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If Buybacks Boost CEO Pay Unfairly, Change CEO Pay

Everyone goes after share repurchases lately, as depriving companies and even the US economy of needed investment funds. We investors know better.

 

The latest in the long series of criticisms, in Bloomberg Business this week, asserts that buybacks serve mostly to increase CEO pay unfairly. At several big companies (IBM, Cisco) they reviewed, exec comp depends in large part on EPS or share prices. So, share repurchases increase EPS or share prices by removing shares from the float.

 

This thinking leads corporate defenders, big conservative institutional investors, and even some pension funds that typically advocate for corp gov reforms to urge companies to curtail repurchases. Alas, this thinking responds to the wrong problem.

 

Instead, structure CEO pay properly. Why link it to EPS, which companies can influence through creative accounting, or to share price, which varies with factors far beyond the control of executives?

 

Pay executives based on the value they create relative to the capital needed to create it. Let's use return on investment, return on equity, economic value added, or other similar measures, ok?

 

MRL

Recent TAI blog posts

 

Current Academic Research on Activist Investing (7/7/15)

The New York Times Thinks Markets Can Drive ESG (7/2/15 email) 

Long-Term Just Means Entrenched (6/30/15) 

The Singing Activist Investor (yes, really) (6/25/15) 

How Use of Share Buyback Proceeds Refutes Short-Termism Claims (6/23/15)

"Valuing the Vote" - A Pension Fund Analyzes the Impact of Proxy Voting (6/16/15)

You can find other useful resources at the  TAI website , including our research on  "Effective Activism" , our new resource guides on attorneys for activist investors and on activist investing data sourcesour  white paper  with the basics on activist investing, and our new guides on  exempt solicitation consent solicitation , and  special shareholder meetings . 
For further information, please contact:
 
Michael R. Levin
[email protected]
847.830.1479