"Inside of me there are two dogs. One is mean and evil and the other is good and they fight each other
all the time. When asked which one wins I answer, the one I feed the most."
- Sitting Bull
"To acquire knowledge, one must study; but to acquire wisdom, one must observe."
- Marilyn vos Savant
"Yesterday I was clever, so I wanted to change the world. Today I am wise, so I am changing myself."
- Rumi
"Experience is not what happens to you; it's what you do with what happens to you."
- Aldous Huxley
1. Esper says 'no decisions' have been finalized on AFRICOM changes
2. How the State Dept. struggles to manage IT and workforce
3. AP Explains: Why US troop cuts in Africa would cause alarm
4. New U.S. law requires government to report risks of overseas activities by ex-spies
5. Iran Says Drone Used in Soleimani Strike Came From Kuwait
6. Digital freedom and DNA: Caution advised on the road ahead
7. A slippery slope: Will foreign companies start ditching American dual-use tech?
8. Presidential Military Service: The Service Gap and the Validation Surge
9. A New UN Cybercrime Treaty? The Way Forward for Supporters of an Open, Free, and Secure Internet
10. As Trump says injuries suffered by U.S. troops in Iranian attack are 'not very serious,' Pentagon offers few details
11. Challenging Snowden: Spycraft, Ethics, and Amendments
12. Marine Raiders led counterattack against al-Shabab militants at Manda Bay, Kenya
13. Army officer says she was raped, but Supreme Court ruling blocks her from justice
1. Esper says 'no decisions' have been finalized on AFRICOM changes
The question is what is our strategy in Africa and specifically how do we view the actions and activities of the revisionist powers (China and Russia) and rogue powers (Iran and north Korea) as well as violent extremist organizations who are all operating in Africa? I have pasted the Secretary's in flight remarks below.
Esper says 'no decisions' have been finalized on AFRICOM changes
NAVAL AIR STATION PENSACOLA, Fla. - Secretary of Defense Mark Esper is not backing down on potentially shifting U.S. forces out of Africa despite a
week of negative reactions from members of Congress - but the secretary did say that "no decisions" have been.
Speaking to reporters Wednesday while travelling to Florida, Esper noted that "everything you do has some type of folks questioning and having concerns" and did not seem concerned by the pushback, which included the leaders of the House and Senate Armed Services committees.
"We haven't talked to them yet in detail... frankly, no decisions have been made," the secretary said. "I've talked to members of Congress several times and once we get through the reviews, I will update Congress as well."
The
potential drawdown of troops is part of a broader review process looking at each U.S. combatant command to decide if the force structure is appropriate for the guidance of the
National Defense Strategy, which focuses on countering Russia and, especially, China.
Esper added that he "hopes" to meet with the chairmen and ranking members "next week" to talk about a number of defense issues.
Last week, Defense News reported that House Armed Services Committee
Chairman Adam Smith, D-Wash., and ranking member Mac Thornberry, R-Texas, had written the secretary asking him to "carefully consider the adverse implications of reducing our force posture in Africa," and cautioning that "the threat of violent extremism and terrorism persists" in the region overseen by U.S. Africa Command.
The chairmen followed criticisms from earlier in the week by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Jim Inhofe, R-Okla., as well as Sens. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., and Chris Coons, D-Del. A bipartisan group of 11 congressmen, led by HASC Vice Chair Anthony Brown, D-Md., also sent a separate
letter to Esper, warning the move is a "shortsighted action that both diminishes our overall national security posture and our ability to lead with American values and influence."
Esper's proposed cuts would most likely focus on the several hundred troops now deployed in countries like Niger, Chad and Mali. If so, that would be a fraction of the 6,000 to 7,000 American troops in Africa, and it would appear to exclude the 500 special operations troops fighting alongside local forces against al-Shabab, an al-Qaida-linked militant group based in Somalia.
When Esper returns to the Pentagon Friday, he will have another meeting with AFRICOM on the potential changes. Esper will also be discussing the start of a review of U.S. Southern Command soon.
2. How the State Dept. struggles to manage IT and workforce
federaltimes.com · by Andrew Eversden, Jessie Bur · January 22, 2020
The Department of State has several ongoing issues related to both information security and workforce. At the heart of the issue is State Department's leadership, according to a Jan. 22 inspector general report detailing the department's struggles in fiscal 2019.
With facilities across the globe sharing information, the State Department depends on information systems to carry out its work. But, the inspector general found "numerous control weaknesses .... affected program effectiveness and increased the Department's vulnerability to cyberattacks and threats."
According to the inspector general, the department hasn't fully implemented its risk management strategy and has dispersed cybersecurity authorities across the department. The IT leadership structure has prevented the department CIO from being accountable for information security issues.
For example, State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security, which has some cybersecurity authorities, doesn't report to State's CIO, the IG wrote. The IG report adds that the CIO doesn't have the ability to track and control IT investments.
Meanwhile, the IG noted, some overseas information systems security officers (ISSOs) continued to fail to complete all their information systems security job requirements. This problem was first identified by the inspector general in 2017. The IG also found deficiencies in the department's IT contingency planning at overseas posts and shortfalls in how the department tests for shortfalls in its IT systems.
For example, the IG found that there "no mechanism in place to communicate identified vulnerabilities to the system owner if a vulnerability was considered significant or required additional resources to remediate."
"Without a systematic approach to monitoring networks and recording findings, department networks could be breached, and information security compromised," the IG wrote.
Staffing issues have plagued the agency as well, an challenge made worse by the hiring freeze that was instituted by President Donald Trump and continued for nearly a year and a half.
"OIG's work finds that staffing gaps, frequent turnover, poor leadership, and inexperienced and undertrained staff frequently contribute to the Department's other management challenges. Workforce management issues are pervasive, affecting programs and operations domestically and overseas and across functional areas and geographic regions," the report said.
The freeze not only prevented the agency from bringing on new personnel, but also disrupted training and professional development programs, as heavy workloads and agencywide restrictions on detail assignments prevented such initiatives from moving forward.
The report identified underqualified and inadequately trained staff as an additional problem plaguing the agency.
Filling leadership positions also proved a significant management challenge for the agency, and those positions that were filled faced issues with accountability and adherence to department principles.
"A report on leadership within the Bureau of International Organization Affairs revealed numerous complaints, including allegations of disrespectful and hostile treatment of employees, unmerited accusations of disloyalty, and retaliation based on conflicts of interest," the report said.
"Many leadership concerns associated with the National Passport Center in New Hampshire were also reported to OIG, prompting a targeted review. Employees reported widespread inappropriate behavior that included allegations of retaliation, such as denying awards, promotions, and special assignments and pursuing meritless disciplinary actions; multiple incidents of sexual and gender-based harassment; and multiple accounts of subtle or blunt intimidation."
3. AP Explains: Why US troop cuts in Africa would cause alarm
JOHANNESBURG (AP) - Even as destroyed U.S. military aircraft smoldered from an al-Shabab attack that killed three Americans this month in Kenya, the al-Qaida-linked group issued a taunting message to African troops: The U.S. will abandon you just as it did the Kurds.
Islamic extremists are already exploiting possible U.S. military cuts in Africa that have caused a rare bipartisan outcry in Washington, with lawmakers stressing the need to counter China and Russia and contain a growing threat from Islamic State group affiliates.
Here's a look at the issue that has caused alarm among some U.S. security allies, while the U.S. probes the deadliest attack against its military in Africa since 2017.
WHAT'S AT STAKE?
Worried U.S. partners have pointed out the poor timing of reducing the U.S. military presence: Africa's extremist groups "set a record pace of activity in 2019" with more than 10,400 killings, a doubling of activity since 2013, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies says in a new report.
The U.S. Africa Command, signaling concern over the Pentagon's potential cuts, has emphasized the Somalia-based al-Shabab as a threat after its leader in November made an unprecedented call to attack Americans wherever they are.
Neither China nor Russia is doing much to counter Africa's extremist groups, U.S. Africa Command officials added in a briefing last week.
The Pentagon's possible reduction of U.S. troops in Africa is part of a worldwide review by Defense Secretary Mark Esper, who is looking for ways to tighten the focus on China and Russia. It is not known when a decision will be announced, but officials say Esper has made clear the U.S. will not withdraw from Africa entirely.
France, which held a counterterror summit with West African leaders this month, has been blunt about the need for U.S. military support in the Sahel, the region just below the Sahara Desert, as groups linked to al-Qaida and IS move closer to well-populated coastal cities in countries like Ghana and Ivory Coast.
The French are increasing their presence in West Africa against what is now Africa's most serious extremist threat, this month announcing additional troops for its 4,500-strong operation in the Sahel and last month carrying out its first armed drone strike there.
"If the Americans were to decide to withdraw from Africa, it would be bad news for us. I confirm it," French President Emmanuel Macron said at the summit. "I hope I can convince President Trump that the fight against terrorism, in which he is deeply engaged, is also at stake in this region."
The U.S., in turn, calls the French presence critical in the Sahel, which Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has suggested as the next focus for the global anti-IS coalition.
"The French have more in the Sahel than we have U.S. service members on the entire (African) continent," Maj. Gen. William Gayler, the U.S. Africa Command director of operations, acknowledged last week. He called for a larger European contribution to support them.
The U.S. has about 5,200 Africa Command personnel, troops and others, on the continent, plus about 800 other Department of Defense personnel.
WHY ARE U.S. LAWMAKERS SPEAKING OUT?
High-profile Republicans and Democrats have warned the Trump administration that cutting the U.S. military presence in Africa would hand over influence on the youthful, booming continent of 1.2 billion people to an assertive China and Russia.
That goes directly against national security strategy, the lawmakers say.
"Both countries view Africa as a critical battlefield to fulfill their global ambitions and challenge U.S. interests" including along critical maritime routes, the Senate Armed Services Committee chairman, Jim Inhofe, said Friday. "Significant" U.S. troop cuts are being considered, he said.
Other lawmakers pointed out the recent establishment of China's first overseas military base in the Horn of Africa nation of Djibouti - a short distance from the U.S. military's only permanent base in Africa - as well as growing Russian activity via mercenaries and military cooperation deals.
The presence in Africa of about a dozen extremist groups linked to al-Qaida or IS, including an IS-linked offshoot of Boko Haram in Nigeria, also has raised concern.
"Any withdrawal or reduction would likely result in a surge in violent extremist attacks on the continent and beyond," senators Lindsey Graham and Chris Coons wrote to the defense secretary last week.
WHAT WAS THAT ABOUT AMERICANS KILLED IN KENYA?
The al-Shabab attack in Kenya slipped largely under the global radar as the U.S. and Iran faced off over the U.S. killing of Iran's top military commander. But the Jan. 5 attack was notable as al-Shabab's first against U.S. forces in Kenya, East Africa's economic hub.
According to internal Kenyan police reports seen by The Associated Press and U.S. Africa Command statements, the al-Shabab fighters killed a U.S. service member and two Defense Department contractors, wounded two other Defense Department members and destroyed several U.S. aircraft and vehicles at an airfield used for counterterror activities.
A "very small U.S. force ... absolutely repelled the al-Shabab attackers away from the airfield. They did that under fire," Gayler with the U.S. Africa Command told reporters. But the extremist group blared its attack as a propaganda win, releasing images of masked fighters posing next to aircraft in flames.
The U.S. has increasingly targeted al-Shabab in Somalia under Trump, saying it carried out 63 airstrikes against the group last year and killed more than 320 fighters.
But even U.S. officials have expressed concern about another looming military withdrawal that could jolt security in East Africa - the planned pullout of nearly 20,000 African Union forces from Somalia by next year. Somali forces are meant to take over security but are widely seen as not ready.
___
Bob Burns in Washington and Abdi Guled in Nairobi, Kenya contributed.
4. New U.S. law requires government to report risks of overseas activities by ex-spies
I missed this in the NDAA.
Excerpts:
This provision was signed into law as part of the Defense Department's spending bill last month. It will require Washington's intelligence community to provide Congress with an annual assessment of risks to national security posed by "retired and former personnel of the intelligence community" who work as intelligence contractors to foreign governments.
The legislation is the second measure Congress signed into law in recent weeks targeting foreign spying work. Another new piece of legislation directs the State Department to report to Congress how it controls the spread of cyber tools and to disclose any action it has taken to punish companies for violating its policies.
Read about State Department legislation spurred by Project Raven (here)
New U.S. law requires government to report risks of overseas activities by ex-spies
Reuters · by Joel Schectman, Christopher Bing4 Min Read · January 22, 2020
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Troubled that former American spies are plying their trade for foreign governments, Congress has passed new legislation requiring U.S. spy agencies to provide an annual assessment detailing the risks such conduct poses for national security.
The new measure was driven by a Reuters investigation revealing how former National Security Agency employees clandestinely assisted a foreign cyber espionage operation in the United Arab Emirates, helping the monarchy target rivals, dissidents and journalists.
Max Rose, a Democratic Congressman from New York, called the contracting practices revealed by Reuters "absolutely chilling" when he initially proposed the legislation on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives last year.
In an emailed statement this week, Rose said the U.S. government has "no comprehensive understanding" of the national security implications triggered when former U.S. intelligence experts go to work overseas.
The new measure, Rose said, will help Congress learn "the full scope of this issue and what steps are needed to keep our nation's secrets safe."
This provision was signed into law as part of the Defense Department's spending bill last month. It will require Washington's intelligence community to provide Congress with an annual assessment of risks to national security posed by "retired and former personnel of the intelligence community" who work as intelligence contractors to foreign governments.
The legislation is the second measure Congress signed into law in recent weeks targeting foreign spying work. Another new piece of legislation directs the State Department to report to Congress how it controls the spread of cyber tools and to disclose any action it has taken to punish companies for violating its policies.
Read about State Department legislation spurred by Project Raven (
here)
Before offering hacking tools or services to foreign governments, contractors must generally obtain approval from the U.S. State Department. While it's usually legal for retired intelligence personnel to work for foreign governments - provided they don't reveal U.S. secrets - some defense experts and lawmakers fear the practice poses risks to the United States.
The secret UAE hacking unit uncovered by Reuters was initially created to help the country fight terrorism. Reuters revealed how it evolved into a tool for the monarchy to quash dissent. The clandestine program, known as Project Raven, helped local security forces track activists, who were sometimes later tortured.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence said it was aware of the new legislation but did not respond to further questions. The UAE Embassy in Washington did not respond to a request for comment. In response to Reuters reporting, a senior UAE official last year said the country possessed a "cyber capability" vital to helping it protect itself.
A State Department spokesman declined to comment. The agency previously said human rights concerns are carefully weighed before such approvals are issued but declined to comment on the authorizations granted for Project Raven.
Reporting by Joel Schectman and Christopher Bing in Washington. Editing by Ronnie Greene
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said the U.S. drone used to kill a top Iranian general in Baghdad took off from a military base in Kuwait, the semi-official Fars news agency reported, citing Brigadier General Amirali Hajizadeh, the commander of the Guards' aerospace force.
The Guards had detected activity from the drone and fighter jets near Baghdad airport but didn't know they were planning to target Qassem Soleimani, according to Hajizadeh. At least four military bases in the Persian Gulf were involved in the Jan. 3 operation, he said, according to the report late Wednesday.
6. Digital freedom and DNA: Caution advised on the road ahead
A brave new world. Genetics and cyber.
Digital freedom and DNA: Caution advised on the road ahead
As the threats of cyberattacks now loom large in the aftermath of recent U.S. tensions in the Middle East, caution is needed with recreational use of genetic testing.
Just a month ago, on Dec. 20, a memorandum advising U.S. military personnel to refrain from the purchase or use of direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing services was sent to a wide Defense Department distribution list. This memo came from the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Joseph D. Kernan and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs James N. Stewart. This was a wise move, as Kernan and Stewart reminded their audience that this largely unregulated DTC genetic testing industry poses potential risks to individual privacy and to national security that could affect military operational readiness.
Privacy considerations and readiness issues are raised by DTC genetic testing of military service members, and major security concerns are at hand.
"Moreover, there is increased concern in the scientific community that outside parties are exploiting the use of genetic data for questionable purposes, including mass surveillance and the ability to track individuals without their authorization or awareness."
Shawn Snow
We already know that foreign governments are exploiting various surveillance methods, including DNA-typing, for monitoring individuals without their consent. There are well-known national security concerns that biological weapons can target specific groups or individuals who are genetically vulnerable to the effects of weaponized pathogens or other diseases. Besides these concerns, large-scale DNA typing affords use of genetic data for individualized identification, permits identification of unexpected parentage and family relationships, and exploits the ability to estimate bio-geographic ancestry.
While some of these genetic data generated are useful for various recreational purposes and for certain forensic investigations, unauthorized hacking of the data on military members could compromise national security for covert operators and for unit cohesion and mission readiness.
Two facts about genetic testing in military health settings are not well-appreciated.
First, protections of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (aka GINA), signed into law by President George W. Bush, do not apply to the military. While there are some policies in place to deal with genetic health information for service members, some genetic testing results, for example the finding of sickle cell trait, can place restrictions on some members with aviation specialties.
Second, U.S. DoD policies (i.e., DodI 6025.19) require service members to report (any) medical and health issues that may affect their individual readiness to deploy to serve on active status and to report any significant health information up the chain-of-command.
These realities present conundrums for those serving on active status in the military. This is due to the large amount of genetic data that are assessed by the DNA companies, often then shared electronically with other companies from the saliva or cheek swab samples they collect.
Depending on the testing kit and service requested by the consumer, genetic disease carrier state and health risk information is often communicated, but not necessarily confirmed or validated by another method, nor are new tests necessarily even reviewed by the FDA before being offered. Such testing results, if affecting a large fraction of those serving in a military unit - be it a squad, platoon or company - could easily interfere with critical missions if the purported results require verification by followup testing or clinical evaluation of the service member.
These matters concern all of us. Our passion for freedom requires us to walk the long and winding road to digital freedom. We must more carefully examine the commercial interests of DTC companies and the security of the genetic data they control as we balance interests in privacy of our service members and our national security, too often threatened and those of privacy rights, too often denied.
Frederick R. Bieber, Ph.D., is a forensic DNA-expert and member of the faculty of medicine at Harvard University. He served as a U.S. Army Reserve officer at the U.S. DoD DNA-Identification Laboratory (AFDIL) in Rockville, Maryland, the Dover AFB Mortuary, and at the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (USACIL) at Fort Gillem, Georgia.
Editor's note: This is an Op-Ed and as such, the opinions expressed are those of the author. If you would like to respond, or have an editorial of your own you would like to submit, please contact Military Times managing editor Howard Altman, [email protected].
7. A slippery slope: Will foreign companies start ditching American dual-use tech?
Largely the result of European space and defense manufacturer design outs, the "U.S. International Trade in Arms Regulations-free" movement began in the 1990s. Since that time, the ITAR-free movement has diffused into other industry sectors and regions. For example, in 2017, the German Ministry of Defence announced tenders for new assault rifles for the German armed forces. The tender included an ITAR-free exclusion criterion not only for the rifles but for supplies as well. India's space program is working with vendors on the basis of ITAR-free systems.
The ITAR are a set of government regulations administering the export, re-export and import of defense-related articles, services and technology on the U.S. Munitions List, or USML. ITAR controls are highly stringent, so much so that the Obama administration in 2010 initiated the Export Control Reform Initiative to streamline controls to make them both effective and to increase American competitiveness.
As the U.S. government controls the re-export of USML items, the ITAR are an internationally well-known quantity. In many instances, foreign defense product producers and consumers know the ITAR more intimately than their U.S. counterparts. Transferring or re-exporting U.S. defense items requires U.S. government approval no matter how seemingly trivial the part or mundane the transfer. The practical effect of ITAR requirements makes U.S. defense items very sticky and cumbersome; therefore: the ITAR-free movement.
In terms of other strategic items, the U.S. Department of Commerce licenses the exports of dual-use components in a similar manner, albeit to a much more nuanced degree. The Export Administration Regulations, or EAR, require consumers of U.S.-origin dual-use items to seek licenses for re-exports and transfers of said items depending upon the amount of U.S.-origin technology/components and/or the proposed destination of the transfer. In contrast to ITAR controls, EAR re-export and retransfer controls are simultaneously more complicated, but more flexible.
A former Pentagon acquisitions official is recommending to Congress a series of legal and regulatory changes to ease defense-industrial cooperation between America and its closest allies.
By: Joe Gould
The
Trump administration's on-going technology war with China is now bleeding into the arcane world of the EAR. Recently, the Commerce Department announced its intention to revise two EAR provisions that regulate U.S.-origin technology incorporated into foreign-produced products. Apparently, the effort is born out of frustration with the government's limited ability to curtail exports (or, more precisely, re-exports)
to Huawei. Revising the two provisions - the de minimis and direct product rules - would allegedly further empower the government to limit Chinese and others' acquisition of EAR-controlled items. However, several major U.S. technology companies have warned about the dire consequences of revising the rules, particularly if they are modified against specific targets.
At a recent meeting of the Department of Commerce's Regulations and Procedures Technical Advisory Committee, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration Rich Ashooh said of changes to the direct product and the de minimis rules: "We are looking at those two and many others," noting that "the U.S. has entered a new realm when it comes to export controls." The looking-glass notwithstanding, the tech sector is decidedly spooked.
In a recent letter to Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, a consortium of tech industry trade associations cautioned that further tightening of technology controls would "encourage the design-out of U.S. technology by non-U.S. firms, while also imposing massive new compliance burdens for U.S. and non-U.S. companies alike .... and .... could set a dangerous precedent." The current private sector admonishments are of piece with earlier jeremiads about overly burdensome U.S. product and technology controls. The effects for this current round of tech redlining could very well be the same: EAR-free foreign products.
The other cautionary note concerns market exit. Last month, the RISC-V Foundation, which directs the development of an open-source instruction set architecture for central processing units, announced that it will incorporate in Switzerland from its current corporate address in Delaware. The RISC-V Foundation chief executive, Calista Redmond, observed about the move: "From around the world, we've heard that 'If the incorporation was not in the U.S., we would be a lot more comfortable.' "
Similar warnings were also articulated in comments to the Department of Commerce's advanced notice of proposed rule making regarding emerging and foundational technologies. One commenter conjectured: "If significant controls were to be imposed .... then the employees and foreign companies will usually choose to leave the United States and take their skills to foreign competition."
In addition to potentially cooling U.S.-based technology exports, Pyrrhic control parameters could also accelerate technology autarky efforts in the target economy (i.e., China). Ironically, the ensuing panicked reaction to Beijing's announcement of its Made in China 2025 policy has only accelerated Beijing's efforts to create an autonomous -- or at least non-U.S. based - innovation ecosystem.
In 2018, Chairman Xi Jinping asserted that "self-reliance is the foundation for the Chinese nation to stand firmly in the world, while independent innovation is the only way for us to climb the peak of the world's science and technology." Even for countries not in the market for tech self-sufficiency, there is an increased general appetite for a U.S.-free alternative, either homegrown or non-U.S. sourced.
Based on the preliminary responses from U.S. and foreign technology companies, the proposed Commerce rules changes would have immediate and, perhaps, lasting negative effects for U.S. exporters.
Unlike the Cold War, the high degree of technology integration with China results in a paradoxical interdependence, the remedy for which includes, yes, finely tuned adjustments to U.S. investment and export control regulation, but also an informed embrace of a competitive strategy of investment. The ITAR-free moniker is bad enough; do we really need an EAR equivalent?
Scott Jones is a nonresident fellow with the Stimson Center's Trade, Technology, and Security program.
8. Presidential Military Service: The Service Gap and the Validation Surge
Although I think my bias should toward military service I know that most military service, save for perhaps an Eisenhower, prepares someone for the Presidency. Yes, it provides important experiences would seem to generate empathy for military personnel by the Chief Executive since he or she had served in some capacity but I certainly do not think military service should in any way be a qualification or a discriminator to be Commander-in-Chief. What we need are men and women who are committed to our nation, strategic thinkers, and have sound judgment. I am reminded of Eliot Cohen's book Supreme Command in which he showed how in some cases civilian leaders with little or no military experience were superior leaders and strategists than general or flag officers.
Then there is the question of general and flag officers endorsing candidates. That is a complex issue. The one guiding principle I think all retired military personnel and especially senior officers at the general and flag level is to protect the reputation of the military as a non-partisan institution. If a former military member wants to participate in the political process they should run for office or become actively engaged in a campaign and get your hands dirty in an election. But just making political endorsements or signing letters without engaging in the political process is problematic to me and gives the appearance the institution can be used for political purposes. We should avoid that.
Presidential Military Service: The Service Gap and the Validation Surge - War on the Rocks
According to Article II of the U.S. Constitution, there are only three criteria for being president: be a natural born citizen of the United States, be at least 35 years old, and have been a resident of the United States for 14 years. While the Constitution states that the president shall be commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, the position has no pre-qualifications. Nevertheless, the role of commander-in-chief is often invoked in speeches, at debates, and in political advertisements. But what makes a person qualified for this role? One measure of qualification - but certainly not the only one - is past military service. This should not weigh more than any other factor, if at all, but it nevertheless is relevant given that presidential candidates - especially nominees in the final months of the election - will need to find some way to prove their ability to command one of the world's largest militaries.
It is important to note here that simply having had some military experience is not necessarily beneficial either to becoming president or during one's presidency. It is the same reason that a resume alone does not guarantee a successful presidency. For example, few individuals had more breadth and depth in their professional backgrounds than James Buchanan. Arguably one of the most qualified individuals to become president, Buchanan was one of the worst. Nor is all military service equal.
Voters, especially veterans, may distinguish between candidates who served in combat (such as John F. Kennedy) and those who did not (Richard Nixon). But the issue also may be disregarded completely in favor of more divisive domestic issues, such as happened in the 2004 race between George W. Bush and John Kerry. In short, voting behavior can be complicated.
This article is a simple, non-academic representation of a history of presidential military service. It neither breaks new ground nor proposes recommendations based on lengthy analysis. For authoritative academic work on this topic, consult the work of Peter Feaver at Duke University and others. Instead, the graphs below offer a window into American presidents' military service. They also suggest possible ramifications for the 2020 election and beyond because fewer presidents in the past thirty years have served in the military and, those that did were junior in rank. For example, do voters care about military service in their candidates? Why were most of the post-World War II presidents those with Navy experience, especially as junior officers, when the Navy was only about a third of the size of the Army during the war years? And why have only generals been president but no Navy admirals?
With regard to the last question, part of the answer lies in the fact that the nation had no rank of admiral until 1862. A few prominent admirals emerged from the Civil War, such as David Farragut and his step-brother David Dixon Porter. However, they were overshadowed by generals who garnered attention from the press and the public. Similarly, the Navy has always received minimal attention for its role in the Anaconda Plan, compared to the Army, which was engaged in the largest battles and suffered heavy casualties that affected so many communities throughout the country. Only one American war - the Spanish-American War - produced a political figure from the Navy and that was Adm. George Dewey. This was, in part, because it was a naval conflict punctuated with images of a sunken U.S. warship and news of two major victories at sea. Nevertheless, the land campaign still produced heroes out of Theodore Roosevelt and Leonard Wood, the latter becoming vice-president and later president, and, the former becoming a candidate for the presidential nomination. Likewise, no U.S. admiral from World War I could capture the public's attention. And, despite the role of Admirals Chester Nimitz, William Halsey, Raymond Spruance, Ernest King, and others during World War II, the campaigns of generals simply overshadowed naval leadership.
Presidential Military Service: An Overview
In the chart below, I have categorized the U.S. presidents by their military branch, the highest rank they achieved while living, whether they had no record of service, and whether they actively avoided military service. Thirty-one of the 44 presidents (Grover Cleveland is counted here only once despite having had two nonsequential terms) had some form of military service ranging from enlisted to five-star general. Of those, 12 - more than 25 percent - reached the rank of general in the Army. Only one, Dwight Eisenhower, served in the 20th century. Nine had no military service, one (Franklin Roosevelt) attempted but failed to serve in the Navy, and three actively avoided military service either via the Civil War Enrollment Act, through which an individual could hire a substitute, or through military deferments.
Source: Generated by the author.
During the 20th century, only one Army officer became president while Navy officers comprise the majority of presidents who served. Yet, no senior Navy officer, namely flag officers, became president. In fact, very few presidential candidates have been senior officers in the Navy. The most senior naval officer who was a nominee was John McCain, who retired from the Navy as a captain in 1981.
What emerges are three distinct periods or groups of presidents with varying degrees of military service.
Group 1: The 19th-Century Generals
Source: Generated by the author.
During the 19th century, 21 of the 25 men to serve as president had military service. (Theodore Roosevelt is included in this group as he was elected as vice president in 1900.) More than half were generals, primarily during the Civil War. Only two flag officers explored running for office to different degrees. Commodore Charles Stewart (there were no admirals until 1862), was approached by Pennsylvania merchants to seek the Democratic nomination in 1844 with the proposal that James Knox Polk serve as his running mate. Stewart balked but managed to receive one vote during the first two ballots of the convention. In 1900, fresh from his victory at the Battle of Manila Bay during the Spanish-American War, Dewey was encouraged to run for the Democratic nomination. But he proved a poor campaigner, making gaffes about the role of the president and facing opposition from Protestant voters for having married a Catholic. He later endorsed Republican William McKinley.
Group 2: The Early 20th Century and Silent Service
Source: Generated by the author.
During the longest period of military service absence (William Taft to Franklin Roosevelt), only one military officer had the stature and popularity to run for president. Gen. John "Black Jack" Pershing commanded the American Expeditionary Force during World War I and was recognized with "General of the Armies" upon his return, but he did not receive support from the troops he had commanded. Aside from World War I, this group of presidents would have had little chance to serve, except for in the Spanish-American War. However, given the limited scope and brevity of that war, there simply weren't as many opportunities to serve as with more expansive conflicts.
Group 3: The Post-War Decline of Rank and Service
Source: Generated by the author.
Dwight Eisenhower's leadership of Allied forces in Europe propelled him to the presidency in 1952 but another equally-known figure from World War II might have preceded him. Gen. Douglas MacArthur held aspirations for running in 1944 and 1948, according to William Manchester's biography of MacArthur, "American Caesar." In 1952, Sen. Robert Taft - then competing with Eisenhower for the Republican nomination - considered MacArthur as his running mate.
Beginning in 1960, World War II Navy veterans - mostly junior officers - dominated the presidency. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, Nixon, Gerald R. Ford, and George H.W. Bush were all Navy Reserve officers during the war. The sole active duty Navy veteran to become president was Naval Academy graduate Jimmy Carter. Ronald Reagan was the only other Army veteran of World War II, having served in the Army Air Corps. The Navy, thus, had an unusually disproportionate number of presidents who served during World War II given that the Army was approximately three times the size of the Navy for any year during the war.
This period also included presidents who had deferments from military service, in both cases with regard to the Vietnam War.
The VPs
Source: Generated by the author.
Presidents' running mates offer another glimpse into high profile politics and military service. Most vice-presidents had no service and, in recent years, two of them had five deferments, each from the Vietnam War.
Falling Off the Service Cliff
Source: Generated by the author.
Since 1992, the election of presidents and vice presidents with military deferments or no service at all has become normalized. This trend will continue if some of the current poll leaders for the Democratic nomination win the general election, such as Joseph Biden, who had five deferments, and Bernie Sanders, who applied for conscientious objector status during Vietnam. Another leading contender, Pete Buttigieg, would continue the trend of junior Navy officers being elected, specifically from the Navy Reserve. Tulsi Gabbard is a major in the Army National Guard, but has been polling in the single digits, while retired Rear Adm. Joe Sestak also polled poorly before ending his campaign.
The Service Gap and the Validation Surge
Source: Generated by the author.
This service gap - a series of presidents and vice presidents with no military service or active avoidance of service - may be a temporary phenomenon. Just as Bob Dole was the last World War II veteran to run for president, it is currently only septuagenarian males who could request military deferments during the Vietnam War when there was a draft. In the all-volunteer force, the issue of a service gap due to active avoidance becomes irrelevant.
One factor in this service gap that might endure is what I'm calling a validation surge - a new era of retired flag and general officers endorsing candidates. The modern phenomenon of high profile, senior endorsements came into its own during the 1992 election, but was foreshadowed by retired Marine Corps Gen. Paul X. Kelley's endorsement of H.W. Bush in 1988. Four years later, retired Adm. William Crowe endorsed Bill Clinton. Endorsements proliferated with each election to the point where Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton were boasting about how many military endorsements each had received during the 2016 election. This is not a new issue. In 2012, the Center for a New American Security published its report, "Military Campaigns: Veterans Endorsements and Presidential Elections," in which the authors (including Feaver) stated: "competition for these endorsements has intensified, with each campaign seeking to best the numbers and ranks put out by the other side in the last election ... Candidates who lack a military service record - or perhaps have one that could use burnishing - have often sought endorsements from groups that speak on behalf of veterans."
As American voters enter the 2020 election, this report is worth revisiting, as are other warnings, including Kori Schake's that endorsements by retired general and flag officers erode public trust in the military, encourage the military to see itself as a political actor, and make it harder for active-duty military leaders to do their jobs.
Claude Berube, PhD, is a contributing editor at War on the Rocks
. He has taught in the political science and history departments at the United States Naval Academy. His third book (co-authored with Steve Frantzich) was titled, Congress: Games and Strategies
. The views expressed here are not those of the Navy or the Naval Academy. Twitter @cgberube.
9.
My snarky comment is UN cyber crime control is like gun control
- then only the criminals will have guns/only the cyber criminals will use the internet for nefarious purposes. We will abide by the UN cybercrime treaty but those who are predisposed to conducting, supporting, or turning a blind eye to cyber criminal activity will only pay lip service to the treaty . (north Korea, Iran, China, and Russia to name a few). But it is interesting that Russia is making this proposal. And it is even more interesting that the author expresses human rights concerns.
Excerpts:
While one may argue that any global diplomatic negotiations on a threat as massive as cybercrime are positive, the Russian resolution and their draft convention raise serious human rights concerns that require urgent attention. Perhaps most critically, the language in the resolution regarding what constitutes the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) for criminal purposes is extremely vague and the Russian draft convention is similarly as vague. Any discussion by a committee of experts on a new treaty based on vague guidelines of what is criminal behavior is likely to provide cover to authoritarian governments to persecute their political opponents.
Further, a new treaty may distract and stall progress on international cybercrime cooperation at a time when the threat is at an all-time high. The Budapest Convention has now been ratified or acceded to by sixty-four countries from different regions. While imperfect and in need of improvement, the Budapest Convention at least requires governments to demonstrate that they meet several standards in order to join. And, many of those that have not joined have still used it as the basis for their national cybercrime legislation. A new UN treaty may only confuse and hinder this progress. Additionally, little evidence was presented by Russia as to why an entirely new treaty is even needed.
So, what now? Before the intergovernmental committee of experts meets in August 2020 to discuss the proposed convention, like-minded governments that have historically been supportive of an open, free, and secure internet model should put the political will and resources into working with "swing states," or those that have not made up their minds about which model they will adopt, to advocate for and provide clearer narratives that support their open internet model. This would include clarifying misconceptions around it and adopting an evidence-based approach to how ICTs should be governed. Proponents of an open internet model can start by focusing on the following points:
A New UN Cybercrime Treaty? The Way Forward for Supporters of an Open, Free, and Secure Internet
Joyce Hakmeh is a senior research fellow with the International Security program at Chatham House and co-editor of the Journal of Cyber Policy.
Allison Peters is the Deputy Director of the National Security Program at Third Way.
Last month, governments gathered at the United Nations to vote on a Russian-led
resolution on cybercrime that could result in irreversible consequences for how countries deal with and cooperate in cybercrime investigations. While the resolution was strongly opposed by a number of major Western powers and human rights groups, it managed to pass in a final vote on December 27, 2019. With this passage, supporters of an open, free, and secure model of the internet-championed for years by the United States, Europe, and other like-minded states-should now change their global engagement strategy on cybercrime and develop more inclusive approaches and clearer narratives to bring more countries to their side.
When it comes to cybercrime, there have always been
wide divisions in views on how it should be addressed and investigated. These divisions have largely mirrored
fights on cyber norms in the United Nations that pit those who have historically supported an open, free, and secure internet against countries like Russia and China who advance a more authoritarian model with expanded state control. During last year's General Assembly, a cybercrime
resolution pushed by Russia to require the UN Secretary-General to collect countries' views about cybercrime passed and successfully placed discussions of a possible cybercrime treaty on the United Nations' agenda.
And indeed, on December 27, Russia moved the ball forward once again with its latest resolution to establish a committee of experts to consider a new UN cybercrime treaty. This resolution advances Russia's long-standing goal to replace the Council of Europe's
Budapest Convention, which is the only international instrument addressing this issue. Russia, which has proposed an alternative UN
draft convention of its own in the past, has consistently argued that the 2004 Budapest Convention is outdated, a regional treaty (although Russia is a Council of Europe member state and convention observer state), and violates principles of state sovereignty and non-interference. Russia's current resolution passed by a
final vote of 79 to 60 with 33 abstentions. The vote was largely along the same dividing lines highlighted above.
While one may argue that any global diplomatic negotiations on a threat as massive as cybercrime are positive, the Russian resolution and their draft convention raise serious
human rights concerns that require urgent attention. Perhaps most critically, the language in the resolution regarding what constitutes the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) for criminal purposes is extremely vague and the Russian draft convention is similarly as vague. Any discussion by a committee of experts on a new treaty based on vague guidelines of what is criminal behavior is likely to provide cover to authoritarian governments to persecute their political opponents.
Further, a new treaty may distract and stall progress on international cybercrime cooperation at a time when the threat is at an all-time high. The Budapest Convention has now been ratified or acceded to by sixty-four countries from different regions. While imperfect and in need of improvement, the Budapest Convention at least requires governments to demonstrate that they meet several standards in order to join. And, many of those that have not joined have still used it as the basis for their national cybercrime legislation. A new UN treaty may only confuse and hinder this progress. Additionally, little evidence was presented by Russia as to why an entirely new treaty is even needed.
So, what now? Before the intergovernmental committee of experts meets in August 2020 to discuss the proposed convention, like-minded governments that have historically been supportive of an open, free, and secure internet model should put the political will and resources into working with "swing states," or those that have not made up their minds about which model they will adopt, to advocate for and provide clearer narratives that support their open internet model. This would include clarifying misconceptions around it and adopting an evidence-based approach to how ICTs should be governed. Proponents of an open internet model can start by focusing on the following points:
First, issues involving ICTs are multi-faceted and the debates about them should be better linked. According to the
UN Secretary General, many decision-makers still lack the technical expertise to engage in these debates, and at the UN General Assembly, ICT issues are being negotiated in three different committees with discussions on cyber norm development and cybercrime occurring separately. For countries who are relatively new to this debate and may lack the needed expertise, this fragmentation can be confusing, even if the separation is justified, due to the nature of the issues or the preference of the United Nations for keeping the different debates separate. Addressing cybercrime is inherently tied to the debates on norms of state behavior in cyberspace-bringing cybercriminals to justice, regardless if they are state-backed, is an important component of enforcing norms. In order to reduce the negative impacts of this fragmentation, supporters of an open internet governance model should better link the various debates in their narratives and work to provide support, particularly through capacity building programming, to these swing states to help them form a more well-rounded understanding of these issues and make informed decisions during UN negotiations. The connection between all of these debates is often missing in the narratives pushed by global powers that support an open internet model, and this should change.
Second, countries would be wise not to just focus on giving the same arguments against a new UN convention and instead address the concerns raised regarding the Budapest Convention, as well as the incentives for joining it. The Budapest Convention is an operational treaty that continues to be reviewed and updated. It sets out common procedures for law enforcement cooperation in cybercrime cases and its members include some of the countries with the world's largest ICT service providers who hold critical electronic evidence. Importantly, the second additional protocol currently under negotiation by the convention could help make the sharing of certain cross-border electronic evidence in criminal investigations more efficient among its member countries (although there were
concerns expressed about it). Demonstrating the importance and benefits of the Budapest Convention and this possible protocol to swing states is critical in gaining their support for it. Despite its limitations, the Budapest Convention has been acting as a confidence-building mechanism for over a decade between the countries who have joined it. This, in an area like cybercrime, is very important.
The cybercrime threat continues to grow and
governments are largely failing to bring perpetrators to justice. More cooperation among states is needed. With the Russian resolution passing, supporters of an open, free, and secure internet should dedicate greater efforts to win over the undecided countries. Failing to do so is a win for cybercriminals and the governments that support them.
10. As Trump says injuries suffered by U.S. troops in Iranian attack are 'not very serious,' Pentagon offers few details
I hope someone informs the President on the importance of recognizing and treating potential traumatic brain injuries.
If the future of war will include these kinds of missile attacks with troops in rudimentary protective positions, we will be seeing more TBI injuries and how should we protect our personnel? This could be a very insidious
injury. After an attack If someone is killed we take care of the remains. If someone is visibly wounded we treat them. But if TBI does not manifest itself for days or weeks to come or goes unrecognized and undiagnosed will we have military personnel continue to operative with impaired cognitive abilities on a large scale? Sure we have had military personnel experience the intense shelling by artillery and aerial bombardment in past wars. But did we know and understand the effects when wounds were not visible? Were the former thousand yard stare and shell shock and battle fatigue psychological or was there a physical component (TBI) to them as well.
As Trump says injuries suffered by U.S. troops in Iranian attack are 'not very serious,' Pentagon offers few details
President Trump on Wednesday addressed injuries suffered by U.S. troops in Iran's recent ballistic missile attacks in Iraq, saying that he can report "it is not very serious" and that defense officials told him about them days after the fact.
"I heard that they had headaches and a couple of other things," the president said. "But I would say, and I can report, it is not very serious, not very serious."
The comments came after the
Pentagon acknowledged Tuesday evening that more U.S. service members have been removed from Iraq for treatment and testing after experiencing concussion-like symptoms caused by the Jan. 8 attack on al-Asad air base in Iraq in which 11 ballistic missiles caused massive explosions and deep craters and left charred wreckage.
Trump and defense officials initially said that no one was injured, but the Pentagon reported last week that 11 service members had been flown out of Iraq to receive follow-up treatment. Defense officials said Tuesday that even more had left, but they declined to say how many or to address questions about whether anyone has been sent back to the United States or been returned to duty.
Air Force Maj. Gen. Alex Grynkewich, a senior commander for the U.S. mission in Iraq and Syria, told reporters outside Washington on Wednesday that he thinks the number of service members who will need treatment is "in the teens." He said that they were "looked at for TBI," an acronym for traumatic brain injury that can range from a mild concussion to something more serious.
"I don't actually have an update on the severity of the injuries," Grynkewich said, citing his time traveling out of Iraq over the past week. He said that some of the service members had been taken to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany, "and we'll do whatever we need to to take care of those soldiers or airmen."
The general said later in the day at the Pentagon that he visited al-Asad and found that in one case, a service member was in a bunker tens of meters from where a missile hit. He said the missile knocked over a "T-wall," a hulking concrete barrier designed to protect service members from enemy fire.
"It knocks over the T-wall onto the bunker and there was someone in that bunker," he said. "I didn't measure it, but not that far away."
Trump, speaking in Davos, Switzerland, said that journalists would "have to ask the Department of Defense" about whether possible traumatic brain injuries were serious. Then he said that he did not think they were, "relative to other injuries that I've seen."
"I've seen what Iran has done with their roadside bombs to our troops," Trump continued. "I've seen people with no legs and with no arms. I've seen people that were horribly, horribly injured in that area, that war."
The Pentagon considers TBI to be a signature wound of the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria and acknowledges that some can be debilitating. More than 313,800 service members have suffered such injuries in combat or training,
according to a Defense Department fact sheet. Symptoms do not always manifest themselves immediately and can include blurry vision, slurred speech and headaches.
Grynkewich, when asked about Trump's comments about TBI and what message they send, said he had not heard them.
"I haven't seen his remarks, and even if I had, I wouldn't comment on them," he said.
He added that TBIs are difficult to assess and that there was "certainly no influence from anyone outside the military in how we can talk about that or should we talk about it."
The discussion has dogged senior U.S. officials after initial reports that no one was injured in the attack, launched in retaliation for the United States' killing of Iranian military commander Qasem Soleimani, who had been linked to the deaths of hundreds of U.S. troops over the past 20 years.
Trump tweeted "All is well!" the night of the Jan. 8 attack. He doubled down on that the following morning in remarks at the White House while flanked by the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
"No Americans were harmed in last night's attack by the Iranian regime," Trump
said. "We suffered no casualties. All of our soldiers are safe, and only minimal damage was sustained at our military bases."
Jonathan Hoffman, the chief Pentagon spokesman, said last week that Trump's comments at the time were based on initial reports the Pentagon had received. Initial reporting, he said, focused on whether anyone had lost their life, a limb or eyesight.
"They all walked onto the aircraft under their own power to assess whether they have a traumatic brain injury," Hoffman said.
U.S. military officials acknowledged the possibility of brain injuries within days of the attack, as a handful of reporters visited al-Asad on Jan. 13. A military official said at the time that "dozens" of service members were suffering from concussion-like symptoms.
Trump, asked whether he could explain the discrepancy between initial reporting and the latest injury updates, said he could not. That information was passed to defense officials in Washington on Jan. 15, after a second wave of service members left Iraq, Hoffman said last week.
The U.S. military's future in Iraq remains unclear after the suspension of most joint operations against the Islamic State in the aftermath of the strike on Soleimani.
Grynkewich said Wednesday that it is "difficult to say exactly what the right word is to describe" current interactions between the two militaries.
The United States would like to collaborate on operations in the future, but that will depend on discussions between U.S. and Iraqi officials, he said.
Asked what will happen if the Iraqi government asks the United States to leave, he answered cautiously.
"I actually don't want to get into that hypothetical," he said.
11. Challenging Snowden: Spycraft, Ethics, and Amendments
Conclusion:
Utilizing ethical problem-solving models such as the categories of moral analysis and Kem's ethical triangle, Edward Snowden believed he was making the morally correct choice to an ethical dilemma promulgated by unethical laws and corrupt political officials; however, his logic was flawed. The efforts of the men and women of the U.S. intelligence community only target America's adversaries for the sole purpose of protecting its citizens in keeping with the Constitution. In a day where IC whistleblower complaints dominate media headlines and congressional chambers on Capitol Hill, it is difficult to dispute the efficacy of the IC Whistleblower Protection Act. Snowden's reasoning should have led him to this conclusion. Ethics and legality do not always share parallel interests, but the laws of society should always clearly nest within an ethical paradigm that favors peace and prosperity for all.
Challenging Snowden: Spycraft, Ethics, and Amendments
Over the course of the last decade, there has been a growing sense of public dissent over the United States government's increased capability to remotely spy on citizens virtually anywhere in the world. The demur reached a fever pitch several years ago when defense industry whistleblowers Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden intentionally leaked classified information. Snowden's disclosures revealed details about American intelligence collection capabilities, targets, and special access programs of the National Security Agency (NSA). Faced with a monumental, but self-imposed, ethical dilemma, Snowden must have asked himself one pivotal question: Is it ethical for the country's intelligence agencies to exploit nearly every known wireless communication modality in favor of U.S. policies and interests even though it could potentially involve spying on countless American citizens in violation of the Fourth Amendment? Edward Snowden utilized principles of ethical decision making, but faulty logic resulted in a treasonous act with longstanding damage to U.S. intelligence operations and foreign diplomacy.
Impact on the Intelligence Community
In 2013, former Booz Allen intelligence contractor, Edward Snowden, intentionally leaked nearly two million classified documents to WikiLeaks and media outlets in a move that upended the intelligence community. The unauthorized disclosures unveiled clandestine NSA collection programs, including PRISM and XKeyscore, that enabled mass surveillance by the U.S. intelligence community (IC) against foreign intelligence targets. Both programs provided the IC with access to enormous swaths of content and metadata across multiple social media platforms and communication modalities. The sensors associated with these programs often engaged in passive collection, but the databases themselves permitted analysts to query seemingly infinite amounts of information for intelligence purposes while only being limited by existing laws and the user's imagination. Put in perspective, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court disclosed that NSA collected in excess of 250 million foreign and domestic internet communications annually through PRISM with approximately 91% of the data sourced directly from internet service providers (ISP) (Bellaby, 2018).
The unauthorized leaks of Snowden yielded four major setbacks. These consequences included the compromise and loss of clandestine U.S. collection capabilities; increased public distrust of the intelligence community; significant loss of business for major U.S. corporations and ISPs; and strong-arm tactics by U.S. allies for increased intelligence sharing. While the negative impact on businesses such as Microsoft and Facebook somewhat adversely affected the U.S. economy, the irreversible damage to the American military and intelligence community was immeasurable. The leaks also supplied details of U.S. intelligence capabilities directly to adversarial nations that provided asylum to Snowden-Russia and the People's Republic of China.
Balancing Ethics and the Constitution
When evaluating the ethical approaches that Snowden used to determine whether his unauthorized disclosures were justified, the consequences-based and virtues-based approaches are most applicable. According to Nolan (2017), there are "four categories of moral analysis: Moral Order and Common Good; Virtues and Rights; Redress and Subsidiarity; and Success and Proportionality" (p. 294). Within those categories, Nolan cites four measures that individuals must also weigh during the course of solving an ethical dilemma. The user must establish (a) the right intentions and (b) just cause to ensure that the ethical decision in question is (c) a last resort and (d) a proportional response to the problem (Nolan, 2017). These concepts of moral analysis parallel Dr. Jack Kem's ethical triangle decision-making model. Kem's model consists of three ethical approaches to problem solving (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Ethical Triangle Decision-making Model (Kem, 2018)
Principles-based Ethical Approach (Rules)
The principles-based approach aligns the potential solution to an ethical dilemma with an established set of rules such as existing laws. This approach does not favor Snowden's course of action because it would dictate that he adhere to the IC Whistleblower Protection Act and NSA's nondisclosure agreement. The U.S. intelligence community aligns its collection methods and surveillance practices with the Fourth Amendment and the defense of global American interests. In accordance with this approach, these rules are deemed just and beneficial to society, and a moral individual will follow them without exception (Kem, 2018).
Virtues-based Ethical Approach
The virtues-based approach completely contrasts the previous approach because it eschews established laws and rules in favor of focusing on what an individual believes to be righteous and virtuous. Firmly entrenched in a belief that senior officials within the IC and the Obama Administration were corrupt, Snowden (2014) postulated:
The breaking point was seeing the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, directly lie under oath to Congress. There's no saving an intelligence community that believes it can lie to the public and the legislators who need to be able to trust it and regulate its actions. . . . No one else was going to do this. The public had a right to know about these programs. The public had a right to know that which the government is doing in its name, and that which the government is doing against the public. (p. 3)
Put simply, Snowden believed the government grossly violated constitutional protections under the guise of public safety and national interest.
Consequences-based Ethical Approach (Outcomes)
This final ethical approach requires a would-be whistleblower to adopt a utilitarian view and determine whether "the ends justify the means" (Kem, 2018, p. 5). If so, a rogue action is ethical and justified. In this case, if Snowden believed that safeguarding the Constitution outweighed the deliberate compromise of U.S. collection capabilities and national defense strategy, then his actions were justified. What serves the greater good - exposing global-reaching, unethical practices or maintaining an unmatched, clandestine ability to spy on America's enemies? Snowden (2013) asserted his position by stating, "I do not want to live in a world where everything I do and say is recorded. That is not something I am willing to support or live under" (p. 1).
Lawful Solution to an Ethical Dilemma
The reality is that Snowden applied flawed logic in his subsequent decision to betray the intelligence community. First, he greatly underestimated the damage to the IC and undervalued thousands of counterinsurgency operations that were successful due to programs like PRISM and XKeyscore (Snowden, 2014). Snowden also failed to believe in the system. NSA emplaces unethical countermeasures like mandatory annual training for all agency employees. It also effectuates procedures for properly handling incidental collection of U.S. persons and entities. A major overarching safeguard against illegal and unethical collection practices is NSA's Office of General Counsel, which is "responsible for ensuring that the legal authorities that NSA has been asked to execute on behalf of the nation's security are properly and reliably discharged" (National Security Agency, n.d.).
Legal Precedent and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
Due to constant advancements in wireless communication technology, the legislative and judiciary branches of government introduce applicable laws and legal decisions at rapid pace. Two landmark court cases, United States v. Miller (1976) and Smith v. Maryland (1979), essentially make it permissible for wireless service companies to provide call logs and other data to law enforcement officials under the issuing of a subpoena or warrant. During the most recent applicable case, Carpenter v. United States (2018), the U.S. Supreme Court narrowly ruled, "The government's warrantless acquisition of . . . cell-site records violated Fourth Amendment[s] right against unreasonable searches and seizures" (para. 4). Still, these court rulings strictly apply to American citizens and do nothing to protect foreign targets and terrorists who are ultimately the sole focus of the U.S. intelligence community.
Section 702 of the FISA Amendment Act governs collection practices that target email and social media accounts as well as passive collection of metadata content. The key element of FISA is that its provisions restrict the intelligence community to target only known or suspected foreign intelligence threats. In the event that collection sensors accidentally intercept communications of a U.S. person or entity, an analyst immediately discontinues and destroys the incidental collection.
Reporting Ethics Violations
Snowden should have used formal whistleblower reporting procedures via the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IGIC) in accordance with the Whistleblower Protection Act. Correct mediums for expressing unethical intelligence practices include use of the IGIC hotline or submission of either a Disclosure of Urgent Concern Form or External Review Panel Request Form. According to former Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, "we will never ever be able to guarantee that there will not be an Edward Snowden or another Chelsea Manning because this is a large enterprise composed of human beings with all their idiosyncrasies" (Friedersdorf, 2014, p. 1). The best we can do as an intelligence community is ensure that insiders who feel the need to question or challenge the ethics and legality of their craft have a pragmatic avenue for voicing those concerns.
Conclusion
Utilizing ethical problem-solving models such as the categories of moral analysis and Kem's ethical triangle, Edward Snowden believed he was making the morally correct choice to an ethical dilemma promulgated by unethical laws and corrupt political officials; however, his logic was flawed. The efforts of the men and women of the U.S. intelligence community only target America's adversaries for the sole purpose of protecting its citizens in keeping with the Constitution. In a day where IC whistleblower complaints dominate media headlines and congressional chambers on Capitol Hill, it is difficult to dispute the efficacy of the IC Whistleblower Protection Act. Snowden's reasoning should have led him to this conclusion. Ethics and legality do not always share parallel interests, but the laws of society should always clearly nest within an ethical paradigm that favors peace and prosperity for all.
References
Bellaby, R. (2018). The ethics of whistleblowing: Creating a new limit on intelligence activity.
Journal of international political theory, 14(1). pp. 60-84.
Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. (2018). Retrieved from https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-402
Friedersdorf, C. (2014). What James Clapper doesn't understand about Edward Snowden. The
Atlantic. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/02/what-james-clapper-doesnt-understand-about-edward-snowden/284032/
Kem, J. D. (2018). Ethical decision making: Using the ethical triangle. Retrieved from http://www.cgscfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Kem-UseoftheEthicalTriangle.pdf
National Security Agency. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.nsa.gov/about/ogc
Nolan, C. (2017). The Edward Snowden and the morality of secrecy. The Catholic Social Science Review. 22. pp. 291-310.
Snowden, E. J. (2013, June 10). Interview by E. MacAskill. Edward Snowden files source, The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/nsa-whistleblower-edward-snowden-why
Snowden, E. J. (2014, January 26). Interview by H. Seifel. Edward Snowden speaks to German press, Government Accountability Project. Retrieved from https://www.whistleblower.org/press/gap-client-edward-snowden-speaks-german-press-12614-transcript/
Jason Payne is an enlisted military intelligence professional with 19 years in service and experience in joint, multi-national, and inter-agency operations. He is currently a student at the U.S. Army's Noncommissioned Officer Leadership Center of Excellence, Sergeants Major Course. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Criminal Justice from Troy University and is pursuing a Master of Science in International Relations.
12. Marine Raiders led counterattack against al-Shabab militants at Manda Bay, Kenya
The
Jan. 5 attack by al-Shabab on the base housing U.S. troops resulted in the death of
one U.S. service member and two Department of Defense contractors. The East African terrorist group, which is affiliated with al-Qaida, also destroyed a number of contractor-operated civilian aircraft before the Marines arrived.
Multiple sources within the Marine Raider community told Marine Corps Times that about a dozen Marines from 3rd Marine Raider Battalion, based out of Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, led Kenyan commandos against the Islamic militants.
The Marines engaged in an intense firefight with the al-Shabab militants, the sources said, ultimately pushing the Islamic fighters out of the military base.
An investigation is being conducted into the attack, per the request of AFRICOM commander U.S Army Gen. Stephen Townsend.
At least one Marine Raider was injured in the fighting, two sources familiar with the operation told Marine Corps Times.
Marine Corps Times was unable to confirm the severity of the injuries. U.S. Africa Command has not yet responded to requests for information about the presence of Marine special operations forces at the base.
Army Spc. Henry "Mitch" Mayfield Jr., 23, was identified as the soldier killed while supporting Operation Octave Shield, the name for the mission focused on targeting militant groups in Somalia, Army Times reported.
Dustin Harrison, 47, and Bruce Triplett, 64, pilots and contractors with L3 Technologies, were also killed, according to The
New York Times.
The Times first reported Wednesday that Marine Raiders participated in the counterattack.
The response by the Raiders was delayed, the Times reported, because the Marines were located at Camp Simba - roughly a mile from the airfield at Manda Bay where the attack took place.
Al-Shabab primarily operates inside of Somalia, but also has carried out attacks across East Africa.
Troops from U.S. Africa Command's East Africa Response Force were sent to Manda Bay in Kenya to reinforce the base and provide extra security, Military Times previously reported.
13. Army officer says she was raped, but Supreme Court ruling blocks her from justice
Another terrible, tragic story in our Army. This is so painful to read on multiple levels.
Army officer says she was raped, but Supreme Court ruling blocks her from justice
Capt. Erin Scanlon says she doesn't know where to begin.
Of the numerous setbacks she says she's faced in the last three years, it's hard for her to pinpoint where she feels it all went wrong.
Her ordeal, she says, started on the night of Sept. 10, 2016, when Scanlon, a former fire support officer in the Army's elite 82nd Airborne Division who left the military last month, claimed she was raped by another Army service member in Fayetteville, North Carolina. She was a first lieutenant at the time of the alleged assault and made captain in February 2019.
But from there her predicament only worsened: The military took over the case from civilian criminal court a week before trial was set to begin, and one of her former special victims counsels, her advocate in the military legal system, was ordered to testify against her about a witness Scanlon didn't disclose until late in the court martial process.
Scanlon says she then wasn't allowed to sit in on the trial or see any transcript and that, now, she has no legal recourse to file a suit against the Army primarily because of a
controversial 1950 Supreme Court ruling that prevents service members from suing the government.
The man she accused, who had been a sergeant first class in the elite and highly secretive Delta Force, denied the allegations and was eventually found not guilty under military court proceedings. ABC News is withholding his name because he was acquitted.
By the end of it all, she says she felt betrayed by the military, which has been trying to combat a surge in sexual assault complaints and create an environment that encourages service members to report assaults.
"In my opinion, I really didn't have a chance at justice from the beginning," Scanlon told ABC News in an interview. "I think they went through the motions of giving me a court martial, but they never planned to prosecute."
Scanlon filed a $10 million claim against the Army in April 2019 alleging "negligent investigation and handling of sexual assault case by Fort Bragg."
The military has since denied the claim, citing the Federal Torts Claims Act, a statute that allows private parties to sue the government or government employees but does not apply to members of the military because of the
controversial Feres doctrine, which stems from the 1950 case Feres v. United States. Scanlon and her lawyer opted to not file suit in federal court having concluded further litigation is futile.
Her current attorney, Natalie Khawam, has been working to limit how the Feres doctrine is applied. She took her fight to Congress last year with another client in hopes of making it easier for service members to file a claim against the military if they are victims of medical malpractice.
They won that fight in December 2019.
"Why is it that these men and women who served our country are not having the same rights, the same legal recourse, that everyone else enjoys?" Khawam told ABC News. "People have to be held accountable."
A spokesperson for U.S. Army Special Operations Command provided the following statement to ABC News on Scanlon's case: "U.S. Army Special Operations Command referred the criminal allegation to court-martial June 2018. The court-martial panel returned a finding of not guilty." The Army declined ABC News' public records request related to Scanlon's case.
The man Scanlon accused, who left Delta Force just weeks before the alleged attack, according to his enlistment record, was arrested on Sept. 30, 2016, by the Fayetteville Police Department after Scanlon filed a police report against him.
She told police that after meeting him on Sept. 9, 2016, at a bar in Fayetteville for a charity event, he invited her to an after-party at a nearby warehouse, according to pre-trial documents obtained by ABC News from Cumberland County, the original jurisdiction for the case.
As Scanlon was leaving a portable toilet outside, the only bathroom available, he allegedly confronted her. "He immediately started kissing me and I started saying, 'Stop. Don't. Go find someone else,'" Scanlon told ABC News.
Scanlon said she continued to try pushing him away and tell him no, but eventually "had just kind of given up."
The sergeant was eventually indicted by a grand jury in Cumberland County on charges of second-degree forcible rape, second-degree forcible sexual offense and misdemeanor sexual battery, according to his indictment, and pleaded not guilty to all charges.
The Fayetteville detective who handled Scanlon's case said that when he spoke with her friend, who was with her the night of the alleged assault, the friend "corroborated the victim's story and advised the victim told her, 'I feel like I was just raped,'" according to a search warrant application.
In the same application for a warrant, the detective said that he reviewed Scanlon's medical record from her sexual assault kit. Her injuries -- lacerations to her back, legs, and hands, a contusion to her lower back and a small vaginal tear -- "corroborated the victim's statement," the detective stated in the warrant.
The sergeant's attorney, who spoke to ABC News on the condition of anonymity, dismissed the allegations against his client, calling indictments "fairly routine." He said Scanlon was an "officer who got caught having sex in a compromising position with an NCO (non-commissioned officer)."
The lawyer also said that there were witnesses who said they saw the incident, with one testifying at the court martial that she saw Scanlon with her arms wrapped around the sergeant's neck and legs wrapped around his waist and that the incident appeared to be consensual.
Scanlon doesn't deny that a woman saw her and the sergeant during the incident, but she claimed she hadn't remembered it until months later.
When she later did tell one of her special victims counsels (SVC), who serve as attorneys meant to help sexual assault victims through the legal process in the military, she also said she felt ashamed that she hadn't reached out to the witness for help.
"I didn't know who she was and she was there and then gone so quickly," Scanlon said. "I thought people wouldn't believe I had been raped if I hadn't yelled out to her for help."
Deanne Gerdes, the executive director of Rape Crisis of Cumberland County, where Scanlon sought help, said it's common for sexual assault victims to suppress certain memories of an assault.
"In my world, that's very typical," Gerdes told ABC News. "It's trauma."
'My life was falling apart'
After waiting more than a year for the trial to begin, Scanlon suffered another setback.
Six days before the Feb. 26, 2018, trial, Cumberland County said the case was now being handled by the military and there would be no trial in civilian criminal court.
She remembers her "anxiety went through the roof."
"My life was falling apart," she said.
The sergeant's attorney said the case was not moved at the behest of the military, but rather because Cumberland County "didn't want the case."
However, court filings appear to tell a different story.
In the court record stating the reason for the dismissal and notice of reinstatement, a box reading "other" is checked and specifies "defendant is being prosecuted by the military for this offense."
A box reading "there is insufficient evidence to warrant prosecution" was not checked. It was also noted in the Army's records of the case that the trial was moved at the request of the military.
At the time, the Army claimed it had only just found out about the case, according to Scanlon and Gerdes, but Scanlon said she notified the Army's Criminal Investigation Command (CID) right after the alleged assault occurred. A case report also shows that the detective handling Scanlon's case had been in contact with agents from CID on four occasions in September 2016 -- about a year and a half before the Army claims to have found out.
Scanlon also claimed that when she reported the incident to the CID, she says officers at CID told her to speak to Fayetteville Police because the alleged assault happened there.
When the case was handed over, Scanlon faced another challenge. Her SVC had requested immunity because Scanlon previously had a relationship had with a non-commissioned officer in violation of military rules and she did not want that to be used against her. It took around three months for Scanlon to be granted immunity to testify and to be able to fully participate in the government's case, according to a record of the court martial.
In court papers from the military trial, the defense team said Scanlon's SVC did not respond to questions about the new witness and that Scanlon refused to be interviewed by the defense.
The Army documents reviewed by ABC News, which didn't include the court martial transcripts, were provided by Scanlon and Gerdes from a public records request filed by Scanlon.
653 days later, a trial finally happens
It had been 653 days since the alleged rape occurred and Scanlon finally had her day in court, on June 25, 2018, in Fort Bragg.
Yet that was all she was there for: a day. The trial ran through June 27.
As in most sexual assault cases, Scanlon was considered a witness. Yet unlike the other witnesses, Scanlon was never officially released by the court and therefore wasn't allowed into the trial proceedings. It's unclear why she wasn't released.
When she did take the stand, she says she found herself feeling like she was the one on trial.
"It was all about me," Scanlon said. "What did I do? How many people did I hook up with before?"
Scanlon said she suffered multiple breakdowns during her testimony and eventually kept her "eyes closed so I didn't have to look at the defense attorney."
Beyond her own testimony, Scanlon says she knows little about the trial and ABC News has been unable to obtain trial transcripts to shed light on what happened.
She says she does know that one of her SVCs was ordered by a judge to testify on behalf of the defense concerning the witness that Scanlon only disclosed around the time the court martial was set to begin, according to Scanlon and court records.
SVCs are part of "a legal support function for victims of sexual assault that provides legal advice and guidance, and maintains a victim's confidentiality," according to the
U.S. Department of Defense Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR).
The SAPR program was
established in 2004 after former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wanted the DoD to review its process for treatment and care of sexual assault victims. It now serves as the DoD's "single point of authority for sexual assault policy and provides oversight to ensure that each of the Service's programs complies with DoD policy," according to its website.
Though SVCs within SAPR have attorney-client privilege, court records show the judge found that Scanlon waived this privilege.
"Being ordered to do something in the military is much different [than in civilian life.] Whether [the SVC] wanted to or not ... it was someone who outranked her who ordered her" back to testify, Gerdes said. Scanlon's SVC who was called to testify did not respond to ABC News' request for comment.
Beyond this incident with one of her SVCs, Scanlon says she felt even more frustrated by the sheer number of counselors she went through ahead of the final trial: five, according to documents.
"They just turned over so fast," she said, citing deployment or a new position.
Gerdes remembers that Scanlon's rotation of SVCs coincided with what she saw as Scanlon's deteriorating mental health.
"She never really knew who she was seeing, which, in the mental health world, is the worst thing you can do," Gerdes said. "Every time she had to retell the story."
Gerdes said few showed up to any pre-trial hearings or court dates.
"I called Fort Bragg and I was like, 'Where are you guys? Why didn't you show up?' And I was told it was bad weather and they couldn't make it," Gerdes said.
When both the government and the sergeant's attorneys rested their case, Scanlon decided to write a victim impact statement in hopes that she could read it if the man she accused was convicted.
When she returned to the courtroom to hear that the sergeant had been found not guilty on all counts, she says she stared straight ahead with little emotion.
"I just walked out, knowing I did everything I could for myself," Scanlon said.
Scanlon has since tried to obtain a trial transcript, but says she was denied because he was acquitted.
"I don't understand why I still would not get those records. He was acquitted like there's your proof right there. ... But why can't I see the records?" she said.
In the statement filed her claim against the military, Scanlon wrote that "even though I was scared, I knew that when something like this happens to you, you are supposed to go to the police, and I couldn't understand why people wouldn't. I quickly realized though."
Sexual assault victims in the military can file a restricted report, which allows them to confidentially report an alleged assault to get treatment, but not trigger a full investigation.
About a quarter of service members who initially filed a restricted report changed it to unrestricted and chose to participate in the military justice process, according to the DOD.
Scanlon had filed an unrestricted report from the beginning.
In the statement with her claim, Scanlon wrote she was forced to "relive that night again and again," miss training, was not able to go to talk to a chaplain on the 24/7 victims hotline and "ended up in a courtroom with my rapist alone with no advocates" because they are "so busy with trainings and new cases."
"I realized these resources weren't serving their purpose. I was able to ask for help from other people," she wrote. "But another victim who may be very scared, will likely give up when the SARC [Sexual Assault Response Coordinator] or VA or chaplain let them down, allowing the perpetrator to get away with his crime.
"I've had all these difficulties as a LT who can tell my commander and soldiers when I need to leave work for an appointment. I can't even imagine how a young solider would feel having to try to explain this to his or her NCO."
Gerdes remembered that after the trial Scanlon wanted to know about the sergeant's whereabouts, out of fear she may run into him at Fort Bragg.
"Was he still in town? Could she go to the gym at post? Could she go to the hospital at post and not run into him?" Gerdes said. "No one ever gave her that information."
Looking ahead
The military has seen a stark increase in sexual assault cases since the year of Scanlon's alleged assault in 2016, according to a
report from the Department of Defense.
Around 20,500 active duty military members in the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines reported being sexually assaulted in the 2018 fiscal year, a 38% increase from the 14,900 in 2016, the report read. The majority of the time -- around 60% of cases -- the victims were women, according to the report.
While the 2018 report did not include the number of cases that went to trial, in 2017, around 400 cases did out of the 774 in which court-martial charges were preferred, according to the
DoD report.
Seventy percent of the cases resulted in a conviction of at least one charge, however the DOD noted the charge could have been sexual assault or any other misconduct charge. Most convicted service members received at least four kinds of punishment, according to the DOD, which were confinement, reduction in rank, fines or forfeitures and a discharge or dismissal from service.
In the military's efforts to combat sexual assault, the Catch a Serial Offender Program was launched in the 2019 fiscal year, according to the DOD. If investigators discover a match in other reported incidents, victims will be notified and given the opportunity to switch their reports from restricted to unrestricted in an effort to participate in the military justice process.
Dr. Nathan Galbreath, the acting director for the department's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office, said in a statement to ABC News that the DoD "remains absolutely committed to preventing sexual assault and encouraging greater reporting of the crime."
"Over the past decade, we've seen a significant decrease in how often the crime occurs and a four-fold increase in how often victims choose to report it," Galbreath said. "The Department encourages greater reporting to provide the highest-quality response to Service members and to hold offenders appropriately accountable."
The sergeant's attorney said his client is still serving in the Army, but said he did know his unit and believed he would not want to reveal it.
Scanlon has since left the military. Her last official day in the U.S. Army was Dec. 23, some four years after she began active duty.
"I kinda did not bounce back like I was hoping to after the trial," she said. "It was right around then I realized, I'm not doing this anymore. I need to get out."
Scanlon's attorney, Khawam, said that when she first heard Scanlon's case she immediately took it on because of her continued fight to limit Feres. One of her clients, Sgt. 1st Class Richard Stayskal, recently won his malpractice challenge of the doctrine.
New legislation, which was agreed upon by Congress and which made it into the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), will allow for members of the country's armed forces to file a claim against the U.S. and receive compensation if they were subjected to "negligent or wrongful" medical treatment at a military facility, according to a portion of the NDAA.
However, sexual assault is still not explicitly an exception to Feres, according to Khawam. The DOD said that Feres was not specifically cited to deny Scanlon's claim, but Dr. Dwight Stirling, the CEO at Center for Law and Military Policy and a leading scholar on the Feres doctrine, said that it is implied by citing the Federal Torts Claims Act.
Stirling told ABC News that while it's "unconscionable to tell a member of the service that if you're sexually assaulted you have no recourse to our court system," it is the reality members of the military face. Feres limits any sort of lawsuit against the U.S. by a member of the military who was hurt in some capacity while on active duty, he said.
While he does not know the exact number of cases in which the Feres doctrine stops a claim against the military in terms of a sexual assault case, he said he believes that most victims would want to have their day in civil court but are not able to do so.
He also noted that Feres creates a culture in which soldiers know they can't have a lawsuit brought against them, a notion that he said could contribute to sexual assaults in the military.
"I know that my colleagues are aware they can't be sued," Stirling, who also serves as a major and JAG officer, told ABC News. "It gives a person whose potentially gonna be a perpetrator a sense of being above the law, being able to function with impunity."
Despite efforts the military has taken to decrease sexual assaults, Stirling says little will change until people can be held accountable.
"The military has tried to solve this issue with all kinds of new programs and personnel and offices and SAPR and what not. None of it has worked," he said. "I contend that it will never work until you allow the person who is a survivor, the victim, their day in court."
Stirling, Khawam and Scanlon are all hopeful that change will come one day. Khawam plans to spend this year appealing to Congress to make exceptions to Feres for sexual assault victims.
In the meantime, Scanlon says she hopes that her story will give other women the strength to come forward and prompt change in how the military handles sexual assault cases.
"They're taking care to make sure that a service member doesn't get put away unless it's proven reasonable beyond a doubt, but what about me?" Scanlon said. "I [was] also in the Army."
Editor's note: ABC News had previously identified Erin Scanlon as a 1st Lt. She was a 1st. Lt at the time of the alleged assault, but made Captain in February 2019.
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:
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