Rolling application procedure for BRITE Lab small grants this year (RFP). If you are interested in BRITE Lab small grants, please contact Lab Director Justin Sydnor with a short description of the study. Justin encourages graduate students or those newer to behavioral/experimental research to reach out at early stages of their study planning and conceptualization.
Contact Felix to book time in the lab or indicate an intention to book. We currently have four studies scheduled to run in coming weeks. Remaining open dates: Oct 18 to Oct 31 and Dec 9 to Dec 20. Please check the calendar for full schedule.
Send interesting things to Justin and/or Felix. If you see any papers, conferences, graduate student workshops, resources, etc. that might be of interest to the broader BRITE Lab community, please send along the info to Justin and Felix.
BRITE Ideas
We will use this space each week in the news blast for Justin to share new ideas he thinks may be of interest for our behavioral & experimental community. If you ever have ideas for topics, please share your ideas with Justin.
This Week's BRITE Idea:
Note from Justin:
We are trying something new this semester with BRITE Ideas, where we hope to frequently feature short write-ups of research from our “BRITE community” of researchers. These might be studies conducted at the BRITE Lab or with BRITE funding, but need not always be. The following one is contributed by Paola Mallucci.
We ran a modified ultimatum game that varies the balance of power between players through a probability that creates a convex combination of the dictator and ultimatum game.
We found that the power change affect what is perceived as a fair outcome of bilateral bargaining and that subjects with more power demand more, as long as there is common knowledge about power distribution. This means that while people think they deserve more when they have more power, they do not ask for more unless the person they are bargaining with knows they have more power. In contrast, we find providing feedback on past bargaining results has no effect on bargaining outcome.
