Tenax Corporation (“Tenax”) and Tenax Manufacturing Alabama, LLC (“Tenax Alabama”) petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor in John Dees’s workers’ compensation and tort action against them. Dees sued Tenax and Tenax Alabama claiming that he was injured while operating a machine as a result of the defective condition of the machine. Dees sought workers’ compensation benefits from Onin Staffing, the staffing company that placed him at Tenax, and sought damages under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine (“AEMLD”) from the Tenax defendants.  

Tenax and Tenax Alabama contended that they were immune from Dees’s tort claims under the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act. Furthermore, Tenax Alabama contended that it was entitled to a summary judgment because it was not a legal entity when Dees was injured. In fact, it was undisputed that Tenax Alabama was not a legal entity at the time Dees was injured. Finding that the Tenax defendants demonstrated a clear legal right to mandamus relief, the Supreme Court granted the petition and issued the writ directing the Circuit Court to enter summary judgment in their favor.

Warren and Johanna Grimes (“the Grimeses”) appealed a declaratory judgment holding that a liability policy issued by Alfa Mutual Insurance Company (“Alfa”) did not provide coverage for a user of an automobile who did not have the express permission of the owner or drivers covered by the policy. Teresa Boop (“Boop”) added liability coverage and uninsured/underinsured-motorist coverage for a pickup truck to her automobile insurance with Alfa. Boop also added her minor son as a driver under the policy. The liability provision of the policy provided: “If this coverage is shown on your declaration, we will pay damages for bodily injury or property damage for which any covered person becomes legally responsible because of a car accident arising out of the ownership, use or maintenance of a covered car or non-owned car. We will settle or defend lawsuits asking for these damages until your coverage for such damage has been exhausted with attorneys hired and paid by us as we consider appropriate. In addition to our limit of liability, we will pay all defense costs we incur. We have the right to investigate, negotiate and settle any claim or suit. We have no duty to defend any suit or settle any claim for bodily injury or property damage not covered under this policy.” Under the policy, “covered person” was defined as: “You and your: Family members. Any other person while using the covered car with the express permission of you or a family member. Under Part A [liability coverage], any person or organization legally responsible for the use of the covered car by covered persons as defined under the three subsections above. Under Part D [uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage], any person while occupying your covered car.”  

Amy Arrington (“Arrington”) was operating the pickup truck when it collided with a vehicle owned and occupied by the Grimeses. Both of the Grimeses suffered personal injuries as a result of the collision. The Grimeses’ insurer, Liberty Mutual, sued Arrington, alleging negligence and wantonness and seeking recovery of damages for the Grimeses’ vehicle.

Thereafter, the Grimeses sued Arrington and Boop, alleging negligence, wantonness, and negligent entrustment, and seeking damages for their personal injuries. In her answer, Arrington argued that she was a covered person under the terms of Boop’s policy with Alfa and that Alfa, therefore, should provide her with a defense in the Grimeses’ action and in Liberty Mutual’s action. The Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the trial court, and found that the trial court did not err in its conclusion that the Alfa policy did not provide coverage for a user of a motor vehicle who did not have the express permission of the owner or drivers who were covered.

University Toyota and University Chevrolet Buick GMC (“the University dealerships”) appealed a circuit court order allowing Beverly Hardeman and Vivian Roberts to pursue their claims against the University dealerships in arbitration proceedings conducted by the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) instead of the Better Business Bureau of North Alabama (“BBB”), the entity identified in the controlling arbitration agreements.  

In conjunction with their purchases of new vehicles from the University dealerships’ predecessor, Jim Bishop, Hardeman and Roberts purchased service contracts entitling them to no-cost oil changes for as long as they owned their respective vehicles. When the Jim Bishop dealerships were sold and rebranded as the University dealerships, initially the University dealerships honored the no-cost oil-change service contracts sold by the Jim Bishop dealerships. However, they eventually stopped providing no-cost oil changes to customers who held those contracts. On October 29, 2015, Hardeman and Roberts filed a demand for arbitration with BBB, the dispute-resolution entity identified in arbitration agreements they had executed when they purchased their vehicles, on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated individuals, based on the University dealerships’ refusal to honor the service contracts. In holding that a trial court can compel arbitration only in a manner consistent with the terms of the applicable arbitration agreement, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order compelling arbitration and remanded the case for the entry of a new order compelling Hardeman and Roberts to arbitrate their claims against the University dealerships before the BBB if they chose to pursue said claims.

Bobby Ward appealed the judgment of the trial court permitting All South Rental Homes and Gary Smith (collectively “All South”) to redeem certain real property located in Jefferson County. After All South failed to pay the ad valorem taxes due on the property, the State of Alabama purchased the property. Thereafter, the State sold the property to Ward. Ward received an ad valorem tax deed which was recorded on August 24, 2015. On August 28, 2015, Ward entered into a three-year lease agreement with Brooke Holloway. Holloway had been in possession of the property since that time.  

On December 7, 2015, All South filed a complaint seeking permission to redeem the property. Ward answered the complaint and filed a motion for summary judgment. On January 29, 2016, the court granted Ward’s motion and concluded that All South did not have the right to redeem the property. All South filed a post judgment motion. The trial court then entered an order setting aside its summary judgment and setting a hearing to determine the amount required for All South to redeem the property. After the hearing, the court concluded that All South could redeem the property by paying Ward $4,206.07. In response, Ward filed his appeal.  

On appeal, Ward argued that All South was not entitled to redeem the property pursuant to §§ 40-10-82 and 40-10-83 of the Alabama Code because All South was not in possession of the property at the time of redemption. Section 40-10-82 states, in part, “No action for the recovery of real estate sold for the payment of taxes shall lie unless the same is brought within three years form the date when the purchaser became entitled to demand a deed therefore…” In discussing § 40-10-82, the Court explained that the three year statutory period begins to run when the tax purchaser becomes entitled to a deed, not when the property is transferred to the State for failure to pay taxes.  The Court found that Ward became entitled to the deed to the property on the date that he purchased the property from the State of Alabama. However, because All South sought to redeem the property within three years of the time Ward became entitled to the deed, the Court held that the trial court did not err in allowing All South to redeem the property.