Quotes of the Day:
“What separates us from the animals, what separates us from the chaos, is our ability to mourn people we’ve never met.”
- Author David Levithan
“If we learn nothing else from this tragedy, we learn that life is short and there is no time for hate.”
- Sandy Dahl, wife of Flight 93 pilot Jason Dahl
”When Americans lend a hand to one another, nothing is impossible. We’re not about what happened on 9/11. We’re about what happened on 9/12.”
-Jeff Parness, founder of New York Says Thank You
1. Moon expresses sympathy to Biden, American people on 9/11 anniversary
2. Brookings Institution names Andrew Yeo as Korea chair
3. Talk of a Nuclear Deterrent in South Korea
4. Thinner, energetic Kim stands out at North Korean parade
5. Voice of America: [Washington Talk] North Korea 'reduced military parade'... What is the purpose of Wang Yi's 'visit to Korea'?
6. When Will the United States Have a Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights?
7. New cases in 1,800s for second day amid spread in capital area
8. North Korea's disappearing supply of soybean oil
9. Korea, China may be part of expert group monitoring Fukushima water release
10. [Kim Myong-sik] Pathetic ulterior motive of ‘fake news’ bill
1. Moon expresses sympathy to Biden, American people on 9/11 anniversary
Moon expresses sympathy to Biden, American people on 9/11 anniversary | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Sept. 11 (Yonhap) -- President Moon Jae-in vowed Saturday that South Korea will continue to contribute to the fight against terrorism as he marked the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
"My deepest sympathies go out to President Joe Biden and the American people ... Twenty years have passed, but the shock of that day still remains as deep wounds in the hearts of so many," he said in a Facebook message.
Moon noted that violence cannot win over peace and inclusiveness and that the tragedy of the 9/11 attacks should never be allowed to happen again.
"Terrorism can never be justified whatever the reason," he wrote. "There is no cause that is more valuable than the life of an innocent citizen."
He added, "The Republic of Korea, as America's strong ally, will continue to actively join your and the international community's efforts to combat terrorism."
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
2. Brookings Institution names Andrew Yeo as Korea chair
Brookings Institution names Andrew Yeo as Korea chair
Posted September. 11, 2021 07:34,
Updated September. 11, 2021 07:34
Brookings Institution names Andrew Yeo as Korea chair. September. 11, 2021 07:34. lightee@donga.com.
The Brookings Institution, a progressive Washington think tank, has appointed Korean-American Andrew Yeo as the chair of its Korea desk. Yeo is a political science professor at Catholic University in the U.S. He acquired a bachelor’s degree from Northwestern University, and master’s and doctorate degrees from Cornell University, and has been studying the Korean Peninsula, East Asia, strategy for allies, and democratization.
Yeo is expected to take charge of Indo-Pacific strategy for the U.S. and its allies, South Korea’s foreign policy, and relations with North Korea. He has supported phased approach towards North Korea in lieu of ‘Big Deal,’ when it comes to Washington-Pyongyang talks on the North’s denuclearization, and indicated that sanctions can be partially lifted to help advance negotiations.
3. Talk of a Nuclear Deterrent in South Korea
We have to ask the question: Will South Korea going nuclear have any deterrent effect on Kim Jong-un? Anymore than US extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella of the US? AAnd the fundamental question we should always be asking is what actually deters Kim Jong-un and in what circumstances do specific actions deter or not deter him. We need to be asking these questions and trying to discern the answers (which of course we will neer know for sure). The best answers to these questions come from the late Hwang Jong-yop (the highest ranking north Korean defector and father of Juche ideology) who told us in 1997 what deterred Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. This of course was the presence of US forces on the peninsula because they knew they could not win a war aginas tht eSouth if the US supported the ROK. And further they believed the US would use nuclear weapons against the regime. But we do not have any similar insights into Kim Jong-un's thinking though we can assume that some of the thinking, analysis, and fears of his father and grandfather were passed down to him. We can judge that from his similar actions and that he continues to follow the Kim family regime playbook. But we need to continue to ask the questions and determine what actions really do deter him and in what circumstances.
Talk of a Nuclear Deterrent in South Korea
North Korea’s resumed activity at Yongbyon has reawakened calls for Seoul to go nuclear.
South Koreans walk past replicas of a North Korean Scud-B missile and South Korean Nike missile at the Korean War Memorial in Seoul on Feb. 28, 2019. Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images
SEOUL—Recent resumption of activity at North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear complex, which is suspected of producing the plutonium needed for the country’s nuclear weapons, has fueled existing convictions among some conservative South Korean politicians that Pyongyang will never agree to give up its nukes so Seoul needs a nuclear deterrent of its own.
The issue has stormed into the early days of the upcoming presidential election, with primary candidates openly pushing for South Korea to host nuclear weapons. Yoo Seong-min, a former lawmaker and primary candidate for the People Power Party, said he would “persuade the U.S. government to sign a nuclear-sharing agreement” with Seoul if he became president. Such an agreement would again allow the deployment of tactical and nonstrategic nuclear weapons on South Korean soil for the first time since the end of the Cold War. Another conservative contender, Hong Joon-pyo, has also argued that a nuclear-sharing agreement is needed lest South Korea end up “slaves to North Korea’s nuclear weapons.”
For some in South Korea, it’s not just about hosting U.S. weapons but also about developing their own. Lee Jong-kul, a representative from the Liberal Party, has said South Korea should “choose tactical nuclear weapons as the last negotiating card” against North Korea. In 2017, a conservative group, the Korean Patriotic Citizens’ Union, organized protests that included chants like “South Korea should immediately begin to arm itself with nuclear weapons.” Nuclear boosterism has grown so much that the leading primary candidate for the Liberal Party, Lee Jae-myung, decried it as “dangerous populism.”
SEOUL—Recent resumption of activity at North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear complex, which is suspected of producing the plutonium needed for the country’s nuclear weapons, has fueled existing convictions among some conservative South Korean politicians that Pyongyang will never agree to give up its nukes so Seoul needs a nuclear deterrent of its own.
The issue has stormed into the early days of the upcoming presidential election, with primary candidates openly pushing for South Korea to host nuclear weapons. Yoo Seong-min, a former lawmaker and primary candidate for the People Power Party, said he would “persuade the U.S. government to sign a nuclear-sharing agreement” with Seoul if he became president. Such an agreement would again allow the deployment of tactical and nonstrategic nuclear weapons on South Korean soil for the first time since the end of the Cold War. Another conservative contender, Hong Joon-pyo, has also argued that a nuclear-sharing agreement is needed lest South Korea end up “slaves to North Korea’s nuclear weapons.”
For some in South Korea, it’s not just about hosting U.S. weapons but also about developing their own. Lee Jong-kul, a representative from the Liberal Party, has said South Korea should “choose tactical nuclear weapons as the last negotiating card” against North Korea. In 2017, a conservative group, the Korean Patriotic Citizens’ Union, organized protests that included chants like “South Korea should immediately begin to arm itself with nuclear weapons.” Nuclear boosterism has grown so much that the leading primary candidate for the Liberal Party, Lee Jae-myung, decried it as “dangerous populism.”
South Korea, which suffered an invasion by its northern neighbor in 1950, is regularly taunted by Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities, tests, and parades of increasingly capable missiles.
“The idea of nuclear weapons in South Korea, in contrast to Japan, has never been fringe. The argument is something like: If North Korea has it, we should have it too,” said Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.
According to polls, almost half of all South Koreans surveyed support the development of their own nuclear weapons to deter North Korea’s threat. The urge to unfurl their own nuclear umbrella has grown in recent years due to both Pyongyang’s fissile and missile advances and after four years of former U.S. President Donald Trump disparaging the Korean alliance and urging the country to develop its own nuclear shield.
But it’s not just politicians and polls. South Korea is the latest member of an exclusive club: countries that have successfully fired submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Seven other countries have done that, but they all have nuclear warheads to stick on top. So what are Seoul’s ambitions?
South Korea “is the only country to develop SLBMs without first developing nuclear weapons, so it makes one wonder,” said Vipin Narang, a professor of nuclear security and political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
SLBMs are hidden underwater, so they offer survivability that could ensure South Korea can hit back against a first strike. But hit back with what?
“Even with a heavy conventional warhead or multiple warheads on each SLBM, does six tubes on a submarine really provide a credible conventional retaliatory capability if all of South Korea’s land-based missiles were wiped out?” Narang asked.
It’s not the only nuke-adjacent technology being advanced. With the removal of the country’s range cap on its missiles, South Korea is pushing for missiles that can carry bigger payloads for longer distances. Those “would be good delivery vehicles” if Seoul ever thought about developing nuclear weapons, Narang said.
The problem is nuclear weapons would not actually deliver security for South Korea. Pyongyang has an arsenal of its own and knows it can poke and prod—whether through cyberattacks or other conventional provocations—with little fear.
“In terms of South Korea’s security, nuclear weapons do very little,” Lewis said. “A nuclear-armed North Korea can be much more aggressive in terms of conventional provocations because [North Korean leader] Kim Jong Un knows he is safe from being invaded by the United States or South Korea. South Korean nuclear weapons don’t solve this problem.”
It’s much like the problem facing Israel, which is widely believed to have its own nuclear capability yet has fought vehemently for years to constrain Iran’s ability to enrich enough uranium to build a bomb.
“Israel has nuclear weapons but is terrified of Iran getting them. Why don’t the Israelis believe deterrence will protect them? Because they are worried that a nuclear-armed Iran will be much more aggressive in terms of using proxies to attack them,” Lewis said. “It’s a very similar problem for South Korea.”
In addition to not delivering deterrence, South Korean nuclear weapons could end up blowing up the Korean economy. It’s one of the most trade-dependent countries on Earth, with trade making up about 70 percent of the country’s GDP; those export industries are dependent on its status as a proliferation-limiting state. A particular concern could be the country’s successful civilian nuclear energy program. South Korea is halfway through a 20-year plan to export 80 nuclear reactors worth $400 billion—deals that could be jeopardized if South Korea opts for proliferation.
“South Korea is very much a trade-dependent country, basically an economy based on the international economy, and the repercussions from developing nuclear weapons will damage this,” said Yim Man-sung, director of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Education and Research Center at the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology in Seoul.
South Korea, a signatory to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, could withdraw from the accord. But that would create a cascade of legal liabilities, especially for the multibillion-dollar exports of civilian nuclear technology. And that, once realized, could take the wind out of the South Korean public’s push for nukes of their own.
“Initially, when people know nothing about the implications, they may say, ‘oh, we should develop nuclear weapons.’ But once they realize the implications, repercussions of that decision, most of them say no,” Yim said.
Morten Soendergaard Larsen is a freelance journalist based in Seoul who writes about geopolitics.
4. Thinner, energetic Kim stands out at North Korean parade
What jumps out at me is that in some of the photos it looks like he is wearing a tan suit? Don't his fashion advisors know that is a fashion faux paux not only for a "world leader" to wear a tan suit in public but also for wearing one after Labor Day? (note my attempt at humor)
Excerpts:
Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, said Kim, with his weight loss and cheerful demeanor at the parade, is likely trying to project an image of a ''normal statesman'' who engages with the public.
''He's also a husband and a father of three children who is approaching his 40s, so it isn't strange that he would care about his health,'' Yang said.
Kim's health is the focus of keen outside attention as the 37-year-old leader hasn't publicly anointed a successor who would take control of North Korea's advancing nuclear arsenal targeting Asian rivals and the American homeland. He has been known for his heavy drinking and smoking, and comes from a family with a history of heart problems. His grandfather and father, who ruled North Korea before him, both died of heart issues.
''Considering the North's political system, where the supreme leader decides everything, Kim's health is an extremely important security matter,'' Park said. ''It's likely there were internal concerns that he was overweight, and it would have been important for Kim to reduce those concerns and present himself as a young and healthy leader who's capable of doing things.''
Thinner, energetic Kim stands out at North Korean parade
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in a Sept. 9 photo, left, looks thinner compared with this 2020 October file photo, right. Yonhap At an unusual North Korean parade showcasing military dogs and virus workers in orange hazmat suits, leader Kim Jong-un still stood out by looking thinner and more energetic than he has in years.
During the event that started late Wednesday, Kim, wearing a cream suit and a shiny white tie, emerged as the clock struck midnight. He beamed in response to thunderous applause from performers and spectators filling Pyongyang's brightly illuminated Kim Il Sung Square, named after his grandfather and founder of the nation, on its 73rd anniversary.
He smiled widely, waved to the crowd and kissed children who presented him with flowers before taking his spot on a balcony to observe the parade. He laughed vigorously and applauded the marchers throughout the event, while chatting animatedly with senior officials.
It was a stark change from 2018, when TV footage showed him struggling to catch his breath while accompanying South Korean President Moon Jae-in on a short hike to North Korea's Mount Paektu during a period of diplomatic engagement. Moon, who is three decades older than Kim, didn't seemed at all fazed by the walk.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, center right, and his wife Ri Sol-ju, center left, visit the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, marking the nation's 73rd anniversary in Pyongyang, North Korea, Sept. 9, in this photo provided by the North Korean government. AP-Yonhap ''His face is clearly thinner and he is moving much more vigorously,'' said Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korea studies at Seoul's Ewha Womans University.
Kim's weight loss became noticeable in June, when he made a first public appearance in weeks to convene a ruling party meeting. Some North Korea watchers said then that Kim, who is about 170 centimeters (5 feet, 8 inches) tall and previously weighed 140 kilograms (308 pounds), may have lost 10 to 20 kilograms (22 to 44 pounds).
Most experts say Kim's weight loss is more likely a result of efforts to improve his shape than an indicator of health problems, considering his regular public activity. It may also have a political purpose.
Kim is facing perhaps his toughest moment as he approaches a decade of rule, with North Korea wrestling with U.S.-led economic sanctions over its nuclear weapons, pandemic border closures that have caused further strain to its broken economy, and food shortages worsened by floods in recent summers.
It has become crucial for Kim to build an image as a young and vigorous leader who can steer the country out of trouble, Park said. Such image-making efforts would align with the latest parade, which showcased civil defense units involved in efforts to rebuild the economy and communities destroyed by floods, and emphasized a domestic message for unity.
Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, said Kim, with his weight loss and cheerful demeanor at the parade, is likely trying to project an image of a ''normal statesman'' who engages with the public.
''He's also a husband and a father of three children who is approaching his 40s, so it isn't strange that he would care about his health,'' Yang said.
Kim's health is the focus of keen outside attention as the 37-year-old leader hasn't publicly anointed a successor who would take control of North Korea's advancing nuclear arsenal targeting Asian rivals and the American homeland. He has been known for his heavy drinking and smoking, and comes from a family with a history of heart problems. His grandfather and father, who ruled North Korea before him, both died of heart issues.
''Considering the North's political system, where the supreme leader decides everything, Kim's health is an extremely important security matter,'' Park said. ''It's likely there were internal concerns that he was overweight, and it would have been important for Kim to reduce those concerns and present himself as a young and healthy leader who's capable of doing things.'' (AP)
5. Voice of America: [Washington Talk] North Korea 'reduced military parade'... What is the purpose of Wang Yi's 'visit to Korea'?
Young Gyo Kim hosted Scott Snyder and me on the weekly talk show, Washington Talk, to discuss north Korea's parade, sanctions relief, and Wang Yi's upcoming visit to South Korea.
As always please note the primary target audience for this is the elite in Pyongyang. It is also broadcast in South Korea. But because it is broadcast into north Korea we spend quite a bit of time criticizing Kim Jong-un and trying to expose his poor decision making and responsibility for the suffering of the Korean people.
The broadcast is in English with Korean subtitles.
[Washington Talk] North Korea 'reduced military parade'... What is the purpose of Wang Yi's 'visit to Korea'?
To commemorate the 73rd anniversary of the establishment of the regime, North Korea held a parade in the middle of the night centered on irregular troops. Strategic weapons such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) that appeared during the last military parade were not mobilized, and their scale was significantly reduced. Under this circumstance, it is noteworthy what kind of discussion he will have with South Korea, which seeks to ease sanctions against North Korea, with humanitarian aid as the priority for Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's visit to South Korea. Moderator: Kim Young-kyo / Conversation: David Maxwell (Senior Research Fellow, Democracy Defense Foundation), Scott Snyder (Director of U.S.-Korea Policy, American Foreign Relations Association)#washington talk #FLY #North Korea #denuclearization #NorthKorea #denuclearization #nuclear #USROK #alliance #WashingtonTalk #VoiceofAmerica
6. When Will the United States Have a Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights?
I too wonder when we will have one. Ambassador King discusses the confirmation process and uses his own experiences as a comparison.
Excerpts:
The bottom line is that the confirmation process in the Senate is precarious at best, and there are a number of potential problems that could slow down or even stop the confirmation of the special envoy for North Korean human rights. President Biden has reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to human rights. The United States has returned as a participant in the UN Human Rights Council and is seeking to be elected to a position on the council. Secretary of State Blinken has unequivocally said a special envoy for North Korean human rights will be appointed. It is clearly an issue that the administration has specified is a priority. The pitfalls of the Senate confirmation process, however, may require a little additional time.
When Will the United States Have a Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights?
Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Korea Chair
csis.org · by Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Korea Chair · August 3, 2021
September 10, 2021
In June 2018, the United States Congress adopted legislation extending (“reauthorizing”) the North Korea Human Rights Act. Among its provisions, the legislation continued the requirement for the president to appoint, with Senate confirmation, a special envoy for North Korean human rights with rank of ambassador within the Department of State. The legislation was approved by unanimous consent in the Senate, and the only recorded vote on the reauthorization legislation taken in the House of Representatives approved it by a vote of 415-0. The legislation was signed by then-president Trump in July 2018.
At the end of Trump’s four-year term in office, however, he had never actually nominated a special envoy for North Korean human rights despite having signed the legislation requiring such an appointment. Earlier, Trump’s first secretary of state Rex Tillerson proposed that the North Korean human rights position be formally abolished, and the second Trump secretary of state Mike Pompeo simply ignored the legislative mandate for the special envoy and avoided press and congressional questions about filling the post.
In March of this year, two months after Joe Biden was sworn in as president, a bipartisan group of a dozen House members sent a letter to the president and the secretary of state calling for the appointment of the North Korean human rights envoy. About that same time, leaders of Human Rights Watch and a number of other prominent international human rights organizations called on the new administration to give greater emphasis to North Korea’s human rights abuses and to prioritize appointment of the U.S. North Korean human rights envoy.
President Biden’s secretary of state Antony Blinken made his first foreign trip as secretary to South Korea and Japan in March. In an interview in connection with that trip, he was asked about North Korean human rights. Blinken responded, “President Biden has been very clear from day one that he was determined to put human rights and democracy back at the center of American foreign policy. North Korea, unfortunately, is one of the most egregious human rights situations that we know around the world.” In an appearance before the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee soon after that on June 8, Blinken said the administration intended to follow the law, and a human rights envoy for North Korea would be appointed.
Hardly a week goes by that I do not get a call from a journalist asking why Biden has not yet named a human rights envoy for North Korea, what this means in terms of the Biden administration’s human rights commitments, and when such an appointment will be made. I have no special insight into the status or timing of such administration personnel questions, but based on my experience in Washington, the selection of a human rights envoy is not behind schedule.
The Senate Confirmation Process
The North Korean human rights envoy by law has the rank of ambassador, and that requires her or him to be nominated by the president and confirmed by the U.S. Senate, the process that is required for almost all senior appointed U.S. government officials. The number of appointees requiring Senate approval is large: the official congressional list of such appointments (United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions, popularly called the “Plum Book”) lists 1,200 to 1,400 positions that require presidential nomination and Senate confirmation, as well as many other appointed positions that do not require Senate approval.
A total of 256 of the senior positions in the Department of State require Senate confirmation. In addition to senior officials in the department, U.S. ambassadors to foreign countries and representatives to international organizations require Senate action. For this reason, the State Department has the largest number of officials in U.S. government agencies requiring Senate approval. The Department of Defense requires Senate confirmation for only 62 senior positions, although it is by far the largest U.S. government agency with 2.86 million military and civilian employees. The Department of State in contrast has a total 69,000 foreign service, civil service, and local national employees.
About two-thirds of the ambassadorial positions at the State Department are filled by career foreign service officers or other career U.S. government foreign policy personnel. These individuals also must be confirmed by the U.S. Senate if they are appointed to an ambassadorial position. About one-third of ambassadorial positions are filled by “political appointees”—individuals who are not career foreign service officers. These ambassadors are generally experienced foreign policy specialists who are not drawn from the foreign service, but some in all administrations are appointed for political reasons rather than expertise.
The general practice is that career foreign service officers who hold ambassadorial appointments do not change when a new president assumes office. They serve a normal three-year term, and they are generally replaced by other career officials as the position becomes vacant.
When an individual is nominated for an ambassadorial position, whether they are a career diplomat or political appointee, the president formally notifies the U.S. Senate that a specific person is nominated for a specific post. The president requests that the Senate give its “advice and consent.” Since it is politically embarrassing for a president to have a nominee rejected by the Senate, individuals are thoroughly vetted before they are nominated.
When nominations are received by the Senate, they are referred to the appropriate Senate committee, which in the case of State Department nominations is the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Staff of the committee conduct a thorough review of a nominee’s background and qualification, including requesting information from law enforcement and other government agencies, universities, and private employers.
When the vetting is completed, the committee holds a public hearing at which the nominee is questioned by senators. For cabinet members, such hearings may last more than a day, but for positions of lesser prominence, two or three nominees will be questioned for a couple of hours by several senators. Invariably, questions come up that require subsequent written responses to be submitted by the nominee.
After this confirmation hearing and its follow-up, the committee holds a formal meeting at which committee members vote to approve or reject the individual nominees. If the committee votes to approve the nominee, the nomination is scheduled for debate and vote by the entire Senate, which usually takes a minimum of an additional week or two to schedule following the committee vote. The time required from the presidential announcement of a nomination until the Senate votes to confirm or reject an individual is usually about three months for routine, non-controversial nominations. Problematic nominations can take many more months.
The online Biden Political Appointee Tracker, which is maintained by the Washington Post and the Partnership for Public Service, identifies most of the positions requiring presidential nomination and Senate confirmation. The status of these appointments is frequently updated.
My Timeline for Senate Confirmation in 2009
When I was confirmed as special envoy for North Korean human rights in the Obama administration in 2009, I was asked by then-secretary of state Hillary Clinton at the end of May to accept the position. The background vetting by Diplomatic Security agents began within a week. Although I had a security clearance for a number of years because of my work with the House Foreign Affairs Committee, my background was thoroughly scrutinized. Even though it was 42 years since I graduated from college, agents went back and not only requested the transcript of my courses and grades, but also contacted some of my undergraduate professors to ask about me. Many neighbors and former colleagues from around the United States were also contacted and questioned about me.
Two months later, I was told by the White House that my name would be submitted to the Senate on the first day or two of August before the Senate adjourned for its summer recess. The day the Senate was to be notified, however, I received a call from the White House telling me that former president Bill Clinton was in Pyongyang to secure the release of two U.S. journalists who had been arrested earlier that year. The State Department did not want to make the announcement of my nomination until Clinton was back in the United States. There was concern that announcing the nomination of the human rights envoy might upset North Korean officials, and the release of the detainees might be scuttled. By the time Clinton and the journalists were back in the United States, the Senate was in recess and my nomination could not be sent to the Senate.
The nomination was announced and officially sent to the Senate in late September 2009. My confirmation hearing was held on November 5. The Foreign Relations Committee voted to send my nomination to the full Senate on November 17, and I was confirmed by the Senate by a voice vote on November 20. I was sworn in on November 23, six months after I was initially asked to accept the position by Secretary Clinton.
It took six months from being asked until I was sworn in. And that was despite the fact that Secretary of State Clinton was pressing for quick action because Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS) was holding up the confirmation of the nominee for assistant secretary of state for Asia until Secretary Clinton had a nominee for special envoy for North Korean human rights. Senator Brownback had a particular interest in North Korean human rights, and he was the author of the Senate version of the original North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004. Clinton and Brownback exchanged a series of letters on the urgency of appointing the special envoy. Secretary Clinton gave Senator Brownback the assurances he sought that the nomination of an acceptable special envoy was moving forward. Other ambassadorial nominations moved at a slower pace. For example, the nomination and confirmation of the U.S. representative to the UN Human Rights Council was not completed until March 3, 2010, some four months after my confirmation.
Senate Procedures Could Delay Action on the Special Envoy
An indication of the time required to make nominations is the fact that President Biden’s nominations of Rahm Emanuel to serve as U.S. ambassador to Japan and of Nicholas Burns to serve as ambassador to China were only announced by the White House and sent to the Senate on August 20. Both positions are among the most important ambassadorial appointments for the United States. If all goes well (an unlikely scenario), the two are unlikely to be at their embassy posts until at least November. Even under the best of circumstances it takes time to cross the t’s and dot the i’s on an ambassadorial nomination.
Despite statements from Secretary of State Antony Blinken that a North Korean human rights envoy will be appointed, there are several complications that could delay that appointment. Because of the number of foreign policy nominations, the Foreign Relations Committee must pace nominations to allow staff to conduct background investigations and senators to hold hearings to question the nominees. In addition to the large number of State Department nominations, the committee is also dealing with important foreign policy issues, including the U.S. civilian and military withdrawal in Afghanistan and the ongoing international repercussions of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Furthermore, acrimonious partisan differences make smooth working of the Senate more difficult. Arcane rules give individual senators the ability to bring Senate confirmation of government officials to a screeching halt. In the current toxic political atmosphere, approving nominees is becoming even more difficult.
The latest example of this comes from Texas senator Ted Cruz. In protest of President Biden’s decision to waive U.S. sanctions intended to block construction of Nord Stream 2, a joint Russian-German oil and gas pipeline project that the United States had previously opposed, Senator Cruz has used obscure Senate rules to delay the voting on State Department ambassadorial nominations in the Foreign Relations Committee. Cruz has also prevented or delayed the full Senate from voting on nominations the committee has already approved. These delaying and obstruction tactics have nothing to do with the qualifications or views of the nominees; rather, they are an effort to change policy involving another totally unrelated issue.
The bottom line is that the confirmation process in the Senate is precarious at best, and there are a number of potential problems that could slow down or even stop the confirmation of the special envoy for North Korean human rights. President Biden has reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to human rights. The United States has returned as a participant in the UN Human Rights Council and is seeking to be elected to a position on the council. Secretary of State Blinken has unequivocally said a special envoy for North Korean human rights will be appointed. It is clearly an issue that the administration has specified is a priority. The pitfalls of the Senate confirmation process, however, may require a little additional time.
Ambassador Robert R. King is a senior adviser in the Office of the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Previously, Ambassador King served as special envoy for North Korean human rights issues at the U.S. Department of State from November 2009 to January 2017.
Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2021 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
csis.org · by Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Korea Chair · August 3, 2021
7. New cases in 1,800s for second day amid spread in capital area
(3rd LD) New cases in 1,800s for second day amid spread in capital area | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: ADDS latest figure in paras 6-7)
SEOUL, Sept. 11 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's daily coronavirus cases stayed in the 1,800s for the second straight day Saturday as infections continued to spread in the greater Seoul area.
The country added 1,865 more COVID-19 cases, including 1,816 local infections, raising the total caseload to 271,227, according to the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA).
The number of new cases was down 27 from Friday but still 62 more than a week ago. In the past week, the number of new cases has ranged from 1,375 to 2,049, averaging 1,759 a day.
The daily caseload has stayed in the four-digits since July 7 amid the fast spread of the more transmissible delta variant nationwide.
The country added 10 more deaths from COVID-19, raising the death toll to 2,358.
As of 9 p.m. Saturday, South Korea reported 1,636 new cases, down 78 from the same time the previous day, according to health authorities and local governments.
Daily cases are counted until midnight and announced the following morning. The greater Seoul area accounted for 74.1 percent of the total.
The capital area has seen a resurgence of infections, with 74.2 percent of the new domestic cases being counted in Seoul, Gyeonggi Province and Incheon.
Health authorities have expressed particular concern about the potential spread of the virus during the Sept. 20-22 Chuseok fall harvest holiday, when millions of South Koreans typically travel nationwide for family gatherings.
Virus curbs have been extended for another four weeks through Oct. 3, with the greater Seoul area under Level 4, the highest in the four-tier system, and other regions under Level 3.
More than 32.8 million people, or 63.9 percent of the country's population of 51.3 million, have received at least one shot of a COVID-19 vaccine, health authorities said.
The number of fully vaccinated people rose to over 19.8 million, or 38.6 percent of the population.
The government has said its aim is to give at least one shot to 70 percent of the population before the Chuseok holiday and reach herd immunity by October.
The total number of people released from quarantine after making full recoveries was 242,960, up 2,227 from a day earlier.
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
8. North Korea's disappearing supply of soybean oil
More indications of the failed economy and the suffering of the Korean people in the north.
North Korea's disappearing supply of soybean oil - Daily NK
North Korean authorities reportedly issued an order for localities to produce cooking oil, including soybean oil, on their own
By Seulkee Jang - 2021.09.10 2:31pm
Imported foodstuffs have grown even more scarce in North Korean markets with the continued closure of the Sino-North Korean border.
With even ordinary foodstuffs such as cooking oil in short supply, many more North Koreans now complain of health problems due to malnutrition.
In a telephone conversation with Daily NK on Wednesday, a source in North Korea said with the border closure growing protracted, there are no imported foodstuffs from China or Southeast Asia in the markets. “Many people haven’t tasted oil in over a year because there’s almost no soybean oil coming in,” he said.
Prior to the closure of the border, Chinese soybean oil was selling for around KPW 10,000 a kilogram in North Korean markets. Recently, however, it was reportedly selling for more than KPW 30,000, triple earlier prices.
And with even this overpriced oil disappearing, it has become next to impossible to buy imported cooking oil in markets, said the source.
With locals facing worsening economic difficulties, many people cannot eat meat; now deprived of even cooking oil, more and more people are suffering health problems such as lethargy and poor eyesight.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is pictured on an on-the-spot visit to the Pyongyang Basic Food Factory in 2013. In front of him, are rows of soybean oil recently produced by the factory. / Image: Rodong Sinmun
Faced with growing public discontent over shortages of imported foodstuffs and rising prices, North Korean authorities reportedly even issued an order for localities to produce cooking oil, including soybean oil, on their own.
Responding to the order, regional parties and people’s committees have reportedly formulated plans to cultivate soybeans and sunflowers to produce and supply domestically manufactured cooking oil.
In fact, in April, the party committee of Kapsan County, Yanggang Province, ordered locals to surrender their small private plots for soybean production, telling residents the authorities would provide them with soybean oil.
With shortages of imported foodstuffs worsening nationwide, localities across the country are apparently attempting to produce food supplies on their own.
However, these local initiatives will likely be easier said than done.
This is because North Korea’s mountainous terrain provides little arable land, and with farming supplies now in short supply, cultivating new crops will prove difficult.
“If there’s land to cultivate, you cultivate staples like rice or potatoes, not crops for oil,” said the source. “It’s completely ineffective to plant sunflowers or soybeans to get oil.
“The problem would be resolved if you lifted the border closure and allowed trade like the old days. I don’t understand why they keep making the problem worse,” he continued, adding, “There are an increasing number of food-short families with little to nothing to eat, but there are also more and more people with just barely enough to eat who are suffering from malnourishment.”
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
9. Korea, China may be part of expert group monitoring Fukushima water release
Korea, China may be part of expert group monitoring Fukushima water release
Published : Sept 10, 2021 - 14:52 Updated : Sept 10, 2021 - 14:52
Storage tanks for treated contaminated water are seen at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Okuma town, Fukushima prefecture. (AP-Yonhap)
The International Atomic Energy Agency will send a group of experts, possibly including some from South Korea and China, to the wrecked Fukushima nuclear power plant in December to monitor the safety and transparency of Japan’s planned disposal of treated radioactive water, an official from the agency said Thursday.
Fishers in Japan and neighboring countries, including China and Korea, reacted angrily to the Japanese government’s decision in April to dump the 1.25 million tons of wastewater it has collected since the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant was crippled by a 2011 earthquake and tsunami. The release is set to start in the spring of 2023, and the procedure is expected to take several decades.
In mind of the international community’s safety and transparency concerns, Japan requested the nuclear watchdog’s assistance to conduct reviews on the water treatment and discharge process, and to determine whether it meets safety standards.
An IAEA team led by Lydie Evrard, head of the agency’s department of nuclear security, is in Japan through Friday to meet with Japanese officials to discuss details about the monitoring process and also to visit the Fukushima site.
During a press conference in Japan, Evrad stressed that the IAEA is firmly committed to ensuring that the review is comprehensive and objective and that the results are conveyed to the international community.
She added that the IAEA will dispatch an 11-member multinational team of experts to Fukushima in December for the review, which may include experts from Korea and China.
The expert team will be asked to assess the water to be released and to evaluate the safety of the release process and the impact of its radiation on people and the environment, in accordance with IAEA safety standards.
She stressed that her team will listen to “different concerns from various stakeholders,” saying the main objective of the review is to be objective and transparent with a science-based approach.
The Japanese government and the plant’s operator, Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, decided to go ahead with the release in April after years of heated debate and despite protests from neighboring countries.
Japan said the decision was unavoidable, with storage space for the radioactive water expected to run out next summer.
It insists the wastewater will be filtered and diluted to remove all radioactive substances except tritium, which it says is harmless to humans in small doses.
The decision, however, was met with fierce backlash from neighbors including Korea, China and Russia, as well as from the Japanese fishing industry and environmental activists around the world. Opponents say the sheer volume of water to be released could affect human health, food safety and the maritime environment.
Last month, Korea expressed “strong regret” upon news reports that TEPCO planned to build an undersea tunnel to release the radioactive water from the power plant into the sea.
Koo Yoon-cheol, head of the Office of Government Policy Coordination, condemned Japan for unilaterally pursuing its plan without any prior consultations with Seoul or seeking its consent. He called on Japan to “immediately halt” the disposal plan and to communicate sufficiently beforehand with neighboring countries.
10. [Kim Myong-sik] Pathetic ulterior motive of ‘fake news’ bill
Sincere pro-democracy advocates must fight to prevent passage of this law.
[Kim Myong-sik] Pathetic ulterior motive of ‘fake news’ bill
Published : Sept 9, 2021 - 05:30 Updated : Sept 9, 2021 - 05:30
In 2007, the final year of the Roh Moo-hyun presidency, major government offices literally locked down press rooms in their precincts under an order from the Blue House. The president made the decision out of belief that media representatives were just there to harass officials on duty.
Print and broadcast journalists, as well as some internet reporters who were not many at that time, had to rent small spaces near government offices to continue to do their job of reporting what was going on inside by the men and women paid with tax money. Official press releases and infrequent press briefings were the only means of access to “news” as phone calls to officials were not often responded to.
Government authorities might have expected a surge of “good news” and a drawdown of “bad news” as an effect of the virtual media blackout. Newspapers, however, carried an increased volume of news stories on the administration, more in negative tones mostly attributed to unnamed but reliable sources. Then, there came a change of power from the left to the right and the new Lee Myung-bak administration reopened press rooms at government ministries as one of its first actions.
After a decade and a half, the leftist government and its party are making another move to interfere with media activities, this time through a tough legislation unseen in a democracy. They seek to control the business of press workers and their employers with threats of huge punitive damage instead of the surgical approach of closing down press rooms. It takes the form of a revision bill to the Law on Press Arbitration and Reparation of Damage, which quickly earned the nickname of “Press Gag Law.”
They argue that it is aimed at preventing “fake news” currently on the rise. More than a dozen radical ruling party lawmakers had individually proposed similar legislation and the different texts were unified into a single bill by a task force team. When the arbitrary contents of the bill were made public in July, journalist organizations of different professional ideals raised a single voice of objection, echoed by international press bodies.
In the fake news bill, particularly poisonous clauses were those providing punitive damage of up to five times the recognized value of the loss to the victim caused by untruthful articles, using the ambiguous terms of “malicious intent” and “gross negligence” in defining fake news, requiring the same space and time for corrections, and allowing individuals the right to interdict (erase) stories apparently violating their privacy and prestige.
With its power of absolute majority in the Assembly, the ruling Democratic Party of Korea passed the bill through relevant committees but at the last moment agreed with the PPP to postpone submitting the bill to the plenary session until late September. In the meantime, the International Press Institute, the World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers, the International Federation of Journalists and the Reporters without Borders issued statements demanding withdrawal of the “anti-disinformation amendment.”
A UN special rapporteur delivered an open letter to the Korean government, expressing her concerns over the controversial bill here which could “violate international human rights law and infringe on freedom of expression.” Irene Khan of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights said if the amendments are adopted at the National Assembly without further changes, they could severely restrict the media’s rights to freedom of information and expression.
Promoters of the fake news bill point to the abundance of false information in the present day South Korea, especially slanderous and defamatory stories about political figures. True, there are innumerable YouTube streaming and podcasts and countless postings on the internet every day and every hour delivering items that contain some truth, half-truths and sheer fabrication to this fully wired Korean society.
But everyone knows that the direct cause for the ruling group to make such hard efforts with the bill is the “Cho Kuk affair” which has dogged the ruling group shortly after the inception of the Moon Jae-in administration. Cho, a former Seoul National University professor, committed himself to the task of reforming the nation’s prosecution service first as the senior presidential secretary for civil affairs and later as the justice minister. His mission foundered as mainstream media exposed improprieties involving Cho and his family.
It is understandable that President Moon, who served as the chief of staff for the late president Roh Moo-hyun, had developed ill sentiments against the strong-armed prosecution and the nation’s media outlets in general. He had witnessed the former probing bribery scandals surrounding Roh’s wife and children and the latter indiscriminately conveying prosecutors’ allegations to the public from the final days of the Roh presidency to his suicide in May 2009.
After the conservative Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations, governing power rolled back to the political lineage of Roh led by his former chief secretary. Moon’s election was a product of the media’s energetic exposure of the Choi Sun-sil scandal, which had grown out of Park’s self-isolation and ineptitude, but the new power holders wishfully assumed their mandate as being given for their moral integrity and public service competence with Cho Kuk as the symbolic figure. The Chosun, JoongAng and Dong-A dailies portrayed wholly different realities.
The media environment in South Korea has changed a lot over the past decade with more and more people relying on information conveyed through online portals and mobile handsets. The role of major dailies has declined but they still enjoy high credibility compared to the various kinds of new media. The ruling power must want to prevent traditional media from finding more Cho Kuks in Korean politics approaching the presidential election.
If the government and its party truly want to get rid of fake news and remove their makers from the information market, they have better things to do than trying to force legitimate media workers into self-censorship in fear of exorbitant “punitive damage.” If they browse through the many political YouTube videos for just an hour, they would know what should be done to protect the public from false information. But they left YouTube and private online outlets out of the fake news bill.
We now ponder if those who move about to quash fake news are actually more afraid of truth from being disseminated by good and just media outlets.
Kim Myong-sik
Kim Myong-sik is a former editorial writer for The Korea Herald. – Ed.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
