This petition for a writ of mandamus arose from separate automobile accidents between an Allstate and a GEICO insured with UIM coverage and an allegedly underinsured tortfeasors. In each case, it was undisputed that the applicable insurance policy contained a "consent-to-settle" clause requiring the provision of notice to, and the consent of, the affected insurer prior to the insured's settlement of any claims against the alleged underinsured tortfeasors and/or a release of the tortfeasors' liability. Pursuant to the procedure outlined by the Alabama Supreme Court in Lambert v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 576 So. 2d 160, 167 (Ala. 1991), the insured notified Allstate of the settlement offer and sought its consent to settle. Allstate, however, declined to consent; instead, as also permitted by Lambert, Allstate opted to advance the $50,000 to the claimant. Allstate then opted out of participation in further proceedings determining tortfeasor’s liability and claimant's damages.

The trial court then enforced a settlement agreement between the underinsured tortfeasors and dismissed the tortfeasors from these actions; leaving the UIM carriers as the sole defendants, despite their desire to opt out of participation.

The Court held that “[b]ecause the insurers, in following the express directives of this Court, have been deprived of their contractual rights as well as the benefit of the procedures set forth in Lowe and Lambert, we conclude that they have demonstrated a clear legal right to the requested relief.” Accordingly, the Alabama Supreme Court issued the writ in favor of Allstate and GEICO. 

A default judgment was entered in favor of McAteer. DuBose requested, in a letter to the trial court that the court set aside the default judgment, asserting only that he had been mistaken regarding the time in which he could submit an answer. In order to have a default judgment set aside, a defendant must prove that he has a meritorious defense, that the plaintiff will not be prejudiced if the default judgment is set aside, and that the default judgment was not a result of the defendant's own culpable conduct. See Kirtland v. Fort Morgan Auth. Sewer Serv., Inc., 524 So. 2d 600 (Ala. 1988). A defendant makes out a prima facie case to have a default judgment set aside when the defendant presents arguments and affidavits or other evidence to establish each of the three Kirtland factors. If a defendant fails to meet its initial burden of demonstrating the existence of all three Kirtland factors, a trial court may summarily deny the motion to set aside the default judgment and does not commit reversible error by denying the motion to set aside the default judgment without conducting a hearing. Carroll v. Williams, 6 So. 3d 463, 468 (Ala. 2008).

DuBose failed to argue before the trial court at that time that he had a meritorious defense to the claims asserted by McAteer in her Complaint or that McAteer would not be unfairly prejudiced if the default judgment were to be set aside. As such, the default judgment was affirmed.