Quotes of the Day:
"Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. In fact, it's the only thing that ever has."
- Margaret Mead
“When the hour of crisis comes, remember that 40 selected men can shake the world”
- Yasotay (Mongol Warlord)
"There are always thugs, villians, rogues, and fools out there, as well as some in here, who mean us harm."
-Colin Gray
1. USFK chief stands firm on alliance on visit to JSA
2. Seoul urges Pyongyang to accept proposed visit by pope
3. N.Korea 'Preparing for Another Submarine-Launched Missile Test'
4. How China-US Competition Factors Into Moon’s Final Inter-Korea Push
5. Nuke envoys of S. Korea, China discuss end-of-war declaration for NK dialogue
6. Talk of possible shift in U.S. nuke policy rekindles questions over America's security assurances for allies
7. S. Korea to develop homegrown lightweight torpedoes by 2028
8. Unification ministry to discuss resuming Panmunjom tours with UNC
9. S. Korea, U.S. kick off joint air exercise
10. Japan's LDP win may throw a wrench in Seoul-Tokyo relations
11. Foreign minister pushes for end of war in talks with U.S. envoy
12. Explosion at Chongjin chemical and textile plant leaves several workers injured
13. Obsession with NK - Pyongyang said to have offered absurd preconditions for talks
14. Time to ease sanctions (north Korea)
1. USFK chief stands firm on alliance on visit to JSA
The best place for the commander to demonstrate strategic reassurance and strategic resolve. I just wish they would use his appropriate title, the Commander of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command, since that is the command that is charged by both nations for deterrence and defense of the ROK.
Monday
November 1, 2021
USFK chief stands firm on alliance on visit to JSA
Paul LaCamera
United States Forces Korea (USFK) commander Paul LaCamera visited the Panmunjom Joint Security Area (JSA) on Friday and promised that the United States would defend South Korea in the event of war, according to military sources on Sunday.
Describing the JSA as a “frontline of freedom,” LaCamera pledged that the United States would defend South Korea on a Friday visit to the area with its iconic blue houses that straddle the border between the two Koreas.
The USFK commander’s announcement at the Panmunjom JSA, a highly symbolic location within the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) where security guards from both North and South Korea tensely face each other, came as a South Korean parliamentary audit of the state intelligence agency revealed the North demanded the end of joint allied military drills as one of the pre-conditions for talks to formally end the 1950-53 Korean War.
The JSA is where the 1953 armistice suspending hostilities between the two Koreas and their allies was signed, although a peace treaty was never concluded.
The Unification Ministry said separately on Monday that it will begin discussions with the U.S.-led United Nations Command to resume tours to Panmunjom as South Korea began easing Covid-19-related restrictions.
Tours to the Panmujom JSA were suspended in July after health authorities imposed strict anti-disease regulations in the greater Seoul area.
In line with the loosening Covid-19 restrictions and the high vaccination rate among soldiers, which currently stands at 94 percent, the Defense Ministry also said Monday that it would lift social distancing restrictions for military personnel, allowing them to go off base on weekdays.
The ministry said it would authorize visits to soldiers from unvaccinated members of the public, so long as the visitors tested negative on a Covid-19 test within 48 hours of their scheduled visit.
Although the defense ministry initially allowed off-duty soldiers to leave their bases on all weekdays starting in February 2019 – a change from the previous policy, which allowed them to leave base only twice a month – that policy was suspended after the Covid-19 pandemic gripped Korea.
However, the defense ministry said it would continue to restrict soldiers’ outings on weekends and overnights off-base.
The military will also maintain its current policy of allowing a maximum of 20 percent of a base’s manpower to go on leave at any point in time. Soldiers returning from leave must submit to two PCR tests, and those who are unvaccinated must also undergo a 14-day period of isolation.
Newly conscripted soldiers entering training for the first time will continue to be tested for Covid-19 on their first and eighth day of enlistment, with additional tests conducted depending on their base situation.
Those entering military service without being vaccinated will be administered a vaccine at a military hospital.
The Defense Ministry is also in consultations with health authorities to obtain booster shots, beginning with 3,000 medical staff at military hospitals this month. The military plans to give additional vaccinations to all soldiers who want it from January to February next year.
BY MICHAEL LEE, PARK YONG-HAN [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
2. Seoul urges Pyongyang to accept proposed visit by pope
Will the regime offer an invitation?
The pope said he was willing to go to the North if he received an invitation, according to the Cheong Wa Dae.
Seoul urges Pyongyang to accept proposed visit by pope | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Nov. 1 (Yonhap) -- The South Korean government on Monday urged North Korea to respond positively to a suggestion that the pope visit there, expressing hope for progress in efforts to promote regional peace.
The unification ministry's statement came after Pope Francis reaffirmed his willingness to visit the North during his meeting with President Moon Jae-in at the Vatican last week.
Moon and the pope met Friday on the sidelines of the Group of 20 summit in Rome, during which Moon said a papal visit to North Korea would foster peace on the Korean Peninsula. The pope said he was willing to go to the North if he received an invitation, according to the Cheong Wa Dae.
"As the pope's willingness to visit North Korea has been reaffirmed, we hope the North would respond and pave the way for fostering peace on the Korean Peninsula," ministry spokesperson Lee Jong-joo told a regular press briefing.
Moon and Pope Francis last met in 2018 when the president made a state visit to Italy.
At the time, Moon delivered a verbal invitation to the pope from North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, but a papal visit failed to materialize amid a deadlock in nuclear talks between Washington and Pyongyang.
scaaet@yna.co.kr
(END)
3. N.Korea 'Preparing for Another Submarine-Launched Missile Test'
N.Korea 'Preparing for Another Submarine-Launched Missile Test'
November 01, 2021 13:05
North Korea appears to be preparing for another test-launch of a submarine-launched ballistic missile at the Sinpo shipyard in South Hamgyong Province, according to website 38 North of Johns Hopkins University last Friday.
The website said satellite imagery indicates "continued activity around North Korea's Sinpo-class experimental ballistic missile submarine consistent with preparations for additional testing of submarine-launched ballistic missiles."
The sub is the same 8.24 Yongung from which a new SLBM was launched on Oct. 19.
This satellite image from Oct. 28 from the website 38 North shows the Sinpo shipyard in North Korea’s South Hamgyong Province, where preparations for a test-launch of a submarine-launched ballistic missile are underway.
The website pointed out a mobile crane positioned next to the submersible test barge that is used to load missile canisters into both the sub and the barge. The crane was also observed alongside the sub on Oct. 20, a day after the last SLBM test.
"Additionally, the rotatable ring mount's cover at the center of the submersible barge has been removed, possibly in order to insert a missile canister into the ring mount," the website speculated.
According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff here, the new SLBM that was fired into the East Sea on Oct. 19 flew about 590 km and reached a 60 km altitude. North Korean state media confirmed the test-launch. This missile is similar to a mini SLBM unveiled by the North during an armaments expo on Oct. 11 to mark the party founding anniversary.
- Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com
4. How China-US Competition Factors Into Moon’s Final Inter-Korea Push
Yes the symbolic and non-legally binding end of war declaration could have many ramifications and unintended consequences.
Excerpts:
Meanwhile, China continues to demonstrate its support for North Korea by providing it with modern advanced conventional weapons and systems. South Korean analysts noted the similarity of North Korea’s Hwasong-8 missile to China’s DF-17. Moon’s shift toward the United States could be seen as a warning to China to refrain from further military technological assistance to North Korea.
The South Korean government has been approached quietly by the United States to encourage Korean shipbuilding companies to become involved in Taiwan’s indigenous submarine project. Indeed, there have been recent rumors that Taiwan would like some South Korean companies to share advanced technologies provided by the United States, for example hypersonic missiles and SLBMs. If China wishes to forestall this possibility, then they would be well advised to join the four-party talks proposed by Moon.
China should also be more cautious in the South and the East China Seas, as its actions there are troubling to Seoul. Fearing that China may extend its gray zone strategy to the Yellow Sea and Ieodo (aka Socotra Rock), some South Korea analysts have argued for the ROK Navy to join the U.S.-led freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea and also to transit through the Taiwan Strait, like Canada and the U.K. China would surely wish to avoid such developments.
In conclusion, there are many uncertainties affecting the situation on the Korean Peninsula, but it seems certain that changes are in the wind, caused by a confluence of factors: Moon’s attempts to secure his legacy, North Korean domestic turbulence, and U.S. pressure on Moon’s policy positions. Doubtless more will become clear following the 53rd SCM in Seoul in early December.
How China-US Competition Factors Into Moon’s Final Inter-Korea Push
Major interconnected shifts are underway on the Korean Peninsula, from a looming end-of-war declaration to South Korea’s involvement in the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy.
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Recently there have been several indications of movement in the political and military situation of the Korean Peninsula: President Moon Jae-in’s last-ditch attempt to foster his Korea Peace Initiative (KPI), announced in 2017; U.S. pressure on Moon’s administration to become more deeply and reliably involved with the U.S.-led efforts to counterbalance China’s military expansionism in Indo-Pacific region; North Korean criticism of the U.S. for double standards with respect to North Korea and Taiwan; a change in North Korean policy toward the U.S. and South Korea, no longer characterizing them as enemies, despite the continuing state of war; ongoing South Korean endeavors to act as a bridge between North Korea and the U.S., with Moon trying to ensure Washington will be sympathetic to his chosen successor at a time of profound political and social change in South Korea; and the extraordinary tit-for-tat competition between the two Koreas in developing and testing ballistic missiles.
Moon has launched several policy initiatives during his presidency. Besides the KPI, which is intended to bring an end to seven decades of “endless war,” there is also his New Northern Policy and his New Southern Policy (NSP). To some extent these policies are interwoven with one another, and they also affect the feasibility of South Korea’s contributing toward implementing the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy.
The bottom line is that Moon wants more strategic autonomy for South Korea to decide for itself how best to balance between the U.S. and China, even while both superpowers are trying to consolidate their allies and partners into stronger and more formalized arrangements. Recently Moon appears to have bravely tilted toward the U.S. side, in hopes of advancing his KPI with an end-of-war declaration.
In South Korea’s domestic political context, the outcome of the forthcoming presidential election, set for March 9, 2022, is very uncertain. Although Moon has obtained some leverage with the United States by engaging more with its Indo-Pacific Strategy, his party, the Democratic Party of Korea, has just selected Lee Jae-myung as its candidate, and Lee is perceived as leaning more toward accommodating North Korea and China, with some characterizing his foreign policy stance as anti-U.S. and anti-Japanese.
The South Korea alliance will also be affected by recent significant military and security developments, notably the testing of the Hyunmoo 4-4 indigenous submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) on October 15, and then of the Nuri space launch vehicle on October 21. Nuri will be used to launch next-generation small military satellites and constellations to improve preparedness for future wars. The growing military clout of South Korea was also seen at the Seoul International Aerospace and Defense Exhibition (ADEX), held in July 2021, at which South Korea held bilateral and multilateral talks on defense cooperation with ASEAN and many South Asian and Latin American nations.
These advances will allow the South Korean military to play a more independent role in conducting a combined defense posture against China and North Korea. The alliance with the United States will remain the cornerstone of South Korea’s defense policy, but the U.S. will be less dominant within the alliance. Responding to concerns about the North Korean nuclear threat, many pundits are suggesting that South Korea should build nuclear-powered submarines, and even develop its own nuclear warheads for use on SLBMs and short-range ballistic missiles. This would raise formidable difficulties, both political, with the U.S. and advocates of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and also technical, with the enrichment of uranium fuel and other challenges.
Many commentators expect U.S. President Joe Biden to reward Moon for his agreement to become more closely involved with the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Strategy to contain China. The South Korean military is rumored to be preparing practical implementation of Moon’s commitment, by cooperating with ASEAN, Turkey, and India, and perhaps with Japan and Australia. The United States has always been equivocal about Moon’s KPI, perceiving it as a kind of meddling between North Korea and the U.S., so what kind of reward can Biden offer Moon? And will it be timed to influence the South Korean presidential election?
There are various indications that military and security changes are underway.
First, the South Korean military has begun to cooperate more, albeit indirectly, with Japan. The 20th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) meeting, held on September 27-28, agreed to establish a working-level consulting group on interconnection and interoperability that will identify commonalities between South Korea’s NSP and the U.S. Indo-Pacific policy. The group may provide input for the forthcoming 53rd Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) between the two countries’ defense ministers, Suh Wook and Lloyd Austin, to be held in Seoul in early December. There is speculation that the new working group may lead to South Korea joining Quad Plus, or an AUKUS-like trilateral security cooperation format with Japan and the U.S., using the NSP as a pretext. On September 29, local media reported that 20th KIDD conducted tabletop exercises to explore countermeasures against North Korea’s Hwasong-8 hypersonic cruise missile, based on the concept of 4D (detect, disrupt, destroy, defend). Significantly, the exercise reportedly included Japan’s ballistic missile defense system.
Second, an essential aspect of Moon’s KPI is an end-of-war declaration, and it seems that Japan is involved in talks about this possibility. U.S. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines and the director of the CIA, Williams Burns, visited Seoul on October 17-18 for meetings with the director of the South Korean National Intelligence Service, Park Jie-won, and the director of the Japanese Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office, Takizawa Hiroaki.
Although no details about the meeting have been released, an end-of-war declaration is widely considered to be imminent. During September and October, there have been numerous meetings presumed to concern an end-of-war declaration, in Seoul, Tokyo, Washington, New York, and Indonesia, involving senior personnel from the United States, South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China.
Third, it is remarkable that Japan’s new prime minister, Kishida Fumio, allowed his intelligence minister to attend the recent meeting in Seoul with his South Korean and U.S. counterparts. This is despite Kishida’s strongly sustaining the historical rifts between South Korea and Japan, which have been getting worse since 2017. Perhaps better days are ahead for the Japan-South Korea relationship, with the U.S. mediating to repair it. It is noteworthy that there have been no further moves to claim compensation for conscripted wartime laborers, which is currently the main source of the friction between South Korea and Japan.
Fourth, the South Korean military has begun to play a more conspicuous role beyond the Korean Peninsula, conducting various activities to support the security capabilities of ASEAN countries and some other nations. This is in line with Moon’s NSP, but also demonstrates South Korea’s commitment to the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, especially through defense-industrial cooperation. For example, at the Seoul ADEX, ROK Army and Air Force officers, and also defense ministry officials, held many meetings with high-level military leaders from ASEAN to discuss the articulation of the NSP.
Fifth, the South Korean military has enhanced its capabilities to support U.S. space and cyber operations, for example by setting up countermeasures against cyberattacks originating in Russia and China. The launch of Nuri was also expedited, despite concerns about preparedness, which were somewhat justified by the failure to put a dummy payload into orbit. In advance of the 53rd SCM, South Korea is clearly trying to demonstrate its advanced technological capacities, in order to reassure the United States that future of the alliance is secure. The ROK Air Force has plans for several kinds of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting satellites to be operating by 2027.
Moon’s Next Steps
So, what can we expect from South Korea for the rest Moon’s term?
First, an end-of-war declaration may well be announced before Moon leaves office in May 2022, perhaps as early as the G-20 meeting in Rome at the end of October. Some see the declaration as a North Korean trick to pry apart the South Korea-U.S. alliance, while others see an opportunity for South Korea and the United States to lighten the burden of their constant military defense against North Korea. If the declaration is not made at the G-20, then the 53rd SCM in Seoul between the South Korean and U.S. defense ministers is another possibility. Indeed, there are probably ongoing discussions about the precise terms of the declaration, how it will be interpreted by North Korea and China, and the legal impact on U.S. Forces Korea and U.N. Command.
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Second, Moon will make further commitments to South Korean alignment with the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, going beyond the joint statement from the May 2021 Biden-Moon summit in Washington. For example, ROK Navy recently conducted naval exercises with the EU and Oman in the Indian Ocean, confirming South Korea’s capacity to join multilateral naval drills, in this case to practice anti-piracy operations. Also, at the South Korean parliamentary audit for 2021, just completed, the ROK Navy argued that its plans to build a light aircraft carrier will make an important contribution to the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Strategy.
Third, there will be new confidence-building measures between the militaries of the two Koreas, to further arms control. There may also be non-military developments. Since Kim and Moon signed the 9/19 agreement, scholars and experts sympathetic to North Korea have proposed a wide variety of follow-up measures, such as setting up a Peace Park in the DMZ, reopening train links between the two Koreas, rebuilding the inter-Korean liaison office, and reopening Kaesong Industrial Complex in North Korea.
What Do These Changes Mean for China?
Finally, what are the implications for China? Surely the Chinese have noticed that Moon is shifting South Korea’s foreign policy stance.
Currently, China is distracted by the Taiwan situation. The United States has organized large-scale multilateral naval exercises nearby, and China responded by demonstrating its superiority in regional air power. North Korea also offered a surprisingly vehement criticism of U.S. policy on Taiwan, but at present China has bigger problems to deal with than the Korean Peninsula. After all, Biden recently stated unequivocally that the United States was committed to defending Taiwan against China, and then the White House walked it back with a claim that the U.S. policy of ambiguity was unchanged.
However, China will be an important part of renewed dialogue on the Korean Peninsula. The only condition set by North Korea for talks with the U.S. is that U.N. sanctions against North Korea must be lifted. North Korea is especially upset by U.N. Security Council Resolution 2397, which it considers an act of war, and China, which voted for the resolution, may have a role in persuading the United States to lift it. China will therefore likely take part in any talks about North Korean issues, directly or at least as an observer.
Moon’s recent speech to the U.N. General Assembly proposed four-party talks between the two Koreas, the United States, and China. China should agree to take part. All of these countries should endorse an end-of-war declaration, which would be a military and political bridge to mitigating tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
Meanwhile, China continues to demonstrate its support for North Korea by providing it with modern advanced conventional weapons and systems. South Korean analysts noted the similarity of North Korea’s Hwasong-8 missile to China’s DF-17. Moon’s shift toward the United States could be seen as a warning to China to refrain from further military technological assistance to North Korea.
The South Korean government has been approached quietly by the United States to encourage Korean shipbuilding companies to become involved in Taiwan’s indigenous submarine project. Indeed, there have been recent rumors that Taiwan would like some South Korean companies to share advanced technologies provided by the United States, for example hypersonic missiles and SLBMs. If China wishes to forestall this possibility, then they would be well advised to join the four-party talks proposed by Moon.
China should also be more cautious in the South and the East China Seas, as its actions there are troubling to Seoul. Fearing that China may extend its gray zone strategy to the Yellow Sea and Ieodo (aka Socotra Rock), some South Korea analysts have argued for the ROK Navy to join the U.S.-led freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea and also to transit through the Taiwan Strait, like Canada and the U.K. China would surely wish to avoid such developments.
In conclusion, there are many uncertainties affecting the situation on the Korean Peninsula, but it seems certain that changes are in the wind, caused by a confluence of factors: Moon’s attempts to secure his legacy, North Korean domestic turbulence, and U.S. pressure on Moon’s policy positions. Doubtless more will become clear following the 53rd SCM in Seoul in early December.
5. Nuke envoys of S. Korea, China discuss end-of-war declaration for NK dialogue
I wonder what remaining veterans of the Chinese People's Volunteers think about an end of war declaration.
Nuke envoys of S. Korea, China discuss end-of-war declaration for NK dialogue | Yonhap News Agency
By Chae Yun-hwan
SEOUL, Nov. 1 (Yonhap) -- The top nuclear envoys of South Korea and China held a videoconference Monday to discuss measures for an early resumption of the Korean peace process, including the proposed declaration of a formal end to the 1950-53 Korean War, Seoul's foreign ministry said.
Noh Kyu-duk, the special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, held the virtual talks with his Chinese counterpart Liu Xiaoming to explain Seoul's efforts to revive stalled dialogue with North Korea and requested Beijing's "constructive" cooperation in the peace drive, the ministry said.
Liu positively evaluated Seoul's efforts to achieve lasting peace on the peninsula and said China will play a "constructive role" and continue to work together for the goal, according to the ministry.
The two sides agreed to meet in person at an earlier date to continue discussions on issues surrounding the peninsula, it noted.
Their talks come two days after the foreign ministers of South Korea and China met in Rome on the sidelines of the Group of 20 summit to explore ways to revitalize the peace drive amid Seoul's efforts to draw support for the declaration.
South Korean President Moon Jae-in proposed again at the U.N. General Assembly in September that the two Koreas and the U.S., with the possible addition of China, formally end the war to kick-start the stalled nuclear dialogue with Pyongyang.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
6. Talk of possible shift in U.S. nuke policy rekindles questions over America's security assurances for allies
We must demonstrate strategic reassurance and strategic resolve if we value our alliance and depend on them for our mutual national security.
(News Focus) Talk of possible shift in U.S. nuke policy rekindles questions over America's security assurances for allies | Yonhap News Agency
By Song Sang-ho
SEOUL, Nov. 1 (Yonhap) -- Talk of the United States' possible policy shift to reduce its use of nuclear arms under the Joe Biden administration is raising anew consequential questions over the future of America's security commitments to South Korea and other allies, analysts said Monday.
With its nuclear posture review under way, the Biden team has reportedly been considering a "no-first-use" declaration, which would rule out the possibility of the U.S. launching a preemptive nuclear strike seen as a formidable deterrent against potential adversaries.
Even if Washington does not go as far as to embrace the no-first-use approach, it could opt for a "sole purpose" policy that would define a strictly limited set of extreme circumstances for the use of nuclear arms, such as retaliation after a nuclear attack, observers said.
U.S. allies have been calling for the strengthening of America's security assurances -- or extended deterrence -- in the face of a nuclear-ambitious North Korea, an increasingly assertive China and a resurgent Russia.
Their doubts on America's security commitments have lingered, as they saw former U.S. President Donald Trump trumpeting his "America first" credo and the Western-backed Afghan government collapsing hopelessly following the U.S. troop withdrawal.
"What's worrisome for allies is that extended deterrence is a commitment that is not binding, and that there hasn't been an historical experience of the allies having been protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella," Park Won-gon, a North Korean studies professor of Ewha Womans University, said.
"Should the U.S. renounce the option of preemptive strike or shift to the sole purpose policy, this would suggest that the level of its security commitments to allies would weaken evidently compared with the existing ones," he added.
The Biden administration has been conducting the nuclear posture review -- a regular process that would set the direction of America's overall policy on nuclear weapons. An updated Nuclear Policy Review (NPR) document is due out early next year.
The possibility of a U.S. policy shift has unnerved conservatives in South Korea, as North Korea has steadily focused on the development of operational nuclear and missile forces as evidenced by the test-firing last month of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile.
Opponents of the policy change argue that the U.S. should keep its stance of strategic ambiguity over its first-use option to ensure that potential enemies dare not think about initiating a war that would cause unacceptable costs on their part.
Commenting on Washington's policy review, an official at Seoul's foreign ministry said Sunday that the U.S.' commitment to the provision of extended deterrence remains "solid" -- remarks apparently aimed at allaying worries about America's possible policy change.
Extended deterrence refers to the U.S.' commitment to mobilizing a full range of its military capabilities, nuclear and conventional, to defend its non-nuclear allies, like South Korea. It includes the so-called nuclear umbrella.
Biden's interim national security strategic guidance, published in March, already hinted at a future policy shift. According to the document, the U.S. will take steps to "reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy," though the U.S. would ensure its strategic nuclear deterrent remains "safe, secure and effective."
Such a stance drew a contrast with the 2018 NPR that signaled a stronger nuclear policy stance with the development of "low-yield" nuclear warheads.
Low-yield nuclear arms will lower the psychological threshold for the use of nuclear arms, as their use will lead to much less damage in a limited battle zone than full-scale nuclear exchanges involving high-yield strategic bombs, experts said.
Some observers said that concerns about a U.S. policy change may be excessive, given that no matter what policy name the Biden government chooses, it would be "declaratory" during his term.
"Whether that is part of the Department of Defense review or not, it is America's declaratory policy during his stint in the White House," Patrick M. Cronin, chair for Asia-Pacific Security at the U.S.-based Hudson Institute, said.
"I don't think that undermines deterrence from aggression, because an adversary who uses any force will have to fear conventional military reprisal," he added.
Going forward, Washington's policy review is expected to be a subject of intense consultations with its allies. The Financial Times reported Saturday that U.S. allies, including Britain, France and Japan, have been lobbying Biden not to alter the U.S. nuclear policy.
South Korea is expected to discuss the issue with the U.S. during various two-way high-level talks, including the Security Consultative Meeting, the annual defense ministerial talks slated to take place in Seoul early next month.
"Now at issue is how the U.S. would persuade allies to back its policy," Kim Tae-hyung, a professor of international politics at Soongsil University, said. "Over the next few months before the NPR comes out, there would be intense debates about the sole purpose, no-first-use or other related issues among the allies as well as among U.S. policymakers."
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
7. S. Korea to develop homegrown lightweight torpedoes by 2028
Independent warfighting capabilities and a strong defense industry.
(LEAD) S. Korea to develop homegrown lightweight torpedoes by 2028 | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: ADDS details in last 3 paras)
SEOUL, Nov. 1 (Yonhap) -- South Korea approved a plan Monday to develop homegrown lightweight torpedoes by 2028 to enhance the Navy's anti-submarine capabilities, the state arms procurement agency said.
Presided over by Defense Minister Suh Wook, the Defense Project Promotion Committee endorsed the project worth 160 billion won (US$135 million), the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) said.
The move came after North Korea test-fired a new submarine-launched ballistic missile last month, in a development that underscored the need for the South to reinforce its underwater defense capabilities.
The committee also approved a project worth 470 billion won to supply GPS-guided bombs for Air Force operations by 2027. Following the approval, related contracts with foreign firms will take effect this year, DAPA officials said.
The project for the guided bomb package involves separate contracts with four foreign firms.
South Korea tapped U.S.-based ENF as the supplier for the penetration bomb, which is capable of breaking into concrete bunkers. The fragmentation warhead will be supplied by Israel-based Elbit Systems Ltd.
Fuzes will be purchased from Orion Advanced Systems Ltd., according to the administration. The guidance kit will be purchased through a government-to-government foreign military sale (FMS) program with the United States.
colin@yna.co.kr
(END)
8. Unification ministry to discuss resuming Panmunjom tours with UNC
As an aside, I wonder if the north is conducting their tours?
(LEAD) Unification ministry to discuss resuming Panmunjom tours with UNC | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: ADDS details in paras 4-5)
SEOUL, Nov. 1 (Yonhap) -- The unification ministry said Monday it will begin discussions with the U.S.-led United Nations Command (UNC) to resume tours to the inter-Korean border village of Panmunjom as South Korea began its "living with COVID-19" scheme meant to phase out coronavirus restrictions amid a rising vaccination rate.
Tours to Panmunjom, or the Joint Security Area (JSA), were suspended in July after health authorities imposed the toughest virus curbs in the greater Seoul area, home to half of the country's 52 million population.
"We are beginning discussions with the UNC and other related organizations on the resumption of tours to Panmunjom," ministry spokesperson Lee Jong-joo said during a regular press briefing.
The UNC said it has also resumed armistice education seminars for units stationed at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas.
"After a COVID social distancing pause, armistice education is back in full swing," the UNC wrote on Facebook. "They are back on the road this week, supporting clear, consistent and transparent adherence to the terms of the armistice."
The move is in line with South Korea's implementation of its first step to get back to normal life Monday on the back of a rising vaccination rate at over 75 percent.
Under the living with COVID-19 policy, South Korea plans to lift most of the virus curbs in phases by the end of January.
scaaet@yna.co.kr
(END)
10. S. Korea, U.S. kick off joint air exercise
Militaries must train. Training is perishable. The pilots (and other military personnel) are like world class athletes - if you are a golfer, tennis player, soccer player, baseball player or football player (among many more) you have to train to maintain your skills. The same is true of militaries. Preventing proper training by canceling, postponing, or scaling back exercises erodes readiness and deterrence. We must never forget the number one priority is to prevent war on the Korean peninsula. No piece of paper or symbolic declaration will enhance the security of the ROK. Only a highly trained and ready combined military force can do that.
S. Korea, U.S. kick off joint air exercise | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Nov. 1 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States kicked off a combined annual air exercise Monday, a source said, in a low-key manner apparently to back ongoing diplomacy to resume dialogue with North Korea.
For the five-day exercise, the allies mobilized some 100 air assets each, including F-15K and KF-16 jets from South Korea and F-16s from the U.S., the source said, noting no military assets were deployed from the U.S. mainland this time.
The allies have regularly held the air exercise in a scaled-down, low-key manner since they suspended the large-scale Vigilant Ace exercise to support peace efforts on the Korean Peninsula.
The South Korean Air Force declined to elaborate on the ongoing maneuvers but said that allied exercises are carried out in a "balanced manner" under the annual plan.
North Korea has long denounced the allies' military drills as a war rehearsal for an invasion and used them as an excuse for provocations.
The reclusive regime recently called on the allies to drop "double standards," bashing Seoul and Washington for defining its missile activities as "provocations" while rationalizing their own as deterrence.
colin@yna.co.kr
(END)
10. Japan's LDP win may throw a wrench in Seoul-Tokyo relations
Monday
November 1, 2021
Japan's LDP win may throw a wrench in Seoul-Tokyo relations
Japan's prime minister and ruling Liberal Democratic Party leader Fumio Kishida puts rosettes above the names of successful general election candidates on a board at the party headquarters in Tokyo on Oct. 31. [BEHROUZ MEHRI/AP/YONHAP]
The comfortable win Sunday by Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the ruling party of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, will likely lead to a continued decline of Korea-Japan relations through next year, according to some experts in Korea.
“It's no secret that Prime Minister Kishida is more keen on focusing on U.S.-Japan relations than on Japan-Korea relations, and [the recent election result] will mean that there are less reasons for Japan to try to improve ties with Korea,” Jin Chang-soo, former president and current senior research fellow on diplomatic strategy studies at Sejong Institute, told the JoongAng Ilbo on Monday.
The LDP won 261 seats out of 465 in the lower house of the parliament on Sunday. The conservative party was also in power during the administrations of Kishida’s predecessors, Yoshihide Suga and Shinzo Abe. To be more exact, the party had rarely not been in power, since its foundation in 1955.
Korea and Japan failed to see eye-to-eye on a number of historical issues during previous administrations, all stemming from Japan's occupation of Korea from 1910-45. These include the forced laborer and "comfort women" issues.
Comfort women is a euphemism used to refer to the women forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese military before and during the Pacific War. Estimates of the number of comfort women range from tens of thousands to as many as 410,000, many of Korean descent.
Korea and Japan signed an agreement in 2015 to address the comfort women issue, which included an apology by Tokyo and a 1-billion-yen ($9 million) fund for the victims. The bilateral agreement received backlash from the victims and civic groups at the time because of a lack of transparency, and the Moon Jae-in administration said it will not scrap the 2015 deal but underscored that it was not a true resolution to the issue of Japan’s wartime sexual slavery.
A number of landmark rulings by the Korean Supreme Court since 2018 has further chilled diplomatic ties, including one ruling that ordered Japan's Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal to compensate victims of forced labor during World War II. Around 500,000 Koreans are estimated to have been subjected to forced labor in Japan at the time.
Japan strongly protested the decisions, claiming that all compensation issues related to its colonial rule were resolved through a 1965 treaty normalizing bilateral relations.
In one of his most recent statements on the issue, Kishida was quoted by local media outlets to have said during a plenary session of the parliament on Oct. 13 that he will strongly demand Korea provide acceptable solutions to the forced laborer issues.
Tokyo has also differed from Seoul on its stance on Seoul’s agenda to formally declare the end to the 1950-53 Korean War.
During the Korea-U.S.-Japan nuclear envoys’ meeting in Washington on Oct. 19, Japan’s director-general for Asian and Oceanian affairs at Tokyo's Foreign Ministry, Takehiro Funakoshi, reportedly told Korea’s nuclear envoy Noh Kyu-duk that “North Korea has been repeatedly raising tensions on the Korean Peninsula,” when Noh requested his support to declare the end to the war.
“Japan agrees with the premise that a ‘diplomatic approach’ is necessary to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, but it firmly maintains its stance that it cannot agree that the method of such an approach should be the declaration of an end to the Korean War proposed by South Korea,” a diplomatic insider told the JoongAng Ilbo on Monday. “Rather, Japan is focusing on condemning North Korea's nuclear development and missile launches and focusing on strengthening deterrence, which shows a significant gap with South Korea's approach to bringing North Korea to the table for dialogue.”
Both President Moon and Prime Minister Kishida will be attending the United Nations 26th Climate Change Conference (COP26) in Glasgow, Scotland, through Tuesday. Several Japanese media outlets including the Mainichi reported that Kishida was hoping to meet with U.S. President Joe Biden during the conference, but did not mention any possibility of such a summit with Korea. There were also no announcements by Seoul on a possible summit on the sidelines of the conference as of press time Monday.
BY JEONG JIN-WOO, ESTHER CHUNG [chung.juhee@joongang.co.kr]
11. Foreign minister pushes for end of war in talks with U.S. envoy
It seems like the single priority of the Moon administration is to have an end of war declaration.
Monday
November 1, 2021
Foreign minister pushes for end of war in talks with U.S. envoy
Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong, left, and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken meet on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Rome on Sunday. [MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS]
Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong pushed for a formal declaration to end the 1950-53 Korean War during his meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on the sidelines of the G-20 Summit in Rome on Sunday.
“The two shared the importance of the stable management of the situation on the Korean Peninsula and had serious discussions on ways to resume the peace process on the Korean Peninsula at an early stage, including a declaration to end the Korean War,” the Foreign Ministry said in a statement Monday.
This push to end the war was, however, left out in the American press release following the meeting, which highlighted the “ironclad U.S.-ROK alliance” and their “commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”
The differing sense of urgency between Washington and Seoul on the end-of-war declaration was not surprising given there have been noted differences in their stances on the agenda.
Seoul has been pushing for a formal declaration to end the Korean War as a means of encouraging Pyongyang to return to dialogue, an issue that has been discussed in a series of talks between the South Korean and U.S. officials, including those of the two countries' nuclear envoys in the past few weeks.
U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan in a press briefing on Tuesday, however, admitted that Korea and the United States “may have somewhat different perspectives on the precise sequence or timing or conditions for different steps” when it comes to Seoul's proposal for an end-of-war declaration as a catalyst to restart nuclear talks.
Sequencing, or who takes the first step and the order of events, is at the core of the denuclearization negotiations, an issue that has frequently come up since diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang kicked off in 2018 with a series of inter-Korean and North-U.S. summit talks.
The timing for making the end-of-war declaration is another point of debate, considering that the Moon Jae-in administration will come to the end of its five-year term next May.
The third issue Sullivan mentioned, conditions, involves what will be given in return for ending the war, something Pyongyang and Washington may not see eye-to-eye on.
The Joe Biden administration has repeatedly offered dialogue “without conditions” to North Korea, who, instead, has repeatedly mentioned a number of conditions, including ending the Washington-Seoul joint military exercises.
The regular joint military exercises have been scaled down both due to the pandemic and to give way to the diplomatic efforts to engage the North in dialogue. One of the large-scale air exercises, the Vigilant Ace, has been suspended since 2018, and only limited flight exercises were held.
A joint annual air exercise between Washington and Seoul held on Monday was also scaled down, according to Yonhap.
Pyongyang, along with protesting the Seoul-Washington joint drills, has called for the removal of U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula, and some experts have been concerned about the legal ramifications of an end-of-war declaration, and whether it would undermine the grounds for the stationing of American forces here.
BY ESTHER CHUNG [chung.juhee@joongang.co.kr]
12. Explosion at Chongjin chemical and textile plant leaves several workers injured
I expect we will see more accidents.
Excerpts:
Chongjin Chemical and Textile Factory was ordered to submit a technological innovation plan by the end of this year — the first of North Korea’s new five-year plan for economic development — to break its dependence on imported raw materials and chemical reagents, or so-called “import disease.” It reportedly began pertinent experiments on Oct. 19.
The kiln unexpectedly exploded while the factory’s technology department, research team and on-site production technicians were gathered to watch the experiment. Some of the onlooking workers next to the kiln were injured, some severely, said the source.
Explosion at Chongjin chemical and textile plant leaves several workers injured - Daily NK
An explosion at Chongjin Chemical and Textile Factory in North Hamgyong Province reportedly left several workers injured.
The factory was conducting chemical experiments in accordance with the party’s “self-reliance” policy at the time of the explosion.
A source in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on Friday that the factory’s Industrial Technology Center was recently conducting experiments to reduce the plant’s dependence on raw materials and chemical reagents when the test kiln exploded. Two people received serious injuries, while five received minor injuries.
Chongjin Chemical and Textile Factory was ordered to submit a technological innovation plan by the end of this year — the first of North Korea’s new five-year plan for economic development — to break its dependence on imported raw materials and chemical reagents, or so-called “import disease.” It reportedly began pertinent experiments on Oct. 19.
The kiln unexpectedly exploded while the factory’s technology department, research team and on-site production technicians were gathered to watch the experiment. Some of the onlooking workers next to the kiln were injured, some severely, said the source.
A view of Chongjin. / Image: Daily NK
The explosion was reportedly so powerful that local residents near the factory could hear it loud and clear.
The source said workers liberally poured condemnation on the accident. For the last month, the factory’s party committee has been berating workers to produce a technological innovation plan. Considering the plan a party task, workers were rushing to achieve results when the accident happened. Haste had led to misfortune, they said.
Prior to this, the factory’s technology personnel reportedly convinced party committee officials to conduct the experiment only after observing the process in more detail, explaining that it was still dangerous despite being lab-tested.
In particular, the technicians reportedly believed the party’s self-sufficiency and localization policies were a mistake. In times such as these, when people are demanding high-quality clothing from South Korea and elsewhere, who would buy clothes made from locally made, poor-quality textiles?
The source said the factory’s technicians and workers have been blaming party officials “who aren’t satisfied until people get hurt trying to do silly things because the party ordered it.” They lament that the party seems “ignorant of this reality.”
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
13. Obsession with NK
This is no surprise as it is in keeping with the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.
[Editorial] Obsession with NK
Pyongyang said to have offered absurd preconditions for talks
Published : Nov 1, 2021 - 05:30 Updated : Nov 1, 2021 - 05:30
North Korea is said to have demanded, as preconditions for talks on declaring the end of the Korean War, that South Korea and the United States stop their combined military exercises and that economic sanctions against Pyongyang be lifted.
A lawmaker who attended a parliamentary audit of the National Intelligence Service on Thursday told reporters later that the agency’s chief had made the revelation.
South Korea and the US have already reduced their combined drills, both to ease inter-Korean tensions and due to the coronavirus pandemic, to the extent that there is great concern about preparedness.
Above all, there is no chance of Pyongyang giving up on its nuclear weapons. It has tested an array of missiles while reportedly reactivating its nuclear facilities.
Suspension of the South Korea-US combined exercises will not only imperil the South’s security but also weaken the alliance.
The lifting of economic sanctions is also an unacceptable demand.
The Moon regime argues that an end-of-war declaration would open the way for denuclearization. But with the war over, North Korea would likely demand the dissolution of the United Nations Command and the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea. A formal end to the war would only obscure the mandate of the UN Command -- created under US leadership after the Korean War broke out -- and ultimately of the US forces stationed in South Korea.
Without a doubt, these are demands that would jeopardize the nation’s security, and yet the Moon administration is pushing almost blindly for an end-of-war declaration -- or even for inter-Korean dialogue to that end. The North, which had been unresponsive to the South’s proposals at first, seems to be seeking to take advantage of Moon’s obsession. It has offered preconditions just for discussion of the issue, not for an end-of-war declaration itself.
Washington recently put the brakes on Seoul’s impatience.
White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan said the US and South Korea may have somewhat different perspectives on the precise sequence or timing or conditions for different steps.
The government in Seoul argues that an end-of-war declaration is only a political and symbolic step that could be reversed if need be. Yet it is questionable if it could be snapped back easily.
Despite Pyongyang offering absurd preconditions and Washington being negative, Moon won’t let go.
He has concentrated the nation’s diplomatic energy on an end-of-war declaration ever since he raised the issue in his address at the UN General Assembly in September.
Suh Hoon, director of Cheong Wa Dae’s National Security Office, and Noh Kyu-duk, head of Korean Peninsula peace negotiations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, visited Washington for consultations about an end-of-war declaration. Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong asked his Russian counterpart to cooperate on the matter.
When Moon asked for support from France while arguing for lighter UN sanctions on North Korea as an incentive for denuclearization at his summit with French President Emmanuel Macron in 2018, Macron said the sanctions would be necessary until the North was willing to cooperate on denuclearization. Moon was effectively snubbed over his unrealistic view of North Korea. Now he argues that an end-of-war declaration would facilitate talks on denuclearization.
The most important premise for an end-of-war declaration is solid trust in North Korea’s promise not to threaten South Korea. At the center of that promise lies denuclearization.
Despite the absence of any such trust, the administration is pushing for an end-of-war declaration and even calling for lighter sanctions on the North as an incentive for talks.
An end-of-war declaration without denuclearization is a sandcastle.
Above all, it is not right for a president in the closing days of his presidency to set new inter-Korean security relations that could have grave consequences.
The president’s focus during the remaining six months of his term should not be an end-of-war declaration, but keeping the situation on the Korean Peninsula under control.
14. Time to ease sanctions (north Korea)
Ease sanctions?
Kim could have sanctions relief if he complied with the requirements of the sanctions.
If we ease sanctions without compliance what malign behavior do we want to condone? Nuclear and ballistic missile development? Proliferation? Global illicit activities? Cyber attacks? Human rights abuses and crimes against humanity?
We should know that if we give sanctions relief without compliance Kim will not come to the negotiating table in good faith but will continue his blackmail diplomacy and political warfare strategy because they work.
And lastly the Korean people in the north are suffering because of the deliberate policy decisions of Kim Jong-un who prioritizes his nuclear and missile programs, military advancement and support to the elite over the welfare of the Korean people in the north. Sanctions relief will only help the regime and not the people.
Time to ease sanctions
By John Burton
One of the main criticisms of the U.N. sanctions against North Korea is that they hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid. The U.N.'s human rights expert on North Korea appeared to acknowledge this fact when he said recently that U.N. sanctions should be eased as the country faces a potential food crisis.
The statement by Tomas Ojea Quintana, the U.N. special rapporteur, should provide an opportunity to re-examine whether U.N. sanctions are the most effective way to deal with ending North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
He warned that with the most vulnerable children and elderly at risk of starvation due to Pyongyang's strict COVID-19 controls, the "sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council should be reviewed and eased when necessary to both facilitate humanitarian and lifesaving assistance."
Other observers suggest that the easing of sanctions could help break the current deadlock between the U.S. and North Korea on the resumption of negotiations.
The U.S., however, appears determined to keep the sanctions in place while paying lip service to its claims that the sanctions do not interfere with humanitarian aid, blaming Pyongyang instead for the dire food situation. U.S. lawmakers also appear reluctant to ease sanctions. But the truth of the matter is that the U.S. needs to take a more proactive approach in addressing North Korea's humanitarian crisis in an effort to build trust with Pyongyang.
Humanitarian conditions in North Korea are only likely to get worse based on a recent assessment by the U.S. intelligence community. It said that North Korea was "highly vulnerable" to the effects of climate change and lacked the capability to adapt.
The National Intelligence Estimate on Climate Change noted that North Korea's poor infrastructure and resource management would probably weaken its ability to cope with increased flooding and drought, exacerbating chronic food shortages.
One hopeful sign is that the U.S. Treasury Department, which is in charge of policing U.S. sanctions worldwide, is at least reviewing its sanctions policy. This includes studying whether to expand humanitarian exceptions to ease the flow of goods and the burden of compliance measures, which have been a source of complaints by U.S. aid groups working in North Korea.
A change in U.S. sanction rules would also probably affect U.N. sanctions on North Korea, which were largely written by Washington during the Obama administration.
But a smarter way for the U.S. to deal with humanitarian issues in North Korea would be working with the U.N. on promoting sustainable development measures.
Washington has often cited North Korea's human rights violations as a justification for its sanctions policy. But working with the U.N. on its Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) program as applied to North Korea could help address human rights issues.
Historically, North Korea has preferred working with the U.N. since Pyongyang regards it as a relatively neutral organization that conveys international recognition to the regime. It has also expressed support for the SDG program which seeks to improve the quality of human life regardless of political system or ideology.
The SDGs address many of the problems affecting North Korea ranging from food insecurity to adequate and sustainable energy. Pyongyang has cooperated with the U.N.'s World Food Programme and UNICEF in trying to feed its most vulnerable populations and has been amenable to accepting U.N. recommendations, such as increasing mandated maternity leave and protecting the rights of the disabled.
This has resulted in cautious optimism that if North Korea can be persuaded to improve basic services, it will also lead to increased economic and social rights.
This oblique approach may prove to be a more effective way to improve the human rights situation in North Korea than tackling the issue head on since Pyongyang is unwilling to engage with U.N. initiatives that directly deal with human rights violations in the country.
This reflects the fact that North Korea is sensitive about its legitimacy and international acceptance and views criticism of its human rights situation as a threat to its status.
One exception to this rule is that North Korea has participated in the U.N.'s Universal Periodic Review, under which each U.N. member conducts a self-examination of its human rights obligations.
Pyongyang has regularly participated in this process since it is not focused solely on North Korea, but rather conducted for all U.N. member countries. It also provides an opportunity for Pyongyang to highlight what it considers its human rights achievements.
Supporting SDG initiatives as a way to improve the human rights situation in North Korea is unlikely to produce quick and immediate results. But it does promise a partial solution to the humanitarian challenges that North Korea faces, which in turn could result in better human rights conditions in the future.
John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
