Quotes of the Day:
“If there's one American belief I hold above all others, it's that those who would set themselves up in judgment on matters of what is "right" and what is "best" should be given no rest; that they should have to defend their behavior most stringently. ... As a nation, we've been through too many fights to preserve our rights of free thought to let them go just because some prude with a highlighter doesn't approve of them."
- Stephen King [Bangor Daily News, Guest Column of March 20, 1992]
“Orwell's vision of our terrible future was that world - the world in which books are banned or burned. Yet it is not the most terrifying world I can think of. I think instead of Huxley [...] I think of his Brave New World. His vision was the more terrible, especially now because it appears to be rapidly coming true, whereas the world of 1984 did not. What is Huxley's horrific vision? It is a world where there is no need for books to be banned, because no one can be bothered to read one.”
- Marcus Sedgwick, The Monsters We Deserve
“Whenever a soldier needed an escape, the antidote to anxiety, relief from boredom, a bit of laughter, inspiration, or hope, he cracked open a book and drank in the words that would transport him elsewhere.”
- Molly Guptill Manning
1. N. Korea calls for glorifying Kim's era as mass movement conference closes
2. Air Force deployed fighters after Russia, China enter Kadiz
3. End of Korean War Declaration: Why Just Words on Paper Won't Matter
4. How Useful Is North Korea’s Railroad Missile Launching System?
5. North Korea sentences two cadres to life sentences for smuggling rice from China
6. N. Korea yet to reopen land border with China: unification ministry
7. North Korea organizes inspection teams to ensure smooth distribution of money vouchers
8. Pursuing unification of two Koreas is already too late, says Lee
9. Inside South Korea’s real ‘Squid Game’ of debt, shame and social pressure
10. Assessing Contemporary Deterrence Parallel to Netflix’s Squid Game
11. Should US support ROK's nuclear armament?
12. Korea and Taiwan
1. N. Korea calls for glorifying Kim's era as mass movement conference closes
Of course the regime has always placed great emphasis on ideological purity and adherence to Juche and Kimilsungism and now Kimjongunism. But could this be an indicator that support for Kim is eroding and that the regime is worried about Korean people becoming "less indoctrinated" and therefore less controllable? Could a comprehensive information and influence activities campaign exploit this?
N. Korea calls for glorifying Kim's era as mass movement conference closes | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Nov. 22 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has called for praising the era of leader Kim Jong-un as a large-scale conference on carrying out a mass movement for the country's development wrapped up, its state media said Monday.
The 5th Conference of the Frontrunners in the Three Revolutions, which kicked off in Pyongyang on Thursday, closed with the adoption of an appeal that calls for the glorification of "the great era of Kim Jong-un," according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
The three-revolution movement is a mass movement devised under Kim Il-sung, the North's late founder and grandfather of the current leader Kim Jong-un, to continue "the revolution in the realms of ideology, technology and culture even after the establishment of the socialist system."
At the start of the conference, Kim sent a letter to the participants and called for strengthening the country's self-reliance.
"It is the feelings and aspiration of all the Korean people who live in the glorious era and the solemn call of the revolution to transform and change the whole society in line with the revolutionary idea and will of the respected Comrade Kim Jong-un," the KCNA said.
The conference took place as North Korea has been continuing to elevate Kim's political status ahead of the 10th anniversary of Kim's leadership. Kim rose to power in December 2011, following the sudden death of his father and former leader Kim Jong-il.
It marked the second of its kind held under the current leader after the fourth conference took place in November 2015. The previous sessions were held in 1986, 1995 and 2006.
scaaet@yna.co.kr
(END)
2. Air Force deployed fighters after Russia, China enter Kadiz
This is geopolitical-military competition (being played on a 3 dimensional chess board). This should not be minimized or discounted but seen as the attempt to cause friction in the ROK/Japan relationship. It would be good if this would backfire and instead of driving a wedge in the relationship it would bring the ROK and Japan together against common threats. But alas, I do not think that is like any time soon.
Monday
November 22, 2021
Air Force deployed fighters after Russia, China enter Kadiz
A Chinese Xian H-6 jet bomber is seen from the cockpit of a Russian Sukhoi fighter jet during the country's drills in December 2020, the previous instance of China and Russia entering the Korean air defense identification zone (Kadiz). [YONHAP]
The Air Force on Friday deployed fighter jets to the eastern waters off the Korean Peninsula after Russian and Chinese aircraft were detected in the Korea air defense identification zone (Kadiz) without prior notice, according to military authorities.
The incident came a day after naval movements by both countries in the waters between Korea and Japan, south of the Kadiz area where Friday's incident occurred.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it is looking into why two Chinese and seven Russian military planes entered Kadiz northeast of Dokdo, the country’s easternmost islets.
JCS did not specify how long the planes flew in the zone before leaving. However, JCS clarified that none of the intruding planes trespassed the country’s territorial airspace.
Generally, a country’s air defense identification zone may extend beyond its territorial airspace to give it ample time to identify incoming aircraft and formulate a response if necessary.
However, the concept is not defined in international law and remains unregulated by an international body.
After detecting the entry of the Chinese and Russian aircraft, the JCS scrambled to prepare F-15K and KF-16 fighter jets and KC-330 air refueling tankers for a possible emergency.
The JCS said that the Chinese military responded to its queries by saying that its planes were carrying out “routine drills” in the area.
"Our assessment is that the situation was joint Chinese and Russian military exercises, but additional evaluation is needed," the JCS said in a statement.
The Chinese and Russian jets’ entry into Kadiz followed joint naval drills by the two countries the day before, when three ships — a Russian Udaloy-class destroyer, a Chinese Luyang-III-class destroyer and Jiangkai-II-class frigate — passed through the Tsushima Strait between the peninsula and Japan headed in the direction of Taiwan between 5 p.m. and 7 p.m. on Thursday.
The Chinese naval vessels were the same that had passed the Tsushima Strait on their way north on Nov. 13.
The number of instances of Chinese and Russian military aircraft entering Kadiz have increased in recent years, in part due to the countries’ disagreement over the validity of the zone.
In contrast to a country’s airspace, which is internationally recognized barring overlapping territorial claims, countries unilaterally demand that foreign aircraft take steps to identify themselves in their self-designated air defense identification zones.
However, Moscow does not recognize Kadiz at all, while Beijing has said in the past the area does not constitute territorial airspace and that all countries should enjoy freedom of movement there.
In 2019, South Korean warplanes fired warning shots at Russian military aircraft when they entered South Korean airspace during a joint air patrol with China.
Seoul and Tokyo accused the two countries of violating their airspace, which Moscow and Beijing denied.
Russia and China last conducted joint air drills in Kadiz in December 2020.
The increasing frequency of movements by the militaries of China and Russia in the waters and air surrounding the Korean Peninsula are seen by some analysts as a sign that the two countries are coordinating their military readiness in Northeast Asia to counter the U.S. alliance with both Korea and Japan.
Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Women’s University, called the joint drills a “sign of Russo-Chinese alignment as U.S.-China relations continue to deteriorate.
“While large-scale joint exercises take great time and expense to organize, the two countries’ movements appear to be a regular occurrence,” Park observed.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
3. End of Korean War Declaration: Why Just Words on Paper Won't Matter
My thoughts on the end of war declaration.
End of Korean War Declaration: Why Just Words on Paper Won't Matter
Let me state up front that I want peace on the Korean peninsula, and I think all Koreans and Americans want peace. The question is, will an end of war declaration contribute to peace if there is no change to the conventional, nuclear, and missile forces in North Korea? How will the security of the ROK be maintained by an end of war declaration? Paper and rhetoric do not trump steel and the amount of North Korean People’s Army steel north of the DMZ is an existential threat to the South and will remain so with a symbolic and non-legally binding end of war declaration.
At the trilateral Deputy Ministerial meetings 16-17 November in Washington, Deputy Secretary of State Sherman said she is satisfied with the consultations on an end of war “statement.” South Korean officials continue to say that the two sides are in the final stages of negotiations and near an agreement.
The ROK and U.S. diplomats are working on a way forward that will support the policies of both countries. The U.S. does not oppose an end of war declaration per se. As the Moon administration emphasizes it is only symbolic and not legally binding so the question is how it will affect the alliance and security on the Korean peninsula?
The U.S. position is likely that if there is an end of war declaration it must be meaningful and it must contribute to the security of the ROK. The only way it can do so is if there are negotiations to reduce the conventional threat on the DMZ as well as with the ballistic missile and nuclear threats. We must never forget that North Korea has the 4th largest military in the world has 70% of its 1.2 million man army deployed between the DMZ and Pyongyang postured for offensive operations. Its purpose is to attack the South. The South Korean forces are postured for the defense. While North Korea accuses the alliance of having a hostile policy, it is the North that actually demonstrates its hostile policy and has done so for the past seven decades. Few in the political ranks or in the media focus on North Korea’s hostile policies.
In regard to the Deputy Secretary’s remarks, we should not read too much into the use of the word statement versus declaration. She stated she is pleased with the diplomatic coordination being done by both sides. The diplomats might reach an agreement that might be summarized this way: The ROK and U.S. support peace and believe that it would be useful to declare an end to the war. However, to do so requires negotiations on both sides that must include concrete assurances and actual concrete measures to ensure the security of the ROK. It is likely there will be a statement that in principle the alliance supports an end of war declaration but will not make a unilateral declaration before completing negotiations with the North. Most importantly, there will be no declaration without substantive action by the North to reduce its threat and end its hostile policy. As long as the north continues to demonstrate its hostile policy the war cannot be declared over.
Again, the U.S. likely is not going to reject the proposal outright. To do so would open the US to criticism that it does not want peace. The U.S. is sincere in the desire for peace, but it has a stronger desire to ensure that attacks are deterred and the security of the ROK is maintained. The U.S. is also concerned with the political warfare strategy of North Korea, China, and Russia. They have already laid the groundwork to blame the U.S. for not reaching an end of war declaration. The regime has stated that it will not support an end of war declaration unless sanctions are lifted. China and Russia have urged the UN Security Council to lift sanctions. A fundamental precept of the Biden administration policy is the full implementation of all relevant UN Security Council resolutions. This means that it does not support sanctions relief until the north complies with the requirements of the resolutions. However, when there is no end of war declaration North Korea, China, and Russia will use their propaganda and agitation departments to blame the U.S. as the obstacle to peace. They will exploit this to focus on another important objective: to drive a wedge in the ROK/U.S. alliance. Fortunately, ROK and U.S. diplomats understand this, and this likely is why there has not been a premature announcement and why the diplomats are working on a way forward that is acceptable to both nations.
The other issue with an end of war declaration is that it will be exploited by political opponents in South Korea and the U.S. who believe U.S. forces should be removed from the Korean peninsula. Kim Jong-un defines the ROK/U.S. Alliance “hostile policy” as the existence of the ROK/U.S. alliance, the presence of U.S. forces in Korea, and extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella over the ROK and Japan. An end of war declaration will breathe oxygen into the arguments of these groups and they could push for the removal of U.S. troops. Paradoxically, they will be providing direct support to Kim Jong-un’s objectives for removal of US troops so he can continue his strategy of subversion, coercion/extortion, blackmail diplomacy and ultimately the use of force to dominate the Korean peninsula under his rule.
In the end, I believe U.S. and ROK diplomats will propose negotiations with the north to work toward an end of war declaration. President Biden and President Moon will give Kim Jong-un an opportunity to negotiate and behave like a responsible member of the international community. This is really the key to any progress: will Kim ever become a responsible member of the international community? Unless he does there can be no progress. And we must not forget that paper and words do not trump steel.
David Maxwell, a 1945 Contributing Editor, is a retired US Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 20 years in Asia and specializes in North Korea and East Asia Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is the editor of Small Wars Journal and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
4. How Useful Is North Korea’s Railroad Missile Launching System?
And I would think our air power would have a field destroying the key nodes of the north Korean rail system and make it inoperable.
But this is just another indication of the regime's intent to build advanced warfare giant capabilities (advanced from the north Korean perspective)
Excerpts:
Returning to the railway missile delivery systems, then, it is obvious that North Korea is not currently in a position to adequately develop their railway lines to become fully operational as a defense system. Such missiles would be prone to massive delays or even failures in getting equipment to the proper location. The North Koreans could solve these problems by better developing their rail system, ensuring stability along the electrical grid, and concealing their missile launch trains from satellite or air reconnaissance using foliage or through night operations.
While this launch system is ingenious and shows real promise in working, certain problems that are endemic to North Korea as a whole will keep the dream of railway-launched missiles from reaching its full potential.
How Useful Is North Korea’s Railroad Missile Launching System?
The new “railway-borne missile regiment” is only as useful as North Korea’s railway system.
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In September of 2021, North Korea “successfully launched ballistic missiles from a train for the first time,” with the country’s official news agency stating “the missiles were launched during a drill of a ‘railway-borne missile regiment’ that transported the weapons system along rail tracks in the country’s mountainous central region and accurately struck a sea target 500 miles away.”
These ballistic missiles entered Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In a meeting of the United Nations Security Council after North Korea’s missile launch, the French ambassador to the U.N., Nicolas de Riviere, was quoted as saying the Council had agreed to condemn the test and perceived it as a “major threat,” as it was “a clear violation of the Council’s resolutions.”
Initial outside estimates by the North Korean analysis website 38 North, determined the missiles launched were KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). According to Vann Van Diepen, a career intelligence analyst and former assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation, “The 800-km range demonstrated in the latest launches is substantially greater than the 600-km range claimed by the North Koreans in March, much less than the 450 km demonstrated by the original KN-23.” Van Diepen further stated that this new method of missile delivery would “certainly diversify the force” as the rail-mobile delivery is more “survivable than fixed-based ones” in addition to the fact that this launch system would “bolster the size of the SRBM force.”
Joseph Bermudez, a renowned expert on North Korea’s military, more warily described the potential for this launch, writing, “it is unclear if what was demonstrated at the recent launch was an operational rail-mobile missile launch platform or a testbed/prototype… Despite North Korean statements, there are no practical means of assessing the size or viability of any North Korean rail-mobile missile force. Analysts and pundits need to be extremely careful in assigning capabilities to North Korea’s ballistic missile force that may not be there.” Bermudez stressed that North Korea could easily have manipulated or staged the event to give off the perception “of a strong and prosperous nation.”
Many other noted experts on Asian military strategy, ballistic missiles, and general warfare have commented on these developments as well. William Gallo, the Seoul bureau chief for Voice of America (VOA), noted that “A rail-based ballistic system reflects North Korea’s efforts to diversify its launch options, which now includes various vehicles and ground launch pads…” However, Gallo added that “some experts say North Korea’s simple rail networks running through its relatively small territory would be quickly destroyed by enemies during a crisis.”
If North Korea’s railway-launched missile system is based on completely stationary lines that can move only forward or backward at limited speeds, they could be targeted and destroyed rather easily.
As for the intent of this system, Fred Kaplan, a prolific writer on foreign policy and international relations, writes in Slate that this new system is not meant for a first-strike capability, but rather “to make it very hard for the United States to launch a nuclear strike on North Korea.” He expands upon this: “[North Korea is] making some of their missiles mobile – hence the launches from trains and submarines – so that the U.S. (or any enemy) would have a hard time finding, tracking, and hitting them… they’re trying to ensure that we can’t nuke them without worrying that they will nuke us back—in which case we probably won’t nuke them in the first place.”
It is very apparent from the above that the most significant development of the September test is not necessarily the missiles themselves, but rather North Korea’s usage of railway lines to conduct the launch.
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This form of missile delivery, transportation, and launching is rather ingenious and innovative. North Korea, as of 2018, has slightly over 5,000 kilometers of railway, most of this being on the global standard gauge rail. In total, North Korea’s railways are predominantly (around 80 percent) electric powered, having largely moved away from steam-powered engines (though a few remain active in an auxiliary capacity).
Young Pioneer Tours, a China based tourism company specializing in North Korea, has described North Korea’s railway system as “extremely well-connected” with “eleven lines that link the whole of the country together.”
However, North Korea’s rail system is neither completely foolproof nor incredibly effective. In fact, North Korea’s railway system is actually in immense disrepair and prone to numerous problems.
A significant amount of North Korea’s railway lines – roughly 97 percent – are single track only. According to NK News, “This means that the trains have to stop frequently, to give way to trains moving in the opposite direction,” which limits the speed at which trains can travel.
DailyNK, an online North Korea-focused newspaper, writes that “…the country’s electricity supply, aging infrastructure, and lack of technology means that trains running on the main Pyongyang-Sinuiju line can only run up to 60 km per hour.” In addition, the railway tracks are poorly constructed: “the widespread lack of fuel means that chemically-untreated wood is often used to build the tracks, with the track ballast being improperly placed at times. This can result in significant damage to the tracks during strong rains.” As mentioned also in NK News, it seems to be a real challenge for North Korea’s railways to maintain an effective electrical grid and keep enough supplies to benefit the rail system.
Returning to the railway missile delivery systems, then, it is obvious that North Korea is not currently in a position to adequately develop their railway lines to become fully operational as a defense system. Such missiles would be prone to massive delays or even failures in getting equipment to the proper location. The North Koreans could solve these problems by better developing their rail system, ensuring stability along the electrical grid, and concealing their missile launch trains from satellite or air reconnaissance using foliage or through night operations.
While this launch system is ingenious and shows real promise in working, certain problems that are endemic to North Korea as a whole will keep the dream of railway-launched missiles from reaching its full potential.
5. North Korea sentences two cadres to life sentences for smuggling rice from China
Interesting development.
The court said the government had declared an emergency quarantine law, closed the border to protect people from COVID-19, and was keeping a firm hand on the nation every day. Despite this, the cadres had displayed laziness “to the end,” with the court criticizing their “anti-party, anti-people behavior.”
Local residents say people believe the situation erupted because officials from several trading companies overlooked what the cadres were doing to get their share of the action, but the cadres were taking the entire rap.
North Korea sentences two cadres to life sentences for smuggling rice from China - Daily NK
The pair sent smuggled rice to state-run food shops without going through the mandatory quarantine and disinfecting period
North Korean authorities recently tried several cadres in Chongjin, North Hamgyong Province, who imported rice from China in violation of state quarantine policies.
A source in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on Thursday that officials from the provincial court and provincial and city branches of the Ministry of Social Security took part in a trial for “residents who committed anti-socialist and non-socialist acts” at the cultural center in Chongjin’s Sunam District on Nov. 10. He said two cadres were given life sentences for smuggling rice from China in defiance of the government’s emergency quarantine rules.
According to the source, the two cadres were turned over to the court for “violating the closed border” to engage in smuggling after receiving in June a special order from North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to supply food to the people.
They did this ostensibly to alleviate a shortage of food.
Onsong County, North Hamgyong Province. / Image: Daily NK
The pair reportedly sent the smuggled rice to state-run food shops without going through the mandatory quarantine and disinfecting period. They also secretly imported goods private smugglers had piled up in China prior to the border closure in 2020, ignoring the quarantine and disinfection process and pocketing the merchandise.
The court said the government had declared an emergency quarantine law, closed the border to protect people from COVID-19, and was keeping a firm hand on the nation every day. Despite this, the cadres had displayed laziness “to the end,” with the court criticizing their “anti-party, anti-people behavior.”
Local residents say people believe the situation erupted because officials from several trading companies overlooked what the cadres were doing to get their share of the action, but the cadres were taking the entire rap.
Meanwhile, the trial also passed judgment on locals who used foreign-made mobile phones or watched or distributed South Korean videos.
The source said the people caught with foreign mobile phones were sentenced to 11 years in prison for calling South Korea or China to receive money. Those who watched or distributed South Korean videos received a range of punishments, from just six months of forced labor to five years in prison.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
6. N. Korea yet to reopen land border with China: unification ministry
N. Korea yet to reopen land border with China: unification ministry | Yonhap News Agency
By Choi Soo-hyang
SEOUL, Nov. 22 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has yet to reopen its land border with China amid indications of brisk preparations to ease lockdown measures attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic, according to Seoul's unification ministry Monday.
South Korea has been closely monitoring signs of the North reopening its border, which has remained closed for nearly two years due to the virus crisis.
"Signs of preparations to resume trade have been continuously detected, but it's not at a stage to say trade has resumed or the North Korea-China border lockdown has been lifted," ministry spokesperson Lee Jong-joo told a regular press briefing.
Earlier this month, local media broadcast footage of a train crossing the bridge over the Amnok River connecting Sinuiju in North Korea to the Chinese port city of Dandong.
"We are monitoring the situation attentively, as the North's easing of border lockdown would result in better environment for cooperation between the two Koreas or with the international community," Lee said.
South Korea and the United States are coordinating humanitarian assistance to North Korea, though Pyongyang has remained unresponsive to Washington's dialogue overtures.
During Monday's briefing, Lee expressed disappointment over little progress in inter-Korean talks as Pyongyang stays silent on Seoul's proposal to set up a virtual conference system for dialogue.
"We find it regretful that the restoration of the communication channel has yet to result in setting up the infrastructure for dialogue, such as the video conferencing system as we proposed, or in substantive talks in different areas," she said.
scaaet@yna.co.kr
(END)
7. North Korea organizes inspection teams to ensure smooth distribution of money vouchers
The regime lost control of its currency because of the extensive use of RMB, dollars, and euros. Is this an attempt to try to regain control? Will it work?
North Korea organizes inspection teams to ensure smooth distribution of money vouchers - Daily NK
North Korean authorities have reportedly organized inspection teams to ensure the smooth distribution of money vouchers, or donpyo. Ostensibly, their job is to encourage locals to regard donpyo as ordinary currency, but punishments of money changers and merchants reluctant to accept vouchers will likely follow “to set an example.”
According to a source in Pyongyang on Thursday, the authorities organized a “unified command to normalize the distribution of donpyo” in the capital on Tuesday, with subordinate “groups” organized in each province. Each provincial group is reportedly composed of cadres from the Organization and Guidance Department of the provincial party, the currency section of the provincial people’s committee, and provincial branches of the Ministry of Social Security, Ministry of State Security and prosecutors’ office.
The source said the groups’ main duty is to encourage locals to regard donpyo as currency and promote their smooth distribution.
North Korean authorities organized inspection teams to normalize distribution of the donpyo because locals do not recognize the vouchers as ordinary currency, and because market merchants and service bodies are treating KPW 5,000 donpyo as if they were worth just KPW 2,500 or KPW 3,000.
Accordingly, the newly organized groups will reportedly go around places where donpyo are in distribution to check whether businesses are refusing the vouchers or treating them less than their face value.
A picture of the foreign currency vouchers currently in circulation in North Korea. / Image: Daily NK
There was a recent incident at a market in Pyongyang’s Sosong District in which a money changer refused a request by an employee of the financial section of a particular enterprise to change donpyo for foreign currency. Ultimately, the money changer exchanged the vouchers at a rate of KPW 2,500 for each KPW 5,000 voucher, but he was arrested by police after they were called to the scene.
The incident suggests that North Korean authorities are paying enterprises that need state funds in donpyo rather than cash, and that those enterprises are putting money together by changing the vouchers into foreign or local currency through money changers.
The source said that the financial sections of enterprises are also trying to get rid of their donpyo as quickly as they can by immediately exchanging them or depositing them in banks. This suggests just how little faith locals have in the vouchers.
Meanwhile, the groups will reportedly focus their efforts on improving the public image of the donpyo, even as they crack down on rumors about the vouchers and businesses that refuse to change or accept them.
The source said the authorities do not believe locals will voluntarily use the donpyo if they start by “strongly making examples” of people. He said the party ordered that educational efforts to teach the principles behind the donpyo should be prioritized over forcing people to use the vouchers.
To do this, it appears the groups will distribute “political education materials” about the donpyo and actively begin efforts to ideologically educate the public.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
8. Pursuing unification of two Koreas is already too late, says Lee
Perhaps candidate Lee thinks he can pander to the youth and those who fear the cost of unification. But unfortunately his views on unification makes South Korea vulnerable to north Korean subversion.
Pursuing unification of two Koreas is already too late, says Lee
Posted November. 22, 2021 07:20,
Updated November. 22, 2021 07:20
Pursuing unification of two Koreas is already too late, says Lee. November. 22, 2021 07:20. by Sung-Hwi Kang, Sung-Yeol Yoo yolo@donga.com,ryu@donga.com.
Ruling Democratic Party presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung heralded a major reshuffle of his election camp on Sunday, “I will continue to make Lee Jae-myung’s Democratic Party, rather than the Democratic Party’s Lee Jae-myung.” “Pursuing unification (of the two Koreas) is already too late,” Lee said the previous day. “I hope that we approach the issue practically rather than politically.” The candidate is making a string of remarks differentiating his stance from that of the incumbent Moon Jae-in administration.
“I will return to square one and will start from scratch. Restarting the election preparation committee, I will run speedily and nimbly towards what the public wants,” Lee said in a Facebook post on Sunday. “I think I must have been complacent with and stuck in the big vessel of the Democratic Party. Going forward, I will admit that wrong things are wrong and that deficient things are deficient, and will start from scratch in a truly humbly manner.”
Lee has taken a step further from his previous indirect criticisms of his election camp through his remarks “The camp is they Roman troops that have never participated in a battle,” and went so far as to express his commitment to comprehensively reshuffle the camp in person. When visiting Hwaji Market in Nonsan, North Chungcheong Province on Saturday, Lee reflected on past mistakes, saying, “Even Lee Jae-myung failed to live up to the public’s aspiration for change and reform.”
In the wake of Lee’s repeated criticisms, the Democratic Party assembled an emergency meeting of its lawmakers and discussed measures including providing Lee with full authority to reshuffle the election camp. The party’s leader Song Young-gil also wrote in his Facebook post, “Let’s empty everything, and start completely anew by following the lesson of ‘humble mind’ and ‘humble acts’ (as the late Chinese leader Mao Zedong ordered ranking officials and their children to work at farms and factories).”
Lee also said in an interview with a YouTube channel, “I will consider a plan to delegate candidate Lee the full authority for reform and reshuffle.”
9. Inside South Korea’s real ‘Squid Game’ of debt, shame and social pressure
But the big difference between north and South is that Squid Game could only be made in the South where freedom exists.
Inside South Korea’s real ‘Squid Game’ of debt, shame and social pressure
Angela, a 62-year-old owner of a Midtown nail salon, used to send some of her earnings back to some of her relatives in Seoul. She still sends money to her older sister — but stopped giving funds to her son and daughter, both in their early 30s, about three years ago.
She’s hesitant to give details — and even asks that an alias be used rather than the American name she’s known as in the salon — but told The Post she disapproved of the expensive handbags, makeup and clothes she found out her married daughter was buying. She was less forthcoming about her son but said he lived above his means in a way that was foreign to her. She said she doesn’t know if he has credit card debt.
“I’m scared to find out,” Angela said. “I don’t ask but I tell him ‘no more money.’”
Angela said she hasn’t seen “Squid Game,” the No. 1 show on Netflix and a cultural juggernaut that shines a hard, if metaphorical, light on South Korea’s high cost of living and the massive credit card debt and shame that goes along with it.
“I know what it’s about,” she said. “There may be some truth to it but it also makes us (South Koreans) look bad”
Unfortunately for Angela, the wildly popular and violent series about 456 desperate, debt-ridden South Koreans playing a series of children’s games to see who will survive and win a $38 million prize — and who will be shot in the head at point-blank range — is not going away. Earlier this month “Squid Game” creator Hwang Dong-hyuk confirmed he will make a second season.
The desperation of debt in Korea was drawn on by “Squid Game” creator Hwang Dong-hyuk (left).
Getty Images; Netflix
“Squid Game” didn’t come out of thin air. Analysts of both South and North Korea told The Post the series illustrates the flip side of the so-called “Miracle on the Han River” – the astonishing rise of the South Korean economy since the end of the Korean War.
In 1953, more than half the population of South Korea lived in abject poverty and more than half were illiterate. But by the end of 1996, the country had become the 29th member country of the OECD, which is made up of advanced countries.
But South Koreans, especially millennials and the even younger generation, paid a price for such rapid growth in such a short amount of time, experts say.
“South Koreans were so eager to have better times because we had to go through such hard times,” Jinah Kwon, a lecturer at the Graduate School of International Studies at Korea University told The Post. “That eagerness to have a better life led them to do everything they could. But all that compressed capitalism made everything a little crazy.”
Kwon said the education system in particular — especially since the 1970s — was very tough on Korea’s kids. Kwon routinely went to school at 8am, not returning home until 11pm.
But, despite all those years of study and hard work, South Koreans under 40 face daunting economic challenges.
Household debt in South Korea, where an average house can now cost upward of a million dollars, has skyrocketed in recent years and is now the highest in Asia. It’s now almost double the US average, according to statistics from Nodutdol, a New York-based Korean diaspora organization.
The average Seoul household is $44,000 in debt, according to a 2018 study from the Seoul Institute. Credit cards with enormous limits are easy to obtain — and the impulse to use them is made worse by the intense competitiveness of South Korean society, Kwon and others said.
So many people, many of them young, have committed suicide on Seoul’s Mapo Bridge in the past decade that city officials placed suicide prevention messages on the handrails, some reading, “You are a good person.”
“South Korea can be very unforgiving,” Greg Scarlatoiu, the executive director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea who lived in Seoul for 20 years with his South Korean wife, told The Post.
The idea for “Squid Game” didn’t come out of thin air. Household debt in South Korea, where an average house can now cost upward of a million dollars, has skyrocketed in recent years.
Netflix
“This is a country that’s undergone spectacular changes and growth in a relatively short time. A lot of people have been left behind. Many got into debt because of the incredible pressure to keep up, to be the best and purchase the best. They see no way out.”
“Shame is very big in Korean culture,” he added. “They call it choi moyon — saving face. In the US, failure is the mother of success. You can declare bankruptcy and no one thinks anything of it. Look at Trump. In South Korea it’s very hard to come back from failure.”
“Squid Game” creator Hwang’s inspiration for the series came from his own financial crises, the worst of which occurred after the global meltdown in 2008.
“I was very financially straitened because my mother retired from the company she was working for,” Hwang, who has refused interviews in recent weeks because he was so overwhelmed with requests, told The Guardian last month. “There was a film I was working on but we failed to get finance. So I couldn’t work for about a year. We had to take out loans — mother, myself and my grandmother.”
Hwang took refuge in Seoul’s comic book cafes, reading survival books like “Liar’s Game.”
“South Koreans were so eager to have better times because we had to go through such hard times,” says lecturer Jinah Kwon.
Dylan Goldby for NY Post
“I related to the people in them, who were desperate for money and success,” he said. “That was a low point in my life. If there was a survival game like these in reality, I wondered, would I join it to make money for my family?”
“Squid Game” came out of an amusement he played as a child that’s not unlike tag and involves tracing squid shapes on a field.
“I used to be good at fighting my way to the squid’s head,” Hwang said. “You had to fight to win.”
Though Hwang has seen much of the world, not just South Korea, locked in a type of Squid Game because of increasing economic inequality, he said the problem is particularly bad in his homeland.
Gordon Chang, author of “Losing South Korea,” said it’s no coincidence that “Squid Game” and another Hollywood juggernaut — the Oscar-winning film “Parasite” — show South Koreans in a poor light.
Seoul’s Mapo Bridge has became of a scene of suicides.
Getty Images
“The filmmakers are leftist and they’re from a generation in South Korea that hates America,” Chang said. “They’ve made South Korea look horrific — even though it’s really not that bad. They all think they’re involved in this existential struggle.”
Chang added that the leftist government of South Korean president Moon Jae-in is trying to “destroy democracy and restore unification with North Korea.”
And it all adds up to great propaganda for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, experts say.
“Kim’s got to be thrilled at how South Korea is being depicted to the world,” Michael Madden, a nonresident fellow at the Stinson Center and an expert on North Korea, told The Post. “He’s always railing about the influence of the West and the consumerism of South Korean and American society. He’s got to be loving ‘Squid Game.’”
Kim has been known to rail against what he calls the “decadent lifestyle” of the West. Though he and his family are known for their secret consumption of a wide variety of luxury products imported underground from overseas, Kim presents himself as a stern nationalist out to preserve traditional Korean values.
North Korean state media has called “Squid Game” an example of the “beastly” nature of a “South Korean capitalist society where mankind is annihilated by extreme competition,” depicting an “unequal society where the strong exploit the weak.”
“Kim’s got to be thrilled at how South Korea is being depicted to the world,” says Michael Madden on North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un (above).
Reuters
But Sean King, an Asia specialist at Park Strategies, said he disagrees that “Squid Game” is a takedown of South Korea and its people.
“What ‘Squid Game’ does is allow people in other countries to see South Koreans as people with the same problems they have,” King said. “They can relate to South Koreans more. It humanizes them even if they are being shown in a bad light. It makes them more like us, which long-term is not good for Kim.
“He doesn’t like people relating more to South Koreans.”
10. Assessing Contemporary Deterrence Parallel to Netflix’s Squid Game
I looked at Squid Game from an information and influence perspective not as a parallel for deterrence theory. This is interesting analysis.
Conclusion:
United States efforts to conduct thoughtful analysis and study the “game” within this era of strategic competition, will fail if it does not unpack the relationships and motivations of the players in order to effectively deter unwarranted outcomes on the homeland and abroad. While the conditions of strategic competition may appear intuitive, it is only by understanding the players, and their respective worldviews, that the rules can be effectively established and the turnabout path to maintaining a democratic, truly free, and just society preserved, as demonstrated in the Squid Game.
Assessing Contemporary Deterrence Parallel to Netflix’s Squid Game
Dr. Brooke Mitchell is a George Washington University Nuclear Security Working Group Fellow. She works on Capitol Hill for a member of the United States Congress and leads appropriation portfolios for defense, energy and water, and military construction and veteran’s affairs. Dr. Mitchell also serves as manager for the Congressional Nuclear Working Group. In addition, she is the Chief Academic Officer for the Small Business Consulting Corporation and principal investigator for Air Force Global Strike Command’s (AFGSC) National Nuclear Strategy and Global Security Workshop for Practitioners. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.
Title: Assessing Contemporary Deterrence Parallel to Netflix’s Squid Game
Date Originally Written: November 17, 2021.
Date Originally Published: November 22, 2021.
Author and / or Article Point of View: The United States Department of Defense (DoD) has placed an increased emphasis on the present era of strategic competition with Russia and China. The author uses the Netflix show Squid Game as a metaphor to draw attention to the value of understanding the players’ motivations as central to define the rules of the game in order to create clear focus around contemporary deterrence.
Summary: DoD’s view of deterrence is reminiscent of Netflix’s hit show, Squid Game[1]. Deterrence traditionally focuses on nation states implementing military actions which may deter adversary action[2]. Deterrence fails when the adversary proceeds anyway. Both deterrence and Squid Game involve players executing their free will to compete against the other players. Deterrence becomes complicated today as players and game rules remain undiscovered.
Text: It has historically been assumed that the strongest parties (i.e. individuals, groups, countries) have an advantage and can thus deter the weaker. Deterrence can be measured in terms of nuclear deterrence (including both weapons and weapons systems), along with conventional sources of warpower, and include additional forms of diplomatic, economic, or social variables that enhance one party’s ability to deny undesirable outcomes.
The question remains though: how, in an era of strategic competition, do traditional deterrence theories or concepts hold true when many leaders, military strategists, and subject matter experts view the United States as facing near-peer competition with both Russia and China? If deterrence is still simply the ability to strategically maneuver strength, or capabilities, to the other parties than by this token the United States won this competition long ago. Yet, despite the present conundrum Russia and now China continues to grow their nuclear arsenals; are far outpacing the United States on the research, development, and fielding of hypersonic technologies; and exceed the United States in the militarization of space and other non-terrestrial warfighting domains[3].
In Squid Game players execute their free will to compete against the other players[4]. The idea is that these individuals have nothing to lose but their life and are gambling to both preserve their life and receive tangible gain. This idea pushes the competition to the brink. The game only ends if the majority agrees to stop playing. The psychological tug-of-war between the barbaric nature of the rules and then sentimental connection to the “fairness” of such a competitive (and lawless society made out to be equitable for all) by Squid Game leaders such as the Front Man, further exacerbates the rapidly shifting conclusions of the viewers. By the characters later chasing the money trail to the evil people funding the game, then pursuing the very master mind both controlling and holding the purse strings the viewer is left questioning, “How could I not see that coming?” or “Why did I miss that?” Only when there is crystal clear clarity around the rules and players of Squid Game can action in pursuit of strategically deterring the extreme nature of the game be confronted.
The characters in Squid Game needing crystal clear clarity around the rules and players is very similar to the 21st century conditions surrounding deterrence. The United States and her allies are attempting to deter Russia and China in their respective activities that are nefarious to the well-being of the world. However, in this pursuit the convoluted, interwoven, sentiment to separate the motivations of how Russia and China are now playing the game from their priorities in how they are choosing to do so is vague and unclear. The money trail can certainly be traced and the United States’ ongoing efforts to modernize military capabilities and enhance its diplomacs capability with adversarial counterparts remains an option. Whether military and diplomatic modernization remain a viable, sustainable option against Russia and China in a contemporary context is a different question altogether. It is certainly feasible to continue building deterrence around existing frameworks but then again, if those frameworks were fool proof, then how on the United States watch did Russia and China gain both power and speed in their respective nuclear arsenals and in the contested domains of cyberspace and space?
United States efforts to conduct thoughtful analysis and study the “game” within this era of strategic competition, will fail if it does not unpack the relationships and motivations of the players in order to effectively deter unwarranted outcomes on the homeland and abroad. While the conditions of strategic competition may appear intuitive, it is only by understanding the players, and their respective worldviews, that the rules can be effectively established and the turnabout path to maintaining a democratic, truly free, and just society preserved, as demonstrated in the Squid Game.
Endnotes:
11. Should US support ROK's nuclear armament?
No.
Excerpts:
The longer the nuclear talks stagnate and the DPRK's nuclear capacity increases, the burden could increase. However, would reducing this burden by granting the ROK a "nuclear self-reliance" be a more optimal outcome? The admission of denuclearization failure, the heightening of uncertainties with China could pose a different and perhaps greater burden for the current U.S. administration.
The tight, bilateral alliances the U.S. has maintained with the ROK and Japan during the Cold War have sometimes been described as "pacts of restraint" by the U.S. over its allies. Despite the costs entailed from such security arrangements, U.S. policymakers viewed the benefits of safeguarding regional stability as outweighing the costs.
In the present regional security context (viewed by some as an early stage of a new Cold War), continuing denuclearization talks with North Korea and direct security reassurance to South Korea might be a less burdensome alternative; so that the U.S. can avoid "even more unpalatable costs" in the Asia-Pacific.
Should US support ROK's nuclear armament?
By Lee Jong-eun
As nuclear talks with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continue to face diplomatic gridlock, public sentiment in the Republic of Korea (ROK) has shifted in favor of either a redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons or the ROK's independent nuclear armament. Several stalwart politicians from the opposition People Power Party have also expressed at least conditional support for the redeployment of U.S. tactical nukes in South Korea.
Until now, U.S. policy circles have generally been opposed or skeptical toward deploying nuclear assets in South Korea or supporting its nuclear armament. But could this stance change? Recently, the Washington Post published an op-ed describing nuclear armament as a "highly unpalatable but increasingly likely solution" for South Korea's security.
As North Korea continues to advance its nuclear armament and is likely to develop a capacity to target U.S. territory in the near future, the op-ed predicts the U.S.-ROK alliance is facing the similar assurance dilemma the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) faced during the Cold War: "Would Americans sacrifice Boston to protect Bonn?"
The U.S. could address the ROK's security dilemma through one of three solutions tried in Europe: expansion of its conventional military presence, deployment of tactical nuclear weapons under a nuclear co-sharing framework, or to permit its ally's nuclear armament.
Of these three options, the U.S. is currently more likely to decrease its conventional military presence in ROK. The NATO-like "nuclear-sharing" framework is also problematic. First, as the U.S. president will ultimately decide on the use of tactical nukes, it is uncertain whether the security dilemma, "Sacrifice Seattle to protect Seoul," would be remedied, even if tactical nukes are to be redeployed.
Second, the current Biden administration's policy is to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy, creating a reluctance to establish a new nuclear-sharing agreement with its allies.
For these reasons, the op-ed recommended for the U.S. to support its ally if the ROK decides to develop nuclear weapons. A nuclear-armed ROK would then be more assured of its security, not only from the DPRK but also from China. But for the United States, would a nuclear-armed ally in the Far East be the least burdensome outcome for U.S. regional security interests?
First, allowing the ROK to develop nuclear weapons could lessen the burden of the U.S. direct security commitment to its ally. Washington might also persuade a more security-confident Seoul to restructure its military structure into more mobile forces, which could more readily participate in US-led global security operations. Second, the ROK's nuclear armament would likely not improve but also not seriously deteriorate the current security situation in the Korean Peninsula.
While during the Cold War, the U.S. was concerned by the militant characteristics of the ROK's past regimes, the ROK now has embedded liberal political institutions that should reassure the U.S. that its ally would not abuse its nuclear arms for geopolitical ambitions.
However, the ROK's nuclear armament will be viewed as a failure of 30 years of diplomatic efforts to denuclearize North Korea. If the prospects of denuclearization were already difficult, the ROK's nuclear armament could fatally doom the chances of the DPRK relinquishing its nuclear arms, creating a security stand-off similar to that of nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. Future U.S. negotiations with North Korea would then be with a de-facto nuclear state.
Another consequence would be the risk of "over-escalation" of security tensions in the Asia-Pacific region. While implementing measures that implicitly deter China's rise, the Biden Administration has also shown restraint in mitigating bilateral tensions. However, the ROK's nuclear armament will cause a shift in the regional status quo that could escalate uncertainties outside the Korean Peninsula.
Would Japan then be justified in developing its nuclear arms to deter threats from North Korea? What about Taiwan? Like South Korea, Taiwan also attempted to develop nuclear weapons in the 1970s. Taiwan currently still has operational nuclear power plants that could produce weapons-grade plutonium.
Even if the U.S. defends the ROK's nuclear armament as an exception, China would perceive the nuclear-armed ROK as a signal that similar armament for Japan and Taiwan could become real possibilities. Such a signal would be perceived as more hostile and provocative than other U.S.-led restraint measures (Such as Quad, AUKUS) toward China.
The alternative, then, for the U.S. is to continue its security reassurance measures for ROK, while nuclear talks with North Korea also continue. Such measures (whether the deployment of tactical nuclear assets or other types of military integration) pose a security burden to the United States.
The longer the nuclear talks stagnate and the DPRK's nuclear capacity increases, the burden could increase. However, would reducing this burden by granting the ROK a "nuclear self-reliance" be a more optimal outcome? The admission of denuclearization failure, the heightening of uncertainties with China could pose a different and perhaps greater burden for the current U.S. administration.
The tight, bilateral alliances the U.S. has maintained with the ROK and Japan during the Cold War have sometimes been described as "pacts of restraint" by the U.S. over its allies. Despite the costs entailed from such security arrangements, U.S. policymakers viewed the benefits of safeguarding regional stability as outweighing the costs.
In the present regional security context (viewed by some as an early stage of a new Cold War), continuing denuclearization talks with North Korea and direct security reassurance to South Korea might be a less burdensome alternative; so that the U.S. can avoid "even more unpalatable costs" in the Asia-Pacific.
Lee Jong-eun (jl4375a@student.american.edu) is a Ph.D. candidate and is also an adjunct faculty at the American University School of International Service. Prior to this, he has served as a South Korean Airforce intelligence officer. His research specialty includes U.S. foreign policy, South Korean politics and foreign policy, alliance management, East Asian regional security.
12. Korea and Taiwan
But....what if.... (what if nK takes advantage of friction between the PRC and ROC?)
Excerpts:
But there are vast differences between the two nations' geopolitical situations. North Korea is an existential threat to Korea, but no one believes that in a hot war, the malnourished and poorly equipped North would win in such a conflict, especially with the guarantee of an American military intervention.
Taiwan has no such assurances. Now I do believe that America would intervene if China's President Xi (unprecedentedly soon to take a third term in office) would make good on his threats to take Taiwan by military force. Australia, Japan and possibly other countries would also intervene. But unlike in Korea, these are implied interventions. Besides giving arms aid to Taiwan, the United States has no statutory obligation to engage physically in an actual war with China to protect Taiwan in a hypothetical conflict, and this ambiguity is by diplomatic design.
Most countries placate China's unfounded claims of sovereignty over Taiwan by allowing Taiwan to only have economic and cultural offices in their territories.
They are actually de facto diplomatic embassies. It's a farce that's probably gone on too long, but Europe and most nations fear angering China if they officially recognize Taiwan as a sovereign country, when that's what it has been for decades. The Chinese Communist Party has never ruled Taiwan.
Korea and Taiwan
By Deauwand Myers
Korea and Taiwan share a lot of similarities. Both countries experienced dictatorial regimes for decades. Both countries were brutally occupied by foreign powers, specifically but not exclusively, Imperial Japan. Both countries are beset by dangerous and intractable enemies. Korea has to contend with North Korea, and Taiwan has to combat an increasingly aggressive China. They both experienced hardships, yet turned their countries into advanced, democratic, economic powerhouses, with advanced technology ― especially electronics and computer chips. Taiwan is the leader in advanced computer chip technology worldwide, while Korea is not far behind, with Samsung and LG.
The similarities don't end there. The national cuisines aren't all that dissimilar between the two nations, and both countries have thriving music and film industries, although in popularity, Korea wins that race.
But there are vast differences between the two nations' geopolitical situations. North Korea is an existential threat to Korea, but no one believes that in a hot war, the malnourished and poorly equipped North would win in such a conflict, especially with the guarantee of an American military intervention.
Taiwan has no such assurances. Now I do believe that America would intervene if China's President Xi (unprecedentedly soon to take a third term in office) would make good on his threats to take Taiwan by military force. Australia, Japan and possibly other countries would also intervene. But unlike in Korea, these are implied interventions. Besides giving arms aid to Taiwan, the United States has no statutory obligation to engage physically in an actual war with China to protect Taiwan in a hypothetical conflict, and this ambiguity is by diplomatic design.
Most countries placate China's unfounded claims of sovereignty over Taiwan by allowing Taiwan to only have economic and cultural offices in their territories.
They are actually de facto diplomatic embassies. It's a farce that's probably gone on too long, but Europe and most nations fear angering China if they officially recognize Taiwan as a sovereign country, when that's what it has been for decades. The Chinese Communist Party has never ruled Taiwan.
There are ways to help this situation, but none of them are foolproof. President Biden, and other leaders of advanced democracies, could amp up military sales and technical assistance to Taiwan. They could also officially recognize Taiwan as an independent country. Finally, the United States could have a permanent military presence on the island.
However, particularly on that last point, it is likely that if America installed a naval base in Taiwan, China, for nationalistic and political reasons, would declare war on Taiwan and the United States.
China's President Xi is ruthless, highly intelligent and ambitious. In just a few years he has consolidated all political power unto himself. He is the head of all important government agencies, the Chinese Communist Party and the military. He has built a cult of personality around himself, and he has brutally crushed all those who oppose him through imprisonment or worse. But scarier, his belief that the dominant Han Chinese are superior, and that all minority languages, cultures and religions should be erased or comport with Han sensibilities is beyond simple authoritarianism. It borders dangerously close on true fascism.
But would President Xi risk a humiliating defeat in a conflict over Taiwan and the possible loss of millions of lives over a country of 23 million people who pose no threat to his regime over his outsized ego? I hope not, but history tells me, yes. We, as an international community, cannot allow despots like Russia's Putin and President Xi to think they can bully and brutalize other nations with impunity.
Surely, China would raise serious objections if Korea increased its diplomatic and economic ties with Taiwan, but such a gesture of solidarity between democratic countries facing dangerous enemies would be a positive sign of mutual understanding.
President Xi believes that with his lightning-speed modernization of China's military, his brutal consolidation of power and the vast sizes of China's economy and population, advanced democracies will simply acquiesce to his whims and wishes.
So far, he has been mostly right. China has illegally built man-made islands far beyond is shores. It is committing cultural genocide, trying to wipe out all of the Islamic faith in vast concentration camps where torture and sexual assault are the norm. Besides words, the international community has done little ― even with proper economic sanctions ― to condemn China's human rights abuses.
If we don't confront China on Taiwan, not only do we risk a brutal crackdown on democracy in Taiwan as we saw in Hong Kong, but we risk setting a precedent that China can commit any immoral act, as long as the economy benefits. That's a weak, and morally bereft, position. Taiwan's President herself in a recent CNN interview acknowledged that China is becoming more aggressive in its military flight incursions near Taiwan. Words are not enough in this situation.
Deauwand Myers (deauwand@hotmail.com) holds a master's degree in English literature and literary theory, and is an English professor outside of Seoul.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
