Labor Law
Jennifer Farley Smith v. Alabama Department of Labor and City of Pelham
On October 1, 2015, Smith was discharged from her job with the city after an investigation revealed that, during work hours with the city, she was using the city's computer equipment and email accounts to conduct business for her second job. Smith applied for unemployment compensation with the Alabama Department of Labor ("ADOL"). On October 30, 2015, an ADOL examiner issued a notice of determination finding that Smith's discharge from the city for the unauthorized use of company equipment constituted misconduct that disqualified her from receiving unemployment-compensation benefits for eight weeks and that warranted a reduction in the benefits she would be eligible to receive thereafter.
The parties agreed that the board of appeals received Smith's application to appeal on January 4, 2016. On January 8, 2016, the board of appeals entered a decision stating that, pursuant to § 25-4-92(c), Ala. Code 1975, because Smith had failed to file her application to appeal before the December 30, 2015, deadline, the board had "no statutory powers to affirm, modify, or set aside the decision of the [hearing officer] because it became final prior to the time your application for appeal was received."
Smith appealed the board of appeals' decision to the circuit court on January 29, 2016. On February 19, 2016, ADOL filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that her application to appeal to the board of appeals had been untimely. In response, Smith submitted an affidavit to the circuit court in which she stated that she had received the hearing officer's decision on January 2, 2016. After the hearing, the circuit court found that it did not have jurisdiction over the matter and dismissed Smith's appeal in a judgment entered on April 22, 2016. Smith then appealed to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals.
The issue addressed on appeal is whether the circuit court correctly interpreted and applied the law governing appeals from administrative decisions of ADOL to find that the board of appeals and, consequently, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to consider her appeal.
The Court of Civil Appeals stated that "the pertinent statute regarding the procedure to appeal the decision of an appeals referee to the Board is Code 1975, § 25-4-92(c).” Section 25-4-92 provides that:
- (c) The decision of an appeals tribunal shall become final 15 days after notice of such decision has been mailed, postage prepaid, to the claimant and other parties to the proceedings, at the addresses furnished, or, if none shall have been furnished, at their last known addresses, unless within that time application be made to the board of appeals for permission to appeal to the board of appeals.
The Court of Civil Appeals thus concluded that, the time in which an application to appeal a decision of the hearing officer (appeals tribunal) to the board of appeals must be within 15 days of when the notice of the hearing officer’s decision has been mailed.
Because Smith's application to the board of appeals to appeal the hearing officer's decision was untimely, the board of appeals did not have authority to consider her appeal. Consequently, the circuit court did not have authority to consider Smith's appeal of the board of appeals' decision, and it properly dismissed the appeal.
