Physical precedent only. In prosecution for DUI and related offenses, trial court erred in granting motion to suppress results of State blood test. Evidence didn't support finding that a reasonable person would have felt intimidated by trooper's statement to defendant that he would "yank" defendant's license based on his refusal. "Baddeley testified that he changed his mind in part because the trooper said that he was going to 'yank' Baddeley's license. He also testified that he changed his mind because he felt 'very intimidated' by the trooper's 'body language and the way he was looking at me.'" Held, "there are no objective facts in the transcript upon which the trial court was authorized to conclude that a reasonable 63-year-old person would not feel free to decline the trooper's request for a blood test. Indeed, Baddeley initially refused to take the test, which reflects that he knew he had a right to do so. The only purported evidence to the contrary is that Baddeley felt intimidated by the trooper's 'body language and the way he was looking at [him].' But Baddeley did not describe the relevant body language or demeanor in any way. And the trial court's finding that 'the Trooper's demeanor changed when [Baddeley] refused [to take the test]' is wholly unsupported by the record and therefore clearly erroneous. There is no testimony about the trooper's demeanor nor a change in it. All we have is Baddeley's subjective feeling of intimidation. Although the trooper testified that Baddeley became argumentative at one point, there is no evidence regarding the topic of that argument or whether it contributed to Baddeley's feeling of intimidation. McFadden dissents from the majority's failure to show due deference to the trial court's findings of fact, and its apparent holding "that a defendant whose consent was in fact secured by intimidation may not be found to have been intimidated if-in the opinion of the appellate court-a reasonable person would not have been intimidated." "The issue to be decided in cases like the one before us is not how a hypothetical reasonable person might feel. Rather, it is to determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer used fear, intimidation, or threats to obtain consent from the individual defendant before the court."

 

Ledbetter v. State, 349 Ga.App. 154, 825 S.E.2d 530 (March 5, 2019).  

   

Following nolle pros of family violence battery and related charges, state court's order denying motion to restrict record affirmed in part, vacated in part. 1. Motion was properly denied as to GCIC/GBI "because the Georgia Crime Information Center was required to automatically restrict Ledbetter's record" under OCGA § 35-3-37(h)(2)(A). "And even if the record was not subject to automatic restriction, nothing in the statute permits the state court to order the Georgia Crime Information Center/Georgia Bureau of Investigation to restrict a record that is not subject to automatic restriction." 2. Motion was properly denied as to police and sheriff because "Ledbetter was required to direct his own request for restriction 'to the appropriate county or municipal jail or detention center.'[fn] Then, only if the 'entity decline[d] to restrict access to such information,' could Ledbetter 'file a civil action in the superior court where the entity is located.' OCGA § 35-3-37(l) (emphasis supplied). Thereafter, the entity's decision may only be upheld if the court determines 'by clear and convincing evidence that the individual did not meet the criteria' for automatic record restriction under subsections (h) and (j) of OCGA § 35-3-37." Defendant here filed motion in state court rather than civil action in superior court. 3. Order vacated and remanded as to court records. Trial court's order denying motion recites that defendant's charges were nolle prossed for "unrestrictable reasons," without reference to any such reasons, and the record reflects none. Court of Appeals remands for consideration of whether any such reasons exist, such as "a plea agreement resulting in a conviction of the individual for an offense arising out of the same underlying transaction or occurrence as the conviction," OCGA § 35-3-37(i)(1)(A), or because "[t]he conduct which resulted in the arrest of the individual was part of a pattern of criminal activity which was prosecuted in another court of the state or a foreign nation," OCGA § 35-3-37(i)(1)(A).

The Gwinnett County Sheriff's Office is excited to announce that the Gwinnett Reentry Intervention Program (GRIP), in partnership with United Way of Greater Atlanta and through View Point Health, officially has a clinician.  Kafilat Oseni LPC will conduct onsite mental health and substance abuse evaluations.  If there is a need for a defendant to have either type of evaluation, as ordered by the court, the order can simply be sent to [email protected].  Lastly, if you have any questions, please do not hesitate to reach out to the GRIP Coordinator.

 

Cpl. Jacob Baird, SO1185

GRIP Coordinator

Gwinnett County Sheriff's Office

Gwinnett Reentry Intervention Program

2900 University Parkway, Lawrenceville, GA 30043

Office: 770-619-6494

Cell: 678-367-1831