Ex parte April Steele Benton, et al.

April Steele Benton and John Benton (“the Bentons”) and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Bibb Circuit Court to vacate its July 18, 2016, order denying their motion to transfer this action from the Bibb Circuit Court to the Shelby Circuit Court and to enter an order granting the motion. In 2014, April Benton, a resident of Bibb County, and Amir Ebrahimi, a resident of Shelby County, were involved in a two-vehicle collision in Shelby County. Following the accident, Ebrahimi was transported by Regional Paramedical Services (“RPS”) to UAB, where he received treatment for his injuries.  

Ebrahimi filed a complaint in the Bibb Circuit Court against April Benton; John Benton, the owner of the car April was driving; and State Farm, Ebrahimi’s underinsured-motorist carrier. The Bentons filed a motion to transfer the action to Shelby County based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Bentons and State Farm contended that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying their motion to transfer the underlying action from Bibb County to Shelby County under the “interest-of-justice” prong of § 6-3-21 because all the material events giving rise to Ebrahimi’s claims occurred in Shelby County and Bibb County’s only connection to the action was the fact that the Bentons resided there.  

Specifically, the Bentons argued in their motion that Shelby County had a stronger connection to the case because: (1) the accident occurred in Shelby County; (2) the Pelham Police Department, located in Shelby County, investigated the accident; (3) Ebrahimi resided in Calera, located in Shelby County; (4) the first responders, employees of RPS, were located in Shelby County; (5) Ebrahimi was treated at UAB, which was closer to Shelby County than to Bibb County; and (6) the only connection this action has with Bibb County was the fact that the Bentons resided there. The Supreme Court found that the trial court should have granted the Bentons’ motion for a change of venue, and accordingly, issued the writ of mandamus directing the trial court to transfer the action to Shelby County.

Ex parte Genesis Pittman, D.M.D., P.C.

Genesis Pittman, D.M.D., P.C. (“Pittman”), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order setting aside a prior summary judgment entered in favor of Pittman. In August 2014, Debra Blackmon filed a pro se action against Pittman claiming negligence and dental malpractice. Blackmon asserted that following a tooth extraction, Pittman prescribed a medication for Blackmon to which she had a known allergy. Specifically, Blackmon alleged that she suffered an allergic reaction necessitating emergency medical treatment as well as a related fall resulting in physical injury after treatment from Pittman.  

According to the trial court’s order, Blackmon failed to timely disclose the identity of an expert witness she had retained. After the expiration of the disclosure deadline, Pittman filed a motion requesting a summary judgment in its favor on the primary ground that, based on Blackmon’s failure to identify an expert, Blackmon could not prove her case. Blackmon filed a response in opposition that included her own affidavit testimony and medical records. After a hearing, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Pittman as to all counts. Blackmon filed a postjudgment motion to alter, amend, or vacate the summary judgment. The trial court ultimately conducted a hearing on Blackmon’s postjudgment motion in May of 2016. On May 6, 2016, 110 days after the filing of Blackmon’s postjudgment motion, the trial court entered an order purporting to grant Blackmon’s postjudgment motion. In response, Pittman applied for mandamus relief and contended that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant Blackmon’s motion.  

Specifically, Pittman argued because Blackmon’s postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law in April of 2016, before the trial court’s entry of an order purporting to dispose of that motion, the trial court lost jurisdiction to rule. Blackmon contended that, by not raising the denial-by-operation-of-law issue in response to the trial court’s order setting a hearing on Blackmon’s postjudgment motion and in ultimately allowing, without objection, the motion to be heard as scheduled, Pittman impliedly consented to an extension of the 90-day period provided for in Rule 59.1 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure.  

Blackmon noted that her postjudgment motion was, allegedly through no fault attributable to her, set for hearing after the expiration of the 90-day period contemplated by Rule 59.1. The Court explained: “Despite the unfortunate result, this Court has explained that, ‘[m]ost importantly, the operation of Rule 59.1 makes no distinction based upon whether the failure to rule appears to be inadvertent [or] deliberate ... [or] any other type of failure.’”(quoting Howard v. McMillian, 480 So. 2d 1251, 1252 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985)). Further, the Court reasoned: “it is undisputed that the trial court failed to rule on Blackmon’s motion within 90 days of the date on which the motion was filed. Under Rule 59.1, that motion was, therefore, denied by operation of law on April 15, 2016, at the expiration of that 90-day period. Thus, the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter any further order after April 15, and the trial court’s order purporting to set aside the summary judgment in favor of Pittman, P.C., was a nullity.” Accordingly, the Alabama Supreme Court granted Pittman’s petition and issued the writ directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order overturning its summary judgment order in favor of Pittman.