Officers J.C. Clifton and Jason Davis petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson County Circuit Court to enter summary judgment in their favor on the grounds of state agent immunity. In 2013, the officers were dispatched to a retail store in response to a shoplifting incident. When the officers arrived to the scene, the two suspects were leaving the store in a vehicle operated by one of the suspects. The officers, driving separate patrol cars at the time, attempted to stop the vehicle. However, the suspects refused to stop, and sped through the parking lot onto the roadway. The suspects sped through multiple red lights before losing control of the vehicle and striking a light pole. One of the suspects was killed and the other was seriously injured.  

In 2015, the surviving suspect sued the officers in their official and individual capacities, alleging that she was injured as a result of the negligent, reckless, and/or wanton conduct of the officers during their pursuit. The suspect also sued the city of Homewood, alleging the city was vicariously liable for the officers’ conduct and was negligent in hiring and supervising the officers. The Supreme Court concluded that the officers were entitled to immunity pursuant to § 6-5-338(a) of the Alabama Code as to the claims against them in both their individual and official capacities. The Court found that the officers had demonstrated (1) that they were peace officers; (2) performing law-enforcement duties at the time of the accident; and (3) were exercising judgment and discrection. Accordingly, the Court granted the officers’ petition and issued the writ directing the Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in favor of the officers and the City of Homewood. 

Brianna Horton appealed the judgment of the Tuscaloosa County Circuit Court dismissing her personal injury action as a sanction for disregarding the requirements of the discovery process. In 2015, Horton sued Bria Hinton, alleging that Hinton had negligently or wantonly operated her vehicle in a manner so as to strike Horton. Horton also alleged claims of outrageous conduct and emotional distress. Hinton filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Horton failed to respond to interrogatories and requests for production of documents, that the trial court entered an order compelling Horton to respond to those discovery requests, and that Horton failed to comply with the trial court’s order. After Hinton filed her motion to dismiss, Horton responded to the discovery requests, and the trial court entered an order denying Hinton’s motion to dismiss as moot.  

Thereafter, Hinton scheduled Horton’s deposition in October 2015, which Horton later cancelled. Hinton sent two letters to Horton’s counsel requesting alternative dates, and received no response. Nevertheless, Hinton scheduled Horton’s deposition and issued a new notice of deposition. Hinton again filed a motion to compel, and the trial court entered an order directing Horton to make herself available for deposition within 21 days “or be subject to possible dismissal” of her action. Horton did not appear at the next scheduled deposition. Accordingly, Hinton filed a motion to dismiss, which the court granted. The trial court denied Horton’s motion to reconsider.  

The Court discussed that Rule 37 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the trial court to dismiss an action as a sanction against a party who violates an order compelling him or her to provide discovery. Further, the Court noted that the Alabama Supreme Court makes clear that “willfulness” on the part of the noncomplying party is a key factor supporting a dismissal. In finding that the trial court did not err in concluding that Horton’s conduct rose to the level of “willfulness” recognized by Alabama law, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment dismissing the action.