Quotes of the Day:
"There are but two ways of forming an opinion in science. One is the scientific method; the other, the scholastic. Once can judge from experiment, or one can blindly accept authority. To the scientific mind, experimental proof is all important and theory is merely a convenience in description, to be junked when it no longer fits. To the academic mind, authority is everything and facts are junked when they no longer fit the theory laid down by authority."
- Robert A. Heinlein - Life Line
"The fourth wave of disinformation slowly built and crested in the mid-2010s, with disinformation reborn and reshaped by new technologies and internet culture. The old art of slow-moving, highly skilled, close-range, labor intensive psychological influence had turned high-tempo, low-skilled, remote, and disjointed. Active measures were now not only more active than ever before but less measured - so much so that the term itself became contested and unsettled." - Thomas Rid, Active Measures - The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare
“The most effective strategies do not depend solely on violence—though this can play an instrumental role, by demonstrating superiority as much as expressing aggression—but benefit instead from the ability to forge coalitions. Little in the rest of this book will suggest that this list should be expanded. The elements of strategic behavior have not changed, only the complexity of the situations in which they must be applied.”
- Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History
1. N.K. leader's sister slams S. Korea, U.S. over joint military exercise
2. Kim Yo Jong, Vice-department Director of WPK Central Committee, Issues Press Statement
3. Korea Is Alive (nK propaganda)
4. Pentagon declines comment on N.K. statement on exercises
5. Thousands Evacuate Homes as Heavy Rains Flood North Korea
6. UN, EU: ‘Ready to provide humanitarian aid to N. Korea for flood damage’
7. Activists charged with espionage allegedly used local newspaper for N. Korean propaganda
8. N.K. refuses to answer calls from S. Korea in apparent protest against military exercise
9. Kim Yo-jong keeps banging drum against drill
10. Shocking spy activities (north Korea in South Korea)
11. Report: North Korea likely to reopen land trade routes with China
12. Kim Joon-hyung on How Seoul Can Lead Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula
13. North Korea: the failure of ‘maximum pressure’ on Kim’s isolated regime
14. US-South Korea drills drop gauntlet on Pyongyang
15. Iran Became a Military Powerhouse Thanks to North Korea
16. What If Kim Jong-un Dies? It Could Mean Nuclear War.
17. North Korea’s Curious COVID-19 Strategy
18. 3 dynamics shaping the security on the Korean peninsula
19. In This Memoir, Prison Is A Place — And A State Of Mind
1. N.K. leader's sister slams S. Korea, U.S. over joint military exercise
Like clockwork. RIght out of the Kim family family regime playbook. I think she has all the threats covered.
No one must overreact. Do not flinch and just keep executing the training.
(LEAD) N.K. leader's sister slams S. Korea, U.S. over joint military exercise | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with details, background, photo, byline)
By Koh Byung-joon
SEOUL, Aug. 10 (Yonhap) -- The sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un on Tuesday slammed South Korea and the United States for going ahead with joint military exercises, denouncing the drills as the "most intensive expression" of Washington's hostile policy toward Pyongyang.
Kim Yo-jong expressed "strong regrets" to South Korea for what she called an "act of betrayal" as the South kicked off a preliminary training with the U.S. in the run-up to next week's main exercise, after her earlier warning that the maneuvers will cloud inter-Korean relations.
She said the exercise shows that U.S. calls for unconditional talks and diplomatic engagement with the North are nothing but hypocrisy designed to conceal its ulterior intention of invasion, and vowed to further strengthen the country's "absolute deterrence" to cope with U.S. military threats.
"The combined exercises are the most intensive expression of the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK and a self-destructive act that threatens the safety of our people and further endangers the situation on the Korean Peninsula," Kim said in a statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency.
"In order to cope with the ever-growing U.S. military threats, we will further strengthen absolute deterrence, namely national defense power aimed at responding quickly to any military act against us as well as preemptive strike capabilities," she said.
Kim described the joint exercise as a "self-destructive" act that will surely bring about consequences.
"Ignoring our repeated warnings, the U.S. and South Korea went ahead with the dangerous war exercise, which will surely cause more serious security threats for themselves," she said.
Kim also demanded U.S. forces stationed in South Korea be withdrawn.
"For peace to take root on the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. should pull back the armed forces of invasion and war equipment deployed in the South," she said. "As long as the U.S. forces remain in the South, the root cause for periodic deterioration of situations on the Korean Peninsula will never disappear."
North Korea has long denounced Seoul and Washington's military drills as a rehearsal for an invasion of the North. The allies say that the exercises are defensive in nature.
Earlier this month, Kim issued a statement, saying that such joint military drills will cloud the future of inter-Korean relations, saying that it is entirely up to South Korea and the U.S. to choose between "despair" and "hope."
(END)
2. Kim Yo Jong, Vice-department Director of WPK Central Committee, Issues Press Statement
"I am Kim Yo-jong and I authorize this message." Or maybe she is saying she had KJU's authorization. (see the last line of her statement).
Anyone know I never capitalize north as in north Korea? It is an old habit from back in the 1980s and 1990s when we used to not capitalize the north in the combined command. It was because we did not recognize the north as the ROK claims sovereignty over the entire peninsula and all Koreans (and still does. And of course the north claims the same).
But as you can see, the north's Propaganda and Agitation Department still does not capitalize the South.
Excerpt:
The U.S. and the south Korean army desperately started joint military exercises further accelerating the instable situation despite the unanimous denunciation and rejection at home and abroad.
Kim Yo Jong, Vice-department Director of WPK Central Committee, Issues Press Statement
Pyongyang, August 10 (KCNA) -- Kim Yo Jong, vice-department director of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), issued the following press statement Tuesday:
The U.S. and the south Korean army desperately started joint military exercises further accelerating the instable situation despite the unanimous denunciation and rejection at home and abroad.
The joint military exercises are divided into an "exercise of the staff for crisis control" from Aug. 10 to 13 and a "combined command exercise" from Aug. 16 to 26. They are the most vivid expression of the U.S. hostile policy towards the DPRK, designed to stifle our state by force, and an unwelcoming act of self-destruction for which a dear price should be paid as they threaten the safety of our people and further imperil the situation on the Korean peninsula.
The dangerous war exercises pushed ahead by the U.S. and the south Korean side disregardful of our repeated warnings will surely make them face more serious security threat.
Whatever the scale and mode, the joint military exercises are of aggressive nature as they are a war rehearsal and preliminary nuclear war exercise for further rounding off the preparations for putting into practice the operational plan with the preemptive strike at us as the gist.
Every March and August, military tension and the danger of conflict flare up in and around the Korean peninsula due to the war frenzy of the U.S. and south Korea.
Now the U.S. doggedly pushes forward with the aggression war drills at such a sensitive time as now when the international eyes are focused on the development of the situation on the peninsula. It is indeed a chief architect destroying peace and stability in the region. This also proves that "diplomatic engagement" and "dialogue with no strings attached" touted by the present U.S. administration is hypocrisy to cover up its aggressive nature.
The prevailing situation proves once again that we were quite just when we decided to steadily build up the capabilities for national defence.
For peace to settle on the peninsula, it is imperative for the U.S. to withdraw its aggression troops and war hardware deployed in south Korea.
As long as the U.S. forces stay in south Korea, the root cause for the periodic aggravation of the situation on the Korean peninsula will never vanish.
The reality proves that only substantial deterrent, not words, can ensure the peace and security of the Korean peninsula, and that it is a vital requirement for us to build up the force powerful enough to fully contain the external threats to us.
We have already clarified that we will counter the U.S. on the principle of power for power and goodwill for goodwill.
We will put more spur to further increasing the deterrent of absolute capacity to cope with the ever-growing military threats from the U.S., i.e. the national defence capabilities and powerful preemptive strike for rapidly countering any military actions against us.
Availing myself of this opportunity, I would like to express my deep regret at the perfidious behavior of the south Korean authorities.
I release this press statement upon authorization. -0-
3. Korea Is Alive (nK propaganda)
A little north Korea "history" (er... propaganda). This was the only known "battle" KIm Il-sung supposedly participated in. He did not liberate Korea or even the northern part of Korea. He attacked/raided one Japanese police box. That is the extent of his military prowess. And he spent the war years as a Soivet Red Army officer in command of the 1-88th special independent sniper brigade which spent most of its time in the Soveit Far East training and not conducting any significant operations.
But these myths are important for the legitimacy of the Kim family regime and the stories must be told over and over again.
Korea Is Alive
This is the great leader Kim Il Sung making a speech in front of the people in Pochonbo on the evening of June 4, Juche 26(1937).
At 10 p.m. a gun report rang out in the night sky of Pochonbo, a small town on the northern tip of Korea.
It was made by Kim Il Sung to herald the start of the Battle of Pochonbo.
The administrative organs of the Japanese imperialists were enveloped in flames by fierce attack of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army. The town was as bright as day.
People ran out from everywhere.
Kim Il Sung made a speech.
As to the scene, famous Korean poet Jo Ki Chon, wrote in his epic poem "Mt. Paektu" as follows.
... ... ...
Suddenly all fell silent
As Kim Il Sung led his detachment
Out on to the square,
And raised aloft his naked sabre,
Fire gleaming in the polished steel.
"Koreans!
Take a close look at the flames
Unleashed against the Japanese!
Korea's soul is still alive,
The heart of our immortal people
Is beating still today!
Let us all fan these flames
Until our enemy is reduced to ashes!"
... ... ...
84 years has passed since then, but those buildings are still preserved at the site of the anti-Japanese war.
Command Post for the Battle of Pochonbo
Police Substation riddled with more than 130 bullets
Battery built next to the Police Substation
Sub-County Office
Fire Hall (Rebuilt after the battle)
Kim Il Sung conceived a thrilling plan to annihilate the pursuing enemy once again and victoriously led the Battles of Kouyushuishan and Jiansanfeng.
He reminisced as follows:
"The greatest significance of the Battle of Pochonbo is that it not only convinced our people, who had thought Korea was dead, that this country was still very much alive but also armed them with the faith that they were fully capable of fighting and achieving national independence and liberation."
4. Pentagon declines comment on N.K. statement on exercises
Rarely is no comment appropriate. But in this case I think it is. We need to show Kim yo-jong that she cannot rise out of us with her rhetoric. Why should we comment when all we are seeing from the north is business as usual? I hope the ROK does the same.
Pentagon declines comment on N.K. statement on exercises | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Aug. 9 (Yonhap) -- The Pentagon declined comment Monday on a statement that the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un issued to denounce joint military exercises between South Korea and the United States.
"We don't have a comment on the DPRK statements. In accordance with CFC Policy, we do not comment on planned or conducted training readiness," Lt. Col. Martin Meiners told Yonhap News Agency in an email, referring to North Korea by the acronym for its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
CFC refers to the Combined Forces Command between South Korea and the U.S.
Earlier, Kim Yo-jong, the sister of the North's leader, slammed South Korea and the U.S. for moving ahead with their planned joint military drill, calling it a war rehearsal and preliminary nuclear war exercise against the country.
The Pentagon spokesman reiterated that South Korea and the U.S. maintain a high-level of defense readiness.
"The ROK-U.S. Alliance remains at a high level of readiness, and continues to maintain a robust combined defense posture to protect the Republic of Korea against any threat or adversary while implementing and maintaining prudent preventive control measures to protect the force," he said, adding all training exercises will strictly adhere to South Korea's COVID-19 guidelines.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
5. Thousands Evacuate Homes as Heavy Rains Flood North Korea
It is Kim Jong-un's decision to continue to keep the border closed:
Excerpt:
The closure of the border with China since January 2020 devastated the North Korean economy, isolating the country from its largest trading partner and leading to shortages of food and other essentials.
Thousands Evacuate Homes as Heavy Rains Flood North Korea
Sinuiju goes without power as neighborhood watch units prepare for emergency.
Rainy season flooding has forced thousands of North Koreans to evacuate their homes and entire cities went without power as rising waters damaged buildings in distant parts of the country, sources in the region told RFA.
North Korean state television reported last week that about 5,000 people nationwide evacuated as floods damaged about 1,000 homes. The rains were heaviest on the country’s east coast, in the provinces of North and South Hamgyong.
North Korea’s state-run Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) reported Aug. 5 that the South Hamgyong Provincial Military Commission received direction in absentia from the country’s leader Kim Jong Un to proceed with recovery efforts.
“It was particularly mentioned that the General Secretary set forth it as an important task facing the chief secretaries of the city and county Party committees to pay primary attention to the life of people in the disaster-stricken areas and strengthen Party work, the work with the people, to rally the broad masses closer around the Party under such difficult situation as now,” the report said.
Lying just across the Yalu river border from China’s Dandong, the North Korean city of Sinuiju from last week had no power, a Chinese citizen of Korean descent told RFA’s Korean Service Aug. 3.
“This morning I got in touch with an acquaintance in Sinuiju over text message. He said that the entire city is flooding and that electricity supply to the whole city has been cut off since the afternoon of the 3rd,” said the source, who requested anonymity for security reasons.
“Each neighborhood watch unit in Sinuiju held an emergency meeting and told residents to evacuate to nearby mountains or highlands should an emergency siren sound,” the source said.
The flooding in Sinuiju is a result of its lack of an effective drainage system to prevent such disasters, according to a resident of the city.
“Due to heavy rains that fell for five hours from 9 am yesterday [Aug. 2] every part of the city is flooded and the roads are cut off,” the resident, who declined to be named, told RFA.
“The rivers overflowed and houses were flooded,” said the resident.
Agriculture vulnerable
North Korea’s outdated agricultural infrastructure must be modernized to protect against future incidents of flooding, Mark Barry, the associate editor of the International Journal on World Peace, told RFA.
“My overall sense is that North Korea’s agriculture will always be highly vulnerable to flooding from heavy annual August rains unless its agricultural sector is rebuilt with the help of South Korea and other international actors,” Barry said.
“North Korea must become as resistant and resilient to these floods as South Korea. China may offer significant technical assistance, but Kim Jong Un will resist such help because of suspicion of Chinese motives,” he said.
The European Union’s Humanitarian Aid Department expressed concern about the flooding and other crises in North Korea.
“[The department] stands ready to provide assistance if border measures are loosened to allow for the import of aid materials and entry of international humanitarian personnel,” an EU official told RFA, noting that the humanitarian situation in North Korea has deteriorated since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The closure of the border with China since January 2020 devastated the North Korean economy, isolating the country from its largest trading partner and leading to shortages of food and other essentials.
“The EU humanitarian aid department is concerned that the severe weather and resultant flooding in August 2021 will lead to an overall worsening of the situation, while the strict border control measures prohibit the import of humanitarian aid goods or entry of personnel,” the official said.
Over the weekend, KCNA reported that “foresighted measures for preventing the flood damage are being taken in various sectors of the national economy.”
KCNA said “efforts are directed” in shoring up flood defenses at power plants, coal mines, farms, construction sites and fisheries.
Reported by Albert Hong and Jeong Yon Park for RFA’s Korean Service. Translated by Leejin Jun. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
6. UN, EU: ‘Ready to provide humanitarian aid to N. Korea for flood damage’
The ROK, the US, and the international community care more about the welfare of the KOrean people living in the. north than does Kim Jong-un.
Excerpt:
The international community, including the U.N., have expressed interest to provide aid, but it remains uncertain whether Pyongyang will accept. Since floods last year, the North has repeatedly stressed “self-recovery and restoration” and has rejected aid from the world.
UN, EU: ‘Ready to provide humanitarian aid to N. Korea for flood damage’
Posted August. 09, 2021 07:22,
Updated August. 09, 2021 07:22
UN, EU: ‘Ready to provide humanitarian aid to N. Korea for flood damage’. August. 09, 2021 07:22. by Youn-Jong Kim zozo@donga.com.
The United Nations and the European Union expressed intentions to provide humanitarian aid to North Korea, which suffered flood damage recently.
According to Voice of America on Friday, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said given that aggravating concern over the North’s food security after last month’s heat wave, it is preparing to support North Korean authorities’ activities helping people who suffered flood damage. The European Union’s humanitarian assistance coordination office also told Radio Free Asia Friday that the organization is worried about food shortages due to the influence of both drought and severe floods that have affected certain regions in the North, saying that if (Pyongyang) eases shutdown of its borders to allow admission of relief supplies and humanitarian aid personnel, it is ready to provide assistance.
The North suffered damage from floods due to torrential rain that hit western regions including South Hamkyong Province from Aug. 1 through Aug. 3. The floods destroyed fully or partially some 1,170 houses, and caused more than 5,000 people to evacuate, the North’s Korean Central TV station reported.
The international community, including the U.N., have expressed interest to provide aid, but it remains uncertain whether Pyongyang will accept. Since floods last year, the North has repeatedly stressed “self-recovery and restoration” and has rejected aid from the world.
7. Activists charged with espionage allegedly used local newspaper for N. Korean propaganda
Subversion. We must understand the regime's strategy.
- Subversion: The undermining of the power and authority of an established system or institution.
- As in: "the ruthless subversion of democracy"
- Ideological War – a choice between:
- Shared ROK/US Values
- Freedom and individual liberty, liberal democracy, free market economy, rule of law, and human rights
- Kim family regime (KFR) “values”
- Juche/Kimilsungism, Socialist Workers Paradise, Songun, Songbun, Byungjin, and denial of human rights to sustain KFR power
- nK engages in active subversion of the ROK
Political Warfare: Political warfare is the use of political means to compel an opponent to do one's will, based on hostile intent. The term political describes the calculated interaction between a government and a target audience to include another state's government, military, and/or general population. Governments use a variety of techniques to coerce certain actions, thereby gaining relative advantage over an opponent. The techniques include propaganda and psychological operations (PSYOP), which service national and military objectives respectively. Propaganda has many aspects and a hostile and coercive political purpose. Psychological operations are for strategic and tactical military objectives and may be intended for hostile military and civilian populations. Smith, Paul A., On Political War (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1989), p. 3. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a233501.pdf
Activists charged with espionage allegedly used local newspaper for N. Korean propaganda | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Aug. 9 (Yonhap) -- Four South Korean activists charged with espionage were found to have used a local online newspaper to disseminate N. Korean propaganda and to update Pyongyang about investigations against them, sources said Monday.
According to the sources, the activists used an online media website owned by one of them, a 47-year-old man surnamed Son, as a channel to glorify the regime.
The activists were recently arrested on espionage charges for allegedly taking orders from Pyongyang and staging a series of protests opposing Seoul's plan to procure U.S.-built F-35A stealth fighter jets.
They were allegedly ordered to promote the "greatness of the chairman," referring to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, to different South Korean groups, especially the youth, through the newspaper.
The National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the National Police Agency (NPA) confirmed those orders in the USB flash drives seized during the raid in the activists' residences and offices in Cheongju, about 140 kilometers south of Seoul, in May.
The NIS reportedly identified 45 articles idolizing Kim Jong-un and North Korea published on the site up until June.
The evidence also showed that the activists swore their loyalty to Kim in 2018, promising to become "faithful warriors" for Kim who, they said, was working for the "unification of the Korean peninsula" and the "absolute victory of socialism."
After the NIS and NPA launched the investigation, the activists also reportedly used the local media to update the North of any developments.
According to the Cheongju District Prosecutors Office, the suspects were unable to use an encrypted program to communicate with Pyongyang after the May raid and seemed to have used newspaper articles to update the North with the ongoing investigation.
In June, the newspaper carried an article titled "North Korean agent Lee Gwang-jin is a ghost created by South Korean intelligence officials," apparently tipping off the North's United Front Department (UFD) that their illicit operation had been exposed. The UFD is known to be in charge of handling inter-Korean affairs and Pyongyang's espionage operations in the South.
Last Monday, prosecutors asked the Cheongju District Court to grant arrest warrants for the suspects, saying they were highly likely to keep informing the North of the investigation to help Pyongyang destroy evidence unless they are detained.
The court allowed the authorities to arrest three of the activists.
One of the activists, only identified as a 57-year-old, reportedly started working for North Korea in 2004, while Son began in 2010. When the other two allegedly became North Korea sympathizers remained unknown.
They, according to the investigators, have traveled often to China to meet North Korean agents and report their activities to benefit Pyongyang, such as anti-weapons movements, talks with ruling Democratic Party affiliates on inter-Korean affairs and the establishment of an underground organization to spread North Korean ideology here.
On Monday, Son reportedly claimed there is no underground organization and the NIS and the police manipulated the case to stage an anti-communism campaign.
nyway@yna.co.kr
(END)
8. N.K. refuses to answer calls from S. Korea in apparent protest against military exercise
Again, right out of the playbook. No surprise here. This is the regime's petty response. We should not overreact to this. We need to hold steady and show Kim Jo-jong that her blackmail diplomacy does not work. This is how we contribute to breaking the cycle. (And yes there may still be a provocation we will deal with).
The Kims have to learn that their decades of political warfare and blackmail dimplamy and trying to get something for nothing are over. We must never give in to the regime's increased tensions, threats, or proviocations because to do so only invites more.
(LEAD) N.K. refuses to answer calls from S. Korea in apparent protest against military exercise | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: CHANGES slug from Koreas-communication channels; RECASTS headline, lead; UPDATES throughout with disconnection of inter-Korean hotlines)
By Choi Soo-hyang and Yi Wonju
SEOUL, Aug. 10 (Yonhap) -- North Korea did not answer daily phone calls from South Korea via liaison and military hotlines on Tuesday afternoon, hours after the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un blasted Seoul and Washington for going ahead with combined military exercises.
The inter-Korean communication lines -- the liaison hotline and the military channels in the eastern and western border regions -- were in normal operation until in the morning but the afternoon calls went unanswered, officials at the unification and defense ministries said.
The disconnection, just two weeks after the lines were restored following a yearlong severance, came after Kim Yo-jong issued a statement expressing "deep regret" to South Korea for going ahead with the exercise with the U.S. despite her earlier warning the maneuvers will cloud inter-Korean relations.
The phone lines were restored late last month after President Moon Jae-in and the North's Kim Jong-un agreed to improve their chilled ties amid little progress in nuclear negotiations.
Whether and how to conduct the summertime exercise drew keen attention after Kim Yo-jong warned that the drills would dampen the conciliatory mood created in the wake of the restoration of the communication lines.
Sources have said the South decided to go ahead with the exercise in a scaled-back manner.
Earlier in the day, a preliminary exercise kicked off in the run-up to the main summertime drills which are scheduled for Aug. 16-26.
scaaet@yna.co.kr
(END)
9. Kim Yo-jong keeps banging drum against drill
Again no surprise here but this statement from Kim Yo-jong begs the question about whether there have been any changes to the Kimfamily regime strategy?
She went on to demand the United States withdraw its troops and military assets from South Korea.
"For peace to settle on the peninsula, it is imperative for the U.S. to withdraw its aggression troops and war hardware deployed in South Korea," said Kim. "As long as the U.S. forces stay in south Korea, the root cause for the periodic aggravation of the situation on the Korean peninsula will never vanish."
Do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure the survival of the mafia like crime family cult known as Kim family regime?
In support of that strategy do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the objective to split the ROK/US Alliance and get US forces off the peninsula? Has KJU given up his divide to conquer strategy - divide the alliance to conquer the ROK?
The answers to these questions should guide us to the strategy to solve the "Korea question" (para 60 of the Armistice) and lead to the only acceptable durable political arrangement: A secure, stable, economically vibrant, non-nuclear Korean peninsula unified under a liberal constitutional form of government with respect for individual liberty, the rule of law, and human rights, determined by the Korean people. In short, a United Republic of Korea (UROK)
The root of all problems in Korea is the existence of the most evil mafia- like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime that has the objective of dominating the Korean Peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.
Tuesday
August 10, 2021
Kim Yo-jong keeps banging drum against drill
A Lockheed Martin U-2S high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft lands at Osan Air Base in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi, after completing a mission Tuesday afternoon. Seoul and Washington kicked off their four-day crisis management staff training Tuesday as a prelude to their annual summertime military exercise next week, and Kim Yo-jong, the North Korean leader’s sister, issued a statement the same day slamming the joint drill. [NEWS1]
Kim Yo-jong, the North Korean leader's sister, lambasted Seoul and Washington Tuesday for their annual summertime joint military exercise and demanded the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula.
Through an English-language statement in the North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Kim expressed her "deep regret at the perfidious behavior of the south Korean authorities," warning that a "a dear price should be paid."
South Korea and the United States kicked off Tuesday a four-day crisis management staff training as a prelude to their main annual summertime joint exercise scheduled from Aug. 16 to 26.
Kim, a vice department director of the North's ruling Workers' Party's Central Committee, said Seoul and Washington's preliminary training and next week's main combined command exercise "are the most vivid expression of the U.S. hostile policy towards the DPRK," using the acronym for the North's full name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
She went onto demand the United States withdraw its troops and military assets from South Korea.
"For peace to settle on the peninsula, it is imperative for the U.S. to withdraw its aggression troops and war hardware deployed in South Korea," said Kim. "As long as the U.S. forces stay in south Korea, the root cause for the periodic aggravation of the situation on the Korean peninsula will never vanish."
Kim Yo-jong, sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, speaks at a Workers’ Party Politburo meeting on June 29, broadcasted on state television on June 30. [YONHAP]
Kim accused the United States of being a "chief architect destroying peace and stability in the region" for pushing forward with the joint drill "at such a sensitive time as now when the international eyes are focused on the development of the situation on the peninsula."
She said that this "proves that 'diplomatic engagement' and 'dialogue with no strings attached' touted by the present U.S. administration is hypocrisy to cover up its aggressive nature."
The Joe Biden administration said it will take a "practical and calibrated" approach to Pyongyang and has offered dialogue without condition multiple times. It has also adhered to strict sanctions and demands for the North to improve its human rights situation.
Kim claimed that the U.S. and South Korean armies "desperately" started the joint military exercise, "further accelerating the unstable situation despite the unanimous denunciation and rejection at home and abroad."
Pyongyang has regularly protested Seoul and Washington's annual springtime and summertime military drills, which it views as rehearsals for invasion of the North.
Some South Korean government officials and lawmakers have called for a postponement of the current drill, taking into consideration inter-Korean relations, which showed some indications of thawing with the recent revival of cross-border communications lines.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi also openly opposed the Seoul-Washington exercise at the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) last Friday, saying that the United States "should not take any actions that will intensify tensions" if it wants to resume dialogue with the North.
However, South Korea's military said the computer-simulated joint summertime exercise will be conducted as scheduled, though with a reduction of participating personnel due to the Covid-19 situation.
In her statement, Kim said, "Whatever the scale and mode, the joint military exercises are of aggressive nature as they are a war rehearsal."
North Korea "will counter the U.S. on the principle of power for power and goodwill for goodwill," said Kim. She added that Pyongyang plans to increase its national defense capabilities and abilities to conduct a "powerful preemptive strike."
The press statement was released "upon authorization," which indicates that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un was behind its release.
Kim's statement was also broadcast on state television Tuesday afternoon, which means it could be seen domestically.
In contrast, her Aug. 1 statement released by the on KCNA, aimed at an external audience, was not carried in the North's official Rodong Sinmun nor aired on its state-run Korean Central Television.
Kim in her statement on Aug. 1 demanded a suspension to the Seoul-Washington military exercise, which she said could undermine inter-Korean relations, calling on the South to choose between "hope and despair."
Previous North Korean leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il, while they did not officially agree to the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea, indicated they understood the need for them during negotiations with Washington and Seoul.
At the first high-level meeting between Kim Yong-sun, a secretary for international affairs of North Korea's Workers' Party, and Arnold Kanter, U.S. under secretary of state for political affairs under President Bill Clinton, in New York in January 1992, the North proposed the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces Korea should Pyongyang and Washington establish diplomatic ties, which was refused by the United States.
This was later confirmed through accounts of the first inter-Korean summit on June 15, 2000 between President Kim Dae-jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, which describe that the North had tacitly agreed to recognize the necessity of U.S. forces in South Korea on the condition of the establishment of diplomatic ties with the United States during the 1992 talks.
Thae Yong-ho, a lawmaker from the main opposition People Power Party and a former North Korea diplomat who defected in 2016, said in a statement Tuesday that leader Kim Jong-un is "trying to get the United States to withdraw from the Korean Peninsula by threatening to press the nuclear button first."
He added, "North Korea, through more intense pressure, will continue in the future to try to weaken the [South-U.S.] alliance and increase mistrust due to differing views on the joint military exercises, and induce clashes within the U.S. political circle over the possibility of sacrificing U.S. forces in Korea rather than its own people in the U.S. mainland."
Thae pointed out that the recent withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq and Afghanistan "may have given encouragement to the Kim siblings."
Responding to Kim Yo-jong's latest bellicose statement, a South Korean Unification Ministry official told reporters Tuesday, "Tensions should never be heightened on the Korean Peninsula under any circumstances," adding that Seoul will be "prepared for all possibilities."
The official continued, "I hope that the will to establish peace on the Korean Peninsula and develop inter-Korean relations, which was confirmed during the recent exchanges of personal letters between the two leaders, will be respected."
Inter-Korean communication lines were restored on July 27 after Pyongyang unilaterally severed them 18 months ago, following a series of letter exchanges between President Moon Jae-in and the North Korean leader since April.
A senior Blue House official told reporters Tuesday, "We will not make any predictions about the intentions of the statement or North Korea's future responses for now, but we are closely monitoring North Korea's future actions."
The official said Kim's statement repeated "North Korea's previous stance" regarding the joint drills with Washington.
The two Koreas exchanged regular daily phone calls through their revived hotlines Tuesday, confirmed the Unification Ministry.
However, the ministry said later that the North Korean side did not respond to another afternoon call and that it will be monitoring the situation.
Ahead of the Seoul-Washington training, John Kirby, the Pentagon spokesman, said in a briefing Monday, "Nothing's changed about our need for readiness on the Korean Peninsula and our desire to work in lockstep with our ROK [Republic of Korea] allies on a training regimen that improves that readiness and keeps that readiness strong."
BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]
10. Shocking spy activities (north Korea in South Korea)
A wise recommendation from the Joongang Ilbo editorial board:
It is true that the prosecution was under attack for its abuse of power in investigating pro-North espionage cases. The suspects in the latest case also attributed their arrests to the NIS’s “fabrication of the results of its investigation.” The solution does not lie in a hurried revamping of investigative authorities, but in the sophistication of their investigation capability. The government must reconsider its hasty restructuring of intelligence agencies after thoroughly analyzing the North’s espionage campaigns before it’s too late.
Monday
August 9, 2021
Shocking spy activities
Appalling acts by a group of South Korean citizens working for North Korea are being exposed one after another. Beyond the level of staging rallies opposing the introduction of F-35A stealth fighter jets to South Korea, they contacted North Korean spies overseas and made a pledge of allegiance to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. That’s just the tip of the iceberg. Members of the group based in North Chungcheong worked for a presidential campaign as special advisors and even engaged in collecting donations for the impeachment of a sitting prosecutor general. One of the members, the owner of a local news organization, is suspected of having reported activities by the National Intelligence Service (NIS), the prosecution and the police to North Korea.
What dumbfounds us is its campaign to read “With the Century” — a memoir by North Korea’s founding father Kim Il Sung — in front of the National Police Agency in central Seoul in May. The top police agency is supposed to lead investigations on spy activities after receiving the right to investigate communist activities from the NIS since the ruling Democratic Party (DP) unilaterally passed a revision on the NIS Act in December. Is it really normal for a local spy group to embark on such a campaign in front of the police headquarters even after the NIS found evidence of it taking orders from North Korea?
The Defense Security Command handling counter-espionage activities in the military was renamed the Defense Security Support Command. The prosecution’s public security department in charge of the arrest, search and seizure, and indictment of suspects on spy charges changed its name to the Public Investigation Department. That’s not all. The NIS will soon lose its authority to deal with communist activities at home and abroad. Its jurisdiction will be handed over to the police in 2024.
Experts in counter-espionage are deeply worried about a security vacuum if the NIS is entirely stripped of its authority to handle pro-North Korea activities. The NIS reportedly obtained tangible evidence of pro-North activities by the group based in Chungcheong. The DP has recklessly pushed to rid the top spy agency of its authority to handle pro-North Korea activities shortly after the launch of the administration in 2017. In the meantime, North Korea contacted South Koreans in China and Cambodia to conduct spy activities here over the past four years.
It is true that the prosecution was under attack for its abuse of power in investigating pro-North espionage cases. The suspects in the latest case also attributed their arrests to the NIS’s “fabrication of the results of its investigation.” The solution does not lie in a hurried revamping of investigative authorities, but in the sophistication of their investigation capability. The government must reconsider its hasty restructuring of intelligence agencies after thoroughly analyzing the North’s espionage campaigns before it’s too late.
11. Report: North Korea likely to reopen land trade routes with China
We have been seeing reports like this for the past few months but Kim Jong-un does not seem to have made the decision to reopen the border for trade. It is his decisions that are causing the suffering. He is focused on maximum control of all aspects of north Korea, from the border to the economy to information.
Report: North Korea likely to reopen land trade routes with China
In this 2020 June file photo taken in Dandong, China, North Korea's Sinuiju is seen across the Aprok River that separates the two countries / Korea Times file
North Korea is likely to reopen suspended land-based trading routes with China after months of delays, according to a Japanese press report.
A source based in the Chinese city of Dandong, in Liaoning Province, told the Nikkei that information about the reopening came from North Korean officials. North Korea-China trade is likely to "resume at the end of the month," the source said.
Dandong is an important point of exchange for the two countries. Close to 90 percent of North Korea's trade is conducted with China, and 70 percent of all China-North Korea trade took place through Dandong before the pandemic.
North Korea's closure of its borders since the start of the pandemic has led to a dramatic decline in activity, but the country may have left maritime routes open for emergency goods.
Earlier this year, the Port State Control Committee of the Asia-Pacific showed North Korean ships entering different Chinese ports.
Activity has yet to reach pre-pandemic levels and could face a long road to recovery, however. According to Seoul's Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency, North Korea's total foreign trade fell by 73.4 percent to $863 million in 2020.
The Nikkei also reported Monday that other trading company executives in Dandong are "not sure" about a border reopening, citing the surge in cases of the contagious Delta variant of COVID-19 in China.
North Korea has attempted to resume land-based trade "several times" since April, but ultimately delayed a reopening because Kim Jong-un was concerned about the latest wave of the novel coronavirus in China, a China-based diplomatic source said, according to the report.
North Korea voiced concerns about the pandemic Friday at the ASEAN Regional Forum.
North Korean Ambassador to Indonesia An Kwang-il, who also is Pyongyang's envoy to ASEAN, said North Korea's response to COVID-19 was a success. The Delta variant spread in other countries because of "hasty" policy to lift restrictions, An said.
"We will thoroughly prevent the spread of COVID-19 in North Korea," the North Korean diplomat said, according to Seoul Economic Daily Monday. (UPI)
12. Kim Joon-hyung on How Seoul Can Lead Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula
I fear the recommended "third zone" is really the "danger zone." The new chancellor of the Korean National Diplomatic Academy seems to discount the importance of the ROK/US alliance and that Korea can maintain a balanced position between China and the US. There could be long term implications.
The number of U.S. allies and partner countries combined is about 60 countries, and the number of countries having China as the No. 1 trade partner exceeds 110. The problem is that most of these countries overlap. Korea faces the biggest burden, as the country’s economy heavily depends on China while it relies greatly on the U.S. in terms of security. But as a matter of fact, the entire world is now caught between the two great powers. Currently, Korea is trying to keep its foreign policy underpinned by the ROK-U.S. alliance while refraining from damaging its relations with China. This is different from strategic ambiguity, and it is not about seeking a pure balance. If the two Koreas choose a path that leads to confrontation amid the U.S.-China strategic competition, the Korean Peninsula could become the center of the New Cold War. To avoid this, it is necessary to actively communicate discourse on peaceful coexistence. The Korean Peninsula must show the world that it can overcome its “peace deficit” and send compelling messages to the broader international community.
Next, it is necessary to work together with countries that have the same stance to prevent the revival of geopolitics and restore the liberal international order. Instead of being forced to choose between the U.S. and China, we can establish the so-called “third zone” in solidarity with countries that share the same vision and will. Pivotal countries such as the ROK, France, Germany, Canada, and ASEAN member states can work together to buffer the U.S.-China conflict and avoid making a binary choice, while assisting developing countries that are suffering from the disappearance of global governance. One specific example can be the recent blame game between Washington and Beijing over the WHO investigations into COVID-19 origins. Although it is difficult to find a clear scientific answer, the investigations are quickly becoming politicized, creating a framework that forces other nations to choose a side. Against this backdrop, South Korea should make diplomatic efforts to lead international discourse by sending a message that the international community must now focus on resolving the most pressing problem – the global spread of COVID-19 together. And as a country with a successful quarantine strategy, Korea can and must prove that it is the world’s vaccination hub with leading technologies that power our COVD-19 response.
Kim Joon-hyung on How Seoul Can Lead Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula
The Diplomat’s Mitch Shin interviews Dr. Kim Joon-hyung, chancellor of Korea National Diplomatic Academy, on the Korean peace process.
August 10, 2021
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Since South Korean President Moon Jae-in took office in 2017, he has been actively seeking opportunities to lead North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to engage in his primary agenda – building a “nuclear-free” and “peaceful” Korean Peninsula. He and then-U.S. President Donald Trump each had summit meetings with Kim, but the trilateral dialogue and negotiations for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula stalled after 2019 Hanoi Summit broke down without productive results. Moon leaves office in May next year – what can he achieve before then?
For an in-depth look, the Diplomat’s Mitch Shin interviewed Dr. Kim Joon-hyung, chancellor of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA) and professor of international studies at Handong Global University in South Korea. Kim was a member of Moon’s presidential campaign team, providing consulting and writing major foreign policies. After Moon was elected, Kim joined the Government Transition Committee and became a member of the Presidential Commission on Policy Planning (in the Security and Foreign Policy Subcommittee). In addition to that, he belongs to Advisory Committees for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Unification, and National Security Council. Dr. Kim earned his bachelor’s degree at Yonsei University (1986), and M.A. and Ph.D. at George Washington University.
The interview below has been lightly edited for clarity.
Since President Moon took office, how has South Korea’s diplomacy or foreign policy changed?
The first and most striking difference is the commitment to the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. Preventing another war and building sustainable peace on the Peninsula has been President Moon Jae-in’s signature policy. In 2017, the Moon administration faced the Trump administration’s hardline policy toward Pyongyang and North Korea’s completion of its nuclear weapons program that could have erupted into a military conflict on the Peninsula. However, President Moon’s commitment and efforts resulted in successful summits in Panmunjom, Singapore, and Pyongyang in 2018. Of course, the setback in Hanoi has led to a long deadlock, but tensions have been drastically reduced compared to 2017 when President Moon took office, and North Korea has not conducted strategic provocations – nuclear and ICBM tests – for years.
The second difference is the diversification of Korean diplomacy. It would not be an overstatement to say that Seoul’s diplomacy used to focus mostly on the U.S. and North Korea in the past. However, over the past four years, Seoul has diversified diplomatic counterparts, re-orienting its diplomatic overtures toward broader regions. In particular, the New Southern Policy and New Northern Policy, which I first coined the terms for and wrote about from the initial stage in President Moon Jae-in’s election camp, are the key achievements of the diversification of Korean diplomacy. In addition, the recent Korea-U.S. summit and G-7 meetings showed that Korea’s national power and international standing increased further. This is attributable to Korea’s strengths in the two most important “value areas” in the current international order – value system and value chain. Korea is now to play an important role in value areas such as democracy and human rights, and Korea has been perceived as a critical link in global value chains – semiconductors, batteries, and biotechnology. And Korea will likely play a greater role on multiple fronts on the international stage in the coming years.
Can the unification and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula be achieved through the Korean government’s diplomacy?
Normatively and realistically, there is no choice but to resolve the North Korea and unification issues through diplomacy. First, the recurrence of war on the Korean Peninsula can never be acceptable. It is also unacceptable to turn a blind eye to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and recognize it. Some argue that tightening sanctions could lead to a North Korean regime collapse, but history tells us otherwise. The imposition of stringent sanctions itself has never led to regime collapse. It seems to me that North Korea’s regime collapse is simply a myth or wishful thinking. After the collapse of the socialist camp in the 1990s, the possibility of a North Korean collapse drew much attention. North Korea, however, has survived the so-called “Arduous March,” the 1990s famine that killed more than 2 million of North Koreans, natural disasters, and diplomatic isolation, and even succeeded in developing nuclear weapons. Recently, with North Korea facing a complex set of challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, flooding, and sanctions, speculations over the possibility of regime collapse and the reinforcement of sanctions emerged again. The situation in North Korea is difficult, but it is far from regime collapse.
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Bringing up the issue of regime collapse would only create a vicious cycle in which North Korea keeps launching strategic provocations to show its robustness. Although the current sanctions against North Korea are the strongest in the U.N.’s history, the impact on the Kim Jong Un regime’s survivability seems overestimated. China and Russia will not let North Korea collapse either. After all, diplomatic negotiations are the only way out.
Regarding the issue of unification, I believe the two Koreas could achieve it once the two sides build sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula so that neither side is perceived as a threat. In this regard, unification will be possible only after achieving peace on the Korean Peninsula through diplomacy. Korean unification is more about the process than the outcome. President Moon and I are basically in agreement on this.
Does Washington actually want the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula? What kind of relationship does Washington seek to build with North Korea?
I am quite sure that there are different views in Washington’s political circle. Some would sincerely want North Korea’s denuclearization while others want to use the North Korean challenges to provide leverage against a rising China and strengthen the U.S. alliance in Northeast Asia. But more to the point, the denuclearization of North Korea is not an urgent issue in U.S. diplomacy although it is one of the key issues. And it appears that many in Washington view the issue as a high-risk, low-return agenda that has lasted more than three decades.
Pyongyang has claimed that it has developed its nuclear weapons program because of Washington’s hostile policy and that it will denuclearize itself only when Washington withdraws that stance first. But the U.S. has demanded that Pyongyang act first by dismantling its nuclear weapons and facilities. However, it seems unlikely that Washington will move first to make breakthroughs as it is facing pressing domestic issues. North Korea has refrained from relying too much on China, saying it wants to improve ties with the U.S., and even said that it could play a role in keeping China in check, as India and Pakistan have done. But it appears that the U.S. is not intent on doing so.
It is often the case that Washington demonizes Pyongyang out of deep-seated distrust and is reluctant to negotiate with Pyongyang. From Washington’s perspective, North Korea is the object to defeat ultimately, not just a negotiation counterpart with good intentions. It is correct that North Korea is a one-man dictatorship and the people have been suffering under tyranny. Nevertheless, it should be recognized as a dialogue partner, because doing so is in the interests of both Seoul and Washington and would open up avenues for denuclearization and sustainable peace on the Korean peninsula. Former Ambassador to ROK Donald Gregg said in his memoir that the biggest reason behind the failure of U.S. foreign policies was the tendency of demonizing leaders or groups in hostile nations.
Can the South Korean government persuade Washington hawks and politicians who are pessimistic on dialogue with North Korea?
For now, the U.S. holds the key to breaking the current impasse. So, it is most critical to persuade Washington. The priority should be dispelling some of the prejudices that the U.S. holds. The two things I have already mentioned are the myth of North Korean collapse and demonization of North Korea. The next is the premature conclusion that Pyongyang will never give up its nuclear weapons program and that dialogue is a time-earning tactic to strengthen its nuclear capabilities. North Korea’s willingness to denuclearize itself is not a fixed principle. Instead, its willingness is likely to change depending on conditions and circumstances. Chairman Kim Jong Un’s denuclearization promise is conditional after all, which means that he will drop nuclear ambitions only for something better than possessing the weapons. From where we stand, it is reasonable to persuade the North to give up its nuclear weapons program as fast as possible with the slightest concessions. However, from Pyongyang’s perspective, it is reasonable to get the most out of the negotiation process, not giving up its nuclear programs until the last minute. The skepticism over North Korea’s willingness to denuclearize itself can motivate the North to further advance nuclear and missile capabilities.
The Korean government needs to persuade the U.S. to adopt a different approach. The U.S. needs to adopt a phased approach rather than a comprehensive. Of course, it is understandable that the U.S. is sick of Pyongyang’s “salami tactics.” However, considering North Korea’s nuclear advancements and the diversification of its capabilities, the “one-shot” solution is no longer feasible. Steering the denuclearization process in two or three stages could be most reasonable and effective. In the context of the Korean government’s consistent stance – “comprehensive agreement, phased implementation” – the Hanoi summit can be considered an intermediate stage, and efforts were made to close part of the Yongbyon nuclear complex in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. As U.S. Secretary of State Blinken said, “Now the ball is in North Korea’s court.” However, that kind of approach only causes a delay in solving the problem, raising the possibility of the return of strategic patience. The best starter at this moment would be providing humanitarian assistance, including COVID-19 vaccines, food, and fertilizer, through international organizations to underscore good intentions without setting preconditions for the resumption of nuclear talks.
Would China support the U.S. and South Korea’s plans to lead the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula?
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China has consistently opposed North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons and even agreed to impose U.N. sanctions. However, the extent to which Beijing recognizes Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons as a threat is very different from that of Seoul and Washington. In particular, China does not intend to achieve North Korean denuclearization by pressuring it to an extent that damages its relationship. And at a time when the U.S. is trying to strengthen the ROK-U.S.-Japan alliance to keep China in check, Pyongyang can at least serve as a buffer state. Taken together, China is less likely to push too hard to denuclearize North Korea, even if China supports the DPRK’s ultimate denuclearization
During the Obama era, the U.S. maintained strategic patience and urged China to use its leverage over North Korea to pressure the regime. China refused to take concrete action, claiming that its leverage over North Korea is not as strong as the U.S. thinks. When the Trump administration bypassed China and negotiated directly with Pyongyang, Xi Jinping tried not to be sidelined by meeting with Kim Jong Un several times, and North Korea leveraged its relations with China to negotiate with the U.S. For this reason, Trump later put the blame on China for the failed negotiations.
The Biden administration has called North Korea’s denuclearization a possible area of cooperation with China, along with climate change and the coronavirus pandemic. Diplomacy is necessary to encourage China to be an important contributor to denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula in order to prevent China from using North Korea as a means of countering the United States. In this regard, the Beijing Winter Olympics could be a good opportunity. China also could take the Olympic Games as an opportunity to promote its image as an important contributor to world peace, not a threatening country that seeks to change the international order as portrayed by the United States.
What principles should South Korea follow to formulate a foreign policy between the two superpowers, the U.S. and China?
The number of U.S. allies and partner countries combined is about 60 countries, and the number of countries having China as the No. 1 trade partner exceeds 110. The problem is that most of these countries overlap. Korea faces the biggest burden, as the country’s economy heavily depends on China while it relies greatly on the U.S. in terms of security. But as a matter of fact, the entire world is now caught between the two great powers. Currently, Korea is trying to keep its foreign policy underpinned by the ROK-U.S. alliance while refraining from damaging its relations with China. This is different from strategic ambiguity, and it is not about seeking a pure balance. If the two Koreas choose a path that leads to confrontation amid the U.S.-China strategic competition, the Korean Peninsula could become the center of the New Cold War. To avoid this, it is necessary to actively communicate discourse on peaceful coexistence. The Korean Peninsula must show the world that it can overcome its “peace deficit” and send compelling messages to the broader international community.
Next, it is necessary to work together with countries that have the same stance to prevent the revival of geopolitics and restore the liberal international order. Instead of being forced to choose between the U.S. and China, we can establish the so-called “third zone” in solidarity with countries that share the same vision and will. Pivotal countries such as the ROK, France, Germany, Canada, and ASEAN member states can work together to buffer the U.S.-China conflict and avoid making a binary choice, while assisting developing countries that are suffering from the disappearance of global governance. One specific example can be the recent blame game between Washington and Beijing over the WHO investigations into COVID-19 origins. Although it is difficult to find a clear scientific answer, the investigations are quickly becoming politicized, creating a framework that forces other nations to choose a side. Against this backdrop, South Korea should make diplomatic efforts to lead international discourse by sending a message that the international community must now focus on resolving the most pressing problem – the global spread of COVID-19 together. And as a country with a successful quarantine strategy, Korea can and must prove that it is the world’s vaccination hub with leading technologies that power our COVD-19 response.
13. North Korea: the failure of ‘maximum pressure’ on Kim’s isolated regime
Mr White does not describe what behavior by north Korea that he wishes to condone by lifting sanctions. Does he support continued nuclear and missile development?, Proliferation?, Global illicit activities? Cyber attacks? Human rights abuses and crimes against humanity in north Korea?
And he fails to recognize that it is not the sanctions that are causing the suffering. It is Kim Jong-un's deliberate policy decisions to prioritize nuclear and missile development and support to the military and the elite rather than the welfare of the Korean people living in the north.
Excerpts:
The sanctions ultimately cause more harm by pushing the secretive state deeper into its shell, some experts say. They add that there are clear signs that the state’s acquisition of stocks of nuclear and chemical weapons has not been curtailed by the sanctions regime.
Ordinary North Koreans have suffered as a result of the sanctions and their plight has worsened in the past 18 months: a crackdown on cross-border trade and travel — a bid by Pyongyang to keep the coronavirus pandemic at bay — has severed access to China, North Korea’s main economic lifeline. All the while, the lavish lifestyle of the leader Kim Jong Un and his court continues unabashed.
North Korea: the failure of ‘maximum pressure’ on Kim’s isolated regime
For decades, Kuwait was a critical hub in North Korea’s network of foreign outposts. Every year, thousands of labourers would take an Air Koryo flight from Pyongyang via Islamabad before being dispatched to construction sites across the oil-rich Gulf state or elsewhere in the Middle East and Africa.
At its peak, the sweat of about 100,000 overseas workers generated as much as $500m hard currency a year for the nuclear-armed regime, according to US government estimates.
But a few years ago the flow of workers declined to a trickle as Kuwaiti authorities acted in accordance with UN sanctions banning the workers. Consular staff assigned to process the workers’ visas, contracts and their salaries were fast becoming obsolete — also curtailing their opportunities for kickbacks and smuggling schemes.
According to people familiar with an official cable sent to diplomats in Seoul in 2019, North Korea had struggled to afford the rent on its embassy in Kuwait and was forced to move to cheaper premises.
“Things were completely different after sanctions took effect,” says one person with knowledge of the situation.
Kim Jong Un waves to participants in a workshop of the commanders and political officers of the Korean People’s Army last month © KNCA/AP
The demise of the scheme to raise funds in the Gulf is one result of the 15-year-long campaign of increasingly harsh sanctions dubbed “maximum pressure”, led by the UN and the US, that have been designed to choke off the regime’s sources of income.
The sanctions ultimately cause more harm by pushing the secretive state deeper into its shell, some experts say. They add that there are clear signs that the state’s acquisition of stocks of nuclear and chemical weapons has not been curtailed by the sanctions regime.
Ordinary North Koreans have suffered as a result of the sanctions and their plight has worsened in the past 18 months: a crackdown on cross-border trade and travel — a bid by Pyongyang to keep the coronavirus pandemic at bay — has severed access to China, North Korea’s main economic lifeline. All the while, the lavish lifestyle of the leader Kim Jong Un and his court continues unabashed.
Workers carry bundles of canvas on the North Korean-China river border near Sinuiju. Ordinary North Koreans have suffered as a result of sanctions © Ng Han Guan/AP
Rachel Lee, a former US government analyst now with the 38 North programme at the Stimson Center think-tank in Washington, describes the dichotomy as “two different worlds — there is definitely a disconnect between the lifestyle of not just the Kim family but the top elite, and the remainder of the population”.
The failure of sanctions is prompting calls for President Joe Biden’s administration to overhaul what has been a de facto policy in four successive administrations.
“The original intention has not been achieved — North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile capabilities have been strengthened,” says one former senior presidential adviser in Seoul who has dealt directly with Pyongyang. “Yet the collateral damage has been widespread. The North Korean people are suffering. Efforts towards reform and opening and a market system have been further delayed. But they cannot get away from it because sanctions have become a kind of theology in Washington, nobody can touch it.”
Violation and defection
North Korea’s overseas labourers are just one strand in a massive web of duplicitous schemes designed with a singular purpose: to bring in cash for the Kim regime. UN investigators, as well as law enforcement and military officials from scores of countries, have for years tracked individuals, companies and governments in order to stamp down on sanctions breaches.
A small sample of the alleged UN violations linked to Pyongyang’s foreign embassies in recent years include military delegations advising countries in Africa, Iranians suspected of smuggling gold and cash to North Korea, an attempted arms deal in Egypt and coal shipments brokered by Indonesian commodity traders.
Few nations have managed to avoid being touched by the Kim regime’s long tentacles. Between 2015 and 2017, North Korea procured luxury goods from as many as 90 countries, according to the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, a Washington research group.
For many experts, the state’s increased aptitude for cyber crime is of greater worry than where Kim sources his black Mercedes-Maybach limousines.
In March, a UN report included an estimate of cryptocurrency theft worth $316m from 2019 to November 2020. According to one complaint filed by the US justice department in August 2020, one hacker linked to North Korea “allegedly stole over $272,000 worth of alternative cryptocurrencies and tokens, including Proton Tokens, PlayGame tokens and IHT Real Estate Protocol [blockchain] tokens”.
“The targeting of virtual assets and virtual asset service providers is rampant,” says Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, who for five years until 2019 served as the finance and economics expert on the UN panel of experts tracking North Korean sanctions.
Not only are the sanctions still proving porous, but some critics say the effort to impose such heavy economic pressure on Pyongyang can have unintended consequences because North Koreans’ chances of engaging with the world have been cut off, blocking the flow of information and ideas.
Sokeel Park, director of Liberty in North Korea, a group that helps North Koreans defect and resettle in South Korea, says sanctions — including the ban on foreign workers — weaken the chances of change inside North Korea. There are also fears that Kim’s renewed fervour for juche — the doctrine of self-reliance developed by his grandfather, the country’s founding leader Kim Il Sung — is laying the ground for years of deepening isolation.
“North Korea changes the more you interact with it,” he says. “If you isolate it from the outside, you actually play into the worst tendencies or instincts of the system. Fewer North Koreans get the crucial contact and exposure to the outside world which does change their awareness and mentality, and downgrades North Korean official ideologies and narratives.”
Instead, people like Park who maintain contacts inside North Korea say the space for engagement is shrinking.
The border restrictions in place since coronavirus cases spread from Wuhan, China, in January 2020 have been beefed up to include shoot-to-kill orders for violators. The meagre savings of people reliant on trade and the grey markets, known as jangmadang, have been eviscerated.
Kuwait City: the flow of North Korean workers declined to a trickle after the Gulf state’s authorities acted in accordance with UN sanctions © Urbanmyth/Alamy
Ha Jin-woo, a defector in South Korea, says the networks designed to help people leave North Korea, as well as facilitate the smuggling of money and information into the country, are eroding. “The North Korean people have suffered a huge blow,” Ha says.
The number of brokers facilitating cross-border contact is in decline. Consumption of foreign media inside North Korea — including South Korean-made dramas and K-pop smuggled in from China — has fallen under renewed levels of scrutiny. Even phone calls to family members outside the country have become too risky, meaning defectors are finding it “almost impossible” to make arrangements to send money back to their families, Ha says.
“The extent of control and punishment has been strengthened,” he adds.
Human rights groups have noted that since 2012 — after Kim and Chinese president Xi Jinping rose to power — border controls have become progressively more draconian.
According to official South Korean data, the number of North Koreans who successfully navigated their way through China and south-east Asia and arrived in Seoul fell to around 1,000 in 2019, from 3,000 a decade earlier. Ryu Hyun Woo, who was Pyongyang’s envoy in Kuwait as sanctions began to hit the embassy’s operations, was one of the most recent high-profile defections. Between April and June this year only two new defectors landed in Seoul, the lowest number since records began.
A South Korean TV news broadcast of a military parade commemorating the 75th anniversary of North Korea’s ruling Workers’ party held in Pyongyang © Jung Yeon-Je/AFP/Getty Images
Waterslides and warheads
In early June, fleets of jet skis were seen cruising atop emerald waters alongside stretches of white sand near Kim’s summer retreat at Wonsan, on North Korea’s south-east coast. A month later, an 80-metre-long floating water park — complete with an Olympic-sized swimming pool and twin spiralling waterslides — was docked at one of the 37-year-old leader’s four beachside mansions in the area.
The scenes illustrated that neither international sanctions nor 18 months of strict border closures aimed at keeping out coronavirus have restricted the lives of luxury enjoyed by the ruler’s family and his court.
Yet in the intervening weeks, Kim publicly reprimanded top cadres in Pyongyang and called for emergency measures over what state media conceded was a “food crisis” in the country.
“It is clear evidence they are enjoying themselves when they are not playing up for the camera,” says Colin Zwirko, a Seoul-based analyst with information service NK Pro, who uncovered the Kims’ latest water-based leisure activities while meticulously poring over satellite imagery.
For some North Korea watchers, the question of why sanctions have failed to significantly tarnish the opulence enjoyed by those at the top, nor rein in Kim’s nuclear weapons technology advancements, has a simple answer: China.
Speaking in late November, the final days of the Trump presidency, Alex Wong, then deputy assistant secretary of state for North Korea, made a series of stunning claims.
China, Wong said, still hosted as many as 20,000 North Korean labourers. On 555 separate occasions in 2020, the US had observed ships carrying prohibited coal or other sanctioned goods from North Korea to China.
Wong said Beijing was “seeking to undo the UN sanctions regime they themselves voted for . . . They are seeking to revive trade links and revenue transfers to the North.”
Beijing, Wong explained, also turned a blind eye to “shadowy avenues” enabling North Korea’s weapons procurement. “The DPRK cannot do that without middlemen. It cannot do that without illicit bank accounts. It cannot do that without a network of money launderers. The overwhelming number of those middlemen, bank accounts and money launderers operate within the borders of China.” Beijing has long denied allegations of supporting North Korea’s illicit activities.
Recent UN reports have noted allegations that North Korea and Iran have resumed technical co-operation on long-range ballistic missile development — officials in Tehran dispute the claims as based on “false information and fabricated data”.
Others argue the US itself should not escape blame for inconsistent sanctions enforcement.
“When I first heard this expression, ‘maximum pressure’, my answer was: I’ll believe it when I see a nine-digit civil penalty against one of the banks that’s helping to launder this money, including the cryptocurrency transactions,” says Joshua Stanton, an American lawyer who helped draft the US sanction laws on North Korea. “I don’t think that we’re serious.”
Back in Seoul, the former South Korean adviser believes the pressure from sanctions will only ever have one outcome: pushing Kim towards a greater dependence on illegal activities and further into China’s orbit.
“Sanctions, for the US, is a matter of policy choice. For North Korea, attempting to overcome sanctions is simply a matter of life and death. North Korea will do whatever it takes to survive.”
Pyongyang: a crackdown on cross-border trade and travel in an effort to keep the pandemic at bay has severed access to China, North Korea’s main economic lifeline © Kyodo/Alamy
An unstable status quo
North Korea’s latest inward turn marks a stark change from 2018 and early 2019 when Kim embarked upon a period of unprecedented summitry, meeting China’s Xi, Russian leader Vladimir Putin and then-president Donald Trump.
When Kim arrived at the Hanoi’s Metropole Hotel and shook hands with Trump on February 28 2019, even some of Washington’s most sceptical observers conceded that a potential US-North Korea deal was finally on the cards.
Kim’s 4,500km journey on his personal, heavily armoured train from Pyongyang through China suggested he was willing to ink a deal that exchanged steps towards denuclearisation for easing of sanctions. But after negotiations fell apart — the US deeming Pyongyang’s promises insufficient — plans for further talks in Berlin and Stockholm were abandoned. The fleeting Trump-Kim bromance dissipated and the two sides have returned to an unstable, acrimonious status quo of sanctions and weapons development.
Since then the North Koreans have become even more impoverished, with the state facing its worst economic downturn since Kim was handed power after the death of his father, Kim Jong Il, in late 2011.
Crop production has been worse than usual after devastating flooding over the past two years. Scarcity of goods and a crackdown on foreign exchange dealers have sparked volatility in the won, the North Korean currency, and rises in the prices of basics such as rice, corn and cooking oil.
Alex Wong, then deputy assistant secretary of state for North Korea, centre, made a series of stunning claims in the final days of the Trump presidency. US aide Lisa Kenna, left, and secretary of state Mike Pompeo, right, during their visit in 2018 © AP
There are also rising expectations North Korea will slip to the back of the queue in the rollout of Covid-19 vaccines. Pyongyang can access the Covax programme under Gavi, a UN-backed alliance, but foreign medical experts have not gained access to the country to assess the status of its distribution networks.
Sydney Seiler, national intelligence officer for North Korea at the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence, reiterated last week that Washington has always “made clear” the benefits North Korea would accrue from giving up its nuclear weapons.
“We’ve arranged the carrots in different ways in different administrations. But all we’ve learnt . . . is that Kim Jong Un is not a rabbit,” he said.
Still, given the signs of the worsening humanitarian situation, some analysts believe the US should orchestrate limited relief from the UN sanctions — even if a wholesale sanctions review is not on the cards in Washington, nor a comprehensive freeze on nuclear weapons development in Pyongyang.
Daniel Wertz, a senior adviser at the National Committee on North Korea, a US think-tank, says specific steps might include a limited reopening of trade and potentially raising the international cap on oil imports. A barter arrangement could also be offered to allow Pyongyang to export some commodities in exchange for food or medicine. And small scale inter-Korean economic projects could be restarted.
All are moves that would help boost North Korean industry rather than the nuclear programme. Such concessions could draw Kim back to the table for nuclear talks. “I think it is very possible that the North Korean leadership will at some point realise what a deep hole it’s got itself into and seek to come to the negotiating table to get itself out,” he says.
The US and South Korea agreed “to explore humanitarian initiatives” in North Korea, Washington said last week. But others fear that the problems posed by an increasingly isolated, yet still nuclear-armed North Korea are no longer at the forefront of American foreign policy.
Eventually, says Kleine-Ahlbrandt, the US will again be “forced to do something” in response. In the meantime, she asks: “We lose how many more years? How much more fissile material is that?”
The Biden administration, she says, “will come to regret this”.
Additional reporting by Kang Buseong and Song Jung-a in Seoul
14. US-South Korea drills drop gauntlet on Pyongyang
"Wobbles" in Seoul. We cannot change domestic politics in Korea but we can observe that the 74 lawmakers and the South Korean appeasement faction do damage to the alliance and put the security of the ROK at risk.
US-South Korea drills drop gauntlet on Pyongyang
Defying table banging by Kim Jong Un’s sister and despite wobbles in Seoul, summer military drills get green light
SEOUL – It has been confirmed that South Korean and US forces will conduct military drills in South Korea in mid-August, drawing a predictably harsh response from the leadership in Pyongyang, and presenting a challenge for pro-engagers in South Korea.
The drills “are the most vivid expression of the US hostile policy towards [North Korea], designed to stifle our state by force, and an unwelcoming act of self-destruction for which a dear price should be paid as they threaten the safety of our people and further imperil the situation on the Korean Peninsula,” Kim Yo Jong, the high-profile sister of national leader Kim Jong Un said in a statement carried by state media on Tuesday morning.
Questions had been raised in South Korea over whether combined South Korean-US military drills should proceed this summer, but Yonhap News, a part state-owned news agency, reported on Monday that they would. The story, citing anonymous sources, said the drills would be held in a scaled-back format due to Covid-19 from August 16-26.
Further confirmation came on Tuesday.
Last week, Asia Times had heard from a source close to US Forces Korea That US personnel and assets have been moved to the peninsula in preparation for the exercises. That suggested a strong US will to proceed with the drills.
The drills are “tabletop drills” – i.e. computer simulations held in sealed command posts – rather than live-fire exercises with troops and kinetic equipment.
There has been a debate underway in the South as to whether it is sound policy to conduct the drills this summer.
Asia Times understands that there is a disconnect within the South Korean government over the drills, with doves in the Ministry of Unification opposed and hawks in the Ministry of National Defense in favor.
South Korean President Moon Jae-in is torn in two directions.
President Moon Jae-in is torn between hawks and doves in his government. Photo: Handout.
On the one hand, Moon, a strong proponent of engagement with North Korea, is nearing the end of his constitutionally mandated single term in office. A presidential election is set for next March. He may be seeking to lay the groundwork of improved relations, either as a personal legacy or as pathway his successor will be compelled to follow.
On the other, Moon also wants the wartime operational control of South Korean forces to move from the US to South Korea – “OPCON Transfer” – to be accelerated. Combined drills are stress-test milestones in that process.
North Korea rumbles
North Korea customarily considers alliance exercises on and around the peninsula practice for an invasion, and a halting of the combined drills is a policy priority.
Following the first summit between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un in 2018, drills were stopped as a confidence-building measure. Subsequently, after it became clear that their engagement had not led to a breakthrough, Covid-19 put further dampeners on exercises.
Now, with the Joe Biden administration entering its first summer in office; with vaccinations making an impression on Covid-19; and with North Korea being unresponsive to South Korean and US requests for dialogue; there is a call for the resumption of drills.
Two factors argue for that resumption. First is that the two militaries need to maintain joint inter-operational readiness – a problem that Pyongyang, fielding a single, rather than an allied force, does not face. Second is that the drills pressure a recalcitrant Pyongyang.
Current indications are that Pyongyang is constrained on multiple fronts. It is maintaining a watertight border closure against Covid, its economy is heavily impacted by sanctions, and it is believed to be facing serious – even potentially catastrophic – food shortages.
Yet, in Pyongyang’s corridors of power, there remains sufficient policy bandwidth for the regime to signal its position that it wants the drills red-lighted.
Kim Yo Jong, sister of North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un. Photo: AFP / Jorge Silva / POOL
Pyongyang dangled the carrot of upgraded relations with Seoul on July 27, when it allowed the reconnection of cross-DMZ hotlines. But in short order, a stick was brandished on August 1, via a statement from Kim Yo Jong
Her current outward-facing role in the regime is as an advocate of hardline stances.
“For some days I have been hearing an unpleasant story that joint military exercises between the South Korean army and the US forces could go ahead as scheduled,” Kim said in a statement carried by the state-run Korean Central News Agency on Monday.
“I view this as an undesirable prelude which seriously undermines the will of the top leaders of the North and the South wishing to see a step taken toward restoring mutual trust and which further beclouds the way ahead of the North-South relations.”
In her subsequent statement on Tuesday, Kim was in full flow.
North Korea will increase “the deterrent of absolute capacity to cope with the ever-growing military threats from the US,” she said, “powerful preemptive strike for rapidly countering any military actions against us.”
She also slammed Seoul.
“Availing myself of this opportunity, I would like to express my deep regret at the perfidious behavior of the South Korean authorities,” she said.
Even so, according to South Korean TV news reports this morning, the recently reconnected cross-border hotlines continued normal operations.
Challenges and sensitivities
Seoul’s enthusiasm for engagement grants Pyongyang leverage. While there was considerable hoopla surrounding the reconnection of the cross-border telephone and fax links, some are cynical about its import; after all, their disconnection is a simple matter.
“They just wanted to give us a carrot,” said Choi Jin-wook, who heads the think tank the Center for Strategic and Cultural Studies. “If we don’t want anything from North Korea, this would not be important, but this government is eager to engage.”
The halting of joint drills, is “the long-term goal [North Korea] wants to achieve,” added Choi.
A demonstration firing of a tactical guided weapon in March 2020 at an undisclosed location in North Korea. Photo: AFP/ KCNA VIA KNS
Still, even military experts in the South concede that there is some justice to the North’s point of view that the exercises involve invasion preparations.
“What we do [in the drills] is we absorb the attack and then we counterattack – and the counter-attack portion can be taken that way,” admitted Chun In-bum, a retired South Korean general who commanded the Special Warfare Command.
But he clarified, “It is a counter attack – not a premeditated attack.”
He also suggested that this is known in North Korea. However, the drills provide a convenient bogeyman for the regime to frighten its own people.
“I think Pyongyang does this just to keep their own people under the illusion that the South Koreans and Americans are trying to attack them, to create a crisis,” Chun said.
Due to border closures, halts to trade, food shortages and likely Covid challenges, North Korea is facing a multi-faceted internal crisis. Given this, an external crisis could feasibly be useful for the Pyongyang elite to refocus their population’s attention away from domestic challenges.
In the past, drills in the spring and summer have generated robust responses from the North, sending jitters across the region as – in a phrase beloved of reporters – “tensions rise.”
Pyongyang can choose from a spectrum: maintaining a dignified silence; thundering against the alliance in public forums and state media; holding mass rallies; or testing-firing weapons of its own, notably missiles.
Editor’s Note: This story was updated with breaking developments on Tuesday, August 10.
15. Iran Became a Military Powerhouse Thanks to North Korea
The rogue/revolutionary powers cooperate.
Iran Became a Military Powerhouse Thanks to North Korea
The U.S. State Department is stepping up its efforts to tighten the sanctions regime arrayed against Iran, drawing renewed attention to the thriving arms trade between Pyongyang and Tehran.
The lucrative military partnership between Iran and North Korea began in the 1980’s, when North Korea first established itself as a legal arms exporter across the third and developing world. North Korea became a major weapons supplier to Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, shipping a wide range of small arms, tanks, artillery systems, and heavy ordnance. Tehran also solicited the aid of North Korean military advisors to train Iran’s armed forces in the use of portable surface-to-air missile systems and other advanced weaponry. It has been estimated that, by the war’s end in 1988, around 300 North Korea military advisors were operating in Iran. To be sure, Pyongyang was not particularly invested in that conflict’s outcome; even as they openly aided Tehran, North Korean diplomats were quietly making overtures to Baghdad. As with its many ongoing weapons sales in Africa, North Korea was primarily driven by the profit motive— particularly, the need to maintain its foreign currency reserves.
In the following decade, the trade relationship shifted to missile technology. The precise extent of Iran-North Korea missile cooperation remains unclear, but there is widespread consensus that technology transfers and direct missile sales played a seminal role in helping to get Iran’s nascent missile program off the ground. A 1993 U.S. intelligence assessment called Iran “one of North Korea’s best customers for ballistic missiles and related technology.” Tehran was an early client for North Korea’s Hwasong-7 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), later using it as the design foundation for their homegrown Shahab-3 MRBM. Even as it continued to purchase North Korean missile technology, Iran developed a growing interest in midget submarines. It is widely believed that Iran’s infamous Ghadir-class submarines— a crucial part of the Iranian Navy’s presence in the Persian Gulf and capacity to stage anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) operations across the Hormuz Strait—are a licensed copy of North Korea’s Yono-class vessels, several of which were purchased by Iran in the early 2000’s.
The Pyongyang-Tehran arms trade has only ballooned with the gradual implementation of international sanctions against North Korea since 2006. The two rogue states have allegedly exchanged nuclear secrets, including the relevant mathematical formulas and key testing data. There is also mounting, though largely circumstantial, evidence that they are exploring a potential deal for centrifuges and enriched uranium transfers.
Most recently, the State and Treasury Departments have accused Iranian defense conglomerate Shahid Movahed Industries of cooperating with North Korea on unspecified “long-range missile development projects.” These developments come on the heels of Korea experts’ well-grounded suspicions that North Korea proliferated Hwasong 12/14/15 IRBM and ICBM technology to Iran in recent years.
The United States has made little progress in stemming the ongoing arms trade and robust technical-military cooperation between Iran and North Korea. The State Department promises more sanctions, but both states have proven remarkably adept at skirting the international sanctions regime. Over the past decade, Pyongyang has established an elaborate network of foreign proxies and elaborate ship-to-ship transfers that have kept North Korean arms flowing across the developing world. Meanwhile, a diplomatic solution is even more dubious. With the 2015 Iran deal all but dead and normalization talks with North Korea on prolonged hiatus until at least after the U.S. presidential election, Washington seemingly lacks the leverage to either drive a wedge in North Korea-Iranian military cooperation or to impose meaningful costs on it.
In this article:
Harry J. Kazianis (@Grecianformula) serves as a Senior Director at the Center for the National Interest in Washington, D.C., a Washington D.C.-based think tank founded by President Richard Nixon in 1994. Kazianis in the past served as Editor-In-Chief of the Diplomat and as a national security-focused fellow at CSIS, the Potomac Foundation, and the University of Nottingham (UK). His ideas have been published in the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Newsweek, CNN, CNBC, and many other outlets across the political spectrum.
16. What If Kim Jong-un Dies? It Could Mean Nuclear War.
We still do not have any knowledge as to whether a successor has been designated. Kim Yo-jong is possible but could be controversial and problematic. But my standard question for policy makers is what do we do if we learned today that Kim Jong-un is dead? What actions are we ready to take? Have we done thorough table top war gaming to examine the possible contingencies and courses of action? How can we gain the initiative when we learn Kim Jong-un is gone?
What If Kim Jong-un Dies? It Could Mean Nuclear War.
The worst case would be a bitter faction fight that turns violent, with military clashes and let loose nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
Last year the world didn’t see enough of North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un. He disappeared from public view and almost immediately stories appeared speculating that he was ill or dead. Of course, he eventually reappeared, embarrassing those who participated in a global death watch.
Now the talk has started again, though this time because he remained in public view. First, he obviously lost weight, as much as 44 pounds in the estimation of South Korean analysts. If intended, that is good news for him. He was estimated to weigh as much as 308 pounds which, given his relatively short stature, made him morbidly obese. (He also drinks and smokes, two other risk factors.) He is vulnerable to heart disease, diabetes, and several other maladies. Dropping a couple of pounds would improve his longevity.
However, substantial weight loss isn’t always intended. If not, it can be a sign of a serious illness, such as cancer. If there was no other indication of infirmity, the drop in weight would more likely be chalked up to a diet fit for a king, or at least a different sort of hereditary leader like himself. But he also recently sported a mark and later a bandage on his head.
Of these nothing was said publicly, of course, and they could reflect minor issues. Seven years ago he disappeared after limping and returned to view walking with a cane. He reportedly had ankle surgery, from which he apparently recovered completely and without difficulty. (In 2008 his father disappeared for far longer with a stroke, and nothing was said to the public then, though after Kim pere reappeared his enfeebled state could not be hidden from viewers.) The latest incident also could be unimportant.
Yet there are indications that Kim Jong-un or his colleagues might be preparing for a succession. Earlier this year the Supreme Leader acquired a promotion, to the general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea. No longer is that position reserved for his father, who died almost a decade ago. Kim fils vacated the position of first secretary, which could become a second-in-command. This move could be unimportant, but venerable North Korea-watcher Andrei Lankov suggested that it related to possible succession: “No other ruling communist party has had a formally defined position of second-in-command—a ruler in-waiting.”
In fact, the Kims have on occasion informally shared power. Kim’s father, Kim Jong-il, acted as quasi-prime minister, running domestic policy during DPRK founder Kim Il-sung’s final years. As Kim Jong-il recovered from a stroke in August 2008 his brother-in-law, Jang Song-thaek, acted in the former’s stead. (After Kim Jong-il’s death, Jang was tasked to help mentor Kim Jong-un, only to be executed by his pupil, perhaps for attempting to take over.)
All that we know about Kim Jong-un’s present health are hints, rumors, and other wisps of information gained while peering through the glass darkly into the DPRK. The fixation on Kim’s health seems creepy. However, in a regime widely (though not universally) believed to reflect one-man rule, what happens when that person crosses the River Styx is hugely important. The deaths of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Joseph Stalin, and Mao Zedong all set off lengthy and consequential power struggles.
In contrast, Kim Il-sung spent a couple decades planning the transition—eliminating rivals, promoting Kim Jong-il, and turning day-to-day management over to the latter. The younger Kim had less time with his son, since the process did not start until Kim Jong-il recovered from his stroke. That left less than three years. Although the succession seemed to go smoothly, it is unclear how much authority Kim Jong-un inherited immediately and how much was added as he surmounted any ensuing challenges.
In any case, today’s Supreme Leader has no obvious heir. His kids are too young. His wife has no political role. His older brother was judged lacking by their father and is a political non-entity. His half-uncle was exiled as ambassador to several European nations by Kim Jong-il. The only plausible candidate would be his sister, Kim Yo-jong. Although she plays an important role, her power appears to be almost entirely derivative, dependent on her brother. Indeed, she appears to have been promoted and demoted, presumably by him, with some regularity, suggesting the lack of an independent power base.
She does possess royal blood, but that means little if her status has not been presented to the public. Nor is it obvious that the Kim pedigree matters much these days: given the floodtide of information from South Korea which has raised Kim Jong-un’s ire, North Koreans appear to be less credulous than in years past. Equally important: DPRK politics is unremittingly sexist. The only women who have enjoyed substantial authority have been the Kims’ wives, consorts, and sisters, and their influence dissipated immediately when a succession occurred.
If not among Kim’s relations, then who would become the next Great Successor? Kim Jong-un’s tendency to transfer, replace, and purge aides leaves no obvious number two, which might well be his intention. In late June he demoted a couple of top officials for “creating a grave incident in ensuring the security of the state and safety of the people.” However, rather than follow Uncle Jang into oblivion, they moved to lesser positions.
Given the lack of an obvious heir apparent, a succession fight would likely be brutal and unpredictable. Heads of security agencies might make a grab for the brass ring. In the Soviet Union long-time secret police chief Lavrentiy Beria failed when he sought the top role in 1953; KGB head Yuri Andropov won the leadership of the communist party in 1982 but died shortly thereafter. The military could bid for power or play kingmaker while extracting promises to protect the institution’s role and privileges.
A collective leadership could emerge, at least at the start. However, North Korean politics always has featured a dominant leader. So has the South, though since 1987 it has relied on elections to select the men and women who rule. The very nature of the North Korean system—totalitarian with no safety net for those who fail—puts a premium on ending up atop the pack. As Donald Trump might say, second place is for losers.
There’s very little that the U.S. could do to influence the outcome. However, the Biden administration should watch carefully if instability seems to threaten. Washington also has cause to maintain open communication with China about potential political challenges in the North. The best case would be a new reform-minded government, something which all should hope for but no one should expect.
The worst case would be a bitter faction fight that turns violent, with military clashes and let loose nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. When Bruce Bennett analyzed the possibility of a DPRK collapse nearly a decade ago, he warned: “There is a reasonable probability that North Korean totalitarianism will end in the foreseeable future, with the very strong likelihood that this end will be accompanied by considerable violence and upheaval.” This possibility, though small, is terrifying enough to warrant conversations with the ROK and China over how to protect peace and stability on the peninsula in the event of a DPRK implosion.
Of course, none of that might happen, at least now. Indeed, most likely Kim Jong-un is healthy, or at least healthy enough to survive the next few years. Which would make the latest round of speculation come to naught. Indeed, so grave are the possible consequences of his death, many people in the West might be praying for his well-being.
Some day the Kim dynasty will pass from the scene. Until then absences and bandages involving Kim Jong-un will matter to not only people living on the Korean peninsula, but around the world. Hopefully, peace will survive his passing.
Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is author of several books, including Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World and co-author of The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations with North and South Korea.
17. North Korea’s Curious COVID-19 Strategy
I am still very worried about a widespread outbreak in the north, especially one that hits the military. It could be catastrophic and could be the catalyst for conflict as well as regime collapse.
Russia and China, both keen to prevent a brewing humanitarian catastrophe on their borders, might be a more suitable alternative for North Korea. Although, a South Korean think tank linked to the country’s intelligence agency claimed that the North is not keen on Chinese jabs due to efficacy concerns and prefers the Russian one but wants it for free. Pyongyang could also turn to Cuba, its “brother in arms,” for its locally produced Abdala vaccine.
Lacking vaccine protection, North Korea remains vulnerable to a mass breach of the coronavirus, which would have profound implications for regime stability, regional security, and lead to a humanitarian disaster. Panacea or not, vaccines can greatly help a resource-strapped North Korea beat the virus and allow a safe reopening. But, even as ordinary North Koreans continue to suffer, the country—at least for now—is betting on its preferred approach in dealing with COVID-19 and one in which it has years of experience—isolation.
North Korea’s Curious COVID-19 Strategy
Pyongyang faces a looming catastrophe but is in no hurry to vaccinate its people.
For a country loathe to admit troubles at home, it’s surprising to see the frequency with which North Korea is doing exactly that of late. Last month, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un compared the hardships caused by the coronavirus pandemic to the 1950-53 Korean War. Before that, he told North Koreans to brace for the “worst-ever” outcome, invoking comparisons to the country’s deadly 1990s famine, known in the North as the Arduous March. In October 2020, he even shed tears while speaking about the country’s struggles.
Kim is grappling with the toughest challenge of his reign so far, and his stark language indicates the severity of the problem.
For a country loathe to admit troubles at home, it’s surprising to see the frequency with which North Korea is doing exactly that of late. Last month, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un compared the hardships caused by the coronavirus pandemic to the 1950-53 Korean War. Before that, he told North Koreans to brace for the “worst-ever” outcome, invoking comparisons to the country’s deadly 1990s famine, known in the North as the Arduous March. In October 2020, he even shed tears while speaking about the country’s struggles.
Kim is grappling with the toughest challenge of his reign so far, and his stark language indicates the severity of the problem.
How bad is the situation in North Korea?
If the regime is admitting that the country is in dire straits, then it is safe to assume things are really bad.
Pyongyang has consistently maintained that no infections have been found at home, a claim widely rejected by international health experts. North Korea is unlikely to publicly acknowledge an outbreak. In June, Kim did berate senior party officials for unspecified lapses that caused a “grave incident” related to COVID-19 that put the safety of the country and the people at risk.
Whatever the specifics of the situation, the containment measures have devastated the already battered North Korean economy, worsening food shortages and precipitating a humanitarian crisis.
South Korea’s central bank estimates that the isolated country’s GDP shrank 4.5 percent last year, the biggest drop in more than 20 years, due to lockdown measures, sanctions, and harsh weather. Trade with China, North Korea’s economic lifeline, tumbled 80 percent in 2020. In July, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization forecast that North Korea could face a food shortage of about 860,000 metric tons this year.
What about vaccines?
Despite the mounting difficulties, North Korea has shown no urgency to inoculate its population, sending out mixed signals about vaccines that could potentially ease its predicament. South Korea, China, and Russia are among a number of countries that have offered jabs to Pyongyang. The Biden administration has also said it is open to sharing coronavirus vaccines.
The offers have gone unheeded. The North Korean regime refuses help and spares no efforts to brag about the superiority of its system.
The propaganda machinery has pushed a narrative domestically that downplays the efficacy of vaccines, exhorting the public not to let their guard down and prepare for a lengthy battle against COVID-19. In May, state media warned locals that vaccines produced overseas were “not a panacea to all problems.”
News of countries vaccinating their people or life returning to normal is rarely, if ever, transmitted within North Korea, perhaps over fears that it might trigger resentment against the regime for its failure to secure shots. In contrast, the propaganda apparatus has been unusually quick to report on cases rising abroad and the spread of COVID-19 variants.
Why is the regime reluctant to talk about vaccines?
The regime clearly knows it cannot obtain sufficient vaccines for a while to prevent community transmission and thus is eager not to raise people’s hopes about a return to pre-pandemic life, lest they start demanding the lifting of restrictions.
Another factor is how to present the news of foreign-made jabs to North Koreans, who have been fed a propaganda diet of self-reliance, or “Juche.” Having to publicly acquire vaccines from abroad would be a severe blow to the regime’s carefully crafted image.
To be fair, inadequate funds to buy expensive vaccines and a lack of refrigeration facilities to transport and store them also inhibit North Korea’s enthusiasm for jabs. The country claims its public health system is world-class, but international experts say it is appalling, with some hospitals even lacking electricity and running water.
More importantly, any inoculation program would require allowing international workers inside the reclusive country to monitor it, a scenario North Korea finds difficult to digest. The regime is fixated on preventing uncensored external information from trickling into the country—even more so during times of trouble—and has increasingly become worried about losing thought control of its citizens.
North Koreans hearing about global vaccine distribution by word of mouth or through leaked foreign media could raise pressure on Kim and his lieutenants to deliver the same for the country’s citizens.
Even if North Korea manages to secure some shots, the quantity will be barely enough to vaccinate a small proportion of the population. The delayed shipment of 1.7 million doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine via Covax, the global vaccine distribution program, is only enough for under 4 percent of the North Korean population. It could create a false sense of security among the public and dampen the watertight vigilance against COVID-19. And how the authorities dole out limited doses is also unclear and could cause disgruntlement if not distributed fairly or seen to favor the elite.
Read More
Thae Yong-ho went from North Korean diplomat to South Korean politician.
Does Pyongyang even want vaccines?
The regime is trying to look competent in protecting the public against the coronavirus until it can secure enough vaccine stockpiles on its desired terms and a nationwide plan to roll them out. North Korea has praised the global development of vaccines, called out countries for hoarding them, and been in regular contact with international health organizations—all indicating an interest in procuring jabs.
“The development of COVID-19 vaccines and medicines might be the achievement for the common mankind, whereas an unfair reality is to be seen that some countries are procuring and storing the vaccines more than its needs by inspiring the vaccine nationalism plainly when other countries can’t even procure it with their affordability,” North Korea said at the World Health Assembly in June.
Pyongyang is reportedly scrambling to secure vaccines for its military and is said to have ordered North Korean diplomats, intelligence agents, and traders to make vaccine acquisition a top priority. North Korea also attempted to steal vaccine technology from the U.S. pharmaceutical company Pfizer, according to South Korean intelligence officials, and has imported vaccine samples from Russia and China for research purposes. To show its scientific chops, North Korea even announced last July that a domestically produced vaccine had entered clinical trials, but it is unclear what became of it.
Could the United States or South Korea help?
North Korea is unlikely to openly accept vaccines from its southern neighbor or the United States, a move difficult to explain amid growing talk of U.S. “hostility.” Also, the regime seeks to be on equal footing with the United States, and being a recipient state would put it on the back foot in any future dialogue with Washington.
Just last month, North Korea warned that U.S. humanitarian aid was a “sinister scheme” to interfere in internal affairs. It even described outside assistance as a form of “economic infiltration.”
Thae Yong-ho, a former North Korean diplomat-turned-defector and now a member of South Korea’s main opposition party, has cautioned that Pyongyang may find any public gesture of COVID-19 aid from Seoul as “humiliating.” The offer of help could harm prospects for future talks given that Kim considers North Korea’s supposed virus-free status as “one of the greatest feats of his leadership,” Thae added.
The regime fears an informed citizenry more than the coronavirus, so perhaps a better option than offering access to vaccines would be offering access to information—however tedious that is—about global vaccination efforts to ordinary North Koreans. Despite what many outsiders believe, the regime is extremely sensitive about erosion of public trust, and a bottom-up clamor for vaccines might alter its calculus and instill a sense of urgency.
So what’s next?
North Korea has recently indicated a desire to mend ties with its southern neighbor, so it could, conceivably, accept the joint production of vaccines at their shared facility—now closed—in the border city of Kaesong. In the event that this happens, North Korea will likely portray the vaccine as a locally developed medical miracle made under Kim’s leadership.
Russia and China, both keen to prevent a brewing humanitarian catastrophe on their borders, might be a more suitable alternative for North Korea. Although, a South Korean think tank linked to the country’s intelligence agency claimed that the North is not keen on Chinese jabs due to efficacy concerns and prefers the Russian one but wants it for free. Pyongyang could also turn to Cuba, its “brother in arms,” for its locally produced Abdala vaccine.
Lacking vaccine protection, North Korea remains vulnerable to a mass breach of the coronavirus, which would have profound implications for regime stability, regional security, and lead to a humanitarian disaster. Panacea or not, vaccines can greatly help a resource-strapped North Korea beat the virus and allow a safe reopening. But, even as ordinary North Koreans continue to suffer, the country—at least for now—is betting on its preferred approach in dealing with COVID-19 and one in which it has years of experience—isolation.
18. 3 dynamics shaping the security on the Korean peninsula
The dynamics:
Will allies and adversaries align?
Is food security national security?
What role will politics play?
3 dynamics shaping the security on the Korean peninsula
- The Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) recently restored communications.
- Chatham House, in partnership with the World Economic Forum, hosted a dialogue exploring the dynamics shaping the security on the peninsula.
- Experts discussed the peninsula's approach to international affairs, food security and politics.
The Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) recently restored a communications hotline between their capitals after Pyongyang had severed the connection 14 months earlier. The restoration of this link raises some hope that strain that had intensified over the past several months can be replaced by additional steps toward dialogue. Yet, lasting, long-term security requires a more comprehensive approach that aligns stakeholders, addresses humanitarian issues, and accounts for domestic politics in key countries.
Within this complex context, Chatham House, in partnership with the World Economic Forum’s Global Future Councils on Geopolitics and the Korean Peninsula, hosted a dialogue exploring the dynamics shaping the security on the peninsula.
The discussion featured Hazel Smith, Professor at SOAS; Moon Chung-in, Chairman of the Sejong Institute, and Jean Lee, Director of the Center for Korean History and Public Policy, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Korea Foundation Korea Fellow at Chatham House, chaired the discussion, with Robin Niblett, Director and Chief Executive of Chatham House, offering opening remarks.
Will allies and adversaries align?
The ROK is looking to create a “virtuous cycle”, according to Moon Chung-in, in which Seoul deepen its already close ties with Washington and also with Pyongyang. In this way, Seoul hopes to be an axis of sorts, moving all three toward deeper engagement.
Whether this approach will be successful, Jean Lee said, is an open question as Washington looks to place the issue of security on the peninsula within wider strategic context: the US-China relationship. According to Lee, the Biden Administration is taking a “regional and global approach”, strengthening ties with traditional partners, most notably, Japan and South Korea, but also with China. Members of the Biden Administration are meeting with counterparts in China at a time when North Korean leader Kim Jong-un for his part has been reaching out to China and Russia to reaffirm his ties with these countries.
The key question will be whether Washington, Seoul and Tokyo can not only align among themselves but also identify common ground with Beijing and Moscow. “Trying to present a united front among the regional partners is absolutely key to bringing North Korea back into the international fold,” Lee said.
Is food security national security?
North Korea is facing severe food shortages, according to United Nation's Food and Agriculture Organization, which estimates the “food gap” in the country to be around 860,000 tons—equivalent to approximately 2.3 months of food use. North Korea, Smith said, views food security as “a national security issue” because the government is facing weakening legitimacy, particularly among younger people.
Beyond the magnitude of the impact of food shortage on its population (vulnerable sectors of society, particularly the young and elderly, will likely suffer disproportionately) losing ideological control of the younger generation represents a national security threat to the regime. It is for this reason that Pyongyang has ignored recent overtures from Washington, instead focusing on its own internal challenges, feeling its nuclear program offers protection from external threats.
The underlying cause of food insecurity is the North’s policies, which has inhibited economic growth. But UN sanctions, argued Smith, particularly those imposed in 2017 targeting natural gas, trucks and machinery, have had a dire effect as well. These items are critical to agriculture, which represents a third of the North’s economy. Therefore, advancing security on the peninsula will need to account for the food crisis itself and for the national-security prism through which Pyongyang views it.
What role will politics play?
The coming year, 2022, will bring presidential elections in South Korea and midterm elections in the US, both of which may offer some additional challenge. Lee said the Biden Administration likely will have “bigger issues” to deal with, particularly on the domestic and economic fronts, in the runup to congressional elections than focusing on North Korea. All the more so, because North Korea does not represent an imminent threat to US interests.
The danger, though, is that North Korea may take provocative steps to try to reassert itself and gain attention. Moon agreed that politics could inject further challenge in that one of the few bipartisan areas of agreement in Washington is strong distaste for engaging North Korea. But Smith said that the active engagement of North Korea by the Trump Administration—specifically the former president’s meeting with Kim in Singapore in June 2018—neutralizes any criticism that Republicans could make if the Biden Administration more fully engaged Pyongyang.
On the North Korean side, Lee said, Pyongyang has been using the COVID-19 pandemic as an excuse to more fully seal the country off. Emerging from this deepened isolation would therefore require a narrative that legitimizes its decision to do so. Otherwise, the regime would lose additional legitimacy among its population.
19. In This Memoir, Prison Is A Place — And A State Of Mind
Another one for the "to read" pile.
Excerpts:
Structurally, the book's "cold turkey" approach — with a serviceable editor's note, but without the translators' introduction, a map of the Korean peninsula, or a historical timeline to accompany Hwang's narrative — still allows a patient reader to gain a broad understanding of Hwang's trajectory in relation to South Korea's geopolitics. Hwang's prison account — divided into six segments — constitutes the lyrical refrain that disrupts the chronology of his life prior to incarceration. This innovative arrangement eloquently replicates the ruptures and rhythms in Hwang's life and art.
While The Prisoner acknowledges free expression's burdens and the North-South struggle's Sisyphean nature, Hwang's epilogue stands firm with his urgent yet timeless warning: "A society where artists have lost their faculty of criticism and submit unconditionally to power is well on its way to losing its democracy."
In This Memoir, Prison Is A Place — And A State Of Mind
NPR · by THÚY ĐINH · August 10, 2021
The Prisoner, Hwang Sok-yong's expansive memoir — incisively translated by Anton Hur and Sora Kim-Russell — vividly captures a South Korean writer's literal and metaphorical imprisonment. Even the cover's ascetic design poignantly evokes the ruptures in Hwang's life and work — caused by war, ideology, geography, and language — rendering the author's disembodied profile in gray against cragged zones of black and white.
Hwang, a former political prisoner and pro-democracy intellectual, maintains that every Korean, North or South, is a refugee due to historical and economic circumstances, and has for decades pushed for peaceful measures to end the peninsula's division at the 38th parallel. (As the 1953 cease-fire agreement was not considered a peace treaty, there has been no official end to the Korean War. Thus the National Security Act, enacted by South Korea when the two countries were formally separated in 1948, has been used by the South to prosecute anyone deemed to "compromise the security of the State.")
He witnessed historic turmoil in both North and South Korea
Born in 1943, Manchuria, Hwang relocated to Pyongyang, North Korea, after Korea's liberation from Japanese rule in 1945. His family later migrated to Seoul, South Korea, where Hwang witnessed the turmoil of the Korean War, then the April Revolution of 1960, when many of his student peers were assaulted or killed by military police during protests against President Rhee Syngman's dictatorship. Hwang's cohort was the first generation to be educated in Korean after liberation — which led to his aspirations for a democratic state and the eventual reunification of North and South Korea.
Hwang's political awareness was further heightened by his subsequent conscripted service in the Vietnam War and his grassroots efforts in the Gwangju Democratization Movement. From his perspective, South Korea's military regimes — supported by America's Cold War interests — employed murderous tactics in the name of anti-communism. Such hardline approach, in his view, violated the fundamental rights of South Korean citizens and further radicalized North Korea, impeding the North-South peace-building process.
The Shadow of Arms, Hwang's novel based on his Vietnam experience — which indicts America's role in Southeast Asia as well as South Korea's complicity — suffered its own rupture when a martial government suppressed the first volume's 1985 publication. Hwang managed to publish the complete novel in 1988 under a different administration, but persistent censorship caused him to question his growth as an artist. This in turn led him to visit North Korea in 1989, resulting in nearly ten years of self-exile and imprisonment — an arid period he nevertheless considers profoundly transformative. Hwang was released in March 1998, shortly after Kim Dae-jung — a pro-democracy activist — became president.
An eventful life sparks creativity — but makes things hard for his family
Cinematic, riveting, elegiac, The Prisoner captures the dialectical tensions in Hwang's life and career in a manner reminiscent of Jacob wrestling with an angel, or the haunting films of South Korean director Lee Chang-dong. Born left-handed but forced to use his right hand — as Asian culture considers the left hand to be the "wrong" hand — for a long time Hwang's self was literally divided. While he used his right hand for writing, he would manifest emotional energy with his left hand — in throwing a ball, swinging a fist in anger, or pulling a woman into an embrace.
Cinematic, riveting, elegiac, 'The Prisoner' captures the dialectical tensions in Hwang's life and career in a manner reminiscent of Jacob wrestling with an angel.
Hwang draws further parallels between this mind-body paradox and his prison hunger strikes: Fasting allowed him to gain critical insights into his past, yet that stern moral stance deprived him of the prison's daily rituals — such as meal breaks — that helped make him feel alive in the present. Similarly, while Hwang's activism represents a yearning to unify the Korea body, the endeavor created painful rifts in his personal life.
Hwang acknowledges the eventful life that nurtured his literary career was also a form of exile or flight — it provided him with meaningful engagements but little space for introspection. Such a life in turn exiled his family members from safety and happiness; his accomplishments in human rights resulted in absence — he failed to see his mother before her death, and was a selfish and unreliable husband and father to his wives and children.
At first, Hwang didn't want to examine himself as closely as his fictional characters
Hwang's memoir, reflective of this protracted struggle, took years, and much prodding from his editors, to complete. At first he was reluctant to apply his fiction's prismatic lens to autobiography — since that would have meant subjecting himself to the same holistic gaze reserved for his characters — but eventually came to appreciate nonfiction's inquisitorial and cathartic appeal. The Prisoner thus expands Hwang's literary scope, uniting his life experience with the compassionate realism of his later works.
'The Prisoner' ... expands Hwang's literary scope, uniting his life experience with the compassionate realism of his later works.
Structurally, the book's "cold turkey" approach — with a serviceable editor's note, but without the translators' introduction, a map of the Korean peninsula, or a historical timeline to accompany Hwang's narrative — still allows a patient reader to gain a broad understanding of Hwang's trajectory in relation to South Korea's geopolitics. Hwang's prison account — divided into six segments — constitutes the lyrical refrain that disrupts the chronology of his life prior to incarceration. This innovative arrangement eloquently replicates the ruptures and rhythms in Hwang's life and art.
While The Prisoner acknowledges free expression's burdens and the North-South struggle's Sisyphean nature, Hwang's epilogue stands firm with his urgent yet timeless warning: "A society where artists have lost their faculty of criticism and submit unconditionally to power is well on its way to losing its democracy."
NPR · by THÚY ĐINH · August 10, 2021
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
