middle Kingdom.
Asia Times | China's surveillance system: a warning for US | Opinion
As
commentators focus more on China's burgeoning surveillance system, an excellent opportunity for critical reflection arises. In the past two years,
scores of articles in reputable publications describe China's surveillance capability in Orwellian terms - a dystopian cacophony of cameras, artificial intelligence (AI), facial-recognition software, and constant social monitoring.
Labeled the "social credit system," China's practice of using its domestic surveillance capacity to evaluate the "trustworthiness" of its citizens has
received notable scholarly attention in many countries. Consumer behavior, social-media involvement, and signs of political discontent are just some of the many indicators the Chinese state will use in making this determination. The project also underscores the widespread cooperation between China's leading technology giants (Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu) and the Communist Party. Indeed, these companies provide much of the data for creating an individual's score.
Incidentally, the "social credit system" has no official name in Chinese ... perhaps echoing an old Mao Zedong insight that to name something is to validate its existence. Regardless, while China's burgeoning practice is indeed alarming, the scary reality is that the current surveillance nexus in the United States poses a striking similarity. This is not to suggest that these systems are completely identical, nor to play down the severity of the situation in China. Yet to ignore the evolving logic of
surveillance capitalism in the West is to limit severely our collective ability to change it and prevent disaster.
Having lived in China as a foreigner, I am familiar with the cameras, with the posters of propaganda, and with the omnipresence of political networks that guide economics. Yet despite the signs of surveillance, I did not feel the overwhelming presence of the state as many dystopian accounts suggest. The point, however, is that a similar normalization of surveillance - an internalized acceptance - can be sensed in the United States as well.
Day-to-day life involves a mobile connectivity that even a decade ago was unprecedented. And this connectivity is generating data at a lightning pace. Since 2018, human beings have created more than
2.5 quintillion bytes of data each day - the result of our online searches, social-media posts, consumer habits, daily routines, and much, much more. Indeed, a
famous study concluded that in 2018 alone, the world generated more data than the entirety of human existence in its history.
Regardless of whether this is accurate, the fact that data occupies a central role in the future is undeniable. This world, however, did not come from nowhere. It was the result of a confluence of factors (historical, economic, political, etc) that when taken on whole is neither good nor bad but simply reality. Surveillance in the United States, needless to say, involves the state.
From
COINTELPRO and the
PATRIOT Act to Edward Snowden's leaks and the countless
whistleblower accounts spread throughout the corners of the Internet, "Big Data" is undeniably interwoven with the intelligence establishment.
Yet if US surveillance was born in Washington, it was certainly conceived in Silicon Valley.
If US surveillance was born in Washington, it was certainly conceived in Silicon Valley. Without the proliferation - and in some instances, direct support - of private Internet companies, US surveillance capacity would lack a massive amount of data on individuals
Without the proliferation - and in
some instances, direct support - of private Internet companies, US surveillance capacity would lack a massive amount of data on individuals. The point is that Google, Facebook and Amazon have accomplished what the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) never could: that is, create a service so attractive, inexpensive and useful that people don't think twice about what happens on the back end when they upload a picture or purchase a new book on a website.
The collection, processing, sale and use of our personal information in massive data sets is exactly the type of ecosystem the Chinese government uses to regulate its people. And with fifth-generation telecommunications (5G) and the
Internet of Things (IoT), the capacity for all this will greatly expand. In addition, AI and self-adaptive algorithms will further enable companies to process data more efficiently and accurately, which means more value will be gained on a range of services and Web-based applications, reinforcing already dubious behavior.
In the US, the state does not determine its citizens' "social credit" score. We Americans are told that the traditions of free speech and freedom of the press ensure a baseline of liberty that, when compared with China at least, look more benign and less dystopian. We are told that people ultimately determine the market and that the big digital players will respond to the wishes of the consumer. We are told ...
And yet, Americans do have a social credit score.
Except that one's "score" that determines access to climbing the social hierarchy is primarily the outcome of the market and not the state. It is the outcome of a world where recruitment, employment, law enforcement and education are processes of sorting, categorizing and, ultimately, acting upon data. The market is just as vicious as the state in determining who's in and who's out.
People are shocked when they learn about the extent to which data analytics sorts résumés, processes e-mails, and determines what is "acceptable" in the social-media world. As the sociologist Manuel Castells puts it, exclusion becomes the main fulcrum of power in the digital age. And both in the US and China, exclusion is the main game in digital space.
For example, take the multiple instances of
Google's ad platform discriminating against certain groups through using protected characteristics (race, gender, etc) as lead data indicators. Or
the stories of how application algorithms have misinterpreted e-mails, misconstrued interview signals, or even misrepresented an applicant as a different, less qualified person.
These are just the mistakes. When the system really works, one's place is the "natural reflection" of one's aptitude and relative qualification. And what really "qualifies" someone is hard to "quantify" - at least without the risk of our social indicators falling victim to personal bias or in worse circumstances, the whim of something people cannot control.
The point here is not to scream with naïveté at how the social hierarchy sorts the "winners" from the "losers." Surveillance capitalism did not create inclusion or how power networks determine "qualification" across social roles, institutions, and complex hierarchical structures. These have arguably been in existence since the beginning of complex social organization, have evolved with the passing of history and have adapted with new combinations of sources of power and control.
American life was all about who's in and who's out long before the Internet and data mining. Digitization has merely taken these qualia and processed them into discrete, quantifiable units - through the collection of behavioral data and the use of predicative indicators. And this transformation has occurred right under our eyes. Through the very market that has offered free, unlimited access to the most powerful communication tool in the history of mankind.
The advent of AI and complex algorithmic processing presents many benefits, from smart cities to engaged civic activity, better decision-making and streamlined functional processes. But possible downside effects of these technologies create problems that, if not addressed now, may become permanently engrained in the state/economy nexus. And this should be avoided.
Many have rightly raised criticism and concern at the emerging reality of China's futuristic surveillance state. Yet looking at the US, we see a daily barrage of disinformation, people or bots making implausible statements through digital forms, and constant, non-stop addiction to screens. All of this has produced a situation of constant surveillance - surveillance of our psychologies, our moods, our creative potentials. And this has resulted in a practice not dissimilar to that of the Middle Kingdom.
10. Defense Secretary Esper to urge NATO to pay more to protect Saudi Arabia from Iran
??? Why doesn't Saudi just pay more to defend itself?
Defense Secretary Esper to urge NATO to pay more to protect Saudi Arabia from Iran
PRINCE SULTAN AIR BASE, Saudi Arabia - Defense Secretary Mark Esper said Tuesday that he will urge allies later this week to contribute more to the defense of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region to counter threats from Iran.
The plan is part of a broader U.S. campaign to get NATO allies to take on more responsibility for security in the Gulf, including pleas for nations to send ships, aircraft and air defense systems to the region.
The U.S. has already agreed to send
three Patriot missile batteries, dozens of fighter jets and other aircraft to Saudi Arabia. And as Esper got a look at one of the Patriot batteries Tuesday at Prince Sultan Air Base, he said Saudi Arabia will "help underwrite" some U.S. costs for the additional aid, which includes about 3,000 American troops.
Standing in front of the battery in the scorching Saudi desert, Esper told reporters traveling with him that he's already had some conversations with counterparts from France, Britain and Germany. "One of my objectives going into Brussels later this week, is to build on those conversations," he said.
Defense Secretary Mark Esper talks to reporters at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, Tuesday, Oct. 22, 2019, where he saw a Patriot missile battery that the U.S. sent to Saudi to help protect the kingdom against the Iranian threat. (Lolita Baldor/AP)
The U.S. has dispatched about
14,000 more U.S. troops into the region since May, beefing up efforts to defend the kingdom in the wake of suspected Iranian missile and drone attacks on oil facilities last month. That's despite President Donald Trump's stated goal of pulling troops out of the Middle East and halting American participation in "endless wars."
The Sept. 14
attack on the Saudi oil facilities, as well as earlier ones on a pipeline in the kingdom and ships in the Gulf, stem from Trump's decision to unilaterally withdraw America from Tehran's nuclear deal with world powers and impose crushing sanctions targeting Iran's crude oil sales and shipments.
Allies, however, have been slow to respond to requests to participate in a maritime security effort that is aimed at countering Iranian attacks on tankers and other ships in the region.
Saudi leaders hosted a one-day meeting of defense chiefs from the Gulf region and across Europe this week and used that platform to seek help securing their country.
With Iranian military threats in mind, the United States is sending American forces, including fighter aircraft, air defense missiles and likely more than 500 troops, to a Saudi air base that became a hub of American air power in the Middle East in the 1990s but was abandoned by Washington after it toppled Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein in 2003.
By: Robert Burns
Gen. Kenneth McKenzie, the top U.S. military commander for the Middle East, was at the meeting. Just after Esper landed Monday in Riyadh, McKenzie boarded the plane, and the two men talked for roughly a half hour. Officials did not divulge the content of the meeting, but at least part of it was expected to be a discussion of how to meet Saudi's security requests.
McKenzie likely also gave Esper an update on the U.S. troop withdrawal from Syria and ongoing plans to keep some forces in Iraq, at least temporarily.
Esper's visit to the Saudi air base on Tuesday was his first chance to see the U.S. troops and missile defense systems deployed there. He said the Saudi agreement to help pay some costs of the operation is not unusual. He said he did not know the amount they would contribute.
Asked if taking money for the deployment makes the U.S. a mercenary force, Esper said no because the U.S. is not doing it for the money, but to deter Iran.
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:
"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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A pro-democracy march in Hong Kong, 20 October 2019 (Photo: Dale de la Rey/AFP via Getty)
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