SSC Selma Operating Company, LLC, and SavaSeniorCare Administrative Services, LLC (“Employers”) appealed from an order of the Dallas Circuit Court denying their motion to compel arbitration of a retaliatory-discharge claim filed against them by Jackie Fikes.

Employers moved to compel arbitration of the retaliatory discharge claim pursuant to their employment-dispute resolution program, under which Fikes had agreed to be bound. The only issue before the Court was whether Fikes met her burden of demonstrating that her retaliatory-discharge claim was not covered under the EDR program. Fikes, relying solely on the provision concerning disputes "not covered" under the EDR program, argued that the plain language of the provision is unambiguous and expressly provides that an employment dispute that "relate[s] to worker's compensation" is not covered under the EDR program.

The Court, relying on Alabama precedent, held that “although a retaliatory-discharge action operates to protect an employee who files a traditional workers' compensation claim ..., [it] does not itself become a workers' compensation action.” Jackson Cty. Hosp. v. Alabama Hosp. Ass'n Trust, 619 So. 2d 1369 (Ala. 1993). Accordingly, the Alabama Supreme Court held the retaliatory discharge claim was not excluded under the EDR program, and reversed and remanded the case to the trial court. 

Action Auto sued Pine City and the purchasers of eight vehicles who had purchased vehicles from Pine City and financed those purchases through FSCU. Action Auto sought possession of the vehicles and money damages. The purchasers each filed counterclaims and cross-claims against Action Auto and Pine City and third-party claims against FSCU, alleging negligence, wantonness, and conspiracy. The purchasers' third-party claims against FSCU are based on FSCU's alleged failure to perfect its security interest in the vehicles before financing the purchasers of the vehicles. FSCU moved for each of those third-party claims to be submitted to arbitration, and, to support its motions, FSCU attached a copy of a "Retail Installment Sale Contract" and a "Dealer's Assignment and Buyer's Consent to Assignment" that each purchaser had executed when he or she purchased the vehicle. The purchasers did not respond with any evidence in opposition to the motion to compel arbitration.

In denying FSCU's motions to compel arbitration, the trial court held that "FSCU's promise to arbitrate is merely illusory and does not serve as valid consideration to support the arbitration agreement." Further, the trial court held that the arbitration provision was unconscionable.

The Alabama Supreme Court held that to invalidate the arbitration provision on the basis of unconscionability, the purchasers were required to establish both procedural and substantive unconscionability. Because the purchasers failed to present evidence establishing procedural unconscionability, the trial court erred in holding the agreement unconscionable.

Like its holding concerning unconscionability, the trial court held that the arbitration provision in each contract failed for lack of consideration based on the allegation that arbitration provision lacked mutuality of remedy. However, the Alabama Supreme Court stated that, "the concept of mutuality of remedy has no application to arbitration agreements." Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions.