Lynda Newman (“Newman”) appealed the summary judgment entered by the trial court in favor of Michael Howard and Rhonda Howard (“the Howards”). The Howards owned a piece of real property in Calhoun County. In April of 2003, the Howards mortgaged the property to secure a note. In 2007, the Howards conveyed the property by general warranty deed to the Newmans, and then Oscar subsequently died. It was undisputed that the 2003 mortgage was not satisfied by the Howards before the conveyance and remained an encumbrance on the property. The Newmans and the Howards were involved in litigation concerning numerous claims against one another involving deeds, financing agreements, mortgages, and contracts between the various parties concerning several pieces of real property, including the property at issue in this case. 

Before a final judgment was reached, in December 2014 the parties dismissed the lawsuits and entered into a “settlement agreement and mutual release agreement.” After Lynda signed the agreement, she attempted to sell the property. During the closing on the sale of the property, Lynda’s attorney conducted a title search and discovered that the property was encumbered by the 2003 mortgage. Lynda requested that the Howards satisfy the mortgage pursuant to the terms of the 2007 general warranty deed. The Howards refused. Lynda then sued the Howards, alleging breach of warranty of title. Michael Howard filed an answer, but did not raise any affirmative defenses. Rhonda Howard never filed an answer. The Howards then filed a motion for a summary judgment, with their sole argument being that Lynda had waived any claims she may have had against the Howards regarding the property by signing the settlement agreement. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the Howards’ summary-judgment motion on the sole basis that Lynda had released any claims she may have had against the Howards.

Lynda appealed the summary judgment and argued that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment for the Howards based on the defense of release when the Howards did not raise that defense until they filed their summary-judgment motion. The Howards offered no argument in rebuttal. The Alabama Supreme Court noted that the Howards’ argument that Lynda is barred from enforcing the warranty deed based on her signing of the agreement is an affirmative defense. The record indicated that Lynda timely objected to the Howards’ raising this affirmative defense for the first time in their summary-judgment motion and that the Howards never filed an amended answer to include the affirmative defense before the trial court entered the summary judgment in their favor.

On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding Lynda timely objected to the Howards’ reliance on the affirmative defense of settlement and release in their summary-judgment motion. Further, it was equally clear that the Howards did not make an amendment to specially plead the affirmative defense of release. 

Rainbow Cinemas, LLC (“Rainbow”), Ambarish Keshani, and Harshit Thakker ( “the defendants”) appealed the trial court’s order denying their motion to compel arbitration of a contract dispute with Consolidated Construction Company of Alabama (“CCC”). CCC agreed to provide specified services in constructing a movie theater for Rainbow. The parties signed the American Institute of Architects “Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor where the basis of payment is a Stipulated Sum” (“the agreement”). The agreement incorporated by reference American Institute of Architects “General Conditions of the Contract for Construction” (“the general conditions”). 

During the course of CCC’s performance, a dispute arose between the parties. in accordance with the contract, CCC referred its claim to the initial decision maker, which was the architect, Hay Buchanan. CCC then made a request for mediation to be administered by the AAA. After having already initiated the arbitration process, CCC sued the defendants. CCC alleged that the defendants had “fraudulently induced it into entering into the contract.” Specifically, CCC alleged that the defendants knew that the contract required an initial decision maker and that the defendants also “knew they had not contracted for [initial-decision-maker] services from the [initial decision maker].” CCC alleged that the defendants “failed to inform CCC ... that Rainbow had not contracted with [architect Hay] Buchanan to act as [the initial decision maker].” CCC then filed a motion with the AAA requesting that the arbitration proceedings be stayed. In response, the defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration and argued that the validity of the arbitration clause in the contract “is something that must be decided by the arbitrator.” The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, which the defendants appealed.

The Alabama Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the contract incorporated the AAA’s Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, which states that “[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement.” Although the question whether an arbitration provision may be used to compel arbitration between a signatory and a nonsignatory is a threshold question of arbitrability usually decided by the court, here that question was delegated to the arbitrator. Accordingly, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration and remanded with instructions to grant the motion to compel arbitration. 

R.E. Garrison Trucking, Inc. (“Garrison”), petitioned the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals for a writ of mandamus directing the Washington Circuit Court (“the trial court”) to vacate its order denying Garrison’s motion for a change of venue and to enter an order transferring the workers’ compensation action to the Cullman Circuit Court. In the underlying civil action, William D. Hennis alleged that he was an employee of Garrison when he suffered an on-the-job accident in Cullman County. Hennis’s Complaint alleged that he is a resident of Washington County. It was undisputed that Garrison’s principal place of business is in Cullman County.

In support of its request for a change of venue, Garrison submitted documentary evidence, including Hennis’s job application, other employment documents, and medical forms that showed Hennis’s address to be in Mobile County. Garrison also submitted a certified copy of a page from the Alabama Secretary of State’s voter registration database showing that Hennis was registered to vote in Mobile County. Additionally, Garrison submitted evidence that it did not do business in Washington County. Evidence proved that Garrison had not delivered to or picked up a load from a single customer in Washington County and that Garrison had not had any sales agents or company sales people who lived in Washington County.

In opposition to Garrison’s evidentiary submissions, Hennis submitted an affidavit and documentary evidence, including his pistol permit, his commercial driver’s license, and vehicle registrations and loan documents completed in 2015, indicating that he lived in Chatom, in Washington County. In his affidavit, he stated that he had lived at the Chatom address for the past 15 years. He explained that in 2014, he began using the Mobile County address, where his former wife lived, for mailing purposes. He said that he lived alone at the Chatom address and that because he was gone for long periods driving for Garrison, he wanted “to be certain [he] got all [his] mail.” Hennis also testified that he was acting as Garrison’s agent when he parked and stored Garrison tractors and trailers on property he owned in Washington County. In response, several Garrison employees testified by affidavit that they had not given Hennis permission to park Garrison’s equipment on Hennis’s property in Washington County when he was not driving. The trial court denied Garrison’s motion seeking a change of venue.

In citing Alabama Code § 6-3-7(a)(3), the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals noted that venue is proper in Washington County if Hennis resided there and if Garrison did business by agent in Washington County at the time of Hennis’s on-the-job accident. The Court held that Garrison did not meet its burden of proving that Hennis did not live in Washington County. However, the Court held that “because the evidence demonstrates that Garrison was not doing business in Washington County, venue is not proper in Washington County.” Accordingly, Garrison’s petition for a writ of mandamus was granted, and the Court directed the trial court to vacate its order denying Garrison’s motion seeking a change of venue.

Hope Kirby (“Kirby”) appealed from an order of the Lauderdale Circuit Court (“the trial court”) dismissing her outrage claim against Jack’s Family Restaurants, LP (“Jack’s”). Kirby, a former employee of Jack’s, filed a complaint in the trial court seeking benefits under the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act, (“the Act”), and seeking damages for the tort of outrage and retaliatory discharge. Kirby named as defendants Jack’s, the Alabama Self-Insured Worker’s Compensation Fund, Employer’s Claim Management, Inc., and Directions Management Services, Inc. (“the defendants”). All defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Kirby’s outrage claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Kirby then filed two amended complaints in an effort to support her outrage claims.

After a hearing, the trial court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. Jack’s then filed a motion requesting clarification of the dismissal order. In response, the trial court entered an order dismissing Kirby’s tort-of-outrage claim asserted against Jack’s and clarified that the dismissal was directed to the tort-of-outrage claim asserted in Kirby’s second amended complaint. The trial court’s dismissal order found, in part, that Kirby’s “allegations fail to rise to the level of a cognizable claim of outrage under Alabama law and, therefore, [Kirby] has failed to state a claim for Outrage.” The trial court certified that order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. Kirby timely filed a notice of appeal to the supreme court. Thereafter, the supreme court deflected the case to this court pursuant to Alabama Code § 12-2-7(6).

In citing Alabama precedent, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals explained: “Rule 54(b) certification is not proper when the unadjudicated claims ‘are so closely intertwined [with those adjudicated in a judgment that has been certified as final so] that separate adjudication would pose an unreasonable risk of inconsistent results.’ Furthermore, Rule 54(b) certification is improper ‘when at least some of the issues presented in the claims still pending in the trial court [are] the same as the issues presented in the claims addressed in the judgment on appeal and’ ‘[r]epeated appellate review of the same underlying facts would be a probability in [the] case.’”

To recover based on a claim of outrage, the Plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s conduct “(1) was intentional or reckless; (2) was extreme and outrageous; and (3) caused emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.” To recover based on a claim of retaliatory discharge, the Plaintiff must prove “(1) an employment relationship, (2) an on-the-job injury, (3) knowledge on the part of the employer of the on-the-job injury, and (4) subsequent termination of employment based solely upon the employee’s on-the-job injury and the filing of a workers’ compensation claim.” The Court found that Kirby relied on facts and circumstances surrounding her injury and termination in support of both her retaliatory-discharge claim and tort-of-outrage claim. Thus, there would be “a probability of ‘[r]epeated appellate review of the same underlying facts,’” and the claims were “so closely intertwined that separate adjudication would pose an unreasonable risk of inconsistent results.” Accordingly, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals found that the trial court’s order was not appropriately certified as final, and dismissed the appeal.